



The Concept of Acquired Knowledge (*'ilm al-ḥusūlī*); Its Reformation in the Discourse of Muslim Scholars

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Abstract

This paper examines the concept of acquired knowledge (*'ilm al-ḥusūlī*) in the discourse of Muslim scholars in relation to the reforms made by many Muslim scholars and thinkers such as al-Shāfi'ī (d.204/820), al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and al-Dihlawī (d.1176/1762). Al-Shāfi'ī contributed much to this field with his classification of knowledge into two categories, *'ilm al-ʿāmmah* and *'ilm al-khāṣṣah*. Al-Ghazālī, who developed *'ilm al-muʿāmalah* and *al-mukāshafah*, suggested a method of revivification (*iḥyā'*) in order to integrate the sciences of acquired knowledge. Al-Dihlawī developed and classified knowledge into *'ilm al-ḥudūrī* and *al-ḥusūlī*, and suggested the concept of *taṭbīq* in reforming acquired knowledge. Their discussions on the reformation of acquired knowledge have paved the way for modern scholars to derive concepts for the integration of human knowledge.

Keywords: Islamic sciences, Narrated sciences, Sufism, Islamic Epistemology, Islamic Philosophy.

Abstrak

Kertas ini akan meneliti konsep ilmu yang diperoleh (*'ilm al-husuli*) dalam wacana para sarjana Muslim berhubung kait dengan pembaharuan yang dibawa oleh sarjana dan pemikir Muslim seperti al-Shafi'i (d.204/820), al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) dan al-Dihlawi (d.1176/1762). Al-Shafi'i memberi sumbangan dalam bidang ini dengan mengklasifikasikan ilmu kepada dua kategori, *'ilm al-ʿammah* dan *'ilm al-khassah*. Al-Ghazali, yang mengembangkan *'ilm al-muʿamalah* dan *al-mukashafah*, mencadangkan kaedah menggiatkan semula (*iḥyā'*) agar dapat menyatukan ilmu sains yang diperoleh. Al-Dihlawi pula mengembang dan mengklasifikasikan ilmu dalam *'ilm al-hudhuri* dan *al-husuli*, serta mencadangkan konsep *taṭbiq* dalam pembaharuan ilmu yang diperoleh. Wacana mereka tentang pembaharuan ilmu yang diperoleh telah menyediakan asas kepada sarjana moden memperoleh konsep bagi menyatukan ilmu pengetahuan.

Kata kunci: sains Islam, pengisahan sains, Sufisme, Epistimologi Islam, Falsafah Islam

Introduction

In Islamic Epistemology there is a slight but significant difference between the terms *al-ʿIlm* and *al-maʿrifah*. The former normally refers to one of the attributes of God who is *al-ʿAlīm* (The Omniscient) whereas the later refers to one of the attributes of mankind who is *al-ʿārīf*. However, on occasions regarding the derivation of the word *'ilm* there are terminologies in the Qur'ān that refer to

the quality of man such as *al-ʿulamā'*, (Al-Qur'ān, 35:28.) *ulū al-ʿilm* (Al-Qur'ān, 3:18.), *al-rāsikhūn fī 'ilm* (Al-Qur'ān, 3:7.) and more.

By contrast however, the Qur'ān's word *'a, r, f* and its derivations are never attributed to God. Unlike God who is omniscient, man is lacking in all aspects including knowledge and must make every effort to acquire it. Muslim scholars agree on the definition, 'less of God's *'ilm*', as God's intellect transcends the human intellect far beyond the capacity of man's reason. For this reason God's knowledge cannot be defined and discussed deliberately; besides this, it is God alone Who grants knowledge to man.

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However, a majority of Muslim philosophers unanimously agree that human knowledge (*al-ma'rifah*) can be defined and discussed deliberately because its nature is limited. Instead of 'human knowledge' the term 'knowledge' is used in its universally understood context, meaning human knowledge. Haji Khalifah (1994) and F. Rosenthal (1970) have listed many definitions of knowledge in their respective and voluminous works, *Kashf al-zunūn* and *Knowledge Triumphant*. All definitions made by Muslim scholars and philosophers were based on the concept that man is constituted of two elements; body (*jasad*) and spirit (*rūḥ*), out of which their integration gives rise to the human soul (*nafs al-insān*). After undergoing certain processes, the soul that receives the meaning of some 'thing' in its actual form is said to be in a state of possessing knowledge.

Many Arabic terms refer to concepts of acquired knowledge. Some of these are '*Ilm al-ḥuṣūlī*', '*Ilm al-kasbī*', '*ilm al-ḥikmiyyah al-'aqliyyah*' and others as made evident in classic Muslim literature. This kind of knowledge is normally called *al-ma'rifah al-bashariyyah* (human knowledge) as it derives from man's efforts to understand himself and others. The Arabic words *al-ḥuṣūlī*, *al-kasbī*, *al-ḥikmiyyah al-'aqliyyah*, refer respectively to man's intellect (*al-'aql*), senses (*al-aḥsās*) and effort (*al-kasb*) to understand something and consequently acquire knowledge.

Al-Shāfi'ī's Classification of Knowledge

Though not explicitly stated, al-Shāfi'ī's epistemology¹ classified knowledge in two categories: revelatory (as the source of knowledge) and human. He considered Revelation—al-Qur'ān and al-sunnah—the sources of knowledge given to mankind. These two sources are intentionally introduced by al-Shāfi'ī in *Kitāb jimā' al-'ilm* of *al-Umm*, in which he discussed the comprehensive nature of the knowledge of God in the form of its revelation as given to the Prophet. The interpretation, as made by the prophet, is *al-sunnah* and also falls within the ambit of revelation.

