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SUNAN KUDUS' STRATEGIC APPROACH TO CULTURAL ADAPTATION IN THE SELF-OTHER PERSPECTIVE

Adita Nurdia Damayanti¹ and Sartini²

Abstract

Sunan Kudus is one of the Walisongo (the nine revered saints of Islam in Indonesia) figures with a particular way of delivering his teachings. To adapt to the community when conveying the teachings of Islam, he employed art and culture as a medium, established architectural foundations, and established social harmony, so much so that the people of Kudus became relatively untouched by horizontal conflicts. This article aims to explore the cultural adaptation models carried out by Sunan Kudus, find the underlying life principles he utilized, and analyze the thoughts and value principles he maintained within the conceptual framework of self-relationship and self-other relationship. The current research is a field study supported by literary data. The research results of this study indicate that he carried out approaches to the community by emphasizing attitudes of mutual respect, humility, and capacity to benefit the surrounding environment. He demonstrated ways of gaining public sympathy through caution and gradual progress. He entered the community's life, approached the community members, and understood the things they needed. He applied a cultural approach and technology to help the community fulfil its needs. Prioritizing fostering tolerance among them, he highly encouraged the promotion of community approach that avoided the use of violent means. This study complements the literature on Sunan Kudus about the concept of self-other. This is a new finding concerning the life

¹ Postgraduate researcher at Faculty of Philosophy, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. She, as the first author wishes to acknowledge that this publication is part of her "Program Recognisi Tugas Akhir" required by Universitas Gadjah Mada supervised by Dr Sartini, the co-author. Email: aditanurdia@mail.ugm.ac.id

² A PhD in Philosophy and Lecturer at Faculty of Philosophy, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Email: tini-sartini@ugm.ac.id

concepts of Sunan Kudus in his relationship with others, with these concepts functioning as a means for him to win the hearts and minds of the people of Kudus to follow the teachings of Islam and to consider him as a role model. The study results have yet to reveal the concept of self-other in terms of the relationship between human beings (Sunan Kudus) and other creatures.

Keywords: adaptation, culture, self-other, Sunan, Kudus, Java.

Introduction

Indonesia as one of the largest multicultural countries in the world can be observed from the viewpoint of its complex sociocultural aspects and extensive geographical conditions. The Southeast Asian country consists of several ethnic groups, cultures, and religions that are pluralistic and heterogenic.³ Based on 2010 Indonesian Statistics (*Badan Pusat Statistik*) data, there are 1,331 ethnic groups in Indonesia with a myriad of religions and cultures.⁴ The nation has six officially recognized religions (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Catholicism, and Confucianism), and 187 faith/belief-based organizations, including Islam Wetu Telu, Sunda Wiwitan, and Islam Kejawen.⁵ The plurality and heterogeneity of Indonesians are bounded in the principle of national unity and oneness expressed in the adage “*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*” (unity in diversity). This implies that the Indonesian nation is united within a single force and harmony of religion, nation, and state that must be knowingly recognized.⁶ In addition, Indonesia maintains as its

³ Budiono Kusumohamidjojo, *Kebhinnekaan Masyarakat di Indonesia: Suatu Problematik Filsafat Kebudayaan* (Jakarta: Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia, 2000), 45, <https://www.amazon.com/Kebhinnekaan-masyarakat-Indonesia-problematik-kebudayaan/dp/9796698986>.

⁴ “Mengulik data suku di Indonesia,” *Mengulik Data Suku di Indonesia*, accessed June 6, 2020, <https://www.bps.go.id/news/2015/11/18/127/mengulik-data-suku-di-indonesia.html>.

⁵ Muhammad Harfin Zuhdi, “Slam Wetu Telu di Bayan Lombok,” *Akademika : Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 17, no. 2 (October 2012), 163.

⁶ Gina Lestari, “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika: Khasanah multikultural Indonesia di tengah kehidupan sara,” *Jurnal Ilmiah Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan*

national ideology and basis the *Pancasila* (the five philosophy of state), which is a set of values functioning as a way of life. Pancasila is the unifying concept stipulating that citizens of differing backgrounds live together in harmony and mutual aid without disregarding their ethnic, traditional, racial, or religious identities.⁷ Although with Pancasila, a common principle for living in Indonesia has already been established, the substantial force of diversity can still lead to potential conflicts. Ideological challenges relating to religious pluralism and multiculturalism include the emergence of terrorist acts and local social conflicts that have been conducted in the name of religion.

One terrorist act executed in the name of religion in Indonesia was the 2002 Bali Bombing, resulting in the death of several Muslims. The terrorists were seeking revenge for the events in Poso and Ambon and were also trying to defend the Afghans against the war perpetuated by the United States. The terrorists considered the war in Afghanistan highly oppressive to the people. Another reason is that they consider Bali as a centre of immorality and not in line with the teachings of Islam.⁸ Another terrorist act was the bombing of the three churches (Santa Maria Tak Bercela church, GKI Diponegoro, and Surabaya Pentecostal Center (GPPS) Sawahan Congregation church) in Surabaya in 2018.⁹ A terrorism observer from Universitas Indonesia, Stanislaus Riyanta believed that there is a strong indication that the actors behind the bombings were members of a militant group calling themselves the Islamic State, or ISIS. Such a conclusion can be drawn from the pattern and characteristics of the attacks carried out on those three churches.¹⁰

28, no. 1 (June 27, 2016), 31, <https://doi.org/10.17977/jppkn.v28i1.5437>.

⁷ Mardiyanto, "Pancasila dan tantangan milenial," *detikNews*, June 1, 2019, <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-4573104/pancasila-dan-tantangan-milenial>.

⁸ Devita Retno, "5 latar belakang peristiwa bom Bali tahun 2002," *Sejarah Lengkap*, January 29, 2019, <https://sejarahlengkap.com/indonesia/latar-belakang-peristiwa-bom-bali>.

⁹ Sandy Pramuji, "3 lokasi ledakan di Surabaya, 9 tewas dan 40 terluka," *Beritatagar.Id*, May 2018, <https://beritatagar.id/artikel/berita/3-bom-meledak-di-surabaya-9-tewas-dan-40-terluka>.

¹⁰ Juni Kriswanto and Ronny Fauzan, "Serangan bom di tiga gereja Surabaya: Pelaku bom bunuh diri 'perempuan yang membawa dua anak,'" *BBC News*

Aside from terrorism, issues involving religious diversity also marred the peace in Indonesia within a narrower social scope, of which among them was the inter-religious conflict in West Java. Exchange of aggressions took place between ordinary folks and the Jamaah Ahmadiyah group members, a result of the majority of denizens being opposed to the Ahmadiyah sect.¹¹ A conflict in Bantul, Yogyakarta also occurred after the majority of Muslim residents forged an agreement to reject non-Muslims living in the area.¹²

Problems emerge when members of a group or community adopt an exclusive mindset, which refers to the sense that they and their group are the most genuine and righteous entity. Driven by this mindset, they subsequently set themselves apart as an exclusive group without intending to mingle with other groups. Religious exclusivism is the doctrine or belief that only one particular religion or belief system is valid.¹³ The group's exclusive mindset is hence interpreted unrestrictedly into actions and deeds, which eventually leads to clashes with other groups and potentially harming social rights and responsibility.¹⁴ Observations of the aforementioned several violent incidents involving intolerance lead one to question where the root of cultural conflict involving Muslims in Indonesia come from religious figures that have actually been teaching us to live in peaceful co-existence.

There are numerous examples of harmonious relations between Muslim adherents and followers of different religions. This may be attributable to how the Islam that arrived in the archipelago combines two differing values. Throughout the process, Muslim figures put

Indonesia, May 13, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-44097913>.

¹¹ Suarni Saputri, "Contoh kasus antar budaya," *Kompasiana.Com*, accessed June 6, 2020, <https://www.kompasiana.com/putriunifa/57124d62d77a610b09ea4dad/contoh-kasus-antar-budaya>.

¹² Irwan Syambudi, "Warga pedukuhan Karet Bantul DIY tolak pendatang beragama Kristen," *Tirto.Id*, April 2, 2019, <https://tirto.id/warga-pedukuhan-karet-bantul-diy-tolak-pendatang-beragama-kristen-dkUb>.

¹³ William Wainwright, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion* (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2005), 345.

¹⁴ Calvin Layuk Allo, "Eksklusifitas sebagai penyebab radikalisme," *Kompasiana.com*, June 5, 2018, <https://www.kompasiana.com/calvinallolayuk/5b162310caf7db4aa2081ed3/eksklusifitas-sebagai-penyebab-radikalisme>.

much effort into carefully orienting how they deliver Islamic teachings to ensure respect for the religious and cultural backgrounds of the communities they visit. These Muslim figures, commonly known as Walisongo (the nine revered saints of Islam in Indonesia), had devised a systematic and long-term dawah strategy, particularly in facing the archipelagic and Javanese cultures.¹⁵ The most fascinating figure among the nine was Sunan Kudus, a Muslim who wanted to spread the word of Islam amidst the Hindu and Buddhist population majority. He had used methods unlike the ones employed by the other *wali* (saints). His strategies were more practical and right on target, leading the community to accept and consider him as a public role model. This Muslim figure did not use violence in facing communities that he regarded as objects for his *da'wah* even though he was the military leader of Demak Kingdom who was not lacking in power, intelligence, and wealth. At the time, there was no state ideology like Pancasila to address the existing differences, yet the people could live in harmony amid cultural and religious diversities. Given this important accomplishment of Sunan Kudus, his life principles and mindset need to be revealed and explained to the public to provide a reflection for resolving conflicts brought about by religious pluralism and multiculturalism in Indonesia.

The present study shall present the life principles and mindset Sunan Kudus used in adapting to a pluralistic society as an implementation of the concept of self-relations between the revered saint and others. It is in this very aspect that the analysis of cultural actions and minimizing of conflicts in social life can be correlated to one another.

Literature Review

Several studies investigate Kauman Village, Kudus Tower, and *da'wah* of Sunan Kudus. One study about Kauman Village elaborated how the Kudus Tower Kauman area contains the history of the Kudus Tower and its founder, namely Sunan Kudus. Kauman

¹⁵ Mashlihatuz Zuhroh, *Masjid Menara Kudus: Ekspresi Multikulturalisme Sunan Kudus: Studi Kasus Kehidupan Toleransi Masyarakat Kudus*, Thesis, Jakarta, UIN Syaraif Hidayatullah, (2018), 73, <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/41756>.

in history is commonly associated with the educated middle-upper class who made their living through trade and were accordingly positioned at the top social stratum. Kudus' trade network had reached as far as China and Vietnam.¹⁶

Another study on the Kudus Tower discusses its significance as a symbol of tolerance between Islam and Hinduism. The Kudus Tower can be described as a temple structure left from the Age of Hinduism.¹⁷ Additionally, another study discusses the unique ornaments of Kudus Tower and explains that the ornamental presence in the Kudus Tower Mosque compound is not as dominant when compared to that of other mosques of the same period, such as the Mantingan-Jepara mosque or the Sendhang Dhuwur-Paciran, Lamongan mosque.¹⁸ Another research focuses on the design and shape of the Kudus Tower, which is considered as resembling the form of temples that have an East Javanese design, such as those found in its *regol* (gate), front yard *gapura* (entrance), foyer, and the interior of Kudus Mosque. Such temples all recall classical art designs in East Java to mind.¹⁹ While some of the aforementioned studies explored the ornaments, structure, area, and shape of Kudus Tower, another study looked into its tradition, focusing on the perceptions of the people of Kudus toward a tradition called Buka Luwur Sunan Kudus, which is a traditional activity routinely held by the Sunan Kudus Cemetery, Tower, and Mosque Foundation to commemorate the death of the saint. A series of events filled with prayer activities and concluded by distributing religious meals, a rice dish called *nasi jangkrik* (lit. cricket rice), is observed during the

¹⁶ Moh Rosyid, "Kawasan kauman Menara Kudus sebagai cagar budaya Islam: Catatan terhadap kebijakan pemerintah Kabupaten Kudus," *PURBAWIDYA: Jurnal Penelitian dan Pengembangan Arkeologi* 7, no. 1 (August 1, 2018), 91, <https://doi.org/10.24164/pw.v7i1.253>.

¹⁷ Parwito, "Masjid Menara Kudus simbol toleransi Islam & Hindu," *Merdeka.Com*, September 8, 2017, <https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/masjid-menara-kudus-simbol-toleransi-islam-amp-hindu.html>.

¹⁸ Supatmo Supatmo, "Keunikan ornamen bermotif figuratif pada Kompleks Bangunan Masjid Menara Kudus," *Imajinasi: Jurnal Seni* 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 63–80, <https://doi.org/10.15294/imajinasi.v7i1.8887>.

¹⁹ Totok Roesmanto, "Rupa bentuk Menara Masjid Kudus, Bali Kulkul dan Candi," *Jurnal Arsitektur Universitas Bandar Lampung* 4, no. 1 (December 2013), 28–35.

commemoration that symbolizes social prosperity. Because the public consider all things associated with him as having the power to bestow blessings upon them, they hustle and jostle to get a piece of it.²⁰ Another study describes the meaning and value inherent within the Buka Luwur Sunan Kudus event, stating that it contains a high level of educational values and noble understandings, namely sense of mutual tolerance, sense of mutual help and respect, practicing and becoming accustomed to giving alms, constantly bringing oneself closer to God, and ability to develop noble characters and restrain oneself from conducting negative deeds while reminding others to conduct proper worship as a provision for life after death.²¹

Another research discusses the concept of multiculturalism that Sunan Kudus followed in spreading Islam in the city of Kudus, and how a life of tolerance among the people of Kudus can be maintained until today. He is a focal point in the superbly tolerant life found in the city of Kudus.²²

Various studies on Sunan Kudus have, thus far, been related to elaborations on the methods he used to spread the word of Islam, as well as discussions on the Kudus Tower and its distinctive architecture, which displays a mixture of Islamic and Hinduism ornaments. To the best of this author's knowledge, no research has yet explored the basic thinking and concepts developed by Sunan Kudus in achieving conditions of tolerance and adaptations. The concept of self-other relations is utilized to shed light on the context.

Method

This is a field research supported by literature review utilizing a factual historical model in exploring the figure²³ of Sunan Kudus.

²⁰ Masita Argarini, *Persepsi Masyarakat Kudus Terhadap Simbol Visual pada Tradisi Buka Luwur Sunan Kudus*, Thesis, Surakarta, Universitas Sebelas Maret, 2015.

²¹ Erik Aditia Ismaya, Irfai Fathurohman, and Deka Setiawan, "Makna dan nilai buka Luwur Sunan Kudus (Sumbangan pemikiran mewujudkan visi Kampus Kebudayaan)," *KREDO: Jurnal Ilmiah Bahasa dan Sastra* 1, no. 1 (November 27, 2017), 44–57, <https://doi.org/10.24176/kredo.v1i1.1752>.

²² Zuhroh, *Masjid Menara Kudus*.

²³ Anton Bakker and Achmad Charis Zubair, *Metodologi Penelitian Filsafat* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2014), 61, <https://opac.perpusnas.go.id/DetailOpac.aspx?id>

Field data were gathered by conducting observations, which were subsequently followed by in-depth interviews with relevant informants, namely the caretaker of Kudus Tower, community figures, religious leaders, and elders representing the community. The results of the interviews and literary data were then collected and presented in accordance with the purpose of study. Analyses were carried out by interpreting data found in cultural adaptation evidences based on the understanding of the concept of adaptation and then reflecting on the life of the people. Thoughts on his cultural adaptation were analysed in aspects that relate to historical environs, influences sustained, and in his life journey.²⁴ The concept of self-other was used to analyse the behaviours shown by Sunan Kudus in adapting to communities that had dissimilar religious and cultural backgrounds in the bid to identify a synthesis in the form of concepts he upheld in engaging with the community, which ultimately led to the subduing of the people of Kudus.

Definition of Worldview

Worldview is a key and defining aspect in a community. The term refers to a set of beliefs regarding fundamental aspects of reality that establish the foundations and influences concerning the forms of perception, thought, knowledge, and action.²⁵ The development of worldview is gradual in the mind of an individual, starting with the accumulation of concepts and mental attitudes that one develops throughout his or her life, which are ultimately shaped into a mental framework or worldview. Epistemologically speaking, the thinking process is similar to seeking and acquiring knowledge, which is the accumulation of a priori and a posteriori knowledge. The process can be explained as follows: the knowledge that an individual acquires surely consists of various concepts in the form of ideas, beliefs, aspirations, and other elements that in their entirety form a total

=271944.

²⁴ Bakker and Zubair, 64.

²⁵ Sartini Sartini and Heddy Shri Ahimsa-Putra, "Preliminary study on worldviews," *Jurnal Humaniora* 29, no. 3 (October 2017), 265, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jh.v29i3.29690>.

concept that is interrelated and organized within a single network.²⁶

The concept of worldview refers to Kearney's opinions, among others, about time, space, self-other, causality, and classification.²⁷ Cultural adaptation is inseparable from the worldview that a community holds, particularly in the relationship of self-other. This is because it is associated with the concept of the self and the others—which is not only limited to be between human beings but may extend to matters that are supranatural in nature and even to the values and culture that a community upholds—that will accordingly influence the adaptation process that an individual undergoes, and whether said individual is accepted in the community or otherwise.²⁸

Concept of Self-Other

The discussion on the concept of self-other begins with the understanding of the relationship between culture and human philosophy. This is because humans are the only creature that possesses a conceptual understanding of the self. Such understanding of the self is alive and nurtured within a culture. Human being as a concrete "I," must be understood in its relationship to "others," in terms of socializing, adapting, and creating culture. Humans possess self-awareness with others as well as the infrahuman.²⁹ Human being's awareness of the self demands an "other." An understanding of the self's role and position is reliant on its relationship with "others." The self and others maintain a reciprocal relationship, with each giving the other meaning, value, and existence. The self and others exist and are united within a complex form of culture, wherein culture is considered as a socializing forum that has its origin in human beings.³⁰ Humans can only define themselves in terms of their relationship with others. Individuals can only be recognized

²⁶ Alparslan Acikgence, "The framework for a history of Islamic Philosophy," *Al-Shajarah: Journal of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC)*, vol. 1, no. 1 & 2 (1996), 6.

²⁷ Sartini and Ahimsa-Putra, "Preliminary study on worldviews," 272.

²⁸ Acikgence, "The framework for a history of Islamic philosophy."

²⁹ Anton Bakker, *Antropologi Metafisik* (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2006), 12–13, https://books.google.com/books/about/Antropologi_Metafisik.html?id=O6quKCJsHLMC.

³⁰ Bakker, 43–50.

based on their relationships and interactions with others, be it in terms of their relationship in an organization, community, or society. Individuals are an essential factor in the social structure.³¹ The self, ethically, has a responsibility to others.³² This correlates with the understanding of the concept of the self, which is an image that a person has of his/herself, which is shaped by the experiences acquired from the interactions conducted in the surrounding environment.³³ The concept of the self is not a congenital thing but is developed based on numerous experiences. Fellow human beings play a substantial role in the life of every individual.³⁴ The self is incapable of identifying and explaining itself if others were, synchronously, omitted from participating in his/her life. The more the self gains a deeper appreciation of all its development as a personal self, then the more connected it will feel toward others.³⁵ The reciprocal relationship between the self and others creates the expectation that one individual's action shall be rewarded accordingly by the action of other individuals.³⁶

In addition to human life being influenced by the existence of other fellow human beings, it is actually influenced by nonhuman others as well. The construction of human life is very much influenced by the self's belief in God as a significant life-controlling force and by awareness of nonhuman beings that exist in this world,

³¹ R. S. Perinbanayagam, "The significance of others in the thought of Alfred Schutz, G. H. Mead and C. H. Cooley," *The Sociological Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (1975), 501–3.

³² Richard Kearney, *Poetics of Imagining: Modern and Post-Modern (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy)* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), <https://www.amazon.com/Poetics-Imagining-Post-modern-Perspectives-Continental/dp/0823218716>.

³³ Hendriati Agustian, *Psikologi Perkembangan: Pendekatan Ekologi Kaitannya Dengan Konsep Diri Dan Penyesuaian Diri Pada Remaja* (Bandung: Refika Aditama, 2006), 138, http://library.fip.uny.ac.id/opac/index.php?p=show_detail&id=2715.

³⁴ Piet Leenhouders and K. J. Veeger, *Manusia Dalam Lingkungannya: Refleksi Filsafat Tentang Manusia* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1988), 191, <https://onsearch.id/Record/IOS2847.INLIS00000000043600>.

³⁵ Leenhouders and Veeger, *Manusia Dalam Lingkungannya*, 194.

³⁶ E. G. Turner, *Athenian Books in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C* (London: Published for the College by H.K. Lewis, 1952).

albeit in different dimensions.

Humans did not come into this world on its own, for there exists a Creator. As beings created by God, humans are mandated to serve God. Human awareness as an individual being and a social being is not to disregard its existence as God's creation. The responsibilities that humans have to their own self, family, community, and country are a part of their servitude and devotion to God. Human activities conducted as individual and social beings are representations of one's self-awareness concerning human accountability to God. Accordingly, humans should conduct themselves well and adopt good deeds and virtues while avoiding unfavourable behaviour. Humans have the power of reasoning and life perspectives. Nonetheless, human beings are cognizant that they are frail creatures with complex lives, and such awareness of their weakness has driven them to seek external power, both physical and nonphysical. This has, in turn, fuelled their belief in God. For humans, God is a constant and eternal need, with worship being the manifestation of human love toward God. Worshiping God is the true core, value, and definition of life. Worship, aside from an expression of love, is also a manifestation of the human fear of God's authority. Consequently, humans worship God as a means of extinguishing fear and anxieties.³⁷

Followers of *Kejawen* (Javanese traditional belief) usually mention God with the term *Gusti Allah*, two words combining the Javanese word *gusti* and the Islamic vocabulary Allah. The word *gusti* in ancient Javanese dictionary is defined as master or the authority and a special group in the royal palace (*keraton*) community.³⁸ *Kejawen* believes in the existence of a life origin—where one came from and where one shall go after his or her life, or what is known with the term *sangkan paraning dumadi*. Followers of *Kejawen* often utilize their surrounding life phenomena

³⁷ Sujarwa, *Ilmu Sosial & Budaya Dasar: Manusia Dan Fenomena Sosial Budaya* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2010), 101–57, https://books.google.co.id/books/about/Ilmu_sosial_budaya_dasar.html?id=TKtXnwEACAAJ&redir_esc=y.

³⁸ P. J. Zoetmulder and S. O. Robson, *Kamus Jawa Kuno Indonesia (Ancient Javanese-Indonesian Dictionary)* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1995), <https://opac.perpusnas.go.id/DetailOpac.aspx?id=355705>.

to express their belief in God, such as naming God with the term *Pangeran*. The word *Pangeran*, which is usually used to address the son of a king or royalties, is also used to address God. The use of the phrase *Pangeran* to address God is found in the *Kitab Primbon* (ancient manuscript) Atassadhur Adammakna, which states “*Ing sabener-benere manungsa iku kanyatahaning Pangeran, lan Pangeran iku mung sawiji*” (in essence, human beings are the actual form of God, and there is only one God). Aside from the use of *Pangeran*, there are also several pre-Islam period terminologies used to address God, including *Sang Hyang*, which means God the Almighty (*Sang Hyang Wenang*), God the provider of knowledge (*Sang Hyang Guru*), God the All Gentle (*Sang Hyang Suksma*), God the Ruler of the Universe (*Hyang Jagad Wasesa*).³⁹ The terminologies used to mention and address God are a form of concept that humans maintain concerning God. For human beings, God has an exceedingly strong relationship to humans and He rules the universe.

The relationship between the self and the “unseen” can be drawn from one single basis, namely a component of the religious system. There we can find emotions of religiosity, which lead human beings to become religious and believe in religious ceremonial systems and their purposes (supernatural power), religious ceremonial systems and their purpose of human relationship with God (supernatural power), and form or be part of religious social groups that adhere to a religious system. The special elements found within the frame of the religious system are occultism and the religious system. Emotions of religiosity drive human beings to engage in religious acts. Emotions of religiosity cause an object, action, or idea to retain a sacred value and are subsequently considered as sacred. Even profane objects, actions, or ideas, when confronted by humans seized by emotions of religiosity consequently become considered as sacred.⁴⁰

³⁹ Siti Woerjan Soemadiyah Noeradyo, *Kitab Primbon Lukmanakim Adammakna: Sambetanipun Betaliemur* (Yogyakarta: Soemodidjojo Mahadewa, 1979), 14, <https://www.amazon.com/Kitab-primbon-Lukmanakim-adammakna-Sambetanipun/dp/B0000D7IY2>.

⁴⁰ Sujarwa, *Ilmu Sosial & Budaya Dasar: Manusia Dan Fenomena Sosial Budaya*,

Profile of Sunan Kudus

Sunan Kudus or Ja'far Shodiq was a figure who held a vital role in the development of Islam in the city of what is now Kudus.⁴¹ He was the son of Sunan Ngudung or Raden Utsman Haji and Nyai Anom Manyuran binti Nyi Gede/Ageng Maloka (the daughter of Sunan Ampel and Nyi Ageng Manila). During the reign of Raden Prawata in Demak Sultanate, he was appointed as the military commander to Adipati Jipang, also known as Arya Penangsang. He was a student of Sunan Kalijaga.⁴² The title of Sunan originated from the word *susuhunan* or *sinuhun* which means someone who is revered. For some time, the title of Sunan was also complemented with the word Kanjeng. These revered individuals or Sunan maintained their role as mentor/educator and held positions as advisor to the king or elder of the Sultanate. He was one of the nine ulama who were pioneers and champions of Islamic development in the Island of Java. These nine ulama are popularly known as Walisongo⁴³

Walisongo resided along the north coast of Java, particularly in some regions throughout East Java (Surabaya, Gresik, Lamongan), Central Java (Demak and Kudus), and West Java (Cirebon), from early 15th century until the middle of the 16th century. Walisongo were intellectual reformers who introduced various forms of new civilizations in the field of health, cultivation, trade, culture, art, society, and governance.⁴⁴ They established mosques as a place of worship and a place to teach religion. They taught religion at the mosque's foyer, which had been made into the oldest educational institution in Java, it having a more democratic nature. During the initial development of Islam, the teaching method conducted by Walisongo was called *gurukula*, wherein a teacher conveyed his teachings to a group of students sitting before him. The knowledge

106–9.

⁴¹ Solichin Salam, *Ja'far Shadiq, Sunan Kudus* (Kudus: Menara Kudus, 1986), 12.

⁴² Rosyid, "Kawasan kauman Menara Kudus sebagai cagar budaya."

⁴³ Badri Yatim, *Sejarah Peradaban Islam* (Jakarta: Rajagrafindo Persada, 1996), 170, <https://opac.perpusnas.go.id/DetailOpac.aspx?id=1137665>.

⁴⁴ Abdul Ghoffir Muhaimin, *Islam Dalam Bingkai Budaya Lokal: Potret Dari Cirebon* (Jakarta: PT Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), 8–11, <https://www.amazon.com/Islam-dalam-bingkai-budaya-lokal/dp/9796261030>.

taught this way covered principles of faith in Islam, principles of worship, martial arts, concept of invulnerability, and self-defense.⁴⁵

The Sunans were masters of various skills and knowledge. Sunan Kudus, known as *waliul ilmi*, mastered various fields of knowledge such as the science of *tawhid* (systematic theology), *hadith*, *usul al-fiqh*, exegesis, literature, classical logic (*manṭiq*), and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence). He can be likened to today's professor having numerous students throughout various regions.⁴⁶ He was a prolific writer who authored several philosophical and religious writings and created Javanese songs in the form of Gending Maskumambang and Mijil.⁴⁷ He is known as a strict ulama in terms of Islamic jurisprudence or *fiqh*. This was evident in his attitude in upholding Shariah laws and his firm actions and thoughts in addressing religious deviations. It had been told that he held a significant role in the Kingdom of Demak's court of law.⁴⁸ He was a courageous figure as demonstrated by his involvement in the expedition to East Java and the battle against Kebo Kenanga who revolted against the Kingdom of Demak. His actions were done for the sake of protecting Islam's purity.⁴⁹ He is also known as a successful trader, and his skills in trading were picked up by the people of Kudus. The term used to describe his entrepreneurial spirit is *gusjigang*. Sources do not specify the type of commodity or commodities Sunan Kudus traded in but there is a possibility that he sold fabrics.⁵⁰

The entrepreneurial spirit of Sunan Kudus was used as one of the means for spreading Islam (*da'wah*) amidst the fact that during at

⁴⁵ M. B. Rahimsyah, *Legenda Dan Sejarah Lengkap Walisongo* (Surabaya: Amanah, 2000), 5, https://books.google.co.id/books/about/Legenda_dan_sejarah_lengkap_Wali_Songo.html?id=8m5YHAAACAAJ&redir_esc=y.

⁴⁶ Salam, *Ja'far Shadiq, Sunan Kudus*, 14.

⁴⁷ Salam, 14.

⁴⁸ Widji Saksono, *Mengislamkan Tanah Jawa: Telaah Atas Metode Dakwah Walisongo* (Mizan, 1995), 44–45, https://books.google.co.id/books/about/Mengislamkan_tanah_Jawa.html?id=F8jXAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y.

⁴⁹ Saksono, *Mengislamkan Tanah Jawa*, 46.

⁵⁰ Nur Said, "Gusjigang dan kesinambungan budaya Sunan Kudus (Relevansinya bagi pendidikan Islam berbasis local genius)," *Jurnal Penelitian ISLAM EMPIRIK* 6, no. 2 (2013), 117.

that time, the people relied only on agriculture and fisheries for their source of income. Hence, his entrepreneurial spirit became a smart choice in winning the hearts of, and gaining sympathy from, the people of Kudus. Additionally, as a way of further adapting to the community, he constructed a tower with an architectural design based on the Hindu culture and complemented by Islamic culture. Some literary sources even state that the structure is a product of the acculturation between Hinduism and Islam. The Kudus Tower is, however, not a result of acculturation because it simply followed the structural design and style of that period. This can be explained by his origin from the Kingdom of Demak. As the military commander of Demak Kingdom, he surely had sufficient knowledge about the style and structure of royal buildings/residences of that time.⁵¹ Although it has not been shown that he was an expert in the field of construction, he is nonetheless well known as a gifted individual in various fields, including in creating appropriate technology for the people of Kudus.

Ultimately, it can be stated that Sunan Kudus and the other saints utilized their religious and technical abilities such as trading and creating technological tools as means to penetrate and adapt to the local culture. The historical legacy left by Sunan Kudus indicates such patterns of adaptation.

Forms of Cultural Adaptation

The people of Kudus had initially followed Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. In the Kudus Tower compound, we can find the Hok Ling Bio Temple that was built in the 15th century, which was prior to the construction of Kudus Tower. Most of the people living in Kudus at time were of Chinese ethnic background. Aside from the Chinese temple, there also stands Langgar Bubar, currently functioning as one of the places of worship for the people of Kudus, which construction dates back before the arrival of Sunan Kudus. Stone carvings of deities can be found at Langgar Bubar. Stone carvings of deities can also be found not far from that location, specifically in the Bacin region. The people of Kudus believe that

⁵¹ Dhani (Yayasan Menara Kudus), December 2019.

these sites are places of worship that have been around before the advent of Islam, which was introduced by Sunan Kudus. The people believe the story written in *Babad Tanah Jawi* (History of Java) that tells of how he migrated to the Muria islands and brought along his students that included Arya Penangsang the Duke of Jipang, Sunan Prawoto the Demak King after Trenggono, and Queen Kalinyamat.⁵²

Although the arrival of Sunan Kudus and his teachings to embrace Islam was carried out in a peaceful manner, it still resulted in various dissenting opinions. Some people became followers of Islam and remained in Kudus, specifically the area that is known today as Kauman. Those who firmly rejected him and Islam fled to the Rahtawu area, which is a highland region of Kudus. There, they developed residential areas and built places of worship according to their belief. This is evidenced by the stone carving of deities found in the area that still remain as a cultural heritage to this day.⁵³

The arrival of Sunan Kudus altered several aspects of life of the people of Kudus, but it did not involve any element of force or coercion. Various beliefs continue to exist in Kudus. Followers of Hinduism, Buddhism still adhere to their respective religions while the Chinese community remains in the Kauman area. The Chinese Buddhists still perform their worshipping rituals at the Hok Ling Bio Temple and reside across the Kudus Tower. In addition, a testament to his success in adapting to the local community is the fact that non-Muslim traditions and structures remain, such as how Langgar Bubar remains standing, the Dhandhangan tradition is still observed, and the tradition of not slaughtering cows persists until today.

Langgar Bubar, which was initially named *Bancikan*, is a place of worship for followers of Hinduism. *Bancikan* was established by Pangeran Pontjowati, who was an envoy from Majapahit and given authority over land in the Kudus area. At the time of Pangeran Pontjowati's arrival, Hinduism was at its peak in Kudus (as indicated by a large part of the community adhering to Hinduism). This is one of the reasons why Pangeran Pontjowati built *Bancikan*. When Sunan Kudus arrived, Pangeran Pontjowati was still a devout follower of Hinduism and was even the leader of the Hindu community around

⁵² Dhani (Yayasan Menara Kudus).

⁵³ Dhani (Yayasan Menara Kudus).

the *Bancikan* area. Sunan Kudus and Pangeran Pontjowati had a good relationship without any dispute despite the fact that they followed different religious beliefs. They are the two individuals who had substantial influence in Kudus at the time. Sunan Kudus and Pangeran Pontjowati fostered good relationships in various fields, which included cooperation in improving the economy and the utilization of social resources.⁵⁴

As time went by, the Hindu place of worship changed its function into a *Langgar* (a small house used by Muslims for praying or Quran recitals) after Pangeran Pontjowati embraced Islam. Pangeran Pontjowati became a loyal student of Sunan Kudus, and he married Sunan Kudus' daughter. Pangeran Pontjowati's conversion to Islam had a significant effect on the community, leading to great developments in Sunan Kudus' *da'wah* process. All followers and residents around the *Bancikan* area (who were loyal followers of Pangeran Pontjowati) converted to Islam and soon, the function of *Bancikan* was changed and so was its name, which became *Langgar* a place of worship that is smaller than a mosque. *Langgar Bubar* (*Bancikan* that changed function or *bubar*—lit. disbanded) became a centre for learning about Islam for Pangeran Pontjowati's followers. In addition to heritage buildings, Sunan Kudus also left behind several traditions.⁵⁵

Dhandhangan began with a habit carried out by students of Sunan Kudus, who flocked the Kudus Tower area in the period leading up to the month of Ramadhan. Hundreds of students and locals gather in wait for the announcement by Sunan Kudus of the beginning of the fasting month. Subsequently, the activity was joined in by followers of Hinduism and Buddhism. It became an event that drew wide interest from young males since beautiful girls who were usually secluded from social activities were also allowed to go out and witness the announcement. Eventually, more people participated in the tradition and converted to Islam. The crowd was also utilized by small traders to sell their products. It then turned into a night market during the period leading up to the month of Ramadhan, becoming a local tradition that is still observed as of current. The

⁵⁴ Munif and Kusdi, January 15, 2020.

⁵⁵ Rochmad, February 2, 2020.

traders come from various regions and diverse religious backgrounds. It is believed that *Dhandhangan* is a legacy passed down by Sunan Kudus and it is a tradition of excellence, providing more auspicious fortune than any ordinary day. Aside from *Dhandangan*, the tradition of not consuming beef is still preserved to this day. This is done to respect followers of Hinduism in Kudus. The Hindu community has great affection and care toward cows. Hinduism teaches its followers to honour cows, a teaching called *Tumpak Kandang*. It has become an annual tradition to give cows religious offerings so that the animals may bring about benefits or good luck to humans.⁵⁶

Sunan Kudus' prohibition against the slaughter of cows was a strategy to gain the public's attention and favour, as they were still followers of Hinduism then. He gathered his students and the entire Kudus population around the courtyard of the Kudus Tower Mosque and when the Hindu followers arrived, he expressed his greetings and welcomed them. Subsequently, he began his lecture, conducted his *da'wah*, and held a dialog. In his lecture, he often cited verses from the Holy Quran, particularly from *Sūrah Al-Baqarah*, which means the cow. He called upon the Muslim community to refrain from slaughtering and eating beef. This request had surprised the residents, particularly the Hindu community, and left them in awe of Sunan Kudus. He was able to gain public sympathy by respecting their beliefs.⁵⁷

Life Value Principles as a Basis of Adaptation Strategy

The title of *Sunan* attached to Sunan Kudus as well as the other saints bear a special meaning. *Sunan* means a person who spreads Islam in a region. *Sunan* also means a holy person who is wise and has close relations with the community. The title of *Sunan* used by the public to address him did not make him better or higher than other members

⁵⁶ Yuliana Nurhayu Rachmawati, *Sunan Kudus: Dinamika Ajaran, Tradisi Dan Budaya Di Kudus Jawa Tengah Tahun 1990-2015*, Thesis, Jakarta, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2018, 70, <https://repository.uinjkt.ac.id/dspace/handle/123456789/43136>.

⁵⁷ Zaimul Haq Elfan Habib, "Sunan Kudus, Umat Hindu dan Sapi Betina," merahputih.com, Sunan Kudus, Umat Hindu, dan Sapi Betina, May 29, 2018, <https://merahputih.com/post/read/sunan-kudus-umat-hindu-dan-sapi-betina>.

of the society. The image of his character can be represented by several life value principles reflected in the various expressions made by Sunan Kudus and the roles that he assumed, as discussed below.⁵⁸

1. Adigang, adigung, adiguna and andhap asor lembah manah

The attitude demonstrated by Sunan Kudus reminds us of the Javanese adage “*oyo adigang, adigung, adiguna*” that talks of an attitude that must be avoided. This expression means that human beings must prioritize the character of *andhap asor* or *lembah manah*, which means humility or modesty. Human beings should not be arrogant and pretentious. As a human being who acknowledges his or her need for other people, s/he must avoid dispositions that lead one to boast of his or her power, position, and authority. People should understand that all three are mandated (by God) and that they should be exercised as righteously and as justly as possible. Higher positions, broader mastery of knowledge, and greater authority that one maintains should not turn one into an arrogant person.⁵⁹

The people of Kudus believe that Sunan Kudus was a figure who possessed an excess of both wealth and knowledge. He used his overabundance to assist others, and he was believed to have often helped the sick. He also willingly relinquished the throne and position that he had for the sake of *da'wah*. This indicates that he was not someone who is blinded by wealth and position, and, in fact, he highly regarded good manners and the avoidance of vanity. These characteristics were inherent in Sunan Kudus before and after the title of Sunan was given to him. The saint was a person who sacrificed his time and energy and consistently upheld the truth.⁶⁰

Sunan Kudus's character as discussed above can be associated with the theory of self-other. The self has control over every action that the individual enacts, and the good and the bad of an action is the accumulative product of self-autonomy. A human being is a complete unity, which includes its strengths and weaknesses, being is the supreme controller of all the actions s/he commits. In this study, the relationship with the theory of self-other refers to all the dispositions

⁵⁸ Dhani (Yayasan Menara Kudus), interview.

⁵⁹ Rochmad, interview.

⁶⁰ Rochmad.

that he had by the virtue of self-autonomy. The virtues and vices that emerged from his character were created and thought out personally by him. He left us with an essential moral value that serves as a lesson and guidance in social relationship. As human beings, we must prioritize good attitude/manners to fellow human beings because we are, essentially, mutually dependent upon one another. All overabundance of wealth and lofty positions should not make us feel better or greater than others. All excess resources that human beings possess should be used to provide benefit to fellow human beings. With their abundance of resources, people should be able to help others without having to feel superior, an inner state that promotes arrogance.

2. *Amar Ma'ruf Nahi Munkar*

The way of life and basic thinking that Sunan Kudus maintained was *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*. The essence of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* is the effort in upholding religion and the interests of the community. Specifically, *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* was significantly emphasized by him to anticipate or eliminate evil. The purpose of this behaviour is to try to keep negative matters away without causing more substantial negative impacts on society.⁶¹

The way of life upheld by Sunan Kudus manifested in his attitude and the way he built his life based on the good for the sake of avoiding evil. He assumed various positions as a military commander, a judge, a teacher, and even a proselytizer of Islam with the aim of upholding truth and virtues in the relationship between fellow human beings and with God. As a newcomer, he understood his self-capacity in terms of what he could and could not do. The principle that he upheld was to constantly spread good things unto other fellow human beings. He lived his life entirely for the sake of enforcing the truth and upholding virtues.⁶²

3. *Astra bhuwana* as the foundation of the *urip iku urup* philosophy

Sunan Kudus is like *astra bhuwana*, which means weapon of the world. This symbolization of a weapon correlates with the way that

⁶¹ Mbah Marto, January 29, 2020.

⁶² Mbah Marto.

humans think and act as a creature with self-autonomy. Humans are able to use their mind to conduct either good or evil. Ideally speaking, humans use their knowledge and mind to conduct good deeds. Humans are expected to practice the life philosophy of *urip iku urup*, which means that life is a flame that enlightens. This is reflected in his personality that constantly utilized his intelligence and abilities for the good of his surrounding environs. His life was lived for the purpose of spreading virtues as a leader, teacher, and proselytizer in accordance with Islam. This is well seen in how Sunan Kudus, being a military commander, did not turn prisoners of war into slaves but, instead, gave them lessons and made them his students. This proves that the Muslim saint did not consider human beings based on their position and wealth. All human beings were treated as equals.⁶³

Sunan Kudus was a teacher to several key figures, one of them being Arya Penangsang, Adipati Jipang Panolan. Although he was a teacher, he willingly assisted his student who had devised a plan of revenge against Sunan Prawata who had seized the throne of, and killed, the latter's father. Arya Penangsang sought help from Sunan Kudus who, aside from being his teacher, was well known as an intelligent strategist. In this case, he used a strategy for good in a case involving the grave matter of avenging death. After several discussions, he eventually agreed to help Arya Penangsang for the sake of upholding the truth, which was to take back what rightfully belonged to Arya Penangsang, and of stopping evil. This is one of the indicators that the life of Sunan Kudus refers to the philosophy of *urip iku urup*. The story of Sunan Kudus and Adipati Jipang demonstrates that an unfavourable action of helping someone to get revenge must be understood astutely for a good end. Mind and reason must be employed to analyse a problem and formulate the actions necessary to uphold the truth.⁶⁴ His decision to help Arya Penangsang should be understood as an effort to manifest the philosophy of *urip iku urup*, that is, turning on the lights to enlighten. Based on his perceptiveness in sorting out various problems and determining the measures to be taken, he was entrusted by the

⁶³ Bowo, *Kepala Desa Temulus*, December 2009.

⁶⁴ Fathoni, January 20, 2020.

Kingdom of Demak to serve as a judge. He had always been accurate in his judgments based on the knowledge and assertiveness that he demonstrated in the past, including in the case of Adipati Jipang. He had succeeded in utilizing the life he had for good, and for that he is considered as a role model for the Muslim community.

4. *Ksatria Berbudi Bawa Leksana*

The self of Sunan Kudus is one of the manifestations of *ksatria berbudi bawa leksana*, which means a wise leader who has good demeanours; is responsible for the lives of many; shows love, care, and affection; and bears responsibility for his speech and action. *Ksatria* manifested in his position as a military commander who was wise, astute, and courageous. He was a great figure in battles, but he showed love, care, and affection to both friends, foes, and people around him. He was known as an individual who was shrewd and wise in devising strategies of war. He was able to unite all his soldiers and create a sense of solidarity among the soldiers of Demak Kingdom. Meanwhile, his love, care, and affection were reflected in his attitude to slaves of war by making them his students. His attitude toward fellow human beings garnered the support and love of numerous parties. This was a key factor that resulted to victory in every battle he led.⁶⁵

Sunan Kudus held the principle that he, himself, has an ethical obligation toward others and fellow beings. Wisdom is something that he prioritized and favoured. This principle manifested when he led a group of his students and followers from the Kingdom of Demak heading toward Kudus. He carried himself as a leader capable of fulfilling his obligations to others, one of which was to maintain the safety of his students and followers.⁶⁶

He observed wisdom and love as a leader when engaging with the people in Kudus and in conducting his *da'wah*. When he first arrived in Kudus, he was a part of the minority so the way that he acted determined how the people of Kudus accepted him at the time. They initially did not entirely accept him, with some even preferring to move to the Rahtawu region rather than converting to Islam and

⁶⁵ Mbah Marto, interview.

⁶⁶ Fathoni, interview.

living side by side with him. He accepted this wholeheartedly. Although he had numerous students and followers, he did not resort to violence in dealing with such public reaction. His wisdom and love eventually won the hearts and minds of the people in Kudus. Gradually, people who were followers of Hinduism or Buddhism converted to Islam and became his followers. This is an implication of the attitude that he had, which was to always humanize and venerate his fellow human beings despite the difference in their religious belief. Additionally, the policy he set in prohibiting his followers to slaughter cows and considering cows as a holy animal to respect the Hindu community also drew the interest of Hindu followers in Kudus to become his followers. Nevertheless, he welcomed the people to embrace the religion they desire while continuing to live in peace and harmony. Widely known as a figure of tolerance in Kudus, he knew when he had to go into battle and when he had to keep calm and peaceful.⁶⁷

5. *Tepo selira lan tansah migunani*

To a newcomer, an attitude of tolerance and politeness should be prioritized: this is known in the Javanese philosophy as *tepo seliro lan tansah migunani*. Sunan Kudus was a figure who embodied and upheld the said philosophy, hence, in the process of his arriving and settling in Kudus, he was well accepted by the people although their beliefs differed. Public acceptance is determined by the attitude of the newcomer toward the surrounding community. Javanese communities, Kudus in particular, prioritized a sense of mutual tolerance and politeness. He had taught his followers and the wider public that it is much better if an individual can provide some benefit to the community. However, if one is unable to contribute, then s/he must give precedence to observing an attitude of politeness and tolerance.⁶⁸

6. *Caraka utusaning donya*

Sunan Kudus, in his relationship with God, perceived himself as a *Caraka*, which means a messenger to the world or *utusaning donya*.

⁶⁷ Dhani (Yayasan Menara Kudus), interview.

⁶⁸ Kang Harin (Masjid Menara Kudus), January 10, 2020.

Human relationship with God can be categorized as human devotion to the Creator. Devotion is a human action in the form of thoughts, opinions, love, energy, or veneration that is carried out sincerely. Humans did not spontaneously come into this world because we were created. As God's creation, humans are obligated to worship God. Humans here on earth are leaders or messengers. The self-expression as a *Caraka* provides a comprehensive image of his existence in this world and his relationship with God. The sense of devotion that humans in this world have to God can be manifested in their worship and the sacrifice they perform. The sacrifice that he performed, in this case, was his wholeheartedness and total devotion to Islam as a manifestation of his love and servitude to his God, i.e., Allah ﷻ. He was, wholeheartedly, willing to leave behind the position, nobility, and authority he had in the Kingdom of Demak for the sake of spreading Islam. He realized and believed that all he possessed were a manifestation of God's love to His people. All mortal worships and behaviours are to be directed toward God, since humans were created by God, and it was by God's will that they developed and flourished.⁶⁹

The Values Inherited from Sunan Kudus Today

Based on the concept of self-other, Sunan Kudus was a manifestation of God's voice—which he believed constantly whispered to him—that taught him to conduct good deeds and avoid bad ones. This was the underlying basis of his behaviour toward others. The existence of Sunan Kudus correlates with his existence as God's creature, based on his self-awareness as an individual and a member of the society. The responsibilities that he had toward himself, his family, the society, and the nation were a part of his devotion and servitude to God. Human activities that he carried out as an individual being and a social being were representations of his self-awareness as a human being who is ultimately accountable to God. All personal and social responsibilities that he assumed were entrusted by God unto human beings as vicegerents on earth. Accordingly, efforts oriented toward achieving *memayu hayuning*

⁶⁹ Mbah Marto, interview.

bawana or the constant endeavour to maintain the beauty of the world was carried out by him with wisdom and prudence. He upheld the belief that human beings as God's creation have the obligation to constantly conduct *da'wah* and spread *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*. Humans have the responsibility to call upon others to conduct virtues and avoid vices.

The successful process of Sunan Kudus' cultural adaptation in conveying Islamic teachings can be observed in terms of several aspects. One of them is the fact that, as of current, Kudus' population is mostly Muslim. This condition significantly differs from that when he first arrived, which was around the 15th century. At the time, Hinduism and Buddhism were the religions of the majority throughout Kudus. A substantial part of the Muslim population in Kudus today still has a close attachment with traditions that have been maintained since the 15th century. The values inherent within Islam as taught in Indonesia are still practiced and have become a way of life.

Kudus is known as a city of *santri* (devout student of Islam), which is centred in the Kauman Village, and the people of Kudus are called *wong ngisor menoro* (people living under the Kudus Tower). The Kudus area that is most populated by *santri* is Kudus Kulon. Nevertheless, the social composition of Kudus Kulon is quite heterogeneous, marked by various religious backgrounds, including Confucianism, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism.⁷⁰ Muslims living in Kudus Kulon exude a greater impression of religiosity than those living in Kudus Wetan. Most of the people living in Kudus Kulon are fanatical *santri*, so the figure of a *kyai* (Javanese cleric or expert in Islam) has always been considered as a role model for Kudus Kulon community. The stance that Kudus Kulon Muslims maintain indicates the success of his process in spreading Islam.⁷¹ His influence can still be felt to this very day. Kudus Kulon is known as a kampong of *santri* since the social activities conducted there mostly consist of religious activities such

⁷⁰ Marbangun Hardjowirogo, *Manusia Jawa* (Jakarta: Inti Idayu Press, 1984), https://books.google.co.id/books/about/Manusia_Jawa.html?id=QEwbAAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y.

⁷¹ Rachmawati, "Sunan Kudus: Dinamika ajaran, tradisi dan budaya di Kudus Jawa Tengah tahun 1990-2015," 36–38.

as Islamic study gatherings (*pengajian*) and congregational worships at mosques. The people of Kudus Kulon continue to strictly preserve the cultural legacy passed on by Sunan Kudus, of which among them is the prohibition to slaughter cows.⁷²

The people of Kudus currently live in harmony and firmly uphold the teachings and heritage of Sunan Kudus. Although Kudus is well known as a city of *santri* due to the abundance of Islamic boarding schools (*pondok pesantren*) and religious figures, the population of Kudus remains very diverse, with its residents living together in peace and harmony. He passed on many virtuous teachings and cultural legacies that became witness to the cultural and social adaptation in the struggle to spread the word of Islam.

