



“Relevantization” of *ŤUĤĤm al-Millah* and Its Contribution to Islamization of Human Knowledge*

Ibrahim Mohamed Zein
Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Science
International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM)

Abstract

This paper discusses the theoretical and practical aspects of the “relevantization” of *UĤm al-Millah* (Islamic Sciences) in the context of the reformation of education in the Muslim world, and in relation to the discourse on methods and approaches to *UĤm al-Millah* in the Islamisation of Human Knowledge (IOHK) project. The paper identifies three problematic issues on the current discourse on relevantisation: the meaning of “relevantisation”; the essence of the desired renewal; and its implications for the method of understanding *UĤm al-Millah*. It argues that the process of relevantisation should begin with the reconstruction of a meaningful history of *UĤm al-Millah* whereby classification of knowledge is used as a tool to bring the diverse sciences into a unified cultural framework based on Qur’anic ideals and values. In support of this argument, the paper examines and discusses comparable efforts by Muslim scholars in the past, with emphasis on Ibn Khaldun, whose theory regarding the correlation between stages of civilisational and scientific developments may be a useful tool for strategising the relevantisation of *UĤm al-Millah* in the contemporary world, where the dominance of modernistic and secular humanistic ideas poses a special challenge to Muslims. The paper then discusses the influence of these past scholars on the deliberations and development of the IOHK project, and the role of IOHK in the relevantisation of *UĤm al-Millah*. It concludes with the reminder that the process of relevantisation, which involves the continual exegetical interpretation of the sources of Islamic knowledge, would be meaningful only if it focused on the systematization of values.

Keywords: Relevantization, Islamic Sciences, Systematization of values.

Abstrak

Artikel ini memberi fokus kepada proses “relevantisasi” *ŤUĤĤm al-Millah* (Sains Islam). Apa yang menjadi tumpuan utama proses ini ialah bagaimana mengenal pasti aspek tetap dan kekal dalam ilmu sains Islam yang berkaitan dengan nilai-nilai ideal Islam. Usaha ini memerlukan pengetahuan yang mendalam dalam bentuk sejarah ilmu sains Islam dan prinsip-prinsip yang digunakan untuk mengasaskannya. Walaupun cara pengklasifikasian ilmu dan pengisahan sejarah Ibn Khaldun diberi tempat yang sewajarnya tetapi sumbangan Islamisasi dalam aliran pemikiran ilmu keduniaan diutamakan dalam proses “relevantisasi”. Justeru, kami tertarik tentang kepentingan melakukan sistemisasi nilai sebagai tugas utama di sebalik proses relevantisasi.

Katakunci: Relevantisasi, Sains Islam, Sistemisasi nilai

Introduction

It has been suggested that Islamization of human knowledge should be the main task of any genuine reform of education in the Muslim world. This was because it represented, by and large, the intellectual content of that reform. Though the essence of this task was to obtain a creative synthesis between contemporary human knowledge and the Islamic tradition, yet Islamic traditional knowledge needed to

be reviewed as well. This made the process of Islamization a rather complex endeavor. One might argue that *ŤUĤĤm al-Millah*ⁱ (Islamic sciences) required more attention in this process. More importantly, however, these sciences and the type of “*relevantization*”ⁱⁱ they should achieve would determine the quality of Islamization of human knowledge. Because of this awareness of the position of these sciences in the process, the intellectual leaders of Islamization of human knowledge revised the steps which were suggested by al-Faruqi after the Islamabad conference, 1982ⁱⁱⁱ. In 1995, al-ŤAlwĤnĤ made the ultimate goal of Islamization of human knowledge to be the development of the details of the Qur’Ĥnic paradigm of knowledge^{iv}. He pointed out the necessary steps to be taken for the realization of that goal.

*Corresponding author: Ibrahim Mohamed Zein
Department of Usul al-Din and Comparative Religion
Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Science,
International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM)
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
E-mail: dribrahimz@iium.edu.my

Moreover, he outlined the framework within which that paradigm could be developed. It should be remembered that out of the six discourses which he suggested for the development of the Qur'Ēnic paradigm of knowledge, three were closely connected with *ŒUIËm al-Millah*^v. The rest of them involved the sources of these sciences in the process of achieving the creative synthesis.

With this new orientation in Islamization of human knowledge there would be a specific need for a serious process of "relevantization" of *ŒUIËm al-Millah* instead of a mere act that was supposed to establish a relevancy of these sciences to contemporary human knowledge and realities. In this regard, a deep look into *UËËl al-DĒn* which was considered by al-GhazĒË as the most universal and foundational science of *ŒUIËm al-Millah* was required for a meaningful process of "relevantization"^{vi}.

This paper focused on "relevantization" on both levels the theoretical and the practical model of the Department of *Usul al-Din* and Comparative Religion, International Islamic University Malaysia^{vii}. Obviously, the main line of argument was largely devoted to the process of "relevantization". However, a considerable space was given to the contribution of "relevantization" to the process of Islamization of human knowledge in general.

It had been recommended that in such a heavily loaded title "Relevantization" of *ŒUIËm al-Millah* and its contribution to Islamization of Human knowledge, to begin with, one should define the key terms that appeared in it. But then again it could be the case that the inherent ambiguity was an unavoidable one. Thus, the element of clarity could be achieved through the development of considerable amount of literature on the subject-matter rather than a set of essential definitions of these terms. Still, one would like to ask a number of questions regarding both relevantization and *ŒUIËm al-Millah*. First, what was meant by relevantization in the discourse of Islamic sciences? What could be the essence of *tajdĒd* of *ŒUIËm al-Millah*? Finally, would the act or the process of *tajdĒd* require a new method of understanding these sciences?

In answering these questions, one should pay special attention to the classification of knowledge as a tool for making sense of the diverse types of sciences. In addition to that there should be a consistent historical narrative that combined all these sciences in one whole cultural framework. Obviously, in the historical Islamic civilization there were a number of doctrines on the classification of knowledge^{viii}. But when it came to the historical narrative concerning these sciences, one would only identify a few of them as consistent and meaningful. Investigation into some of these historical narratives would reveal the strategies which were taken by these scholars to make these sciences relevant to their social realities. It would

equally inform us about the type of consensus among the scholars about issues concerning methods of investigation and most important of all these historical narratives had already identified the permanent aspects of these sciences which were recognized as the core of these sciences; whereas the changeable aspects were considered as closely connected with the Muslim responses to their social and intellectual realities. This identification of the changeable aspects would reveal to us how Muslim scholars in adapting to their historical situations made the permanent aspects of these sciences to respond to historical requirements. This urgent need for a scholarly response would be translated into a set of sciences or modes of explanations in these sciences.

In these changeable aspects of the sciences one could see clearly how these scholars finished the task of relevantization and obviously made these sciences both meaningful and acquired as well a sensible continuation of the legacy. Therefore, the *tajdĒd* of *ŒUIËm al-Millah* would certainly investigate the way the changeable aspects of these sciences were adapted within a framework of the permanent elements of the sciences as a whole. In this regard, one might in some instances, come to the conclusion that the act of *tajdĒd* required both a fresh look into the main issues and a new method. Clearly, it could equally be suggested that one might think along the lines of how to conduct an inquiry to determine the relationship between relevantization and the reformulation of the changeable aspects of these sciences.

It should be noted that the classification of knowledge would show us what system of arrangement was followed to make a distinction between *ŒUIËm al-Millah* and philosophical sciences; more to the point how these philosophical sciences were adapted within the general framework of sciences and how some of their methods were adopted in *ŒUIËm al-Millah*. It could be argued that there would be interesting parallels between the strategies which were followed in the historical Islamic civilization regarding philosophical sciences and the current process of Islamization of human knowledge. From that parallelism one could devise strategies for both relevantization of *ŒUIËm al-Millah* and Islamization of human knowledge. Evidently, this could not be achieved at a single stroke; but rather it had to take a long process to reach a desirable state of maturation. Therefore, both the classification of knowledge and the historical narrative would be regarded as important determinants of the quality of both relevantization of *ŒUIËm al-Millah* and Islamization of human knowledge.

The starting point for "relevantization" of Islamic sciences would be to reconstruct a meaningful history of these sciences. This would require a careful examination of both the different proposals of

classification of knowledge which were given by Muslim scholars and specific historical narratives which were reconstructed by these scholars regarding the historical development of these sciences. In some cases both the classification of knowledge and the historical narrative of the development of these sciences could hardly be separated from each other. Evidently, a good example of this combination of classification of knowledge and the narrative of the historical development of sciences in Islamic civilization was given by Ibn Khaldun in his *Muqaddimah*^{ix}. In addition to that he drew our attention to the relationship between sciences and crafts in general and *Ūmrġn* (civilization)^x. In this regard, Ibn Khaldun’s main concern was, how the sciences developed according to the gradual evolution of civilization in specific society. This meant, according to Ibn Khaldun, that at each stage of development there would appear certain type of sciences^{xi}. Moreover, the appearance of these sciences and their flourish would be equally determined by the stage of civilization of that society. Ibn Khaldun explained why in some parts of the Muslim world, at his time, certain sciences flourished and others declined by utilizing this mode of explanation which was based on the principles of *Ūmrġn*^{xii}. Most importantly, perhaps, some of these sciences were essential and necessary for the very existence of that society^{xiii}. Therefore, for Ibn Khaldun, the understanding of the role of these sciences was closely connected with the stage of civilization of that specific society. Accordingly, we could speak of one set of sciences as essential to the existence of that society, but at the same time that type of science would develop according to the needs and the stage of civilization of the society. One could say that Ibn Khaldun developed both his classification of knowledge and the narrative of the historical development of sciences in Islamic civilization within the framework of the science of *Ūmrġn*. Furthermore, most of his remarks and generalizations about these sciences were solely based on his personal experience and the available information about Muslim scholarship in the *Magrib*. However, his comparison between the type of scholarship in *Magrib* and *Mashriq* of the Muslim world, at his time, reflected a deep knowledge of the development of systems of learning in the *Magrib*. Although he was of the opinion that scholarship in *Magrib* stood no comparison with that in the *Mashriq*, yet the *Magrib* contributed significantly to some aspects of the general development of both Islamic and philosophical sciences^{xiv}. Therefore, Ibn Khaldun’s line of narrative concerning the development of Islamic and philosophical sciences showed a comprehensive knowledge of the type of scholarship in both *Mashriq*

and *Magrib*. In parts of this section of the *Muqaddimah* about the history of sciences when he felt there were some materials which were beyond his reach he would acknowledge that in his narrative and hesitated to make a generalization^{xv}. Because of his high sense of history, mastery of the craft of historical writing and his reforming zeal of scholarship and educational system, his narrative of the historical development would be useful for the contemporary process of “relevantization” of Islamic sciences.