In *al-Risālah*, al-Shāfi'ī's discourse on knowledge mainly centred on human knowledge like the *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *uṣūl al-ḥadīth* (Calder, 1983; Shukri, 2008). The first two chapters mainly discuss the Qur'ān, al-sunnah regarding their relationship and elucidation. The remaining ten chapters deal with man's reason as a consequence of these two sources and include the *naskh* (the theory of abrogation); religious obligation; conflicting *ḥadīth*; '*ilm* (knowledge); *khabar al-*

wāḥid (the single-transmitted report); *ijmā'* (consensus); *qiyās* (analogical reasoning); *ijtihād* (the effort to form a right opinion); *istiḥsān* (juristic preference); and *ikhtilāf* (disagreement). (Al-Shāfi'ī, 2009),

Without defining what knowledge is, al-Shāfi'ī confines his discussion to the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and employs the term 'knowledge' in the sense of religious rulings. His main discussion on the 'knowledge of ruling' is that which is derived from Divine sources, '*ilm aḥkām Allāh*' and the rulings of the Prophet. In other words, the role of man's intellect in acquiring knowledge, especially in understanding the Divine sources, is deliberately discussed by al-Shāfi'ī. Subsequently, it can be understood that al-Shāfi'ī's discussion of the concept of knowledge regards that which is acquired, as he discusses revelation in his *jimā' al-'Ilm* separately.

According to al-Shāfi'ī (1993), human knowledge can be classified into '*ilm al-dīn*' (religious knowledge) and '*ilm al-dunyā*' (worldly knowledge). What is readily deduced from al-Shāfi'ī's discussion is that religious knowledge is the result of man's intellectual effort to directly understand the Qur'ān and *Sunnah*. Thus, it leads to the development of other sciences such as *fiqh*, *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *tafsīr*, '*ulūm al-Qur'ān*' etc. For this purpose al-Shāfi'ī emphasizes the *uṣūl al-fiqh* in which the *al-qiyās* (religious analogy) became his most preferred methodology. On the other hand, worldly knowledge is the effort of man's intellect to understand this world and its phenomena, which, to some extent, does not directly deal with the Qur'ān and *sunnah*. An in-depth analysis of his works reveals that al-Shāfi'ī gives special emphasis to religious knowledge.

Al-Shāfi'ī (1993) suggested that religious knowledge is of two categories; '*ilm al-'āmm*' (common knowledge) and '*ilm al-khāṣṣ*' (specialist knowledge). Common knowledge is that which every sane, mature, adult Muslim knows and of which ignorance is impossible. This category comprises the five daily prayers, fasting during Ramaḍān, alms giving (*zakāt*), the pilgrimage, etc. In other words, it is knowledge which all Muslims must acquire to fulfil their religious obligations as made evident by al-Shāfi'ī's words, *kullīfa al-'ibād* (individually obligatory). The source of this knowledge is Revelation, i.e. the Qur'ān and sunnah. As the Qur'ān is *mutawātir* wherein error is not possible, the same applies to the sunnah or *akḥabar al-'āmmah* (*al-ladhī lā yumkin fīhi al-ghalaṭ min al-khabar*), which qualifies it as a source of knowledge also. Error in this type of

knowledge is impossible as no one disputes its having been faithfully narrated over generations. As a jurist al-Shāfi'ī linked this type of knowledge to that which has the ethically legal status as an obligatory duty for all individuals (*farḍ 'alā al-āmmah*).

As for specialist knowledge ('ilm al-khāss), al-Shāfi'ī refers it to the details of the common knowledge ('ilm al-āmmah) which are subsidiary duties and specific rulings (*furū' al-farā'id, khāss al-aḥkām*) from God to mankind; for example, the detailed laws regarding the five daily prayers, fasting, *zakāt*, pilgrimage and others. Al-Shāfi'ī, (1993) claimed that most of these rulings are not textually (*naṣṣan*) mentioned in the two major sources of revelation but are deduced by the practice of religious analogy (*al-qiyās*).

Al-Shāfi'ī further stated that the method of *qiyās* is to be preferred when dealing with 'ilm al-khāssah, although other methods such as *ta'wīl, ra'y, istihsān*, etc. may also be employed. In other words specialist knowledge emphasizes the use of reason by select individuals who deduce rulings from the Qur'ān and *sunnah*. Subsequently, al-Shāfi'ī is of the opinion that the legal value of acquiring this type of knowledge is a collective obligation (*farḍ fī hi qasḍ al-kifāyah*). According to him this is evident in the many Qur'anic verses on the obligation of striving for the sake of God (*jihād*) (Al-Qur'ān, 9:29, 36, 38-39, 41, 111, 122). All of these verses indicate that *Jihād* is obligatory for a group of people upon which God blesses with high rank, whereas the rest of the community is not obliged to do so.

Al-Shāfi'ī's Reformation of Acquired Knowledge

As the method of religious reasoning, according to Kamali (1996) had already been used by the companions and their successors, the effort made by al-Shāfi'ī may be deemed a reformation of their methodologies. It is worth mentioning that reforms made by al-Shāfi'ī preceded the arrival of Greek philosophy in the Islamic world, especially the introduction of Aristotelian logic, mostly introduced by al-Fārābī (d.338/950). The methodology of reasoning which fell under the ambit of acquired knowledge was improved by al-Shāfi'ī and his followers. He named his methodology 'analogical religious reasoning' (*al-qiyās al-shar'ī*), which deal solely with the two divine sources, al-Qur'ān and al-sunnah.

Qiyās (Analogical Reasoning)

Although analogical reasoning existed during the lifetime of the Prophet, the first to apply it systematically was Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/767). According to D. Bakar (1994), it is also said that a semi-technical use of the term *qiyās* is found in a letter from the second Caliph, 'Umar al-Khaṭṭāb (d.23/644) to Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī (d. 51/672) on the issue of determining the minimum dower (*mahr*).

Unlike Aristotle's analogy, al-Shāfi'ī did not base his analogy on the syllogistic method which consists of three premises or principles² but by deducing the cause ('illah) of the *ḥukm* as found in the Qur'ān and *aḥādīth* (i.e. the *aṣl*), and then applying *ḥukm* to a new case (*al-far'*). This is commonly practiced in the field of *fiqh* since the absence of legal value (*ḥukm*) in both sources demands that man use his reason. In other words, the scope of al-Shāfi'ī's analogy is narrower as it only treats the *ḥukm* of new cases (*al-far'*) not presented in the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. Al-Shāfi'ī's analogy does not involve the discovery of new formulae as in the pure and applied sciences search for the laws of nature. One can term his type of analogy as *al-qiyās al-shar'ī* (i.e., religious analogy). Aristotle's syllogism is discussed elsewhere in this writing, as it was amply criticized then modified by al-Ghazālī as part of his efforts to revive Islamic religious sciences ('ulūm al-dīn).