The struggle experienced by Sunan Kudus in spreading Islam was based on his use of several methods that incorporated values of tolerance. Instead of resorting to violence, he approached the people of Kudus by understanding their needs and utilizing art and culture as well as appropriate technology. He prioritized an attitude of *andhap asor lembah manah* (humbleness/humility). Even as his position rose, his mastery of relevant knowledge broadened, and his power/authority increased, he did not become an arrogant individual. Highly upholding the concept of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* was something he did by fighting for or promoting the truth (spreading the word of Islam) and maintaining good deeds. One of his purposes in life was *urip iku urup*, which meant leading a life capable of enlightening fellow human beings. He also emphasized an attitude of *tepo seliro lan tansah migunani*, which refers to the ability to provide benefits to the people he met and to highlight the awareness of always being polite and tolerant. These virtues have been passed down to the city of Kudus and resulted in the city being one of the notably tolerant cities in Indonesia.

Sunan Kudus' teachings and attitude towards life is a demonstration of the relationship between the self and others. Sunan Kudus' 'self' shows its existence in its relationship with the community, which serves others. The existence of others is given

⁷² Lance Castles, *Religion, Politics, and Economic Behavior in Java: The Kudus Cigarette Industry*, First Edition (Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967), 87, <https://www.amazon.com/Religion-politics-economic-behavior-Java/dp/B0006BQR5K>.

significant attention through God. The measures he carried out in the process of adaptation and socialization were manifestations based on the belief in the existence of God and one's position before God.

Conclusion

The data and analyses discussed above reveal the basic reasoning and stance of Sunan Kudus, which are representations of the concept of self and others. These principles of fundamental values were developed by the *wali* as bases for adapting to, and living together in, society. He emphasized the need to understand attitudes that should be avoided, namely *adigang*, *adigung*, *adiguna*. As human beings, we should not be dependent on our power, authority, and intellect because life with fellow men and women can be led in peace and harmony so long as each individual maintains an attitude of mutual respect, politeness, and humility toward one another. As human beings, we should also implement *tepo selira lan tansah migunani*, which is an attitude underlying tolerance and politeness toward our fellow human beings, as well as constant endeavour to be of benefit to others. The mindset and attitude that he showed in spreading Islam throughout Kudus have proven that violence is unnecessary to influence an individual or a community. People will be more interested and sympathetic if the approaches employed emphasize respect and are able to provide benefits to one's self and others.

There are numerous values and attitude to life that we can learn from the history of Sunan Kudus. This Muslim saint is greatly revered by the people so much so that a cult following has emerged in various traditions. Further studies are needed to better understand such a phenomenon.

ISLAM IN MODERN MALAY LITERATURE

Examining the Role and Position of “Story” According to *Persuratan Baru*

Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani¹
Muhd. Zulkifli Ismail²

Abstract

This article discusses the synchronisation of Persuratan Baru’s idea on the role and position of stories in literature to Islam. Persuratan Baru (PB) is a literary notion proposed by Mohd. Affandi Hassan as an alternative to resolve the confusion of knowledge in modern Malay literature. To this end, PB upholds Islam particularly its core doctrine Tawhid as its conceptual framework which recognises the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunnah as legitimate sources of knowledge. Among the major ideas of PB is “Ilmu-Cerita” (Knowledge-Story) which prioritises “Ilmu” (Knowledge) and subordinates “Cerita” (Story) to “Ilmu.” More important is Affandi Hassan’s statement that his idea of “Ilmu-Cerita” is indeed Islamic as it is inspired by the Qur’an. No critical research has examined the synchronisation of PB idea and “Ilmu-Cerita” to Islam. This article is structured to achieve two objectives. Firstly, to discuss PB’s idea on “Ilmu-Cerita” as expounded by Affandi Hassan in his writings. Secondly, to examine the synchronisation of the idea to Islam by referring to authoritative (mu’tabar) Arabic commentaries of the Qur’an. This study applies a textual analysis approach that outlines two levels of reading procedure, i.e., descriptive reading and analytical reading. The study reveals that in PB’s perspective the aim of literary writing is to convey ilmu (knowledge), and therefore cerita (story) functions as a tool in conveying knowledge. Close reading on the mu’tabar Arabic commentaries of the Qur’an reveals that stories in the Qur’an seek to

¹ Associate Professor, Department of Malay Language, Faculty of Modern Languages and Communication, Universiti Putra Malaysia. Email: zariat@upm.edu.my

² Senior Lecturer, Department of Foreign Languages, Faculty of Modern Languages and Communication, Universiti Putra Malaysia. Email: zulismail@upm.edu.my

convey knowledge, i.e., good lessons that benefit mankind in everyday life. In this context that stories in the Islamic perspective serve as a tool to convey knowledge. With this understanding, PB's idea of "Knowledge-Story" is found in synchronisation with the teaching of Islam.

Keywords: Islamic literature, Malay literature, stories in Qur'an, *Persuratan Baru*, Affandi Hassan.

Introduction

In the 1970s and 1980s, modern Malay literature showed a clear tendency towards Islam thus sparking what is known as the literary phenomenon of "*Sastera Islam*" (*Islamic Literature*). This continued in the following decades, which witnessed a polemic among literary scholars, laureates and critics on the meaning and role of "literature" according to the Islamic worldview.³ It was in such an intellectual climate that *Persuratan Baru* (henceforth PB) emerged as a new literary notion following its proposal by Mohd. Affandi Hassan (henceforth Affandi),⁴ a renowned prolific creative writer and a literary critic in contemporary Malay literature. Affandi, who has been writing since the 1960s, discussed the idea of PB in several of his prominent writings such as *Pendidikan Estetika daripada Pendekatan Tauhid* (1992), followed by *Medan-Medan dalam Sistem*

³ Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir, "Sastera Islam: Malaysia's literary phenomenon of The 1970s and 1980s," *The Muslim World*, vol. LXXXIX, no. 3-4 (July-October 1989), 232-248. The inclination towards Islam in modern Malay literature continues until today. Interestingly, in the mid-2000s, the same trend hit the domain of "popular literature", stirring the "phenomenon of popular Islamic novels" in the style of *Ayat-ayat Cinta*, an Indonesian novel by Habiburrahman El-Shirazy. For more information, see Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, "Islam, romance and popular taste in Indonesia: A textual analysis of *Ayat-ayat Cinta* by Habiburrahman El-Shirazy and *Syahadat Cinta* by Taufiqurrahman Al-Azizy," *Indonesia and the Malay World*, vol. 40, no. 116 (March 2012), 59-73; Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, "The conflict of love and Islam: The main ingredients in the popular Islamic novels of Malaysia," *Southeast Asia Research*, vol. 22, no.3 (2014), 1-16.

⁴ Literally, the word means "New Literature" but Affandi translates it as "Genuine Literature."

Persuratan Melayu: Sanggahan Terhadap Syarahan Perdana Prof. Dr. Muhammad Haji Salleh (1994), “Pemikiran dan Pendekatan dalam Kritikan Sastera Melayu Moden” (1994), and a tetralogy novel *Pujangga Melayu* (1997).⁵ Affandi introduced the term *Persuratan Baru* in 1994 after having critically debated several issues in modern Malay literature.⁶

In 2008, the term PB was explicitly indicated as the title of the book *Gagasan Persuratan Baru: Pengenalan dan Penerapan*, which discusses it at a philosophical level. Later, the idea was applied by Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir and Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani in their literary analyses. The publication of this book with such a title was to convey the message that PB was proposed as a systematic literary notion. It thus was open for debate in the academia. Apart from his writings in a blog specifically named “*Gagasan Persuratan Baru*,” Affandi discusses the idea of PB among others in “Mengembalikan Peranan Ilmu yang Benar dalam Persuratan Melayu” (2010), “Keindahan Bahasa Berasaskan Konsep Ihsan” (2012), *Balai Maqamat* (2014), *Pandirisme dalam Komuniti Dunia* (2016), *Hikayat Buyung Lurus: Sebuah Hikayat Politik Melayu* (2016), *Anugerah Sastera Negara dalam Kesusasteraan Melayu Moden* (2019) and *Teori-teori Sastera Barat dalam Tangan Sarjana Malaysia* (2021). It is important to note that PB was proposed as an alternative solution to problems in modern Malay literature. Affandi relates the problems to the “confusion of knowledge” which refers to the secular worldview underpinning the modern Malay literature that contrasts to the Islamic worldview.⁷ The Islamic worldview

⁵ For more information on Affandi’s biography and literary tradition, see Akalily Narmi, Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, Kamariah Kamarudin, and Pabiyah Hajimaming@Toklubok, “Sumbangan Shah Waliyullah al-Dihlawi dalam perkembangan intelektual Islam di Malaysia: Beberapa perkembangan mutakhir,” *Journal of Al-Tamaddun*, 17, no. 1 (June 2022), 97-108. For reviews on PB, see Nudra Shafini Halis Azhan, Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, and Salmah Jan Noor Muhammad, “Kesusasteraan Melayu dan Persuratan Baru: Satu pengamatan kritis tentang sambutan keserjanaan,” *Pertanika: Journal of Social Science and Humanities*, vol. 29, no. 2 (June 2021), 1449-1468.

⁶ Mohd. Affandi Hassan, “Mengapa saya menulis Aligupit,” *Dewan Sastera*, September, 1994, 9-11.

⁷ The term “confusion of knowledge” was coined by Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas in discussing the dilemma of contemporary Muslims. See al-Attas, *Islam*

according to Affandi is shaped by the principle of Tawhid which recognises the Oneness of God, as well as the Qur'an and the Prophetic Sunnah as the highest sources of knowledge.⁸ Affandi argues that confusion of knowledge is evident when modern Malay literature recognises and put to pride works that contradict Islamic values.⁹ PB argued that due to the confusion, "knowledge" (*ilm*) in its Islamic definition was no longer adopted and modern Malay literature became a fictional writing enthusiasm.¹⁰ Thus, PB concluded Islam had been completely marginalised and its worldview is not adopted when defining the meaning and role of Malay literature. To address the problem, Affandi proposed that PB upholds Islam particularly its Tawhidic teachings.

As a literary notion, PB received an encouraging academic reception from literary scholars and critics. Among the early enthusiasts were Abdullah Tahir (1995) and Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir (1999: 121-133), who both well accepted PB as a substantive literary notion that should thus be given serious

and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM), 1978). In order to understand religious polemics in the Western modern intellectual tradition and how it affects modern Malay literature, see Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, "Kesangsian terhadap agama: Memetakan wacana-wacana Barat yang melingkari "kemodenan" Abdullah Munsyi. *Kemanusiaan: The Asian Journal of Humanities*, vol. 29, no. 1 (2022), 145–168.

⁸ Mohd. Affandi Hassan, *Pendidikan Estetika Daripada Pendekatan Tauhid* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1992), 15-32; Akalily Narmi, Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, Kamariah Kamarudin, and Pabiyah Hajimaming@Toklubok, "Pengaruh pemikiran al-Dihlawi mengenai taklif dalam Kitab *Hujjat Allah Al-Balighah* terhadap pemikiran Sastera Islam Mohd. Affandi Hassan dalam gagasan Persuratan Baru," *Afkar*, vol. 25, no. 1 (June 2023), 199-230; Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, "Sastera berpaksikan Tauhid: Satu penerokaan terhadap gagasan Persuratan Baru oleh Mohd. Affandi Hassan – Bahagian I," *Jurnal YADIM (Journal of Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia)* vol. 7 (October 2005), 10-16.

⁹ Mohd. Affandi Hassan, Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir, and Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, *Gagasan Persuratan Baru: Pengenalan dan Penerapan* (Bangi: Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu (ATMA), 2008), 82-83; Mohd. Affandi Hassan, Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir, and Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, *Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, Edisi Kedua (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2014), 162-163.

¹⁰ Mohd. Affandi Hassan, *Medan-Medan dalam Sistem Persuratan Melayu* (Kota Bharu: Penerbit Tiga Puteri, 1994), 37.

attention.¹¹ This was followed by Mohd. Zariat in 2004 through his doctoral thesis (published in 2011) who pioneered an effort in developing a systematic analytical framework based on PB for application in a comprehensive analysis on Malay literary texts. The framework leads the way to the application of PB in several master and doctoral theses.¹² PB was also discussed in scholarly writings relating to theories and critical approaches in Malay literature.¹³ More interestingly, PB has received due attention at a higher scholarly level when professors of literature critically debated it through their inaugural lectures.¹⁴ Affandi's *Pendidikan Estetika daripada Pendekatan Tauhid* that proposed preliminary notion of PB, was also listed in "Key Works Initiative" in *The Annotated Bibliography Project* by Aga Khan University, Institute for the Study

¹¹ Abdullah Tahir, "Novel-novel Mohd. Affandi Hassan: Meneliti kemungkinan penerapan konsep "Persuratan Baru Melayu"" (lecture, Kongres Bahasa Melayu Sedunia, Kuala Lumpur, August 21-25, 1995); Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir, "Mohd. Affandi Hassan's notion of Persuratan Baru: A preliminary exploration," in *Texts & Contexts: Interactions Between Literature and Culture in Southeast Asia*, eds. Luisa J. Mallari-Hall & Lily Rose R. Tope (Quezon City: The Department of English and Comparative Literature, College of Arts and Letters, University of the Phillipines, 1999), 121-133.

¹² See Nahari Mastono Arukin, *Analisis Pemikiran dalam Espen-Espen Mohd. Affandi Hassan*, MA Thesis, Universiti Putera Malaysia, 2008; Nur Fatiha Fadila Abu Bakar, *Intelektualisme dalam Lima Novel Anwar Ridhwan Dari Sudut Persuratan Baru*, MA Thesis, Universiti Pertanian Malaysia, 2014, Siti Aisyah binti Mohamed Salim, *Sejarah Alternatif dalam Novel Duka Tuan Bertakhta: Satu Analisis Menurut Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, Master of Letters, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2014; Nurul Hilwany Che Shaffine, *Ilmu dalam Novel Karya Aisya Sofea Berdasarkan Persuratan Baru*, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 2017; Akalily Narmi, *Wacana Taklif dan Manifestasinya Terhadap Cerita dalam Novel Pujangga Melayu oleh Mohd. Affandi Hassan*, MA Thesis, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 2019; and Muhammad Zarif Hassan@Zulkifli, *Penilaian Kandungan Teks Novel Mata Pelajaran Kesusasteraan Melayu Berdasarkan Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, PhD Thesis, Universiti Putera Malaysia, 2023.

¹³ Zawiah Yahya, *Reading Approaches in Malay Literature: Critical Theory in the Making* (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2010); A. Halim Ali, *Inti Sari Teori Sastera: Barat dan Malaysia* (Shah Alam: NHA Excell Resources, 2018).

¹⁴ Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir, *Kritikan Sastera Melayu: Antara Cerita dengan Ilmu* (Bangi: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2007); Muhammad Bukhari Lubis, *Kesusasteraan Islami Bandingan: Menyingkap Tabir Mengungkap Fikir* (Tanjong Malim: Penerbit Universiti Pendidikan Sultan Idris, 2017).

of Muslim Civilisations, United Kingdom.¹⁵ It is clear that today PB has been recognised and given critical receptions by academics and literary audience.

As mentioned earlier, PB upholds the Islamic worldview as its philosophical framework. The choice was put forward on the stand that Islam and its scientific tradition has a significant contribution in the emergence of the tradition of Malay letters (*tradisi persuratan Melayu*).¹⁶ According to Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (henceforth al-Attas), the arrival of Islam to the Malay World introduced rationalism and individualism which universally became the framework in measuring the progression in civilizations.¹⁷ During the Islamic period, the nature of Malay language has shifted from an aesthetic language that narrates fantasy including superstition, fable and myth, to a scientific language that debates knowledge and ideas.¹⁸ The proposition by al-Attas was supported by V.I. Braginsky (henceforth Braginsky) who recognised the emergence of the “*literary self-awareness*” in Malay literature during the Islamic period. By “*literary self-awareness*”, Braginsky means a systematic and comprehensive understanding of the genuine meaning of “*literature*” (*sastera*) and the substantive roles of authors and authorship.¹⁹ With these achievements, PB emphasises that the tradition of Malay letters of the sixteenth and the seventeenth century was *par-excellence* that was unrivalled in the history of Malay literature.²⁰ Therefore, PB proposed the tradition of Malay letters to

¹⁵ Affandi Hassan, Mohd. Tahir and Abdul Rani, *Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, 150.

¹⁶ Mohd. Affandi Hassan, *Medan-Medan Dalam Sistem Persuratan Melayu*, 18-19; Alparslan Acikgenc, *Islamic Scientific Tradition in History* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (IKIM), 2014); Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, *Seksualiti dalam Novel Melayu: Satu Analisis Teks Berdasarkan Persuratan Baru* (PhD Thesis, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2004), 128-131.

¹⁷ Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, *Islam dalam Sejarah dan Kebudayaan Melayu* (Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1972), 29-32; 44-47.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 20-21.

¹⁹ V. I. Braginsky, *The System of Classical Malay Literature* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993), 29; Vladimir Braginsky, *The Heritage of Traditional Malay Literature: A Historical Survey of Genres, Writings and Literary Views* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004), 204-206; Abdul Rani, *Seksualiti dalam Novel Melayu*, 132-135 & 204-206.

²⁰ Affandi Hassan, *Medan-Medan Dalam Sistem Persuratan Melayu*, 18-19; 35; Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, “Tradisi persuratan Melayu: Tradisi par excellence dalam

be the benchmark in measuring the progression of modern Malay literature. Based on this benchmark, PB argued that modern Malay literature is without a strong epistemological basis, since it has given prominence to fictional writings that prioritise leisure. This retrogress occurred due to the confusion of knowledge whereby values contrary to Islam were highly appreciated and knowledge and intellectualism as the basis of literary activities sidelined.

In responding to the confusion of knowledge problem, PB argues for a redefinition of the meaning and role of Malay literature according to the Islamic worldview. PB also argues that the confusion of knowledge has resulted in several conventions in fictional writings, particularly for novels and short stories, that could adversely affect the growth of genuine literature. Firstly, the preoccupation with “story” (*cerita*) and the primacy of “story” over knowledge (*ilmu*).²¹ This practice may be seen through the National Laureates who confess that writing is just to narrate stories, and leave to readers the questions of knowledge and didacticism. Some writers openly stated that their fictional works should not be didactic or to cultivate values.²² Secondly, and related to the above issue, is the propensity for human evils and weaknesses, which PB argues were dominant themes in Malay novels and short stories. This includes justifying the propensity with ideas such as prostitution for the sake of survival, stealing from others to help the poor, and treachery towards parents to achieve one’s ambition.²³ Thirdly, the preoccupation with story-making to highlight an exploration of new story-telling techniques which are unconventional (commonly known as “experimental” style of writing), which includes the manipulation of sex and erotica to escalate the intensity of a story.²⁴ As a result, modern Malay literature demonstrates values which are contrary to Islam. It became more serious when these fictional works were

sejarah kesusasteraan Melayu” (lecture, Seminar Antarabangsa Kesusasteraan Asia Tenggara (SAKAT) XVI 2022, Balai Seminar Tun Hamdan Syeikh Tahir Wisma Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, October 4-5, 2022).

²¹ Affandi Hassan, Mohd. Tahir and Abdul Rani, *Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, 4-65; 142-144.

²² Abdul Rani, *Seksualiti dalam Novel Melayu*, 104-105; 110-114.

²³ Affandi Hassan, Mohd. Tahir and Abdul Rani, *Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, 81-85.

²⁴ Abdul Rani, *Seksualiti dalam Novel Melayu*, 556-570; 478-481.

praised by literary critics and through literary recognitions, and thus became a trendsetter in modern Malay literature.

In attempting to solve this problem, PB proposed its main idea, which is “knowledge-story” (*Ilmu-Cerita*). By this idea, PB differentiates between “*ilmu*” (knowledge) and “*cerita*” (story). At the practical level, “knowledge” is further defined as “thought” (*pemikiran*) which is substantively and academically debated to create a “discourse” (*wacana*). Meanwhile, “story” is described as a narrative developed from the manipulation of narrative devices such as characters, plot, events and settings. PB prioritises “discourse” (*wacana*) or “knowledge” (*ilmu*) as opposed to “story” (*cerita*). Thus, the aim of literary writing including fictional works such as novels or short stories is to produce “discourse” (*wacana*) and not “story” (*cerita*). In other words, PB subordinates “story” (*cerita*) to “discourse” (*wacana*). PB concludes that “story” (*cerita*) only serves as a tool in conveying “discourse” (*wacana*). In this context, fictional works such as novels and short stories provide a space to convey “true knowledge” (*ilmu yang benar*) in Islam, as defined in the Qur’an and Sunnah.

Research Problem and Objectives

A preliminary observation reveals that PB’s idea of “Knowledge-Story” (*Ilmu-Cerita*) as described above, is novel and had never been thought of in modern Malay literature, as admitted by Ungku Maimunah (2007).²⁵ As far as it is known, there had been no notion in the modern Malay literature (more often mentioned as “literary theory”) that problematised the inclination towards “story” (*cerita*) as well as the primacy of “story” (*cerita*) over “knowledge” (*ilmu*). On the contrary, “story” and “story-making” are endorsed as a “nature” of literature, thus “story-telling” became the priority in literary writings.²⁶ It is obvious that PB’s idea of “Knowledge-Story”

²⁵ Mohd. Tahir, *Kritikan Sastera Melayu*, 58-60.

²⁶ See Shahnon Ahmad, *Sastera: Pengalaman, Ilmu, Imaginasi dan Kitarannya* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1994), 41; 43; Shahnon Ahmad, *Pongang Sastera* (Shah Alam: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1995), 200; A. Samad Said, *Dari Salina ke Langit Petang: Proses Mencipta Novel* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1987), 1; Salbiah Ani, “Tikam lidah pada wacana hatiku terluka

(“*Ilmu-Cerita*”) which prioritises “discourse” (*wacana*) as opposed to “story” (*cerita*), contests the preference for “story” and “story-making”.

Against this background, this article aims to highlight Affandi’s statement about his idea on “Knowledge-Story” (“*Ilmu-Cerita*”). In his writing, Affandi revealed that the idea was inspired by the Qur’an.²⁷ This is unsurprising since PB acknowledges Islam as its epistemological framework. In the Islamic tradition, the Qur’an is acknowledged as a revelation from Allah ﷻ, the Creator and Guide of humankind. Other than accounts about creation, human phenomena, man’s duties and responsibilities, and divine rewards and punishment, the Qur’an contains stories about prophets and messengers and their peoples, as well individuals such as Maryam, Khidir, Iskandar Dzulkarnain, Queen Balqis and others. Within this context, Affandi argues that the stories in the Qur’an are not mere stories; instead, they convey “true knowledge” in Islam (*ilmu yang benar di sisi Islam*) in the forms of notions, reminders and warnings from Allah ﷻ to mankind. What is important in this context is Affandi’s statement that his idea of “Knowledge-Story” (“*Ilmu-Cerita*”) is Islamic, as it is inspired by the Qur’an.

Preliminary observation shows that Affandi’s PB idea finds acceptance among scholars and researchers.²⁸ In line with this acceptance, some researchers discuss the idea of “Knowledge-Story” including its relation to Islam. However, most researchers refer to earlier studies on stories in the Qur’an or to the Malay or English commentaries of the Qur’an. A research by Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani for instance, refers to Abdullah Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur’an: Text, Translation & Commentary* (1938) and Muhammad Asad, *The Message of the Qur’an* (1980).²⁹ This study shows that there has

di Bukhara,” *Berita Harian*, April 9, 2002, 16.

²⁶ Affandi Hassan, “Mengapa saya”, 10-11.

²⁷ Afandi Hassan, “Mengapa saya”, 10-11.

²⁸ Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir, “Lorong Midaq oleh Naguib Mahfouz: Satu penilaian menurut gagasan “Persuratan Baru” janaan Mohd. Affandi Hassan,” in *Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, Mohd. Affandi Hassan, Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir, and Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani (Bangi: Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu (ATMA), 2008), 222-223; Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, *Seksualiti dalam Novel Melayu*, 208.

²⁹ Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, *Seksualiti dalam Novel Melayu*, 208.

been no serious effort to critically examine PB's idea of "Knowledge-Story" in relation to the Qur'an, by referring to Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an especially those considered as "authoritative" or *mu'tabar*. In the tradition of *'ilm al-tafsīr* (or the science of Qur'anic interpretations), the term "*mu'tabar*" commonly refers to commentaries that are recognised by *jumhūr al-'ulamā'* (the majority of scholars) as authoritative because these are written by renowned scholars in the discipline and thus enjoy considerable influence in society. The issue in question clearly demonstrates the *lacuna* which can be filled with a scientific study on PB's idea of "Knowledge-Story" by referring to *mu'tabar* Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an.

Following the abovementioned issue, this article is structured to achieve two objectives. Firstly, to discuss PB's idea of "Knowledge-Story" explicated by Affandi in his writings. Secondly, to examine the synchronisation of the PB idea to Islam by referring to *mu'tabar* Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an.

Research Approach

This research applies a textual analysis approach because the materials consist of written texts. Analysis of the texts under study was carried out based on a reading procedure comprising two levels: i) descriptive reading which enables the researcher to discuss PB's idea of "Knowledge-Story", and ii) analytical reading which enables the study to summarise on the synchronisation of the idea to Islam by referring to *mu'tabar* Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an.

In order to materialise the first objective, this research analysed PB's idea of "Knowledge-Story" using Affandi's writing as the research material.³⁰ In order to realise the second objective, this research selected six *mu'tabar* Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an as

³⁰ Following are the studied texts of Affandi Hassan's writings; (i) Mohd. Affandi Hassan, "Mengapa saya menulis *Aligupit*". *Dewan Sastera*, September 1994, 9-11, (ii) Mohd. Affandi Hassan, *Pujangga Melayu* (Shah Alam: Penerbit Fajar Bakti, 1997), and (iii) Mohd. Affandi Hassan, Ungku Maimunah Mohd. Tahir & Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, *Gagasan Persuratan Baru: Pengenalan dan Penerapan* (Bangi: Institut Alam dan Tamadun Melayu (ATMA), 2008).

references.³¹ These selected commentaries were written by six renowned scholars in the history of Islamic scientific tradition who lived between the ninth and the twentieth century. The latitude of about 1,000 years is hoped to give a comprehensive understanding relating the subject under study that can be influenced by the factor of different eras. These six selected commentaries are considered *mu'tabar* in the discipline of *tafsir* because they have been used as major references until now. All the commentaries have been republished several times in various editions within the past six decades until recent times.

Analysis and Discussion

1) PB's Idea on "Knowledge-Story" (*Ilmu-Cerita*)

a) The Role of "Story" as a Tool to Convey "Knowledge"

By and large, PB relates the role of "story" to writing creative genres such as novels and short stories. As mentioned above, PB emphasises that the purpose of writing is to convey true knowledge as understood in Islam. This is based on PB's understanding of the worldview of Islam as comprising *tawhid* as its core teaching with the Qur'an and Sunnah as the sources of reference.

With this writing purpose in view, PB conceptually differentiates between "story" and "knowledge", given the precise

³¹ The following are titles of the Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an selected for the study:- (i) Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari (838 CE-923 CE), *Jami' al-Bayan 'an Ta'wil Aya al-Qur'an* also widely known as *Tafsir al-Tabari*, ed., Abdullah bin Abd al-Muhsin Al-Turki (Al-Gizah: Dar Hijr, 2001), (ii) Muhammad bin Umar al-Razi (1149/1150 CE-1209 CE), *Mafatih al-Ghayb* also known as *Tafsir al-Kabir* (Beirut: Dar Ihya al-Turath al-'Arabi, 1999), 3rd edition, (iii) Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Qurtubi (1214 CE-1273 CE), *Al-Jami' Li Ahkam al-Qur'an* also known as *Tafsir al-Qurtubi*, ed., Ahmad Al-Bardouni & Ibrahim Atfayash (Kaherah: Dar al-Kutub al-Misriyyah, 1964), 2nd edition, (iv) Ismail bin Umar Ibnu Kathir (1301 CE -1373 CE), *Tafsir al-Qur'an al-'Azim* also known as *Tafsir Ibnu Kathir*, ed., Sami bin Muhammad Al-Salamah (Riyadh: Dar Taibah li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', 1999), 2nd edition, (v) Muhammad bin Ali al-Shauqani (1759 CE-1834 CE), *Fath al-Qadir* (Damsyik: Dar Ibnu Kathir, 1993), and (vi) Muhammad al-Tahir Ibnu 'Asyur (1879 CE-1973 CE), *al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir min al-Tafsir* (Tunis: al-Dar al-Tunisiyyah, 1984).

definition of the two terminologies. PB defines “story” as a narration developed from manipulating narrative devices such as characters, plots, events and settings. Meanwhile, “knowledge” is defined as “thoughts” or “scholarly ideas” which are debated substantively until what is termed by Affandi as “discourse” is created.³² It is clear from the PB definition that “story” is not the same as “knowledge,” as conceptualised by Affandi; “The two main elements contrasted [in PB] are aspects of discourse and story in evaluating a novel” [*Dua unsur utama yang dipertentangkan [dalam PB] ialah aspek wacana dan cerita dalam menilai sesebuah novel*].³³ In PB, “story” and “knowledge” need to be differentiated and contrasted because the tendency to only deliver the “story” alone may distort the purpose to convey “knowledge”.³⁴

In differentiating between “story” and “knowledge”, PB explains that the delivering of a story is not the “end result” of creative writing, instead, “story” is only a “tool” or a “means” to convey “knowledge” as maintained by Affandi; “story [in the concept by PB] is to express a notion or thought, in order to give reminders or warnings” [*Cerita [dalam PB] digunakan untuk menyatakan sesuatu gagasan atau pemikiran, untuk memberikan peringatan atau amaran*].³⁵ As a tool, a “story” which develops through the manipulation of narrative devices, provides space for the author to convey his thoughts (*pemikiran*). In manipulating characters for instance, the author’s thoughts are woven into the mind with opinions of the characters which are reflected in dialogues, arguments (*hujjah*) and sermons (*khutbah*). In other words, “character”, as a narrative device, convey the author’s thoughts. Thus, “thoughts” in creative works such as novels and short stories are understood in PB through academic discussion (by the author) which substantively debates and finally develops a discourse. In this context, the aspect being put to concern is the academic arguments that shape the discourse, and it is this aspect that dominantly manoeuvres creative writing.³⁶

³² Affandi Hassan, Mohd. Tahir and Abdul Rani, *Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, 106.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Affandi Hassan, “Mengapa saya”, 10.

³⁶ Affandi Hassan, Mohd. Tahir and Abdul Rani, *Gagasan Persuratan Baru*, 64;

In order to establish such a story, the manipulation of narrative devices such as character development is defined and determined by its relevance to the author's arguments (*hujjah*) and discourse (*wacana*). Similar understanding and practice also applies to manipulating other narrative devices such as the plot construction or the selection of events and settings. Based on this conception, PB introduces "stylization of ideas" (translated into Malay as "*siratan makna*"), a concept which generally puts forward a style in creative writing that prioritises thoughts (*pemikiran*) and discourse (*wacana*).³⁷

The discussion at this juncture aims to explain how PB conceptualises the role of "story" as a tool in conveying "knowledge". It is clear that narrating a "story" is not the purpose of writing creative works such as novels or short stories. Instead, according to PB, the end of creative writing is to convey "knowledge".

b) The Position of "Story"

PB conceptualises the position between "story" and "knowledge" in the principle of "*Dominance-Priority*". This principle underlines what is dominant in literary works, either "story" or "knowledge". The dominant prescribes the priority of a creative work. In order to identify the "*Dominance-Priority*", PB proposes "narrative space" (*ruang naratif*), a concept that regards a literary work as "space" developed from the beginning to the end of the story. It is important to note that as a creative work, PB does not totally neglect the "story" part. However, "story"'s role and position are defined and determined by "knowledge" as explained above. The concept of "narrative space" enables the author to limit the role of story as a tool to convey "knowledge". A "narrative space" may be conceptually

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³⁷ Affandi Hassan, *Pujangga Melayu*, 215. For more details on *Pujangga Melayu* as a novel that provides space to convey "discourse" (*wacana*), see Nudra Shafini Halis Azhan, Mohd. Zariat Abdul Rani, and Salmah Jan Noor Muhammad, "Moderate propositional theory of literary truth" oleh Jukka Mikkonen: Satu pengenalan terhadap kesusasteraan Melayu moden", *Kajian Malaysia*, vol. 41, no. 1 (April 2023), 213–234.

filled up by two types of content, namely “story content” and “discourse content”. “Story content” is provided by manipulating narrative devices such as characters, plot, events and settings. In contrast, “discourse content” consists of arguments that are presented in detail, analysed and synthesised practically in an academic manner to develop a substantive discourse. By conceptualising creative works such as novels or short stories as “space”, the writing is propelled by the author’s strategy, either to fill the “narrative space” (of his creative work) with only “story content” or with both “story and discourse content”.

A “narrative space” (of a creative work) with just a “story content” or minor portion of “discourse content” would be viewed essentially as a “story”. On the other hand, a “narrative space” with largely “discourse content” would make “knowledge” a dominant aspect in a creative work. The dominance of one type of content in a “narrative space” determines the “priority” of either knowledge or story in a creative work.³⁸ By and large, PB upholds “knowledge” as the fundamental and dominant aspect in a creative writing, thus subordinating “story” to it. In this respect, PB offers understanding and practices contrary to conventional creative writing.

2) Synchronising PB’s Idea of “Knowledge-Story” with Islam according to the *Mu’tabar* Arabic Commentaries of the Qur’an

As discussed earlier, PB entrusts the idea of “*Knowledge-Story*” based of the Qur’an.³⁹ This explanation raises questions on the synchronisation of PB’s particular idea with Islam, and invites discussions on the role and position of stories in the Qur’an based on the *mu’tabar* Arabic commentaries of the Qur’an. Preliminary readings show that among the *dalil* (evidences) from the Qur’an in support of the role and position of story is the following verse (12:111):⁴⁰

³⁸ Affandi Hassan, *Pujangga Melayu*, 215-216.

³⁹ Affandi Hassan, “Mengapa saya”, 10.

⁴⁰ The verse is translated into English by Pickthall as in the following, “In their history verily there is a lesson for men of understanding. It is no invented story but a confirmation of the existing (Scripture) and a detailed explanation of everything, and

لَقَدْ كَانَ فِي قَصَصِهِمْ عِبْرَةً لِّأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ ۗ مَا كَانَ حَدِيثًا يُفْتَرَىٰ
وَلَكِن تَصَدِّقَ الَّذِي بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ وَتَفْصِيلَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَهُدًى وَرَحْمَةً لِّقَوْمٍ
يُؤْمِنُونَ

Within academia, Sūrah Yūsuf has been used many times as an important reference in the effort to understand the concept and form of story according to Islam.⁴¹ In the Qur'an itself the story of Prophet Yūsuf عليه السلام has been stated as *ذٰهُ الْيٰسْرِ اَوْ حَيْثَا بِمَآ الْقَصَصِ اَحْسَنُ* ' (12: 3) or translated by Seyyed Hossein Nasr as "...the most beautiful of stories by Our having revealed unto thee this Qur'an" (589).⁴² Nasr also explains that the special characteristic of Sūrah Yūsuf also lies in the narration about the Prophet Yūsuf عليه السلام himself in one chapter of its own (*sūrah*) and in a chronology.⁴³ Abdullah Yusuf Ali explains the exquisiteness of the story about Prophet Yūsuf عليه السلام in the Qur'an which is described as "*the most beautiful stories*", among which rely on the complete structure of the story, rendering chronologically in one particular chapter, narrating the rise and fall of nations in their era thus making it an easy reference to be exemplified

a guidance and a mercy for folk who believe." Muhammad William Pickthall, *The Roman Transliteration of The Holy Qur'-aan With Full Arabic Text: English Translation by Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall* (Lahore: Quدرات Ullah Co, 2011), 275. While Seyyed Hossein Nasr translated the similar verse as follows, "Certainly in their stories is a lesson for those possessed of intellect. It is not a fabricated account; rather, it is a confirmation of that which came before it, and an elaboration of all things, and a guidance and a mercy for a people who believe." Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Study Qur'an: A New Translation and Commentary* (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2015), 614.

⁴¹ Among Muslim scholars, the Qur'an is recognized as a source of revelation knowledge, and therefore the study of it is included in the context of Sūrah Yūsuf, carried out to understand the revelation of Allah سبحانه وتعالى Sūrah Yūsuf in the Qur'an also invites studies by Western researchers who tend to deal with the Qur'an not as a source of revealed knowledge. See John MacDonald, "Joseph in the Quran and Muslim commentary: A comparative study: Part 1", *The Muslim World*, vol. XLVI, No. 2 (July 1956), 133-131; John MacDonald, "Joseph in the Quran Part II", *The Muslim World*, vol. XLVI, No. 3 (July 1956), 207-224.

⁴² Nasr, *The Study Qur'an*, 589.

⁴³ Nasr, *The Study Qur'an*, 589.

from it, other than the complexity of levels of human spiritual elements, as a result of events that befall them.⁴⁴ Mustansir Mir believes that Sūrah Yūsuf can offer an understanding of Islamic concept and structure of a story as manifested in the Qur'an.⁴⁵ All these scholarly views invite this study to examine the interpretation of Sūrah Yūsuf particularly verse 111, in the effort to understand the role and position of stories in the Qur'an.

a) Lessons to Man Who Thinks

With reference to Sūrah Yūsuf, Verse 111, several sentences, phrases, and words became the focus of the *mu'tabar* Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an. Among them is the sentence *فِي كَانَ لَفَذٌ أَلْبَابٌ لِأُولَىٰ عِبْرَةٌ قَصِيصُهُمْ* which was translated by Pickthall as follows; "In their history verily there is a lesson for men of understanding".⁴⁶ In this sentence, among the important words given emphasis by *tafsir* scholars is the word "ibrah"/عِبْرَةٌ. Imam Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Qurtubi (henceforth al-Qurtubi) in his *الجامع لأحكام القرآن* (*al-Jāmi' li Ahkām al-Qur'ān*) interprets "ibrah"/عِبْرَةٌ as "thoughts" (فكرة), "reminders" (تذكرة) or "warnings" (عظة).⁴⁷

Similar interpretation can also be found in *جامع البيان عن تأويل آي القرآن* (*Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āya al-Qur'ān*) by Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari (henceforth al-Tabari), who interprets the word as "to learn lessons from it" (يعتبرون بها) or "advice" or "reminder" (موعظة).⁴⁸ From these explanations, it can be understood that the word "ibrah"/عِبْرَةٌ in Sūrah Yūsuf, Ayat 111 carries the meaning of "lesson" which include advice, thought, reminder or warning which benefit man who thinks.

Imam Muhammad bin Ali al-Shauqani (henceforth al-Shauqani) in his *فتح القدير* (*Fath al-Qadir*), interprets the word "ibrah"/عِبْرَةٌ as "baṣīrah" (بصيرة) or *insight* that provides knowledge,

⁴⁴ 'Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali, *The Holy Qur'an: Arabic Text With An English Translation and Commentary*, (Lahore: Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1937), vol. II, 548.

⁴⁵ Mustansir Mir, "The Qur'anic story Of Joseph: Plot, themes and characters," *The Muslim World*, vol. LXXVI, no. 1 (January 1986), 15.

⁴⁶ Pickthall, *The Roman Transliteration*, 275.

⁴⁷ Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Qurtubi, *Al-Jāmi' li Ahkām al-Qur'ān*.

⁴⁸ Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari, *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āya al-Qur'ān*.

and thus, is able to release mankind from ignorance and confusion. In the context of the verse *أَلَّا لَيْبَ لَأُولَىٰ عِبْرَةٌ فَصَصِيهِمْ فِي كَأَن لَّكَدَ*, al-Shauqani explains that the word *qasasihim* (فَصَصِيهِمْ) can refer to either narrations about previous prophets, or specifically the story about Prophet Yūsuf عليه السلام from which man learns “*basīrah*” (بصيرة) or *insight* that can be understood by “common sense” (*al-'uqūl al-salīmah/ العقول السليمة*), therefore enables man to benefit for his self-worth. From al-Shauqani’s interpretation, it can be understood that “*ibrah*”/عبرة in the verse is ever relevant to the life of mankind.⁴⁹

In his *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm* (Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm), Imam Ismail bin Umar Ibnu Kathir (henceforth Ibnu Kathir) explains the meaning of the expression “*ibrah li ūli al-bab*” (عِبْرَةٌ لِّأُولَىٰ أَلْبَابٍ) as a lesson to men who are sensible.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, Imam Muhammad al-Tahir Ibnu ‘Asyur (henceforth Ibnu ‘Asyur) in his *al-tahriir wa al-tanwīr min al-tafsīr* (al-Tahriir wa al-Tanwīr min al-Tafsīr), interpretes the verse *أَلَّا لَيْبَ لَأُولَىٰ عِبْرَةٌ فَصَصِيهِمْ فِي كَأَن لَّكَدَ* to mean that “*ibrah*”/عبرة which can be attained through a process that connects between matters that can be witnessed by five basic human senses, with matters that are beyond those senses. This process can be performed by rational men (*ashābul uqūl/ أصحاب العقول*). In other words, stories in the Qur’an provide to man the opportunity to understand matters beyond transcendental dimension in order to attain “*ibrah*”/عبرة, as expressed in the verse in the Qur’an.

Imam Muhammad bin Umar al-Razi (henceforth al-Razi) in his *Mafātīh al-Ghayb* (Mafātīh al-Ghayb) explains that there are three forms of “*ibrah*”/عبرة which can be read in the story of Prophet Yūsuf عليه السلام in the Qur’an. Firstly, Allah سبحانه has the might to elevate the position of His servants. In the story Allah سبحانه raised the Prophet’s status as a servant (after his separation from his father Prophet Yaakob عليه السلام by his brothers) to the head of state. And thus too, according to al-Razi, Allah سبحانه lifted the status of Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم, in accordance with His will. Secondly, the story becomes a miracle (*mu’jizat/ معجزة*) of the Prophet Muhammad صلى الله عليه وسلم since it is about events not known to him until Allah سبحانه reveals it. Thirdly, the form that underlines the

⁴⁹ Muhammad bin Ali al-Shauqani, *Fath al-Qadīr*.

⁵⁰ Ismail bin Umar Ibnu Kathir, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm*.

important characteristics of a constructive narration according to the teachings of the Qur'an. The characteristics are clear when Allah ﷻ refers to the story as “الْقَصَصِ أَحْسَنَ” *the most beautiful stories*.⁵¹

It is clear from all the above commentaries that there are lessons or “*ibrah*”/عِبْرَةٌ to be learned from the story, including advice, thoughts, reminders or warnings to mankind. The fact that “*ibrah*”/عِبْرَةٌ is a fundamental content in the story about Prophet Yūsuf ﷺ, and the story is prescribed by Allah ﷻ as “الْقَصَصِ أَحْسَنَ” (*the most beautiful stories*), clearly shows that the role of “story” according to the Qur'an is to convey lessons or “*ibrah*”/عِبْرَةٌ.

b) Not Fictional or Deception

This study also found that the *mu'tabar* commentaries provide detailed explanations of this part of the verse 12:111, which is كَانَ لَقَدْ فِي يَدَيْهِ بَيِّنَاتٌ لِّذِي تَصْدِيقٍ وَلَكِنْ يُفْتَرَىٰ حَدِيثًا كَانَ مَا ۖ الْأَلْبَابِ لِأُولَىٰ عِبْرَةٍ قَصَصِهِمْ فِي translated by Pickthall as “*It is no invented story*”.⁵² Al-Qurtubi interprets this sentence to mean that the story of Prophet Yūsuf ﷺ in the Qur'an is not a fake narration. Instead it tells the truth about the content of sacred books before the Qur'an, that is, the Psalms (*Zabur*), the Torah (*Taurah*), and the Bible (*Injil*). According to al-Qurtubi, this is because Prophet Yūsuf ﷺ has also been described in these sacred books.⁵³ Al-Tabari interprets the same sentence as meaning that the story is not fictional or a deceptive narration (*yufalq*/يُخْتَلَقُ), rather it confirms the content of previous sacred books as Allah's revelations.⁵⁴ Ibn Kathir shows a similar understanding when he explains that it is impossible for the Qur'an to convey untrue or fictional content. Rather, the Qur'an affirms all previous sacred books, and denies all untruths and fictional matters.⁵⁵

According to al-Razi, stories about Prophet Yūsuf ﷺ in the Qur'an are “non-fictional” (مَا كَانَتْ هَذِهِ الْقِصَّةُ حَدِيثًا يُفْتَرَىٰ) because similar stories had been narrated in previous sacred books, especially the

⁵¹ Muhammad bin Umar al-Razi, *Maḥāṭih al-Ghayb*.

⁵² Pickthall, *The Roman Transliteration*, 275.

⁵³ al-Qurtubi, *Al-Jāmi' li Ahkām al-Qur'an*.

⁵⁴ al-Tabari, *Jāmi' al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āya al-Qur'an*.

⁵⁵ Ibnu Kathir, *Tafsīr al-Qur'an al-'Azīm*.

Torah, which Allah ﷻ revealed to Prophet Mūsā عليه السلام.⁵⁶ Similarly, al-Shauqani argues that stories in the Qur'an are neither fictional nor fabricated, but true stories as they were already narrated earlier in the Torah, Psalms, and the Bible.⁵⁷ With similar implications, Ibn 'Asyur asserts that the stories of previous people (before the Qur'an) are true stories (*al-khabar sidiq/ خبر صدق*) in conformity with reality (*mutabiq lilwaqi/ مطابق للواقع*). In relation to the meaning of the first sentence as previously described, Ibnu 'Asyur argues that “*ibrah*”/عبرة could not be attained by man through fictional stories or deceptions. This is because the soul of mankind does not easily perceive lessons (*لا تحتفظ به النفوس*) from fictional or deceptive stories. Such stories are considered as lacking in “*ibrah*”/عبرة to mankind. Referring to fictional stories, Ibn 'Asyur provides their examples such as superstitious supposition (*الخرافات*), stories about spirits and ghosts (*أحاديث الجن والغول*) and epics containing elements of mythology such as “Rustam and Esfandiyar” (*رستم وأسفنديار*), a Persian epic that tells stories of two legends named Rustam and Esfandiyar. Ibn 'Asyur thinks that such story is fictional and is merely for seductive fantasy (*الخيالات اللذيذة*), among which are rendered through humour (*الفكاهات*).⁵⁸

Based on the above discussion, it is clear that all the *mu'tabar* commentaries of the Qur'an referred in this study understand that the story of the Prophet Yūsuf عليه السلام is true and real, and not fictional, neither fabricated nor containing deceptions. This understanding is based on the fact that similar narrations are found in the sacred books of the Psalm, the Torah, and the Bible, the authenticity of which the Qur'an confirms. These commentaries concur that fictional and fabricated stories or stories containing deceptions do not render real lessons or “*ibrah*”/عبرة beneficial to mankind. In other words, such stories are considered as incapable of offering what the verse 12:111 refers to as “moral lessons for thinking human beings” as “*ibrah li uli al-bab*” (*عِبْرَةٌ لِأُولَى الْأَبْوابِ*).

⁵⁶ al-Razi, *Mafātih al-Ghayb*.

⁵⁷ al-Shauqai, *Fath al-Qadīr*.

⁵⁸ Muhammad al-Tahir Ibnu 'Asyur, *al-Tahrīr wa al-Tanwīr min al-Tafsīr*.

c) Guidance and Blessing to the Believers of Allah ﷻ

Other than the two sentences discussed above, most of the commentaries also discuss the final portion of verse 12:111, which is *يُؤْمِنُونَ لِقَوْمٍ وَرَحْمَةً وَهُدًى شَيْءٍ كُلِّ وَتَفْصِيلٍ*, translated by Pickthall as “...and a detailed explanation of everything, and a guidance and a mercy for folk who believe”.⁵⁹ With reference to this sentence, al-Qurtubi interprets the phrase *شَيْءٍ كُلِّ وَتَفْصِيلٍ* (*explanation of everything*) as an explanation needed by mankind about the Shari’ah (laws/regulations/code of conduct), including what is made permissible (*halal*) and forbidden (*haram*) by Allah ﷻ.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, Ibn Kathir explains that the expression *شَيْءٍ كُلِّ وَتَفْصِيلٍ* bears meanings related to religion such as *halal* and *haram*, *makruh* (offensive) and *sunnah* (meritorious), deeds of devotion and obligation, prophetic messages on matters which are absolute, unseen of the future, knowledge about Allah ﷻ and how He is totally dissimilar to all beings.⁶¹ According to al-Razi, the sentence explains about two things; about Prophet Yūsuf عليه السلام within the circle of his father and siblings, as well as about matters relating to Islam.⁶²

The next sentence is *يُؤْمِنُونَ لِقَوْمٍ وَرَحْمَةً وَهُدًى* which Ibn Kathir understands as referring to the soul of man who is endowed with guidance and thus free from astray, and who in fact is awarded with grace from Allah ﷻ in this world and hereafter.⁶³ With reference to the same sentence, al-Razi interprets the word *هُدًى* (*huda*) as “receiving guidance in this world”, while the phrase *يُؤْمِنُونَ لِقَوْمٍ وَرَحْمَةً* refers to the *hidayah* or guidance that begets man in his life, which gives him the reason to receive blessings from Allah ﷻ on reckoning day.⁶⁴

Ibn ‘Asyur explains that the sentence *شَيْءٍ كُلِّ صِيلٍ* refers to matters relating to *i’tibar* or teachings or lessons in the stories of the Qur’an. He understands the word *هُدًى* (*huda*) to mean “*‘ibrah*” or

⁵⁹ Pickthall, *The Roman Transliteration*, 275.

⁶⁰ al-Qurtubi, *Al-Jāmi’ li Ahkām al-Qur’ān*.

⁶¹ Ibnu Kathir, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm*.

⁶² al-Razi, *Maḥāṭih al-Ghayb*.

⁶³ Ibnu Kathir, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘Azīm*.

⁶⁴ al-Razi, *Maḥāṭih al-Ghayb*.

lessons that bring faith (*iman*) and piety (*taqwa*). To him *taqwa* is the fundamental aspect for man in obtaining success in life in this world and in the hereafter. Lastly, the expression **يُؤْمِنُونَ لِقَوْمٍ وَّرَحْمَةً** is explained by him as blessings from Allah **سُبْحَانَ** to those who learn lessons from the stories in the Qur'an, that keep man from astray, thus bringing them close to peace in the present life and the hereafter.

Based on the above discussion, most of the *mu'tabar* commentaries obviously describe the sentence **يُؤْمِنُونَ لِقَوْمٍ وَّرَحْمَةً** as a detailed explanation about Islam as a religion. This includes “*ibrah*”/عبرة or lessons that can be learned by Muslims from the narration about Prophet Yūsuf **عَلَيْهِ السَّلَام** in the Qur'an. These lessons become a guidance or **يُؤْمِنُونَ** to those who have the faith (*iman*) and piety (*taqwa*) in performing orders from Allah **سُبْحَانَ** as well as abstaining from what is forbidden with the view of receiving blessings from Him.

