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חינוך, CHINUCH:  
ISRAEL'S EDUCATION SYSTEM  
AND QUESTIONS OF IDENTITY

Arief S. Arman<sup>1</sup>

*"I pray to the God within me that He will give me  
the strength to ask Him the right questions."*<sup>2</sup>

(Elie Wiesel)

Albeit in a different context, Wiesel's soliloquy resonates with the pressing questions on the formation of identity, and contingent quest for meaning for many Jews. Indeed, what are the right questions to ask the divine, in as much as the divine seems to be indifferent to the indignation suffered by Jews, especially when it comes to the memory of *the Shoah* (?) The space to ask such questions sets itself in the rigmarole of the everyday, and ties in with notions of belonging and memory. These concepts are thus linked to the theme of religion in global politics, exemplified in the curious case of Israel. Prior to its establishment in 1948, the founders of Israel often applied religious justifications for its creation and subsequent existence, with a 'return to homeland' among the oft-heard sentiments. The purposes of this paper are varied. The first is to understand the character of Israel through the theoretical framework provided by Rogers Brubaker in his 'Four Approaches to Nationalism', with a focus on how *nationalism itself can be argued as a form of religion*. Secondly, we will look at the justifications to why secular education – as an extension on nationalism as religion – has taken root in Israel. We proceed with an argument that the removal of religious knowledge

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<sup>2</sup> Elie Wiesel, *Night*, trans., Marion Wiesel, 2006. (Hill & Wang).

(primarily ethics) from the Israeli education system will prove to be detrimental in the long run, as the relationship between individuals will thus be determined purely in the language of capital, and ‘success’ as defined by market forces, which runs counter to genuine solidarity.

First and foremost, we need to come to terms with the arguments brought forward by Brubaker. He breaks down four different approaches to nationalism, with the first (1) being an assertion that “religion and nationalism, along with ethnicity and race, as analogous phenomena.”<sup>3</sup> Next, he (2) contends the ways in which religion helps explain things about nationalism, before moving on to (3) treating religion as part of nationalism, and to the (4) positing of a distinctly religious form of nationalism.<sup>4</sup> Brubaker also argues that nationalism is not entirely secular<sup>5</sup>, in that it is still intertwined within discourses on religion.<sup>6</sup> These approaches indicate a moving away from the secularisation thesis, whereby the modernisation of society is equated to a decline in religion, both in the minds of the individuals, and the collective that make up the polity. There are basic analytical distinctions to be ascertained here, with ‘the secular’ being a central modern epistemic category, while ‘secularisation’ an analytical conceptualisation of modern-historical processes, and ‘secularism’ as a worldview and ideology<sup>7</sup>. In contemporary Israel,

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<sup>3</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and nationalism: four approaches,” *Nations and Nationalism*, 2012, 18(1), 3.

<sup>4</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and nationalism: four approaches,” *Nations and Nationalism*, 2012, 18(1), 3.

<sup>5</sup> In the context of Israel, the term ‘secular’ does not correspond entirely to ‘*hiloni*’ which has been used to designate Jews who have completely abandoned the practice of Judaism. In the Israeli framework, the term has acquired a more militant connotation, and now tends to imply ‘anti-Judaic’, or occasionally, ‘anti-Semitic’. See Yakov M. Rabkin, *A Threat from Within: A Century of Jewish Opposition to Zionism*, (Zed Books, 2006).

<sup>6</sup> It seems to be the case that any discussion on secularism will always be made in contradistinction with religion, in its myriad forms. There is a “dialogic and entwined nature of the interaction between ‘the secular’ and ‘the religious’”. See Mohita Bhatia, “Secularism and secularisation: a bibliographical essay,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 48, No. 50, (2013).

<sup>7</sup> José Casanova, “The secular, secularizations, secularisms,” *Rethinking Secularism*, eds., Craig Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer, and J. VanAntwerpen (Oxford and New

these distinctions are blurred and constantly re-assessed, since there is still the inherent struggle of moving away from "... the Jewish tradition which never accepted the Augustinian division between the two cities of God."<sup>8</sup> For current Premier, Benjamin Netanyahu (as well as his predecessors), Casanova's analytical distinctions facilitate a hybrid construction of governance; neither entirely secular nor fully Judaic.