In his attempt to extrapolate legal values (*aḥkām*), al-Shāfi'ī and his followers introduced the mechanism of *qiyās* which must be based exclusively on the following (Hassan, 1986):

(a) *takhrīj al-manāṭ* (derivation of the basis for rulings);

(b) *tanqīḥ al-manāṭ* (refinement of the basis for rulings); and

(c) *taḥqīq al-manāṭ* (the verification or ascertainment of the basis for rulings), also known as *masālik al-'illah* (path to the cause).

Al-Manāṭ al-ḥukm or *al-'illah* may be defined as a thing to which the Sharī'ah has attributed the ruling or that which anchored (*naṭa*) it or appointed it as a sign for the ruling. (D.Bakar,1994). The main purpose of the *masālik al-'illah* is to find reasons for each *ḥukm* as contained in the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. In other words, the *qiyās* of al-Shāfi'ī and his followers are confined solely to the legal texts of the Qur'an and *Sunnah*; also known as *āyāt wa aḥādīth al-aḥkām* (legal verses and traditions). However, these texts are small in both number and comparison to other verses. It is said that out of more than 6,000 verses, only 300 or so concern legal rulings. This is also the case with *aḥādīth al-*

aḥkām as based solely on the categories of either *ṣaḥīḥ* (authentic) and *ḥasan* (good). As for *aḥādīth*'s falling under the categories of *ḍa'īf* (weak) and *mawḍū'* (fabricated), these are usually rejected as sources for *ḥukm* in Islamic law. Accordingly, in addition to either 'obvious' (*qiyās jalī*) or 'hidden analogy' (*qiyās khafī*) as per Ḥanafite jurists, Shāfi'ite jurists divided *qiyās* into three main categories: (a) *al-qiyās al-awlā* (superior analogy);³ (b) *al-qiyās al-musāwī* (equal analogy),⁴ and (c) *al-qiyās al-adnā* (inferior analogy).⁵ (Kamali, 1999)

Al-Ghazali's Concept of Acquired Knowledge.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī is one of the outstanding scholars in Islamic world who mastered many areas of knowledge including jurisprudence and its principles (*fiqh wa uṣūlih*), speculative theology (*kalām*), Sufism (*taṣawwuf*), Philosophy and others. Having trained under the Shāfi'ite school of jurisprudence, al-Ghazālī followed his predecessor's juristic point of view. With the knowledge of *kalām*, philosophy and Sufism he developed several approaches to the classification of knowledge, all of which begin with a profound comprehension of revelation, al-Qur'ān and al-Sunnah. Al-Ghazālī (1980) acknowledged that he had gone through the works of al-Muḥāsibī (d.857/242), al-Junayd (d.297/910) and Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī (d.386/996) in the field of Sufism. He also probably had studied some other works of his predecessors like Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d.402/1013), 'Abd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī (d.465/1072) and al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d.502/1108).

Al-Ghazali 's Classification of Knowledge

A study made by Bakar (1992) suggested that al-Ghazālī employed several systems for the classification of knowledge in his epistemology; some of which are presential ('*ilm al-ḥudūrī*'; '*ilm al-mukāshafah*'; '*ilm al-laduniyyah*')); acquired ('*ilm al-ḥuṣūlī*'); religious (*shar'īyyah*); intellectual ('*aqliyyah*', *ghayr shar'ī*); individual obligations (*farḍ 'ayn*); collective obligations (*farḍ kifāyah*); worldly sciences ('*ulūm al-dunyā*'); other-worldly sciences ('*ulūm al-ākhirah*'); theoretical; practical ('*ilm al-mu'āmalah*'); and finally, Islamically related sciences ('*ulūm al-dīn*'). In his discourse on knowledge, he was reluctant to talk in detail on '*ilm al-ḥudūrī*' or '*ilm al-mukāshafah*' and the like as they are beyond the grasp of the human mind's capacity. Al-Ghazālī, (1988) described this type of knowledge as *al-malakah fawq al-'aql*. Most of his discourse on knowledge centred on humanly

acquired knowledge, i.e., sciences that were based on intellection ('*ilm al-ḥuṣūlī*'); the "seeing of things as they really are" (*ma'rifat al-shay' 'alā mā huwa bih*).

In the spirit of reform, al-Ghazālī contributed remarkable effort towards Greek philosophy, especially Epistemology, Ontology, Cosmology and Axiology. He gave special attention to the methodology of Greek philosophy in that he praises their efforts and exercise of their intellectual power to find the truth. However, he isolated elements not in line with Islam, especially the wrong use of syllogism, the concept of the human soul and its relation to mind and body as examples. This is evident in his books on philosophy and Sufism: *Maqāsid al-falāsifah*, *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*, *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, *al-Qistās al-mustaqīm*, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* and others. His remarkable effort can be considered in modern terms as *Islamicization* and '*relevantization*', especially for conforming Greek philosophy and its methodology to Islamic values.

Another salient feature of al-Ghazālī's concept of reform is his concept of *iḥyā'* or the revivification of religiously related knowledge or sciences ('*ulūm al-dīn*'). Al-Ghazālī, (1988) confined his concept of *iḥyā'* to practical religious sciences ('*ilm al-mu'āmalah*') to the exclusion of the science of revelation ('*ilm al-mukāshafah*'). We can assume that this category of '*ilm al-mu'āmalah*' is similar to another his classifications, that of the acquired sciences ('*ilm al-ḥuṣūlī*'). Most branches of practical religious sciences scattered throughout his categorization of *farḍ 'ayn* and *farḍ kifāyah* need revision as they are misused by certain learned men with worldly interests ('*ulamā' al-dunyā*'). This would comply with his classification of knowledge into worldly-related sciences ('*ulūm al-dunyā*') and other worldly-related sciences ('*ulūm al-ākhirah*'). Examples of worldly-related sciences are jurisprudence (*fiqh*), *kalām*, linguistics and syntax, medicine and others while other worldly-related sciences are those concerning states of the heart.

In *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān*, al-Ghazālī (1983) clearly relates that the Qur'ān can be divided into two parts: the outward part (*al-Qashr*, *al-kiswah*, *al-ṣadf*), and the inward part. The outward part is concerns the Arabic language (*al-lughah al-'arabiyyah*) from which branches three types of knowledge: (a) *Tafsīr*, the science of Arabic syntax (*i'rāb*); (b) the science of reading (*qirā'at*); (c) the science of pronunciation (*alfāz*). The inwards component is the pith of the Qur'ān and holds two gradations. First are the lower grades (*tabaqāt al-*

suflā) and second are the upper grades or roots ('ilm al-*ṣawāb*). From the lower grades stem three types of knowledge: the history of the Prophets, 'ilm al-*kalām*, and Jurisprudence.