Conclusion

This study stems from Affandi's statement that his idea of “*Knowledge-Story*” is inspired by the Qur'an. PB conceptualises this idea by contrasting “knowledge” to “story”, and maintains “story” as a tool in conveying “knowledge”. Therefore, PB puts forward the primacy of “knowledge” with “story” subordinated to it. This idea invites further examinations, especially to understand the role and position of “story” from the Islamic perspective. This study focuses on the Qur'anic verse 12:111, which among others describes the role and position of stories narrated in the Qur'an. A close reading of the six selected *mu'tabar* commentaries of the Qur'an reveals that the verse offers a fundamental understanding of the role and position of stories from the Islamic perspective. The majority of the commentaries concur that stories in the Qur'an comprise “*ibrah*”/عبرة or lessons which also contain advice, thoughts, reminders or warnings to mankind. Most commentaries also regard the story of Prophet Yūsuf **عَلَيْهِ السَّلَام** in the Qur'an as not fictional, neither fabricated nor containing deceptions; rather, it is a true story based on real events. “*ibrah*”/عبرة thus understood may serve as a source of guidance (**يُؤْمِنُونَ**) to mankind and blessings (*rahmah*) from Allah **سُبْحَانَ** to guarantee success (*al-falah*) in the present life and the hereafter.

Also discussed was how PB emerged as a literary notion that conceptualises the role of “story” in conveying “true knowledge” as understood in Islam. This “true knowledge” would enable man to understand and differentiate clearly between good and evil. With this understanding, man would be able to make the right choice (*ikhtiyar*) in his every action and finally to perform good deeds and avoid evil deeds (*amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar*). In other words, “true knowledge” is man’s starting point in becoming a good servant of Allah. It is in this context that stories in the Islamic perspectives are viewed as a tool to convey “true knowledge”; in other words, as an “*ibrah*”/عبرة or lessons mentioned in the Qur’an that are explained in the *mu'tabar* commentaries referred in this study. In this sense that the PB idea of “*Knowledge-Story*” is said to be synchronised with the teachings of Islam.

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AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI TALIBAN
A Comparative Study of
Their Political Ideology and Religious Affiliations

Muhammad Kalim Ullah Khan¹ and Osman Bakar²

Abstract

The main aim of this article is to discuss several facets of the socio-political phenomena known under the general name of Taliban that swept Afghanistan and embroiled Pakistan in a regional conflict since the last decade of twentieth century. The focus of the discussion is on the emergence of Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as two separate and distinct movements, their organizational developments, and their similarities and differences in terms of political ideology, religious affiliations, and relationships with Pakistan. The organizational and political-religious transformation of the Taliban is examined in this article in three historical phases. First, the political-religious background in Afghanistan that led to the formation of the Taliban in 1994 and its rise to power in 1996 only two years after its existence as an Islamic movement. Second, the seven-year period 1994-2001 during which the Taliban ruled Afghanistan until they were ousted from power following the invasion of the country by the US-led coalition forces a month after the September 11 (2001) tragic event in New York. This article examines the transformation of the Taliban as a movement and as a government ruling in the name of Islam during this period. And third, the twenty-year period when the Taliban as opposition forces waged an insurgency against the US-installed puppet regime that successfully ended with them regaining power in August 2021. The article concludes with some

¹ Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Thought and Civilisation, University of Management and Technology, Sialkot Campus, Pakistan. Email: kalim.ullah@skt.umt.edu.pk

² Professor and Holder of Al-Ghazali Chair of Epistemology and Civilisational Studies and Renewal at ISTAC, International Islamic University Malaysia and Emeritus Professor of Philosophy of Science, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. Email: osmanbakar@iium.edu.my

remarks on the possible directions in which the Taliban could be heading in the post-2021 era.

Keywords: Taliban, Afghanistan, Pakistan, ideology, the US, extremism, and religious.

Introduction

There is no doubt that the Taliban has become an important as well as a controversial issue in the contemporary world. They now ruled Afghanistan for the second time after humiliating the United States (US) and its allies by forcing them to flee the country. They returned to Kabul with little resistance. The first time the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, with hardly any experience in governance and administration not to mention their political immaturity and religious extremism, they gained fame in the West for hosting the US' then number one enemy Osama bin Laden and his senior aides and providing him with a sanctuary in the Afghan mountains. They also gained notoriety in the West as oppressors of women. But many Muslims do not agree with this Western view. They prefer to give the Taliban a chance to prove to the world that without external interference they would bring positive changes in Afghanistan both on the political and religious fronts.

It is important to emphasize though that this group owes its existence and violent growth to the confluence of several international forces that sought to draw Afghanistan into their respective political and military orbits of influence. These forces, clearly more so than the domestic ones, particularly American and Russian interventions in various forms, helped plunge the country into chaos. But neighbouring Pakistan and India also had a fair share of their divisive interference in Afghanistan over the decades. These two traditional rivals in the Indian subcontinent could not let their hands off Afghanistan even for a single moment because of its apparent strategic importance to them. Global superpower and regional rivalries and infightings among the Afghan Muslims help pave the way for the emergence of the Taliban as a radical Islamic movement and thrust them to the centre-stage of international politics at the turn of the twenty-first century.

The Taliban (literally students in both Pashto and Arabic) was founded as an Islamic movement in 1994. Its founding-leader (*amir*) was Mulla Mohammed Omar, an Afghan militant from the Pashtun ethnic group, which is the largest in the country. It was a group unknown to the outside world until they gained power in 1996 by default. As it happened, the Taliban emerged on the political scene that year to fill the prolonged power vacuum created by the failure of the Mujahidin coalition to form a working government. Although the Taliban was founded in Afghanistan, its name initially was not exclusively used to refer to its members who were Afghan citizens. There were also significant numbers of Taliban members who lived on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan. They were either Afghan students in Pakistani madrasas (seminaries) many of which were financed by Saudis, or Pakistani madrasamates who were also ethnic Pashtuns. Taliban members in the two countries were thus united in religion and ethnicity. Moreover, rather noteworthy is the fact that ethnic Pashtuns constitute nearly 20% of Pakistan's population making them the second largest ethnic group in the country. This demographic fact means that the first Taliban government in Kabul enjoyed sympathy and support from the Pashtun population on both sides of the border. They could rely on the local Pashtun population as a source of membership recruitment.

However, the label Pakistani Taliban did not appear until after the American invasion of Afghanistan and the fall of the Taliban government. We will later explain the developments in the post-invasion Taliban movement that led to the identification of Pakistani Taliban as a distinct group from the Afghan Taliban who were waging an insurgency against the American puppet regime in Kabul. There has been some confusion among researchers about the identity of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban. This article will show that the two groups are not identical, although there exist ideological, social, and organizational relationships between them. It will discuss similarities and differences between the two Taliban groups.

The Emergence of the Taliban: Historical Background

The original Taliban that was established in 1994 by Mulla Omar was an independent Islamic movement with its own cause and goals.

Before its appearance, several streams of Islamic ideology favouring the enforcement of Islamic law (*Shariah*) have flowed across Afghanistan. Each stream is identified with a particular Muslim organization or Islamic movement. In this sense there were several Islamic movements and Islamic political parties predating the Taliban, including *Hizb-e-Islami* (Islamic Party) led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (born: 1949) and *Jamiat-e-Islami* (Islamic Society) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani (1940-2011). Scholars have used different theories to explain the diversity in Islamic ideological movements in the country that are basically political in nature. The theories include those that see these movements as expressions of “traditional revolt”³ against modernity or as a “fundamentalist variety of pan-Islamism identified with the Muslim Brotherhood”⁴ in the Arab world or as a nationalistic response to the modern challenge.

The Islamic political ideology in its various forms in Afghanistan did not develop during the Soviet occupation. Rather, it has been nurtured as early as 1968 by such thinkers as Professor Ghulam M. Niazi (1932-1978)⁵ and Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, and even earlier in 1957 by Dr Saeed M. Musa Tawana, another academic from Kabul University. Abdul Rahim Niazi (d. 1970) founded the student organization *Jawan-e-Musalman* (Muslim Youth) in 1968 in Kabul University.⁶ The Soviet Union tried its best to crush this organization through its Marxist leader Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan (1909 – 1978), who overthrew the monarchy of Mohammad Zahir Shah (reign: 1933-1973) in 1973 through a military coup d’etat to establish Afghanistan as a republic. However, this first President of modern Afghanistan failed.⁷ He was

³ C. Gerald, “With the Afghan rebels,” *The New York Review of Books*, 1980.

⁴ S. Harrison, “Dateline Afghanistan: Exit through Finland,” *Foreign Policy* 41 (Winter) (1980): 178.

⁵ Ghulam Nazi was a Professor of Theology at the Faculty of Shariah, Kabul University. He founded the first Islamic circle in Afghanistan (1957) and later (1967) together with Rabbani *Jamiat-e-Islami* Afghanistan and is thus qualified to be treated as the founder of the Islamic movement in modern Afghanistan.

⁶ F. Rahman & B. Qureshi, *Afghans Meet Soviet Challenge* (Peshawar: Institute of Regional Studies, 1981).

⁷ S. G. Speen, “Flexible ‘fundamentalism’ favoured by the US and for Afghanistan,” in *Issues in the Islamic Movements*, ed. K. Siddiqui (London: The Open Press

assassinated in 1978. Anti-communist Muslim fighters intensified their guerrilla war against the Afghan communist government. The regime was in deep trouble. The following year in late 1979, the Soviet Union intervened to save the communist government. That fateful event was to plunge Afghanistan into a civil war, the so-called Soviet Afghan War (1979-1989), which was essentially a protracted armed conflict between the Soviet Union and the Afghanistan Mujahidin supported by the US and its allies. The Soviet invasion and its aftermath were to drag the US and other powers into the conflict, helping to turn it into a major international crisis.

The original Afghan Mujahidin led by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi (1925-2019) emerged as a jihadi response to the Soviet invasion. Their leaders were highly educated. Several of them were University Professors and doctors. They were determined to establish an Islamic Republic in Afghanistan in place of the hated Marxist Republic. Although there was a mass exodus of Afghans to Pakistan following the Mujahidin liberation war against the Soviet puppet regime in Kabul (1979-1989), the great majority of the Mujahidin did not migrate to Pakistan or Iran; they stayed to fight the puppet regime. The regime installed by the Soviet Union under the leadership of President Najibullah (1947-1996) fought the Mujahidin and its allies for nearly three years without success. When the regime finally collapsed in April 1992, a power struggle emerged among the Mujahidin parties.

After the fall of Najibullah, the Mujahidin coalition reached an agreement on post-Soviet governance on 24 April 1992. An Islamic Council would be formed with Sibghatullah Mojaddedi as President for the first two months followed by Rabbani for the next four months. This development in Afghan politics looked promising at first, but the power sharing agreement collapsed due to infighting among the Mujahidin groups and political differences between Mojaddedi and Rabbani. The latter refused to yield power. Following negotiations to resolve the intra-Mujahidin conflict, the Afghan leaders signed another Islamabad accord on 7 March 1993. According to this agreement, Rabbani was to remain President and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to become the Prime Minister but that accord

Limited, 1985), 247.

failed to be implemented. The intra-Mujahidin fighting worsened to the point of Hekmatyar's forces attacking Kabul. This development had serious negative implications for the country. In 1996, with the country in chaos without a working government, the then two-year old Taliban with no experience in politics and governance took over Kabul to form a government.

The Taliban: Its First Taste and Reign of Power

The war-weary Afghan people supported the Taliban not for any ideological reason but simply because they wanted to see a normalcy of peace, thinking that they were just "Taliban" (students), politically innocent free from sectarian political ambitions. But the international community – save Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – did not recognize its government. As for the Taliban, they seemed unconcerned with the international opinion. They just wished to get freedom from the traditional warlords^{8,9}.

Pakistan officially recognised the Taliban government on 25 May 1997. Pakistan justified its recognition and support for the Taliban government by claiming that it wanted to restore peace and unity in its neighbouring Afghanistan, which it then viewed as a highly desirable objective for the Afghan people themselves. Pakistan's position is understandable since if peace were to prevail in Afghanistan, there would be peace in Pakistan as well. Furthermore, since the Soviet invasion nearly 3.5 million Afghan refugees moved into Pakistan,¹⁰ which threatened the country's internal security, peace, and prosperity. According to the Street Wall Journal, four million Afghan people were then living in Pakistan.¹¹ Presently, more than two million Afghan refugees are still living in Pakistan, which is a constant burden on the country's economy and a source of

⁸ R. Yusufzai, "Violation of Islamic teaching," *The News International*, Islamabad. October 4, 1996.

⁹ H. Malik, *Pakistan: Founders' Aspirations and Today's Realities* (Oxford University press, 2001), 395.

¹⁰ M. Jalalzai, *Taliban and the New Great Game in Afghanistan* (Lahore: Dua Publications, 2002), 194; and A. Siddique, "Securing peace and promoting stability in Western Pakistan," in *Stabilization Operations, Security and Development; States of fragility*, ed. R. Muggah (Oxon., 2014), 107.

¹¹ "Unspooking Spooks." *Wall Street Journal Editorial*, 18 September 2001.

violence. From Pakistan's perspective, it had more reasons to gain than to lose from its diplomatic relations with the newly setup Taliban government.

Paramount in Pakistan's decision to recognise the Taliban government was its security interests. In FATA (Federal Administered Tribal Agencies) and along the Afghan border there were many secret agencies working for their own sectarian interests. These agencies found opportunities to sabotage national and regional peace-seeking efforts. Sometimes violence increased along the Durand Line (the 2,670 km international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan) due to the direct involvement of secret agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).¹² A statement by ex-Indian Foreign Minister reflects his country's interest in this region; he said that red lines should not be crossed in negotiation with the Taliban¹³. The Pakistani Army and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) did not play a negative role against the Taliban, because ISI knew that the American Army and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would leave the country and they would have to get together on each matter. Pakistan's government and military had spent much energy in ventures since 1979. The Pakistani military or ISI could bring in new constant antagonists and nurtured a permanent neighbour against its wishes.

The ISI had to survive in a complex and complicated web of international and regional networks, but the CIA goals were comprehensive. To the Pakistan government's credit, it saved the country from external aggressions. Indian forces were deployed on Pakistan's border ready with the Israeli Air Force in Siri Nager (Kashmir) to attack Pakistan after 9/11 had occurred. The US and its Allies pressured Pakistan to join them leaving it with no choice but to join. India, Israel, U.S and NATO and other allies' first target was Pakistan. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and all Muslim countries were hesitant to support Pakistan directly. However, the country survived, although its foreign policy and diplomacy were not favourable to the solidarity of Pakistan and the major issue was Taliban. It was a

¹² Ibid. p. 95.

¹³ S. Khurshid, "Red lines and negotiation with Taliban," *The Express* (Urdu), 21 June 2013.

similar situation that Pakistan faced during the Soviet Afghan War; politically, economically, and strategically the existing situation was a great threat to Pakistan's survival.

Saudi Arabia's recognition and support for the Taliban government followed only a day after Pakistan's. Later that same week, the UAE became the third country to confer official recognition, which is hardly surprising since it usually toes the Saudi line in foreign policy. Saudi support appeared to be primarily based on religious consideration. Many of the Taliban leaders and followers, including Mulla Omar, had studied in the Deoband seminaries (*madrasas*) in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many of these seminaries are financed by the Saudis. There is ideological affinity between the Saudi Wahhabi school of thought and the Deoband school of thought that shaped the Taliban mindset. The Deoband school emphasized exoteric aspects or externalities of the Shariah.

In both Afghanistan and Pakistan ethnicity and religiosity are closely intertwined. It is important to first understand the Pashtun tribal structure and Islamic identity before delving further into the issue of the Taliban Movement and its religious ideology. The Islamic identity of the Pashtuns is inextricably linked to their tribal system. Their traditional practices such as *riwaj* (customs) and *Pashtunwali* (the Pashtun code of ethics) are generally not in conflict with Islamic teachings. On their part, the Taliban did not forbid any local customs and village traditions when they were in power, because they believed them to be Islamic. However, they did end a few customs like the *baad system*, in which women from an enemy tribe had to be given to another group in hostility to stop mutual killing.

Foreign invaders found it challenging to draw the Taliban Pashtuns away from their tribal and social structures because their education in *hujras* (adjacent rooms attached to mosques) have made them more traditionally attached to their outward and inward practices of Islam. However, those Taliban who received their education from Pakistani madrasas just paid attention to their outward practices, and their political character was more romanticized. The younger generation lived their whole lives in

Pakistan, from infancy to adulthood, and received their education there as well, particularly from the Deoband school of thought. Which is why, they adhered to outward practices of the religion and were more focused on revolutionary Islamic ideas. For strategic purposes, the US and its allies made every effort to alter Afghan society's tribal structure, especially in the southern belt of Pashtun tribes. Their findings indicated that it was simpler to alter the tribal system of law than the Islamic one. No matter whether the two systems were based on local customs or Islamic law, neither made it possible for invaders to overthrow or destroy them. In a nutshell, Islam coexists with the Pashtun's tribal organization.

The Taliban underwent significant ideological and political shifts beginning in the second half of the 1990s after their rise to power and again after their return to power in August 2021. Quite clearly, over the lengthy period of twenty-five years (1996-2021), dramatic shifts in their ideological outlook took place. Many academics are unsure whether the Taliban Movement began as an Islamic movement or as a Pashtun movement. It should be kept in mind that both Pashtun customs and Islamic traditions were severely distorted during the Soviet occupation, specifically under Najib's communist administration. As we indicated above, the Taliban first appeared on the Afghan national political scene after the Mujahidin failed to reach a consensus on the composition of the national government. They were then mere students who had gathered under Mulla Omar's patronage.

The Afghan Taliban's organizational structure and political administrative set up were partly inclusive and partly exclusive. A clean and effective organizational network would depend on the clarity of its shaping ideas or ideology understood in the positive sense. If the guiding ideas are flawed, then the organizational structure will be weakened. Poor ideology combined with a hollow political administrative set up would make the state weaker. The Afghan Taliban appeared with unclear ideology and direction. As a result, the government failed to sustain itself. Progressively weakened, the government collapsed in a relatively short period.

In the beginning, the Taliban won the sympathies of locals but with the passage of time, people were trying to avoid them, because

of their authoritarian mindset. In the beginning, the Afghan people were happy that the Taliban did not demand power and after establishing law and order, they promised that they would hand over power to the sovereign government. However, after getting control of Kabul their behaviour and attitudes became dictatorial¹⁴. All powers were centralized in one hand, as was the case with the Pakistani Taliban.

During their first reign of power, the Taliban adopted three distinct strategies, namely ethnic, political, and religious. In the 1990s ethnic and expulsion of the Soviet Union strategy were used, in which they were successful and the whole nation was gathered under their umbrella. Ordinary Afghans chose to support the movement as it offered a safeguard against rampant extortion, rape, and other such lawlessness, rather than from a desire to comply with the Taliban's strict approach to religious doctrines.¹⁵ The popular perception amongst many Afghans is that prior to the Taliban rise to power, especially during the rule of the Mujahidin coalition, the government in Kabul has been dominated by non-Pashtuns, and especially by the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance. This perception has resulted in sympathy for the Taliban, and the number of Pashtuns joining the movement has consequently risen. However, with the Soviet Union's expulsion, the ethnic strategy was abandoned in favour of a religious one that included the enforcement of Islamic laws and regulations. One thing is clear. During the 1990s the Taliban were more inclined towards religious rather than political ideology. But on the religious front the Taliban Administration received a poor review. It is severely criticised by the international community for its strict interpretation of the Shariah, particularly its restrictive view of the place and role of women in education.

The Afghan Taliban's ethnic strategy worked well with the Pashtuns since they share a common ethnic identity. In fact, its appeal extends to the whole Pashtun territory, including the

¹⁴ A. Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia*. (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 211.

¹⁵ David B. Edwards, *Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad* (California: University of California Press, 2002), <http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft3p30056w> (accessed 20 Sep 2022).

neighbouring territory on the Pakistani side of the border from which both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban derive their main support. In this ethnic strategy the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban converge. However, their pro-Wahhabi religious ideology has little appeal to the mainstream Afghan society since most Afghans are attached to either the traditional Sunni Maturidi theological school or the Sufi Orders or both.

Ideologically speaking, the Taliban may be classified into two groups: traditional Taliban and politically oriented Taliban. Mullah Omar (1960-2013), the first Afghan President under the Taliban, often mentioned that Islam is the only bond that binds all Afghans and therefore the Taliban should not indulge in fighting based on ethnicity, linguistic or tribal factors. But the Afghan Taliban has proved to be deeply ideological by virtue of their mixing political with religious ideology. They were embracing a divisive and regressive brand of political Islam. In their second reign of power since August 2021 it appears that they are still displaying the same brand of political-religious ideology.

Post-US Invasion Era: Taliban Insurgency and the Emergence of Pakistani Taliban

Following the September 11 (2001) incident, for which the US blamed Osama ben Laden who was given sanctuary in Afghanistan by Mulla Omar, the US-led coalition invaded the country and ousted the Taliban from power in October the following month in the name of fighting terrorism. The invasion further devastated the country and created more turmoil. The Taliban fought back by waging an insurgency against the US-installed puppet regime in Kabul. It was during this period that the media made its first reference to the existence of what is called the Pakistani Taliban that is separate and different from the Afghan Taliban.

Although the Taliban only emerged as a movement in Afghanistan in the last decade of the twentieth century, its early members had received religious education in Pakistan's seminaries. During the insurgency relations between Pakistan and the Taliban were rather volatile. Pakistan had to perform a delicate balancing act between its commitment as an ally to the US-led "coalition of the

willing” against the Taliban-supported Qaeda and its sensitivities to the Pakistani Pashtun sympathy for the Afghan Taliban. The media first used the term “Pakistani Taliban” when armed tribesmen resisted Pakistan’s drive against foreign militants who mostly existed along the Durand Line. Local Pashtuns were mobilized and activated, and it was these who became known as the Pakistani Taliban.¹⁶ They had a visible and active presence in FATA and the outskirts of the NWFP (North-West Frontier Province). Presently, the new name “*Khyber Pakhtunkhwa*” was adopted. Initially, they did not challenge the Pakistani law and order but later they were involved in disturbing the peace¹⁷. Initial government military operations against the Pakistani Taliban were often used more to obtain leverage than to defeat them. Due to conservatism, the FATA region was affected a lot by conflicting interests and fabricated ideas. Anyhow, Al-Qaeda exerted more influence on the Pakistani than on the Afghan Taliban. Some fighters in FATA that have mistakenly been referred to as the Taliban in the media were merely members of religious-cum-social organizations with political ambition and were in no way trying to undermine the government or its local representatives.

The Frontier Crimes Regulation Act 1901 was enforced by the British colonial rulers in the seven tribal regions covering 10,000 square miles. Each region was called an agency. After drawing the Durand Line in 1893, recognized *Sardars* and *Maliks* allowed local customary laws to prevail. The government does not interfere with the local system of *jirga* (council of elders) for the settlement of disputes. One tension, which contributed a lot to providing safe passage for the warriors, occurred in 2001, when the Indian Army was deployed on the eastern border known as *Line of Control* (LOC) due to the Kashmiri freedom fighters’ attack on the Indian Parliament¹⁸. Due to this giving of safe passage, this tribal belt has had a wave of extortions, narcotics, murders, and abductions. As a

¹⁶ H. A. Rizvi, “Understanding the insurgency,” *Daily Times*, Lahore, 5 October 2008.

¹⁷ C. Franco, “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: The Bajaur case’, *NEFA Foundation*, 15 July 2009, www.nefafoundation.org, accessed 13 July 2010.

¹⁸ A. Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, 224.

result, the local political administration became powerless, and the militants got stronger than ever¹⁹.

Unlike the Afghani Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban was neither independent nor committed to any specific ideology. The Pakistani Taliban has never been a monolithic entity. It was a group that served various interests. For one thing, most groups in FATA are fragmented into smaller units that range from 'hard' to 'soft'. The use of these terms has been much debated; while the hard Taliban mounts attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the soft Taliban focuses on attacking Afghanistan. Both groups are composed of members with different tribal loyalties and different agendas, and a few units in each category oppose the Pakistani state and the security forces. Further, these units consider their fight against the Pakistani as a jihad. Mainstream Muslim community, however, disagree with their interpretation of jihad. The Pakistani Taliban perceives their actions towards the Pakistani Army and the mainstream Pakistani society as a jihad. Nonetheless, there are some slightly more moderate Taliban groups in FATA that, while not necessarily pro-government, are rarely involved in attacks against Pakistani forces. Several of these have opposed the presence of foreign warriors in their respective areas and such groups have concentrated mainly on Afghanistan.

Although without an ideology the Pakistani Taliban use the Taliban name to discredit the Afghan Taliban. However, the attempt to discredit the latter is rather misplaced. The Afghani Taliban are not known to have killed innocent civilians nor take extortion money²⁰. Anyway, the Pakistani Taliban employs a careful strategy to advance their cause based on establishing networks. First, they recruit personnel before initiating vigilante activities, which are justified by attacking so-called un-Islamic activities.²¹ These personnel were trained in different tribal areas by some secret agencies, and a huge amount of dollars was spent for this purpose. This is the traditional

¹⁹ *New York Times*, 19 January 2006.

²⁰ S. N. Jamal, "Afghan Taliban," *Roznāma Express* (Urdu), Lahore, Pakistan, 19 January 2014.

²¹ A. A. Shah, "Pakistani Taliban," *Interview International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR)*, Singapore, 15 January 2009. Retrieved from <http://www.pvtr.org/StaffPublications.htm>.

history of the tribal area; they always keep guns with them. However, it does not mean that they are naturally ill-willed people. They are co-operative, patriotic, caring, dauntless, and brave. However, sometimes exaggerated claims are made. It is not true to say that secret agencies played an important role in nurturing a whole generation to become fighters as claimed by Daniel Markey who described the CIA, through the ISI, as having moved in huge sums of money to help establish madrasas to train a generation in warfare and militancy.²² The fact is that some fighters were brought by secret agencies from all over the world for training in this region, because that area was comparatively favourable and safer²³ according to battle rules, since they could easily be moved to other areas.

According to Ahmed Rashid, a Taliban-expert journalist, the Pakistani Taliban that arose across the border proved to be more ruthless and committed to Al-Qaeda²⁴. The Pakistan Taliban flourished in very remote areas where *takfir* (apostasy pronouncements) was quite common. These areas are known for being the hotbed of religious extremism. The spirit of Islamic moderation has been lost. Instead, a wrongly interpreted jihadi culture prevailed, which encouraged extremism. Due to ignorance and misunderstandings, different religious groups issued wrong *fatāwa* (religious edicts) against one another. This misuse of fatwa polarized the Muslim community and created enmity among the various religious groups. It foments violence, since having declared a rival group as infidels and astray, renegades or apostates, a religious group may consider it legitimate to act violently.

Misguided jihadi culture that goes against Islamic teachings developed and spread in Pakistan due to two main reasons: one is the Kashmir dispute, and the other is the Soviet Afghan war. As many as perhaps 250,000 young people were recruited into the battlefields through sectarian organizations without being educated on the true

²² D. Markey, *Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt*, Council Special Report No. 36, Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Actions, August 2008. Retrieved from www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Pakistan_CSR36.pdf.

²³ I. Gul, "Military operations in FATA," in *Political Violence and Terrorism in South Asia*, eds. P. I. Cheema, M. H. Noori & A. R. Malik (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2006).

²⁴ A. Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, 236.

Islamic concept of jihad. Many Pakistanis associated the Pakistani Taliban with violence. The Afghan Taliban has also been blamed for the violence in Afghanistan and the adjoining regions in Pakistan. However, many parties and groups, including foreign powers contributed to violence after the Soviet Afghan War. During the War America and Saudi Arabia poured money into Afghanistan to finance Islamic fundamentalist movements to beat the Russians²⁵.

Hilary Clinton, the former US Secretary of State, also referred to her country's role in fomenting violence in the region when she said, "We also have a history of moving into Pakistan. The people we are fighting today, we funded them twenty years ago. We did it because we were reluctant about that struggle with the Soviet Union; they invaded Afghanistan, and we did not want to see them control Central Asia and so we went to work. Mr. Reagan dealt with the Pakistani ISI and military and recruited the Mujahidin. The Wahabi brand of Islam was imported from Saudi Arabia and from other places. Billions of dollars were wasted to collapse the Soviet Union."²⁶ This was the triangle of Saudi Arabia, the USA and Pakistan, who supported the *deobandi madrasa* students and poured huge amounts of money and supplies into the Islamic areas near Pakistan's border.²⁷ At the same time, the Taliban provided peace for a limited period through their own efforts in their territory. However, one thing that cannot be disputed was that when the Taliban appeared

²⁵ As Amir Rana says, "America started to spend enormous resources in the Afghan war. Berzenski describes that 3 July 1979; President Jimmy Carter sanctioned a fund of five hundred million dollar for this purpose, which was kept completely secret. According to John Pinger, the purpose of that fund was to establish such movement that could foster the religious Islamic fundamentalism to terminate the role of Russia in central Asia. America and Saudi Arabia, during the Soviet Afghan war, provided four hundred and five billion dollars to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and weapons and drugs became prominent business of this region" (Rana, 2002: 17-18). According to an Afghan correspondent Sur Gul Speen, America tried to create influence on Sardar Daud. For this purpose, they sent US\$12 to Daud in 1977. Huge amount was sent through the Shah of Iran to Sardar Daud (Speen, 1985).

²⁶ C. Hillary, *US and Taliban*. Accessed on 23-06-2013, at 11:08pm. Retrieved from <http://www.youtube.com/watch>.

²⁷ A. Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

on the scene, sectarianism and ethnic cleansing reached its climax for the first time in the history of Afghanistan.²⁸

The Pakistani Taliban: One Name, Many Groups

The diversity of the Pakistani Taliban needs to be thoroughly examined if we are to understand the complex web of allegiances and relationships among them. The next discussion is about the different Taliban groups and their allies' outfits.

1. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The Pakistan Taliban was established by Bait Ullah Mehsud under the full name of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan), hereafter cited as TTP. The strongholds of TTP are in Orakzai and Mehsud agencies, and North Waziristan and Bajaur. TTP claims it is involved in a defensive jihad against the Pakistan's Army²⁹. According to its spokesperson, 'the main objective of TTP is to fight NATO and US forces. However, we were forced to resort to a defensive jihad in our country, due to the wrong policies of Pakistan's government'³⁰.

The Pakistani Taliban wanted to create a government modelled on the Afghan Taliban government existing during the period 1996-2001. This was their first strategy to wrest control of the western province of Pakistan. They had sympathizers who agree with their strategies³¹. This is the case not only in tribal areas but also in Karachi, Pakistan's largest city and economic hub, where they had proved capable of paralyzing it with their disruptive activities; even Mulla Omer claimed that the Taliban had the ability to take control of Karachi³². Furthermore, they have threatened the *Muttahida Qaumi*

²⁸ A. Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia*.

²⁹ *Daily Times*, Lahore, 16 December 2007.

³⁰ M. Abdul-Baqi, *Pakistani Taliban Disclosed*. Retrieved from www.islamonline.net. Accessed on 15 July 2010.

³¹ H. Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan," *CTS Sentinel*, 2008. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/17868/profile_of_tehrikitaliban_pakistan.html.

³² F. Khan, "Taliban and their sympathizers," *Daily Times*, 10 August 2008.

movement (MQM)³³ headed by Altaf Hussain. The Pakistani Taliban's disruption and destabilization of Karachi had resulted in daily target killings and suicide attacks. No doubt, in this violent setting in Karachi, ethnic issues were at play, but the actual problem was political. The Pashtuns and the Mohājir were in political disputes fighting for dominance in such a significant highly populated area as Karachi.

TTP is known to have close connection with the madrasas. It is claimed that in the madrasas they controlled students were indoctrinated with ideology of violence. Many top leaders of the movement such as Abd Ullah Mehsud³⁴ are associated with the *Madrassa Islamia Banoria*, Karachi. To counter this threat of violence some Madāris have banned the Taliban outfits. However, the ban is quite difficult, if not impossible, to be implemented.

In the Waziristan region, which is divided into North and South, there are three dominant tribes, namely the Wazir, the Mehsud and the Dawar. The word 'Waziristan' means the land of the Wazirs³⁵. The inhabitants of the North and South Waziristan are known as the Utmanzai and Ahmedzai Wazirs respectively. The Wazirs generally abide by the Islamic traditions. The Mehsuds are less inclined to respect inherited traditions and are generally more violent³⁶ than the Wazirs. The Wazirs are dauntless and patriotic. There is enmity between the Wazir and the Mehsud tribes. This is because Dre, which is a clan of the Mehsud tribe, has wrested control of the Baddar Valley and Chalweshti from the Wazirs³⁷. Some jihadi organizations, like *Lashkar-e Jhangvi* and *Harkat-ul Mujahedin*, have operational partnerships with one another. According to Akbar S. Ahmed, the Mehsuds are naturally more jubilant³⁸ in their transitory victories than the Wazirs. Ahmed's characterization of the

³³ F. Khan, "Operational partnership," *Daily Times*, 4 September 2008.

³⁴ He was the *Fadil* (specific course of uloom-e Islamia wal-Arabia)

³⁵ A. S. Ahmed, *Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 20.

³⁶ K. Fukui & J. Makarkis, eds., *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn* (Ohio University Press, 1994) 15-32.

³⁷ C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties Relating to India and Neighboring Countries* (Foreign and Political Dept., Government of India, Delhi, 1933).

³⁸ A. S. Ahmed, *Religion and Politics in Muslim Society*, 20.

Mehsud's patriotism is not shared by some others including the author's own friend from Waziristan who was cynical about it, suggesting instead that the Mehsuds' patriotism was only to get reward, nothing beyond that. If they can get rewards from foreigners, they would be happy to display their acts of patriotism. Minhaj-ud-Din Mehsud speaking about his own Mehsud tribe lends support to the same view in his MA thesis³⁹. Intra-political ethnic violence contributed a lot to the growth of the TTP in the region, since the psychological factor of ethnic identity plays an important role. Due to several factors, the Mehsuds became better suited to spearhead the reign of TTP.

2. Muqami (Local) Tehrik-e Taliban (MTT)

Muqami Tehrik-e Taliban (MTT) was formed with the aim of merging its forces with the Afghan Taliban to fight against NATO and US forces and if Pakistani forces created hurdles, it would fight against the Pakistani military⁴⁰. MTT has affiliations with the Afghan Taliban, Islamic Jihad Union, Tanzim Al-Qaeda Al- Jihad and the Libyan Islamic Fighters Group. MTT is more moderate than the TTP. Although they want to enforce the same Taliban model of Islamic rule in Pakistan, Mulla Umar persuaded the Pakistani Taliban to concentrate their energies in Afghanistan. Moreover, he was offended by the TTP's formation, and he disowned the Bait Ullah Mehsud⁴¹. The second difference between MTT and TTP is that the former is in favour of negotiation with Pakistan's government. The third difference between the two is that unlike TTP, MTT has no foreign fighters.

3. Lashkar-e Islam (Horde of Islam) (LI)

The Khyber region is the stronghold of LI. Through this agency, more than three hundred trucks loaded with supplies come through the Khyber Pass crossing Torkham. LI is locally known as Tanzeem (organization), founded by Muftī Munir Shakir. The organization has

³⁹ M. Mehsud, "*Impact of Education on Social Change in South Waziristan Agency*," (Unpublished Master's Thesis, Punjab University, Lahore, Pakistan, 1970).

⁴⁰ *Dawn*, Karachi, 1 July 2008.

⁴¹ *Asia Times*, 24 January 2008.

many sectarian differences with Peer Saif-ur-Rahman. Peer Saif-ur-Rahman belonged to a *Sufi* (mystic) way, which had many similarities with *Beralvis*, and due to sectarian differences with Munir Shakir, he had to shift from the Khyber agency to *Faqir Abad* near Lahore. LI's ideas match with the Deobandi sect and they declared jihad against the non-Deobandis; its followers strictly oppose the Sufis whom they consider as exploiters. Mufti Munir Shakir came from the Karak district and settled in the Kurram agency, but he was forced to flee to the Khyber agency on account of his contentious opinions and later, for the same reasons, he had to leave the Khyber agency too.

LI is not supportive of TTP, although its leaders invited them many times to join. Its main aim is to eliminate all forms of evils which exist in society. Moreover, LI has no objection to the presence of Pakistan's army in Bara; unlike TTP, LI did not have any fight with the Pakistan's army. LI defends the Afghan Taliban's insurgency, but it denies having any link with them. Furthermore, LI has no links with Al-Qaeda, nor does it have any intention to send its members to fight outside the region. Significantly, LI has banned all terrorists from staying in or entering the Khyber agency, be they local or foreign.

4. Punjabi Taliban (PT)

The Punjabi Taliban has settled and dwelled in Mehsud's tribal areas in South and North Waziristan agencies. They are stronger than other Taliban groups⁴² but there is inconsistency in them. They are trying to establish their territory in the Shawal Valley near the Afghan border. However, they have not much presence in this valley. Youngsters are brought to be taught and brainwashed that the Pakistan's Army and polity are pro-American. Punjabi Taliban mostly come from Punjab province where *Beralvis* constitute the majority and due to this, the Punjabi Taliban are more rigorous than the other Taliban groups. Punjabi Taliban have appeared very late on the scene. Their network is not vast because they do not have definite areas to enhance their activities. However, they are getting enough

⁴² *Daily Times*, Lahore, 26 August 2009.

contacts with different organizations. In addition, they have made some relations with al-Qaida. In our view, PT would be a more attractive partner to al-Qaida in Pakistan than the TTP. Moreover, they need to hire people for their activities because their recruits are less in number than those of MTT or TTP. They came from different cities of the Punjab province such as Multan, Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Rahim Yar Khan. They can speak Pashto fluently, which is the local language of Northern West Province.

5. Tehrik-e Nifaz Shariat-e Muhammadi (TNSM)

Sufi Muhammad established *Tehrik-e Nifaz Shariat-e Muhammadi* (TNSM) in 1992. According to him, the existing system in Pakistan is totally for infidels⁴³. Different *'ulama* in his party give him advice on different occasions. Its members wear black turbans, and they have shoulder length hair. TNSM is not organized in the tribal areas where its members are a majority since they are mostly poor, being labourers and peddlers. For instance, its leader, Mulana Fazlullah, was a chair-lift operator. The TNSM was non-violent but with the passage of time, it indulged in violent activities during the 1990s. However, Sufi Muhammad himself delivered infuriated emotional speeches to provoke the people against Afghanistan. During Musharraf's period, his *Tehrik* (movement) was banned, and Sufi Muhammad was sent to jail⁴⁴. However, now he has been acquitted⁴⁵. The Swat valley with world-renowned natural beauty became the breeding ground for terrorists.⁴⁶ Later, TNSM was merged with TTP without the consent of Sufi Muhammad, and Mulana Fazlullah was appointed as Secretary-General. Consequently, Sufi Muhammad condemned the activities led by Fazlullah. He said, "We never intended to pick up arms for the enforcement of the Shariah. We

⁴³ *Daily Times*, Lahore, 4 May 2009.

⁴⁴ M. Rana, *Back Grounder: Shari'ah Movement in Malakand* (South Asia Net, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, 2008).

⁴⁵ "TNSM chief Sufi Muhammad acquitted, *International News*, 18 April 2015 Retrieved from, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/article-181895-TNSM-chief-Sufi-Muhammad-acquitted-in-16-more-terrorism-cases>. Accessed on 21 May 2015.

⁴⁶ *The News*, Lahore, 18 June 2007.

cannot even think of killing people for this purpose.”⁴⁷ After the merger of the TNSM with TTP, the Taliban were allowed to establish their footholds in the Malakand division.

In the beginning, a minority of the people welcomed Sufi Muhammad in the hope that he would enforce the Shariah. Some people even presented him with jewellery to help him cover the cost of maintaining peace in the region, because they were being compelled by the landlords and other ruling elites to give up the region. No doubt, people were very obedient to the Islamic law, and they wanted to spend their lives according to the Shariah. However, the TNSM leaders were incompetent in enforcing the Shariah. Therefore, Sufi Muhammad could not create peace in Swat Valley and Malakand, and his son-in-law Fazlullah sabotaged the peace process due to the alliance with TTP. Although Sufi Muhammad’s views were not the same as those of TTP, he wanted to enforce the Afghan Taliban Shariah system in Pakistan, specifically in the Swat Valley and Malakand division. In his opinion, only the Taliban can enforce the Shariah law in Pakistan⁴⁸. TNSM did not believe in democracy or other forms of governments because all these systems, according to their definition, are based on infidelity. In his speeches, he declared that the Pakistani constitution was an infidel one, and all the institutions of state were infidel institutions; he said in one speech, “I would not offer prayer behind anyone who would seek to justify democracy.”⁴⁹ According to his doctrine, in the presence of the Quran and the Prophetic Sunnah, there is no need of any constitution⁵⁰.

Conclusion

The foregoing discussion shows that the movement generally known as the Taliban that operates in both Afghan and Pakistani territories appears as fragmented and splintered into many groups. The Afghan Taliban which now rules Kabul for the second time is seen as a united and solid organization. But its relations with the outside world

⁴⁷ *The News*, Lahore, 31 March 2008.

⁴⁸ *The News*, Lahore, 1 July 2007.

⁴⁹ *Roznama Waqt* (Urdu Newspaper), 14 May 2009.

⁵⁰ *Roznama Waqt* (Urdu Newspaper), 14 May 2009.

are problematic to say the least. Till now, no country recognises them as the lawful government of Afghanistan, although there has been limited recognition of their de facto governance over the country. The Pakistani Taliban, however, is diverse with some groups working with and some others opposing Pakistan's military and local government authorities. There is tension and conflict not only between the Pakistan Taliban groups and Pakistani authorities but also among themselves. Since the Afghan Taliban is enjoying support from some Taliban groups on the Pakistani side of the border that are opposed to the Pakistani government the relation between Pakistan and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan can only be strained and volatile.

The future of Taliban Afghanistan is full of uncertainties. A major contributing factor to these uncertainties is the unresolved tension and conflicts between the different groups comprised under the Pakistani Taliban and between Afghanistan and Pakistan as close neighbours. In the final analysis the future of Taliban Afghanistan lies in the hands of the Taliban leadership itself. It is a question of whether the movement is prepared to earnestly and sincerely reform and renew itself in the light of the integral teachings of Islam viewed in its totality. Reform (*iṣlāḥ*) and renewal (*tajdīd*) are the two keys to the future of Afghanistan.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TURKIYE IN MALAYSIA

Ottoman History in Malaysian Secondary History Textbooks (1989-2022)

Ahmad Murad Merican¹
Tayfun Akgun²

Abstract

This article explores the teaching of Ottoman history and the image of the Ottomans through a close and critical reading of Malaysian secondary history textbooks used between 1989 and 2022. It argues that Malaysian secondary history textbooks focus mainly on the political and military aspects of sixteenth-century Ottoman history. They do not, consciously or subconsciously, make detailed reference to political and socio-economic turning points in nineteenth-century Ottoman history. Sejarah Tingkatan 2 (History: Form 2), one of the history textbooks examined in the article, exceptionally discusses the impact of Ottoman pan-Islamism and Turkish nationalism on the political and religious thought of the Malays. Nonetheless, history textbooks published after the 2000s have not touched on these important issues. In history textbooks, the Ottoman Empire is regarded as one of the significant states of the Islamic world; therefore, Ottoman history is analyzed within the framework of Islamic history and Islamic civilization. The portrayal of Ottomans is positive and favourable. There are no distortions, biases, or stereotypes concerning Ottoman history in Malaysian secondary history textbooks.

Keywords: Malaysia, Ottoman history, the image of the Ottomans, history textbooks, history education.

¹ Professor of Social and Intellectual History and Head of Malay-Islamic Civilisational Unit at ISTAC-IIUM. Email: ahmadmurad@iium.edu.my

² PhD student, ISTAC, International Islamic University Malaysia. Email: takgunpau20@gmail.com

Introduction

The political, military, and intellectual relations between the Ottoman State and Muslim polities in the Malay world began in the early sixteenth century.³ The Sultanate of Aceh was the first Malay state to appeal to the Ottomans for military assistance to prevent Portuguese activities in the Strait of Malacca in the sixteenth century. Ottomans responded positively to the Acehnese request.⁴ However, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there was a long pause in Ottoman-Malay relations in general and Ottoman-Aceh relations in particular. The middle of the nineteenth century witnessed the re-establishment of relations between the two regions. The Sultanate of Aceh under increasing Dutch pressure re-established diplomatic and military relationships with its old and powerful ally, the Ottoman Empire.⁵ The former asked for military and diplomatic help from the latter. However, the Ottomans could not completely meet the demands of Aceh because of their geopolitical realities, financial problems, and the pressure of Western powers.⁶ At least, the diplomatic strategies of the Acehnese, specifically their emphasis on the idea of Pan-Islamic solidarity and historical ties established between the two powers, were influential in persuading some Ottoman statesmen to advocate the Acehnese cause.⁷

Like the Aceh Sultanate, the Sultanates of Riau and Jambi requested diplomatic and military help from the Ottoman Empire to deal with the Dutch pressure from the nineteenth century onwards.⁸

³ Anthony Reid, "Sixteenth-Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia," *The Journal of Southeast Asian History* 10/3, (1969): 395-414.

⁴ İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, "Ottoman-Aceh Relations as documented in Turkish Sources," in *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, eds. R. M. Feener, P. Daly and A. Reid (Leiden: KITLV, 2011), 69-79.

⁵ Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islamism in Indonesia and Malaysia," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (1967): 267-283.

⁶ İsmail Hakkı Göksoy, "Ottoman-Aceh Relations as documented in Turkish Sources," 92.

⁷ İ. H. Kadı, A. C. S. Peacock and A. T. Gallop, "Writing History: The Acehnese Embassy to Istanbul, 1849-52," in *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, eds. R. M. Feener, P. Daly and A. Reid (Leiden, KITLV, 2011), 164.

⁸ B. W. Andaya, "From Rum to Tokyo: The Search for Anticolonial Allies by the Rulers of Riau, 1899-1914," *Indonesia*, 24 (1977): 123-56 and Mehmet Özey,

The Ottomans could not correspond to the demands of Riau and Jambi. In addition to the Ottoman's intensive relationship with the Muslim states in Sumatra, they also had connections with Muslim states in the Malay Peninsula in the nineteenth century. Among the well-known examples of interactions between the Ottomans and the Malay Peninsula are the 1824 letter of Ahmad Tajuddin Halim Shah of Kedah (r. 1797-1843) to the Ottoman Empire and the visit of Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor (r. 1862-1895) to Istanbul in 1895.⁹ In brief, there had been enduring and cordial connections between the Ottomans and Muslim polities of the Malay world from the sixteenth century onwards through envoys, dispatches, royal visits, and correspondences.

The friendly, long-standing, and vibrant relationships between the Ottomans and Muslim polities in the Malay world stimulate to be asked the following questions: How has Ottoman history been taught in Malaysian secondary schools? How much coverage have Malaysian secondary history textbooks given to Ottoman history? To what extent have they touched upon the relationship between Ottomans and Malays? Which facets of Ottoman history have they focused on? How were Ottomans portrayed in the textbooks? Have there been factual errors, misrepresentations, stereotypes, and biases in the education of Ottoman history in the textbooks?

There is a corpus of studies on the teaching of Ottoman history and the image of Ottomans in the different parts of the world in the existing literature.¹⁰ However, the treatment of Ottoman history in

"Notes on the Ottoman-Malay World Relations," in *Routledge Handbook of Islam in Southeast Asia*, ed. Khairuddin Aljunied, (London and New York: Routledge, 2022), 88-112.

⁹ İsmail Hakkı Kadı, "The Ottomans and Southeast Asia Prior to the Hamidian Era: A Critique of Colonial Perceptions of Ottoman-Southeast Asian Interaction," in *From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks and Southeast Asia*, eds. A. C. S. Peacock and A. T. Gallop, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 155-159 and A. Rahman Tang Abdullah, "Sultan Abu Bakar's Foreign Guests and Travels Abroad, 1860s-1895: Fact and Fiction in Early Malay Historical Accounts," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 84, no.1 (2011): 11-12.

¹⁰ For some examples of the literature, see Dino Mujadžević, "The Image of Ottomans in Croatian Historiography: Changing Narratives in Elementary School Textbooks in Croatia -1980s to 2000s," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 34, no.3 (2014): 293-302; Ahmet Alibašić, "Images of the Ottomans in History Textbooks in

Southeast Asian countries is an under-developed topic in both Malaysia and Turkey. Zaitun bte Sidin first analyzed the teaching of the history of Middle Eastern, Asian, and Western countries in Malaysian lower history textbooks used before 1989.¹¹ However, her study did not cover the teaching of Ottoman history in Malaysian secondary history textbooks. Alaeddin Tekin has examined how Ottoman history was taught in Indonesian history textbooks.¹² Tayfun Akgün has explored the perception of Ottoman Turks in the Malaysian history textbook used in 2017.¹³ The scope of the present article is beyond one history textbook. It deals with the teaching of Ottoman history and the image of the Ottomans in Malaysian secondary textbooks utilized between 1989 and 2022. Thus, it attempts to significantly contribute to the existing literature by exploring the teaching of Ottoman history in Malaysia, which is a neglected issue.

The article provides the impetus for the teaching of not merely Ottoman history but also the history of other nations in history textbooks because they have a vital role in affecting and shaping the perceptions and attitudes of students toward foreign countries. The critical and comprehensive debate on how the history of foreign countries is treated in history textbooks hopefully paves the way for the unbiased, objective, and inclusive teaching of the histories of foreign countries.

Bosnia and Herzegovina,” *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi* 17 (2007): 103-37; Ahmet Şimşek and Nigar M. Cengiz, “Rusya Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Türk-Osmanlı İmgesi [Images of Turk-Ottoman in Russian History Textbook],” *Turkish History Education Journal* 4(2), (2015): 225-258 and Ahmet Şimşek and Ee Young Cou, “Güney Kore Tarih Ders Kitaplarında Türk ve Osmanlı Algıları [Turkish and Ottoman Perceptions in South Korean History Textbooks],” *Bilgi* 89 (2019): 143-70.

¹¹ Zaitun bte Sidin, “The Treatment of Foreign Countries in Malaysian Lower Secondary History Textbooks,” Ph.D. thesis, the University of Iowa, 1987.

¹² Alaeddin Tekin, “Endonezya Lise Ders Kitaplarında Türk İmajı,” in *Dünyada Türk İmajı: Tarih Ders Kitaplarındaki Durum*, ed. Ahmet Şimşek (Ankara: Pegem Akademi, 2018), 143-161.

¹³ Tayfun Akgün “Malezya Lise Tarih Kitaplarında Türk İmgesi [Turkish Image in Malaysian Secondary History Textbooks],” in *Dünyada Türk İmajı: Tarih Ders Kitaplarındaki Durum*, ed. Ahmet Şimşek (Ankara: Pegem Akademi, 2018), 391-404.