One might have some misgivings about the choice of Ibn Khaldun’s historical narrative of the development of Islamic sciences because of his limited knowledge of other scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and theology. Further, his *Malikite/Asharite* commitment was highly visible in his writings. It was equally important, at his time that the real scholarship on Islamic and philosophical sciences was in the *Mashriq*. Despite all these observations, one could say that Ibn Khaldun was aware of his short-comings and the gaps he had in his knowledge. But he had a theoretical framework based on the science of *Ūmrġn* and genuine desire to learn from others. These two factors contributed positively to the general make-up of a narrative that is open to new evidence and did not say more than what could be said. Above all, perhaps, Ibn Khaldun knew how to detect the line of development and observed the factors behind decline in Islamic scholarship, more to the point he had good sense for the reform of Islamic educational system. One more important factor in his background was that he travelled extensively in the *Megrie*b and obviously while he was in Egypt he added new information to this part of the *Muqaddimah*^{xvi}.

Classification of Knowledge and Relevantization

The very act of arranging different types of knowledge in a particular order referred to the intent of making that type of knowledge relevant to a specific concern. When al-Imġm al-ShġfiŪġ made a distinction between *Khabar al-ŪŪmmāh* and *Khabar al-Khġġāh*, he intended to differentiate between what is certain and what is probable^{xvii}. At his time there was a need to understand how to deal with the traditions of the Prophet. More specifically, what would be the difference in the status of the *Sunnah* according to its chain of transmission? Should we accept all the corpus of the *Sunnah* and consider it as binding regardless of its authenticity? When a question like this was made the main concern of the scholars showed that there was a need for classification within the existing body of knowledge. More importantly, the issue of classification though it was within the same type of knowledge, it was about the degree of certainty in understanding that type of knowledge. It should be remembered that al-Imġm al-ShġfiŪġ sorted out that

problem in such a way that those who came after him accepted completely his position on the issue of the *Sunnah*. More to the point, the whole scholarship was devoted after his work to document the *Sunnah* in line with the criteria he suggested in his book *al-Risālah*.^{xviii} The internal classification of the *Sunnah* according to its degree of authenticity and its relevancy to the Qur'ān made al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī to outline the different stages of *Bay'ān* (conspicuous declaration) in the relationship between the *Sunnah* and the Qur'ān.^{xix} This became the important aspect of the new knowledge which was later known as the principles of Islamic jurisprudence.

Obviously, the starting point was how to classify the corpus of *Sunnah* and then how to relate the *Sunnah* to the Qur'ān. From these two steps emerged an important one which showed how to relate the religious text to new realities which were not directly addressed by it. Al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī's argument for analogical deduction and his complete rejection of personal preference as a legitimate method of relating the religious text to new social realities identified both what to be considered as the sources of Islamic knowledge and the tools for understanding them as well as how to drive rulings from them.^{xx} It was equally important when he limited the *ikmah* (wisdom) to the *Sunnah*, he wanted to rule out the possibility of utilizing or adapting some parts of Greek sciences to Islamic sciences.^{xxi} Therefore, in his classification of knowledge *Ūlūm al-Aw'āl* (sciences of the Greek, Persians and others) were made irrelevant to Islamic sciences. This led al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī to draw the attention of the scholars to the importance of *Bay'ān* and the relevant linguistic tools for understanding the text. Thus, syntactic and semantic analyses of the text were given a considerable amount of energy and interest by the scholars after al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī. All these made the linguistic tools to be an integral part of Islamic sciences, though later on a distinction was made between the sciences of tools i.e. Arabic sciences and sciences concerned with content.

The effort of al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī was credited with both making a system of internal classification of Islamic sciences and ruling out the possibility of utilizing alien sciences within the framework of Islamic sciences. Arabic language was seen by him as having its own logic that needed to be understood in order to achieve the required level of understanding the different shades of meanings in the Qur'ān or the *Sunnah* of the Prophet. Evidently, his reorganizing of Islamic sciences made a significant impact upon those who came after him. Thus, the recurrent theme in any classification of knowledge after him was, essentially, about whether to include or to exclude *Ūlūm al-Aw'āl*; more to the point was to make the classification based on *Ūlūm al-Millāh* (reason) or *Naql*

(tradition). It should be remembered that this did not mean that Islamic sciences which were based primarily on *Naql* that there was no place for reason in these sciences, but rather the distinction was focused on the fact that philosophical sciences were not based on a religious tradition. There the human reason would be taken as the starting point where in Islamic sciences revelation was made as the main sources of knowledge. Therefore, the main difference could be seen between a knowledge enterprise that made its beginning and end the human reason, whereas the other one made revelation, the main source of knowledge without the rejection of reason.

It should be remarked that the end result of al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī's argument was both to make philosophical sciences irrelevant to Islamic sciences and to focus the attention on the systematization of the corpus of revelation and the linguistic tools of understanding that corpus. By doing so, he made the relevantization process, at his time, to be connected with his classification of knowledge. Evidently, what was done by him had a great impact on the development of knowledge and its classification. This could be derived from the body of literature that had been developed after him. Those who were influenced by the Greek sciences like al-Kindi and al-Farabi developed their own classification of knowledge whereas those who were critical of the Greek sciences devised a new classification of knowledge which was slightly different from what al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī suggested in *al-Risālah*.^{xxii} One could say that the difference between their position and al-Imām al-Shāfi'ī's position was based on the level of maturation which was achieved at their time.

A good example as I suggested before was Ibn Khaldun's classification of knowledge. At his time a way was devised for how to benefit from the Greek sciences in the development of *Ūlūm al-Millāh*. A key figure in this regard was al-Imām al-Ghazālī who paved the way for the utilization of an adapted form of logic in the study of *Ūlūm al-Millāh*.^{xxiii} Even he went further to consider the study of logic as a necessary introduction for all sciences.^{xxiv}

Some observations on Ibn Khaldun's classification of knowledge

It was within the framework of the science of *umr'ān* that Ibn Khaldun took account of classification of knowledge. This made his classification of knowledge more significant in the discussion concerning relevantization of *Ūlūm al-Millāh*. This was because of the fact that his classification of knowledge had been given within a framework that paid attention to civilizational factors. In this regard, knowledge was seen within a social context and its development went hand in hand with the social maturation of the society. The more the society was moving from a simple state

to a complex one that would be reflected in the types of sciences in that society. This axiom was a determinant factor, for Ibn Khaldun's analysis of sciences and the way he decided to classify them^{xxv}.

The first observation on his classification of knowledge had to do with his distinction of knowledge into knowledge that had been transmitted from one generation to the other which was meant to give that society its self-identity; while the second type of knowledge had to do with the human rational faculty and its mere speculation and experimentation^{xxvi}. For the first type of knowledge, Ibn Khaldun identified *Ūlēm al-Millāh* as the type of knowledge that developed according to revelation which was given to Prophet Muhammad. Ibn Khaldun was of the opinion that each and every nation or civilization would have such a type of knowledge. For the second type of knowledge he pointed to the philosophical sciences. Therefore, his classification had two general divisions. And yet he equally showed how the development of these two divisions of knowledge in the historical Islamic civilization affected each other. Though they were completely separated from each other, according to their origin, yet in the process of adaptation and maturation each one of them had a great impact on the other. This did not mean that the exchange of ideas was not governed by any principles; to the contrary, it was governed by a set of principles from *Ūlēm al-Millāh*.

Ibn Khaldun made an interesting comparison between the position of Arabic language in *Ūlēm al-Millāh* and the position of logic in the philosophical sciences. Both Arabic and logic were looked at as tools for understanding. This meant that the internal classification of philosophical sciences would differentiate between logic as a tool which could be used in all philosophical sciences and sciences that dealt with content. In addition to logic mathematics was considered in Ibn Khaldun's classification as a tool that could be used in other sciences^{xxvii}. It seemed that Ibn Khaldun in his internal classification of both *Ūlēm al-Millāh* and philosophical sciences realized the importance of making that distinction between sciences which were concerned with the content or subject matter and those which could be regarded as tools. He carefully showed us how mathematics was used in *Ūlēm al-Millāh* in calculating the different portions of inheritance. Even some scholars developed a number of mathematical formulas that made the science of inheritance more accurate. The use of mathematics was less problematic than the use of logic in *Ūlēm al-Millāh*, but by the time of Ibn Khaldun, it seemed logic was fairly adapted in *Ūlēm al-Millāh*. Because of this, he made that famous distinction in *ilm al-Kalēm* between the position of *al-MutaqaddimĒn* (early scholars) and *al-Muta'akhirĒn*

(later scholars).^{xxviii} Early scholars in *AshŪarite* theology, according to him, believed that there should be a necessary connection between the validity of the form of argument and the subject-matter, whereas the later scholars separated between the form of the argument and its subject-matter. Therefore, the difference between the earlier scholars and later scholars was not based on the content of articles of faith but rather on the form of argument to be used in their proofs.^{xxix} While the earlier scholars confined themselves to rational arguments based on the sensibility of the Arabic language; later scholars, after the adaptation of the logic in the Arabic language, developed more accurate forms of argumentation. This difference between the early and later scholars was based on the fact that later scholars adapted logic in their proofs and their arguments were more sophisticated compared with the earlier ones. In this regard, Ibn Khaldun emphasized the continuation of the *AshŪarite* school of theology rather than a seemingly epistemic rupture between the earlier scholars and later ones. He assured us that the difference was based on the form of the proof not on the content of the articles of faith.^{xxx} By doing so, he was able to solve the problem of the utilization of logic in *Ūlēm al-Millāh*. Therefore, the internal classification of the philosophical sciences adopted by him was an ingenious way of solving the apparent contradiction between the philosophical sciences and *Ūlēm al-Millāh*. It was because logic or mathematics were considered as tools, then they could be used by *Ūlēm al-Millāh*.