The upper grades of Qur'anic knowledge contain the knowledge of purification of the soul and the removal of the obstacles or 'destructive qualities (*al-muhlikāt*); and secondly, knowledge for equipping the soul with saving qualities (*al-munjiyāt*). Both are included in the knowledge of the straight path (*al-'ilm bi al-ṣirāṭ al-mustaqīm*) and the mystical way (*ṭarīq al-sulūk*). The highest and noblest knowledge is the knowledge of God (*ma'rifah*) and of the last day (*yawm al-ākhirah*). These are considered highest by al-Ghazālī (1983) because all other forms of knowledge are sought for their sake whereas knowledge is not sought for anything else. This sort of knowledge can be attained through the intuitive knowledge of inner realities (*kashf*).

These are the sciences as derived from the Qur'ān by al-Ghazālī who further classifies them under '*ulūm al-shar'ī* and *ghayr al-shar'ī*. From their classification it is clear that according to al-Ghazālī, *kalām* and *fiqh* derive from the lower grades of the inward part of the Qur'ān, whereas the *ma'rifat Allāh* is the highest and noblest knowledge of the upper grades.

Like al-Shāfi'ī, a further classification relates to an ethical-legal position in the sense that each science has or is subjected to legal values, either *farḍ 'ayn* or *farḍ kifāyah*. With regard to practical religion ('ilm al-*mu'āmalah*), it consists of three things: beliefs, works, and prohibitions. A sane adult must observe the requirements of these three areas on attaining the age of puberty. The first is the obligation is to learn the two utterances of faith (*al-shahādah*) and understand them. Thus, it is called *farḍ 'ayn* for it is an individual effort to acquire such knowledge. A detailed discussion of God and the Prophet is not required at the time of utterance but to understand them is acceptable. Once an individual acquires faith enough (*īmān*) to confess the *shahādah*, he must next acquire knowledge about the five daily prayers and what is related to them such as prayer times, ablution, and method of prayer, and the requirements and prohibitions entailed.

In line with al-Shāfi'ī's concept of '*ilm al-āmmah*, the science of *farḍ 'ayn* of al-Ghazālī covers knowledge about the tenets of Islam such as the *shahādah*, *ṣalāt*, *ṣawm*, *zakāt* and *hajj al-bayt*. The purpose of *farḍ 'ayn* is to protect the faith from deviation resulting from passing thoughts of doubt (*khaṭir*), evil impulses, hypocrisy and envy and to

aid their eradication. This area is discussed by al-Ghazālī in chapters on the destructive matters of life contained in his book the *Ihyā' 'ulūm al-dīn* under the on the wonders of the heart', whose main theme is the concept of *ihyā'* of the soul. This type of science conforms to his classification of '*ulūm al-ākhirah* (other worldly sciences). As a Shāfi'ite, al-Ghazālī seems to have modified and improved al-Shāfi'ī's concept of '*ilm al-āmmah* by naming it *farḍ 'ayn* and suggesting ways to protect the faith—a discussion absent from al-Shāfi'ī's work.

He divides *farḍ kifāyah* into two sub-categories, the *shar'ī* (sciences derived from revelation directly via human reason), and *ghayr shar'ī* (sciences derived solely from human reason). The *shar'ī* sciences are of two types; the praiseworthy (*al-maḥmūdah*) and blameworthy (*al-madhmūmah*). The praiseworthy are set on four foundations; the *uṣūl* (sources), *furū'* (branches), *muqaddimāt* (auxiliary) and *mutammimāt* (supplementary). The sources are al-Qur'ān and al-sunnah comprising the consensus of all Muslims (*ijmā'*) and traditions of the companions (*āthār*). It seems that al-Ghazālī (1988) follows al-Shāfi'ī's concept of '*ilm al-khāṣṣah* (specialist knowledge) and shortens the phrase *farḍ fī hi qaṣd al-kifāyah* in to *farḍ kifāyah*.

The branches (*furū'*) are the sciences derived from the sources (*uṣūl*, and are adduced by the mind to widen the understanding of the sources. (Al-Ghazālī, 1983) They are like a collection of laws from the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth* that pertain to this world, and sciences that pertains to the hereafter such as the conditions of the heart. He goes on to describe the auxiliary (*muqaddimāt*) sciences that serve as tools for the *shar'ī* sciences such as the Arabic language. Sciences derived from the latter are linguistics, syntax and writing that are required to understand the Qur'ān, sunnah etc.

The *mutammimāt* (supplementary) sciences enhance the understanding of the sources. Such sciences are the sciences of Qur'ān, of *ḥadīth*, of the biographic history of the Prophet (*sīrah*), of Quranic exegesis (*tafsīr*), of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and so on. Surprisingly, al-Ghazālī classifies the science of jurisprudence under the ambit of '*ulūm al-dunyā* (worldly sciences) as *shar'ī* is praiseworthy because it deals with the administration and governance of this world. (Al-Ghazālī, 1988)

The *ghayr shar'ī* sciences comprise three categories; the praiseworthy (*maḥmūd*), the blameworthy (*madhmūm*) and the permissible (*mubāḥ*). As mentioned elsewhere, the praiseworthy are like the sciences of linguistics,

syntax, writing, and others. Adding to this list, al-Ghazālī places medicine (*al-ṭibb*) and physician (*al-ṭabīb*) to the praiseworthy. He classifies Philosophy into four main subjects; Geometry and Arithmetic (*al-handasah wa al-ḥisāb*), Logics (*manṭiq*), Divinity (*ilāhiyyāt*), and some subjects of Physics (*tabī'īyyāt*) under the ambit of permissible (*mubāḥ*) sciences to be learned. However, these may become blameworthy if one's intention and means are incorrect. (Al-Ghazālī, 2006)

Since the science of logics (*manṭiq*) and divinity (*ilāhiyyāt*) are components of theology and philosophy, pursuing them is also *farḍ kifāyah* whose task is to guard the laymen's faith against innovations that follow the philosophic disputations and erroneous theological views. It can be assumed that any science that contributes much to the religion of Islam and covers aspects of faith, laws and ethics can be included under Islamic sciences ('*ulūm al-dīn*).