Sources and Methodology

The major primary sources of this study are history textbooks used in Malaysian secondary schools between 1989 and 2022. These are: (1) Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid, Khoo Kay Kim, Muhd. Yusof bin Ibrahim and D. S. Ranjit Singh, *Sejarah Tingkatan 2* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1989); (2) Khasnor Johan, Mahayudin Haji Yahaya, Muzaffar Tate, Qasim Ahmad and Rohana Zubir, *Sejarah Peradabaan Dunia Tingkatan 4* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1991); (3) Nik Hassan Shuhaimi bin Nik Abdul Rahman, Muhd. Yusof bin Ibrahim, Muhammad Bukhari bin Ahmad and Rosnanaini binti Sulaiman, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2002); and (4) Mohd. bin Samsudin, Azharudin bin Mohamed Dali and Sharifah Afidah binti Syed Hamid, *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2016).

There are common traits of all history textbooks examined in the article. Firstly, they were published by Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (The National Language and Literary Agency) on behalf of Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia (Ministry of Education Malaysia). Secondly, they have been written by a panel of authors appointed by Kementerian Pendidikan Malaysia. Their authors are predominantly well-known local historians such as Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid and Khoo Kay Kim. Finally, they have been compulsory teaching materials in Malaysian secondary schools between 1989 and 2002.

Sejarah Tingkatan 2, *Sejarah Peradabaan Dunia Tingkatan 4*, and *Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks* were written based on the principles of *Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah* (KBSM, the Secondary School Integrated Curriculum). KBSM began to be implemented in 1989 when history became a compulsory subject in Malaysian secondary schools.¹⁴ On the contrary, *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* merely follows the foundations of *Kurikulum Standard Sekolah Menengah* (KSSM, the Secondary School Standard Curriculum), which was implemented in 2017. It is still a contemporary history textbook in Malaysian secondary schools.

¹⁴ Sharipah Aini Jaafar and Arba'iyah Mohd. Noor, "Pelaksanaan Pengejaran dan Pembelajaran Sejarah di Sekolah-Sekolah di Malaysia, 1957-1989," *Sejarah* 35, no. 2 (2016): 45.

Data for this study is primarily obtained from the four Malaysian secondary history textbooks which allocate space to the subject of Ottoman history. In the textbooks, words, sentences, illustrations, and maps concerning the Ottoman Empire are studied in a descriptive, interpretative, and comprehensive manner. Relevant quotations and passages to Ottoman history are extracted from the textbooks to examine and demonstrate latent and manifest messages conveyed. Moreover, the accounts of the textbooks on Ottoman history are compared with known authoritative and scholarly studies to determine the accuracy of the narrative in the textbooks.

Ottoman History in the History Textbooks (1989-2020)

Sejarah Tingkatan 2: Nineteenth-Century Ottoman History and Turkish Nationalism

Sejarah Tingkatan 2 (History: Form 2) was one of the history textbooks that had a chapter on Ottoman history. It was used between 1989 and the 2000s.¹⁵ It consists of the political, administrative, and socio-economic aspects of Malaysian history from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Ottoman history is covered in the thirteenth chapter of the textbook, entitled “Boisterous Winds From Outside” (*Angin Kencang Dari Luar*). The chapter provides relatively detailed information on the influences of Ottoman pan-Islamism and Turkish nationalism on the political and religious thought of the Malays in the twentieth century.

In the chapter, the terms *Empayar Turki* (the Turkish Empire) and *Empayar Uthmaniah* (the Ottoman Empire) refer interchangeably to the Ottomans. Additionally, the term *Turki* (Turkey) generally denotes the Ottoman Empire rather than the Republic of Turkey. When the textbook mentions various developments in the Republic of Turkey, it uses the term *Turki Muda* (Young Turks). The term *Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyyah* (the Ottoman-Turkish State), which appeared in the subsequent history textbooks, is not employed in *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*. In Malaysia,

¹⁵ Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid, Khoo Kay Kim, Muhd. Yusof bin Ibrahim and D. S. Ranjit Singh, *Sejarah Tingkatan 2* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1995). This study uses the ninth print of the book.

some scholars prefer to use the local term *kerajaan* (state) for Islamic states instead of the term empire (*empayar*). They consider that the term empire has a negative connotation. However, the authors of the textbook favoured employing the terms *Empayar Uthmaniyah* and *Empayar Turki*.

The chapter first touches on anti-colonial developments and the emergence of national spirit in Asian countries, including Malaysia, in the early twentieth century. It also mentions that anti-colonial and national developments in Japan and Turkey affected the Malay Peninsula.

The subsection of the chapter, “Turkish Influence (*Pengaruh Turki*)”, gives the following information on the image of the Ottoman sultans in the Islamic countries in general and Malaya in particular:

After Japan, the Turkish influence is more clearly visible in Malaya. The Sultan of Turkey was indeed considered the Caliph in the Islamic world. Therefore, Turkish leaders were highly respected. In our country, the influence might be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century. At that time, the Pan-Islamic movement was expanding its influence throughout all Islamic countries. They called on Muslims to unite under the shadow of the Turkish Empire, also known as the Ottoman Empire. The empire was established in 1300 by a Muslim warrior named Usman.¹⁶

The textbook emphasizes two important points. The first point is that Muslims in Islamic countries, including Malay Muslims, looked up to the Ottoman sultans as caliphs. The second point is that the impact of Pan-Islamism on the religious and political thought of Malays began in the late nineteenth century. While these two points are plausible, information about the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in 1300 was inaccurate. The general histories of the Ottoman Empire accept the year 1299 as the establishment of the empire. That year, however, is still contested.

The sub-section proceeds to how Pan-Islamism was introduced and influenced the political and intellectual spheres of the Malay

¹⁶ Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*, 181-182.

Peninsula. It points out that Shaykh Haji Wan Ahmad bin Haji Wan Muhammad Zain (c. 1855-1908) had a vital role in the introduction of Pan-Islamist ideas in Malaya. He advocated the unification of Kelantan and Patani states against Siam with the support of the Ottoman Empire. However, his suggestion did not materialise. Moreover, the textbook mentions relations between Kelantan and Turkey in the 1980s. It possibly refers to the connection between the Islamic parties of the two countries, Refah and PAS.¹⁷

Shaykh Wan Ahmad bin Muhammad Zain Mustafa al-Fatani was appointed to manage the Malay printing press, *al-Matba'ah al-Miriyyah al-Ka'inah*, in Makkah in 1885 during the reign of Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909). The Ottoman Empire funded the press to publish religious texts in Malay. He also allocated space to Ottoman history in his famous book *Hadiqatul Azhar wal-Riahin* (1886). He viewed the Ottoman sultans as the rightful caliph. He firmly believed in the excellence of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸ Importantly, the textbook underlines the role of Shaykh Wan Ahmad disseminating Pan-Islamic ideas in Malaya.

The textbook continues to cite more concrete examples of the relationship between the Malay Peninsula and the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ The first instance is that Pahang attempted to obtain assistance from the Ottomans against the British colonial rule in the early 1890s but to no avail. The second instance is that Mehmet Kamil Bey significantly contributed to the rise of Pan-Islamism in Johore. However, the textbook does not give detailed information about Kamil Bey. He was an Ottoman consul-general in Batavia between 15 July 1897 and 16 July 1898. He made considerable efforts to develop Ottoman policy in the region. His activities are the establishment of Ottomans' close contacts with Hadhrami Muslims in the Malay world, the rise of anti-colonial feelings among the local Muslims, and the international Ottoman scholarship initiative for the children of local Muslims in Java.²⁰ While the role of Kamil Bey in

¹⁷ Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*, 182.

¹⁸ Mohammad Redzuan Othman, "Pan-Islamic Appeal and Political Patronage: The Malay Perspective and the Ottoman Response," *Sejarah* 4, no. 4 (1996): 99.

¹⁹ Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*, 182.

²⁰ Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islamism in Indonesia and Malaysia,"

the region is mentioned in the textbook, Sultan Abu Bakar's visit to Istanbul in 1895 is surprisingly excluded.²¹

After the discussion on the contacts between the Ottomans and Malay states in the Malay Peninsula, the chapter turns its attention to the impact of the Pan-Islamic movement on Malaya during the First World War. According to the textbook, "In the war [the First World War], the Sultan of Turkey was allied with Germany. His Majesty declared a jihad war against the Allied Powers, namely Britain, the United States, and France. This declaration affected Islamic countries, including our country. However, the British tried to block that influence by censoring news from abroad, especially those related to Turkey".²²

The chapter also mentions the sepoy rebellion that took place in Singapore in February 1915. Kassim Ismail Mansur and Nur Alam Syah, staunch adherents of Pan-Islamism, supported the rebellion of the Muslim Indian soldiers in Singapore against the British. The British suppressed the mutiny and executed the leaders of the rebellion.²³ The textbook offers detailed information on the role of two Pan-Islamist followers who supported the Ottoman cause in the First World War.

The following parts of the chapter touch on the consequences of the First World War, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), and the influence of Turkish nationalism on the Malay intellectuals. According to the chapter, the Western invasion of Anatolia led to the emergence of the Khilafat movement in India. The movement reached Singapore in 1922, but it was short-lived under the watchful eyes of the British.²⁴

The chapter moves to the issues of Turkish nationalism and the abolition of the caliphate by Turkey: "In Turkey, the national spirit began to develop widely. This spirit was motivated by a group of Young Turks. They wanted to modernize the Turkish state as

267-283.

²¹ It must be said that the 1990s research on the relations between the two regions was not as comprehensive as recent studies. At the time, the authors probably were unable to access reliable sources.

²² Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*, 182.

²³ *Ibid.*, 182-83.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Western countries had done. Their leader was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In 1923, Turkey declared a republic and in 1924, the Khilafat system was dissolved".²⁵ Mustafa Kemal was not the leader of the Young Turks, yet he was impressed by the ideas of the Young Turks. The authors of the textbook possibly implied that Mustafa Kemal had been the leader of the Republic of Turkey.

The chapter states that the dissolution of the caliphate led educated Malays to take a negative stance towards Turkish nationalism because they believed that it had been against Islamic religion and law. Abdul Kadir Adabi was one of the Malay intellectuals who denounced the dissolution of the caliphate. However, educated Malays discussed various developments in Turkey in various local periodicals such as *Pengasoh*, *al-Ikhwan*, and *Saudara* as the textbook points out.²⁶ One also finds coverage of the Ottomans and the Balkans in Syed Shaikh al-Hady's *al-Imam* (1906-08). The chapter also underlines that Malays positively responded to some elements of Turkish nationalism. For instance, Malays might follow in the footsteps of the Turks who rescued their economy from the Jews and revived the national spirit. Finally, the authors of the textbook state that *Kaum Muda* in Malaya was impressed by the political and intellectual notions of the Republic of Turkey, particularly the independence of Turkey from Western powers. Like Turkey, *Kaum Muda* fought to gain the independence of Malaysia from the British and they established *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (Young Malay Union) for this purpose in 1938.²⁷

There are several questions concerning Ottoman and Turkish history at the end of the chapter: What was the plan of the Pan-Islamic Movement? What was the greatest influence of this movement on Malaya? How did scholars in Malaya respond to the development of the national spirit led by a group of the Young Turks? These questions are analytical. They lead students to think and analyze the impacts of Ottomans on the Malay Peninsula. Local interests and concerns affect questions in the textbook.

There are three illustrations of the Ottoman Empire and the

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*, 183.

²⁷ Ibid., 184.

Republic of Turkey in the textbook: (1) the colourful map of Turkey that indicates its geographical borders and its neighbouring countries like Syria, Iraq, and Greece, (2) the portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the founder of the Republic of Turkey and (3) Abdul Kadir bin Ahmad (Abdul Kadir Adabi).²⁸



Map 1: Turkey



Picture 1: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

²⁸ Zainal Abidin bin Abdul Wahid et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*, 182-184.



Picture 2: Abdul Kadir Adabi

The history textbook does not have a bibliography. Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain the sources of the textbook on the histories of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey. However, the part of Turkish influence on the Malay Peninsula is probably derived from the studies of Khoo Kay Kim, one of the authors of *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*. He touched upon the rebellion of Indian sepoy in colonial Singapore during the First World War in his doctoral thesis.²⁹ Possibly, the authors were aware of Anthony Milner's article entitled "The Impact of the Turkish Revolution on Malaya".³⁰ The authors discuss in detail the Turkish impacts on the political, intellectual, and social aspects of the Malay people despite the limited literature on the issue at that time. The students in Form 2 of the secondary schools learned about the political and intellectual connections between Turkey and Malaysia. The image of Ottomans is positive in the textbook, and there are no biases, stereotypes, or distortions in presenting Ottoman-Turkish history. The textbook contains a few factual errors in Ottoman history. However, the authors of the textbook have appropriated the subject objectively.

Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4: Sixteenth-Century Ottoman History

The *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4* (History of World Civilisation: Form 4), published in 1991, is concerned with the

²⁹ Khoo Kay Kim, "The Beginnings of Political Extremism in Malaya, 1915-1935", Ph.D. thesis, University of Malaya, 1973.

³⁰ A. C. Milner, "The Impact of the Turkish Revolution in Malaya," *Archipel* 31 (1986): 117-30.

development of human history from pre-historic to modern times. It also gives coverage to the origin and evolution of the Islamic and Western civilizations.³¹ The subject of Ottoman history is dealt with in the second chapter of the book, “Islam Changes Human Civilisation” (*Islam Mengubah Tamadun Manusia*), which covers important civilizational developments in the history of Muslims from the sixth to the sixteenth century.

The chapter refers to the Ottoman Empire as *Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyah*. Additionally, the Ottoman Empire is regarded as “one of the greatest Islamic empires”. It states that the Ottomans brought the last caliph of the Mamluk Sultanate, al-Mutawakkil III, to Istanbul. Hence, they inherited the caliphate institution from the Mamluks.³² Therefore, Ottoman history is analyzed within the framework of Islamic civilization and history and the Ottoman Empire is viewed as one of the chains of Islamic states.

The subject of Ottoman history in the chapter starts with a brief reminder about the teaching of the impact of the Ottoman Empire on the society of the Malay world in *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*. The chapter then mentions that the Ottoman Empire survived for 600 years “from 1281 to 1924”. As stated earlier, it is generally accepted that the Ottoman Empire was established in 1299. The information in the textbook is not correct. The chapter then states the origin of the Ottoman State as follows: “Uthman bin Ertoghrul was the founder of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire. Uthman’s family initially lived in Anatolia like Bedouins. They were very active in fighting the Byzantine army and had a close relationship with the Seljuk state in Konya. Finally, they decided to settle in the north eastern part of Anatolia. Over time they became stronger with the support of new Turkic immigrants coming from Central Asia”.³³ The chapter stresses the lifestyle of the Ottomans in the thirteenth century and

³¹ Khasnor Johan, Mahayudin Haji Yahya, Muzaffer Tate, Qasim Ahmad and Rohana Zunir, *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4 Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1997). The study uses the seventh edition of the textbook, which is available to the researchers.

³² Johan et al, *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4 Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah*, 54-56.

³³ Johan et al, *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4 Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah*, 54-56.

their relationship with the Anatolian Seljuks.

After mentioning the origin of the Ottoman Empire, the chapter enlists the positive attributes of the Ottomans. They are described as courageous, strong, religious, virtuous, and ambitious. According to the chapter, the Ottomans' spirit of jihad and their military capacity were the main factors for their success.³⁴ It does not refer to any negative characteristics of the Ottomans. In this regard, the image of the Ottomans is positive and favourable and there are no biases and prejudices against the Ottoman Turks.


The chapter states that there was a total of 37 Ottoman sultans. However, it is generally accepted that 36 Ottoman sultans came to power. The authors of the textbook possibly accepted Süleyman Çelebi as the Ottoman sultan because they refer to Suleiman the Magnificent (r. 1520-66) as Suleiman II. In the existing literature on Ottoman history and general histories of the Ottoman Empire, Süleyman Çelebi is not regarded as the Ottoman sultan. According to the textbook, Urkhan, Muhammad II, Abu al-Fatih and Suleiman the Magnificent are among the well-known Ottoman sultans.³⁵ It did not mention the names of the Ottoman sultans in the nineteenth century. It merely focuses on the sultans of the "golden age" of the Ottoman Empire.

The issue of attributes of the Ottomans follows the territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and Europe between the fourteenth century and the sixteenth century. The textbook states that the Ottomans initially controlled Sakarya, Iznik, and Izmit ruled by the Byzantine Empire, and they subsequently turned their attention to Europe with the conquest of Gallipoli in 1356. They conquered Edirne, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Wallachia, and Southern Greece during the reigns of Murad I and Bayazid I. The military expansion of the Ottomans in the Balkans caused the Ottomans to have a close relationship with Christians in the Balkans. Some of them were converted to Islam; thus, the Ottomans played a vital role in the introduction of Islam in the Balkans according to the textbook. It also mentions that the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans led to the formation of a new military unit, Janissary (*Yeni Cheri*). The Turkish

³⁴ Ibid., 56.

³⁵ Ibid.,

term *Yeni Cheri*, is mentioned in the textbook. In the chapter, the sixteenth century is viewed as the “Golden Age of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire”.³⁶ This view is supported by the colourful map of the Ottoman Empire which indicates Ottoman expansion between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries and the territory of the Ottoman Empire (Map 2).



Map 2: The map of the Ottoman Empire.³⁷

The textbook attaches importance to the military capacity and tactics of the Ottoman Empire as follows:


In addition to religious and moral factors, the great success of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire was also due to their efficiency and ability on the battlefield. They had sufficient weapons. Their navy is said to have as many as 3000 warships equipped with weapons. The Turkish army was indeed known for its bravery and high morale. They had leadership and efficiency in organizing war tactics and strategies according to the examples shown by Prophet Muhammad and the earliest Islamic leaders.

³⁶ Johan et al, *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4 Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah*, 56

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 55.

Turkish military tactics and strategies were copied by Europeans who were then used again against the Turkish army when the Turkish government collapsed.³⁸

The sub-section of the chapter, “The Contribution of the Islamic Civilisation to Human Civilisation” (*Sumbangan Tamadun Islam kepada Peradaban Manusia*), gives detailed coverage of how the Islamic civilization significantly contributed to world civilization in the fields of philosophy, arts, science, economics, and law. In the sub-section, there is a lack of intellectual and scientific contributions of the Ottomans to the Islamic civilization in various fields, specifically science, education, calligraphy, and architecture. The textbook merely emphasizes the role of the Ottoman army in the Islamic civilization. It claims that the Ottoman army represents the zenith of the Islamic military capacity. Europeans assimilated Ottoman-Turkish military strategies and technologies.³⁹ In the part of the chapter, “Islamic Art” (*Kesenian Islam*), there was a picture of the domes of the Blue Mosque (Picture 3). There exists sketchy information about the mosque under the picture: “View of the big and small domes of the Blue Mosque built by a Muslim architect, Mehmed Aga, in the seventeenth century in Istanbul, Turkey”.



Picture 3: The Domes of the Blue Mosque⁴⁰

³⁸ Johan et al, *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4 Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah*, 56.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 68.

⁴⁰ Johan et al, *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4 Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah*, 67.

In the Exercise and Activity part (*Latihan dan Aktiviti*) at the end of the chapter, one of the discussion topics is associated with the subject of the Ottoman Empire: “The Ottoman-Turkish Empire was the longest reigning Islamic empire or government. To your view, why could the government last until 600 years?”⁴¹ This question encourages students of Form 4 to examine Ottoman history. It is prepared for the improvement of the cognitive and analytical thinking of the students.

It is difficult to ascertain the reference sources of the textbooks for Ottoman history. Based on the bibliography of the textbook, the authors may have benefitted from the following books: F. Beers Burton, *World History* (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs, 1988); H. A. Davies, *An Outline History of the World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol. IV, art. Turks. Leiden: Brill, 1934; Hamka, *Sejarah Umat Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1985); William McNeil, *A World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) and Weech W. N. *Sejarah Dunia Jilid 1*, translated by Abdul Karim Abdullah dan Hamidah Shamsuddin, (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1981).⁴²

In a nutshell, the *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4* gives two-page coverage to the subject of the history of the Ottoman-Turkish state (*Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyah*). It is the same as that of the Umayyads and Abbasids. The main focus of the textbook is on the political and military aspects of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century which is viewed as the “golden age of the Ottoman Empire”. There are some omissions in the teaching of the political history of the Ottomans. For instance, the textbook does not mention the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul and Ottoman history between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Furthermore, there is an absence of information on the socio-economic and intellectual aspects of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans are more positively

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁴² The authors benefitted from the part of Ottoman history in world histories as well as encyclopaedic information rather than any standard and specific studies on the Ottoman history of their time such as *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973) by the prominent Turkish scholar Halil Inalcik and *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980) by Norman Itzkowitz.

portrayed in the textbook like *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*. There are also no biases or prejudices against the Ottomans. There are two main actual errors. The authors of the textbook state that the Ottoman Empire was established in 1281 and there were 37 Ottoman sultans.

Sejarah Tingkatan 4: A Comprehensive History of Sixteenth-Century Ottoman History

Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks was a compulsory history textbook used in Form 4 of Malaysian secondary schools between 2002 and 2017.⁴³ It covers Ottoman history in its sixth chapter, “The Formation of the Islamic States and Their Contributions” (*Pembentukan Kerajaan Islam dan Sumbangannya*), which focuses on the histories of the Umayyads, Abbasids, and Ottomans and their role in the growth of the Islamic civilization. Ottoman history is analyzed under three sub-sections: (1) The Establishment of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire (*Pembentukan Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyah*); (2) The Contribution of the Ottoman Empire (*Sumbangan Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyah*); and (3) The Factors in the Spread of Islam in Europe (*Faktor Penyebaran Islam ke Eropah*). They concentrate on the foundation and role of the Ottoman Empire (*Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyah*), as well as its scientific and intellectual contributions to Islamic civilization. The section on Ottoman history contains six pages between pages 158 and 163. It devotes more space to the Ottoman Empire compared to the Umayyads (five pages) and the Abbasids (three pages). Numerically, 18.75% of the chapter is related to the subject of Ottoman history.

The starting point of the section, “The Establishment of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire”, is the appearance of various small states in the Middle East as a result of the Mongol conquest of the Abbasids in 1258. The Seljuks are regarded as one of the most significant states in the thirteenth century. The section continues to emphasise the establishment and growth of the Ottoman state and its relations with the Seljuks:

⁴³ Nik Hassan Shuhaimi bin Nik Abdul Rahman, Muhd. Yusof bin Ibrahim, Muhammad Bukhari bin Ahmad and Rosnanaini binti Sulaiman, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2017).

The Ottoman State began as one of the principalities situated in Western Anatolia (today Turkey). Despite being under the influence of the Seljuks, the Anatolian principalities of Seljuks were more independent in terms of government and administration. Although this principality [the Ottoman State] was one of the small principalities in the Western Anatolian region, it managed to dominate the other principalities and eventually became the kingdom.⁴⁴

There are two shortcomings in the above-mentioned quotation. The first is the lack of fundamental distinction between the Great Seljuks and the Anatolian Seljuks. The second is the neglect of the political, socio-economic, and religious aspects of Anatolia in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries such as the Mongol occupation of Anatolia, the role of the Mamluks in Anatolia, and the socio-economic and religious revolts that emerged in thirteenth-century Anatolia. All these developments directly or indirectly affected the foundation of the Ottoman Empire. They lead students to understand the context in which the Ottoman Empire was founded and the political, socio-economic, and religious conditions of the Islamic world after the Mongol attacks and the Crusaders.

The section presents information on the origin of the Ottoman state, its geographical location, the founder of the state, and the first battles of Osman Bey as follows:

The word Ottoman comes from the name of the founder of this state, namely Osman bin Ertugrul bin Suleyman Shah who came from the Kayı tribe. In the early periods, Osman Bey was the *emir* or the Seljuk governor in the Western Anatolia region. This region was the border with the Byzantine Empire known as Eastern Rome. Therefore, the region under Ottoman rule was more threatened than other regions. In 1301, Osman succeeded in defeating a Byzantine army. In addition to motivating the veterans, this victory united the leaders

⁴⁴ Rahman et al, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4*, 158.

of the community under Osman's leadership for new conquests.⁴⁵

This passage offers a more comprehensive account of the origin of the Ottomans compared to those in *Sejarah Tingkatan 2* and *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4*. Although the authors of the textbook were aware of the importance and results of the Battle of Bapheus between the Ottomans and Byzantines in 1301, they did not specify the name and place of the war. As a consequence of the war, Osman Bey proved himself as one of the most powerful and charismatic rulers in the region.⁴⁶

In the section, the origin of the Ottoman Empire follows a sketch of early Ottoman expansion in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with special reference to the military activities of early Ottoman sultans. The reigns of Osman I and Orhan were mentioned as follows: "Osman began to conquer the area around Anatolia and later made the city of Bursa the capital of the country. Osman passed away in 1326 and the expansion of power was continued by his son Orhan I and the subsequent Ottoman government".⁴⁷ The section then focuses on Ottoman expansion in Anatolia and the Balkans in the fourteenth century: "Between 1336 and 1354, Orhan succeeded in conquering Marmara, the Aegean, Ankara and Gallipoli regions. During the reigns of Murad I and Bayazid I, the Ottoman state also controlled the Southern Balkan, Northern Bulgaria, Sofia, Thessaloniki, Kosovo, Northern Albania, and Wallachia regions".⁴⁸

Finally, the section briefly deals with the reigns of Sultan Mehmed II and Sulaiman I. It mentions the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the reign of Sultan Mehmed marked the beginning of the Ottoman Empire (*empayar Uthmaniyah*). However, the death of Sulaiman I resulted in the decline of the Ottoman Empire even though the empire ended in the early twentieth century.

⁴⁵ Rahman et al, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4*, 158-159.

⁴⁶ Halil Inalcik, "Osman Ghazi's Siege of Nicaea and the Battle of Bapheus," in *The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389)*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1993), 77-98.

⁴⁷ Rahman et al, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4*, 159.

⁴⁸ Rahman et al, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4*, 159.

According to the section, weak sultans, the collapse of tax collection, rebellions, and uncontrollable population growth resulted in the decline of the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁹ The authors of the textbook seem to have adhered to the paradigm of the Ottoman decline, which persisted in the literature of the 2000s on Ottoman studies.

The authors of *Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks* endeavours to summarize six hundred years within merely one page. This led them to leave out some important political and military developments between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as the Battle of Ankara in 1402, the Ottoman battles against Crusaders in Kosovo and Nicopolis, and important happenings during the reign of Sulaiman I. Furthermore, the authors have probably deliberately focused solely on the achievements of the Ottoman Empire in the classical period and have not touched on any issues after the 17th century. For instance, the timetable, which shows the names and reigns of Ottoman sultans, gives priority to Ottoman sultans from the thirteenth to late sixteenth centuries (Picture 4). Furthermore, the names of the Ottoman sultans in the 17th and 20th centuries were not included in the timetable. The authors preferred to pay attention to positive issues rather than negative ones in the teaching of Ottoman history.


Jangka Masa (Tahun)	1280 – 1326	1326 – 1362	1362–1389	1389 – 1402	1413 – 1421	1421 – 1444
Pemerintahan	Uthman Ertughrul	Orhan I	Murad I	Bayezid I	Mehmed I	Murad II
1444 – 1446;	1481 – 1512	1512 – 1520	1520 – 1666	1566 – 1574	1574 – 1595	1595 – 1603
1451–1481						
Mehmed II (Fatih)	Bayezid II	Selim	Suleiman I (Kanuni)	Selim II	Murad III	Mehmed III

Picture 4: Ottoman Sultans⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Rahman et al, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4*, 159.

At the end of the sub-section, (*Pembentukan Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyyah*), there is a map that indicates the places dominated by the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries and the years of conquest (Map 3). The map allows students to imagine the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. However, there are three fundamental errors in the map. Firstly, the dates, which should be given as 1512-1566 and 1566-1683, are given as 1412-1566, and 1466-1683. Secondly, modern state names or geographical names are used in some places instead of state names (such as Safavids) contemporary to the Ottoman state. Finally, the map is heavily used in tones of blue when compared to the colourful and clear maps of the Ottoman Empire in *Sejarah Tingkatan 2* and *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4* (Map 1 and 2).



Map 3: The map of the Ottoman State⁵¹

The second section of the chapter, “The Contributions of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire” (*Sumbangan Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyyah*), looks at the political, legal, economic, intellectual, and scientific contributions of the Ottoman state to Islamic civilization.

⁵¹ Rahman et al, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4*, 160.

The Ottoman Empire is regarded as an exceptional and enduring Islamic state which lasted “for nearly six hundred years in such a large region”. In addition, according to the section, the Ottomans significantly contributed to the development of the Islamic civilization and created an empire that represented the unity of Muslims. Istanbul was the capital of the Muslim world and Sultan Selim I was considered “the protector of Muslims in the Muslim world”. The authors of the textbook elevate the Ottoman Empire to the zenith of the Islamic states and analyze Ottoman history within the Islamic civilization and through the Islamic vocabulary.⁵² Nonetheless, they do not mention Abdul Hamid II, who used the power of the caliphate against Western powers in the nineteenth-century Muslim world and established cordial and vibrant relations with the Muslim polities in the Malay world. Presumably, they confined themselves to the narrative of the Ottoman classical period.

As for the various contributions of the Ottoman Empire to the Islamic civilization, the section first discusses three important contributions of the Ottoman in the legal context: (1) a legal system that protects and maintains the life, property, and honour of each subject regardless of their race and religion during the era of Suleyman, the Lawgiver; (2) The contribution of the Ottomans to the management and organization of Islamic law; and (3) Duties such as *Qadi* and *Mufti* to be made part of the Islamic religious administration centre and fatwas issued during the Ottoman period are still in use.⁵³

In the economic field, the Ottomans took control of international trade in the East-West axis and established the Istanbul-based Islamic World Trade Union using the geo-political position of Istanbul. This information was an accurate determination for the 16th century, yet the centre of international trade after this century moved to the Atlantic and Indian oceans to the advantage of Western powers.⁵⁴

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Rahman et al, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4*, 160-161.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 161.



Picture 5: The Margin Note⁵⁵

The scientific and intellectual contributions of the Ottomans to Islamic civilization received special attention and were illustrated with examples. The section refers to the developed Ottoman *madrasah* system, the tradition of writing encyclopaedia, and the widespread libraries in the Ottoman Empire. In the margin note, it was explained to the student that encyclopaedic works of Ottoman scholars, Molla Fenari (d. 1431), Molla Lütfi (d. 1495), and Kâtip Çelebi (1609-1658) (Picture 5).

The section finally deals with Ottoman architecture. The most prominent architect of Ottoman architecture, Mimar Sinan, is explained in the margin note (Picture 5). In this note, however, there is a factual error: “Mimar Sinan's most famous work of art is the Sultan Ahmad Mosque (Blue Mosque) in Istanbul”. The architect of Sultan Ahmad Mosque is not Mimar Sinan, but Sedefkar Mehmed Aga.⁵⁶ There is no information on the construction date of the mosque and its position and significance in both Ottoman and Islamic architecture. As has been remembered, the picture of the Blue Mosque in *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4* (Picture 4) provides correct information about the architect of the mosque and its

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ John Freely, *A History of Ottoman Architecture* (Southampton and Boston: WIT Press, 2011), 329.

construction date. Unlike the view of the domes of the Blue Mosque in *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4*, an unclear and blue-tonal picture of the mosque from a wide perspective was added to the book (Picture 6); thus, the image of the Ottoman mosque was clarified in the students' memory.



Picture 6: Sultan Ahmad Mosque⁵⁷

After the contribution of the Ottomans to Islamic civilization, their role in the spread of Islam in Europe is the final topic of the section on Ottoman history. This part is broader, more comprehensive, and more academic. The authors benefit from the findings of Halil Inalcik's *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* and the four-volume encyclopaedia, entitled *The Great Ottoman Turkish Civilization*, edited by the Turkish historian Kemal Çiçek. These reference sources lead the history textbook to present not only a positive image of the Ottomans but also a Turkish approach to Ottoman history. Hence, the portrayal of the Ottomans is positive and there are no biases and stereotypes concerning Ottomans in the textbook.

In the textbook, the reasons for the spread of Islam in the Balkans and Europe are given as follows: (1) The key factor in the spread of Islam to Europe in the time of Umayyads and Ottomans was the high moral values and beliefs among Muslims; (2) The Spirit of Gazi (*Semangat Ghazi*) in the Ottoman army allowed both the

⁵⁷ Rahman et al, *Sejarah Tingkatan 4*, 161.

spread of Islam and the Ottoman conquests in Europe; (3) Ottoman military system, Janissaries, modern military equipment and powerful Ottoman navy played a vital role in the spread of Islam in the Balkans and Europe; (4) political instability in Europe, fights and disputes in the throne of the Byzantine state; (5) problems among the churches in the Balkans: abuse of power, internal turmoil and economic difficulties; (6) The social and religious policies of the Ottoman state: 'istimalet policy' (when a place is conquered, it is asked that the people who live there should be obeyed and subject to the state and never plundered) and that the Orthodox church is patronized by the Ottoman; and (7) Turkish migrations to the Balkans and tolerable teachings of Sufis.

The definitions of concepts such as Gazi spirit and Janissary were given to the students in the form of margin notes. While the first concept is described as a Muslim hero who aimed to disseminate Islam, the Janissaries are described as “an elite infantry group in the Ottoman military system”. Another margin note provides statistical information about the Muslim population in the sixteenth-century Balkans: “The census conducted by the Ottoman state in the 1530s was almost 19% Muslim in the Balkans. A total of 45% of Muslims in the Balkans were living in city centres such as Bosnia. Further, Sofia and Edirne had 66% and 82% Muslim population respectively”.

The subject of Ottoman history ended with four questions and activities pertaining directly to the Ottoman Empire: How was the Ottoman Empire established? State the factors that caused the Ottoman Empire to disseminate Islamic teachings. What does the Janissary mean? Explain the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire. The student might easily find answers to some questions in the book such as the meaning of the term Janissary which was explained to students in the margin note. Other questions foster students to think analytically.

Sejarah Tingkatan 1: Sketchy Ottoman History

The year 2017 has witnessed the implementation of a new curriculum entitled *Kurikulum Standard Sekolah Menengah* (KSSM, the Secondary School Standard Curriculum) instead of *Kurikulum Bersepadu Sekolah Menengah* (KBSM, the Secondary School Integrated Curriculum). KSSM has introduced significant shifts in

the teaching, coverage, and themes of history in Malaysian secondary schools, and it has also subsequently affected the teaching of Ottoman history. The first important change is that Ottoman history started to be taught in Form 1 of secondary schools instead of Form 4. There is no coverage of the diplomatic and intellectual relations between the Ottoman Empire and Muslim kingdoms in the Malay world in the history textbook of Form 2. Ottoman history gets coverage in the history textbook of Form 1. However, Ottoman history is still being covered in the textbook about human history and Islamic civilization. The second change is that new history textbooks do not cover the subject in detail. It means that the new curriculum fosters student-centred learning rather than textbook-centred learning in history education.


Sejarah Tingkatan 1 (History: Form 1) is a new and contemporary history textbook that gives space to Ottoman history. Its eighth chapter, “Islamic Civilization and Its Contribution” (*Tamadun Islam dan Sumbangannya*), offers information on Ottoman history. The coverage of the history of the Ottoman Empire (*Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyah*) in the new textbook is quite limited compared to the coverage of Ottoman history in the previous history textbooks. Only one page is allocated to the subject. It briefly focuses on three issues: (1) The Ottoman-Turkish State was centred in Anatolia; (2) The further development of Islam had also extended to the Balkan region, Eastern Europe, the borders of Russia, and around the Black Sea, in addition to maintaining power in Western Asia; and (3) The influence of the Ottoman Turks also reached the Malay world (Picture 7).⁵⁸ The subject of Ottoman history is supported by the map in colour which indicates the spread of Islam from the time of the Prophet Muhammad to the Ottoman Empire. The map demonstrates that Islam spread to Europe during the era of the Ottoman Empire (Map 4). Compared to the maps in the history textbook examined previously, the map in the new textbook is based on the theme of the spread of Islam in the Middle East, Asia, North Africa, Central Asia, and Europe rather than the particular map of the territory of the Ottoman Empire.

⁵⁸ Mohd bin Samsudin, Azharudin bin Mohamed Dali and Sharifah Afidah binti Syed Hamid, *Sejarah Tingkatan 1 Buku Teks*, 168.

Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyah

- Kerajaan Turki Uthmaniyah berpusat di Anatolia.
- Perkembangan Islam seterusnya juga telah meluas hingga ke rantau Balkan, Eropah Timur, sempadan Rusia dan sekitar Laut Hitam, di samping mengekalkan kekuasaan di Asia Barat.
- Pengaruh Turki Uthmaniyah juga telah sampai ke Alam Melayu.

Picture 7: The Ottoman Empire.



Map 4: The map of the spread of Islam

On page 168, the chapter provides a QR code that gives additional information on the subject of Islamic states including the Ottoman Empire:

The Ottoman-Turkish Empire was founded by Uthman bin Ertughrul bin Sulaiman Shah. This kingdom reached its peak when Sultan Muhammad al-Fatih succeeded in taking control of Constantinople in 1453 AD. The Ottoman Empire...was the largest Islamic empire that ruled from 680 H/1281 AD until 1342 H/1924 AD. This kingdom survived for about six centuries until it collapsed after the outbreak of the First World War.

The Ottoman-Turkish Empire successfully expanded its empire and the influence of Islamic Civilization in Eastern Europe. Among its famous rulers are Sultan Murad I, Sultan Murad II, Sultan Bayazid I, Sultan Muhammad al-Fatih, Sultan Selim I, and Sultan Sulaiman Qanuni. The Ottoman government placed great emphasis on military matters by establishing a military force trained in the ins and outs of war known as Janissaries.

Its leaders also had authority, personal strength, and high morals, to the point of being able to bring the Ottomans to a high level. The empire extended to North Africa in the southwest, Persia in the east, and several conquered areas such as Egypt, the Balkans, and Syria. In general, the Ottoman-Turkish Empire had more territories in Europe compared to those in Asia.


In the textbook, Ottoman history from the thirteenth to the early twentieth century was summarized. Like the previous textbooks, *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* concentrates mainly on the military achievements of sixteenth-century Ottoman history, as well as the expansion of the Ottoman Empire to the Balkans, Europe, and North Africa. Furthermore, like other textbooks examined in the study, *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* emphasizes the prolonged rule of the Ottoman Empire from the 1280s to the 1920s, its influential sultans like Sultan Muhammad al-Fatih, Sultan Selim I, and Sultan Sulaiman II, and the military power of the Ottoman Empire. *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* omits

the history of the Ottoman Empire between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries. Furthermore, in the following sub-section of the textbook, “The Presence of Intellectual Activity Centres” (*Kewujudan Pusat Kegiatan Intelektual*), there is no information on how the Ottoman scholars contributed to the Islamic civilization.⁵⁹ In brief, *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* is primarily concerned with the political, military, and territorial aspects of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century.

The main sources of the textbook for Ottoman history are general studies on Islamic civilization and Islamic history: Hamka’s *Sejarah Umat Islam* (Selangor: PTS Publishing House, 2016), Osman Bakar’s *Tamadun Islam dan Tamadun Asia* (Kuala Lumpur: Universiti Malaya, 2012), Mahayudin Hj. Yahya and Ahmad Jelani Halimi’s *Sejarah Islam* (Selangor: Fajar Bakti, 1994), Esa Khalid’s *Konsep Tamadun Islam: Sains dan Teknologi* (Skudai: Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 2001) and Wan Abdul Rahman Latif’s *Sejarah Perkembangan Tamadun Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2001). Unlike sources of *Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks*, there is a lack of references related directly to academic studies on Ottoman history in *Sejarah Tingkatan 1*.

In the sub-section of the chapter, “The Contributions of the Islamic Civilisation in the Field of Architecture” (*Sumbangan Tamadun Islam dalam Bidang Seni Bina*), like previous history textbooks, the picture of Sultan Ahmad Mosque is added with the following information: “The use of the dome as the main structure of the roof can be found in mosques during the Ottoman-Turkish period. For example, the Sultan Ahmet Mosque (Blue Mosque) has the main prayer room covered by a semi-circular dome and has many minarets on the side of the mosque. Its function is for safety by strengthening the structural system from its wide range” (Picture 8). The textbook focuses mainly on the architectural aspects of the Sultan Ahmad Mosque rather than the construction date and architect of the mosque as in the previous textbook.

⁵⁹ Samsudin et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 1 Buku Teks*, 179-181.



Picture 8: Sultan Ahmet Mosque, Turkey⁶⁰

The subject of Ottoman history in the textbook ends with the question of where the capital of the Ottoman Empire was.⁶¹ Ironically, the textbook does not give any information about the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

The *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* offers quite limited coverage of Ottoman history in the new curriculum. The main topics of Ottoman history are the genesis and evolution of the Ottoman State, its role in the spread of Islam in Europe, as well as the interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Malay polities in the Malay world.⁶² The portrayal of the Ottomans is largely neutral. There is an apparent absence of biases, stereotypes, and prejudices.

Concluding Remarks

Ottoman history gets considerable coverage in the history textbooks used in Malaysian secondary schools between 1989 and 2022. While the *Sejarah Tingkatan 2* (1989) exceptionally focuses on the topic of the impact of Ottoman Pan-Islamism and Turkish nationalism over the intellectual and political spheres of the Malay Peninsula in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4*, *Sejarah Tingkatan Empat Buku Teks*, and *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* are primarily concerned with the genesis of the Ottoman Empire, its wars and military affairs, as well as its intellectual and architectural contributions to the Islamic

⁶⁰ Samsudin et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 1 Buku Teks*, 185.

⁶¹ Samsudin et al., *Sejarah Tingkatan 1 Buku Teks*, 187.

⁶² It is hoped that the decorated Malay letters to Ottoman sultans in history will be used in the teaching of the history of Ottoman-Malay world relations.

civilization. In all history textbooks, Ottoman history is taught to students through the following categories: Ottoman politics, military, individuals (especially prominent Ottoman sultans of the sixteenth century and a few Ottoman scholars), religion, and architecture (specifically Sultan Ahmad Mosque mentioned in three history textbooks). There is a dearth of information on the economic, societal, and educational aspects of the Ottoman Empire in all textbooks. Sixteenth-century Ottoman history is given more attention in the textbooks, except for *Sejarah Tingkatan 2*. Ottoman history between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries is largely absent.

Ottoman history is analyzed within the Islamic civilization and Islamic history. It is regarded as the most powerful and longest Islamic empire in all textbooks. The history of the Ottoman Empire is taught along with the histories of the Umayyads and Abbasids. In this regard, the Ottomans are seen as the continuation of Islamic states or caliphates. More specifically, in the *Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks*, the Ottoman army was viewed as the “Islamic army”; the Ottoman state as “the Islamic State”, Istanbul as “the management centre of the Muslim world”, and Ottomans as “the protector of Muslims”. *Sejarah Tingkatan 1* emphasises the role of the Ottomans in the spread of Islam in the Balkans and Europe. In brief, Ottoman history is discussed within the framework of Islamic civilization and Islamic history.

In the textbooks, the Ottomans are portrayed positively and favourably. For instance, the *Sejarah Peradaban Dunia Tingkatan 4* views the Ottomans as courageous, strong, religious, virtuous, and ambitious for jihad against the Christian Byzantine Empire. There are no biases, stereotypes, or prejudices about Ottoman history in all the textbooks examined in this study. The positive image of the Ottoman Empire and the lack of biases and stereotypes concerning the Ottomans are closely tied to the friendly relations between the Ottomans and Malays in history. History textbooks are written in Malaysia by a panel of professional historians. An objective portrayal of the subject is expected. There are, however, some factual errors and deficiencies in the textbooks.

Finally, we can conclude that the history textbooks of Malaysian secondary schools provide space for Ottoman history. On

a related note, comparative studies on the subject among Southeast Asian countries would be useful, especially in Indonesia, and Thailand. On the other side of the coin, how do Turkish history textbooks cover Southeast Asia in general, Malaysia, and the Malay Archipelago in particular? Such studies would certainly be revealing of past relationships.

TEMPORAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL FORCES IN SHAPING IBN KHALDUN'S THEORY

Relevance and Application in Modern Societal Dynamics

Zhilwan Tahir¹ and Abdul Wahed Jalal Nori²

Abstract

The article examines and discusses temporal and geographical forces shaping Ibn Khaldun's theory's relevance and application in modern societal dynamics. The report provides the critical biographies of Ibn Khaldun to understand better the thinker's philosophical perspectives on history and civilization. The study explains how historical context shapes Ibn Khaldun's thought. Moreover, the study argues that Ibn Khaldun had a theory on the development and collapse of states and civilizations relevant to modern societal dynamics. Besides, it evaluates Ibn Khaldun's concepts and relates them to the present day. This study claims that Ibn Khaldun's perspectives on history, society, and civilization are less subjective and more rational. Further, this study examines the impact of leadership qualities and the influence of 'asabiyyah and cycle patterns and Ibn Khaldun's reflections on the socio-economic complexity of the modern world. Ibn Khaldun's interpretations and definitions of history and civilization resulted in significant innovation in human science. The study adopts qualitative research techniques to achieve its objectives. Ibn Khaldun had a multi-dimensional outlook on civilization and history and the way history develops. This study argues that his multidimensional approach to history deserves a new analytical study.

¹ PhD candidate (philosophy of history) at the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC-IIUM). Email: zhelwantahr94@gmail.com

² Assistant Professor at the Department of Fundamental and Inter-disciplinary Studies, AbdulHamid AbuSulayman Kulliyah of IRKHS, International Islamic University Malaysia. Email: wahed@iium.edu.my

Keywords: Ibn Khaldun, *'asabiyyah*, civilization, cyclical nature, societal dynamics

Introduction

The adage "All ideas and theories are products of their historical context" is commonly acknowledged. To comprehend the theoretical framework, beliefs, and conceptual underpinnings of a particular thinker, it is imperative to contextualize his ideas within the historical and geographical milieu in which they were formulated. To effectively analyse historical topics, it is crucial to have a comprehensive understanding of the social and political context and prevailing ideologies of the era in which the writer lived. Neglecting to consider the historical circumstances surrounding events and theories would impede the accurate comprehension of such subjects. Examining historical ideas solely through the lens of our present time would lead to a deviation from the intended focus and objective. To ensure precision and facilitate understanding of the perspectives and ideas put forward by Ibn Khaldun this article will primarily focus on the historical context and concept of Ibn Khaldun's theory. There has been a renewed interest in revisiting historical theories and analysing their relevance and applicability in modern times. Analogous to this, evaluating the applicability and relevance of Ibn Khaldun's theory in modern times will be another task of this article.

Lifetime of Ibn Khaldun (May 27, 1332- March 17, 1406)

Ibn Khaldun's birth took place in the year 1332 in Tunis. His family held a prominent position in Andalusia (Muslim, Spain) and exerted significant influence in the intellectual and political spheres. Following the successful re-conquest of Seville by the Crusaders in 1248, the Ibn Khaldun family decided to depart from Spain and establish their residence in Tunis during the initial decades of the thirteenth century.³ Ibn Khaldun's life may be divided into three

³ Nedjah Abdelhakim, A Comparative Study of the Economic Ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun and its Relevance to Conventional Economic Thought, Master Dissertation, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2000.

sections for convenience. The first two decades were his youth and schooling. The following 23 years, he spent pursuing academic goals and occasional political posts. He was a judge in his latter 30 years. He divided the Maghreb, the Muslim West, into the first two eras and Egypt into the third. Ibn Khaldun's active engagement in the political affairs of many rulers and governments in North Africa and Spain throughout the relevant era might help explain his intellectual framework's socio-political context.⁴

Ibn Khaldun learned from his father. Traditional primary education included memorizing and studying the Holy Quran for Ibn Khaldun. He also learned religious traditions and theology early on. He also had a solid basis in philosophy, mathematics, logic, and astronomy. Due to the Marinid invasion, Tunis had several famous thinkers. This group gave Ibn Khaldun outstanding mentors whose expertise and intellectual accomplishments inspired him. The prominent academics aided his cognitive development. Ibn Khaldun's schooling was interrupted by two significant events. A severe plague epidemic in North Africa in 1349 devastated the area. This disease affected many academics and people, affecting the population. The Marinid dynasty's last intellectuals left Morocco in about 1350.⁵

In 1354, he was invited to come before the Fez court and presented to the Sultan. He was appointed to the Sultan's scientific council and other roles. During this time, Ibn Khaldun presumably became more aware of political changes.⁶ Ibn Khaldun became a significant player in North African history. He actively influenced the success and failure of these nations. He sometimes helped them rise or fall, but sometimes he started fights and political manoeuvring. Ibn Khaldun, a twenty-two-year-old, was brilliant, powerful, driven, ambitious, and proud of his ancestry. These traits drove him to gain power, influence, and fortune. During that time, North Africa's state and judicial structures allowed talented and determined people to ascend to power. Sultan Abu Enan, the most notable king in North

⁴ Syed Farid Alatas, *Ibn Khaldun* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2-3.

⁵ Ahamad Faosiy Ogunbado, *The Concept of Leadership in Islam: A Special Reference to Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah*, PhD Thesis, International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, International Islamic University Malaysia, 2012.

⁶ Alatas, *Ibn Khaldun*, 5.

Africa, started a crucial political age. Over 30 years, he experienced success and loss, affluence and misery. Ibn Khaldun's ambition drove him to political conspiracy two years after his appointment to Fez's court. Despite his youth, Sultan Abu Enan appointed Ibn Khaldun secretary of the privy council, a post he honoured and appreciated.⁷

Ibn Khaldun references his break with Abu Enan. Ibn Khaldun was close to Muhammad, the overthrown Almohad ruler of Bougie, who was imprisoned at Fez. Ibn Khaldun devised a scheme to help Muhammad restore his kingdom as Sultan Abu Enan's health declined in late 1356. Abu Enan detained Ibn Khaldun in early 1357 in reaction to the scheme. After Sultan Abu Enan died in 1358, Ibn Khaldun was released after nearly two years of jail. The Vizier released Ibn Khaldun from prison and restored him after taking power. Ibn Khaldun's return to Tunis was denied.⁸

From 1357 until 1362, Ibn Khaldun actively built relationships with influential people to gain favour. Ibn Khaldun held several high-ranking jobs and excelled. Despite his wanderer's jobs, Ibn Khaldun excelled at them. Fez factions' internal rivalries and plots made Ibn Khaldun's situation worse. In early 1362, he visited Andalusia. In Granada, Sultan Mouhamad welcomed Khaldun warmly. In 1364, Ibn Khaldun headed an embassy to Pedro El Cruel in Seville while in Granada. He left Granada soon after due to disputes with Ibn Khaieb, a notable scholar. After returning to Bougie, he became Abu Nabd Allah's chamberlain. Rebels assassinated the prince a year later, ending his rule. Ibn Khaldun travelled extensively throughout central and western North Africa for nine years, cultivating tribal relationships. At this point, he saw the differences between a nomadic and sedentary lifestyle and rural and metropolitan areas.⁹

As his dislike of politics grew, Ibn Khaldun decided to leave politics and seek sanctuary in Qalat Salama. The tranquillity of Qalat Salama begins Ibn Khaldun's third phase. After spending his adult life in political machinations, serving in diverse courts in North Africa and

⁷ Mohammad Abdullah Enan, *Ibn Khaldūn: His Life and Works* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2007): 17-19.