It should be noted that Ibn Khaldun went further in his classification to show that the type of rationality that could be accepted in these philosophical sciences would be the same rationality that would govern the sensibility of *Ūlēm al-Millāh*. Thus rationality should be considered as a criterion for accepting or rejecting an argument within the boundaries of the philosophical sciences or *Ūlēm al-Millāh*. Because of this understanding of rationality he rejected magical practices in agricultural sciences.^{xxxi} In addition to that he argued for the elimination of Greek metaphysics and astrology from philosophical sciences.^{xxxii} In all these the only criterion he used was the inconsistency of these sciences with rationality. Therefore, these sciences were not rejected because they contradicted Islamic beliefs, but because they could not pass the test of rationality. This shows that his sense of rationality was a shared factor between the two kinds of sciences and he equally applied it to them. In line with its tenets he accepted some of the arguments in *Ūlēm al-Millāh* and rejected others. He completely dismissed positions which were based on mythological accounts on *Ūlēm al-Millāh*.^{xxxiii} This position of Ibn Khaldun was particularly important in view of the fact

that rationality was based on a universal criterion. By taking that position, he drew our attention to the importance of regarding sciences as one whole system. Therefore, the scheme of classification of knowledge was meant to identify the different parts of a system of inter-connected sciences and to emphasize the element of rationality that cut through them. For Ibn Khaldun that element of rationality could be found in the sciences of tools. These tools would cut across separate sciences in both philosophical sciences as well as *Ūlūm al-Millāh*. In this way, he declared that rationality should be regarded as one and the same for all sciences. One could say that his classification of knowledge based on the distinction between *Ūlūm al-Millāh* and philosophical sciences was not meant to emphasize two types of rationality, but rather to point to the fact that rationality should be regarded as sharing matrix.

Ibn Khaldun's strategy for making internal classification within the general line of classification of knowledge between *Ūlūm al-Millāh* and philosophical sciences was an important way for emphasizing the unity of knowledge. Thus, the interconnectedness of knowledge in different disciplines was seen by him in the criterion of rationality. This criterion, according to him, should not be considered as the monopoly of one science over the others; but rather it should be regarded as an integral element of each science. Though he drew our attention to the association of this rationality with the sciences of tools, it should be noted that these sciences of tools were governed by the same sense of rationality in other sciences. The only difference could be seen in the fact that these sciences dealt directly with the criterion of rationality and more to the point they focused on the forms of the argument rather than the content.

Finally, these observations on Ibn Khaldun's classification of knowledge could help in understanding the contemporary process of relevantization of *Ūlūm al-Millāh*. This would imply some historical parallelism should be drawn between the classification of knowledge at the time of Ibn Khaldun and the contemporary scholarship of classification of knowledge. Obviously, the most important aspect of this parallelism has to be found on the concept of rationalization. How it could be universalized in such a way that the organization of sciences should follow one type of sensibility? Most importantly, perhaps, the demarcation between the sciences of tools and sciences of content would be of a great significance for the interconnectedness between different types of sciences. These were among the most important parameters for relevantization of *Ūlūm al-Millāh* that Ibn Khaldun highlighted in his classification of knowledge. It seemed that the project of relevantization would require both an ability to

understand the interconnectedness between all sciences in the scheme of classification of knowledge and a good sense of judgment. Both the ability to see the sense of rationality that cut across these sciences and the sensibility to evaluate these sciences with an ideal scale of values would be the determinant of the quality of relevantization of *Ūlūm al-Millāh*. It seemed that relevantization was a continuous undertaking by different scholars and not only scholars of jurisprudence or theology but the major difference in these historical attempts was the quality of relevantization which was achieved at each attempt.

Some observations on Ibn Khaldun's Historical Narrative

Apart from his theory of *ŪmrĒn* and its impact on sciences, Ibn Khaldun developed a historical narrative which could be particularly useful for relevantization of *Ūlūm al-Millāh*. The observations were meant to focus on the textual strategies which were taken by him to give a meaningful narrative of the development of these sciences and the context within which these sciences took place. Obviously, he selected a number of books and leading scholars in each field of study. Most importantly, he evaluated the main works in each discipline and pointed to the line of historical development. In addition to that, he looked into the internal development in leading schools of jurisprudence and theology. By doing so he identified the main issues and the different methods which were used for tackling these central issues. Evidently, his narrative mirrored the intellectual achievement of his time and pointed to the direction to be taken by scholars in order to reform *Ūlūm al-Millāh* and adapt philosophical sciences within the general cultural framework.

For understanding such a rich and complex narrative, one should refrain from making any generalization. This remark was not meant to belittle the value of such generalization, but rather to refocus the attention into the details of the narrative. Out of these details, one could see the relevancy of them in making sense of the contemporary efforts of relevantization of *Ūlūm al-Millāh*. In this regards, the details were seen as historical decisions which were made at creative moments in the history of these sciences. Of course, this was not meant to include all the details in that narrative; but rather the details that described a turning point or a starting point in the development of a conceptual issue or a methodic direction. All these details were important steps that made Ibn Khaldun's narrative an historical model for how *Ūlūm al-Millāh* gained a continuous relevancy to the social realities of Muslims.

One should give an account of Ibn Khaldun's narrative by focusing on its general scheme. Then,

most of the suggestions about how to understand these details within that general account would be realized in the way that had been suggested. Obviously, the general account was meant to provide a schematic understanding of Ibn Khaldun's strategy for writing this part of *al-Muqaddimah*. One would not like to give a selective interpretation of these details, but rather to keep in mind all the relevant and rich framework within which his narrative advanced a new way to explain the development in *Ūlēm al-Millāh*. To reach that goal, one should regard the starting point in this narrative what Ibn Khaldun decided it to be so. Though he noticed that he was not going to follow an historical criterion, yet his principle to start with sciences according to their proximity to the Qur'ānic text reflected some historical preference.^{xxxiv} Because of this principle the first science, to begin with, was the *taḥt al-qir'ān* (science of the recitation of the Qur'ān), then the sciences of *ĪdĒth* and he ended up *Ūlēm al-Millāh* by *Ūlēm al-taḥt al-rĒ'yah* (sciences of dream interpretation)^{xxxv}. In addition to that he went on to give an exposition of sciences of Arabic language which he regarded as tool sciences. It should be noted that he decided to put these sciences after he gave a detailed exposition of his account on how to reform the educational system during his time.^{xxxvi} For the philosophical sciences, after he enumerated them, his exposition of these sciences was based on which one should be accepted and which one should be rejected.^{xxxvii} Apparently, his narrative does not seem to follow one strategy or one historical line.

However, on a careful study of the narrative, it revealed that there were reasons behind that arrangement. Ibn Khaldun's message was about the interconnectedness of knowledge, when he decided to put philosophical sciences right after *Ūlēm al-Millāh* this meant to emphasize the unity of knowledge. By leaving the sciences of Arabic language at the end though their natural place would be immediately after *Ūlēm al-Millāh*, he reinforced the distinction between sciences of content and sciences of tool. Furthermore, though logic was considered as a science of tool, yet it was discussed within the philosophical sciences; indeed, it was given the priority over other philosophical sciences.^{xxxviii} Therefore, one could say that he equally emphasized the importance of logic among the philosophical sciences and its relevance for all sciences. Both *Ūlēm al-Millāh* and the philosophical sciences required a deep understanding of logic. The way he organized the sciences in an ordinal fashion and then decided to give logic a significant status among them, was meant to send a message which emphasized that logic should be regarded as a methodic tool for all sciences. Evidently, this echoed al-GhazĒlī's assertion regarding logic.^{xxxix} The type of logic he was dealing with was completely

adapted within the cultural framework of Islam; it was no longer an alien science. Therefore, at the time of Ibn Khaldun, the assertion of al-GhazĒlī about logic as being an inseparable introduction for all sciences, was well received and became part of the educational system.^{xl}

For Ibn Khaldun's narrative no compromise was accepted wherever the doctrine of *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* was concerned. Because of this position his narrative reflected the sensibility of the main stream Islam. He equally argued for the reasons behind his choice and showed how insignificant the contributions of both the *IbadĒ* and *Ithna AshrĒ* to the main Islamic sciences.^{xli} Moreover how their political domination over Egypt, during their era, disrupted the development of main stream Islam in that part of the Muslim world. The *IsmĒilĒ* presence in Egypt, according to Ibn Khaldun, caused serious disruptions for several years concerning educational development. This was detrimental to the normal development of *ShĒfiĒ* jurisprudence and other sciences of main stream Islam in Egypt.^{xlii} Thus, one could safely say that Ibn Khaldun's narrative was chiefly concerned with the doctrine of *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-JamĒ'ah* in *Ūlēm al-Millāh*. However, when he dealt with philosophical sciences, he adopted a more inclusive strategy and a broad vision. There even the contributions of non-Muslims to these sciences within Islamic civilization were highly regarded; and especially when he discussed medical sciences, he was of the opinion that the Prophet's assertions on medicine should not be considered as part of his vocation as a Messenger of Allah; rather these assertions, according to Ibn Khaldun, were made out of his own personal judgment as an Arab who was familiar with the customs of his time.^{xliii}

Once again one could say that Ibn Khaldun was strictly governed by the requirements of rationality. This led him to view all the *ĪdĒth* literature on medicine under what he called *Ūlēm al-Narab* (Arab customs).^{xliv} One might not agree with Ibn Khaldun in his generalization on the Prophetic medical literature, but his position in this regard, showed his strategy to develop an historical narrative that differentiate between what should be considered as part of revelation and hence could be considered as part of *Ūlēm al-Millāh* and on the other side, those sciences which should be viewed as part of philosophical sciences. Then, they should be strictly regulated by the tenets of rationality. This narrative verve of Ibn Khaldun might not be appreciated by some who would like to draw a definitive line of demarcation between philosophical sciences and *Ūlēm al-Millāh*.