Al-Ghazālī (1988) classifies the sciences of magic, talisman, juggling, trickery and others under what is blameworthy. However, these sciences in themselves are not evil but are considered especially blameworthy because of those who seek their worldly benefits. This also goes for the '*ulūm al-dunyā*, *shar'ī* and *ghayr shar'ī* sciences which basically are praiseworthy in nature, but when in the hand of bad people who seek worldly interests become blameworthy. Al-Ghazālī gives the example of the sciences of '*ilm al-kalām* and *al-fiqh* which are *shar'ī* in nature, and astronomy, geometry, arithmetic which are *ghayr al-shar'ī*, but can be misused by evil people. Therefore, in order to guide them to the right path he suggests that *ihyā'* be applied to the sciences of *farḍ 'ayn* and *farḍ kifāyah* or, for a wider scope, '*ilm al-mu'āmalah*.

It can be assumed that from an ethical-legal point of view, any science that falls under *farḍ 'ayn*, *farḍ kifāyah* and *mubāḥ*, or can be reformed to *farḍ kifāyah* or *mubāḥ*, may be included under the '*ilm al-mu'āmalah* (knowledge of practical religion) or on a wider scope '*ulūm al-dīn* (Islamic sciences). This is evident from al-Ghazālī's treatment of Greek philosophy, especially the subject of Logics (*manṭiq*). Having known that Logics is of Greek origin, al-Ghazālī reforms (*ihyā'*) it until becomes an accepted methodology for the defence of the faith ('*aqidah*) of Islam. By purifying it from elements not in line with Islamic values, he eventually classified it under *ghayr shar'ī* whose acquisition is *farḍ kifāyah*. Until now this subject is studied as one of the Islamic sciences ('*ulūm al-dīn*).

The Concept of Revivification (*ihyā'*) of Acquired Knowledge

Al-Ghazālī developed the concept of *ihyā'* for dealing with acquired knowledge or '*ilm al-mu'āmalah*; this category covers the narrated sciences ('*ulūm al-shar'ī*), the intellectual sciences (*ghayr al-shar'ī*), the worldly sciences ('*ulūm al-dunyā*) and other-worldly sciences ('*ulūm al-ākhirah*), individual obligations (*farḍ 'ayn*) and collective obligations (*farḍ kifāyah*). It is worth mentioning that prior to this effort al-Ghazālī had mastered the sciences related to Qur'ān and Sunnah. This is evident in books such as *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān*, *al-Wajīz* and others. Furthermore, he also mastered many of contemporary sciences of his time such as jurisprudence and its principles (*fiqh wa uṣūlih*), Sufism (*taṣawwuf*), speculative theology ('*ilm al-kalām*), and Philosophy which included Mathematics and Geometry, Divinity, Logics, Physics and more.

The most remarkable effort made by al-Ghazālī is his reformation of Greek philosophy which is mostly presented in the works of al-Fārābī (d.338/950) and Ibn Sīnā (d.428/1037). His effort to reform philosophy began with his journey to acquire ultimate truth during which he devoted more than four years in the study of philosophy. He wrote that the aim of the philosophers (*Maqāsid al-falāsifah*) was to elucidate their goals, objectives and methodologies employed in their mission to find the truth. He later criticised them in *Tahāfut al-falāsifah*, *al-Qistās al-mustaqīm*, *al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl* and other works.

Ghayr al-Shar'ī-Logic

Ghayr al-shar'ī sciences are acquired by the method of intellection much like arithmetic, medical experimentation, or sensory cognition such as the hearing of language and so forth. Logic can be classified under several categories of al-Ghazālī's system of classification such as *ghayr shar'ī*, '*ilm al-dunyā* (worldly), *mubāḥ* (permissible), and *farḍ kifāyah*. An example al-Ghazālī's employment of the formula of *ihyā'* on Logic is demonstrated in the following pages. This process *kalām* reasoning adopts the Aristotelian methodology of the syllogism in order to strengthen theological arguments. Aristotle's analogy as based on syllogistic reasoning is characterized by three fundamental premises or principles; the first is the 'major premise', the second is the 'minor premise' followed by the third, which is the 'conclusion'.

The first premise must be a universal rule and also an affirmative statement based on research and not on assumption, for example;

Every man must die (First premise)
Aristotle is a man (Second premise)
Therefore, Aristotle must die (Conclusion)

Every intoxicating item is prohibited (First premise)
Liquor is intoxicating (Second premise)
Therefore, liquor is prohibited (Conclusion)

Errors occur most often when the major premise, being the most important contains a weak statement which then determines the status of the result or conclusion drawn. If the statement of the first premise is based on conjecture or hearsay, or is not universal by nature and is axiomatically wrong, it inevitably leads to the false result and vice-versa, even though the procedure (method) is syllogistically correct. Therefore, Aristotle's analogy does not give any new information except for what transpires as a result of the first premise. There are many other examples of this point like:

Every intoxicating item is liquid and prohibited (First premise)
Water is liquid (second premise)
Therefore, water is prohibited. (Result)

The first premise of the examples given is not universal as it is not special characteristic of the object under scrutiny (i.e. intoxicating item). Hence, the result is also incorrect though the procedure is syllogistically correct. The syllogistic mechanism is also used in deductive⁶ and inductive⁷ methods. It aims at finding the general rule which can be applied to everybody especially when it relates to man's daily life and the laws of nature. This method of reasoning is widely used in the field of philosophy, applied sciences and theology.

However, the reasoning can only be applied to the physical/sensible world and not to the metaphysical realm (*sam'iyiyyāt*, *ghaybiyyāt*) as suggested by al-Ghazālī (1980). He goes on to demonstrate the weaknesses of the syllogism especially when it involves metaphysical issues. He refers to his polemics with the Mu'tazilites on issues like God having a body, God's justice (*al-'adālah al-ilāhiyyah*) and others which come under the subject of Metaphysics (*al-ilāhiyyah*). He demonstrates the above issues as follows:

Deductive Proving.
Every agent-maker has a body.

God is the agent-maker.
Therefore, God has a body.

Inductive Proving.
The agent-makers like weavers, cuppers, shoemaker, tailors, carpenters etc., have bodies.
Thus, every agent has a body
God is the agent-maker.
Therefore, God has a body.