### Early Days

Did nationalism emerge from the decline of religion, or did it rise from a period of intensified religious sentiment? In the context of Israel, Jewish political theorising is *sui generis*, since much of its discourse pertains to an ancient longing of return, and a form of sovereignty that is as much political as it is spiritual.<sup>9</sup> Historically, the Jewish community in Europe lived in the peripheries of society, often enclosed within the space known as *Judengasse* or ghettos<sup>10</sup>. This isolation from other Europeans *made self-governance necessary*, with reliance on non-Jews kept at a minimum. Such non-reliance galvanised the spirit of European Jews (*Ashkenazim*) to slowly establish their own state. Through the ideals of Zionism<sup>11</sup> pioneered by Theodor Hertzl, what was once a faraway dream is now a lived reality. In 'The Zionist Idea', Joseph Heller opines that "the particular character of a national culture is determined by a common psychological, economic, and historical condition, which subconsciously shapes a common way of life: out of which arise...

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York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 54-74.

<sup>8</sup> Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig & Bernard Susser, *Comparative Jewish Politics: Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora* (Bar-Ilan University Press, 1981), 11.

<sup>9</sup> There are, however, arguments made that 'Israel' is a spiritual community without arbitrary borders, rather than a fixed nation-state. See also Rabin (2006) in footnote 1.

<sup>10</sup> Howard Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History* (Dell Publishing, 1977), 25.

<sup>11</sup> Zionism is defined as "the name given to a particular form or manifestation of Jewish nationalism, and its object is defined as the realisation of the Jewish national idea." See Joseph Heller, *The Zionist Idea* (London: The Joint Zionist Publications Committee, 1947), 6.

(an) individually differentiated creative energy.”<sup>12</sup> These common conditions can also be manufactured in that the narratives of *aliya* (waves of Jewish immigration into then British Palestine) were at odds with the *Yishuv*<sup>13</sup> (Jewish community who were already living in the contested area, and without any central governance). However, reconciliation between the two is assumed to have taken place as time progressed. Heller also argues that the ethos of a specific nation is not a combination of several specific features, but rather a general predisposition to specific mental and spiritual functions.<sup>14</sup> After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, a transformation of culture took root, with the obvious transition being a move away from feudalism to a central form of governance, identified as commensurate to those ‘specific mental and spiritual functions.’

The concept of transition is not novel here, in that “after a millennia of reacting to ever-shifting circumstances, Israeli Jews have now institutionalised, in their political culture, the idea of change, but in such a way as to preserve those institutions and ideals which they had struggled to develop.”<sup>15</sup> The potential for Israel’s social, economic, and political growth stems from the notion of the *Yishuv* as an autonomous political system in embryo, defined as ‘a state in the making’, or ‘a state within a state’<sup>16</sup> From here, Susser points out that *Halachic*<sup>17</sup> authority does not imply that Jewish political tradition is either autocratic or uncritical or unchanging<sup>18</sup>. As

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<sup>12</sup> Joseph Heller, *The Zionist Idea*, 6.

<sup>13</sup> The term came into use in the 1880s, when there were about 25,000 Jews living across the land of current-day Israel. See Alan Dowty, *Arabs and Jews in Ottoman Palestine* (Indiana University Press, 2021).

<sup>14</sup> Joseph Heller, *The Zionist Idea*, 4.

<sup>15</sup> Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig & Bernard Susser, *Comparative Jewish Politics: Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora*, 12.

<sup>16</sup> Dan Horowitz & Moshe Lissak, *Origins of the Israeli Polity: Palestine under the Mandate* (University of Chicago Press, 1979), 2.

<sup>17</sup> Jewish law (or code of conduct) known as the *Halakha* or *Halachah*. For a brief introduction, see, [https://www.chabad.org/library/article\\_cdo/aid/4165687/jewish/What-Is-Halakhah-Halachah-Jewish-Law.htm](https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/4165687/jewish/What-Is-Halakhah-Halachah-Jewish-Law.htm).

<sup>18</sup> Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig & Bernard Susser, *Comparative Jewish Politics: Public Life in Israel and the Diaspora*, 9.



such, the living of a Jewish life is dependent on the circumstances that one finds him/herself in.