He continued his historical narrative following the same strategy of focusing on the interconnectedness of

these sciences through the canon of rational thinking. Because of this it is rather expected to make an assertion on the Prophetic medical literature in the section which was devoted to medicine within the division of philosophical sciences. This meant that medical literature should be considered as one whole unit regardless of its sources. Furthermore, it should be remarked that he decided to conclude his historical narrative on philosophical sciences by two sections on what he designated as *FĒ IbĪĒl al-Falasafah wa FasĒd Muntahiluha* (The Falsification of Philosophy and the inconsistency of its follower).^{xlvi} The second section was on the falsification of astrology as a profession and how weak its bases and inconsistent its objectives.^{xlvi} These two sections do not have parallel in his historical narrative regarding *ŤUIĒm al-Millah*. By having them that way he decided to make a distinction between philosophical sciences and professions connected to them on the one side, and those who regarded philosophy as an ideology by giving a public support to it as a belief system. While philosophical sciences were generally accepted by Ibn Khaldun, the advocacy of philosophy and its metaphysical system was completely rejected by him. Moreover, he took the same position with regard to astrology. Therefore, one could state that in his narrative concerning philosophical sciences he decided to follow a strategy that is both inclusive and invariably regulated by the tenets of rationality. This strategy made a great contribution for understanding the different parts of sciences in Islamic civilization. In addition to that one could say with that line of narrative Ibn Khaldun provided us with a compelling evidence for the interconnectedness of sciences in Islamic civilization. Although the details of his narrative regarding *ŤUIĒm al-Millah* were different from those of the philosophical sciences, yet the general line of his account reflected a sense of unity in diversity among these sciences. The noticeable feature of his narrative that all these sciences represent the human sensibility, therefore, whenever a science or a profession deviated from that rationality it should be abandoned completely.

Since the analysis of his narrative was focused on its relevancy to the process of relevantization of *ŤUIĒm al-Millah*, it would be more fruitful to pay more attention to his strategy concerning that aspect. It should be noted that the general strategy within his narrative paid attention to the interconnectedness between urbanization and the development of sciences. Thus prior to the chapter on sciences, he had two chapters on the development of cities and the different factors that contribute to their rapid growth; and concluded this chapter with a section devoted to the city languages and their relationship with the Arabic of Muġar.^{xlvi} Then, he focused on the positive impact of the crafts in general on the human mind and

particularly the craft of writing and mathematics. These two chapters were meant to prepare the stage for the final chapter of the *Muqaddimah* which was devoted to sciences and professions connected with education. Taken together the two previous chapters drew our attention to the relationship between sciences and urbanization. Because of this Ibn Khaldun emphasized in his narrative that line of urban development and its impact on the growth of sciences and crafts.

Since the main focus is on the relevantization of *ŤUIĒm al-Millah* the following observations will be confined to these sciences. According to Ibn Khaldun's narrative one should know how the sources of *ŤUIĒm al-Millah* came into existence. From this understanding of the formation of the sources and the sciences that accompanied their formation, he felt there would be a dire need for the development of the sciences of commentaries. This required a review of the historical materials of the interpretations of the sources. He pointed to the line of development of the science of *tafsĒr* and how it turned from an immediate reflection on the Qur'Ēnic text into a more sophisticated craft.^{xlvi} In this regard his main criticism of the early materials of *tafsĒr* was focused on the *IsrĒĒliyyĒt*. He pointed to the fact that these materials were based on faulty oral traditions inherited from companions of the Prophet who were once Jews.^{xlvi} Because of their insufficient knowledge of the Torah most of their statements were based on oral tradition. Therefore, the need for an updated *tafsĒr* should be the main concern of Muslim scholarship to rectify this problem and others. He reached this conclusion after a thorough investigation of the development of the *tafsĒr* literature.¹ In all this he emphasized the point that *tafsĒr* should be regarded as an open ended academic venture; each generation due to their historic situation and urban development would be able to contribute to this type of *ŤUIĒm al-Millah*. Thus, he invited the generations to come to learn from what had been developed and to critically contribute their part.

With regard to the *Sunnah*, Ibn Khaldun followed the same line of argument and drew our attention to the importance of the commentaries on the *ĪadĒth* literature. There, he was concerned with developing a commentary on al-BukhĒrĒ's *ṢaġĒĪ*. He suggested that it should be the main focus of the *ŤUlamĒ* of his time to come up with a worthy commentary of al-BukhĒrĒ's work.^{li} According to Ibn Khaldun, this worthy champion of al-BukhĒrĒ's text could yet to come, thus, once again for him the interpretation of the *ĪadĒth* literature in general should be regarded as an open ended intellectual enterprise. There would never be a final say on these sources, but rather each generation should exert their utmost capacity to reflect on these sources. For Ibn Khaldun the quality of their

reflection would be determined by both their historic situation and urban development.

It should be remarked that *Fiqh* and its related sciences were given more attention in Ibn Khaldun's narrative. Because of this it occupied a central place in *Ūlēm al-Millah* in terms of scope and significance for all aspects of human life and society. He reminded us that *Fiqh* was not known as a technical term during the time of the companions, but rather those who were engaged in this activity were known as *al-QurrÉ* (readers).^{lii} This was largely due to the historical situation and urban development of that era. Later on *Fiqh* became a terminology that signified a similar activity by the next generations. This showed that though the terminology might differ, yet the content of the intellectual endeavor would be exactly the same. Thus the *qurrÉ* among the companions their role was taken by the *FuqahÉ* like Abu xanÊfa and MÉlik. The only difference, according to Ibn Khaldun, was largely due to the terminology and the degree of urban development. In this regard, he clarified the mistake of some who did not observe this fact in their understanding of the term *FarÉ'id* (obligations) which later had a definitive meaning related to the science of inheritance laws. A *ÍadÊth* narrated on the authority of Abu Hurayrah stated that *al-FarÉ'id* is half of Islamic knowledge. Those who were concerned with this science (*al-FarÉ'id*) argued in favor of its importance by referring to the *ÍadÊth*. Ibn Khaldun, pointed to the fact that the meaning of *FarÉ'id* in the *ÍadÊth* meant *Fiqh* as a whole and not only inheritance laws. This for him had been regarded as a good example of misunderstanding the development of terminology throughout the history of *Ūlēm al-Millah*.^{liii}

For him the main schools of jurisprudence were the xanafÊ and MÉlikÊ, though he was a MÉlikÊ, yet he had high regards for xanafÊ jurisprudence. This was due to the fact that xanafÊ jurisprudence was more urban compared with MÉlikÊ system of learning. In addition to that *qiyÊs* (analogical reasoning) was more developed among the xanafÊ scholars, whereas MÉlikÊ scholars excelled in developing an *ÊthÊr* based tradition of *Fiqh*.^{liv} However, Ibn Khaldun, showed us in his historical narrative how the MÉlikÊ school was constantly engaged with the xanafÊ school. This led to the development of a number of MÉlikÊ compendium based on a comparison between MÉlikÊ and xanafÊ jurisprudence. One should not overlook the thoroughness with which he tackled the development of MÉlikÊ School of jurisprudence. Obviously, the message behind this was to emphasize the relationship between *Fiqh* and the stage of urban development. He insisted that the development in *Fiqh* and its related sciences was completely based on the technical terminologies while the content was kept intact. Thus, he meant to say despite the sophistication

which was reflected in the technical terminologies of *Fiqh* sciences, content wise these sciences were all the same.