On the issue of God's justice, al-Ghazālī rebuts arguments made by the Mu'tazilites that it is obligatory on God to do the best for His servants. They were unable to substantiate their contentions except for personal opinions (*ra'y*). According to al-Ghazālī, this is due to incorrectness in comparing (*qiyās*) Creator with creature; and of God's knowledge with their knowledge. Al-Ghazālī (1980) gave his rebuttal as follows: "If the best were obligatory on God, He would do it. But it is known that He has not done it; so [that] proves that it is not obligatory-for He does not omit the obligatory". If the Mu'tazilite doctrine as inferred from its incorrect analogy were accepted, it would then lead to a corruption of faith as it interferes with the Absolute Power of God.

After demonstrating the loopholes of Aristotelian syllogism, al-Ghazālī went on to discuss its purpose. The method of *kalām* is simply meant to protect the layman's religious belief from any confusion created by heretics (Al-Ghazālī, 1983). He mentions that he cannot attain his aim through *kalām*, but argues that it can assist others in attaining their aims (theologians). This science also compels the layman to question philosophy with respect of the study of essence (*dhāt*), accident (*'araḍ*) and so forth. As a result, the layman will be confused as regards truth and falsehood. Although he denied *kalām* personally, he nevertheless approved of its use for those who prefer it (Al-Ghazālī, 1980).

In summary, in order to defend and strengthen the faith scholars of speculative theology apply Aristotelian logic, especially the syllogism. In the hands of al-Ghazālī, the subject of Logic had been revived (*iḥyā'*) until it is qualified for inclusion as one of the *farḍ kifāyah* sciences. After this process is completed one must then observe the science of the heart or 'self'.

As for other intellectual sciences, al-Ghazālī (1988) had high regard for *al-ṭibb* (medicine) and *al-ṭabīb* (physician,) to the extent they are equivalent with *uṣūl al-fiqh* as they are worldly sciences and their pursuit is considered *farḍ kifāyah*. This is so because during his time a large

number of non-Muslims (*ahl al-dhimmah*) studied these subjects compared to Muslims who favoured the study of *fiqh* and *uṣūl al-fiqh*. In other words, it can be assumed that sciences related to medicine are Islamic sciences because they are included in the *farḍ kifāya*.

Shar'ī sciences

As all *shar'ī* sciences derive directly from revelation they are praiseworthy. Although all are praiseworthy, "sometimes, however, they may be confused with what may be taken for praiseworthy but, in fact, are blameworthy". (Al-Ghazālī, 1988) In this case he appends that the science of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) potentially falls under this ambit. He went further to say that the main focus of jurisprudence is the governance of this world which is subjected to either the lawful or unlawful. As the jurists make judgments based on outward evidence, this science does not deal with the states of the heart which is the science of the hereafter. Should this science been in the hand of jurists who are worldly inclined, their judgments would also be biased in that direction. He therefore, links this science with the science of the states of the heart or soul. To study the science of the states of the heart was considered *farḍ 'ayn* by al-Ghazālī.

The underlying theme of the science of states of the heart is to revive the heart or soul of the individual so he/she will then observe and implement the Islamic values of acquired knowledge. This science discusses the reality of the human soul (*qalb*, *'aql*, *naḥs*) which has two qualities, the praiseworthy and the blameworthy. Hence, praiseworthy qualities⁸ should be equipped within the soul to replace those that are blameworthy.⁹

The soul should undergo a certain process of purification to equip it with good characteristic leading to salvation (*munjiyāt*) so as to control vices that otherwise lead it to perdition (*muhlikāt*). In order to purify the soul, al-Ghazālī suggests the method of *mujāhadah* (self mortification) and *riyādah al-naḥs* (self training) to be practiced. It starts with repentance (*tawbah*) and ends with the love of God (*maḥabbat Allāh*), all of which he considers the stations (*maqāmāt*) of Sufism. Prior to the achievement of these stations, he suggests that one should practice devotional actions (*'ibādah*) which are of two kinds; obligatory and supererogatory acts. Details of his method for the purification of the soul can be seen in his theory of Islamic ethics (*akhlāq Islāmiyyah*), which is also a part of philosophy.

Al-Ghazālī's concepts regarding the revivification (*iḥyā'*) of the sciences can be viewed as a process of integrating various sciences from acquired knowledge so they may be included within Islamic sciences (*'ulūm al-dīn*). The process begins with the person(s) involved who must undergo a process of purification of the soul and understand the science of the heart so as to enable him to integrate the other sciences. However, he faced problems with the sciences of astrology, magic and talismans as to how they might be tailored to Islamic values in order to qualify them classification under the category of *mubāḥ* (permissible). For this reason he classified them as blameworthy.

Al-Dihlawī's Concept of Acquired Knowledge

Another outstanding figure reputed for his theories of reformation is Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī. One of his theories is *taṭbīq*, whose root word is *t*, *b*, *q*, can be understood to mean the finding of common points or ideas in contradictory theories, ideologies etc so they can be practiced in line with Islamic values. His theory of adjustment/adaptation/accommodation (*taṭbīq*) can be seen as an attempt to reconcile various schools of jurisprudence, Sufi orders, theology and so forth in the Islamic world. It is important to analyse his theory of *ma'rifah* especially in his classification of knowledge as it is the underlying idea of his theory of *taṭbīq*.

Like al-Ghazālī, al-Dihlawī, classifies human knowledge into *presentia* knowledge (*'ilm al-ḥuḍūrī*) and acquired knowledge (*'ilm al-ḥuṣūlī*) (Al-Dihlawī, 1970). Following al-Ghazālī, he is of the opinion that *'ilm al-ḥuḍūrī* is beyond the capacity of man's reason and a gift to a selected few from God. According to al-Dihlawī, (1974) in his work *Al-Khair al-Kathir*, this type of knowledge does not involve five external senses (*iḥsās*) but is transmitted through the *imaginative* faculty (*takhayyul*) and *estimative* faculty (*tawahhum*). Unlike al-Ghazālī who refuses to speak of this type of knowledge, he describes this in a highly detailed explanation in which he puts the *waḥy* (revelation) of the prophets and messengers on the primary list. According to him, the *waḥy* is a privilege of the prophets alone and cannot be obtained by ordinary people.

