Emanation, Intellection, and Virtues: Al-Fārābī’s Conception of the Soul (al-Nafs)

Abstract

What do we really mean by “soul”? Which of its concepts are we invoking in the teaching and learning of psychology - the soul as a psychological construct of the West or as the spiritual essence grounded in the Islamic intellectual tradition? To truly obtain a comprehensive view of the soul, this paper argues that we must turn to the work of classical Muslim scholars. As such, we approached the above questions from al-Fārābī’s thoughts by first considering his life, major works, and contributions. Second, we focus on his ontological, epistemological, and axiological stances, which are central because the way he perceives reality, knowledge, and values informs his view of the soul. We then discuss al-Fārābī’s conception of the soul in terms of its nature, structure, and development. For him, the soul is seen as an immaterial substance that emanates from the First Cause, which is then elevated by intellection, composed of body, soul, and spirit, and perfected through the pursuit of virtue. His classification of five types of soul and their developmental trajectory is also discussed. Rather than retrofitting the works and thoughts of Muslim scholars into contemporary psychology, we argue for a framework grounded in the Islamic teachings, tradition, and history. To understand this premise better, we end with a discussion of the parallel between al-Fārābī’s views on the soul and those of recent efforts in Islamic psychology.