⁸ Alatas, *Ibn Khaldun*, 5.

⁹ Akhmetova, Elmira Akhmetova, "Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406): His contribution to the science of civilisation," *Architects of Civilisation*, 2014, 1-5.

Andalusia, and meeting aristocrats and tribal leaders, he was ready to contemplate history, particularly state ascension and decline. Ibn Khaldun wrote the *Muqaddima*, or Prolegomenon, at this castle before writing his comprehensive account of the Arab and Berber peoples. Egypt was his next stop. Egypt welcomed Ibn Khaldun warmly. Due to dispersed scholarly publications, scientists are familiar with the topic. Ibn Khaldun became a high court judge and Al-Azhar professor. Scholar and statesman Ibn Khaldun died at 76 on March 17, 1406. Throughout his lifetime, he made significant contributions to the progression of scientific knowledge and dedicated his efforts to improving North Africa and Andalusia. The last resting place of Cairo's Sufi Babul Nasr is in Cairo.¹⁰

Historical Context and Geographical Landscape

The late seventh century Hijra saw significant political developments in North Africa. The Almohad kingdom declined, spawning minor republics and principalities. The Emirate of Banu Hafs was in Tunis, while the Middle Barbary and Tlemcen were under Banu Abd al-Wad. Fez and Morocco also formed the Banu Mareen Kingdom. Resilient rebels and charismatic leaders created miniature principalities in several cities and ports inside and beyond these kingdoms. The Marinids (Banu Mareen) inherited most of the Almohad patrimony. Their domain was the largest and most powerful, including Mauritania (Morocco), Ceuta, Middle Barbary, and Gibraltar. Sultan Abu Yusuf Yacoub in Abd al-Hag founded and led their dynasty, invading Andalusia many times before dying in 685 A.H. Several influential monarchs followed him. Sultan Abul Hassan ruled Fez throughout the period under review. After his father, Sultan Abu Saeed, died in 1330, he became king. He sought lofty goals with a strong determination. Gibraltar was taken from the Christians in 733 A.H., then progressively acquired Middle Barbary's ports from the Banu Abd al Wad faction until they took Tlemcen, their capital, in 737. Eastern sections of the Banu Mareen dynasty reached Tunis. After that, Sultan Abul Hassan planned to

¹⁰ Wawan Hernawan, "Ibn Khaldun thought: A review of al-Muqaddimah book," *Jurnal Ushuluddin*, vol. 23, no. 2 (2017), 173-184.

conquer Tunis by attacking the Banu Hafs, a close family and friend of the Sultan. The situation recurred like kings and viziers.¹¹

The position of North African nations in the eighth century Hijra was that revolutions and political upheavals were frequent, with various usurpers and dynasties taking over kingdoms. Numerous fights aimed at acquiring Bougie, Constantine, Bona, and Tlemcen, small principalities in essential cities and ports. The thrones of North Africa were vulnerable to fate, making it a hotbed of ambition and competition. It hosted complex plots and attracted leaders and rivals for power. The transfer of energy between thrones and emirates was expected, as were internal strife and warfare between dynasties. However, these unsettling territories thrived during brief moments of tranquillity and competed in wealth and splendor, attracting intellectuals and writers.

In North Africa's history, intellectual advancement thrived, entrenched itself, and shifted with state circumstances. Like states, this intellectual movement was unstable and irregular. It also moved to another court as its energy diminished. The North African intellectual movement consistently met and travelled to different rulers and courts. It also kept North Africa and Muslim Spain in touch. Granada was a centre for an esteemed intellectual movement, but Andalusia was overcrowded with scholars and writers. That the Christian kingdom of Castille had acquired numerous provinces of Andalusia and taken over most of its ports and cities made matters worse. Several scholars and intellectuals from Andalusia chose North Africa for its better prospects, security, and food.¹²

Instability was ubiquitous in social, economic, and political dimensions when Ibn Khaldun was born and grew. This practice and custom in North Africa greatly influenced ibn Khaldun's view. Ibn Khaldun believed that culture is a homogeneous, internally harmonious, and bounded system of values, conceptions, and practices that limits community variety and individual agency. Khaldun believed customs shaped human nature and character.¹³

¹¹ Mohammad Abdullah Enan, *Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Works*, 12-15.

¹² Mohammad Abdullah Enan, *Ibn Khaldūn: His Life and Works*, 16.

¹³ Marko Pišev, "Anthropological aspects of Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah: A critical examination," *Un article du dossier documentaire: Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406)*, 2019.

“Custom causes human nature to incline toward the things to which it becomes used. Man is the child of customs, not the child of his ancestors”.¹⁴

Ibn Khaldun's philosophy applied to his own life because he was nurtured in a culture where a group with more *Asabiyyah* would attack and destroy a faction with less. Additionally, the next generation indulges in a luxury lifestyle, disregarding their valued reputation and moral ideals. The state and dynasty will decline after *'asabiyyah's* fall. Ibn Khaldun's perspective shows the power and dynasty of North Africa's historical relevance. Undoubtedly, Ibn Khaldun was a remarkable scholar who carefully evaluated his day's history and contemporary conditions. Ultimately, this circumstance influenced much of his scientific work.

Upon perusing Ibn Khaldun's biography, one discerns a distinct duality in his character, whereby he exhibits a simultaneous inclination towards both ambitions for social status and authority and a vigorous pursuit of intellectual enlightenment and erudition. During the era of Ibn Khaldun, the realms of science and politics operated on divergent logical frameworks. Ibn Khaldun expressed his belief in a specific section of his *Muqaddimah*, noting that:

“Scholars are, of all people, those least familiar with politics. The reason for this is that (scholars) are used to mental speculation and to a searching study of ideas which they abstract from the sensibilia and conceive in their minds as general universals so that they may apply to some matter in general but not to any particular case, individual, race, nation, or group of people. (Scholars) then make such universal ideas conform (in their minds) to facts of the outside world. They also compare things with others similar to or like them, with the help of analogical reasoning used in jurisprudence, which is familiar to them. All their conclusions and views continue to be something in mind. They come to

¹⁴ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*: Abd Ar Rahman bin Muhammed Ibn Khaldun, F. Rosenthal, ed., 1967: 484.

conform (to the facts of the outside world) only after research and speculation have ended, or they may never come to do (to them). The facts of the outside world are merely exceptional cases of the (ideas) in the mind. For instance, the religious laws are special cases derived from the well-known (texts) of the Qur'an and the Sunnah. In their case, one expects the facts of the outside world to conform to them, in contrast with the intellectual sciences, where, to (prove) the soundness of views, one expects those views to do to the facts of the outside world”¹⁵.

He then contrasted political and scientific reasoning in the same part. He studied religious studies in his youth and was expected to work in religion. At eighteen, he entered politics and became a monarch. It is worth noting that Ibn Khaldun swiftly left politics to pursue academic pursuits before returning to politics. This implies that Ibn Khaldun had significant psychological issues. Ibn Khaldun came from a prominent family, which may explain this. An intriguing characteristic of this family is their simultaneous development of political figures and constant political contributions. This shows that Ibn Khaldun was raised in a home with political and scientific power. Ibn Khaldun's parents fostered his passion for academic pursuits, reflected in his many political and scientific viewpoints and his overall philosophy.¹⁶

A significant pandemic killed many people during Ibn Khaldun's reign. The disease killed many people in cities but spared the plains, creating a massive imbalance between the nomadic population and urban areas. Nomads became the dominant force due to their numerical dominance and physical prowess, occupying towns that had been centres of power. The disease caused rapid and frequent movements in emirates and controls, causing significant political and social disturbances. Conspiracy theories, wars, and political upheavals endured. Nomadic tribal tribes primarily carried

¹⁵ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, 732.

¹⁶ Ali Wardi, *Mantiq Ibn Khaldun* (Beirut: Kuffan publishing, 1994), 115.

out the attacks. In his book above, Wardi, an Iraqi sociologist, posits an alternative explanation, asserting that.

Ibn Khaldun entered politics during a time of significant political change. Ibn Khaldun wanted to build a little kingdom to revive his bloodline. Ibn Khaldun failed. He began examining his failures. Ibn Khaldun's political failure may have been due to a weak 'Asabiyyah. Ibn Khaldun was part of the 'Asabiyyah family, which was declining in power and coherence.¹⁷

Islamic civilization's political unrest also influenced Ibn Khaldun's thought. Toledo, Córdoba, Seville, Granada, and the territory between Almeria and Jebel al-Fath were no longer under Muslim rule. Many Muslim populations were deported to Morocco and Tunisia, where Muslim tradition persisted. After the al-Muhad State collapsed, Morocco's Muslim region was divided into three territories ruled by different families. The Banu Marin in Far Morocco, Banu Abd al-Waad in Central Morocco, and Banu Hafs in Lower Morocco were "African." The Mamluks ruled eastern Egypt, which was mainly Muslim. Egypt had a more stable political system than Morocco. The death of a sultan often causes political instability. As Ibn Khaldun spent 24 years investigating this topic, the Mamluks broadly experienced such crises. The community confronted internal and religious issues. These nations were vital during a crucial change. The Mongols' destruction of the Abbasid state divided the land into many principalities and smaller states. Tamerlane's invasion of Iraq, Syria, and Anatolia also affected the region.¹⁸

Experiencing pessimism and a sense of hopelessness may be a challenging emotional response under the complex circumstances that have impacted the Islamic world, as the prominent nations that once spearheaded its progress have seen setbacks in their pursuit of success. As a contemporary individual, Ibn Khaldun was subject to the prevailing pessimistic sentiments of the populace. According to George Sutton, Ibn Khaldun's work might be characterized as a

¹⁷ Ali Wardi, *Mantiq Ibn Khaldun*, 129.

¹⁸ Satie Alhasri, *Dirasat ean Muqadumat Ibn Khaldun* (New York: Hindawi publishing corporation city, 2017), 62-72

pessimistic literary composition. Ibn Khaldun is regarded as a prominent figure associated with despair.¹⁹

Ibn Khaldun's philosophy was shaped by many personal, familial, social, political, and civilizational influences. These diverse elements played a significant role in developing Ibn Khaldun's intellectual framework.

Brief Overview of Ibn Khaldun's Perspective on History and Civilization and its Cyclical Nature

Ibn Khaldun posited that history is a discipline of great significance, replete with multiple benefits, and characterized by a noble goal. He argued that history provides us with insights into past civilizations, elucidating their customs and practices, shedding light on the lives of prophets, and offering an understanding of monarchs' governance and political systems.²⁰ Ibn Khaldun used critical analysis, empirical observation, comparative analysis, and rigorous research. He examined historical events, their origins, and historians' methods using scientific criticism. Analyzing and comparing several versions eliminated fabrication and exaggeration to provide an objective view of the events.²¹ His accurate and rational interpretation of history makes Ibn Khaldun a notable scientific success in the arts. Avicenna, Al-Farabi, and Averroes laid the groundwork for Islamic social philosophy, which inspired this method of thought. Ibn Khaldun's scholarship also addresses epistemological issues that arose throughout Islamic civilization.²²

Ibn Khaldun thought civilizations grow and collapse cyclically and studied their dynamics and characteristics. Ibn Khaldun felt that

¹⁹ George Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science* (Washington: Carnegie institution, 1948), vol. III.

²⁰ Abdul Matin, "Innovative ideas of Ibn Khaldun to sociology and philosophy of history," *Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research*, vol. 8, no. 1 (2021), 571-579.

²¹ Imadaldin Al Jubouri, "Ibn Khaldun and the philosophy of history", *Medieval Philosophy*, March 2005, https://philosophynow.org/issues/50/Ibn_Khaldun_and_the_Philosophy_of_History

²² Mohammareza Shahidipak, "Ibn Khaldun as a paradigm for the past and future of sociology and humanity", *Sociology International Journal*, vol. 4, no. 5 (2020), 153-159.

richness and extravagance due to moral corruption and lack of discipline were the fundamental reasons for civilization's demise. His solidarity helps society innovate, overcome obstacles, and flourish economically. As the community prospers, Khaldun claims that an opulent lifestyle reduces collective cohesiveness, causing moral deterioration and social disintegration. In *The Muqaddimah*, Ibn Khaldun examines source material and methodology, history writing issues, and the misconceptions that often mislead historians. His remarks remain pertinent. Ibn Khaldun's view of history and civilization is unique and profound. Khaldun's cyclical view of history holds that civilizations will fall. He claims that civilizations evolved from nomadic to sedentary. As a civilization gets prosperous and complacent, it disintegrates, allowing a new mobile group to rise and establish its civilization. Khaldun stresses the importance of social structures and collective solidarity in civilizations' rise and demise. He also emphasizes cultural and intellectual aspirations as driving reasons behind civilizations' rise and fall. Khaldun's view of history as a cycle of civilizations' emergence, decay, and replacement is comprehensive.²³

His historical interpretation relies on Ibn Khaldun's '*Asabiyyah* theory and civilization's cyclical character. '*Asabiyyah*, or social cohesion, drives civilizations' rise and demise. According to Ibn Khaldun, '*Asabiyyah* was strongest during civilization's founding period, when a strong leader unites the people via shared ideals, aims, and identity. Strong social solidarity promotes political stability, economic growth, and cultural development. With each generation, '*Asabiyyah* declines, giving place to individualism, corruption, and moral decay. This deterioration causes the civilization to collapse and a new one to rise. Ibn Khaldun claims that human cultures are cyclical and driven by dynamics.²⁴ Ibn Khaldun's theory on dynasties and empires' rise and collapse helps explain power's

²³ Hesiod, "The tragedy of civilization: Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddimah*," *Discourse on Minerva*, March 30, 2019, <https://minervawisdom.com/2019/03/30/the-tragedy-of-civilization-ibn-khaldun-muqaddimah/>.

²⁴ Asyiqin Abd Halim, *The Application of Ibn Khaldūn's Theory of Aṣabiyyah to the Modern Period with Special Reference to the Malay Muslim Community in Malaysia*, PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2013.

evolution. His complex view of ‘*Asabiyyah*, or societal cohesiveness, as the cause of dynasties' growth and fall encompasses internal and external variables. According to Khaldun, strong solidarity and unity allow a group to overcome weaker ones and form a prosperous dynasty. ‘*Asabiyyah* declined, causing social disintegration and the demise of the reigning dynasty. This cyclical growth and decay pattern applies to all cultures throughout time and place. Some academics think that Khaldun's thesis oversimplifies complicated historical processes, yet it illuminates the link between societal cohesiveness and governing entity lifespan. Khaldun's theory advances history and civilization by giving a complete framework for analysing dynasty and empire growth and demise.

‘*Asabiyyah* in Modern Time

The critical elements of Ibn Khaldun's theory must be evaluated in the present day to ascertain its validity and applicability. ‘*Asabiyyah*'s societal unity and solidarity that drive growth is essential. This is obvious in modern societies since solid social networks and teamwork are necessary for achieving common goals. Ibn Khaldun's ‘*Asabiyyah* theory has influenced political and sociological research. It has been critically assessed, nevertheless. Since it assumes that social coherence and collective unity determine the rise and fall of kingdoms and dynasties, it is too deterministic. Critics say economic conditions, technology, and foreign pressures affect political choices. According to another assessment, ‘*Asabiyyah* promotes group identity and loyalty above individual liberty and rights, which might justify authoritarianism and discriminatory political practices. ‘*Asabiyyah* was developed in a specific historical setting and may not apply to modern political and social circumstances, according to academic research²⁵.

‘*Asabiyyah* has been criticized for justifying authoritarianism and restricting political practices. For instance, numerous dictatorial leaders have employed ‘*Asabiyyah* to create a collective consciousness based on national or religious identification among

²⁵ Bishara Azmi, “Sect, sectarianism and imagined sects”, *Azmi Bishara*, April 2008, <https://www.azmibishara.com/en/books/sect-sectarianism-and-imagined-sects>.

their followers, marginalizing or excluding others. This might limit individual rights and marginalize communities. The Islamic State (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq sprang from its followers' 'Asabiyyah. This collective identity viewed them as part of a new Islamic kingdom.²⁶ Thus, religious and ethnic minorities were persecuted and forced to follow strict religious norms. Critics argue that exclusionary political methods are unethical and may cause social unrest and long-term instability. According to some scholars, 'Asabiyyah aims to simplify and reduce complicated social and political processes into a single explanation. Several critics have called the idea deterministic since it assumes that collective coherence determines social and political outcomes. Despite Ibn Khaldun's sociological accomplishments and essential theory, his work has been criticized. Scholars first argue that his argument is unsupported by facts and depends on historical narratives and personal experience. Unsubstantiated claims diminish his credibility and applicability. Many scholars contend that Ibn Khaldun's cyclical approach to societal transition is overly reductionist and ignores modern civilizations' complexity and unpredictability. Detractors argue that the author's focus on tribalism and conflict as the main drivers of society's evolution ignores economic systems and technological advances. These criticisms emphasize the necessity to study modern socioeconomic processes more deeply.²⁷

Alternatively, Garrison found that Ibn Khaldun's 'Asabiyyah may be applied to modern culture. 'Asabiyyah, or societal cohesion and unity, may help a new dynasty or state rise. 'Asabiyyah may take several forms in modern nations, including nationality, religion, and politics. The rise of populist movements worldwide may be 'Asabiyyah. These social movements frequently foster a common identity and goal, sometimes leading to a new political framework. Ibn Khaldun noted that internal schisms and conflicts might weaken the social cohesiveness that helped 'Asabiyyah rise. Thus, 'Asabiyyah

²⁶ Akhilesh Pillalamarri, "Why militant groups succeed," *The Diplomat*, August 27, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/08/why-militant-groups-succeed/>.

²⁷ Morteza Hashemi, "Bedouins of Silicon Valley: A neo-Khaldunian approach to the sociology of technology." *The Sociological Review*, vol. 67, no. 3 (2019), 536-551.

may illuminate modern political transition and social integration.²⁸

Correspondingly, Sümer proposes using ‘*Asabiyyah*’ as a theoretical framework to understand and evaluate modern societies, particularly those with multicultural and multinational political structures like Turkey and the EU, as well as other political entities worldwide. ‘*Asabiyyah*’ may be used to understand the social and political changes that have resulted from the EU’s development and fusion of cultures and nationalities. Turkey, with its diverse population and ethnic and cultural heritages, may use ‘*Asabiyyah*’ to study its political system. Policymakers may promote social cohesion, peace, and prosperity by understanding ‘*Asabiyyah*’ in these communities.²⁹ Similarly, Birtek argues that “*Asabiyyah*” is relevant in modern civilizations, especially when studying a fresh cultural and political event that defies standard social theory. The author believes this work, ‘*Asabiyyah*’, sprang from a particular place, a town community on the brink of modernity. Additionally, this ‘*Asabiyyah*’ is created by a critical blend of traditional and modern features. The author also notes that ‘*Asabiyyah*’, unlike Ibn Khaldun, maintains its subservient status by its political objective, which underpins its claims to current and future political power. The author does not demonstrate how ‘*Asabiyyah*’ applies to modern societies. Still, political movements that rely on primordial or semi-primordial affiliations and seek to overthrow established authorities could be examined. These movements embody ‘*Asabiyyah*’ because they are based on a profound sense of identity and solidarity in tradition while simultaneously trying to fit into modern political and economic structures.³⁰

Halim found various ‘*Asabiyyah*’-related challenges for modern Muslims. These obstacles include integration, intra-group discord, moral difficulties, criminal activity, and social, internal, and

²⁸ Douglas Herthum Garrison, *Ibn Khaldun and the Modern Social Sciences: A Comparative Theoretical Inquiry into Society, the State, and Revolution*, Master Dissertation, University of Denver, 2012.

²⁹ Beyza Sümer, "Ibn Khaldun's *asabiyya* for social cohesion," *Elektronik Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, vol. 11, no. 41 (2012), 253-267.

³⁰ Faruk Birtek, "From Durkheim to Hardy: A possible hypothesis on rereading the new politics of localism: A post-script to Durkheim and Labriola." *Il Politico*, 1996, 257-383.

international concerns. The above factors may indicate weakened *Asabiyyah*, which might lead to a civilization's decline. Nationalism uses '*Asabiyyah*' in modern culture. Nationalism expresses '*Asabiyyah*', a sociological word for a collective mood in which individuals strongly identify with and feel loyalty to their nation. This phenomenon may promote communal awareness and togetherness, benefiting a community. Nationalism may cause conflict within a group if it gets too extreme or exclusionary.³¹

Examining social events and human behaviour shows Ibn Khaldun's theory's relevance and applicability in today's complex global setting. Ibn Khaldun's concept of '*Asabiyyah*', or social cohesion, remains pertinent as civilizations struggle with societal dispersion and discord. The author's study of civilizations' rise and fall based on wealth and degradation may also apply to global issues like economic inequality and political instability. Ibn Khaldun's historical and cultural context must be considered while assessing his restrictions and predispositions. Personal experiences and ideas shaped the theoretical frameworks and opinions of fourteenth-century historian and sociologist Ibn Khaldun. His approach relied on empirical facts and generalizations, which may have yet to see modern civilization's complexities. Ibn Khaldun also emphasized economic elements as drivers for social change since scholars now recognize the importance of economic progress and its impact on society. Recognizing historical background helps us understand modern social systems' complexities and dynamics. Thus, Ibn Khaldun's theory's ideas and conceptions remain relevant to community analysis.

In summary, Ibn Khaldun's thesis is still valid today. His concentration on geography, ecology, and social coherence in historical evolution remains relevant. '*Asabiyyah*', or group solidarity, is essential in contemporary culture since political and economic growth depends on group unity and cooperation. In modern times, historical events and power shifts reflect the author's study of dynasties and civilizations' cycles. Although aspects of Ibn Khaldun's

³¹ Halim Harliana et al., "The principal thinking of Ibn Khaldun: An analysis on the contribution to the development of contemporary science," In *Proceedings of The International Conference on Social Sciences (ICSS)*, vol. 1, no. 1. 2018, 591-600.

ideas may need to be adjusted or expanded to fit modern society, his core concepts and discernments remain essential perspectives on the human predicament.

Leadership Qualities and Effect of ‘Asabiyyah and Cycle Pattern on It

The restrictions and settings that formed Ibn Khaldun's works must be considered while appraising their relevance today. The *Muqaddimah* by Ibn Khaldun helps explain historical processes but should be approached cautiously. Ibn Khaldun's cyclical theory of dynasty development and decay may not describe the complicated dynamics of contemporary societies. Current civilizations' global interconnectivity and rapid technical advancements are the main reasons. Ibn Khaldun's attention to social cohesion and economic elements may shed light on current geopolitical dynamics. His thesis emphasizes the complex link between social cohesion, economic productivity, and political stability, which are still important in modern civilizations. Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on cultural influences, particularly religious beliefs and rituals, provides a unique perspective on modern societies. Ibn Khaldun's idea may be evaluated from numerous angles in the contemporary period. The theory is still significant in economics. ‘*Asabiyyah*, Ibn Khaldun's concept of social cohesiveness, emphasizes the necessity for solid community bonds to grow economically. The current debate on social capital and economic growth reflects the above idea.

The importance of Ibn Khaldun's ideology to modern governance, leadership, and ‘*Asabiyyah* Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on social cohesion and effective administration resonates with modern governance and leadership issues. The theory's recognition of political institutions' cyclical nature is significant in modern democracies, where power fluctuates. Current leaders must display solid moral integrity and make ethical decisions; therefore, acknowledging the role of moral ideals and virtuous leaders in creating society is crucial. The philosophy of Ibn Khaldun gives essential insights and navigational aid.

Positive, negative, and irrelevant arguments exist on how ‘*Asabiyyah* may impact current leadership. ‘*Asabiyyah* may foster

group identification and loyalty to support a stance in a positive influence debate. Sidani recognizes ibn Khaldun's theory's significance now. He believes that although ibn Khaldun's leadership theory was developed in a specific historical and cultural context, many of his ideas are still relevant today. In collectivist cultures, group cohesion is critical to leadership. Hence, 'Asabiyyah, a feeling of communal solidarity, may be necessary. Teamwork and corporate culture that values common identity and beliefs use this idea in modern society. Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on leader traits and behaviour is another example of his influence on current administration and leadership. This notion remains relevant since empirical research has demonstrated that leader behaviour and personality qualities affect organizational performance. A leader who is honest, transparent, and ethical is an example. A leader like this will likely gain followers' trust and respect, which may boost organizational performance.³² For example, The success of post-apartheid South Africa under Nelson Mandela's leadership highlights the importance of inclusive governance. Mandela's ability to bridge racial divides and establish a united nation aligns with Ibn Khaldun's notion of ethical leadership and social cohesion.

In Almoharby's study, Ibn Khaldun's leadership concept remains vital in modern administration and leadership. The idea emphasizes a leader's good reputation and morality. Former Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba's leadership style illustrates Ibn Khaldun's theory's application. Bourguiba was known for uniting Tunisia's different groups and promoting national identity. The speaker also stressed education and modernization, improving the country's economy and society. Former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad's leadership style is another example. Mahathir has been lauded for uniting Malaysia's ethnic and religious groups and defining the nation. He has also stressed education and modernization, improving the nation's economy and society. The research suggests that Ibn Khaldun's leadership theory may

³² Yusuf M. Sidani, "Ibn Khaldun of North Africa: an AD 1377 theory of leadership," *Journal of Management History*, vol. 14, no. 1 (2008), 73-86.

illuminate modern leadership and government, particularly in diverse cultures.³³

Alatas evaluates Ibn Khaldun's state-building thesis in historical and contemporary situations in his work. The author recommends integrating Ibn Khaldun's theoretical framework with sociological notions of the Ottoman and Safavid empires and the Syrian state. The author also critically analyses Ibn Khaldun's views' relevance to the contemporary condition and state creation and decay in Saudi Arabia and Syria. The author argues that Ibn Khaldun's state formation concept is relevant to modern governance and leadership, particularly in the Arab Spring. The author suggests using 'Asabiyyah, which means social cohesion, to understand tribalism in contemporary Arab societies and its effects on governance and leadership. Turchin and Hall offer to study modern political regimes' rise and fall using Ibn Khaldun's theory on state evolution. The writers discuss using the "Ibn Khaldun cycle" to understand the four Chinggisid dynasties' ascendancy and collapse.³⁴

Negative impact: 'Asabiyyah may lead to partiality, nepotism, or exclusion of other groups.

According to Shihade, 'Asabiyyah may lead to an authoritarian leader who favours power and group above community benefit. This might subjugate numerous groups and people, fragmenting society. The author believes that 'Asabiyyah should be based on the material needs of the group rather than religious or ethnic feelings. The author also thinks the government should encourage internal unity and avoid economic monopolies.³⁵ Similarly, in Irwin's research, 'Asabiyyah might lead to excessive indulgence and authoritarian governance, which could harm the ruling class's leadership. This suggests that 'Asabiyyah may reduce leadership qualities, including discipline,

³³ Darwish Almoharby and Mark Neal, "Clarifying Islamic perspectives on leadership." *Education, Business and Society: Contemporary Middle Eastern Issues*, vol. 6, no. 3/4 (2013), 148-161.

³⁴ Syed Farid Alatas, *Applying Ibn Khaldūn: The Recovery of a Lost Tradition in Sociology* (London: Routledge, 2014), 214-215.

³⁵ Magid Shihade, "Asabiyya–Solidarity in the age of barbarism: An Afro-Arab-Asian alternative," *Current Sociology*, vol. 68, no. 2 (2020), 263-278.

communal welfare, self-gratification, and authoritarianism.³⁶

Correspondingly, Darling, in his study, said that 'Asabiyyah may also adversely affect leadership attributes. The Mamluks, as an illustration, endeavoured to cultivate 'Asabiyyah within their military hard worker via the establishment of training institutes and houses. Still, the efficacy of this approach was only partially achieved. By instilling a culture of competition among their recruits, encompassing individuals, homes, and social classes, they have effectively ensured their inability to align their governance with the anticipated standards of justice seen by the governed. The financial challenges experienced throughout their subsequent years further intensified the issue.³⁷ Similarly, according to Ahmad, Ibn Khaldun's theoretical framework posits that social cohesiveness is a fundamental pillar of social structure as elucidated by Khaldun, the concept of 'Asabiyyah functions as a unifying force that fosters solidarity among communities through shared language, culture, and behavioural norms. Society achieves cohesion when individuals consciously align their conduct with an idealized concept of perfection, operating within various hierarchical levels such as family, clan, tribe, and kingdom or nation. Hence, the erosion of 'Asabiyyah might engender a shortage of proficient governance, thereby precipitating political volatility, societal turmoil, and several adverse ramifications.³⁸

Some argue that 'Asabiyyah is no longer relevant in modern times, as societies have become more diverse and complex. In today's globalized world, leaders need to be able to navigate multiple identities and interests rather than relying on a narrow tribal or family network. Therefore, *Asabiyyah* may need help understanding modern leadership qualities.

In modern culture, cyclical patterns may affect leadership in numerous ways. Long-term vision is one example. Leaders who grasp state progression cyclical patterns may be more likely to take a

³⁶ Robert Irwin, "Toynbee and Ibn Khaldun." *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 33, no. 3 (1997), 461-479.

³⁷ Linda T. Darling, "Social cohesion ('Asabiyya) and justice in the late medieval Middle East," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 49, no. 2 (2007), 329-357.

³⁸ Akbar Ahmed, "Ibn Khaldun's understanding of civilizations and the dilemmas of Islam and the West today," *The Middle East Journal* (2002), 20-45.


forward-thinking approach to improve their country or organization. Individuals may choose strong institutions, education and infrastructure, and social unity above immediate rewards or selfish ambitions. This may help the state's long-term stability. Singapore's transformation from a developing nation into a global economic hub can be attributed to its long-term planning and forward-looking policies. The city-state's leaders embraced Ibn Khaldun's lessons by prioritizing education, infrastructure, and economic diversification.

Additionally, accountability is essential. Leaders who recognize the risks of personal pleasure are more likely to take responsibility for their actions toward their constituents. Their decision-making procedures may be more transparent, responsive to public concerns, and more likely to share power among stakeholders. This may reduce power concentration and promote inclusive, active government. Change resistance is similar.

Conversely, recurring moods may lead to resistance to change and innovation. Leaders who obsess about the status quo may hesitate to accept new technologies, promote diversity, or challenge power relations. This might lead to stagnation and deterioration if the government fails to adapt. Cycle pattern influences on leadership abilities in modern society are varied and diversified. The framework may help leaders understand their challenges and opportunities, but it can also stifle change. Leaders who can balance stability, innovation, and adaptation may be better able to handle modern governance challenges. One example of cycle patterns' impact on leadership qualities is the COVID-19 pandemic. Leaders in many countries have had to be adaptable and creative to respond to the rapidly changing situation while communicating effectively with their constituents. Countries like New Zealand and Taiwan demonstrated effective leadership and public cooperation, reflecting Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on social cohesion as a source of resilience.

Although Ibn Khaldun still needed to construct a complete management or leadership theory, he did propose leadership theories in the framework of studying countries, civilizations, and social institutions. The author also investigated the motivations for political leadership, emphasizing leadership characteristics and behaviours. Analysing how Ibn Khaldun's philosophy may influence modern

leadership techniques shows its relevance and applicability. Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on understanding a community's social and cultural context and the need for good administration and leadership correlates with modern management. The author's thoughts on society's cyclical tendencies and the necessity for flexible leaders are applicable in a rapidly changing global world. Ibn Khaldun regarded a country as active and evolving through three generations: initial, middle, and final. The initial batch lived in subsistence in dry areas and rural villages. The next generation gained power, created an independent state, and lived a lavish urban lifestyle. Modern administration and leadership must recognize the need to balance affluence and toughness to prevent a nation from deteriorating.



Ibn Khaldun's Reflections on the Socioeconomic Complexity of the Modern World

Ibn Khaldun's economic ideas were ahead of his time. Ibn Khaldun's ideas were re-examined and accepted by modern economics. Ibn Khaldun's economic development proposal, which focused on supply and demand and human capital utilization and composition, may have inspired current views about human capital and economic growth. His study of commerce between rich and necessitous countries and the influence of economic frameworks on development may be relevant to current issues about globalization and social inequity.

Ibn Khaldun's idea has shaped contemporary economics and development, making it worth studying. Before Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and David Ricardo, Ibn Khaldun established economic development theory. Ibn Khaldun's beliefs precede Smith's commodity work, Marx's required and surplus labour, and Ricardo's fixed unit of measurement and commodity golden and silver. His economic subjects are value, distribution, development, money, pricing, public finance, business cycles, inflation, rent, trade advantages, and politics. His ideas may assist governments and schools in achieving sustainable development. Labor specialization and economic growth show how Ibn Khaldun's argument relates to current socioeconomic ideas. Ibn Khaldun felt labour specialization encouraged industry and crafts, which boosted affluence. The theory suggests the division of labour is a significant economic engine in contemporary nations. The role of justice in economic growth is another. Fairness provides equitable and impartial involvement, which Ibn Khaldun believed was necessary for society's advancement. Similar to inclusive growth, it stresses economic advantages for all groups. Ibn Khaldun's thoughts on sustainable and fair economic development are relevant today.³⁹ Example, Canada's multiculturalism policy recognizes the importance of cultural diversity in nation-building. The policy's focus on celebrating various cultural backgrounds and fostering social inclusion resonates with

³⁹ M. T. S. H. Mohammad, "Principles of sustainable development in Ibn Khaldun's economic thought," *Malaysian Journal of Real Estate*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2010), 1-18.

Ibn Khaldun's emphasis on cultural influences in societal dynamics.

The argument is that Ibn Khaldun's economic teachings apply to present socioeconomic difficulties. Given income disparity, poverty, and social exclusion, Ibn Khaldun's focus on political, social, economic, and demographic aspects of economic outcomes is widely known. The study implies that Ibn Khaldun's views might help create policies that account for complicated issues and encourage fair, sustainable economic development. Income inequality is a modern application of Ibn Khaldun's financial concepts. Ibn Khaldun's taxation stresses balancing the state's financial demands with the public's capacity to pay taxes. The author argues that too many tariffs undermine the economy and promote social discontent, while too few lead to weak governance and insufficient public services. This notion is significant given income inequality and tax policy concerns.⁴⁰

Ibn Khaldun's specific section of his *Muqaddimah*, which F. Rosenthal edited, showed how taxes affect society and the economy:

“The tax increases beyond the limits of equity. The result is that the interest of the subjects in cultural enterprises disappears since when they compare expenditures and taxes with their income and gain and see the little profit they make, they lose all hope. Therefore, many of them refrain from all cultural activities. The result is that the total tax revenue decreases as (the number of) individual assessments decrease. When the decrease is noticed, individual imposts are often increased. This is considered a means of compensating for the decrease. Finally, individual imposts and assessments reach their limit. It would be of no avail to increase them further. The costs of all cultural enterprise are now too high, the taxes are too heavy, and the profits anticipated fail to materialize. Thus, the total revenue continues to decrease. In contrast, the amounts of individual imposts and

⁴⁰ Abdul Azim Islahi, "Ibn Khaldun's theory of taxation and its relevance today," In *Conference on Ibn Khaldun*, Madrid, 2006, 3-5.

assessments continue to increase because it is believed that such an increase will compensate (for the drop in revenue) in the end. Finally, civilization is destroyed because the incentive for cultural activity is gone. The dynasty suffers from the situation because it (is the dynasty that) profits from cultural activity".⁴¹

Many contemporary economies tax the affluent and businesses less than the ordinary individual. Tax reform and wealth transfer are favoured to narrow these imbalances. The necessity to balance governmental demands and population tax capacity may benefit from Ibn Khaldun's taxes in policymaking. Public services are also crucial to economic progress and social stability. Example: Scandinavian countries like Norway and Sweden prioritize progressive taxation to fund robust public services and reduce income inequality. This approach aligns with Ibn Khaldun's understanding of balancing taxation and public.

Ibn Khaldun's philosophy applies to socio-economic issues today. Economic concerns include Ibn Khaldun's views on market processes, division of labour, public finance, and national wealth requirements. The applicability of his dynamic poverty model to Muslim-majority nations' poverty rates proves his ideas' longevity. Ibn Khaldun's integrative and dynamic method of analysing persons and society impacted current social science's socio-economic understanding. Academics have used Ibn Khaldun's theory to study Muslim-majority governments' economic problems. Labor allocation, market dynamics, and governmental financial management are issues. Ibn Khaldun's comprehensive approach to analysing persons and society inspired contemporary social science's understanding of socio-economic concerns, notably culture's role in economic development.⁴² Ibn Khaldun's economic ideas went beyond his time's intellectual climate. Economists rediscovered some of his ideas. According to Ibn Khaldun's thesis, supply and demand and human capital usage and composition may have affected current

⁴¹ Ibn Khaldun, "The Muqaddimah: Abd Ar Rahman bin Muhammed Ibn Khaldun, 353.

⁴² Mimma Maripatul Uula, "The economic thought of Ibn Khaldun," *Islamic Economic and History*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2022).

views on human capital and economic growth. His research on trade between wealthy and necessitous nations and economic frameworks on development may be significant to globalization and social inequality.⁴³

Specialization and division of labour include persons or groups specializing in specific tasks or areas of competence within a system or organization. Learning specialized skills and knowledge to increase productivity is this strategy. The economic benefit comes from specialization and labor division. Individuals and corporations specialize in modern civilization, improving productivity and economic development. Institutional incentives are examined. Ibn Khaldun emphasized incentives and structures for economic progress. Modern society may employ this idea to stimulate individual and company innovation and entrepreneurship via legislation. This process needs a supporting institutional environment that boosts economic activity.⁴⁴

Critiques of applying Ibn Khaldun's economic theories to modern economic policies have been raised on the other side. According to some scholars, it is argued that Ibn Khaldun's economic views may have little direct applicability to the complexities of the contemporary global economy due to their formulation within a specific historical and cultural context. Since the era of Ibn Khaldun, notable changes have occurred in socioeconomic frameworks and circumstances, making applying his principles to modern economic policy a challenging endeavour. According to critics, the economic ideas of Ibn Khaldun needed to handle the numerous features of modern economic systems. The author's focus on agriculture as the foundation of society may need to account for the complex dynamics of modern industrial and service economies.⁴⁵ Some experts argue

⁴³ Jean David C. Boulakia, "Ibn Khaldun: a fourteenth-century economist," *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 79, no. 5 (1971), 1105-1118.

⁴⁴ Karatas, Selim Cafer Karatas, "The economic theory of Ibn Khaldun and the rise and fall of nations," *Muslim Heritage*, April 24, 2014. <https://muslimheritage.com/the-economic-theory-of-ibn-khaldun-and-the-rise-and-fall-of-nations/>.

⁴⁵ Adil H. Mouhammed, "On Ibn Khaldun's critique of the market economy with some lessons to the Arab world," *Journal of Third World Studies*, vol. 25, no. 2 (2008), 207-226.

that Ibn Khaldun's economic concepts need more empirical support and analysis. His beliefs influenced his time but may not match modern economic research and evidence-based administration.⁴⁶


Understanding Ibn Khaldun's theory in the present socio-economic context is crucial since it emphasizes social cohesiveness and group linkages in economic success. Social solidarity 'Asabiyyah explains how strong social relationships promote economic prosperity. Globalization and interconnection recognize the need for cooperation and collaboration to boost economic progress. Using Ibn Khaldun's notion, policymakers may promote resilience, inclusiveness, and sustainable development. Business partnerships and government cooperation to accomplish objectives demonstrate this. Its economy is more robust because of the EU 'Asabiyyah. Socioeconomic progress requires cooperation and collaboration in this perspective.

Despite its challenges, Ibn Khaldun's theory is essential to comprehending the present socioeconomic reality. Pre-modern cultures, unlike modern ones, conceived the notion. Many of his theories may only apply to a limited number of global systems. In a world of individualism and cultural diversity, Ibn Khaldun's 'Asabiyyah social cohesiveness may not be meaningful. Ibn Khaldun's belief that modern civilizations fluctuate continually makes growth and collapse cycles hard to describe and assess.

Ibn Khaldun's Reflection on Socioeconomic Complexity

In sum, the theory proposed by Ibn Khaldun has been proven to offer significant contributions to comprehending and evaluating present-day socio-economic dynamics. It underscores the importance of achieving equilibrium in development, fostering sustainable economic expansion, and implementing efficient governance as essential factors in guaranteeing enduring stability and prosperity within society. Examining Ibn Khaldun's theory enables researchers and policymakers to better comprehend the interdependencies between socioeconomic forces and social alterations in the contemporary period.

⁴⁶ Siti Kholifatul Rizkiah and Abdelkader Chachi, "The relevance of Ibn Khaldun's economic thought in the contemporary world," *Turkish Journal of Islamic Economics (Tujise)*, 2020, 71-90.



Conclusion

This article provided a critical analysis of the life of Ibn Khaldun, exploring the influence of his historical and cultural setting on the development of his views. This article critically analyzed the contemporary relevance of Ibn Khaldun's beliefs. The initial synopsis of Ibn Khaldun's thesis emphasized the significance of societal unity, financial well-being, and civilizations' inescapable deterioration and collapse. Subsequently, an examination was undertaken to ascertain the contemporary applicability of the idea. The principles put out by Ibn Khaldun, particularly his emphasis on the necessity of social cohesion, continue to hold relevance, as evidenced by the findings of this research. Certain concepts proposed by Ibn Khaldun, such as the cyclical patterns observed in the evolution of civilizations, may need reassessment in the light of contemporary developments. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that cycle patterns influence leadership skills, which are widely recognized as significant in any setting. Leaders who possess the ability to exhibit empathy, practical

communication skills, adaptability, and strategic thinking are more inclined to achieve success in attaining their objectives and fostering constructive transformation, irrespective of the cyclical patterns they encounter.

The presentation also addressed the challenges of modernizing a traditional notion for contemporary applications. Furthermore, it is crucial to acknowledge that ‘asabiyyah can possess both positive and negative implications in contemporary, debatable discourses. When excessively pursued, it can result in “groupthink” and a deficiency in critical thinking, compromising the argument’s quality. Moreover, the concept of ‘asabiyyah can also engender an absence of empathy and comprehension towards those who do not possess congruent group affiliations, hence fostering polarization and fragmentation. This analysis underscores the importance of thoroughly examining historical concepts to determine their relevance in the contemporary global landscape. The argument put out by Ibn Khaldun holds recent significance in the field of study as it promotes the pursuit of inquiry. Despite the antiquity of his teachings, they remain relevant and applicable in contemporary society, enabling us to comprehend and thrive in the present era. Scientists and researchers must comprehensively analyze Ibn Khaldun’s theoretical framework to enhance understanding of societal dynamics and develop efficacious policies and methodologies to address current issues.

ABUL KALAM AZAD'S IDEA OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM FOR AN INCLUSIVE INDIAN NATIONALISM

A Civilizational Revisit

Md Yousuf Ali¹ and Osman Bakar²

Abstract

*Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1958), the first Minister of Education in independent India, was a towering figure in the modern subcontinent. A freedom fighter against British colonial rule following the steps of Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), an Islamic thinker, and a champion of Hindu-Muslim unity, Azad was an intellectual-activist advocating an inclusive Indian nationalism. This article focuses on Azad's idea of religious pluralism based on the doctrine of unity of religions (wahdat al-adyan) and how he related it to his vision of an inclusive Indian nationalism. It discusses the main ideas embodied in this vision, especially the interrelated ideas of national unity and integrity, communal solidarity and harmony, cultural cohesion, and the need for a comprehensive education system that would serve national unity and the well-being of all Indians. Azad's idea of unity of religions is articulated in his well-known exegetical work *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, especially in his commentary on the "Opening Chapter" (Surah al-Fatihah) of the *Qur'an*. This article also shows that Azad emphasized on common religious and cultural values as a means of embracing others for partnership in a national unity movement.*

Keywords: (Abul Kalam) Azad, inclusive Indian nationalism, national unity, unity of religions, Hindu-Muslim, national integrity, British-India, freedom of India.

¹ Associate Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Islamic Thought, Department of Aqidah and Religious Studies, Faculty of Leadership and Management (FKP), Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM). Email: yousufali@usim.edu.my

² Emeritus Professor, al-Ghazali Chair of Epistemology and Civilizational Studies and Renewal at ISTAC, IIUM. Email: osmanbakar@iium.edu.my

Introduction

This article is the third in a series of articles we have devoted to the study of four leading Indian Muslim intellectual-activists, who lived during British colonial rule (1858-1947), regarding their thoughts on Hindu-Muslim relations and Indian national unity. The four figures are Syed Ahmad Khan (1817-1898),³ Abul Kalam Ghulam Mohiuddin Azad⁴ (1888-1958), Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) and Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi (1914-1999). This article focuses on Azad's presiding idea of an inclusive and united India in which light all his political and religious views are to be understood and appreciated. His idea of unity encompasses notions of national unity, unity of religions, unity of humanity, and an inclusive nationalism centred on the one-nation concept. But as our discussion shows, the most fundamental of these notions in shaping his vision of an inclusive and united India is the idea of unity of religions (*wahdat al-adyan*). In other words, this idea is understood by Azad as the very source of all his other notions of unity. From the political perspective, however, it was his idea of inclusive Indian nationalism that reigned supreme to which his religious and other political beliefs were subordinated.

Azad believed that without national unity India's liberation from British colonial rule would be impossible to achieve. But he also argued that, given India's religious diversity, its national unity could not be realised without religious unity. Viewed from this perspective, his idea of unity of religions became transformed into a theological tool that would serve his larger and ultimate political goal, namely the realization of an inclusive and united India as he has envisioned it. In this article, we will discuss Azad's idea of unity of religions alongside his political idea of an inclusive Indian nationalism and how in his life he sought to harmonize between the two ideas.

³ Two articles on Ahmad Khan have been published. See Md Yousuf Ali and Osman Bakar, "Issues of Hindu-Muslim relations in the works of Syed Ahmad Khan," *Al-Shajarah* 25, no. 2 (2020): 315-333; and "Syed Ahmad Khan's Twin Objectives of Educational Reforms in British India: Muslim Advancement and Hindu-Muslim Unity," *Al-Shajarah* 26, no. 1 (2021): 49-70.

⁴ Hereafter, he will be cited as Azad.

Azad's Life and Works

Azad's life and thought have been widely studied.⁵ However, these studies mainly pertain to his political thoughts, educational reforms, and activism in the Indian freedom movement.⁶ Less studied was his conception of unity of religions to which he interestingly gave a political interpretation. Azad was born in Dhu'l-hijjah 1305/August 1888 in Mecca. He came from a lineage of learned Muslim scholars noted for their distinguished religious standings.⁷ His ancestors had intellectual and spiritual links to Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi (d. 1762), and Shah 'Abd al-'Aziz (d. 1824).⁸ Having an Arab mother, the daughter of a mufti of Medina, and a Sufi (*pir-'alim*) father, Khairuddin Dihlawi (d. 1908), Azad received his early education at home to escape the influence of Western education. Under his father's supervision, Azad completed at the age of fifteen the *dars-i Nizami* course of higher Islamic studies.⁹ But his *taqlid*-based learning experience with his father made him critical of this traditional approach to the study of Islam.

He seemed to have been endowed with a critical mind that was ever keen in search of a rational approach to religion. He confessed

⁵ The first substantial biography of Azad in English is Ian Henderson Douglas' *Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography*, eds., Gail Minault and Christian W. Troll (New Delhi, 1988); (Oxford University Press, 1993). Other important references to Azad's life and works include Humayun Kabir, ed., *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Memorial Volume* (Bombay, 1959); Syeda Saiyidain Hameed, ed., *India's Maulana: Abul Kalam Azad* (New Delhi, 1990), 2 vols.; V. N. Datta, *Maulana Azad* (New Delhi, 1990), and Arsh Masiani, *Abul Kalam Azad* (New Delhi: Publications Divisions, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1976); and S. R. Sharma, *Life and Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* (Jaipur: Book Enclave, 2005). Christian Troll published a concise account of Azad's life and thought in John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World* (Oxford University Press, 1995), vol. 1, 164-166. According to Troll (p. 166), Humayun Kabir's book is "the most important collection of views and analyses of Azad's personality and work by contemporaries."

⁶ See Maulana Abul Kalam Azad *India Wins Freedom* (Namaskar Books, 2021). This book records Azad's autobiographical narrative of his role in and contributions to the independence movement leading to India's partition.

⁷ A. Malsiani, *Abul Kalam Azad*.

⁸ Christian Troll, "Azad, Abu Al-Kalam," 164.

⁹ A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1988).

this much in *al-Hilal* (The Crescent), one of two weekly Urdu journals¹⁰ which he edited: “I am a born Muslim, but I was not content with the religion I inherited by birth from my ancestors. I cast it away as soon as I was mentally mature enough to discard what I did not want and tried to search out my own way impartially and with an open mind... at last I found what I wanted, and this is now where I found myself. Undoubtedly, this is Islam but not Islam that was made up of customs...and that I inherited from my Muslim family. I am not a Muslim because I ought to follow the path of parents, but I am a Muslim because I discovered it through my own efforts and research. The credence, conviction, and peace of mind I was after, now I have found for myself”¹¹.

Azad’s dissatisfaction with the religious knowledge that he inherited from his family led him to studying the writings of Ahmad Khan, who died when Azad was ten years old. Early in life, Azad was greatly influenced by Ahmad Khan’s new rationalism in his approach to Islamic thought.¹² However, his independent thinking and open mind led him to a period of “doubt, unbelief, and sensuous living.”¹³ Apparently, it was also the period when he was inspired to immerse himself in the teachings of other religions, especially Hinduism, in search of the truth. But by the end of 1909 when he was twenty-one years old, he returned to his Islamic faith.

Around the same time Azad was politically influenced by the revolutionary ideas of young Muslim leaders in Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey such as Muhammad Abduh, Saeed Pasha, and other revolutionary activists whom he met during his visits to those countries.¹⁴ Azad struck a rapport with these leaders because during that time, they were also struggling for liberating their homelands from imperialist aggressions and injustice. After his return from the Arab countries, he realized that there was no alternative means to the

¹⁰ The other journal was *Al-Balagh*.

¹¹ Ravindra Kumar, *The Selected Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1992), 67.

¹² A. R. Malihabadi, *Azad Ki Kahani Khud Azad ki Zabuni* (New Delhi, 1958), 231, 360.