### **Ambiguity of Identity and Politics of Education**

The initial consensus (known as the ‘status quo’ in Israeli history) between statist and their religious counterparts (the rabbinical class) began to wane in the 1980s, as secular resentment towards religious orthodoxy became more pronounced.<sup>19</sup> There are three crucial changes that provided fertile ground for the seeds of secularisation to germinate. These include the (1) ascent of a neoliberal economy, (2) mass immigration of a million Jews from the former Soviet Union, and (3) emergence of religious and spiritual alternatives to Judaism.<sup>20</sup> Since “ethnicity and nationalism have been characterised as basic sources and forms of social and cultural identification,”<sup>21</sup> there was a need for the reconciliation of different modes of ‘Jewishness’ in Israel. Similar to the *Ashkenazis* who had to ‘educate’ *Mizrachi* Jews (of Arab or North African descent), or as ‘assimilating Israelis’ and ‘identity-preserving Jews’<sup>22</sup> we observe that there is no one way of expressing Jewish identity.<sup>23</sup> In contemporary settings, the contestation of space and influence between Orthodox Jews and their secular counterparts (often from the *Ashkenazi* polity) proves to be a tremendous challenge for the Israeli authorities.<sup>24</sup> This clash is

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<sup>19</sup> Guy Ben-Porat, *Between State and Synagogue: The Secularization of Contemporary Israel* (University of Cambridge Press, 2013), 37.

<sup>20</sup> Guy Ben-Porat, *Between State and Synagogue: The Secularization of Contemporary Israel* (University of Cambridge Press, 2013), 37.

<sup>21</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Religion and nationalism: four approaches,” in *Nations and Nationalism*, 18(1), 2012:4

<sup>22</sup> Eliezer Schweid, “Judaism in Israeli culture,” *In Search of Identity: Jewish Aspects in Israeli Culture* (London: Routledge, 1999), 26.

<sup>23</sup> We see similar patterns of trying to define the self based on the other. Although the context is dissimilar, the idea of a ‘narrative trap’ is espoused further in Rosemary Hollis’ *Surviving the Story: The Narrative Trap in Israel and Palestine* (Red Hawk Books, 2019).

<sup>24</sup> If we are to consider ‘secular Jews’ as a sort of sect different to Orthodox (Hasedi) Jews, then parallels can be drawn to the divide between Sunnis and Shi’is in the Muslim world. In understanding this split as further fuelled by Western influence, see Reidar Visser’s ‘The Western Imposition of Sectarianism on Iraqi Politics’ in *The Arab Studies Journal* (Vol. 15/16, No. 2/1 pp. 83-99);

brought about by varying iterations of what it means ‘to be a Jew’, and is very much related to the ambiguity of identity inherent in its own history and trajectory. Yet, ‘Israeliness’ is understood by the majority as a civil political-linguistic-territorial belonging.<sup>25</sup> This usually incorporates a certain measure of ‘Judaism’ in the religious, traditional, or national sense, but these notions are often fragmented.<sup>26</sup> The urgent call for unity in the state focused on the immediate work at hand, which is:

“the establishment of state institutions and their economic, technological, administrative, socio-professional, legal-professional and political functioning – areas whose development and perfection predominantly required the internalisation of knowledge and expertise drawn from external, Western sources, and not specifically from the values of the tradition.”<sup>27</sup>

The above is essential, since “economic growth was accompanied by cultural changes, often described as ‘Americanisation’. This transition gained momentum in the 1990s, owing to globalisation and the initiation of the peace process that added to the economic growth and opened up new parts of the world to Israel and to Israeli consumers.”<sup>28</sup>

The central form of governance mentioned earlier is pivotal, in that education in Israel is influenced by who is at the helm. Again, the influence of the post-modern condition adversely impacts Israel, and is observed in the aspect of public policy-making through education.<sup>29</sup> Nationalism in this regard takes the form of a merging

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<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27934026>

<sup>25</sup> Discussions on the essence of Judaism – if it is a religion, a people, a nation, an ethnic group, a race, and/or a civilisation –remains unsettled. “Either we serve God and suffer the fate that comes our way by virtue of linking our fate to God’s fate, or we sever the connection to God and become a nation like any other, an ethnic diaspora like any other.” See (Eisen, 2020) <https://www.jtsa.edu/torah/our-covenant-with-god/>.

<sup>26</sup> Eliezer Schweid, “Judaism in Israeli culture,” 10.

<sup>27</sup> Eliezer Schweid, “Judaism in Israeli culture,” 10.

<sup>28</sup> Guy Ben-Porat, *Between State and Synagogue*, 39.