Although he devoted a significant space for both *Ūlēm al-KalÊm* and *talawwf*, yet his line of argument was to purify these sciences from the negative impact of philosophical sciences and other influences on them. In this regard, he identified the parts of these sciences which should be held in high esteem and other parts which should be criticized and abandoned completely.^{lv} In these sciences, he felt that there were elements that did not develop according to the tenets of Islamic knowledge. For him the line of development regarding these two sciences was negatively influenced by both Greek metaphysics and *ShÊah* issues. Thus, it had been recommended by him that we should be aware of these elements and deal with them intelligently. Finally, the science of dream interpretation, though it was considered by him as a new development in Islamic knowledge, it did have the basis in the sources and it continued to grow within the Islamic parameters.^{lvi}

Ibn Khaldun's narrative addressed issues which were strongly related to the contemporary process of relevantization of *Ūlēm al-Millah*. Indeed, he developed a set of strategies and arguments for the general review of these sciences. The line of development in these sciences, according to him, should carefully make a distinction between the content of these sciences and their changeable terminologies. More to the point the status of these sciences were not of the same degree. Some of these sciences were regarded as *ÍarÊrÊ* (necessary), while other were considered as *ÍÊjÊ* or *taÊsÊnÊ* (required or luxury sciences respectively).^{lvii} In addition to that he highlighted the fact that these sciences were interconnected. These interrelationships among them were reflected in the activities of the main *FuqahÉ* who contributed to the development of the different branches of *Ūlēm al-Millah*. Finally, he pointed to the fact that in dealing with these sciences and obviously philosophical sciences, the learner needed to develop the *malakah* (intellectual capacity) to be considered as a scholar in these sciences.^{lviii} Therefore, for Ibn Khaldun, this intellectual capacity and not the details of the sciences should be the major concern of the educational system. By focusing on it the process of relevantization could be achieved in a proper way. One could say that the accumulation of Islamic learning which solely based on the development of technical terminologies, according to Ibn Khaldun, might be a real hindrance for a learner. Unless one could make a distinction between the permanent content of these sciences and their changeable terminologies, one would not be able to make a real contribution to these sciences. The intellectual

capacity, for Ibn Khaldun, was highly regarded in order to make sense of these sciences and to develop them accordingly.

From Ibn Khaldun to Islamization of Human Knowledge (IOHK) Project

Both Ibn Khaldun's classification of knowledge and his historical narrative were relevant to the project of IOHK. Though the project of IOHK officially started with the 1977 Makkah Conference on education, the idea of educational reform based on IOHK was put forward many years prior to that conference. However, the conference provided an important platform to make a joint effort in this regard.^{lix} It might be argued that Ibn Khaldun's ideas about educational reform were completely different from the ideas mooted in 1977 conference on education concerning IOHK. This was, largely, due to the fact that the vantage point of 1977 conference was the bifurcation of the educational system in Muslim countries into traditional Islamic madrasah and modern secular education. Obviously, this was unthinkable during the time of Ibn Khaldun. Therefore, any parallelism to be drawn between Ibn Khaldun's suggestions and the IOHK project should be sensitive to the historical gap and the substantial changes in the educational systems. Despite all this both IOHK and Ibn Khaldun's suggestions focused on the importance of the interconnectedness of sciences and the association of *Ūlūm al-Millāh* with the identity of Islamic civilization. Though any assertion in *Ūlūm al-Millāh* its test of validity should be based on the same tenets of rationality that would govern an assertion in any other science, the only difference between the sciences of *Ūlūm al-Millāh* and other sciences would be that they are based on the revealed sources. This principle was shared by both Ibn Khaldun and those who committed their intellectual efforts for IOHK project. Furthermore the interconnectedness of sciences is equally a shared concern for both.

From the previous account on Ibn Khaldun, one could say that analogical deduction was given a central place in both *Ūlūm al-Millāh* and philosophical sciences. This was because it had been viewed as the only valid rational tool; while the other tools analysis were both criticized and sidelined. However, the project of IOHK focused its criticism on analogical deduction as a viable tool of analysis.^{lx} This, perhaps, might point to the real methodic difference between Ibn Khaldun's suggestions and IOHK project. Nonetheless, a form of a wider analogical deduction was suggested by the scholars of IOHK, instead of the textual based one. Whether it was a classical form of analogical deduction or the new suggested form, it should be added that the scholars of IOHK would emphasize the need for Islamic worldview as the framework within which these tools of analysis would

function. This had to be connected with the fact that both Ibn Khaldun and the scholars of IOHK had high regards for al-Ghazālī and his efforts to reform both *Ūlūm al-Millāh* and the educational system. Though Ibn Khaldun was not directly regarded by the scholars of IOHK, one could say that through the constant presence of al-Ghazālī and similar appreciation of his efforts by both of them, Ibn Khaldun's contributions might filter through to IOHK literature.

This would lead us to suggest that Ibn Khaldun's relevantization of *Ūlūm al-Millāh* was a major step in the task of unifying the different sciences in one whole body of knowledge. Needless to say, the same undertaking was the main concern of IOHK scholars. As I indicated earlier, a parallelism in this regard that did not pay attention to the major differences might not be useful. But still, this point of similarity would mark an important space on how to learn from the rich intellectual history which was reconstructed by Ibn Khaldun. Although the scholars of IOHK after 1977 conference realized the major difference between them regarding their position on *Ūlūm al-Millāh*, both of the two camps agreed on the need to Islamize social and natural sciences. Those who anchored themselves in the *sufi* tradition and made the starting point *Ūlūm al-Millāh* were very critical of those who dismissed *tasawwuf*.^{lxi} However, those who were critical of *tasawwuf* and felt that there should be a reform that would engulf both *Ūlūm al-Millāh* and social sciences; went further to suggest a creative synthesis between these sciences as the necessary step for a meaningful reform.^{lxii}

After 1977 conference Syed Ali Ashraf observed that the school of thought that developed on the issue of IOHK was divided into two groups.^{lxiii} One which provided intellectual leadership for Islamabad conference on Islamization of knowledge that resulted in the document which was edited by Ismail al-Farḥī, and the continued academic efforts which were led by Syed Naqib al-Attas, Syed Hussein Nasar and Syed Ali Ashraf.^{lxiv} The main point of difference between these two groups, according to Syed Ali Ashraf, was their view on *tasawwuf*. While the first group showed a negative view on the place of *tasawwuf* in Islamic sciences and life; the second group viewed *tasawwuf* as a genuine Islamic science and the core of both Islamic metaphysics and axiology. In addition to this Ashraf emphasized that the starting point for IOHK should be to crystallize the major ideas and concepts from Islamic sources.^{lxv} These, then, were the most important differences between the two groups. It should be noted that while the document of Islamabad drew our attention to the practical side of IOHK and suggested a concrete action plan to be followed in this regard which would result in a university text-book, it equally outlined the methodological framework within which the text-book should be written.^{lxvi} Though it

gave the impression that the new knowledge that would develop from the creative synthesis could largely be seen as neither the social nor natural sciences as we knew them, nor as a continuation of *ŤUIĚm al-Millah*, it equally emphasized the need for both reforming *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* and adapting social and natural sciences in one whole body of knowledge. Furthermore, analogical deduction and the methodology of *UIĚl al-Fiqh* in particular was vehemently criticized and consequently rendered ineffective in the new project of reform^{lxvii}. Because of this Ashraf felt that this would marginalize the tradition and superimpose alien terminologies and concepts on it^{lxviii}. And yet within al-FarĚqĚ's group, al-ŤAlwĚnĚ agreed that *UIĚl al-Fiqh* methodology should be the method to be followed for Islamization of human knowledge. It should be noted that analogical deduction, according to al-ŤAlwĚnĚ, could be adapted to serve that intellectual endeavor. Though this position was not accepted by the school, an interest in wider form of analogical deduction was developed and a shift of emphasis was made by a reference to *MaqĚĚid al-SharĚŤnah* and it's both methods of thematic induction and a wider form of analogical deduction^{lxix}.

The tragic and untimely death of al-FarĚqĚ was a serious blow to the project. Because of this the project suffered a major setback in term of its intellectual leadership and the content of its outcome. After ten years of a hard work and extensive intellectual exchange al-ŤAlwĚnĚ advanced a new set of agenda for the project. This new orientation was based on the research of Haj Hamad who was attached to the main office of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), Henredon, Virginia^{lxx}. Though al-ŤAlwĚnĚ gave a fair assessment of Islamabad document, he equally emphasized the need for a genuine reform of Islamic sciences. For him the main concern should be the development of Islamic paradigm of knowledge^{lxxi}. This could be established by the discovery of the Qur'Ěnic epistemology which should be based on the combination of the two readings. Taken together the reading of the universe and reading of the revelation would constitute the essence of the Qur'Ěnic epistemology, according to al-ŤAlwĚnĚ^{lxxii}. But before such a reading which would combine both in a one synthetic reading, there should be a number of discourses regarding the methods of dealing with the Quran, the *Sunnah*, Islamic tradition and Western knowledge. The culmination of all these would contribute to the establishment of the Islamic paradigm of knowledge^{lxxiii}.

By doing so, Muslim scholars would contribute significantly to the solution of the crisis in method which was a direct result of secular humanism failure in the domain of epistemology. For al-ŤAlwĚnĚ,

secular humanism attempts to solve the epistemic crisis of humanity was doomed to failure. This was, largely, due to its imbalance and lack of comprehensiveness in understanding the methodic problem. Therefore, Islamization of human knowledge should be based on an alternative paradigm of knowledge which should neither be based on the rejection of metaphysics nor the empirical world. Rather it could come up with a comprehensive understanding of both in one unified and balanced method^{lxxiv}.

These six discourses on method which were suggested by al-ŤAlwĚnĚ in his proposal focused our attention on the need for a methodic reform regarding *ŤUIĚm al-Millah*^{lxxv}. Most importantly, it emphasized the dire need for a method to govern the relationship with Western tradition of knowledge in particular or sciences that had been produced by other civilizations in general. Apparently, the type of rationality in these six discourses where three of them were closely related to *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* and one was devoted to alien sciences should be one and the same. Therefore, these four discourses governed by the principles of the methodology of the two readings would constitute the essential elements of the Islamic paradigm of knowledge. Perhaps, some might have misgivings about the usage of the term paradigm. But al-ŤAlwĚnĚ, in line with the emphasis of IOHK on the importance of universality of both knowledge and ethics, would not agree to the classification of the Islamic paradigm as historical and relativistic in nature. Rather, he acknowledged the historical and relative elements within this paradigm as changeable elements, whereas the permanent ones represented the main principles of the Qur'Ěn. In addition to that al-ŤAlwĚnĚ realized the importance of emphasizing the universality of this paradigm. Indeed it was meant to solve the civilizational problem of humanity. With all these efforts al-ŤAlwĚnĚ recruited a number of Muslim intellectuals and learned *ŤUlamĚ'* to develop the essential parameters of these six discourses. His effort was a well-meaning attempt to be helpful in establishing the Islamic paradigm of knowledge. The main and unexpected difficulties that the proposal faced were that it was neither well received by the academics in IIUM, nor it generated a satisfactory intellectual curiosity among the *Ummah*^{lxxvi}. It should be remarked that during this time Abu Sulyman was the Rector of IIUM. Obviously, at that time, the real test of success or failure of new ideas regarding IOHK would be their acceptance or adaptation in IIUM academic circles. Though al-ŤAlwĚnĚ tried very hard to advance this new orientation, it certainly fell on deaf ears^{lxxvii}.