¹³ Christian Troll, “Azad, Abu Al-Kalam,” 164.

¹⁴ Tara Chand, *History of Freedom Movement in India* (New Delhi: Publications Divisions, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1965), vol. 3.

liberation of India from imperialist rule except through the unity of the Indian people.

To achieve this mission of national unity, Azad embarked on journalism as a career, strongly believing that he could best influence and shape public opinion to empower nationalism through this medium. On 13 July 1912, he published and edited the earlier cited weekly journal, *al-Hilal*. Of superior quality to other periodicals in its intellectual content, *al-Hilal* became widely influential. The main purpose of this periodical was to awaken the Muslims and all Indians in general from their political slumber and bridge the gap between Muslims and Hindus in terms of ideas and beliefs. His powerful writings harping on the theme of Hindu-Muslim unity and the slogan 'Free India' swept over the country and inspired the hearts and minds of young as well as older generations alike and drew the attention of Gandhi, Nehru, and other leaders of India. Through *al-Hilal*, a new political consciousness was born that created a revolutionary sentiment among the masses against the British Raj¹⁵. In two years, the publication of the journal reached a circulation of 26,000 copies a week¹⁶.

However, in 1914, the colonial government banned *al-Hilal* to stop its propagation against its policies by imposing the Press Act. To continue propagating Indian nationalism and his revolutionary ideas for India's freedom he published and edited *al-Balagh* in the same year. But this journal suffered the same fate when the government banned it under the Defence of India Regulations Act. On the 3rd of March 1916 the Government of Bengal issued an order for Azad's immediate externment from Bengal to Ranchi in Bihar.¹⁷ He left

¹⁵ Justice K. M. Yusuf, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, 2014; and Mahavir Singh, ed., *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Profile of a Nationalist* (New Delhi: Anamika Publishers and Distributers Pvt).

¹⁶ Abdullah, "Contribution of *al-Hilal* in India's Independence Movement, Mass Communication," *International Journal of Scientific Research* 3, no. 8 (2014): 231.

¹⁷ He left Calcutta on the same date. See Azad's autobiography in his Preface to the First Edition of his *Tarjuman al-Qur'an* in Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an: The Opening Chapter of the Qur'an*, ed. and translation, Syed Abdul Latif (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1991), first publication in 1962 under the title *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an, Volume One*.

Calcutta for Ranchi where he was arrested and only released after the first World War in 1920¹⁸.

Azad's idea of nationalism was supported wholeheartedly by Indians of all religious communities, including Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists, who shared similar social, economic, and political aspirations and common interests. Azad's mission was to recognise the identity of each community as Indians and to persuade all groups to fight together against the British rule¹⁹. His top priority was to change Muslim political behaviour towards the adoption of a common struggle with Hindus to remove foreign power from India²⁰.

Rather noteworthy, Azad was extenuated just a few months after his announcement in *al-Balagh* that he would "prepare and publish an explanatory Urdu translation of the Qur'an, styled *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, and a commentary of it called *Tafsir al-Bayan*."²¹ This monumental project was originally conceived by Azad in 1915. According to him, the project has three objectives: "One was to prepare a translation of the Qur'an, the second was to write a Commentary thereon, and the third was to contribute a prolegomena to the Commentary."²² Each work was meant for three different audiences, the translation for the average reader, the Commentary for those pursuing a detailed study of the Qur'an, and the Prolegomena for the advanced scholar.²³ The commentary work was entitled *Tafsir al-Bayan* and the prolegomena part entitled *Muqaddima*.²⁴ By the time he made the *Al-Balagh* announcement of the project "five parts of the Qur'an had already been translated, and the Commentary had covered the matter of the Qur'an up to the *Al-Imran* or Chapter 3 of the Qur'an, and the Prolegomena had been set in the form of

¹⁸ A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*, 9. See also *al-Hilal*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1912), 1.

¹⁹ Ahmad Dar Muzaffar, "Role of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad in Hindu-Muslim Unity during Freedom Struggle," *International Journal of Innovative Knowledge Concepts* 2, issue 4 (April 2016): 1.

²⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru, *Discovery of India* (Asia Publishing House, 1961), 4.

²¹ Mawlana A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, xxv.

²² A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, xxv.

²³ A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, xxv-xxvi.

²⁴ A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, Preface to the translation, xvi.

notes.”²⁵ But the frequent political harassment by the British colonial authorities to which Azad was subjected, which he called a series of “ordeals,” had kept the project in abeyance for nearly fifteen years. He completed the translation of the entire Qur’an into Urdu at the end of 1918, an exceptionally remarkable achievement at the young age of thirty.

However, for Azad, the achievement was not yet to be celebrated. Sad to say, parts of the manuscripts of the translation were then not in his possession, which meant further delay in its publication. These were in the hands of Sir Charles Cleveland (1866-1929), head of the British Secret Service in India during the First World War. According to Azad, Cleveland was the person in charge of the Intelligence Department of the Government of India who “took an inordinate personal interest”²⁶ in the issue of his Quranic translation manuscripts. As Azad narrated it in his preface to the first edition of *Tarjuman al-Qur’an*, Cleveland took away from Azad’s residence in Ranchi “not only the manuscripts of the translation and the Commentary which had been returned by the local Government, but the manuscripts also of every other of my writings and indeed every scrap of printed matter that lay about me.”²⁷ The translation manuscripts were earlier seized in Calcutta when the order of internment was served on Azad but were returned to him several weeks later. Cleveland felt that the local government was hasty in its decision to return the manuscripts to Azad. He reversed this decision and resealed the manuscripts. Azad appealed several times to the Government of India for the return of his manuscripts only to receive a negative reply. This forced him to re-translate the part of the Qur’an with the lost translation. He told us that “it was an ordeal” for him “to write over again what had already been written and lost.”²⁸

Although Azad completed the translation of the whole Qur’an, he was not able to see its whole publication during his lifetime. According to Dr Syed Abdul Latif, the translator into English (from Urdu) of Azad’s *Tarjuman Al-Qur’an* as well as the editor of the

²⁵ A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur’an*, xxvi.

²⁶ A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur’an*, xxvii.

²⁷ A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur’an*, xxvii.

²⁸ A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur’an*, xxvii.

translation, two of the three planned volumes of the translation and commentary project were published in his lifetime.²⁹ But the third and the last volume in the series could not be issued in his lifetime. Azad has other literary works to his credit, including his political biography entitled *India Wins Freedom*, which was translated from Urdu into English. This is a useful volume on Azad's significant contribution to the national movement for the liberation of India from British rule. But *The Tarjuman Al-Qur'an* clearly stands out as his magnum opus. In the words of Syed A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, xv Abdul Latif, "Of his major works, *The Tarjuman Al-Qur'an* is regarded on all hands as his main contribution to Islamic learning."³⁰

Azad's Inclusive Indian Nationalism

The concept of Indian nationalism was developed by Hindu and Muslim leaders during the freedom movement against British rule beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century. Its main purpose was to increase the strength, liberty, and prosperity of the Indian people, irrespective of religion, race, caste, or creed.³¹ It was articulated by many Indian intellectuals and political activists. Azad was one of the most prominent among them. He himself was inspired and influenced by India's national figures like Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Ghandi, Tagore, and Jinnah. Azad's concept of Indian nationalism was neither Hindu nor Islamic, but a synthesis of the two cultures.³² In short, it was inclusive. Moreover, he emphasised that his nationalism was liberal, rational, and characterised by religious sagacity. These societal traits are important to the realisation of Hindu-Muslim unity and the establishment of a single Indian nationality.

Many factors contributed to Azad's formative thought on nationalism, particularly in the Indian context. These factors include

²⁹ A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, xv.

³⁰ A. K. Azad, *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, xv.

³¹ S. R. Ghosh, *Muslims in Indian Democracy* (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi, 1984), 173.

³² Meraj Ahmad, "Maulana Azad's vision of modern India," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research* 4, no. 2 (March 2018): 108-109.

the rise and impact of European nationalism in the nineteenth century motivated by various political considerations; the emergence of various revolutionary movements in Islamic countries such as the Young Turks Movement (1889-1918), the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the rise of Sinn Fein movement in Ireland founded in October 1902, and the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. These factors inspired him to start the Indian nationalism.³³ The success of Western countries in building a modern nation-state through the notion of citizenship and territoriality had significant influence on his thought.³⁴ His great dismay at the negative pervasive impact of colonial rule on the Indian people forced him to develop the ideals of Indian nationalism and preserve the Indian identity.³⁵ Commenting on Azad's progressive engagement with Indian nationalism, Boyd Shafer reminds us that men do not become nationalists because of biological reasons, but rather they acquire national consciousness by which they become national patriots because of the political, economic, and social discriminated conditions created by British policies, which forced Indians to become nationalists.³⁶

To build a united nation, Azad argued there was an urgent need to liberate the mindset of people in India from religious sectarianism and narrow-mindedness towards the unity of religions and unity of humanity. Azad's progressive thought on nationalism won high praise from Gandhi. "I have had the privilege of being associated with Maulana Azad in national work since 1920....," said Gandhi, and "his nationalism is as robust as his faith in Islam, that is why today he is the supreme head of the Indian Congress, and every Indian student should not forget it."³⁷ For him Islam and nationalism do not contradict each other. He saw 'nationalism' as of two types:

³³ Parasad Brenda, *Indian Nationalism and Asia* (B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1979), 5-6.

³⁴ K. K. Gangadharan, ed., *Indian National Consciousness: Growth and Development* (New Delhi: D. R. Goyal for Kalamkar Prakashan), 146.

³⁵ R. Suntharalingam, *Indian Nationalism: A Historical Analysis* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1983), 43.

³⁶ R. Suntharalingam, *Indian Nationalism*, 43.

³⁷ A. K. Azad, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Tributes Writings, and Speeches* (Patna: Khuda Baksh Oriental Library, 2002), 15.

one is exclusive and aggressive, which is rejected by religions, and the other is inclusive, moderate, and humane, which is easily harmonised with and integrated into one's religious beliefs, traditional values, and socio-cultural sentiments that have been shaped by multi-religious and multi-cultural living.³⁸ Although there is great diversity in India in terms of languages, cultures, and religions, Azad believes that an inclusive Indian nationalism is possible. He argued that the diversity in question would not prevent the Indian people from being united for the cause of the independence from British rule.³⁹ His conviction was that a loyal nationalist ardently loves his/her country and would readily work together with other fellow countrymen in enhancing a common culture and common values through a common nationalism and would sacrifice his/her life and wealth for the sake of the nation.

In *al-Hilal Thani*, Azad defines 'nationalism' as "a collective consciousness of man and a notion of social order in a country by which people developed their relations, collective feelings and undertake their collective responsibilities in a territory and state."⁴⁰ He argues that innumerable realities of a common life and social association in Indian society for over one thousand years had amalgamated into a united nationalism⁴¹.

Azad did not see Islam as an obstacle to the agenda of bringing all Indians under the banner of national movement. On the contrary, he saw Islam as a source of empowerment of Indian nationalism. In a lecture he delivered at the Indian National Congress in 1940 he emphasised: "My sources of inspiration as a Muslim are Islamic traditions built over more than thirteen hundred years. My real property is the history, education, art, culture and civilization and heritage of Islam. It is my duty to save every command of Islam and I do not want any type of interference in it. But with all these sentiments, I have one more sentiment, which is the product of the reality of my life. Islamic spirit would not come in its way. It directs

³⁸ Zakir Hussain, *Abul Kalam Azad between Dreams and Realities* (Prakash Book Depot, 1990), 128-129.

³⁹ Ravindra Kumar, *The Selected Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, 2.

⁴⁰ A. K. Azad, "Islam and Nationalism," *Al-Hilal Thani*, June-December 2007.

⁴¹ A. K. Azad, *Indian Wins Freedom*, 27.

me to love my country with a feeling. I feel proud I am Indian. I am a part of indivisible India, and this is "Indian nationalism."⁴²

Azad also reminded Indian Muslims that it is their obligatory religious duty to join hands with Hindus to fight against the imperialists. He himself, he said, was religiously inspired to fight against the aggressors to free India by the following verses of the Qur'an: "You are the best people ever raised up for mankind; you enjoy the good (*al-ma'ruf*) and forbid the evil (*al-munkar*)."⁴³ And "Let their arise out of you a group of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong: they are the ones who are successful."⁴⁴

Azad saw these verses as justifying Indian nationalism whereby Muslims would spearhead a national movement with other communities for the establishment of equality and justice. Azad's approach to his united nationalism was empowerment of Muslim belief in their own religion and their cultural cohesion with other religious communities and cultural groups. To Azad, the joint wealth of India is not material but spiritual and moral. It is the heritage of the common nationality of its people by which they have been moulded into a united and indivisible nation. He drew parallels between India and the state of Medina established by the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ, which signed a treaty with the diverse communities of Arabia based on commitment to peace and harmony and friendliness for the common cause of humanity. Under this agreement, every citizen is responsible to defend the country, if it is attacked by the enemy from outside. In Medina under the Prophet's leadership the Jews and Christians were given freedom of religion as well freedom of speech, which signified a united nationalism unheard of in its time. Likewise, Muslims living in India should make a treaty with the followers of other religions in India in the spirit of the Medina covenant: "I hereby promise to make complete peace with the tribes dwelling in the neighbourhood of Medina and express full agreement with the stipulations set down by them. We, the

⁴² Meraj Ahmad, "Mawlana Azad's vision of modern India," 109.

⁴³ *The Qur'an*, 3:110.

⁴⁴ *The Qur'an*, 3:104-105.

signatories of the aforesaid of a single band, group, or community.”⁴⁵

Azad recalled history and made the following emphasis: “Eleven hundred years of common history have enriched India with our common achievements...which are joint endeavour. The country did not belong to a community, but it belongs to all and one. I am indispensable to this noble edifice and without me this splendid structure of India is incomplete.”⁴⁶

However, Azad expressed his conviction that as a Muslim this is his sacred responsibility to convey the true teachings of Islam towards all people as exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ and his companions. Azad’s concept of nationalism was based on the teachings of Islam; it was aimed at countering the aggression of colonialism and to free people of India to establish peace and harmony for all Indians. In 1921 at the Khilafat conference at Agra, he said: “The need of the hour is that the seven crore Muslims are living in India, should establish such close ties and develop such fellow feeling with the twenty-two crore Hindus, that they may henceforth be reckoned as one single nation and country as inseparable parts of one combined and indivisible whole.”⁴⁷

Indian nationalism: Issue of national unity (Muttahida Qaumiyat)

Azad’s idea of national unity is conveyed by the Arabic-Urdu term *muttahida qaumiyat*, which literally means ‘national unity.’ Central to the realisation of this idea is the existence of Hindu-Muslim unity. Not surprisingly, Azad worked hard to bridge the widening gap between these two rival religious groups by developing more sympathetic relations between them. For Azad, the concept of national unity is an application of the principle of *Tawhid* (Divine Unity) to the socio-political domain. The intellectual instrument of this application is rationalism. The principle of *Tawhid* at both theoretical and practical levels embraced all religions and communities in a country where diversity of language and culture

⁴⁵ Zia al-Hasan Farooqi, *Maulana Azad Towards Freedom* (Delhi: B. R. Publishing Company, 1997), 129.

⁴⁶ P. N. Chapra, *Maulana Abul Kalam’s Unfulfilled Dreams* (New Delhi: Inprint, 1990), 149.

⁴⁷ Ravindra Kumar, *The Selected Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, 18.

exists like in India. National unity, he believed, is the only way to liberate India from imperialist and colonialist rule. In 1923, at the Indian National Congress meeting in Delhi, he enunciated and articulated his broad-based humanitarian nationalism for the betterment of Indian community by which a common culture, customs, and common interest can be developed within a plural religious society.⁴⁸ Earlier in 1920, in his Presidential address at the Congress, he described: "Our language, our poetry, literature, society, our tastes, our dresses, our traditions and the innumerable realities of our daily life abide the passion of a common life and an integrated society... our social association for over one thousand years has amalgamated into a united nationalism."⁴⁹

Azad believed that through national unity, a true Indian identity and independence can be attained. He reminded Indian Muslims that the British would allow them to pray as a religious duty, but they would not allow them to uphold the temporal power of the people's vicegerency (*Khalifat*).⁵⁰ Azad also held the view that national unity would eventually lead to the abolishment of the idea of majority or minority in the national consciousness because "mutual confidence and mutual faith with the feeling of emboldened truth can guarantee for our hopeful future."⁵¹ He made clear to the Indian people that criticizing one another or blaming the past is not what is now needed by them, but today's need is "national unity or Indian nationalism" for the sake of Indian independence.⁵² Azad's advisory words proved to be true. The concept of nationalism did contribute significantly to national unity within the context of Indian social, political, economic, and religious perspectives.⁵³

⁴⁸ Ravindra Kumar, *The Selected Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, 2.

⁴⁹ A. K. Azad, *Indian Wins Freedom*, 27.

⁵⁰ Gail Minault, *The Khalifat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press and Oxford University Press, 1982), 93-95.

⁵¹ Ravindra Kumar, *Selected Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, 4.

⁵² Ravindra Kumar, *Selected Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, 4.

⁵³ Ravindra Kumar, *Life and Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad* (Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, Mehra Offset Press, 1991), 4.

Indian nationalism: The role of arts and cultural cohesion

Azad cultivated Indic arts and culture throughout his life. He considered himself first and foremost an Indian nationalist with the conviction that national identity ought to be above and over religious and regional identities. Thus, in his Presidential address in 1940, he stated unequivocally: “Our languages, our poetry, our literature, our culture, our art, our dress, our manners and customs, the innumerable happening of our daily life, everything bears the sign of our joint endeavor...our languages were different but we grew to use a common language, our manners and customs were dissimilar but they acted and reacted on each other, and thus produced a new synthesis. This joint wealth is the heritage of our common nationality...these thousand years of our joint life have mingled us into a common nationality.”⁵⁴

Azad believed that arts and culture had the power to bind together not only hearts and souls but also entire societies and nations. These bindings would preserve “our heritage, identity, and history, and develop a sense of unity to work together shoulder to shoulder and reflect our emotion through our attitudes and conducts.”⁵⁵ Azad’s attempt was to create more sympathetic relations between Hindus and Muslims. Institutionalization of the arts and culture into the Indian educational system was one of his initiatives. In this spirit he founded such organisations as “Sangeet Natok Academy,” “Sahitya Academy,” “Lalit Kala Academy,” and Indian Council for Cultural Relations between Hindu and Muslim Communities.⁵⁶

Indian Nationalism: Communal harmony and solidarity

Azad strongly felt that communal harmony and solidarity was a pre-condition for India’s freedom. He realized that religions could play an important role to alleviate communal harmony. Accordingly,

⁵⁴ Abul Kalam Azad, *Presidential Address to the Indian National Congress in 1940* delivered at the fifty-third session of the Indian National Congress held at Ramgarh, March 19-20, 1940.

⁵⁵ Abul Kalam Azad, *Presidential Address in 1940*.

⁵⁶ Meraj Ahmad, “Maulana Azad’s vision of modern India,” 112.

he respected all religions and paid tribute to them as a mark of admiration for them and their followers. He envisioned a country of communal harmony and solidarity where all religionists will follow their respective religious obligations. He argued that if the inhabitants of India professed Hinduism for thousands of years, Islam too is the religion of many Indians for a thousand years.⁵⁷ Likewise, if a Hindu declares proudly that he/she is an Indian and follows Hinduism, so we can say with equal pride that we are Indians and follow Islam. I have expressed often and widely that Indian Christians too have a right to say with pride that they are Indians and follow Christianity.⁵⁸

Azad argued that only religion can protect cultural identity and nationalism based on religious orthodoxy. And it is only by virtue of the common bond existing between religions and the people's broadmindedness that India could get rid of the colonial power to establish an independent nationhood and to preserve its historic traditions of catholicity and co-existence. Azad used his vast Islamic knowledge to persuade the Indian Muslims to join the national struggle against British imperialist rule. He told them that it is the teaching of Islam itself to encourage its followers to strive for human brotherhood, communal harmony, and cultural cohesion. Many Indian Muslims were, in fact, persuaded by his religious conviction.

The evidence of Azad's commitment to a united India could be seen in his strong opposition to the partition of the subcontinent proposed by the Muslim League (founded in 1906). He tirelessly advocated for a single India that would embrace both Hindus and Muslims while strongly opposing the partition of British India into independent India and Pakistan.⁵⁹ For shaping the Indian culture and communal harmony, Azad believed there was no other alternative except through unity and universal brotherhood of its people. On 15th December 1923, in his presidential address again to the Indian National Congress, he declared unequivocally that Muslims should

⁵⁷ P. N. Chapra, "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's Unfulfilled Dream," 149.

⁵⁸ P. N. Chapra, "Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's Unfulfilled Dream," 149. See also A. K. Azad, Presidential Address in 1940.

⁵⁹ On Azad's own account of his opposition to British India's participation, see A. K. Azad, *India Wins Freedom*. See also K. Sarwar Hasan, "Abul Kalam Azad on Partition: A Review Article," *Pakistan Horizon* 13, no. 4 (1960): 318-323.

join the Congress for the freedom of India because to him the country does not belong to any single community but to all and one. His conviction on communal harmony was that every Muslim or every Hindu is a member of the Indian nation and by religious dogma, one cannot separate himself/herself from the larger Indian society. For being an independent nation, unity between Hindus and Muslims was deemed more important than even the freedom of the country.⁶⁰ He warned that any delay in the attainment of *Swaraj* (Independence and self-government) would be a great loss to India but if India's unity is lost, it would be a loss for the entire mankind.⁶¹

Indian nationalism: The Khilafat movement for national integrity

Taking over the responsibility of Khilafat Movement (KM) (1919-1924) by Azad was another pragmatic approach of his to motivate Hindus and Muslims to join the freedom movement, which originally aimed to safeguard the Ottoman Empire from 1919 until 1924. His participation in KM was to unite all Indians to free India from colonial rule in solidarity with the leaders of the Islamic countries who were also fighting to liberate their countries from the imperialist aggression. As a leader of KM Azad got disillusioned with the British and became anti-imperialistic with the slogan, "Hindu-Muslims ke Jai."⁶² This movement, which was supported by Gandhi, had the potential of uniting Hindus and Muslims in India. In expressing his support for KM, Gandhi commented that "if the British fight, they can fight only united Hindus and Muslims."⁶³ For the formation of national union, Azad advised Muslims to cooperate with KM. Rhetorically, he raised a question: Is there any obstacle for Muslims to make a covenant with a nation which had not committed aggression against them and not occupied their lands?⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Kumar, Ravindra. *The Selected Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad*, 57.

⁶¹ Sayed Shahabuddin, ed., *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: Selected Speeches and Writings* (New Delhi: Hope India Publication, 2007), 42.

⁶² The slogan means "Victory of Muslims and Hindus."

⁶³ Mushirul Hasan, ed., *Islam and Indian Nationalism: Reflections on Abul Kalam Azad* (Manohar publication, published by Ajay Kumar Jain, 1992), 109-110.

⁶⁴ A. K. Azad, *Khutbaat-e-Abul Kalam Azad* (Lahore: Islamic Publishing House), new edition, 45. See Mushirula Hasan, ed., *Islam and Indian Nationalism*, 24.

Azad encouraged the Muslim community to join KM to establish peace and harmony, justice, and equality for all. They should emulate the first Muslims in Medina, he argued, who made an agreement to do so for Muslims and others. He reminded Muslims that it is their duty to uphold and defend the Khilafat institution from the common enemies of Muslims and non-Muslims in India by means of Jihad.⁶⁵ In adopting this position Azad was no doubt influenced by the Pan-Islamism movement by which he became familiar to Indians and closer to Gandhi with his philosophy. Both Azad and Gandhi shared a deep passion for religion. Azad emulated the Prophet Muhammad's life by living simply, rejecting material possessions and pleasures. He played a key role in the mobilization of people in India to join KM. Under Azad and Gandhi, the Non-Cooperation Movement and Khalifat Movement adopted a unified plan of action of non-violence and non-cooperation.

The Non-Cooperation Movement launched by Gandhi on 4 September 1920 was a turning point in Azad's role in the national movement. Through this movement, he was able to motivate more Muslims to join the Indian National Congress to fight together with Hindus against the British rule. It was a good opportunity for him to be closer to both communities to convey the message of his Indian nationalism. Azad wholeheartedly supported the Non-Cooperation movement. He advocated its necessity and principles. In this process, he became the frontier fighter in the eyes of Gandhi. His focal point in the process of the movement was Hindu-Muslim unity and thanks to his charismatic leadership he managed to unite both communities against British colonial rule for India's liberation.

Azad's idea of Khilafat is not to be confused with the caliphate system of rule in Islamic history. He was referring to a new political institution for modern India that appeared to be a combination of elements from the traditional Islamic caliphate and elements from modern Western democracy. By 'Khilafat' Azad means 'political institution' and by 'Khalifah' he means 'representative.' The functions of a Khalifah are to shape a nation's free will, unity,

⁶⁵ Abul Kalam Azad, *Masala-i-Khilafat wa Jazeera al-Arab* (Calcutta, Al-Balagh Press, 1920). See its English translation by Mirza Abdul Qadir Beg, *Khilafat and Jazeera al-Arab* (Bombay: Central Khalifat Committee, 1920), 23.

suffrage, and election for the well-being of humanity. Khalifah as the head of the state must be elected by the choice of the people. He should not claim a special privilege, consider the treasury as the property of the people, be responsible for the establishment of the parliamentary government, and practice consultation in all administrative and legal matters for the betterment of the country and people. His political vision was a democratic, united, and prosperous India, which provides equal opportunities for all citizens and eliminates all discriminations and barriers based on birth, caste, tribe, and wealth from India. Azad held a moderate political view after joining Khilafat and Gandhi's Satyagraha movements for the formation of the National Union. His political approach was non-violence as a strategy during India's freedom struggle.

In *al-Hilal*, he published his ideas on political authority (*'imarat*) based on three principles inspired by the Qur'an and Sunnah. These are the fundamental principles of collective life. In his conception, *'imarat* is understood as political authority and state power pure and simple, which are a part of the universal khilafat of Islam. In India where Muslims are a minority to him, they should maintain their relations with the country's government under a collective agreement. The purpose of the three principles of *'imarat* elaborated by Azad was to establish a collective life for minority Muslims in India. The three principles as applied to the Muslim community are: Agreeing unanimously by all citizens on a learned and enterprising Muslim to make him their Imam, accepting truly and sincerely all his teachings and obeying unquestioningly all his directives based on the Qur'an and Sunnah.⁶⁶

He argued that the political approach of Muslims in India as a minority should be moderate. Azad viewed that if Muslims as a minority worked as one organized mass with a separate leader of their own, not individually, then they would secure effectively more parliamentary seats for the community.⁶⁷ This is how Azad envisioned a truly Islamic collective life for Indian Muslims. Azad argued that if the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ could unite with the Jews of Medina against the Quraish with the aim of forming 'One National

⁶⁶ Mushirul Hasan, ed., *Islam and Indian Nationalism*, 109-110.

⁶⁷ Mushirul Hasan, ed., *Islam and Indian Nationalism*, 110.

Polity', then, there is nothing wrong for Indian Muslims to unite with Hindus for the formation of national unity. He argued that there is no obstacle for Muslims to make a covenant with a nation, which had not committed aggression against them. In fact, they must stand up against aggressors who occupied their land. Doing 'jihad' (struggle) for defending the land and its people from aggression for Muslims is an obligatory religious duty. He further argued that if religion is being threatened by the enemy, Muslims are obliged to protect the people of the country as ordained by Allah.⁶⁸ It is worth noting that with the support of Gandhi and Azad, KM was able to reach out to all the sections of Muslim society and organized them as a force which shook the foundation of British rule in India.

Indian nationalism: Education for well-being of all Indians

As a nationalist, Azad emphasized on the development of a comprehensive education system that befitted India as a multicultural and multireligious society. As the first Education Minister of independent India, he initiated reforms and democratization of the country's education system with the view of abolishing the dominating structures of hegemonic hierarchy of caste and class. These existing structures perpetuated separatism and sectarian nationalism that divided the nation and prevented its progress. Azad promoted all over India the Gandhian notion of education, which was a proper education meant for every citizen of India. Azad believed that for independent India, a proper and effective policy of education is more important than its industrial policy.

Azad's educational policy was based on two fundamental principles: one is the unity of India, and the other is beneficial education for all. He argued that any type of progress is possible for a nation, if the country is politically, economically, socially, and culturally united and stable. However, to establish a common educational system for all in a united India, Azad had to face many challenges during the period when he served as Education Minister.

⁶⁸ A. K. Azad, *Khilafat and Jazirah al-Arab*, Mirza Abdul Qadir Beg, English trans., 23.

His main challenge was how to implement a universal and beneficial education system for post-colonial India.

The unity of religions (*wahdat al-adyan*)

Azad's argument for embracing the doctrine of the unity of religions was both theological and political. Both arguments are found in his commentary on the Opening Chapter (*Surah al-Fatihah*). In other words, Azad's advocacy of the idea of unity of religions is to be understood both in the political and theological sense. Theologically, the doctrine of unity of religions is supreme in which the idea of national unity and inclusive nationalism is only to be viewed as its application to the political domain. Politically, however, the doctrine of unity of religions is treated as just one among several instruments to help contribute to the empowerment of India's inclusive nationalism.

Given India's glaring religious diversity, so Azad argued, its national unity cannot be achieved without religious unity. Azad approached the problem of religious diversity that is characteristic of India from the perspective of religious unity, which he inferred from the content of *Surah al-Fatihah*. Thus, the societal and national context of his advocacy of unity of religions was Indian religious pluralism by which is meant the existence of many religions in India. Politically, he argued that the unity of religions means the unity and the empowerment of their followers and of the whole nation for two main purposes. First, India's liberation and freedom from colonial rule; Second, India's national reconstruction to attain progress in politics, economy, and other sectors of societal life.⁶⁹ Azad's deep conviction about the unity of religions is clearly reflected in his literary works.⁷⁰ He saw the unity of religions in the political sense as the most powerful enabling factor for a united India. That is why, he appealed acquiescently to the followers of all religions to return to the true form of their respective religions by which they could forge a united India for its liberation from imperialist rule. This appeal is

⁶⁹ A. K. Azad, *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, ed., A. Latif (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965), vol. 1, 184-185.

⁷⁰ A. K. Azad, *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: His Passion for Freedom and Communal Harmony*, 2011, 16-30.

rather significant since it has a bearing on his conception of the theological unity of religions.

Azad was fully aware of the obstacles that stand in the way of authentic understanding of unity of religions. In his exegesis of *Surah al-Fatihah* he discusses some of these obstacles. He describes one of the major obstacles as follows: "The claim of every religious group was not that it alone was the bearer of truth, but that the religion of every other group was false. The natural result of such an attitude was hatred of others and mutual warfare and bloodshed in the name of God."⁷¹ But Azad argued that the claim is false, since the criterion of truth used by the claimant in judging between religions is based on differences in their external forms, which are naturally bound to be so. Azad refers to formal differences between religions in "the character of the ceremonial and of the customs and manners which the followers of a religion observed, such as the form of worship, the ceremonial attendant on sacrifices, the type of food permitted or prohibited, and the outside mode of dress and manner of living."⁷² For Azad, the unity of religions is to be found in their inner dimensions, and not in their external forms.

According to Azad, the Qur'an presents a universal theory of the unity of religions in the sense that "it re-presents to the world at large the universal truth sponsored by every religion."⁷³ As he understood it, the unity of religions is essentially the unity of the universal truths contained in them. Interestingly, Azad discussed the theory in his commentary on the last three verses of *Surah al-Fatihah*. He entitled the commentary "Divine Guidance: *Hidayat*."⁷⁴ He outlines in this commentary the main principles of the theory of unity of religions, which he gathered from the Qur'an.⁷⁵ These principles include (1) the idea of the same common divine source of all religions and their respective scriptures, and hence implying One Common God for humanity; (2) the idea of a universal

⁷¹ A. K. Azad, *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, 180-181.

⁷² A. K. Azad, *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, 0.

⁷³ A. K. Azad, *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, 181.

⁷⁴ A. K. Azad, *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, 147-189.

⁷⁵ A. K. Azad, *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, 181-189.

spiritual law⁷⁶ governing the human order just as there is a universal biophysical law governing the natural order; (3) the unity of mankind;⁷⁷ (4) the unity of the Qur'an in its account of all divine messages that came before it: the Qur'an proclaimed the truth of all revealed religions; and (5) the idea of one straight path (*sirat al-mustaqim*) for all religions; Azad understands this straight path as "the universal religion (*din*) or the way of God that the Qur'an speaks of."⁷⁸

In subscribing to a Qur'an-based theory of unity of religions, Azad was thus advocating a concept of religious pluralism that is in conformity with Islam. He was interested in its application to his pursuit of an inclusive Indian nationalism. He was convinced that it would empower Indian nationalism. The unity of religions signifies to him the idea of living together as one nation with peace, religious co-existence and non-violence, cultural cohesion, and having dialogue to overcome differences between groups and communities.

Azad was aware that people are divided among themselves into many sects or groups in the names of race, caste, tribes, customs, nation, community, religion, and culture. As a result, people are isolated from each other. But the main purpose of religion to him is not to brand divisions among people but to worship the One God who is the Creator of all things, to function as His vicegerents of God, and to fulfil the trust assigned by Him.

Concluding Remarks

Azad's struggle in the Indian national movement for an independent India was a success. But his sacrifices for the freedom of the people of India as a united country failed to prevent the partition of the subcontinent along religious lines. He constantly appeals to both communities to live together like brothers and sisters and work collaboratively for the common good as one people. The goals he set for his community, society, and people and the approaches and strategies he adopted in the pursuit of these goals are still relevant and meaningful to the contemporary world. They are indeed

⁷⁶ *The Qur'an*, 49:13.

⁷⁷ *The Qur'an*, 10:19.

⁷⁸ A. K. Azad, *Tarjuman al-Qur'an*, 185.

particularly relevant to the Muslim communities, be they a majority or a minority in their respective countries.

The national issues Azad addressed for the betterment of the entire community, the religious doctrines he reformed, and the multicultural approaches to national unity that he adopted, as discussed in this article, have become even more important for our time. In contemporary India, Hindu-Muslim relations are at their worst level, certainly far below the prevailing level during the time of Abul Kalam Azad. For multicultural nations that are still struggling to achieve national unity and inter-religious harmony, there are still useful lessons that may be learnt from Azad's life and thought.

NECESSITY IN XENOTRANSPLANTATION

Islamic Perspectives Revisited

Kee Lam Wong¹ and Waleed Fekry Faris²

Abstract

*Organ failures cause significant problems and sufferings which affect the livelihood, quality of life and decrease in life expectancy to the person. The caregivers, family and community also carry the disease burden and costs of the organ failures. Allotransplantation (AT) offers probable cures to organ failure but is limited by the supply of human organs. Organ shortages have resulted in numerous biomedical ethical problems and illegal activities. Xenotransplantation (XT) and specifically Porcine Xenotransplantation (PXT) has high expectations from researchers and clinicians to be the alternative to AT. From the Islamic perspectives, multiple deliberations and fatwas are issued that vary from total prohibition to conditional permissibility and full permissibility. Often, *ḍarūrah* or dire necessity is invoked to make XT or PXT permissible. The relevant biomedical issues and whether pre-conditions for *ḍarūrah* have been satisfied are discussed.*

Keywords: necessity, *ḍarūrah*, dire necessity, xenotransplantation, porcine xenotransplantation.

1. Introduction

Organ replacement therapies for failed organs, e.g., dialysis for kidney failure, have been invented for decades and have steadily improved since. However, no machines or biomedical system can replace the full physiological functions of different vital organs.³

¹ Postgraduate student at ISTAC, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Email: wongk17352507@gmail.com

² Professor Dr, Department of Mechanical Engineering, Kulliyah of Engineering, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Email: waleed@iium.edu.my

³ J. J. G. Martínez & K. Bendjelid, "Artificial Liver Support Systems: What is New

The cost of supportive therapies, damaged quality of life and burden on physical and psychological health of the patients and caregivers are considerable.^{4 5} Thus, Organ Transplantation (OT) with human organs (AT) is needed for these organ failures. At its first inception, the application of AT was restricted. With technological improvements, increasing advances in the understanding of the immunology of rejection and modification of post-transplant immunosuppression, more and more patients are eligible to receive OT and have improved quality of life and survival post-transplant. AT becomes a standard and commonplace therapy for patients with various acute and chronic organ failures. However, patients with different organ failures increase substantially but not the source of donor organs. Inevitably, the demand for OT far exceeds the supply of organs creating long backlogs and waiting lists for AT globally.

The growing shortages of donor organs create problems in many domains, from procurement and allocation to bioethical controversies, non-ethical and illegal activities. Policy makers, clinicians and researchers are actively searching for methods to procure adequate supplies of donor organs to satisfy the demand for OT. However, growing different organs from human stem cells or cellular layers *ex vivo* or *in vitro* to replace fully the functions of all these organs are not foreseeable in the foreseeable future.⁶

Organ XT has the potential to mitigate donor supply shortages and solve the problems that have arisen from these shortages for Muslims and non-Muslims alike. For example, in transplant tourism, AT operation in the organ ‘traded’ regions may only have sub-optimal facilities causing higher mortality, rejection, infection and other

over the Last Decade?” *Annals of Intensive Care* 8, no. 109 (2018): 1–14.

⁴ J. V. Bonventre, F. P. Hurst, M. West, I. Wu, P. Roy-Chaudhury & M. Sheldon, “A Technology Roadmap for Innovative Approaches to Kidney Replacement Therapies a Catalyst for Change,” *Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology* 14, no. 10 (2019): 1539–1547.

⁵ D. J. Hurst, L. A. Padilla, D. K. Cooper & W. Paris, “Scientific and Psychosocial Ethical Considerations for Initial Clinical Trials of Kidney Xenotransplantation,” *Xenotransplantation*, 29, no. 1 (2022): 1–5.

⁶ J. V. Bonventre et al., “A Technology Roadmap for Innovative Approaches to Kidney Replacement Therapies...”

post-transplant complications in the recipients.⁷ XT, especially Porcine Xenotransplantation (PXT), is actively pursued as the alternative to human sourced organs because of its advantages over other xenografts (XGs) (*vide infra*).

From the Islamic perspectives, OT had been performed in pre-Islamic period and early Islamic period. These include auto-transplantation, AT, and XT.⁸ Necessity holds the key to avert prohibition in Islam and is relied upon for various bioethical issues in OT. The acceptance of PXT from the Islamic perspectives through the application of necessity is probably an oversimplification and premature.^{9 10 11} As of now, the authors opined that PXT has not satisfied the pre-conditions required for *ḍarūrah* or dire necessity. This paper reviews the PXT's present status and discusses the biomedical ethics and applicability of *ḍarūrah* in OT, XT and PXT.

2. Review of Necessity in Islamic Perspectives

Necessity is explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an, long before the Necessity in Common Law.¹² However, the Qur'an, hadiths and sunnah have not laid down the preconditions for necessity and *ḍarūrah* in one single place. Throughout the years, there are numerous deliberations or decisions from Islamic jurists and authorities. Using the same set of Qur'an verses, hadiths and sunnah, these deliberations from jurists were vastly different.¹³ Amidst these

⁷ D. Atighetchi, *Islamic Bioethics: Problems and Perspectives* (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2007).

⁸ J. Ali, "Islamic Perspectives on Organ Transplantation: A Continuous Debate," *Religions*, 12, no. 8 (2021): 7–22.

⁹ M. Z. Butt, *Organ Donation and Transplantation in Islam: An Opinion*, 2019.

¹⁰ M. F. M. Zailani, M. N. Hamdan & A. N. M. Yusof, "Human–Pig chimeric organ in organ transplantation from Islamic bioethics perspectives," *Asian Bioethics Review* (2022): 1–8.

¹¹ D. Rodger, D. J. Hurst & D. K. C. Cooper, "Xenotransplantation: A historical–ethical account of viewpoints," *Xenotransplantation*, 30 (2023): 1–7.

¹² As described in J. Candlish, "'Necessity' in criminal and medical jurisprudence: A comparison of common law and Islamic law concepts," *IJUM Law Journal* 152 (2007): 215–229.

¹³ S. Hamdy, "Rethinking Islamic legal ethics in Egypt's organ transplant debate," In J. E. Brockopp & T. Eich, eds., *Muslim Medical Ethics: from Theory to Practice* (Columbia, South Carolina: The University of Southern Carolina Press, 2008), 78–93.

inconsistencies and controversies, the applications, preconditions, and limitations for necessity and *darūrah* are gradually established. These principles are becoming consistent and certain. Nevertheless, some degree of flexibility is allowed to cater for specific situations or changing circumstances.¹⁴

2.1 The Notion of Necessity

Shari'ah is the way of life for Muslims. What are permissible (*halāl*) and prohibited (*ḥaram*) are prescribed by the Qur'an, hadith and sunnah. Al-Qur'an proclaims explicit and implicit obligations and prohibitions. Being forgiving and merciful, Allah provides relieves and the pre-conditions for relieves where the performance of such obligations will result in harm, hardship, or injury. Necessity is often used as the relief in biomedical issues.

From Islamic perspectives, Necessity is divided into three categories:

- a) Need: a loose term meaning defining what one wants. A person will not suffer immediately if the need is not satisfied.
- b) Simple necessity: a higher level of need with more urgency to acquire or satisfy. As such, one's life and other *maqāsid shari'ah* are not threatened. The consequences of not satisfying simple necessity are only hardship and inconveniences.
- c) *darūrah*: necessity with sufficient intensity to avert prohibition.¹⁵

2.2 Reliefs using *darūrah* (Dire Necessity)

Maqāsid al-sharī'ah is the foundation of invoking *darūrah* in most situations. It was initially established for the purpose of protection of the five hierarchical higher objectives: *al-dīn* (faith), *al-nafs* (life), *al-'ird* (dignity or progeny), *al-'aql* (intellect or mind) and *al-mal* (property or wealth).¹⁶ ¹⁷ Honor or dignity has been added by some

¹⁴ M. Z. Al-Mutairi, "Necessity in Islamic Law," (PhD Thesis, The University of Edinburgh, 1997).

¹⁵ M. Z. Al-Mutairi, "Necessity in Islamic Law," 68–69.

¹⁶ N. U. Haq, "The importance of the higher objectives of Islam (*maqasid*

authors.¹⁸ In general, the safety of human health and security of life are often placed above all (*sharī'ah*) obligations.¹⁹ Many of these situations invoking *darūrah* are well described and quoted in deliberations and decisions: unlawful food and hunger (starvation),²⁰ ²¹ ²² worship and sickness or injuries,²³ faith and compulsion (duress),²⁴ seeking of treatment for sickness or injury where treatment is effective etc. (Table 1), dignity of body and public interests,²⁵ compliance with statutory laws,²⁶ permissible homicide and ummatic dangers.²⁷

al-sharī'ah in medicine,” in *FIMA Yearbook 2020*, ed. M.M. Nordin (Amman: Jordan Society for Islamic Medical Sciences, 2022), 1-8.

¹⁷ A. Padela, “Maqāṣidī Models for an “Islamic” medical ethics,” *American Journal of Islam and Society* 39, no. 1-2 (2022): 72-114.

¹⁸ M. Albar, “Organ transplantation: A Sunni Islamic perspective,” *Saudi Journal of Kidney Diseases and Transplantation* 23, issue 4 (2012): 50.

¹⁹ M. J. Samdani, “Doctrine of necessity (In Islamic Jurisprudence),” *Global Journal of Human Social Science: Arts & Humanities - Psychology* 19, no. 12 (2019): 53-58.

²⁰ The Qur'an, 2:173.

إِنَّمَا حَرَّمَ عَلَيْكُمُ الْمَيْتَةَ وَالْدَّمَ وَالْحَمَّ وَالْخَنزِيرَ وَمَا أَهَلَ بِهِ لَعْنِ اللَّهِ فَمَنْ اضْطُرَّ غَيْرَ بَاغٍ وَلَا عَادٍ فَلَا إِثْمَ عَلَيْهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ ١٧٣

“He has only forbidden you ‘to eat’ carrion, blood, swine, and what is slaughtered in the name of any other than Allah. But if someone is compelled by necessity—neither driven by desire nor exceeding immediate need—they will not be sinful. Surely Allah is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful”.

²¹ A. I. Padela, S. W. Furber, M. A. Kholwadia & E. Moosa, (2014), “Dire necessity and transformation: Entry-points for modern science in Islamic bioethical assessment of porcine products in vaccines, *Bioethics* 28, no. 2 (2014): 59-66.

²² Y. H. M. Safian, “Necessity (*darura*) in Islamic Law: A Study with Special Reference to the Harm Reduction Programme in Malaysia,” (PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 2010), 31-42.

²³ M. Z. Al-Mutairi, “Necessity in Islamic Law,” 115-117.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 81-91.

²⁵ A. Sachedina, *Islamic Biomedical Ethics: Principles and Application* (Oxford University Press, 2009), 175-180.

²⁶ M. Ghaly, “Religio-ethical discussions on organ donation among Muslims in Europe: An example of transnational Islamic bioethics,” *Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy* 15, no. 2 (2012): 207-220.

²⁷ M. A. Albar & H. Chamsi-Pasha, *Contemporary Bioethics Islamic Perspective* (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015), 69.

Table 1 Seeking Treatment or Remedy for Diseases^{28 29}

Category	Requirements
Mandatory	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Effective treatment is available. 2 Treatment is saving life or vitality. 3 Public interest or public health, <i>maṣlahāh</i>, is involved.
Encouraged and preferred	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Treatment is likely to be successful and harm is unlikely. 2 Disease will affect activities and duties of self, family, and community. 3 Mode is <i>halāl</i> or <i>ḥaram</i> but permissible through <i>darūrah</i>
Optional (Facultative)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Benefits from treatment are not proven or uncertain. 2 Illnesses or side effects from mode of therapy are uncertain. 3 Autonomy is allowed in deciding acceptance or refusal of treatment. 4 Informed consent is to be available except in emergency.
Abstinence preferred	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Treatment is unlikely to be beneficial. 2 Harm from treatment is likely to be more than benefits.
Prohibited	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Treatment involves amulet (other than Qur'an), sorcery, divination, talisman or encroaches on creeds etc. 2 Treatment involves the use of prohibited material: wine or intoxicant,

²⁸ Adapted and modified from M. A. Albar & H. Chamsi-Pasha, *Contemporary Bioethics Islamic Perspective*, 55–56.

²⁹ Adapted and modified from M. Z. Butt, *Organ Donation and Transplantation in Islam*, 22 -24.

pork, blood, or products from killing of unlawful animals.
ḍarūrah may be applied to reverse the prohibition.

Since one of the pre-conditions for *ḍarūrah* is the absence of a permissible (lawful) alternative, the application of *ḍarūrah* in biomedical ethics is expected to vary with time, place and change in technology for specific issues or location. Given the absence of a system of precedence in Islamic Legal System, generalization and universal applicability could be difficult. Thus, each issue needs to be judged according to Islamic Law by the local authority to decide on whether *ḍarūrah* can be invoked.

2.3 Pre-conditions and Proportionality in *ḍarūrah*

Darūrah is applicable to a person and episode specific. The deliberations may be applied or extrapolated to other persons through analogy (*qiyās*). Pre-conditions are not set clearly in Qur'an, hadiths and sunnah and have evolved over time. The search for these pre-conditions through the decided scenarios helps to improve consistency in deliberations or expectations from Muslims facing similar situations. This can also minimize the over-use or unjustified use of *ḍarūrah*.

2.3.1 The Harm

A severe harm or a threat of severe harm that affects one or more of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* must be present. Compliance with *Sharī'ah* rules, laws or obligations will result in the harm or the person will suffer from the harm or consequences of the harm. Thus, trivial or non-serious harms are excluded. The harm or consequence(s) of the harm is (are) real, immediate, and certain, and believed by the person that the harm(s) is (are) immediate and certain.

The scope of harm covers injuries and extends to significant or unreasonable hardship involving the *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* necessities. The scope has evolved to include protection of society, economic

systema and political administration.³⁰ As of date, most deliberations concentrate on physical or quantifiable harms. Psychological or mental harms and benefits are often neglected or relatively under-evaluated.

2.3.2 The Prohibited Act

A prohibited act can or likely can prevent, mitigate, lessen, or remove the harm. The prohibited act:

- a) may be an unlawful act or an act that delays or neglects an obligation (e.g., salat or fasting) and is to the harm going to be inflicted to the person.
- b) is actionable or executable with no better and lawful alternative available at the time or immediate future.
- c) must be stopped if a permissible or lawful alternative becomes available.
- d) is only allowed to the point of relieving the harm or being sufficient for ordinary life activities e.g., eating just enough to prevent starving to death.

Prohibited acts can be classified into three categories: a) the prohibited act is permitted, and sin is not committed; b) the prohibited act is allowed but the sin is removed; c) the prohibited act remains prohibited and sin is committed. *Darūrah* is only applicable for the first two classes of prohibited acts.³¹ Where more than one prohibited act can be chosen, the prohibited act with the lesser or least harm needs to be chosen.

2.3.3 The Person

Jurists permit subjectivity, the tolerance of the harm by the person and variations at specific situations. However, the person must have adequate analysis and perception of the harm, degree of certainty and unavailability of lawful alternatives. The personal perception of the threat is sufficient. Muslim jurists classify certainty into four levels (100%, 75%, 50% and < 25%). The threat must be perceived to have

³⁰ Y. H. M. Safian, "Necessity (darura) in Islamic Law," 55.

³¹ Ibid 83–85.

a certainty of more than 75%.³² Subjective analysis needs to take into consideration the personal characteristics, including age, sex, previous life experiences, physical conditions etc., that can have been or may be caused by the harm.

The often-neglected concern is the tolerance or acceptability of the types of harms or risks from the execution of the prohibited act by the person (patient). This can vary among different persons (patients). This is very important in biomedical issues like OT, XT and PXT. Risks from the procedure and post-transplant immunosuppression are definite and certain. Like all other medical treatments, the ultimate decision whether to undergo the transplant is the acceptance by the patient, after these risks are duly informed.

2.3.4 Limitations

Darūrah is bound by its limitations that include infringement on other people's rights, causing grievous bodily harm, committing sinful and prohibited acts (murder or rape)³³ or contradicting any rulings on needs from Qur'an, hadiths and sunnah.³⁴

In OT, it means the human donor cannot be killed or has foreseeable serious complications from donation or after donation. For XT, the donor animals must be treated well with good livelihood, health, normal or accepted fertility. All procedures, manipulations, slaughtering, procurement of organs, burial or cremation must be respectful to the animals with least suffering. In addition, certain organs, e.g., those carrying genetic information like testis and ovary, are not allowed to be transplanted (*vide infra*).³⁵

³² Ibid 116.