<sup>29</sup> Abraham Yogev, “Bringing order to chaos? Educational policy in Israel in the

with capitalism, and an extension of a neoliberal *zeitgeist*. It is thus required that the education system prepares its students for economic uncertainty, and the planning of an assumed (impending) financial collapse.<sup>30</sup> Why then, did secular education take root in Israel? The first argument to be made here is that Israel's education system has reduced religious studies *as a mere afterthought*. Instead, significance has been placed on subjects that can facilitate the securing of a 'good job' in the future, whereby "the educational philosophy of high school and university is thus primarily directed to 'preparation of life' in the narrow sense of professional socialization: individualistic, contemporary minded and pragmatic-functional."<sup>31</sup> Claims of institutional autonomy (involving the control over school systems and media), are part of the phenomenon of politicised ethnicity, "broadly understood as encompassing claims made on the basis of ethno-religious, ethno-national, ethno-racial, ethno-regional, or otherwise ethno-cultural identifications, which have proliferated in both the developed and developing world in the last half century."<sup>32</sup> As such, Israel is the perfect example of the aforesaid phenomenon as authorities ground themselves in an identification and meaning attached to varied iterations of Judaism, which includes a modern (re)interpretation. Thus, institutional autonomy plays a key role in maintaining an assumed balance in a secular nation-state. Such an outlook is reminiscent of Jewish history, specifically from the eighteenth century onwards. This timeframe was replete with instances of a need to counter the demands of life related to the merchant class, in which "this middle-class orientation explained, too, the social philosophy of the *maskilim*. They urged that the Jews 'productivise' themselves, move into useful, dignified livelihoods so as to be an engaged polity, and not merely idle bystanders in the sweeping tides of modernity."<sup>33</sup> The American historian, Howard

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postmodern era," in *Public Policy in Israel*, eds., David Nachmias & Itai Sened (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 209.

<sup>30</sup> Abraham Yogev, "Bringing order to chaos? Educational policy in Israel in the postmodern era," in *Public Policy in Israel*, eds., David Nachmias & Itai Sened (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 209.

<sup>31</sup> Eliezer Schweid, "Judaism in Israeli culture," 10.

<sup>32</sup> Rogers Brubaker, "Religion and nationalism," 18(1), 2012, 5.

<sup>33</sup> Howard Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History* (Dell Publishing, 1977).

Sachar (d. 2018) puts it rather bluntly that “Jews helped to shape the destiny of capitalism, but capitalism also shaped the destiny of the Jews.”<sup>34</sup>

Going by the earlier claim that *nationalism itself can be understood as religion*, does a removal of religion from the education system entail a removal of an aspect of nationalism (vice versa)? We contend that if there is a removal of religious education, the younger generation of Israelis will not fully understand its diverse history, which runs on varying levels of abstraction and theory.<sup>35</sup> Instead, this void is supplanted by a contemporary notion of what it means to be both ‘Israeli’ and ‘Jewish’, highlighting notions of valiant patriotism (which one can argue as borderline xenophobia) and reconfiguration of memory at the behest of the authorities. This is the shift from to the ‘corporatism’<sup>36</sup> found in ghettos of days past to central government, highlighting an extraordinary need to exert influence on its impressionable population. There is an added element of the fear of *yerida* (emigration), whereby Israelis who are dissatisfied with the government might opt to leave the country, potentially causing demographic imbalance. Against the backdrop of a strong religious orthodoxy, it is a mistake to assume that secular education will quell any concerns of *yerida*. This situation is again, indicative of a cognitive dissonance prevalent in Israel; that is of wanting to be rooted, but also desiring to move away, due to disagreements based on a lack of political clarity and definition.

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<sup>34</sup> Howard Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History* (Dell Publishing, 1977), 39.

<sup>35</sup> Susser however argues, the departure from traditional modes of Jewish discourse is exemplified by the Jewish philosopher Maimonides, who had valiantly attempted to synthesize Aristotle with Jewish ideas. However, its status remains indeterminate in contemporary Jewish life. “It stands as a prodigious intellectual monument that one is duty-bound to visit but unwilling to adopt at home.” See Bernard Susser, “Jewish political theory,” in Lehman-Wilzig & Susser, eds., *Comparative Jewish Politics* (1981).