One could argue that this new orientation in IOHK unlike al-FarĚqĚ's proposal was more general and was

much less about the direct objectives of IOHK. It rather was an ambitious intellectual endeavor that could only be articulated by a scholar who is well-grounded in both *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* and social sciences. Perhaps, the coming generation of scholars of IOHK would be more qualified to carry out such an historical task. However, it should be noted that al-ŤAlwĚnĚ's proposal drew our attention to a more comprehensive line of investigation regarding the reform of *ŤUIĚm al-Millah*. The reform could not be achieved by a re-reading of *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* or an historical reconstruction of its legacy, but rather by a new unified reading of the data of revelation and the data of the empirical world. This certainly would require a new curriculum and methodic strategies. One could ask about the implication of this new orientation on *ŤUIĚm al-Millah*. Evidently, straight answer to this would be no body could be able to know neither the dynamics of this venture nor its end results. Because of this uncertainty it would be quite difficult to implement this proposal in an institutional set up. One way of developing such initiative to its logical end could be through informal structures and personal efforts. This might lead to a gradual accumulation of literature which could find its way in formal institutions. It was, perhaps, these concerns that led both al-FarĚqĚ and Abu Sulyman to emphasize the practical aspects of the project. Their outline or the five principles which would provide a theoretical framework for the IOHK could lead to the new orientation of al-ŤAlwĚnĚ's proposal. It might be argued that the nature of Islamabad Conference and the participants could not favor such a highly theoretical proposal for IOHK.

It should be remarked that during the heyday of reforming al-Azhar, Muhammad Abdu suggested the introduction of the Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun in the curriculum^{lxxviii}. In addition to that the reformation of al-Azhar was based on al-GhazĚlĚ's position on sciences which was equally emphasized by Ibn Khaldun in his Muqaddimah^{lxxix}. Furthermore, Abdu's famous work entitled *al-TawĚĚd* depended on Ibn Khaldun's summary of *Ťilm al-KalĚm*^{lxxx}. All these alluded to the fact that Ibn Khaldun was part and parcel of the reform agenda. However, IOHK project touched the real nerve of the problem. While the issue of teaching alien sciences dominated the scene during the early days of the educational reform movement, in Islamabad conference the real issue was about the Islamization of human knowledge itself. This task was parallel to the work of al-GhazĚlĚ and others in their adaptation of scientific products of alien sciences into the Islamic framework. By the time of Ibn Khaldun both his historical narrative of sciences in Islamic civilization and classification of knowledge became possible because of the efforts of al-GhazĚlĚ and his likes. Similar to that intellectual endeavor the IOHK

project drew our attention to the need for a more fundamental reform. Al-FarĚqĚ, after reviewing the contemporary attempts for reform, stated that:

"It is high time for the scholars of Islam to disown such failure and harmful methods of educational reform". For them the reform of education is the Islamization of modern knowledge itself, a task identified in character with, though greater in scope than that undertaken by our ancestors who digested the knowledge of their time and produced the Islamic legacy of culture and civilization^{lxxxi}.

Evidently, al-FarĚqĚ anchored the IOHK project in the legacy of al-GhazĚlĚ and his likes and equally was very critical of the contemporary efforts of reform. For him these attempts of adding alien sciences to the existing Islamic sciences were both ill-informed about the nature of these alien sciences and were not aware of the methodic challenge of modernity to Islamic tradition of learning^{lxxxii}. Though al-FarĚqĚ and Abu Sulyman did not go into the minute details of the relevantization of *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* in their pamphlet on Islamization of knowledge after Islamabad conference, they devoted a considerable intellectual effort on both educational strategies for relevantization and specific works on the subject-matter.

Al-FarĚqĚ took the project of IOHK a stage further. He spared no effort to realize the recommendations of Islamabad conference. It should be remembered that the two major works which he finished after that conference were entitled "*TawĚĚd* and Its Implications on Thought and Life"^{lxxxiii} and "The Cultural Atlas of Islam"^{lxxxiv}. These works were exactly the main projects which were recommended by the conference for the realization of IOHK in the institutions of higher learning. The first work was meant to serve as the basis for Islamic worldview, whereas the second one was to provide the substantive materials for the university text-book that should be taught to all university students. Perhaps, al-FarĚqĚ would love to see these two books translated to all Islamic languages and utilized as the foundation for the educational reform. Abu Sulyman, few years after Islamabad conference, took the challenges of re-establishing IIUM along the lines of the IOHK project, when he was invited by the Malaysian Government to become the second Rector. His main achievement was to establish the Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences on the principle of integration of knowledge^{lxxxv}. This experiment was the culmination of the different processes of IOHK. There was a certain novelty value in its approach. It marked definitive change in both the way IOHK project was conceived and the implementation procedures it should take. This turned the intellectual debate into the practical aspects of developing academic structures

that would facilitate the implementation of integration of knowledge in a university set up. Though still the theoretical issues of IOHK were given due attention, the main focus was shifted towards the pragmatic and practical issues of educational programs. In this regard, issues connected with theory of knowledge or the sources of knowledge could be discussed so long as they contribute directly to the problems of developing a curriculum which had been based on Islamic worldview.

This shift in the debate about IOHK was meant to set up a model for reforming higher education. The prototype which would emerge from this experiment was supposed to redefine the meaning of knowledge along the lines of the Islamic worldview. Certainly, universal aspects of this worldview would be at the core of the whole process. In addition to that the type of rationality which would govern this process would obviously retain all the universalistic aspects of rationality. Though the priority of this experiment was to develop a prototype for universities in the Muslim world, the real success of the experiment would be its acceptance as a new alternative for secular humanism in institutions of higher learning. This way the claim for universalism could be realized on a meaningful concept of Islamic humanism that would universalize the normative dimension of educational institutions.

After 20 years of the experiment the real achievement was much less about the volume of research it produced during these years but rather the number of graduates who went through the academic structures which were set up under the principle of integration of knowledge. The most affected by this experiment were the students who were majoring in Islamic Revealed Knowledge departments. These students studied *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* within a framework that taught social sciences from a critical perspective. By now, the majority of the academic staff in Islamic Revealed Knowledge departments were the graduates of this experiment. Clearly, then, the new breed of academic actors would be in a better position to carry out a form of relevantization of *ŤUIĚm al-Millah*. More to the point the criticism of analytical syllogism which were made by Abu Sulyman and al-FarĚqĚ required a new methodology for *ŤUIĚm al-Millah*. This new method was a more wider type of syllogism which was less based on the formal aspect of analogical deduction but rather based on the axiological aspect. In this regard, it would be a comparison between two societies based on a set of shared values. Obviously it could not be based on one case from the traditional Islamic society and a similar one from the contemporary society. This type of analogy was rendered by Abu Sulyman as baseless^{lxxxvi}.

As the result of this new development in the method of *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* the process of relevantization was

refocused on *maqĚġid al-SharĚŤnah* where analogical deduction was substituted with a wider analogical comparison that transcended the case to case analogy to a societal type to type analogy. This opened the way for a new discussion on systematization of values of the *SharĚŤnah*. This could equally be informed by the type of urban development of the Muslim societies as suggested by Ibn Khaldun. Most importantly, these processes of relevantization could add new sciences to *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* and drop some of the existing sciences in accordance with the classification of these sciences. Those sciences which were considered as part of the necessary sciences would be given the lead to reshape other sciences and respond to the social realities of Muslim societies. This could create new dynamics which would create new sciences that would be classified as *ġĚġĚ* and *talġĚnĚ* sciences. However, the corpus of the existing sciences of *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* could be regarded as the history of these sciences. This historical corpus would always form the tradition within which both the necessary sciences of *ŤUIĚm al-Millah* and the new sciences that could emerge from the interaction between the necessary sciences and the new social realities.

It should be remembered that a significant number of postgraduate students at the Departments of Islamic Revealed Knowledge became more and more interested in applied Islamology. This phenomenon signaled that social facts drew the attention of these researchers. In addition to that their training was no longer focused on textual studies; but rather the new method of wider analogical deduction and the critical framework of social sciences provided a new dynamic. Though the majority of the postgraduate students would choose the Department of *Fiqh* and *UġĚl al-Fiqh*, the Department of *UġĚl al-DĚn* and Comparative Religion was entrusted to teach courses on research methodology and Islamization of knowledge to all Islamic Revealed Knowledge departments. The three departments of Islamic Revealed Knowledge were originally meant to create a framework for Islamic revealed knowledge that would both foster the process of integration of knowledge within Islamic sciences and with social sciences. By doing so gradually the walls between these disciplines would ultimately disappear and a new system of knowledge would evolve where the rationality based on Islamic worldview could govern the processes of creating new knowledge. It should be noted that the danger of maintaining the status quo would always be the real challenge for such a project. Where conservatism and resistance to change among both the guardians of Islamic sciences and social sciences would create obstacles that could slow down the process or divert the attention away from the real issues. In this regard, a constant training was held for

academics from both disciplines to elevate their awareness and co-opt them into specific committees in the project of integration of knowledge.