³³ Wahbah Zuhaili, quoted in Y. H. M. Safian, *Necessity (darura) in Islamic Law*, 87-88.

³⁴ N. M. Isa, "Darurah (Necessity) and its application in Islamic ethical assessment of medical applications: A review on Malaysian fatwa," *Science and Engineering Ethics* 22, no. 5 (2016): 1319–1332.

³⁵ A. I. Padela & R. Duivenbode, "The ethics of organ donation: Donation after circulatory determination of death, and xenotransplantation from an Islamic perspective," *Xenotransplantation* 25, no. 3 (2018): 1–12.

3 Necessity in biomedical ethics context

Biotechnology has changed the landscape of medical care tremendously. Islamic biomedical ethics is to control the outcome of biotechnological applications and their effects on societal functions and values to make sure these applications do not contradict humanity or moral standards, as seen from Islamic perspectives. It has been suggested that Muslims should keep open to novel treatments that are developed to relieve permanent incapacity and sufferings for the affected person and those that are costly to the family and healthcare system. In addition, jurists acting on their own can be difficult because these decisions and deliberations on such biotechnologies require substantial and in-depth understanding and ramifications of the biotechnology itself. Appropriate jurists-specialists interface would facilitate such decisions and deliberations.³⁶

According to the Principalists of ‘Western’ biomedical ethics, there are four domains: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. In these four domains, necessity in the literal sense is entrenched. For biomedical issues considered by Islamic jurists, the deliberations or decisions often involve necessity. These may be simple necessity or *darūrah* and may involve one or more of these domains, especially for OT and PXT.

3.1 Biomedical Ethics

3.1.1 Autonomy

Saving and preservation of life is a necessity for Muslims and non-Muslims. However, the decision to undertake such actions in Western biomedical ethics is personal. This includes euthanasia in some jurisdictions.

In Islam, the basic concept on the person as a being is different. Man is created by Allah and acts as the vicegerent for Allah. He is only

³⁶ A. I. Padela, “Jurists, physicians, and other experts in dialogue: A multidisciplinary visions for Islamic bioethical deliberations,” in *Medicine and Shariah: A Dialogue in Islamic Bioethica*, ed. A. I. Padela (University of Notre Dame Press, 2021), 227–234.

the custodian of the body and soul that are entrusted in him by Allah. He is bound by the *Shari'ah* and other laws derivable from the Qur'an. In other words, he does not have full freedom in making decisions with regards to his body and its contents (organs). He is allowed to make rational decisions and be responsible for his own well-being, to his family and ultimately to Allah. Thus, he has the obligation and duty to preserve good health, prevent any preventable diseases, seek, and receive treatment for any sickness or ill-health, not to injure or hurt himself. However, *ḍarūrah* can be invoked to bypass any possible prohibitions on autonomy.

Within the bounds of autonomy, Muslims are given the right to make and be responsible to decisions on his/her matters. This would include consent for treatment³⁷ and possibly, consent to undergo experimental treatment. Healthcare service providers are also bound by informed consents in providing treatments and conducting clinical researches.³⁸

3.1.2 Beneficence

Doing good (deeds), beneficence, is accepted universally and crosses cultures and civilizations. Beneficence covers wide ranges of activities that involve intentions, attempts, promotions of good or for good causes to oneself or others. Non-Islamic (Western) biomedical ethics conforms with these.

There are quite a lot of references in Qur'an and *sunnah* with respect to beneficence. Islamic biomedical ethics on beneficence is built upon these to provide 'ease, comfort, and benefit to others', i.e., the best possible (affordable) healthcare to the patients.³⁹ The Qur'an (41:46) says:

مَنْ عَمِلْ صَالِحًا فَلِنَفْسِهِ وَمَنْ أَسَاءَ فَعَلَيْهَا وَمَا رَبُّكَ بِظَلَمٍ لِّلْعَبِيدِ ٤٦

“Whoever does good, it is to their own benefit. And

³⁷ M. A. Albar & H. Chamsi-Pasha, *Contemporary Bioethics Islamic Perspective*, 111.

³⁸ M. Ebrahimi & K. Yusoff, “Islamic identity, ethical principles and human values,” *European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies* 2, no. 6 (2017): 329-333.

³⁹ M. I. Khan, “The agreement and divergence between Islamic medical ethics and contemporary biomedical ethics,” in *FIMA Yearbook 2020* ed. M. M. Nordin (Amman: Jordan Society for Islamic Medical Sciences), 57–71.

whoever does evil, it is to their own loss. Your Lord is never unjust to 'His' creation.

3.1.3 Non-maleficence

Treatments or interventions need to be given if benefits exceed the risks that a person or a patient can accept. Islam does not permit harm. Islamic axioms place 'avoiding harm' above 'doing good'. In other words, for all ethical decisions, the lesser harm takes precedent over benefit. After this consideration, the option with the best benefit will be chosen.^{40 41} The Qur'an (6:160) says:

مَنْ جَاءَ بِالْحَسَنَةِ فَلَهُ عَشْرُ أَمْثَالِهَا وَمَنْ جَاءَ بِالسَّيِّئَةِ فَلَا يُجْزَى إِلَّا مِثْلَهَا وَهُمْ لَا يُظْلَمُونَ ١٦٠

Whoever comes with a good deed will be rewarded tenfold. But whoever comes with a bad deed will be punished for only one. None will be wronged.

3.1.4 Justice

Islam embraces justice comprehensively in all dimensions.⁴² The Qur'an has verses that stress on justice. The Qur'an (57:25) says:

لَقَدْ أَرْسَلْنَا رُسُلَنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا مَعَهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَالْمِيزَانَ لِيَقُومَ النَّاسُ بِالْقِسْطِ وَأَنْزَلْنَا الْحَدِيدَ فِيهِ بَأْسٌ شَدِيدٌ وَمَنْفَعٌ لِلنَّاسِ وَلِيَعْلَمَ اللَّهُ مَنْ يَتَصَرَّفُ وَرُسُلُهُ بِالْغَيْبِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ قَوِيٌّ عَزِيزٌ ٢٥

Indeed, We sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and with them We sent down the Scripture and the balance 'of justice' so that people may administer justice. And We sent down iron with its great might, benefits for humanity, and means for Allah to prove who 'is willing to' stand up for Him and His messengers without seeing

⁴⁰ Ibid, 67.

⁴¹ H. Chamsi-Pasha & M. A. Albar, "Western and Islamic bioethics: How close is the gap? *Avicenna Journal of Medicine* 3, no.1 (2013): 8–14.

⁴² M. I. Khan, "The agreement and divergence between Islamic medical ethics and contemporary biomedical ethics," 68-69.

Him. Surely Allah is All-Powerful, Almighty.”⁴³

Applying these principles in Islamic biomedical ethics means all patients should be treated justly with no preferences or discriminations according to ethnicity, colour, sex, etc. The exclusion criteria in AT may be construed as injustice as patients with comparable organ failure are not given equal opportunity of getting AT because of organ shortages.

3.2 Application of necessity and *ḍarūrah* in biomedical ethics

Well-being is perceived as vital. Sicknesses affect the well-being and relief from sickness is generally accepted as desirable. Refusing treatment for any treatable disease is often unimaginable. Though some jurists hold contrary opinions, necessity is often applied in seeking and receiving treatment, undergoing research and advice on new biotechnological advances (Table 1). The harms and benefits to the person also extend to the harms and benefits to the community and the public at large (*maṣlahāh*).

To satisfy what are required for *ḍarūrah* at the personal level, the person must suffer from a medical condition(s) that could:

- a) affect his/her life at this moment (immediate) or near future with high certainty or probability.
- b) cause his/her life in danger or shorten his life expectancy.
- c) inflict physical, social, or psychological suffering, pain, or agony.
- d) have negative impact on his/her quality of life (well-being) if the harm is allowed to continue.
- e) improve or have benefited from a prohibited medical treatment.

The prohibited treatment is:

- a) effective or likely to be effective to preserve or save life; relieve suffering, pain, or agony; improve his/her quality of life.
- b) the best option after a thorough harm-benefit, what-if and proportionality analysis.
- b) the only option with no other available (Islamic) lawful treatment.
- c) accessible, affordable, and executable.

⁴³ Other verses include 60:8, 16:90, 5:8, and 38:26.

- d) provided by a trusted experienced and Allah-fearing medical practitioner.⁴⁴

The execution of the prohibited treatment:

- a) will not inflict harm on other people or conflict with other hierarchical necessities in *maqāṣid al-shari'ah* (faith, life, intellect, progeny, wealth).
- b) must be target based with the minimal effective amount for the shortest possible period.⁴⁵ Overtreatment means unnecessary treatment and should be avoided.
- c) will be stopped once the harm or the anticipated harm has been resolved or a lawful treatment is available.

Examples of prohibited treatments that are permissible include porcine gelatin in capsules, porcine insulin, trypsin in influenza vaccine etc. Treatments with porcine derived products are not permissible because another lawful alternative becomes available, e.g., Menimune meningococcal vaccine (porcine), Clexane and Fraxiparine.⁴⁶

4 Application of *darūrah* in OT

In OT, the recipient has organ failure. Acute organ failure can cause suffering with probable and immediate death. Chronic organ failure can result in suffering, decreased quality of life, and shortened survival despite supportive therapy. Given the availability of respective technology and support, the organ failures are reversible after AT with accepted risks to the recipient and minimal risks to living organ donors.

The principles of biomedical ethics reshuffle to the order of autonomy, justice, non-maleficence and beneficence where justice in deciding allocation and procurement of organs occupies a higher position in the hierarchy. However, the Qur'an and hadiths are silent on OT. Despite using almost identical quotes and references to the

⁴⁴ Y. H. M. Safian, "Necessity (darura) in Islamic Law," 132.

⁴⁵ N. M. Isa, "Darurah (Necessity) and its application in Islamic ethical assessment of medical applications," 1323.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 1329.

Qur'an, hadiths and sunnah, three groups of deliberations in slightly varied forms are held by Muslim jurists and authorities for *darūrah* and OT:^{47 48 49}

- a) not permissible because OT involves the body that is sanctify, both for living or deceased.
- b) permissible with conditions.
- c) always permissible.

The classical hadith, narrated by Aisha, Ummul Mu'minin, is used by jurists to prohibit any form of mutilation of the human body (Sunan Abi Dawud 3207)⁵⁰:

حَدَّثَنَا الْقَعْبِيُّ، حَدَّثَنَا عَبْدُ الْعَزِيزِ بْنُ مُحَمَّدٍ، عَنْ سَعْدٍ، - يَغْنِي ابْنُ سَعِيدٍ - عَنْ
عُمَرَ بِنْتِ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ، عَنْ عَائِشَةَ، أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ قَالَ " كَسْرُ عَظْمِ
الْمَيِّتِ كَكَسْرِهِ حَيًّا "

The Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: Breaking a dead man's bone is like breaking it when he is alive.

Geographical variation in permissibility of OT does exist. Among the Sunnis, Arab Muslims scholars permit OT. From the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, Muslim scholars take spirituality as priority above living and disallow OT.⁵¹ On the other hand, *Shī'ites* jurists and scholars in the Middle East hold OT permissible.⁵²

Butt remarked 'that jurists who cited human dignity as a reason to prohibit the use of body parts did so based on the norms of their times. Today, however, organ transplantation (OT) is viewed in a totally different light, and, rather than a violation of human dignity, it

⁴⁷ A. Ali, T. Ahmed, A. Ayub, S. Dano, M. Khalid, N. El-Dassouki, A. Orchanian-Cheff, S. Alibhai & I. Mucsi, "Organ donation and transplant: The Islamic perspective," *Clinical Transplantation* 34, no. 4 (2020): 1–12.

⁴⁸ J. A. Ali, "Islamic perspectives on organ transplantation: A continuous debate," *Religions* 12, no. 8 (2021): 7–22.

⁴⁹ A. Sharif, "Organ donation and Islam: challenges and opportunities," *Transplantation* 94, no. 5 (2012): 442–446.

⁵⁰ <http://www.sunnah.com>

⁵¹ J. A. Ali, "Islamic perspectives on organ transplantation" 8-9.

⁵² M. S. Siraj, "How a compensated kidney donation program facilitates the sale of human organs in a regulated market: The implications of Islam on organ donation and sale," *Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine* 17, no. 10 (2022): 1–18.

is seen as the ultimate gift',⁵³

The rule on inviolability and prohibition of mutilation of the body is not absolute. With due respect to the body observed, post-mortem is permissible and accepted by Muslims on the ground of the laws of land and public interest.⁵⁴ Consequential rules on sanctified body are the balance between harms and interests of human beings. At times of conflicts, the lesser of harms or sacrifice of lesser of the interests is chosen for the greater one.⁵⁵

Since there are significant suffering and threat to the life of the recipient, *darūrah* can be invoked in OT according to most jurists who permit OT. The donor, living or deceased, must be well respected and dignified. The reasoning can be simple and straightforward. Allah will not only look after the benefit of one single individual but will take care of all human beings giving them the desired benefits and enjoyment in this world and hereafter.⁵⁶ Thus, Allah presides over all individuals on their body, how to use the body to his own interests and to all others around him. Man, being the vicegerent of Allah, should act in the interest of Allah in himself and all other beings accordingly to benefit himself and all others. This is an obligation and well above ordinary altruism. Therefore, organ donation by Muslims should be permissible for the benefits of the recipient or the community at large but not for benefits purely to themselves or personal gains.^{57 58}

There are some differences when the pre-conditions in *darūrah* are applied in OT. The decision for OT is determined by clinical evidence. The degree of organ failure, severity and urgency for OT relies almost entirely on medical opinion that is mostly objective. Subjectivity is only minor or additive. As a pre-requisite, a known success rate (benefits) for that OT must be established.⁵⁹

⁵³ M. Z. Butt, *Organ Donation and Transplantation in Islam*, 40.

⁵⁴ *vide supra*, Section 2.2.

⁵⁵ *vide supra*, Section 2.3.

⁵⁶ A. Sachedina, *Islamic Biomedical Ethics*, 44, 82, 86.

⁵⁷ D. Atighetchi, *Islamic Bioethics: Problems and Perspectives* (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Springer, 2007), Chapter 7, 161–197.

⁵⁸ M. S. Siraj, "How a Compensated Kidney Donation Program Facilitates the Sale of Human Organs....," 7–8.

⁵⁹ N. M. Isa, "Darurah (Necessity) and Its Application in Islamic Ethical Assessment of Medical Applications," 1325.

On immediacy, there are two groups. One is immediate in acute organ failures e.g., liver and heart failure. The other group, which is far more common, is chronic organ failure e.g., kidneys. Any waiting period to invoke *ḍarūrah* is a clinical decision rather than a judicial requirement.

From the Islamic perspectives, lawful organ is a must. The donation of organs must be out of altruism, voluntary or with consent. The health or life of living donor must not be significantly jeopardized. Compliance with the laws of land, e.g., opt out for organ donation, can invoke *ḍarūrah* for public benefits (interests). Human organs are not tradable commodities. Organs obtained from illegal practices, e.g., organ trades are prohibited. Moreover, different Islamic jurisdictions still have different rulings on organ donation after death, Muslim to non-Muslim donation or financial compensation for organ donation etc.

On limitations, not all organs are permitted in OT. Some jurists classify human parts into three types: those that are unique, those that are in pairs and those of which there are four of a kind. Those organs that are unique, vital for bodily functions or with aesthetic importance are not allowed to be procured for live donation.⁶⁰ Organs that carry genetic information that inflicts on progeny, e.g., ovary and testis, are explicitly prohibited.⁶¹

For the donor, the rights of donors must be observed. Killing another person for his organ is prohibited. The donor must not have any serious foreseeable harm after donation. In XT, the donor animals must be well treated and have least suffering from the procuring of the organ(s).

5 *Darūrah* in the context of XT and PXT

XT is transplant of xenografts (XG) across species. These include different tissues, cells, or organs. PXT is XT using porcine xenografts (PXG). The ultimate goal for XT or PXT is to achieve successful transplantation of XG or PXG into human body that is comparable to AT.

⁶⁰ A. Sachedina, *Islamic Biomedical Ethics*, 187–188.

⁶¹ A. I. Padela & R. Duivenbode, “The ethics of organ donation...,” Table 2, 5.

5.1 XT and AT: Islamic perspectives

AT is the transplant of human tissue or organs from one person to another. Data from human organ AT can be used as benchmarks to assess the benefits and harms of XT and PXT. In contrast to AT, XT has five groups of medical obstacles:

- a) anatomical and structural incompatibility.
- b) severe immunological rejection.
- c) physiological incompatibility.
- d) cross species infections (xenozoonosis).
- e) cancer risk from animal retrovirus and other carcinogenic viruses, and/or immunosuppression.

Each of these has significant impacts on the harms and benefits to the recipient. XGs using pig's bones, goat's amnion tissue etc. had been used successfully.⁶² ⁶³ However, after years of trials, there is still no successful full organ XT on human recipient for organ failure.

From the Islamic perspectives, the over-riding and additional requirement for XT is a permissible XG that is pure and clean. There are debates on the source of XGs from different animals and the requirement of lawful slaughtering. According to Omar and Muda, there are three groups of opinions:

- a) Tissues and organs from lawful animals that are slaughtered lawfully are clean and permissible to be used in XT.
- b) Lawful animals that are not slaughtered lawfully is carrion. For the latter, opinion is divided: i) tissues or organs without blood or fluid and hard objects are clean (bone, tooth, horn, nail, tusk); ii) all carrions are unclean; iii) tissues or organs with blood flow are unclean and require invoking *darūrah* to be permissible.
- c) Tissues and organs from prohibited animals, except pigs and dogs, are similar to carrion. For pigs, all parts are unclean and require *darūrah* to be permissible. For dogs, opinion is divided: i) all parts unclean and require *darūrah* to be permissible; ii) only mouth and

⁶² M. Albar, "Organ transplantation: A Sunni Islamic perspective," 817–822.

⁶³ N. Omar & Z. Muda, "The application of the rule of Istihsan bi Al-Maslahah (Juristic Preference by Interest): A practical approach on some medical treatment," *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences* 7, no. 5 (2017): 365–376.

saliva are unclean; hard objects are permissible but inner parts are unclean and require *darūrah* to be permissible; iii) all parts are clean and permissible.⁶⁴

XT has its own advantages over AT. Since XG supply can be potentially unlimited, XT can solve the problems associated with human Organ Shortages e.g., risks to living organ donor, unjust procurement and allocations of organs, low cadaveric donation rate, exclusion of patients, transplant tourism, black markets for organ trading, organ trafficking, duress, illegal extraction, exploitation of poor countries, one-kidney villages etc. Multi-organ OTs, repeat OTs, OT for unusual organs and non-attempted organs could be possible.

For Muslims, XT provides additional advantages. Controversies to define and determine death for organ donation, Muslim to non-Muslim organ donations and receiving organs, and financial initiatives or compensation for organ donation can be avoided. For jurists who oppose all forms of OT using human organs and who question or disagree with the definition of and decision on brain death and ‘donation after circulatory determination of death’ for OT,^{65 66} XT provides the much-needed alternative replacing the need of procuring organs from human, alive or deceased.

5.2 PXT and Non-Human Primate-XT (NHP-XT)

NHP are used as donors and recipients in XT research. NHP as a donor has the distinct advantage of closer physiological similarity with human. Monkeys have much higher hazards in biosafety because of their genetic proximity to human. Baboons and chimpanzees are often used in NHP-XTs. In addition, NHP are used as recipients in PXT before clinical PXT in human.

These NHPs have an intrinsic problem with anatomical compatibility. For example, baboon heart or liver are small. Thus, recipients must be of small size and NHP-XGs are inappropriate for usual human adult. Secondly, NHPs has a much smaller potential as

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ A. I. Padela & R. Duivenbode, ‘The Ethics of Organ Donation...’, 6 – 7.

⁶⁶ A. Sharif, ‘Organ Donation and Islam...’, *Transplantation*, 442–446.

supply of donor organs because they have small litter sizes, long reproduction cycles, difficulty in breeding and genetic manipulation (GM) etc. In addition, some of them are endangered species and not allowed to be used.

Pigs are different. Those disadvantages of NHPs as source of donor organs are largely overcome. Pigs have anatomical and structural similarity to human organs e.g., liver, kidneys, and heart; and the potential of unlimited supply because of short reproduction cycle, large litter size, familiar domestication and breeding etc. Some porcine cells or organs have physiological compatibility to human and such products have been used therapeutically for a long time e.g., porcine insulin. In addition, genetically modifications for pigs are possible and available to reduce post-transplant medical obstacles.^{67 68 69}

It is almost impossible to have repeated NHP-XT because of limited supply of NHP organ from the same or similar animal. For PXT, the supply of donor organs from the same litter or similar genetic constitution is highly possible. For example, in porcine islet transplantation, the attrition rate for the implanted porcine islets is high. This can be compensated by repeated islet PXT.

NHP as recipients in PXT helps in pre-clinical research. However, the immune system and response of NHPs to PXG can be substantially different from human. Some pre-formed antibodies e.g., to porcine xenoantigens, may be present in NHP but not in human. These results of NHP-PXT cannot be extrapolated to human.

5.3 *Darūrah* in the context of PXT

Use of XG, e.g., animal's bones, had been reported in contemporary Islamic literatures.⁷⁰ Apparently, *darūrah* had not been discussed or

⁶⁷ J. Denner, "Porcine endogenous retroviruses and xenotransplantation," *Viruses* 13, no. 11 (2021): 1–17.

⁶⁸ A. N. Carrier, A. Verma, M. Mohiuddin, M. Pascual, Y. D. Muller, A. Longchamp, C. Bhati, L. H. Buhler, D. G. Maluf & R. P. H. Meier, "Xenotransplantation: A New Era," *Frontiers in Immunology* 13 (2022): 1–11.

⁶⁹ D. Rodger, D. J. Hurst & D. K. C. Cooper, "Xenotransplantation: A historical–ethical account of viewpoints," *Xenotransplantation* 30 (2023): 1–7.

⁷⁰ M. A. Albar & H. Chamsi-Pasha, Contemporary Bioethics Islamic Perspective, 210.

invoked. There are three groups of PXGs:

- a) transformed or derived porcine products.
- b) acellular tissues.
- c) cells and organs.

For acellular or decellularized PXG, they do not have robust cellular antigens to trigger rejection. In contrast to organ PXG, rejections occur in Cells and Organs PXT. Cell PXT has less severe rejection, simpler macro- and micro-environments for engraftment and better post-PXT functioning. Major Organ PXTs are much more complicated. In addition to more severe rejection, many products with different physiological functions are produced by these solid organs e.g., kidney and liver. They could have complicated homeostatic mechanisms that are mediated differently by these porcine organs, e.g., porcine renin and erythropoietin. In addition, each Organ PXT can have its own unique problems following transplant, e.g., left ventricular hypertrophy or failure after porcine heart PXT or overgrowth of kidney PXG after kidney PXT.

Adherence to general biomedical ethics is similar in most researches in PXT. Religious perspectives apparently are not set as a priority for research and applications of PXT in the reported studies (*vide infra*).

As of today, PXT offers the best anatomical and structural compatibility. There are significant advances in attempts to overcome the major obstacles: lessened rejections from genetically modified pigs and new intensive immunosuppression, better physiological adaptation, and controllable cross species infections. The most feared porcine retrovirus has not been shown to be a problem following Islet PXT (*vide infra*).⁷¹

Contemporary Muslim jurists and scholars are divided on PXT.⁷² For those jurists who reject PXT, the human body is pure and needs to remain pure to meet Allah's expectation. PXG is impure. Any impurities or uncleaned tissues or organs, that are implanted or transplanted, are not acceptable. Numerous jurists and scholars, who allow PXT, rely on *ḍarūrah*. Two pre-conditions are laid down for human PXT:

⁷¹ J. Denner, "Porcine endogenous retroviruses and xenotransplantation," 8 – 9.

⁷² D. Atighetchi, *Islamic Bioethics: Problems and Perspectives*, 181 – 183.

- a) if the PXT is done for an emergency where no alternative medicine or other (lawful) organ is available;
- b) the harm from the transplant must be less than the harm from not performing the PXT (the principle of proportionality)^{73 74 75 76 77}
This recommendation is apparently made in view of the interests of the individual and misses out on public interests, which are as important. The major advantage of PXT is unlimited supply of (animal) donor organs at low costs. Given the enormous number of Muslim and non-Muslim patients requiring OT, PXT can benefit many patients at affordable costs (in the future). Eventually, this may stop all black markets for sale of human organs, organ trafficking, transplant tourism and other crimes or immoralities related to human Organ Shortages.

5.3.1 Basic requirements allowing PXT: Islamic perspectives.

The interests of the recipient with organ failure and the donor animal must be respected and attended to. Criteria need to be established to allow PXT:

- a) The recipient must suffer from one or more organ failures that affect his health and life.
- b) The respective organ from donor animal is available.
- c) The animal should be reared properly and slaughtered lawfully, if necessary.⁷⁸ Burial or cremation of the donor pig should be respected.
- d) To ensure the shortest warm ischemic time for better engraftment,

⁷³ M. Z. Butt, *Organ Donation and Transplantation in Islam*, 33.

⁷⁴ A. I. Padela & R. Duivenbode, "The ethics of organ donation....," 7 – 8.

⁷⁵ H. A. Qotadah & M. Syarifah, "Pig kidney xenotransplantation as an alternative solution of Hifdz Al Nafs," *International Journal of Islamic Khazanah* 12, no. 2 (2022): 94–102.

⁷⁶ M. F. M. Zailani, M. N. Hamdan & A. N. Yusof, "Human–Pig chimeric organ in organ transplantation from Islamic bioethics perspectives," *Asian Bioethics Review* (2022): 1–8.

⁷⁷ D. Rodger, D. J. Hurst & D. K. C. Cooper, "Xenotransplantation: A Historical–ethical Account....," 2.

⁷⁸ W. Paris, R. J. H. Seidler, K. FitzGerald, A. I. Padela, E. Cozzi & D. K. C. Cooper, "Jewish, Christian and Muslim Theological Perspectives about Xenotransplantation," *Xenotransplantation* 25, no. 3 (2018): 5.

the procurement may take place when the animal is still alive. This procurement of the organ from the donor animal should minimize the suffering of the animal and uphold the animals' rights and welfare.

- e) PXT must produce benefits to the recipient through a functional organ relieving his suffering and saving his life.
- f) The PXT is the only method available to the recipient.
- g) The PXT has a reasonable chance of success.
- h) Public interests will not be harmed e.g., porcine associated infection will not be disseminated and may be benefited with less disease burdens and less public health expenses.
- i) The harms and benefits of the PXT must be compared to the natural state and history of progression of the organ failure, supportive therapy, and AT in the recipient.⁷⁹ This issue is recipient-group specific and appropriate benchmarks from comparable recipients with organ failure should be used.

5.3.2 Permissible porcine therapeutic products

Consumption of pork is explicitly prohibited in Islam. However, porcine, or porcine derived medical products are used with conditional approval. There are three groups of jurists' opinion:

- a) all porcine related biomedical products are *haram* and not permitted to be transplanted into human body. These products undoubtedly will include porcine organs.
- b) transformed PXG is permitted because of either structural change or change of purpose other than ingestion as food.
- c) PXG is permitted after *darūrah* is invoked and pre-conditions for *darūrah* are satisfied. These permissible products are either derived from pigs or porcine acellular products and tissues. The typical example is porcine heart valves that are used for respective valvular replacements.⁸⁰ *Darūrah* is invoked and the porcine heart valve can only be used if the patient's condition is testified by a

⁷⁹ Adapted and modified from M. Z. al-Mutairi, "Necessity in Islamic Law," (PhD Thesis, The University of Edinburgh, 1997), 130.

⁸⁰ O. Ali, F. Aljanadi & H. Rabbi, "The use of porcine bioprosthesis valves: An Islamic perspective and a bioethical discussion," *Journal of the British Islamic Medical Association* 11, no. 4 (2022): 1–9.

specialist doctor and an alternative lawful heart valve is not available.

Transformed porcine products are permissible if the transformation successfully changes the physical properties (appearance, smell, and taste etc.), chemical or biochemical properties (molecular structure, genetic makeup etc.), unique (phenotypic) characteristics or the mode of use other than ingestion. Sufficient dilution or use of minute quantities may make these prohibited materials permissible.^{81 82} The often-quoted permitted examples include vinegar derived from wine and tanned hide from unlawful animals. This principle of transformation (*istihalah*) is extended to permit the use of gelatin in vaccines and capsules, and trypsin in vaccines.^{83 84} An Australian study of Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu perspectives on use of porcine or bovine surgical products emphasised the need for surgeons to know and communicate with patients of different religious backgrounds with regards to use of these products. However, most often than not, the information on these products is inadequate.⁸⁵ From Islamic perspectives, porcine surgical products can be used where *darūrah* is invoked or with sufficient transformation, like gelatin. To safeguard the interests of Muslim patients and medical practitioners, it will be advisable to consider *halāl* certification of surgical products or appliances that are derived from lawful animals lawfully slaughtered.

This principle of transformation probably is not applicable to

⁸¹ S. A. Ismail & A. Setiawan, "Shari'ah concept of medicine and seeking remedy," In M. M. Nordin, ed., *FIMA Yearbook 2020*, 31–35.

⁸² A. S. Rosman, A. Khan, N. A. Fadzillah, A. B. S. Darawi, A. Hehsan, A. M. Hassan, M. A. Ghazali, Ikhsan & Z. Haron, "Fatwa debate on porcine derivatives in vaccine from the concept of physical and chemical transformation (Istihalah) in Islamic jurisprudence and science," *Journal of Critical Reviews* 7, no. 7 (2020): 1037–1045.

⁸³ A. I. Padela, S. W. Furber, M. A. Kholwadia & E. Moosa, "Dire Necessity and Transformation...", 59–66.

⁸⁴ H. Musa & M. M. Nordin, "The permissibility of judicially prohibited and impure substances in medicines from the perspective of contemporary Fiqh Councils," in *FIMA Yearbook 2020*, ed. M. M. Nordin, 36–39.

⁸⁵ C. Easterbrook & G. Maddern, "Porcine and bovine surgical products: Jewish, Muslim, and Hindu perspectives," *Arch Surg* 143, no. 4 (2008): 366–370.

Cell or Organ PXT because the physical properties, e.g., appearance and the genetic constitution remains substantially porcine even after all GMs⁸⁶ or in humanized chimera.⁸⁷

5.3.3 Porcine acellular or decellularized tissues PXT

Porcine acellular or decellularized tissues or products do not stimulate the recipient's immune system significantly. Thus, rejection is not an obstacle. Since porcine cells are not involved, endogenous and genome associated viral infection will not occur. Other infections in the XG can be excluded or cleared by appropriate technologies.

From Islamic perspectives, the three groups of opinion are the same.⁸⁸ These PXGs will be permissible if a) a change of usage for PXG to PXT and not consumption is accepted, or b) *darūrah* is invoked.

5.3.4 Porcine Cells and Organs

Organ PXT has distinct advantages over AT. Donor animals can be pre-conditioned such that their organs can be better prepared and safer from rejection and infection for transplantation: a) a longer period is available for detection of pathogens; b) latent infections can be excluded with appropriate detection methods; c) anti-viral drugs can be developed and used in porcine donor and human recipient; d) the donor animal may be vaccinated to protect the donor cells or organs if required.^{89 90}

⁸⁶ W. Paris, R. J. H. Seidler, K. FitzGerald, A. I. Padela, E. Cozzi & D. K. C. Cooper, "Jewish, Christian and Muslim Theological Perspectives about Xenotransplantation," 1–8.

⁸⁷ J. V. Bonventre, F. P. Hurst, M. West, I. Wu, P. Roy-Chaudhury & M. Sheldon, "A technology roadmap for innovative approaches to kidney replacement therapies, a catalyst for change," *Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology* 14, no. 10 (2019): 1539–1547.

⁸⁸ *vide supra*, section 5.3.2.

⁸⁹ J. Denner, "Xenotransplantation — A special case of One Health," *One Health* 3 (2017): 17–22.

⁹⁰ J. Denner, "Porcine endogenous retroviruses and xenotransplantation," *Viruses* 13, no. 11 (2021): 9-11.

5.3.4.1 Roadmap in Cell and Organ PXT

Modern day biomedical ethics is much more stringent. Contemporary PXT⁹¹ without good theoretical and basic research data cannot be performed in most, if not all, countries. The historical NHP to human XT, like Baby Fae,⁹² probably will not be performed again. The whole XT research direction is on developing the appropriate protocol to achieve and improve clinical Organ PXT to human recipients.

PXT on NHP or pre-clinical PXT is considered to be the pivotal step toward Organ PXT in human.⁹³ Undoubtedly, this is going to provide better understanding of and possible solution to various PXT obstacles. With the NHP-PXT models, safety of trial drugs or regimen could detect serious complications before applying to human recipients, e.g., anti-CD154 associated thrombosis and unsuitability of calcineurin inhibitors for islet PXT.⁹⁴ The micro-encapsulation and portal of islets PXT can also be tested.⁹⁵ However, certain targeted biologics towards the xenoantigens in NHP-XT may not be appropriate to human. Given the differences of the immune system and physiological systems between NHP and human, the final tests still need to be performed on human recipients. Five steps are involved in this Roadmap:

- a) preparation of the porcine donor:
 - i) reduce as much as possible the xenoantigens that trigger rejections. These include knock-out genes, transgenesis, tolerance induction and humanized chimera.
 - ii) reduce endogenous and exogenous infection, e.g., porcine

⁹¹ Quoted in M. Albar, "Organ transplantation: A Sunni Islamic perspective," 818.

⁹² Quoted in F. Dayan & B. Ali, "The application of necessity to xenotransplantation: constitutional & Islamic bioethical perspective," *Llkogretim Online* 19, no. 2 (2020): 1246–1253.

⁹³ T. S. Min, H. J. Han & S. H. Park, "Porcine xenotransplantation to primate," *Asian-Aust J Anim Sci* 23, no. 11 (2010): 1535–1542.

⁹⁴ S. H. Hong, H. J. Kim, S. J. Kang & Chung_Gyu Park, "Novel immunomodulatory approaches for porcine Islet Xenotransplantation," *Current Diabetes Reports* 21, no. 3 (2021): 1–8.

⁹⁵ T. S. Min, H. J. Han & S. H. Park, "Porcine xenotransplantation to primate," *Asian-Aust J Anim Sci* 23, no.11 (2010): 1538.

- endogenous retrovirus (PERV), porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV), porcine Hepatitis E (PHE).
- iii) ensure the welfare and livelihood of the porcine donors are observed.
 - b) preparation of the recipient: innovative and appropriate immunosuppression regimens using drugs and targeted therapy.
 - c) selection of human recipients in experimental studies: to study and accumulate data on PXT kinetics and dynamics, especially for physiological compatibility.
 - d) enrolment of first stage clinical trials: choose the right group of patients with organ failure receiving the respective Organ PXT.
 - e) human Organ PXT clinical trials: full scale application of human Organ PXT.

5.3.4.2 Recent achievements in Cells and Organ PXT

The understanding of rejections in XT has increased tremendously. More and more powerful immunosuppressive drugs or biologics (targeted therapy) are increasingly available to suppress rejection. However, over-zealous immunosuppression may not be the best way forward because such regimen is likely to be costly and damaging to the recipient in the long term. Maximize the rejection prevention by GM and immunomodulation of the donor with the least immunosuppression for the recipient is the best approach.

Genetical engineering is a powerful tool in PXT and is the centrepiece towards success in human Organ PXT. This can be applied in multiple points of the rejection cascade and post PXT obstacles. GMs of the porcine genome can decrease or abrogate rejection, enhance physiological compatibility, decrease post-XT syndromes, and eliminate endogenous retrovirus genomes.⁹⁶ The humanized transgenic porcine chimera is another alternative, but this gets the genetic composition of the donor animal closer and closer to the human genome. The ethical concern eventually would be how to define these animals (pigs) to be animals (pigs) or human. This issue is less problematic in porcine chimeras generated by blastocyst

⁹⁶ M. Shahab, N. U. Din & N. Shahab, “Genetically engineered porcine organs for human xenotransplantation,” *Cureus* 14, no. 9 (2022): 1–4.

complementation from GM pigs because the donor is porcine and the organ is human. Finally, GMs must not be excessive as to affect the rights of the donor animals.⁹⁷ The more the GMs, the more the donor animal is distant from its natural state. This may affect the livelihood, fertility and well-being of the donor animal that need to be protected.

5.3.4.2.1 Minimize rejection and prolong PXG survival

The cascade of rejection of PXG is complex, involving interplays of natural anti-porcine xenoantigen antibodies, complement, thrombosis, inflammation, and different cell types. Achievements have been substantial in these two critical areas:

- a) Modification of donor pigs: these include induction of tolerance,⁹⁸ humanized chimera,⁹⁹ GMs to produce pigs with multiple knockout genes and transgenesis for expression of protective protein for complement and coagulation,¹⁰⁰¹⁰¹ and immunomodulation of donor, e.g., implantation of subcapsular autologous porcine thymus in kidney PXG.¹⁰² There is also the possibility of customized pigs to tailor to individual patient with organ failure especially to those who require repeated PXT (blastocyst complementation).

From the Islamic perspective, human-animal (porcine)

⁹⁷ Hadiths quoted in M. A. Albar & H. Chamsi-Pasha, *Contemporary Bioethics*....., 56.

⁹⁸ P. A. Vagefi, J. A. Shah & D. H. Sachs, "Progress towards inducing tolerance of pig-to-primate xenografts," *International Journal of Surgery* 23 (2015): 291–295.

⁹⁹ J. V. Bonventre et al., "A technology roadmap for innovative approaches.....," 1546.

¹⁰⁰ D. K. C. Cooper, H. Hara, H. Iwase, T. Yamamoto, Z. Y. Wang, A. Jagdale, M. H. Bikhet, H. Q. Nguyen, J. B. Foote, W. D. Paris, D. Ayares, V. Kumar, D. J. Anderson, J. E. Locke & D. E. Eckhoff, "Pig kidney xenotransplantation: progress toward clinical trials," *Clinical Transplantation* (2021): 35(e14139).

¹⁰¹ D. Niu, X. Ma, T. Yuan, Y. Niu, Y. Xu, Z. Sun, Y. Ping, W. Li, J. Zhang, T. Wang & G. M. Church, "Porcine genome engineering for xenotransplantation," *Advanced Drug Delivery Reviews* 168 (2021): 229–245.

¹⁰² R. A. Montgomery, J. M. Stern, B. E. Lonze, V. S. Tatapudi, M. Mangiola, M. Wu, E. Weldon, N. Lawson, C. Deterville, R. A. Dieter, B. Sullivan, G. Boulton, B. Parent, G. Piper, P. Sommer, S. Cawthon, E. Duggan, D. Ayares, A. Dandro, and Z. A. Stewart, "Results of two cases of pig-to-human kidney xenotransplantation," *New England Journal of Medicine* 386, no. 20 (2021): 1891.

chimera has the most controversy.¹⁰³ Inserting part of the human genome into the animal (pig) to produce a chimera or humanized protein may infringe the purpose of divine creation of and dignity of man. Moreover, chimeric PXT is likely to be more permissible if the required human organ can be grown in a chimeric pig (blastocyst complementation) or the donor organ can be devoid of porcine cells as much as possible. For all chimeric PXTs, *darūrah* still needs to be invoked.

b) Reduction or suppression of rejection by recipient:

Immunosuppressive therapy to counter rejection is a double-edged sword. Without immunosuppressive therapy, the organ graft will be rejected and fail. However, substantial morbidity and mortality are associated with post-transplant immunosuppression. It had been reported that forty percent of patients with kidney AT died with a functional kidney graft. Most of the deaths were related to immunosuppression.¹⁰⁴

New combination of immunosuppressive drugs, biologics and other adjunctive therapy dampens the immune response, increases graft survival, and maintains graft functions. A better preparation of the donor organ (PXG) that decrease the intensity of rejection will help to lessen the need of intensive immunosuppression and thus, reduce the consequent morbidity and mortality.

Most of the data on immunosuppressive regimens are from pre-clinical studies that involve NHP-PXT systems. Recent data on heart and kidney PXT had been reported.¹⁰⁵ ¹⁰⁶ More data may be emerging soon.

¹⁰³ M. F. M. Zailani, M. N. Hamdan & A. N. M. Yusof, "Human-Pig chimeric organ in organ transplantation...", 2-4.

¹⁰⁴ B. I. Shaw & A. D. Kirk, "Kidney xenotransplantation steps toward clinical application," *Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology* 14, no. 4 (2019): 620–622.

¹⁰⁵ R. A. Montgomery et al., "Results of two cases of pig-to-human kidney xenotransplantation," 1889–1898.

¹⁰⁶ A. N. Carrier, A. Verma, M. Mohiuddin, M. Pascual, Y. D. Muller, A. Longchamp, C. Bhati, L. H. Buhler, D. G. Maluf & R. P. H. Meier, "Xenotransplantation: A New Era," *Frontiers in Immunology* 13 (2022): 1–11.

5.3.4.2.2 Physiological compatibility

Most Islamic jurists' deliberations and decisions on PXT miss out on the importance of physiological compatibility. Porcine proteins from organ PXG have their own species-specific physiological properties and auto-regulatory (homeostatic) mechanism. In AT, there are no such problems because the human proteins are similar and have similar physiological functions. In XT, the physiological consequences may be different and may be much more pronounced with Organ PXT. When the Cell or Organ PXG is transplanted to the recipient, these porcine proteins may act differently. These differences result in different PXT specific syndrome in the NHP and human recipients. For example, in kidney PXT, there may be overgrowth of PXG, hypovolemic syndrome and anemia caused by inadequate erythropoiesis from porcine erythropoietin. Other syndromes include the maladaptive ventricular hypertrophy following heart PXT.^{107 108 109}

Genetic modification can be performed on the donor pig to decrease growth hormone receptor that is alleged to be the cause of over-growth of PXG¹¹⁰ or to produce humanized protein with the desired physiological function.¹¹¹ With more research on human recipients, the 'real' physiological changes and the consequences would be studied. Remedies could be developed accordingly. These will pave the way for full clinical Organ PXT for human recipients with organ failure.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ D. K. C. Cooper et. al., "Pig kidney xenotransplantation: progress toward clinical trials." 4-5.

¹⁰⁹ V. S. Tatapudi & A. D. Griesemer, "Physiologic considerations of pig-to-human kidney xenotransplantation," *Current Opinion in Nephrology and Hypertension* 32, no. 2 (2023): 193–198.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ B. Cho, E. J. Lee, S. M. Ahn, G. Kim, S. H. Lee, D. Y. Ji & J. T. Kang, "Production of genetically modified pigs expressing human insulin and C-peptide as a source of Islets for Xenotransplantation," *Transgenic Research* 28, no. 5–6 (201): 553-555.

5.3.4.2.3 Cross species infections

The prevention of potential pathogens of the donor animals starts from the parent animals that are raised in isolated and biosecured environments. Clean embryo transfer, Cesarean section, colostrum deprivation, early weaning and infection screening are effective means to eliminate potential pathogens, e.g., PCMV and PHE, in the donor.^{112 113}

Among porcine zoonotic infections, PERV is a major concern. PERV is integrated into the porcine genome as multiple copies of the provirus that are constantly present in the porcine genome irrespective of tissue types.¹¹⁴ PERV-A and PERV-B can infect human cells whereas PERV-C does not infect human cells. Substantial number of PERV provirus can be knockout in porcine cells in culture and pigs through genetic editing. This has the potential of clearing most if not all the PERV provirus in the porcine genome. Other measures that could decrease the potential harms from PERV include selection of low expression PERV-A and PERV-B pigs, use of anti-viral drugs, vaccination, and RNA interference. Choice of PERV-C free pigs can decrease the transmission of PERV infection including PERV-A/C combination.^{115 116} In addition, transgenesis for knockout genes does not influence the pattern of PERV trans-infection in the skin of the transgenic pigs.¹¹⁷

¹¹² J. Denner, “Porcine endogenous retroviruses and xenotransplantation,” *Viruses* 13, no. 11 (2021): 1.

¹¹³ S. Halecker, S. Hansen, L. Krabben, F. Ebner, B. Kaufer & J. Denner, “How, where and when to screen for porcine cytomegalovirus (PCMV) in donor pigs for xenotransplantation,” *Sci Rep* 12, no. 21545 (2022): 1–10.

¹¹⁴ U. Mazurek, M. C. Kimsa, B. Strzalka-Mrozik, M. W. Kimsa, J. Adamska, D. Lipinski, J. Zeyland, M. Szalata, R. Slomski, J. Jura, Z. Smorag, R. Nowak & J. Gola, “Quantitative analysis of porcine endogenous retroviruses in different organs of transgenic pigs generated for xenotransplantation,” *Current Microbiology* 67, no. 4 (2013): 505–514.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 507–509.

¹¹⁶ J. Denner, “Porcine endogenous retroviruses and xenotransplantation,” 9–11.

¹¹⁷ M. Kimsa-Dudek, B. Strzalka-Mrozik, M. W. Kimsa, I. Blecharz, J. Gola, B. Skowronek, A. Janiszewski, D. Lipinski, J. Zeyland, M. Szalata, R. Slomski & U. Mazurek, “Screening pigs for xenotransplantation: Expression of porcine endogenous retroviruses in transgenic pig skin,” *Transgenic Research* 24, no. 3 (2015): 529–536.

Data from islet cells and heart PXT to NHP, PXT to human and *ex vivo* perfusion in human using porcine organ or cellular bioreactor showed absence of transmission of PERV or clinically significant PERV from donor to recipient.¹¹⁸ In other words, PERV has not caused any infection risk to the PXT recipients and the community. However, it would still be advisable to minimize this risk as much as possible until more safety data are available.

5.3.4.2.4 Cell and Organ PXT attempted in human

Islet PXT had been performed with wild type and genetically modified porcine islets for patients with Type I diabetes mellitus (islet cell failure) with varying success.¹¹⁹ Human C peptide may have protective function against various complications in diabetes mellitus. Porcine C peptide from islets PXT does not have full physiological function of human C peptide in human. Transgenic pigs expressing human proinsulin with human C peptide are produced and may provide more benefits to the recipient in future Islet PXT.¹²⁰

Using organs sourced from genetically modified pigs, one heart PXT on a patient with heart failure and three kidney PXTs on three decedent patients were performed and reported.¹²¹ Three different immunosuppression protocols were used. The patient with heart PXT died of multi-organ failure two months after PXT. Two kidney PXG was pre-implanted with porcine thymus (thymokidney) after *ex vivo* perfusion with Static Preservation Fluid.¹²² No hyper-acute rejection occurred. The thymokidney functioned well 54 hours post PXT per protocol. The third patient with kidney PXT had thrombotic microangiopathy post-PXT while on a ‘standard immunosuppression’ plus rituximab regimen. The thrombotic

¹¹⁸J. Denner, “Porcine endogenous retroviruses and xenotransplantation,” 8.-9

¹¹⁹ M. Shahab, N. U. Din & N. Shahab, “Genetically engineered porcine organs for human xenotransplantation,” *Cureus* 14, no. 9 (2022): 2-3.

¹²⁰ B. Cho, E. J. Lee, S. M. Ahn, G. Kim, S. H. Lee, D. Y. Ji & J. T. Kang, “Production of genetically modified pigs. . . .” 556.

¹²¹ A. N. Carrier et. al., “Xenotransplantation: A new era,” 6-7.

¹²² R. A. Montgomery et al., “Results of two cases of pig-to-human kidney xenotransplantation,” 1892.

microangiopathy may be part and parcel of an antibody-mediated rejection. Two of these three decedent patients with kidney PXT had their own functioning kidney before PXT. It was unclear how the kidney PXT was working by itself. The efficiency of the kidney PXT to clear creatinine or other toxic products can be better ascertained if the kidney PXT is performed on a recipient with no functioning kidneys.

5.4 *Darūrah* and achievements in PXT

There are substantial advances in treatment and prevention of rejection, understanding and management of physiological compatibility and no evidence of porcine derived zoonosis developing in PXT recipients or in the community.

The major determinants for invoking *darūrah* are the certainty of success, benefits, and reduced harm in the PXT recipient. The benefits to the recipient should include survival advantage for immediate, short, medium, and long term; improved physical and psychological quality of life; less burden to patients and carers. Benefits to the community at large would include medical, general utilitarian, social and political interests. Very few people realize that Muslims could have a much higher stake in PXT especially for those who object human donors for OT, alive or deceased.

The benefit-harm analysis involves the problems that can occur in the four phases following PXT and their comparison with allograft (Table 2). Using porcine organs that have anatomical compatibility to human, the technological aspect of transplantation is easily satisfied. Better procurement and *ex vivo* perfusion of the organ PXG improve the immediate post PXT functions. The *ex vivo* perfusion by customized fluid may eliminate most of the ‘impure’ blood and tissue fluid from the PXG as well.

Table 2 Problems following PXT¹²³

Survival Phases following PXT	Problems
Immediate	Structural and technical complications Hyper-rejection

¹²³ Modified from A. N. Carrier et al., “Xenotransplantation: A new era,” 1–11.

Short-term	Rejection Acute infection from immunosuppression Physiological incompatibility
Medium-term	Rejection Dysfunction PXG Post-PXG syndromes Opportunistic infection Cross species infection
Long-term	Chronic rejection Dysfunction PXG Post-PXG syndromes Opportunistic infections Cross species infections

Exception for Islets PXT, the present data are still limited to the early phase of PXT. Data on short-term, medium-term and long-term survival are limited or not available. Therefore, these determinants for invoking *darūrah* are not available. Without these data on definite or established benefits and harms, PXT should not be permissible.

On the issue of public interests with respect to costs and accessibility in developing world, these are not solved by PXT at this stage. The genetically modified pigs and their care are costly. Follow up treatments with complicated immunosuppressive regimens are expensive and require support from experts who may not be available in the developing countries. Two issues in the future may help:

- a) After clinical PXT is proven to be successful, the optimal GMs combination can be determined. Mass production of such pigs can bring down the cost of these organ PXGs.
- b) If blastocyst complementation using human stem cells is successful, the chimeric organ remains human and customized to the recipient. Post-transplant immunosuppression with the respective expertise may not be required.

5.5 Proposed Roadmap for PXT in human

Since the benefits and harms from Organ PXT are not sufficient to satisfy the preconditions of *darūrah*., any permission for Organ PXT

relying on *darūrah* is premature. New data need to be constantly collected, analysed, and discussed among medical experts and jurists before making any deliberations and advice on Organ PXT.

The following roadmaps according to different categories of porcine origin is proposed:

- a) Porcine derived or transformed products: need *halāl* certification and continuing search of lawful alternative.
- b) Acellular PXT: need *halāl* certification and continuing search of lawful alternative.
- c) Cell PXT: continue with search for physiological compatibility for each cell type, e.g., islets, stem cells, neurons, skin.
- d) Organ PXT with anatomical and physiological compatibility: continue with attempts in NHP and human, e.g., kidney, liver, heart.
- e) Other non-attempted organs or multiple organs: wait until data and reviews on other PXT are available, e.g., lung, small bowel, whole pancreas, adrenals.