<sup>36</sup> A technique by which the ruler decentralised responsibilities and rights, in the hopes that barons and townships would perform functions for him, that he, the king, could not afford, or did not have the strength to perform himself. In a decentralised society, Christian rulers permitted Jews to control their own autonomous corporations, for as long as they paid a collective tax or assizes (which were hefty in nature). See Howard M. Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History* (1977).

Nevertheless, despite its secular-religious ambiguities, Israel is often taken to be the only truly modern state in the Middle East, which indicates a vagueness and the shifting of standards for assessing a state's modernity.<sup>37</sup>

### **Problems Now, Problems After**

What are the consequences of widespread secular education? There are numerous impacts, but we shall only highlight two. The first is an abdication of cultural-value-socialisation transmission to students, or a passing down of heritage and hope. If this transmission of knowledge does not take place, a genuine sense of belonging and of community will not be felt by the younger generation.<sup>38</sup> Such a situation would open up a vacuum of meaning and identity in the lives of students across Israel, which could easily be supplanted by extremist opinions of a violent nature. There is the added issue that even if 'Judaic' subjects are taught, it will take the form of a collection of information, and not so much a specific formation of a worldview (or ethical framework). Such education is still stuck within the rubric of exams and marks, "like those other kinds of instructional matter that are taken 'seriously'".<sup>39</sup>

As it were, the telling of stories of hope is not a transmission of knowledge applicable to the capitalist market. It is not mistaken to say that a heightened sense of competition with others will inevitably create a citizenry that will always look outward to come to terms with what is inward. This dual aspect, that of the physical/corporeal and the spiritual/metaphysical were not entirely removed from the lives of Jews prior to the establishment of the state of Israel. What we observe in the current milieu is a separation between the two, which is of course understood through the lens of secularism, and the desire to be on par with (if not better than) other democratic, liberal, and secular states. We would do well to remember that the process of neo-liberalisation has entailed a 'creative destruction' of sorts, impacting divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions,

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<sup>37</sup> Hussein Ali Agrama, *Questioning Secularism: Islam, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law in Modern Egypt* (The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 6-7.

<sup>38</sup> Eliezer Schweid, "Judaism in Israeli culture," 15.

<sup>39</sup> Eliezer Schweid, "Judaism in Israeli culture," 16.

attachments to land, and perhaps most crucially habits of the heart. If market exchange within neoliberalism is upheld as an ethic in itself there is a real danger of it acting as a guide to all human action, which substitutes for all previously held ethical beliefs. It seeks to bring all human action to the domain of the market<sup>40</sup>, entailing a worldview that looks at others as means to an end, and not an end in themselves. Genuine solidarity cannot be attained if almost everyone is seen as an economic rival.

Secondly, any identification of the students with the Jewish cause and of Judaism, as well as Zionism as a national ethos, is superficial, which could lead to the temptation of *yerida*<sup>41</sup> as mentioned prior. To express simply the problem at hand the Israeli education system depends too much on external models and is too reactionary towards changes from outside its borders. By applying the logic of emigration, what is stopping parents from sending their children overseas, where better economic opportunities (and lower cost of living) are available? We argue that the content and quality of education should *not be fully compromised* in succumbing to modernity. It is suggested that Israeli education policy should be established by schools themselves (as well as the local authorities) rather than by a central regulator.

Recent developments in Israel highlight a nascent antagonism towards authority, which can be inferred as a direct result of the education policies in the nation-state. The intelligent young adults begin to question the vestiges of power which rests in the Knesset. Benjamin Netanyahu's sacking of Defence Minister Yoav Gallant seems to indicate his desire to hold on to power at all costs, even with the risk of increasing collateral in his never-ending war against Hamas. The sacking comes after Gallant called for a stop to the judicial overhaul that was made by Netanyahu and his cabinet.<sup>42</sup> It is indeed a trend in modern nation-states that all domains of power are

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<sup>40</sup> David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 3.

<sup>41</sup> Eliezer Schweid, "Judaism in Israeli culture," 17.

<sup>42</sup> For a better understanding of the issue at hand, see: <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-03-26/ty-article/netanyahu-fires-defense-minister-gallant-for-calling-to-stop-judicial-overhaul/00000187-1f31-d4ca-afff-1f39e2be0000>

questioned and are subsequently removed. Therefore, it should not be entirely surprising that secular education in Israel has paved the way to a post-Zionist (which is rather ironic) and post-Jewish (if one can ever mention as such) praxis, which does not bode well for both Orthodox Jews and their secular counterparts. Could there possibly be an internal implosion in the near future?