Since the Department of *UĪĒl al-DĒn* and Comparative Religion was given a leading role in both exercises of integration of knowledge and relevantization of *ŤUIĒm al-Millah*, it would certainly help to pay attention to the major principles behind the setting of this department. Religion, in this department, had been regarded as a life fact^{lxxxvii}. Where values and descriptive aspects of religious phenomenon were studied as a unified whole. The theoretical framework which was developed by al-FarĒqĒ regarding the principles of evaluation of a religious phenomenon in a comparatists setting had been criticized, adapted and developed by the faculty members of this department^{lxxxviii}. A number of postgraduate dissertations were either directly written about al-FarĒqĒ's contribution to the study of religious phenomenon or utilized his methodology for the study of other religions^{lxxxix}. Al-FarĒqĒ's presence was not confined to the department of *UĪĒl al-DĒn* and Comparative Religion alone, his intellectual and academic contribution was equally felt throughout the rest of the departments of the Kulliyyah. This was meant to emphasize both logical and axiological presence of his articulation of the principle of IOHK. Though Abu Sulyman was the driving force behind these efforts and he both participated in their articulation and obviously in their creative implementation in a university programs, yet at the early stages al-FarĒqĒ was always referred to in the discussions ins and outs. At a later stage, Abu Sulyman was credited with the insistence of the development of new methodology for *ŤUIĒm al-Millah* and the criticism of analogical deduction. It might be the case that when IOHK was transformed from a university-in-speech to practical programs in a real university Abu Sulyman realized the type of the new challenges. He carefully reorganized the possibilities and set up new principles for the project. The principle of integration of knowledge and the structure upon which it operated showed both the creativity and farsightedness of Abu Sulyman.

From *UĪĒl al-DĒn* to Systematization of Values

It should be repeated that IIUM championed the cause of IOHK since its inception in 1983, and consistently worked for the realization of that cause in its academic programs. Although the heyday of IOHK was during the 90s, the university continued to support the activities of IOHK. During the 90s it was realized how much important of *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* was for reforming Islamic education. A number of publications were made by the university or through the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)^{xc}. In addition to that research by postgraduate students was

encouraged on issues related to *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* and its application on contemporary socio-economic realities in Muslim societies. All these efforts, later on, resulted in an unprecedented rise in the number of postgraduate dissertations on *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah*. Moreover, an international conference was held by the university on *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* and an academic circle was formed for the study of al-ShĒĒlibĒ's work entitled "*Al-MuwĒfaqĒt fĒ UĪĒl al-SharĒĒnah*". As the result, thematic induction as research tool was hotly debated^{xc}. At the center of the debate was how al-ShĒĒlibĒ adapted induction in the study of *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah*; more to the point what was the strategy taken by al-ShĒĒlibĒ to develop a thematic form of inductive method. Because of which he argued for *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* in a rational and consistent way.

All should agree, by now, that at the core of the debate on thematic induction or *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* in general was a dire effort for systematization of the values of the *SharĒĒnah*. The connection between *UĪĒl al-DĒn* and *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* was made clear by the intellectual activities of Ibn ŤŖshĒr in his work entitled *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* where he criticized al-ShĒĒlibĒ for not doing enough to utilize thematic induction in deriving the principles of *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah*^{xcii}. For Ibn ŤŖshĒr the correct approach was to utilize the forms of arguments developed by the *MutakallimĒn* for the realization of certainty in reaching the principles of *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah*^{xciii}. This drew the attention for an integrated approach to legality and axiology. Though the main domain of *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* was legality, this new orientation pointed to the fact that axiology should be taken as the foundation for any theorization on legality. Since axiology was taken as the major aspect of *UĪĒl al-DĒn*, the new efforts were meant to emphasize both the need for an integrative approach to the dichotomy of legality/ axiology and a shift of interest into systematization of values. This new approach would certainly not abandon the issues of *UĪĒl al-DĒn*, but rather all the theological tools would be needed for the systematization process. This change in position from theological debates on the relationship between the attributes of God and His essence to discovering values and regarding the attributes of God as the fountain of values helped a great deal the new orientation to connect IOHK project with a more universal and practical endeavor.

By this point, one should emphasize that research in *MaqĒĒl al-SharĒĒnah* within the university reached the conclusion that this academic endeavor could essentially be about the systematization of values^{xciv}. These values should not be regarded as only Islamic values, but rather they are universal values. This was the way it was seen by classical scholars of Islamic jurisprudence. They argued for the position that each

of the Five *Kulliyāt* (Five essential values of *Shar'īnah*) as universal ethical values. These values were carefully considered by all civilized people. The hierarchy of these values might differ from one group to the other, but their presence as essential values for the very existence of the human society had been highly regarded throughout the history. This was the position which was taken by leading classical scholars of Islamic jurisprudence when they argued for *Maq'īd al-Shar'īnah* as a theoretical tool for the systematization of values in Islamic rulings. From this main postulate, they emphasized the ethical position that took into consideration the axiological hierarchy that the ethics of intent should be regarded as the basis for the ethics of action. Therefore, in the evaluation of the human act a critical examination should be leveled against the ethics of intent for a meaningful understanding of the valuational judgment on that act. This consequently assumed that the human will should determine the ethicality of the act.

By doing so, *Maq'īd al-Shar'īnah* could be the source for advancing a set of ethical principles that would govern the process of systematization of values. Admittedly, one had to have a clear understanding of the nature of these valuational principles in order that the systematization of values could be reached on different levels. In this regard, one should keep his eyes firmly fixed on the postulate that the realm of axiology is part of the metaphysical realm. This would mean that values are relational to humans and not relative to them. As a result, human could have the capacity to discover values and not make them. Consequently, this would lead one to subscribe to the view that the human being is the bridge between the physical and the metaphysical worlds. This position of the human being would ultimately define who we are and how values could enter the realm of the material world. By having this conviction on values and their realization in the material world one would uphold the distinction between values in-themselves and their material actualization or realization in specific human action. While values should be regarded as metaphysical entities their realization would certainly be part of this world. This distinction ought to be kept in mind for the sake of making sense of the fact that value as such is indivisible, whereas its realization would take multiple forms.

In addition to these axiological postulates and suppositions which should be accepted for building up a set of valuational principles for the systematization process; one should firmly consider the following assertions: first, in Islamic ethics the absolute values represent the attributes of Allah; second, monotheism is the only metaphysical principle out of which universality of ethics could be derived. All these should be accepted for the systematization of values to

be achieved within a framework which would be both universal and particular. Its universality could be grounded on humanism and its particularism would reflect the Islamic ethos. It should be remembered that its Islamicity would not require a sense of relativity regarding values, but rather it obviously would emphasize the relationality of values to human beings.

By moving the prime act of relevantization from *U'īl al-D'ēn* to *Maq'īd al-Shar'īnah*, the project of systematization of values would require an integrative method. In this new situation both *Maq'īd al-Shar'īnah* and *U'īl al-D'ēn* principles should be utilized in the process of the systematization of values. This would require a dynamic engagement of both sciences for the new orientation of relevantization. Ultimately, the systematization process would result into a universal doctrine of Islamic humanism. Therefore, both the interconnectedness of sciences and the new knowledge would be based on universal principles of rationality. Anything which would resist this new narrative of relevantization should consequently be abandoned for the sake of a new beginning for the Muslims and humanity at large.

Conclusion

Although I started with Ibn Khaldun's classification of knowledge and his historical narrative on sciences in Islamic civilization, the real concern of this essay was about relevantization of Islamic revealed sciences. One could say that Ibn Khaldun's rewriting of history of sciences in Islamic civilization showed both his project of relevantization and his selections as a reader of these sciences. Obviously, the few selections which were made by him as a reader of these sciences revealed the deep images of a Muslim scholar at a specific time while being both an excellent writer and a critical reader. These two qualities should be highly regarded in any successful attempts for relevantization. In addition to that one would make the assertion that the science of *Ūmr'ēn* was an outcome of a creative engagement of the process of relevantization. A significant attention should be made to the fact that the science of *Ūmr'ēn* was neither a part of *Ūlēm al-Millāh* nor the philosophical sciences. It was a new knowledge that had been created from the process of relevantization. In addition to that Ibn Khaldun's theory of *Malakah* should be developed and made as a corner stone for contemporary process of relevantization.

Moreover, I would like to advance the following propositions: first, relevantization could only be achieved when a sharp distinction is made between *Ūlēm al-Millāh* and the history of these sciences; second, the decisive factor in building the Qur'ānic paradigm of knowledge would be the complete adoption of a set of rational principles of

understanding and the Qur’ānic valuational system; third, the systematization of values process would be the only viable platform for both IOHK and universality of values.

It should be remembered that, in essence, relevantization is about a constant exegetical interpretation of the sources. This effort would be a meaningful one only when it is focused on systematization of values. An excellent historical example of this process of relevantization which was based on systematization of values was done by al-Imām al-Ghazālī in his magnum opus entitled “*‘Ilm al-Ūlūm al-Dīn*” and prior to this work al-Mawardi’s book entitled “*Adab al-Dīn wa al-Dunyā*”. Clearly al-Ghazālī’s work was the culmination of this process in the six century of *Hijrah*.

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ⁱ This term was adopted from Ibn Khaldun Classification of Knowledge in his *Muqaddimah*. Though he used the term *ulum naqliyyah* or *shar’iyyah*, yet the term *millah* was utilized by him to differentiate between this type of sciences and philosophical sciences, al-Amiri before Ibn Khaldun used the term *al-‘ulum al-milliyah*. I benefited from the Rosenthal’s translation of the *Muqaddimah*, though in some places I felt he did not render the meaning of Ibn Khaldun’s text properly.

