Epistemological Implication of al-Ghazzālī’s Account of Causality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31436/id.v26i1.1131Abstract
The problem that will be dealt with in this paper is al-Ghazālī’s
account of causality in the observed phenomenal world where he denies the
necessity of that causation. This denial brought about Ibn Rushd’s accusation
on the denial of knowledge, arguing that knowledge is based on causality
in the phenomenal words. However, detailed perusal of al-Ghazālī’s works
suggests that Ibn Rushd’s accusation is not the case. al-Ghazālī differentiates
between knowledge of the fact and knowledge of reasoned fact, or in other
words he distinguished ontological causality from logical causality. In
addition, al-Ghazālī’s denial of causal necessity is supported by his own
logic, where the knowledge attainment becomes possible when it is examined
from demonstrative sciences, especially from empirically tested premises (almujarrabāt).