### **Moving Forward**

Since there is no written constitution in Israel, competing claims to legitimacy must be addressed accordingly. The imperative for change is mentioned by Susser, as he quotes the Anglo-Irish political theorist Edmund Burke; “a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation.”<sup>43</sup> However, the change suggested here is one that is based on Jewish tradition and are on Judaic terms, in which we borrow Susser’s truth-claim that the “*Halacha* is a total way of living, a religio-legal constitution of existence that legislates with such... thoroughness that it constitutes a non-philosophical but densely real portrait of the good life. As with political discourse, it is an embedded theory that incarnates itself in institutions and practice.”<sup>44</sup> Such is the significance of the transmission of knowledge (of heritage and hope) onto future generations. Furthermore, and on the point of *Halacha*<sup>45</sup>, we ought to appreciate the words of the Lithuanian-born Jewish philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas, that “For Judaism, the goal of education consists in instituting a link between man and the saintliness of God and in maintaining man in this relationship.”<sup>46</sup>

For the sake of brevity, we did not delve into ‘the how’ education in Israel is secular. It is hoped that the ‘why’ is sufficient for our current discussion. To reiterate, Brubaker’s framework of nationalism as a form of religion can definitely be applied in the contemporary example of Israel. If religious knowledge is entirely

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<sup>43</sup> Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig & Bernard Susser, *Comparative Jewish Politics*, 9.

<sup>44</sup> Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig & Bernard Susser, *Comparative Jewish Politics*, 20.

<sup>45</sup> Similarities can be drawn to the Islamic conception of sacred law; the *Sharī'ah* (roughly translated as ‘the way to the watering hole’).

<sup>46</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, trans. Seán Hand (The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1990), 4.

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removed from the Israeli education system, Wiesel's lamentations will not be of asking the right questions to God, but of questioning His existence altogether.



## TRANSLITERATION TABLE

### CONSONANTS

Ar=Arabic, Pr=Persian, OT=Ottoman Turkish, Ur=Urdu

Ar	Pr	OT	UR	Ar	Pr	OT	UR	Ar	Pr	OT	UR	
ء	ب	پ	پ	ز	ز	ز	ز	گ	—	g	g	g
ب	ب	ب	ب	ژ	—	—	ř	ل	l	l	l	l
پ	پ	پ	پ	ژ	—	zh	j	م	m	m	m	m
ت	ت	ت	ت	س	s	s	s	ن	n	n	n	n
ث	—	—	ﺖ	ش	sh	sh	ş	ه	h	h	h <sup>1</sup>	h <sup>1</sup>
ث	th	th	th	ص	ş	ş	ş	و	w	v/u	v	v/u
ج	j	j	c	ض	đ	ž	ž	ی	y	y	y	y
چ	—	ch	çh	ط	ﺖ	ﺖ	ﺖ	ة	-ah	—	—	-a <sup>2</sup>
ح	h	h	h	ظ	ž	ž	ž	ال	al <sup>3</sup>	—	—	—
خ	kh	kh	kh	ع	‘	‘	‘	—	—	—	—	—
د	d	d	d	غ	gh	ğh	ğh	—	—	—	—	—
ڈ	—	—	d	ف	f	f	f	—	—	—	—	—
ذ	dh	dh	dh	ق	q	q	q	—	—	—	—	—
ر	r	r	r	ك	k	k/g	k/ñ	—	—	—	—	—

<sup>1</sup> – when not final

<sup>2</sup> – at in construct state

<sup>3</sup> – (article) al - or l-

### VOWELS

	Arabic and Persian	Urdu	Ottoman Turkish
Long	ا	ā	ā
	آ	Ā	—
	و	ū	ū
	ي	ī	ī
Doubled	ي	iy (final form i)	iy (final form i)
	و	uww (final form ū) uvv (for Persian)	uvv
Diphthongs	و	au or aw	ev
	ی	ai or ay	ey
Short	ا	a	a or e
	ا	u	u or ū
	ا	i	o or ö
	ا	i	i

### URDU ASPIRATED SOUNDS

For aspirated sounds not used in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish add h after the letter and underline both the letters e.g. جھ jh گھ gh

For Ottoman Turkish, modern Turkish orthography may be used.

# AL-SHAJARAH

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