5.5.1 Experimental Research in PXT

A small study of 163 patients with kidney failure and 40 healthcare providers showed that pig-to-human XT could be accepted if the results of PXT was comparable to AT. The great majority of patients would accept PXT if they had no religious concern. Data were not collected on the religious background of the respondents in this survey¹²⁴ As of now, Organ PXT to human body for organ failure are limited. This major determinant for acceptance of PXT will not be available for quite some time.¹²⁵

Islamic biomedical ethics do not prohibit medical research. Quality researches by researchers are allowed.¹²⁶ The XTs in the Islamic contemporary period probably would not satisfy the present-day biomedical ethics. The Muslim researcher must have the

¹²⁴ A. I. Padilla, D. Hurst, R. Lopez, V. Kumar, D. K. C. Cooper & W. Paris, "Attitudes to clinical pig kidney xenotransplantation among medical providers and patients," *Kidney360* 1, no. 7 (2020): 657–662.

¹²⁵ *vide supra*, Section 5.4.

¹²⁶ J. Rajab & M. Irfan, "Contemporary international principles of medical ethics," In M. M. Nordin, ed., *FIMA Yearbook 2020*, 22–30.

intention of doing the research for the benefits of the mankind for the sake of Allah, ensure the rights of human and animals are protected, maintain objectivity and safety, avoid, and prevent harm as much as reasonable, trustworthy in collection and publication of data.

For the medical researchers and healthcare providers, the first step is to achieve non-maleficence: making sure the PXT survives the first stage of engraftment without causing immediate harms to the recipient. The PXT then needs to go through the subsequent phases with consequential benefits in immediate, short, medium, and long term to the recipient, family, ummah and public at large.

On the participation of recipients with organ failure in PXT, man is given freedom of choices by Allah in all daily events. Sacrificing oneself or interests of oneself are highly honoured in Islam. The Qur'an (2:195) says:

وَأَنْفِقُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ وَلَا تُلْقُوا بِأَيْدِيكُمْ إِلَى التَّهْلُكَةِ وَأَحْسِنُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ
الْمُحْسِنِينَ ١٩٥

“Spend in the cause of Allah and do not let your own hands throw you into destruction ‘by withholding’. And do good, for Allah certainly loves the good doers.”

And in the verse 59:9 it says:

وَالَّذِينَ تَبَوَّءُوا الدَّارَ وَالْإِيمَانَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ يُحِبُّونَ مَنْ هَاجَرَ إِلَيْهِمْ وَلَا يَجِدُونَ فِي
صُدُورِهِمْ حَاجَةً مِمَّا أُوتُوا وَيُؤْتُونَ عَلَى أَنْفُسِهِمْ وَلَوْ كَانَ بِهِمْ خَصَاصَةٌ وَمَنْ يُوقِ شَحْنِ
نَفْسِهِ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ ٩

“As for those who had settled in the city and ‘embraced’ the faith before ‘the arrival of’ the emigrants, they love whoever immigrates to them, never having a desire in their hearts for whatever ‘of the gains’ is given to the emigrants. They give ‘the emigrants’ preference over themselves even though they may be in need. And whoever is saved from the selfishness of their own souls, it is they who are ‘truly’ successful.

Muslims with organ failure may invoke *darūrah* and participate in Organ PXT for public interests and future benefits of patients with

respective organ failures. This obviously is out of benevolence, altruism, and personal sacrifice.

The four domains of the Principalists' biomedical ethics are not hierarchical. For Muslims to participate in PXT, a re-arranged hierarchical order may be more appropriate:

- a) Autonomy: the patients, family members or custodians are given the freedom of choice and are fully informed about the expected outcomes from the PXT.
- b) Justice: participation is non-discriminatory, and all his/her interests and rights are fully protected and respected before, during and after the participation.
- c) Non-maleficence: harms must be put under intensive scrutiny and be removed, if necessary, e.g., in failed kidney PXT, the kidney PXG could be removed, and dialysis reinstated.¹²⁷ This does not include decedent persons.
- d) Beneficence: decedent PXT recipient will not have any benefits. As of now, the potential benefits for surviving PXT recipients could be minimal and short-lived.¹²⁸

5.5.2 Clinical trials in Cell and Organ PXT

NHP-PXT cannot replace studies in human PXT especially some post-XT syndromes found in NHP-PXT are not detected in human PXT, e.g., proteinuria and hypoalbuminemia after kidney PXT to NHP. The first stage will be to test out the clinical efficacy and safety using GM pigs, new immunomodulation and immunosuppressive regimens.

A stringent patient selection process for PXT is essential to achieve the best possible results. Given the uncertainty on risk and benefits of PXT, participation of the PXT recipient is entirely a personal decision.¹²⁹ PXT needs to be the best available and possible alternative to the patients with organ failure at the time. This means those eligible for AT, who would have been already enrolled for AT, will be excluded. In addition, those recipients with extremely high

¹²⁷ A. N. Carrier et al., "Xenotransplantation: A new era," 5-6.

¹²⁸ Ibid, 7-8.

¹²⁹ D. J. Hurst, L. A. Padilla, D. K. C. Cooper & W. Paris, "Scientific and psychosocial ethical considerations for initial clinical trials of kidney xenotransplantation," *Xenotransplantation* 29, no. 1 (2022): 1-5.

risks need to be excluded as well because their underlying risks could have negative impacts on their lives and survival after PXT. The latter is very important to avoid negative perception for the whole PXT program by patients with organ failure and the community at large.¹³⁰

The second issue is appropriate benchmarking. Data from AT are inappropriate. AT has been established for a long time with known safety and efficacy profiles. PXT needs to go through the same learning curve of AT in the past. It is not envisaged that PXT can achieve the same degree of safety and efficacy within a considerable period of clinical application.

In addition, the recipients selected in the first stage of PXT clinical trial should be those excluded from routine AT because of age, co-morbidities etc. Therefore, the results of PXT should be compared to patients with organ failure who are refused AT and receive supportive therapy only,^{131 132} or where human organ is not available. The latter data may be a range or an average because the results could vary from centres to centres. The researchers and recipients may have to decide how much excess risk of PXT above these benchmarks can be accepted. At this stage, it is unrealistic to expect kidney PXT for kidney failure can achieve the proposed 90% survival for 1-year post-transplantation as in chronic dialysis.

Most authors suggest that experimental PXT should begin with kidney PXT because replacement therapy (dialysis) is easily available. If severe rejection or side effects from immunosuppression occur, the PXG can be removed, and immunosuppression can be stopped. The PXT recipient can revert to dialysis. Moreover, replacement therapy for liver and heart failure are less effective. It should be more urgent to get an alternative OT. This pressing need may put liver and heart PXT to a higher order for research in clinical PXT.

¹³⁰ R. Chaban, D. K. C. Cooper & R. N. Pierson, "Pig heart and lung xenotransplantation: Present status," *Journal of Heart and Lung Transplantation* 41, no. 8 (2022) 1020.

¹³¹ A. N. Carrier et. al., "Xenotransplantation: A New Era," 5-6.

¹³² D. K. C. Cooper et al., "Pig Kidney Xenotransplantation: Progress Toward Clinical Trials," 7-8.

6 Conclusion

From the Islamic perspectives, porcine products have been permitted to be used in medical treatments through the application of *istihalah* and *ḍarūrah*. Cell and Organ PXT have the potential to solve problems with human Organ Shortages and biomedical controversies that could be worse in the Muslim world. However, Cell and Organ PXT are still experimental. Comprehensive data on clinical benefits and harms are lacking. *Darūrah* cannot be invoked at this stage because this important precondition in *ḍarūrah* is not satisfied.

Continuing preclinical and clinical research should be continued. For Muslim patients with organ failure who participate in experimental research, *ḍarūrah* can be invoked for public interests and future benefits to patients with organ failure. *Darūrah* can also facilitate the participation of Muslim researchers in PXT.

Finally, information and deliberations on XT and PXT must be communicated appropriately and timely to Muslims, ummah and community at large such that they could be correctly informed about the development, achievements and expectations for XT and PXT.^{133 134} These can be mediated by the respective Muslim association, Iman and healthcare practitioners in a concerted manner.

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¹³³ Ahmed, M., Kubilis, P., & Padela, A. "American Muslim Physician Attitudes Toward Organ Donation," *Journal of Religion and Health* 57, no. 5 (2018): 1717–1730.

¹³⁴ A. I. Padela & Ebrahim Moosa, "Muslim doctors and Islamic bioethics: Insights from a National Survey of Muslim Physicians in the United States," in *Medicine and Shariah*, ed. A. I. Padela (University of Notre Dame Press, 2021), 193–225.

Review Essay

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ISLAMIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

Arfah Abdul Majid¹
Khairudin Aljunied²

Abstract

Since the 1970s, Muslim intellectuals have offered alternatives to Euro-American dominance in the realm of knowledge. A new movement known as the “Islamization of Knowledge” was founded arguing for an epistemological revolution that hinged on the ideals of Tawhid (unity) and the sacralization of “secularized” disciplines and subjects. This article offers some critical reflections on this intriguing undertaking. In our view, the Islamization of Knowledge project was structured primarily around the idea of civilizational difference and a partial reading of the history of knowledge formation. The notion that knowledge can be “Islamized” or has been “secularized” is equally problematic because human knowledge incorporates both secular and sacred dimensions. Duality exists only in the minds and practices of knowledge producers and policymakers.

Introduction

This article offers some critical reflections on an influential intellectual movement known as the “Islamization of Knowledge.” We develop two overlapping arguments. First, the Islamization of Knowledge project was conceived from the perspective of

¹ Senior Lecturer, Department of Government and Civilisation Studies, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Malaysia. Email: am_arfah@upm.edu.my

² Professor, Universiti Malaya and Associate Professor, National University of Singapore. Email: aljunied1976@gmail.com

civilizational difference. That is the modern Western worldview as well as the conception of knowledge are viewed by the theorists and ideologues of Islamization of Knowledge as radically distinct from the Islamic one and therefore irreconcilable. Such sharp distinctions, in our view, flies in the face of unremitting civilizational syntheses between Islam and the West for over a millennium till the present. Secondly, we assert that all attempts at disaggregating sacred knowledge from secular academic pursuits and re-sacralizing modern knowledge are only viable if “sacred” and “secular” knowledge do not share symbiotic features. The nature of knowledge and of life, however, shows the contrary. All knowledge is imbued with sacred and secular elements. As Talal Asad reminds us, the secular and the religious remade each other. The “‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ are not essentially fixed categories.”³ Decoupling of the sacred from the secular, or fusing the sacred with the secular in the realm of knowledge formation are contingent largely on the producers of knowledge and policymakers. In other words, dualism does not exist in knowledge. It exists in the minds of the purveyors of knowledge. Precisely for the same reason, the current project of integrating knowledge in Muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan and Malaysia is counter-productive. Noble and aspirational, such efforts, however, depart from the spirit of universalism in Islam.

This reflexive article is divided into three parts. We begin by discussing the circumstances surrounding the growth of a promising intellectual movement christened as the “Islamization of Knowledge.” We offer a broad overview of the thoughts and reflections of key thinkers in this movement. Following this, we delve into how civilizational difference has structured the movement. In the third section, we then provide a brief exposition of the history of knowledge formation to show that all attempts at secularizing and sacralizing knowledge are, in essence, problematic, if not impractical.

The Islamization of Knowledge Project: Origins and Trajectories

Since the 1970s, Muslims in the modern world have been faced with

³ Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 25.

intellectual conundrums which they viewed as a consequence of the infusion of secularism into their homelands. In Malaysia, for example, the dualistic educational system introduced by the British gave rise to a segregated Muslim society. Traditional religious education no longer guaranteed employment or prestigious positions and was perceived by Muslim themselves as second-tier to modern and Western-oriented education.⁴ In response to this dilemma, a new crop of Muslim intellectuals initiated an “epistemological revolution”.⁵ They saw Western and secular knowledge as detrimental to the Muslim way of life (*dīn*). Secular knowledge, they reasoned, runs into conflict with Islam as it is detached from spiritual and religious values. Among the prominent scholars spearheading this epistemological revolution is Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas. Knowledge in Islam, according to Al-Attas, is “not neutral and can indeed be infused with a nature and content which masquerades as knowledge.”⁶ In response to the perceived threat of secularization and Westernization, Al-Attas pioneered the Islamization of Knowledge movement. The movement seeks to liberate “man first from magical, mythological, animistic, national-cultural tradition, and then from secular control over his reason and his language.”⁷

One of the objectives of the Islamization of knowledge is dewesternizing secular frameworks of thought. Al-Attas deconstructs foreign elements that have regulated how Muslims conceive knowledge. Those elements are: “dualism in envisioning reality and truth; dualism of mind and body; their separation of *intellectus* and *ratio*, their stress upon the validity of ratio; their methodological

⁴ Rosnani Hashim, “Educational dualism in Malaysia: Progress and problems toward Integration,” *Muslim Education Quarterly*, vol. 11, no.3 (1994), 34-41. See also Suhailah Hussein, “Critical pedagogy, Islamisation of knowledge and Muslim education,” *Intellectual Discourse*, vol. 15, no.1 (2007), 85-104.

⁵ Rosnani Hashim and Imron Rossidy, “Islamization of knowledge: A comparative analysis of the conceptions of Al-Attas and Al-Fārūqī,” *Intellectual Discourse*, vol. 8, no. 1 (2013), 19-44, <http://irep.iium.edu.my/25955/>.

⁶ Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1978), 127.

⁷ Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism*, 174, see also, Rosnani and Imron, *Islamization of Knowledge*, 19-44.

cleavage about rationalism and empiricism; their doctrine of humanism; the secular ideology; their concept of tragedy-mainly in literature.”⁸ Once all these elements (i.e., secularism, dualism, humanism, and tragedy) are eliminated from the human sciences, Islamic concepts can then be infused. This will then shepherd fresh interpretation of facts and the formulation of new grand theories.⁹ According to Al-Attas, knowledge should be grounded in the principle of unity. Islam upholds that there is “only One Reality and Truth, and all Islamic values pertain ultimately to it alone, so that to the Muslim, individually and collectively, all endeavour towards change and development and progress and perfection is invariably determined by the worldview that projects the vision of the One Reality and confirms the affirmation of the same Truth.”¹⁰

Another prominent Palestinian-American thinker, Ismail Al-Faruqi, in turn, theorizes the Islamization of knowledge as the integration of “new knowledge into the corpus of the Islamic legacy by eliminating, amending, re-interpreting and adapting its components as the worldview of Islam and its values dictate.”¹¹ Extending Al-Attas’ ideas, Al-Faruqi questions the epistemological bases of modern academic disciplines and calls for the incorporation of the concept of *Tawhid* (unity). Al-Faruqi argues for eliminating the dichotomy between ‘*aql* (acquired) and *naql* (revealed) sciences. He underlines the unity of life whereby all actions of human beings are to be analyzed on equal terms and not determined by ethnicity, colour, class and so forth which are the hallmarks of Western orientalism. He sees all disciplines as humanistic and sought to harmonize them to address worldly problems.¹²

The third scholar to be considered here is Seyyed Hossein Nasr who emphasizes the need to resacralize knowledge instead of Islamization of knowledge since all world religions view knowledge

⁸ Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism*, 45.

⁹ Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism*, 45.

¹⁰ Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism*, 84.

¹¹ Ismail Raji Al-Faruqi, *Islamization of Knowledge: The Problem, Principles, and the Workplan* (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), 1982), 30.

¹² Al-Faruqi, *Islamization of Knowledge*, 22.

as sacred.¹³ Agreeing however with the earlier thinkers, he emphasizes the internalization of the concept of *Tawhid* in the process of reconstructing knowledge to reveal the underlying “unity and inter-relatedness of all that exists.”¹⁴ Even though the concept of *Tawhid* fundamentally refers to unity and oneness of God, Nasr believes *Tawhid* also symbolizes a comprehensive metaphysical view of the unity of all knowledge.¹⁵ “The testimony of the faith *La ilaha illa 'Llah* (There is no divinity but the Divine) is a statement concerning knowledge, not sentiments or the will. It contains the quintessence of metaphysical knowledge concerning the Principle and its manifestation.”¹⁶

These three thinkers influenced a burgeoning generation of scholars advocating for a holistic conception of knowledge consistent with the *tawhidic* worldview. To them, knowledge is inherently connected to the divine. To operationalize the Islamization of Knowledge project, Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman along with other scholars associated with the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) based in North Virginia, United States devised a workplan that involved the production of new textbooks offering Islamic approaches to academic disciplines and the training of a cadre of academicians.¹⁷

Al-Alwani, in turn, emphasizes the importance of reading and understanding both the signs of God in the Qur’an (*ayat al-Qur’aniyyah*) and the signs of God in His creation (*ayat*

¹³ Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred* (State University of New York Press, 1989), 6.

¹⁴ Ibrahim Kalin, ‘The sacred versus the secular: Nasr on science’, in *The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr*, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier and Lucian Stone (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing CO., 2001), 451.

¹⁵ Ernest Wolf-Gazo, ‘The sacred versus the secular: Nasr on Science’, in *The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr*, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier and Lucian Stone (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing CO., 2001), 277-303.

¹⁶ Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred*, 13.

¹⁷ The comprehensive discourse on the malaise of the Ummah and the action plan to reconstruct the Muslim thought are highlighted in Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman, *Islamization of Knowledge: The Problem, Principles, and the Workplan* (Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), 1989).

al-kauniyyah) as the mainsprings of the Islamization of Knowledge project.

The foundation of the tawhīdi episteme which holds that the universe has a Creator, who has charged humanity with His stewardship and what they knew not, making revelation a principal source of knowledge and likewise the natural world, so that by means of reading the two within a framework of pure tawhīd, proper, discerning, and purposeful knowledge may result”.¹⁸

In Malaysia, a noted intellectual and former rector of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), Kamal Hassan further expands these thinkers’ ideas by subjecting to critical assessment facets of social and natural sciences that are inconsistent with Islamic teachings and worldviews. Modern paradigms, theories, concepts, and methodologies that are compatible and in harmony with Islam should not be judiciously incorporated into the heart of what he calls the “Islamicization of Knowledge,”¹⁹ a mere terminological refurbishment of the Islamization of Knowledge endeavour.

The Islamization of knowledge project is not without problems. Osman Bakar, one of the leading theorists in the movement, sees the Islamization of Knowledge as rapidly losing its relevance since new perspectives have not been offered to address new global epistemological developments. Among the new epistemological developments is postmodernism, a deconstructive system of thought that encouraged many scholars and institutions to consider various traditions of knowledge into the heart of the Western academe.²⁰ In the same vein, Mumtaz Ali highlights a core

¹⁸ Taha Jabir Al-Alwani, “The Islamization of knowledge: yesterday and today,” *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, vol. 12, no.1 (1995), 5.

¹⁹ The full text of the lecture delivered by the late Prof. M. Kamal Hassan in January 2022, entitled “Islamisation of human knowledge,” can be accessed at https://www.iium.edu.my/media/84229/MKH_UNICORE%204-IOHK.docx.pdf

²⁰ Osman Bakar, *Islamic Civilisation and the Modern World: Thematic Essays* (Gadong: University Brunei Darussalam Press, 2014). Osman Bakar also calls for a new grand synthesis between Islamic science, modern science, and post-modernity in Osman Bakar, “Islamic Science, Modern Science, and Post-Modernity: Towards a

weakness in any attempts at Islamizing knowledge. It is necessary, according to him, “to make a clear distinction between the Divine and human...the real issue does not lie in the absence of principles and values, rather the real issue arises when we come to their application and this involves the issue of methodology.”²¹ Going further, we show that epistemological and methodological problems found in the Islamization of Knowledge project have to do, first of all, with a misleading perception of civilizational difference and a partial view of the nature of knowledge.

Civilizational Difference and the Inter-civilizational Nature of Knowledge

The Islamization of Knowledge project was based on the idea of civilizational difference. Islamic worldview and conception of knowledge are regarded as fundamentally distinct from the West. In making out binaries between Islam and the West, theorists of the Islamization of Knowledge de-emphasize inter-civilizational exchanges that took place over many centuries; inter-civilizational exchanges that became an elementary attribute of knowledge formation in Islam. Indeed, a cursory survey of the global history of knowledge across the Muslim civilization and beyond informs us that Arabic numerals and algebra were developed through the interactions between Indian, Muslim, and Western traditions of knowledge. Many mathematical concepts such as the concept of zero, geometry and infinity were discovered during the Vedic period of Indian civilization. These concepts did not emerge from pure reason but were formulated through the study of the Vedas. The concepts of zero and the decimal system can be found in the Atharvaveda and this was later studied and developed further by Muslim thinkers.²²

new synthesis through a Tawhidic epistemology,” *Revelation and Science*, vol. 1, no.3 (2011), 13-20.

²¹ Mohammad Mumtaz Ali, “Reconstruction of Islamic thought and civilization,” *American Journal of Islam and Society*, vol. 16, no. 1 (April 1, 1999), 93–109, <https://doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v16i1.2132>.

²² Subhajyoti Borgohain, “Mathematical concepts and its theories in the Vedas,” *Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development (IJTSRD)*, vol. 5, no.3 (2021), 735-737.

Al-Khwarizmi (780-850) was one great Muslim mathematician and astronomer who was influenced by the works of Indian mathematical giants and, in effect, inspired generations of mathematicians from different civilizations.²³

In other fields of knowledge, the same inter-civilizational exchanges were evident. Islamic medicine was developed from intense knowledge exchanges with Greek and Indian civilizations. Research by Meyerhof and Speziale reveals the translation and incorporation of many concepts from Ayurvedic texts such as alchemy (*rasaśāstra*) and rejuvenating therapy (*rasāyana*) into Arabic and Persian.²⁴ This transfer of knowledge and expertise advanced the Arabo-Persian medicine during the late medieval and early modern periods. A combination of Ayurvedic and Greco-Arabic medicinal practices were eventually used by Muslim and Hindu doctors in South Asia. In the field of astronomy, during the Song Dynasty, a Hui Muslim known as Ma Yize had introduced the seven-day week into the Chinese calendrical system.²⁵ An Islamic astronomical handbook called *zij* that was translated into Chinese with the title, *Huihui Li* or *Huihui lifa* (Islamic astronomical system). The handbooks contained large sets of mathematical tables that aided astronomical and astrological calculations.²⁶

To be sure, the European Renaissance in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries blossomed through the contributions of Muslim thinkers during the height of Islamic civilization.²⁷ Europeans were

²³ Matthew E. Falagas, Effie Zarkadoulia, and George Samonis, "Arab science in the Golden Age (750–1258 C.E.) and today," *The FASEB Journal*, vol. 20, no. 10 (August 1, 2006), 1581–86, <https://doi.org/10.1096/fj.06-0803ufm>.

²⁴ Max Meyerhof, "On the transmission of Greek and Indian Science to the Arabs," *Islamic Culture*, vol. 11, no.1 (1937), 17-29. See also Fabrizio Speziale, "Rasāyana and Rasaśāstra in the Persian medical culture of South Asia," *History of Science in South Asia*, vol. 7 (2019), 1-14.

²⁵ The contributions of Muslims in the development of knowledge and science in other civilizations are further discussed in Johan Meuleman, *Islam in the Era of Globalization: Muslim Attitudes towards Modernity and Identity* (Routledge, 2005).

²⁶ Benno Van Dalen, "Islamic astronomical tables in China: the sources for the Huihui li," in *Astrophysics and Space Science Library: Vol. 275. History of Oriental Astronomy*, ed. S.M. Razaullah Ansari (Springer, 2002), 19-31.

²⁷ Ahmed Essa and Othman Ali, *Books-In-Brief: Studies in Islamic Civilization: The Muslim Contribution to the Renaissance* (International Institute of Islamic

exposed to sciences developed by Islamic scholars through the work of translation, from Arabic to Latin. They utilized these sciences for the advancement of their knowledge. For example, the works of Leonardo of Pisa (Fibonacci) on algebra were mostly derived from his readings of al-Khwarizmi's texts. The reverse held true. Three hundred years before the translation movement in Renaissance Europe began, a similar translation movement was well in operation in the heart of the Islamic world. Classical Greek works such as Euclid's *Elements* and Ptolemy's *Almagest* were translated into Arabic.²⁸ Al-Farabi (870-950), as a case in point, benefited from the writings of Greek sages. Conferred the title of a "second master" or "second teacher" after Aristotle, he became a source of reference for philosophers and scholars from other religions and civilizations. Al-Farabi believed that human intelligence originated through inspiration from God. Religious scriptures should, to him, be studied by scientists in their bid to offer new theories and discoveries. The work of a Jewish philosopher and theologian, Maimonides (1138-1204), entitled *Guide to the Lost* shows traces of al-Farabi's ideas. Through the works and ideas of al-Farabi, the Europeans recovered ancient Greek philosophy.²⁹ The Chinese also contributed to medical discoveries through the study of Daoist texts. They deliberated on the concept of *Qi* that pays emphasis on longevity. Daoist texts stress on preserving one's self and nature through the philosophy of *Daodejing*. This goal can be achieved through nurturing a life of meditation and proper living (*yangsheng*).³⁰

The sacred origins of knowledge especially in European and non-European societies have been highlighted by Nasr:

In the beginning, Reality was at once being, knowledge, and bliss (the *sat*, *chit*, and, *ananda* of the Hindu tradition or *qudrah*, *hikmah*, and *rahmah* which are

Thought (IIT), 2012).

²⁸ Jim Al-Khalili, *Pathfinders: The Golden Age of Arabic Science* (Penguin UK, 2012).

²⁹ Osman Bakar, *Al-Farabi: Life, Works and Significance* (Islamic Book Trust, 2018).

³⁰ Raphals Lisa, "Daoism and Science," in *Dao Companion to Daoist Philosophy*, ed. Xiaogan Liu (Dordrecht Toronto: Springer, 2015), Vol. 6, 539-550.

among the Names of Allah in Islam) and in that “now” which is the ever-present “in the beginning,” knowledge continues to possess a profound relation with that principal and primordial Reality which is the Sacred and the source of all that is sacred.”³¹

Scientific discoveries during the Golden Age of Islam, in particular, were inspired by Quranic verses about the relationship between nature and man. Muslim scholars studied nature to deepen their faith in God and understand the wisdom of divine creation.³² They were especially motivated by natural phenomena mentioned in the Quran. For example in Surah Al-Mu’minun, verse 12-14, the creation of human beings was unravelled and this spurred Muslim scientists to invent theories and scientific tools to test and confirm the validity of revelation:

We did create man from a quintessence (of clay). Then We placed him as (a drop of) sperm in a place of rest firmly fixed. Then We made the sperm into a clot of congealed blood; then of that clot We made a (foetus) lump; then We made out of that lump bones and clothed the bones with flesh; then We developed out of it another creature: so blessed be Allah the Best to create!³³

It is evident from the above account that knowledge is a product of inter-civilizational exchanges. The so-called “Western knowledge” in our times traces its genealogy to interactions with other bodies of knowledge. By distinguishing Western knowledge and Islamic knowledge, the proponents of Islamization of Knowledge are presumably disowning the contributions of other civilizations. Hence, the claim made by Al-Attas that Western philosophy must be totally rebutted runs contrary to the methodology of Muslim scholars of the past. They did not reject but sought to harmonize any traditions of

³¹ Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred*, 6-7.

³² Yasmeen Mahnaz Faruqi, “Contributions of Islamic scholars to the scientific enterprise.,” *International Education Journal*, vol. 7, no. 4 (September 1, 2006), 391–99, <http://ehlt.flinders.edu.au/education/iej/articles/v7n4/Faruqi/paper.pdf>.

³³ The Qur’an, 23:12-14.

knowledge they considered inconsistent with Islamic values. Such harmonization of knowledge was not without contestations from within the Islamic intellectual circles. Ibn Sina (980-1037) was criticized by Al-Ghazali in *Tahāfut Al-Falāsifah* (The Incoherence of Philosophers) for being overly enamoured by Greek philosophy and contravening Islamic principles. According to Fazlur Rahman: “This was an attempt to sift what al-Ghazali thought to be Islamic from what he thought to be un-Islamic.” Fazlur goes further to make a compelling point about the futility of dewesternizing and Islamizing knowledge. What is most crucial to him is not whether knowledge is Western or non-Western but whether such knowledge is consistent with Islamic values.³⁴

Secularizing Knowledge and Sacralizing Knowledge: Two Sides of the Same Problem

Modern secularists’ claim that secular knowledge can be objective and value-free if methodological agnosticism is adhered to. Extending the views of Robert Proctor,³⁵ we would like to stress the fallacious nature of this claim for the fact that secular knowledge too has metaphysical foundations. Many scientific discoveries were inspired by or grew from religious teachings and convictions. Knowledge of sacred scriptures has given rise to various branches and forms of knowledge about the world and these two bodies of knowledge alternately affected one another. The symbiotic relationship between the sacred and the secular meant that any attempt to secularize or sacralize knowledge is unfeasible or futile. Still, we must trace the origins of the bifurcation between secular and religious knowledge to appreciate why such divisions became mainstream especially during the advent of Western modernity. The term secularism was coined as early as 1871 by George Holyoake in his book *The Principles of Secularism*:

Secularism is the study of promoting human welfare by

³⁴ Fazlur Rahman, “Islamization of knowledge: A response,” *The American Journal of Islamic Social Science*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1988), 3-11.

³⁵ See Robert Proctor, *Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge* (Harvard University Press, 1991).

material means; measuring human welfare by the utilitarian rule, and making the service of others a duty of life. Secularism relates to the present existence of man, and to action, the issues of which can be tested by the experience of this life-having for its objects the development of the physical, moral, and intellectual nature of man to the highest perceivable point, as the immediate duty of society: inculcating the practical sufficiency of natural morality apart from Atheism, Theism, or Christianity.³⁶

Holyoake considers secularism as an alternative to the theological understanding of life. The term “secularization,” in turn, was discussed in the influential work of the Dutch theologian Cornelis Van Peursen. Al-Attas also uses Van Peursen’s definition of secularization as “the deliverance of man first from religious and then from metaphysical control over his reason and his language.”³⁷ Al-Attas however does not make a distinction between the concept of secularization and secularism. Both secularism and secularization, he writes, “are equally opposed to the worldview projected by Islam. As far as their opposition to Islam is concerned we do not find the distinction between them significant enough for us to justify our making a special distinction between them from the point of view of practical judgement.”³⁸

The Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Europe was an era when secularization expanded. More emphasis was given to worldly domains of life and learning and religions were viewed with scepticism and cynicism.³⁹ According to Reader, the Enlightenment was “an emphasis on the primacy of reason as the correct way of organizing knowledge, a concentration on empirical data accessible

³⁶ George Jacob Holyoake, *The Principles of Secularism Illustrated*. Third Edition, Revised, (Austin & Company, 1870).

³⁷ Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism*, 15. See also Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective* (Princeton University Press, 2013), 2.

³⁸ Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism*, 48.

³⁹ Margaret C. Jacob, *The Secular Enlightenment* (Princeton University Press eBooks: 2019), <https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691161327.001.0001>.

to all and a belief that human progress was to be achieved by the application of science and reason.”⁴⁰ Enlightenment thinkers critiqued religious dimensions in knowledge and emphasised the autonomy of reason. Nonetheless, Enlightenment thinkers were not opposed to religion per se. Rather they shunned elements of superstition, extremism and other ‘irrational’ aspects of religion. Even Voltaire, a staunch critic of religion, subjected his criticism towards the oppressive Catholic Church in France but not towards Christianity in general. Charles Taylor maintains that secularism itself had theological origins and eventually influenced the rise of Christian monotheism and the Protestant Reformation. “The interesting story is not simply one of decline but also of a new placement of the sacred or spiritual in relation to individual and social life.”⁴¹ Protestantism underscored individual liberty and raged against the authority of the Church. In effect, Protestantism further strengthened the Enlightenment era in the West. Most Protestant thinkers, however, leaned on the authority of religious scriptures. This was different from the approach used by the atheistic philosophers during the Enlightenment era. To develop natural science, atheistic philosophers believed that the Bible could not be taken as a source of knowledge. Even so, the Enlightenment did not eradicate religious communities’ place had in the development of knowledge. Instead, a recent work by David Sorkin shows that there were different Enlightenments co-existing within the same times and spaces, a strand that emphasised reason over religion and another strain that highlighted the roles of religious beliefs in the enhancement of knowledge. Both Enlightenments were in competition with each other and interactions between both was commonplace.⁴²

Religion and metaphysics, therefore, did not completely lose their importance during the Enlightenment era. It was ‘rationalized’ yet remained ‘unsecularized.’ As a matter of fact, some

⁴⁰ John Reader, *Beyond All Reason: The Limits of Postmodern Theology* (Aureus Publishing, 1997), 4.

⁴¹ Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Harvard University Press, 2018), 437.

⁴² David Sorkin, *The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna* (Princeton University Press, 2018), 3.

Enlightenment philosophers and scientists such as Spinoza and Leibniz wrote their works based on metaphysical and theological grounds.⁴³ One of the renowned rationalist philosophers, René Descartes (1596-1650), developed scientific arguments based on metaphysical foundations. According to Descartes, all human knowledge including the knowledge gained through the senses stems from knowledge of God though he departed from Christian theology. “And thus I see plainly that the certainty and truth of every science depends exclusively upon the knowledge of the true God, to the extent that, prior to becoming aware of him, I was incapable of achieving perfect knowledge about anything else.”⁴⁴

In his book entitled *The Principle of Philosophy*, he wrote:

The philosophy whole is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, emerging from the trunk, are all the other sciences, which maybe reduce to the three principle ones, namely, medicine, mechanics and morality...by morality I understand the highest and most perfect morality, which presupposes a complete knowledge of the other sciences and is the ultimate degree of wisdom.”⁴⁵

The foundation of knowledge, according to Descartes, begins with metaphysics. The so-called Western secular knowledge, therefore, was not totally objective, neutral, and value-free. It had theological and metaphysical origins.

The post-Enlightenment period witnessed the expansion of European colonialism into Muslim lands. Most Muslim empires had succumbed to Western domination by the early twentieth century. The secularization process became more comprehensive than ever, so

⁴³ Pauline Phemister, *The Rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz* (Wiley, 2006).

⁴⁴ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies* (OUP Oxford, 2008), 47. This great philosophical text was originally published in Latin in 1641.

⁴⁵ Roger Ariew, “Descartes and the tree of knowledge,” *Synthese*, vol. 92, no. 1 (July 1, 1992), 101–16, <https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413744>.

much so that some would-be nation-states, such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey adopted secularism as state ideology. In communist-ruled countries, secular institutions dominated religious ones. Be that as it may, colonialism, Western modernity and other secularizing processes did not totally obliterate Islamic piety from the hearts and minds of Muslim scholars and intellectuals. Granted that some Muslim countries such as Turkey and Tunisia took on aggressive secularist stances and marginalized Islam from public space and education, but such secularizing policies had a reverse effect decades later. Many studies have shown that modernity and secularization spurred the coming into of new waves of Islamic revivalism and modernity defined in Islamic terms.⁴⁶

It is, therefore, unsurprising that almost all the founding thinkers of the Islamization of Knowledge movement were trained in secular schools and Western universities. They provide evidence of the continued sway of Islam in the modern age. Colonialism, communism, capitalism and other forces of secularization did not annihilate Islamic piety. It had, in fact, provided the very basis for the Islamization of Knowledge movement. In other words, secularization of Muslim lands in the modern period, as Aljunied has shown, marshalled Islamization by other means. And yet, such Islamization became, at times, defensive as part of the postcolonial responses to Western domination.⁴⁷ Just as secularization had a theological and metaphysical origin, Islamization also had a secular antecedent.

From this, it follows that, in classifying knowledge into Islamicized and secularized types, proponents of Islamization of Knowledge merely mirrored their secular nemeses. Put differently, the problem with the Islamization of Knowledge project lies in its adoption and duplication of the reductionist approach of the ultra-secularists during the Enlightenment era, and thereafter that saw no prospects in fusing different domains of knowledge developed by varying traditions into a universally accepted form of knowledge for

⁴⁶ Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies* (Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁴⁷ The impact of British colonialism on Islamization in Malaysia is thoroughly discussed in Khairudin Aljunied, *Islam in Malaysia: An Entwined History* (Oxford University Press, 2019).

Muslims and non-Muslims. Islamization of Knowledge, we would like to state here boldly, is a secularism-in-reverse. Instead of bringing knowledge back to its pluralistic forms where the secular and the religious were taken as harmonious, Islamization of Knowledge proponents end up marking divisions between the metaphysical, theological and religious knowledge with what they call “secular” or “secularized” sciences. Secular knowledge was barely divorced from its religious past and what is needed instead is for Muslims to use and advance such knowledge to reflect their convictions and value systems.

Furthermore, instead of formulating new theories, building new concepts, founding new fields, ushering new disciplines and introducing new axioms for the study of natural phenomena and human societies for the benefit of humankind, proponents of the Islamization of Knowledge have merely engaged in what we call as adding “Islamic veneers” to the established bodies of knowledge. Hence, sociology becomes “Islamic sociology”, and physics as we know it today is prefixed with the term “Islamicized” without any radical changes to the disciplines. Merely adding Qur’anic verses and hadiths to justify that these disciplines are now Islamic is probably the furthest that proponents of Islamization of knowledge have achieved. It has not brought about any radical changes to the existing knowledge bases, nor has the Islamization of Knowledge project given birth to globally renowned universities with top scientists and scholars offering ground-breaking and field-changing discoveries.

Conclusion

Over the past few decades, Muslim intellectuals have sought to rectify the intellectual crisis that has plagued the Muslim world by embarking on the ‘epistemological revolution.’ Known as Islamization of Knowledge, thinkers within this movement desired a dewesternization of global epistemology and infusion of Islamic values into modern knowledge. They hoped to synthesize the social sciences and humanities with the natural sciences and the incorporation of religious principles into the heart of academic pursuits. Grounded in the *tawhid* paradigm, they affirmed knowledge’s holistic and sacred nature. However, applying the

Islamization principles and strategies has yet to be achieved due to the fallacy of civilizational difference and a mistaken idea of knowledge formations. The unresolved methodological issues in the Islamization project have further reinforced dualism. The fight against secularism, coupled with the politicization of Islam, eventually led to more secularization couched in Islamic terms.⁴⁸

The concept of dewesternization was based on the notion that Western civilization conflicts with the Islamic and Asian civilizations. In reality, knowledge has diverse origins and is, hence, inter-civilizational in nature. The so-called Western knowledge we inherit today resulted from interactions with Muslim, Indian, Chinese and other influences. Furthermore, the claim that the only valid scientific knowledge is secular can be refuted since most scientific discoveries in great civilizations were religiously inspired. Knowledge has been imbued with secular and sacred elements, so decoupling the two would appear to be a utopian venture. We will conclude by restating that attempts to resacralize knowledge are noteworthy yet ill-founded. It is not knowledge or institutions of knowledge that should be resacralized but how Muslims think that should be reformed to manifest the ideals of unity and universality.

⁴⁸ Examples of how the politicization of Islam further reinforces secularization are discussed in Humeira Iqtidar, *Secularizing Islamists?: Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-Ud-Da'wa in Urban Pakistan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). Based on the analysis, the competition among two Islamist parties in Pakistan i.e. *Jama'at-e-Islami* and *Jama'at-ud-Da'wa* had influenced the growth of secularization.

Book Reviews

Rohan Gunaratna, *Sri Lanka's Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for International Community*. Penguin Radom House, Singapore, 2023. pp. 238. ISBN 9789814954631.

Reviewer: Mohamed Fouz Mohamed Zacky, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia. Email: zackyfouz@iiu.edu.my

Rohan Gunaratna's recent publication titled *Sri Lanka's Easter Sunday Massacre: Lessons for International Community* tries to explore the "Easter Attack massacre" and its root causes in Sri Lanka. The work would indeed become one of the main references for those interested in exploring the sources and roots of the Easter Attack. Although the Easter Sunday massacre was a watershed event in Sri Lankan history as well as the 'September 11' of Sri Lankan Muslims, there has been a lack of detailed analysis on the subject thus far. In this sense, Gunaratna's work could be seen as the first detailed study of the tragedy, elaborating on the background of the bombers, their preparations, and the execution. In the aftermath of the attack, there has been a serious public debate on the nature of tragedy and its root causes. Participating in this debate, Imthiyaz Razak argued that the Easter attacks were a by-product of both "violence against Muslims since 2012", unleashed by the Sinhala-Buddhist extremists and cultural exclusivism of Muslims, enabled by the political bargaining between the majoritarian state and minority political elites.¹ For his part, Rajan Hoole argued in his work *Sri Lanka's Easter Tragedy* that the Easter Attack was the result of the entrenched phenomenon of the deep state that tries to manipulate religious extremists for their political ends. For him, the Easter Attack was more political than ideological. However, Gunaratna stressed the point that the Easter Attack directly resulted

¹ Imthiyaz Razak, "The Easter Sunday Bombings and the Crisis Facing Sri Lanka's Muslims," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 55 (1), 2019, 3-16.

from the religious radicalization of a segment of the Muslim community in Sri Lanka, who embraced the Salafi-Wahhabism ideology of political Islam. The book elaborates this argument through a lengthy introduction and subsequent four chapters.

Gunaratna attempted to give a broader global and local context of the Easter Attack in the introduction. After encountering massive defeats in Iraq and Syria, IS (Islamic State) decided to decentralize “its ideological and operational capabilities”, creating provinces, groups, networks, cells, and personalities worldwide (p. lxxv). Gunaratna argues that the Easter Attack on Sri Lankan soil needs to be analyzed in light of this strategic change in IS’ operations. Concerning the local context, he argues that Sri Lankan IS-affiliated operatives’ attacks on high-rise hotels in Colombo and selected churches were “not just driven by domestic compulsions but also and perhaps mainly by international drivers” (p. lxxviii). He mentions two such events: an attack on a mosque by a right-wing terrorist in New Zealand on the 15th of March 2019 and the military campaign of a global coalition of military forces against IS in Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, the book maintains that one of the chief reasons for the attack was negligence by the political leadership, which “was influenced by the ideals of Western liberal democracies,” in acting against the long-term phenomenon of religious radicalization despite multiple warnings from the intelligence community.

The first chapter, ‘The Anatomy of the Easter Attack,’ delves into the attack’s ideological motivations, initial preparations, and executions. Citing the mastermind of the Easter Attack, Zahran Hashim’s recorded speech, Gunaratna argues that a jihadi spirit drove the attackers to blow themselves up, and they “embraced the ISIS politico-religious ideology and believed that they were fighters of God” (p. 39). Then, he analyses the initial planning and execution of the suicide attacks following seven key aspects: operational security, chasing targets, supply chain, manufacturing explosives, rehearsal, and coordination (pp. 19-39). Moreover, many analysts are stunned why suicide bombers attacked the churches and hotels instead of Buddhist temples, given the existence of a few radical Buddhist monks and ultra-nationalist mobs who were behind the riots that targeted Muslim business centres and mosques in the last ten years.

In this chapter, Gunaratna tries to respond to that dilemma, stressing that “operational and ideological considerations would eventually prompt IS to strike Christians including Catholic targets over Buddhist and Hindu targets” (p. 23). On the nature of the attack, it seems that Gunaratna attributes the perpetrators of the Easter Attack to the Islamic State group on various ideological grounds and the recent change within IS in terms of its de-centralization strategy rather than direct order from the top leadership of the IS to its Sri Lankan self-claimed affiliates (pp. 50-51).

Following the general assumption that ideological exclusivism leads to extremism and terrorism, the second and third chapter tries to capture the ideological journey of the essential figures of Jihadism in Sri Lanka while exploring how they helped expand the country's IS network. Two of those foremost leaders are Zahran Hashim and Naufer. Gunaratna says that by embracing Salafi-Wahhabism Zahran was already known as a radical preacher, and he “wanted an immediate revolution, not a gradual evolution. He took radicalization to another level” (p. 79). The chapter highlights Naufer as the mentor of Zahran and the ideological father of the IS network in Sri Lanka. He further says that “the radicalization trajectories of Zahran and his mentor Naufer were almost identical as both were exposed to exclusivist ideology that took them to its logical conclusion, terrorism” (p. 99). Furthermore, the chapter provides a comprehensive picture of how both figures developed their network's capabilities to promote the Islamic State ideology, expand their support base, and conduct military training.

Chapter three introduces another central person, Jameel, who helped to create the terrorist group ‘Millat Ibrahim’ in Sri Lanka, which operated to promote IS ideology in the western part of the Island. Gunaratna highlights that both Zahran's group, which largely hailed from the eastern part of Sri Lanka, and Jameel's group operated independently without contact. However, Zahran and Jameel eventually met and decided to work on a single project for promoting IS ideology in Sri Lanka. The chapter also elucidates how these IS operatives infiltrated Islamic religious schools, Islamic movements, and digital communities to attract students and members to their ideology (pp. 115-130). In addition, Gunaratna did not forget

to shed light on the ultimate fracture that split the IS operatives into two different groups just prior to the Easter Attack, where most radical members of the two opted to follow the leadership of Zahran and Jameel while others stood with Naufer. Zahran's group decided to become suicide bombers for IS ideology. In contrast, the latter group was more strategic in their thinking in terms of establishing the ideology in Sri Lanka (p. 121). In the fourth and final chapter of the book, Gunaratna offers policy recommendations and solutions while keeping all the stakeholders in mind such as the international community, the government, law enforcement agencies, and community leaders, who are responsible for protecting communal harmony and national security.

As an overall note, it is evident that the strength of Gunaratna's work is in its attempt to provide an inside view into the dynamics that led to the Easter Attack. In particular, the book sheds light on all key personalities who propagated, planned, and executed the attack. Nevertheless, the book has a severe limitation regarding its approach to explaining the dynamics of Islamic socio-political groups and movements. The author follows the highly controversial binary framework of *peaceful and traditionalist Sufism vs. radical political Islam and Salafis* as an analytical category to study Islamic socio-political movements and groups in Sri Lanka in tracing the ideological root causes of Easter Attack. As a result, it seems that the author implicitly makes a controversial claim arguing that Islamic social movements and Salafi religious groups except the Sufis are complicit in the Easter Attack.

Furthermore, Gunaratna treats the Salafis, mainstream Islamic social movements like Jamaat-e-Islami and IS terror cells as like-minded groups where members of each can easily cross over to the other. This over-generalized perspective on Islamic religious groups tends to miss the theological and sociological dynamics/nuances that shape their discourses and activism in different contexts. Such binary reading fails to explain why most Salafi and Islamist groups rejected Jihadism as an ideology and strategy in the global and local contexts. Therefore, such a reading of the Islamic religious landscape, which Gunaratna adopted in this

book, has already been problematized in several works in recent scholarship².

It seems that the book's binary treatment of Islamic socio-religious movements mainly resulted from an absence of an in-depth theoretical chapter on the ideology of Jihadism. The book did not present an overview of Jihadism's fundamental assumptions,

² J. Wagemakers, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Ideology, History and Decedents* (Amsterdam University Press, 2022); I. Ahmed, *Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamath E Islami in India* (Princeton University Press, 2009); A. Bayat, ed., *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2013). I. Hamdeh, *Salafism and Traditionalism: Scholarly Authority in Modern Islam* (Cambridge University Press, 2021); J. Wagemakers, *Salafism in Jordan: Political Islam in a Quietist Community*, (Cambridge University Press, 2016); K. P. Ewing & R. R. Corbett, *Modern Sufis and the State: The Politics of Islam in South Asia and Beyond*. (Columbia University Press, 2020); F. Muideini, *Sponsoring Sufism: How Governments Promote 'Mystical Islam' in their Domestic and Foreign Policies*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); N. Islam, & S. Islam, *Islam and Democracy in South Asia: The Case of Bangladesh* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Q. Wiktorowics, "Anatomy of Salafi Movements," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006), 207-239; H. Iqtidar, *Secularizing Islamists?: Jama'at-e-Islami and Jama'at-ud-Da'wa in Urban Pakistan* (University of Chicago Press, 2011).

worldview, strategies, and evolution in modern Islam and how it differs from other schools of Islamic religious thought. Acknowledging this shortcoming as a significant analytical and theoretical weakness of the book is important. The book's generalized claims have the potential to refuel Islamophobia and inter-communal mistrust through its distortion of the internal dynamics and real image of the Islamic religious landscape viewed as a whole. These observations notwithstanding, Gunaratna's *Sri Lanka's Easter Sunday Massacre* is a welcome reference source for those interested in exploring the details about the extremist figures who engineered the Easter Attack in Sri Lanka and their plans and execution.

TRANSLITERATION TABLE

CONSONANTS

Ar=Arabic, Pr=Persian, OT=Ottoman Turkish, Ur=Urdu

Ar	Pr	OT	UR	Ar	Pr	OT	UR	Ar	Pr	OT	UR	
ء	ب	پ	پ	ز	ز	ز	ز	گ	—	g	g	g
ب	ب	ب	ب	ژ	—	—	ř	ل	l	l	l	l
پ	پ	پ	پ	ژ	—	zh	j	م	m	m	m	m
ت	ت	ت	ت	س	s	s	s	ن	n	n	n	n
ث	—	—	ṭ	ش	sh	sh	ş	ه	h	h	h ¹	h ¹
ث	th	th	th	ص	ş	ş	ş	و	w	v/u	v	v/u
ج	j	j	c	ض	ḏ	ḏ	ž	ی	y	y	y	y
چ	—	ch	çh	ط	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	ة	-ah	—	—	-a ²
ح	ḥ	ḥ	ḥ	ظ	ẓ	ẓ	ẓ	ال	al ³	—	—	—
خ	kh	kh	kh	ع	‘	‘	‘	—	—	—	—	—
د	d	d	d	غ	gh	gh	ğh	—	—	—	—	—
ڈ	—	—	d	ف	f	f	f	—	—	—	—	—
ذ	dh	dh	dh	ق	q	q	q	—	—	—	—	—
ر	r	r	r	ك	k	k/g	k/ñ	—	—	—	—	—

¹ – when not final

² – at in construct state

³ – (article) al - or l-

VOWELS

	Arabic and Persian	Urdu	Ottoman Turkish
Long	ا	ā	ā
	آ	Ā	—
	و	ū	ū
	ي	ī	ī
Doubled	ي	iy (final form i)	iy (final form i)
	و	uww (final form ū) uvv (for Persian)	uvv
Diphthongs	و	au or aw	ev
	ی	ai or ay	ey
Short	ا	a	a or e
	ا	u	u or ū
	ا	i	o or ö
	ا	i	i

URDU ASPIRATED SOUNDS

For aspirated sounds not used in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish add h after the letter and underline both the letters e.g. جھ jh گھ gh

For Ottoman Turkish, modern Turkish orthography may be used.

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