The second on his list is knowledge of unveiling (*al-makshūfāt*) of which he includes many kinds of intuitive knowledge such as unveiling (*kashf*), true vision (*ru'yah al-ṣāliḥah*), insight (*firāsah*), divine whispers (*ḥātīf*), spiritual vision (*al-mubasshirāt*) and others. This type of knowledge falls under the realm of extraordinary happenings (*khawāriq al-*

'ādah) granted by God only to a select few. He of the opinion that since this is only for a select few there is no use for its elaboration it as it is not subject to his formula of adaptation (*taṭbīq*).

Like al-Ghazālī who classifies '*ilm al-mu'āmalah* into *shar'ī* and *ghayr shar'ī*, al-Dihlawī has another classification that is also acquired knowledge ('*ilm al-ḥusūlī*). This type is defined as 'portraying the form (of Reality) in the mind' and the 'realization or comprehension of the known object in the intellect of the knower (the subject) (*ḥusūl ṣūrah al-shay'*). It involves the four faculties of man; senses (*iḥsās*), imagination (*takhayyul*), estimation (*tawahhum*), and intellection (*ta'qqul*). Al-Dihlawī (1970, 1974)

It branches out into transmitted or narrated sciences (*al-manqūlāt*) and intellectual sciences (*al-ma'qūlāt*). *Al-Manqūlāt* signifies those sciences that derive by the use of man's reason from the two transmitted sources, al-Qur'ān and al-sunnah. Examples are '*Ulūm al-Qur'ān*', '*ulum al-ḥadīth*', Qur'anic exegesis (*tafsīr*), jurisprudence ('*ulūm al-fiqh*) and its principles (*uṣūl al-fiqh*), theology (*uṣūl al-dīn*), Sufism (*taṣawwuf*) and others. It seems that al-Dihlawī fully accords with al-Ghazālī's categorization of the *shar'ī* sciences.

According to al-Dihlawī (1999), al-Qur'ān also deals with at least five categories of science:

- 1) The science of divine injunctions ('*ilm al-aḥkām*);
- 2) the science of disputation ('*ilm al-mukhāṣamah*);
- 3) the science of divine favours ('*ilm al-ālā*');
- 4) the science covering the important events which God caused to take place ('*ilm bi ayyām Allāh*);
- 5) the science which reminds human beings of death ('*ilm al-ma'ād*).

Elsewhere, al-Dihlawī (1974) adds other sciences like metaphysics ('*ilm al-ilāhiyyah*), physics ('*ilm al-ṭabī'īyyah*), eschatology ('*ilm bi mā ba'd al-mawt*), the science of threats and encouragements ('*ilm al-tarhīb wa al-targhīb*), science of creation (*takwīniyyāt*), and stories (*qaṣaṣ*).

In addition to *al-Ma'qūlāt* or *al-'ulūm al-ḥikmiyyah* (philosophical sciences) are sciences that derive by man's reason from other sources than the two revealed origins. Examples are Logics (*manṭiq*), Physical philosophy (*al-ṭabī'īyyāt*), Mathematics (*al-riyāḍiyyāt*), Metaphysics (*al-ilāhiyyāt*), Language (*al-lughah*) etc. Furthermore, there are many others that fall under a category for which al-Dihlawī employed special terminology, that of skills or arts (*funūn*). These are disciplines of home management (*fann tadbīr al-manzil*), of social transaction (*fann al-mu'āmalat*), and of

practical economy (*fann ādāb al-ma'āsh*) (Al-Dihlawī, 1996). This category is similar to that of al-Ghazālī's *ghayr al-shar'ī* sciences.

An in-depth analysis of al-Dihlawī's works reveals that he gave much emphasis to acquired knowledge more so than intuitive knowledge as the former plays a greater role in man's earthly life. As discussed elsewhere, acquired knowledge consists of the transmitted sciences (*al-manqūlāt*) and intellectual sciences (*al-ma'qūlāt*) as integrated under al-Dihlawī's concept of *taṭbīq*. This is evident from his attitude towards the Islamic schools of jurisprudence, Sufism, Logics and so forth. Although practically he is a *ḥanafīte*, he held high regards for the method of analogical reasoning, especially religious analogy (*al-qiyās*) as per al-Shāfi'ī while he abandoned the Ḥanafī's concept of *istiḥsān* (juristic preference). In this regard he is in full accord with al-Shāfi'ī and al-Ghazālī. He also regards *al-Muwattā'*—compiled in Madīnah by Imām Malik (d.179/795) who was among the *tābi'in* (generation of Successors of the Companion)—as one of the basic references for all schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

As a philosopher, on many occasions he relied on syllogism, especially as a Sufi as he integrated many orders (*tariqāt*) such as the Qādiriyyah, Suhrawardiyyah, Naqshabandiyyah, Chistiyyah and others. The most remarkable effort in Sufism made by al-Dihlawī was to reconcile the *Wujūdiyyah* school of Ibn 'Arabī (d.637/1240) with the *Shuhūdiyyah* school of Ahmad Sirhindi (d.1033/1624). According to him, both theories recognized God as the absolute Being (*wujūd al-muṭlaq*) and the universe, including creatures, as contingent beings or metaphorical being (*wujūd al-majāzī*). Ibn 'Arabī employed the terms *tajallī* and *ta'ayyun* (self-determination or manifestation) when referring to the process of how the Absolute Being creates the contingent being. The use of these terminologies, i.e. of *tajallī* and *ta'ayyun*, led to the misconception that God and creatures are united in one being (*waḥdat al-wujūd*), which then led to a further misunderstanding in that God and creatures have the same qualities. Sirhindi, however employed the terms 'shadow' (*zill*) and 'image' in reference to 'contingent' beings (creatures). This led to the understanding that God and creatures are different beings (*ithnayyat al-wujūd*) with different qualities. The creature exists because of the existence of the absolute Being just as the image of the object in the mirror exists due to existence of the object. However, the image will have opposite and different qualities from the

object such as powerlessness, speechlessness, ignorance, etc.