ⁱⁱ This term was coined by Prof. Mohammad Kamal Hassan.

ⁱⁱⁱ Isma’il Raji al-Faruqi, *Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Work plan*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Berntwood, 1982.

^{iv} Taha Jabir al-‘Alwani, *The Islamization of Knowledge: Yesterday and Today*, International Islamic Publishing House and International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, 1995.

^v Ibid., pp.14-27.

^{vi} Al-Ghazali, *al-Mustasfa min ‘ilm al-Usul*, Dar ‘ihya’ al-Turath al-‘Arabi, Beirut, 1997, pp.13-14.

^{vii} Ibrahim Mohamed Zein, “Religions As a ‘life fact’: Al-Faruqi’s Impact on The International Islamic University Malaysia” *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol.28, Summer 2011, pp.53-74.

^{viii} See Al-Farabi, *Ihsa al-‘Ulum*, Cairo,1949. An interesting classification of knowledge was given by al-‘Amiri, *Kitab al-‘Ilam bi Manaqib al-Islam*, Dar al-Arabi, Cairo,1967, pp.83-122.

^{ix} Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah Ibn Khaldun*, Dar al-Qalam, Beirut: 1992, pp.435-588.

^x Ibid, pp.434-435.

^{xi} Ibid, pp.430-434.

^{xii} Ibid,p.434.

^{xiii} Ibid,p.400.

^{xiv} Ibid, pp.430-434.

^{xv} Ibid, pp.448-449.

^{xvi} Ibid,p.449.

^{xvii} Al-Shafi‘i, *al-Risalah*, Dar al-Turath, Cairo, 1979,pp.357-387.

^{xviii} See Ibn Hanbal’s work *al-Musnad* and the rest of *Kutub al-Sunnah*, Bukhari,Muslim, Tirmizi,Abu Daud, *al-Nisa’i* and *Ibn Majah*. All these scholars in their documentation of the Sunnah were having the principles of al-Imām al-Shafi‘i at the back of their minds.

^{xix} Al-Risalah,pp.21-53. Majid Khaduri’s translation of the concept of *Bayan* should be relooked into for better understanding of al-Shafi‘i argument.

^{xx} Ibid, pp.487-559

^{xxi} Ibid, p.78

^{xxii} Al-Ghazali, *al-Mustasfa*, pp.15-17 or Ibn Khaldun in *al-Muqaddimah*, pp.435-588.

^{xxiii} Al-Ghazali, *al-Mustasfa*, pp. 16-17

^{xxiv} Ibid, p.7.

^{xxv} Ibn Khaldun, pp.430-434.

^{xxvi} Ibid, p.435.

^{xxvii} Ibid, pp. 482-485.

^{xxviii} Ibid,p.466.

^{xxix} Ibid,pp.465-466.

^{xxx} Ibid, p.466.

^{xxxi} Ibid,p.494.

^{xxxii} Ibid,pp.495-503.

^{xxxiii} Ibid,p.438.

^{xxxiv} Ibid,p.437.

^{xxxv} Ibid,pp.475-478.

^{xxxvi} Ibid,pp.531-545.

^{xxxvii} Ibid,pp.478-531.

^{xxxviii} Ibid,pp.478-479.

^{xxxix} Ibid,pp.489-492.

^{xl} Ibid,p.492.

^{xli} Ibid,pp.446-447.

^{xlii} Ibid, p.449.

^{xliii} Ibid,pp.493-494

^{xliv} Ibid,p.493.

^{xlv} Ibid,pp.514-519.

^{xlvi} Ibid,pp.519-524.

^{xlvii} Ibid,pp.479-480.

^{xlviii} Ibid,pp.438-440.

^{xlix} Ibid,p.439.

^l Ibid,pp.439-440.

^{li} Ibid,p.443.

^{lii} Ibid,p.446.

^{liii} Ibid,p.453.

^{liv} Ibid,p.457.

^{lv} Ibid,pp.458-475.

^{lvi} Ibid,p.475.

^{lvii} Ibid,p.400.

^{lviii} Ibid, p.430.

^{lix} First World Conference on Muslim Education, King Abdul Aziz University, 1977,pp.9-160. See also S.S.Husain & S.A.Ashraf, *Crisis in Muslim Education*, King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, 1977,pp.7-50.

^{lx} Al-Faruqi, *Islamization*, p.18.

^{lxi} Syed Ali Ashraf, *Islamic Education Movement: An Historical Analysis*, The Islamic Academy, Cambridge, 1990, p.30.

^{lxii} Al-Faruqi, *Islamization*, p.44.

^{lxiii} Ashraf, *Islamic Education*, pp.39-41.

^{lxiv} *Ibid*, pp.42-44.

^{lxv} *Ibid*, p.43.

^{lxvi} Al-Faruqi, *Islamization*, pp.22-38.

^{lxvii} Al-Faruqi, *Islamization*, pp.17-18, and also see Abdul Hamid Abu Sulyman, *Qadiyat al-Manhajiyah fi al-Fikr al-Islami*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1989, p.7.

^{lxviii} Ashraf, *Islamic Education*, pp.27-31.

^{lxix} See Abu Sulyman, *Qadiyat al-Manhajiyah fi al-Fikr al-Islami*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, 1991, pp.79-80.

^{lxx} Abu al-Qasim Haj Hamad, *Manhajiyat al-Qur'an al-Ma'rifiyyah*, Dar al-Hadi, Beirut, 2003, pp.25-79 and 258-327.

^{lxxi} See *Ūlēm al-Khiḥ*, *Ūlēm al-Fikr al-Islami: Madkhal ilē nuz'Em al-Khiḥ*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, 1995.

^{lxxii} 'Alwani, *Islamization*, p.13.

^{lxxiii} *Ibid*, pp.23-30.

^{lxxiv} 'Alwani, *The Islamization*, p.11.

^{lxxv} *Ibid*, pp.14-23.

^{lxxvi} See Abu Qasim's work on *Manhajiyat al-Qur'an al-Ma'rifiyyah* was received in the closed door seminar which was held in Cairo in 1992.

^{lxxvii} After the closed door seminar which was held in Cairo, it became clear that these new ideas are not part of the main stream sensibility of IHOK.

^{lxxviii} 'Abbas Mahmud al-'Aqqad, al-Imam Muhammad 'Abdu, Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnani, Beirut, 1980, pp.130-133.

^{lxxix} *Ibid*, p.130.

^{lxxx} Muhammad 'Abdu, *Risalat al-Tawhid*, Dar al-Shuruq, pp.17-37.

^{lxxxi} ^{lxxxii} Al-Faruqi, *Islamization*, preface.

^{lxxxii} *Ibid*, preface.

^{lxxxiii} Isma'il Raji al-Faruqi, *Al-Tawhid: Its Implication for Thought and Life*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, 1982.

^{lxxxiv} Isma'il Raji al-Faruqi and Lois Lamya al-Faruqi, *Cultural Atlas of Islam*, (New York: MacMillan, 1996).

^{lxxxv} Abdul Hamid Abu Sulyman "Ma'arif al-Wahy: al-Manhajiyah wa al-Ada", *Islamiyyat al-Ma'rifah*, Vol.1, No.3, 1996, pp.85-109. In addition to that his famous article on al-Takamul al-Ma'rifi (integration of knowledge), Abdul Hamid Abu Sulyman, "Islamiyyat al-Jami'ah wa Tafsir al-Ta'lim al-'Ali bayna al-Nazariyyah wa al-Tadbiq", *Islamiyyat al-Ma'rifah*, Vol.1, No.7, No.26, 2001. See also, Abu Bakar Mohamed Ahmed Mohamed Ibrahim, *al-Takamul al-Ma'rifi fi al-Manhaj al-Jami'iyah*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, 2007. It should be noted that of Late Dr. Fath al-Malkawi through both Journal of *Islamiyyat al-Ma'rifah* and his training module on integration of knowledge made a significant impact on the ongoing debate on issues concerning integration of knowledge in the institutions of higher learning.

^{lxxxvi} Abu Sulyman "Ma'rif al-Wahy", pp.100-105.

^{lxxxvii} Hand Book of the Department of Usul al-Din and Comparative Religion, 2001, 2002.

^{lxxxviii} Zein, "Religions As a 'life fact'", pp.66-70.

^{lxxxix} *Ibid*, pp.69-70.

^{xc} The first work was al-Raysini, then approximately every year a new work will be published on Maqasid al-Shari'ah. Ahmed al-Raysini, *Nazariyyat al-Maqasid 'ind al-Imam al-Shatibi*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, second edition, 1992.

^{xcii} See Yunis Soualhi, Al-Imam Al-Shatibi's Induction: From mere Conjectures to Methodic Status (Unpublished MIRKH Thesis, 1994), Ibrahim Mohamed Zein, "Al-Istiqrā' 'ind al-Shatibi wa Manhaj al-Nazar fi Mudawwanatina al-Usuliyyah" *Islamiyyat al-Ma'rifah*, Vol.8, No.30, 2002, pp.27-59.

^{xciii} Mohamed El-Tahir Ibn Ashur, *Maqaaid al-Shari'ah al-Islamiyyah*, (ed.) Mohamed El-Tahir El-Misawi, Dar al-Fajr, KL, 1999, pp.123-124.

^{xciv} *Ibid*, p.117.

^{xcv} I would like to acknowledge that Dr. Mohamed El-Tahir El-Misawi drew my attention to this important idea. His observation made me to revisit the whole idea of the meaning of *Maqasid al-Shari'ah* in the process of relevantization of 'Ulum al-Millāh.