According to al-Dihlawī, the terminologies of manifestation (*tajallī* or *ta'ayyun*) and image (*zill*) render a common meaning that is based on unreal existence and dependent on the absolute existence. Therefore, both meanings can be reconciled and a new interpretation is needed to harmonize the contradiction. He suggests that existence is a matter or quality (*ṣifat*) that can be conceptualized in the mind. Moreover, there are two type of existence (*wujūd*); the existence of the Absolute Self-existence (*wujūd li dhātihi* or *fī nafsihi*), and the contingent (*wujūd li ghayrihi*). If there is an object, its quality (existence) can be conceptualized by the mind through its form (*ṣūrah*). However, if its quality disappears from the contingent(s), it/they will also disappear. Therefore, according to al-Dihlawī both figures emphasize different issues. Ibn 'Arabī stressed the eternal knowledge (*a'yān al-thābitah*) of God who is Self-existent (*wujūd li dhātihi*) whereas Sirhindi stresses the contingents (*wujūd li ghayrihi*), i.e., this new terrestrial universe. As such there is no conflict between the two theories.

To comprehensively map his concept of *taṭbīq*, he tried to integrate most of the sciences of acquired knowledge under an Islamic framework. Close examination of his life and works reveals that he emphasized knowledge drawn from the Qur'an and Sunnah as the basis for his concept of *taṭbīq*. The science of the Qur'an comprising topics like *asbāb al-nuzūl* (reasons of revelation), *al-nasakh wa al-mansūkh* (abrogation and abrogated verses) and such are of great significant to the formula of *taṭbīq* and which improve one's knowledge of the Qur'an. His competency on this subject is made evident in his book *al-Fawz al-kabīr fī uṣūl al-tafsīr*. In other words, knowledge of the Qur'an and its contents is of great importance to the application of the concept of *taṭbīq*.

Practicing, following and studying the Sunnah is another important feature of his formula of *taṭbīq* as it becomes the yardstick for evaluating exogenous values. The science of *ḥadīth* which includes the memorization and study of *matn* criticism is of great help in understanding his reform effort. The formula for understanding the concept of abrogation (*naskh* and *mansūkh*) and the reconciliation of *ikhtilāf al-aḥādith* (contradictory traditions) become the basis of his effort of *taṭbīq* for the sciences of acquired knowledge (Al-Dihlawī, (2000).

Another important aspect of al-Dihlawī's formula for *taṭbīq* is his emphasis on Islamic

spirituality based on authentic (*ṣahīḥ*) traditions. The person who wishes to apply the formula for *taṭbīq* should purify his soul by following the *Shari'ah* and Sunnah of the Prophet. By doing so, one draws closer to God and at the same time equips one's soul with noble qualities (*al-akhlāq al-karīmah*) while avoiding bad characters (*al-akhlāq al-madhmūmah*). A person who has undergone this purification process is potentially granted intuitive knowledge by God.

As al-Dihlawī's formula for *taṭbīq* deals with contradictory ideas, it is accordingly characterised by a sound intellectual discussion (*khiṭab al-'ilmī*) in which philosophical methodology and reasoning, especially Logic, is used. Like al-Ghazālī, although he prefers religious analogical reasoning (*qiyās al-shar'ī*) of *Uṣūl al-fiqh* of al-Shāfi'ī, he sometimes employed the method of analogical reasoning from Greek philosophy. In other words, one of the characteristics of his formula for *taṭbīq* is to master the subjects of *Uṣūl al-fiqh* and Logic, both of which are classified under '*ulūm al-dunyā* (worldly sciences) considered *farḍ 'ayn* by al-Ghazālī.

Conclusion

It is obvious that *ma'rifah* (knowledge) is one of the attributes (*ṣifāt*) through which man is considered either knowledgeable or ignorant. The attributes of man will always be in the righteous position if he follows the teachings of Islam and vice-versa. The acquired knowledge that is given special position in Islamic epistemology covers the narrated and intellectual sciences, arts and skills. They are the achievement of man's reason which is granted by God for the development of this world. Since revelation and reason work hand in hand in Islam, this implies that the concept of knowledge in Islam is naturally integrated. Previous scholars made every effort to integrate these sciences for inclusion within the Islamic framework.

In order to include these sciences in the Islamic framework, al-Shāfi'ī placed them under '*ilm al-'āmm* and '*ilm al-khāṣṣ*. The status of '*ilm al-'āmm* is obligatory upon individual (*kullīfa al-'ibād* or *farḍ 'alā al-'āmmah*) and '*ilm al-khāṣṣ* is the collective's obligation (*farḍ fī hi qaṣd al-kifāyah*). His discussion was mostly directed toward religious knowledge ('*ilm al-dīn*), especially the specialist knowledge ('*ilm al-khāṣṣ*) of *uṣūl al-fiqh* which mainly uses man's reasoning to understand revelation. However, he does not discuss other intellectual or worldly sciences ('*ilm al-dunyā*).

As one of the Shāfi'ites, al-Ghazālī further developed an idea from al-Shāfi'ī and introduced three terminologies: *farḍ 'ayn*, *farḍ kifāyah* and

mubāḥ. Any science that suits or is tailored to these three would be considered by al-Ghazālī an Islamic science ('*ulūm al-dīn*). Whether narrated ('*ulūm al-shar'ī*) or intellectual sciences (*ghayr al-shar'ī*), in order to be included under Islamic science al-Ghazālī introduced *Ihyā'* which covers many disciplines. One of which is that a person involved must undergo the purification of his/her soul processes which emphasize having right intentions and choosing correct means and equipping the soul with noble qualities while avoiding blameworthy characters and traits. In other words, such a person should learn and practice the science of the heart. As for the narrated sciences ('*ulūm al-shar'ī*), it is sufficient for this person to learn and practice the science of the heart as in the case of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and '*ilm al-kalām*.

As for the intellectual sciences, efforts should be made to address the issue of making the teaching of these sciences fall in line with Islamic values by purging irreligious elements from their methodology as was done in the case of Aristotle's Logic, Ethics and so forth. In the case of sciences related to medicine, linguistic, the applied sciences and others, the person involved should abide by Islamic teachings and have the right intention and correct means.

Although a Ḥanafite, al-Dihlawī admired the method of religious analogy (*al-qiyās*) as per al-Shāfi'ī. He introduced the formula for the reconciliation and accommodation (*taṭbīq*) of contradictory ideas in the narrated (*al-manqūlāt*) and intellectual sciences (*al-ma'qūlāt*) of acquired knowledge ('*ilm al-ḥuṣūlī*). As a matter of fact he added a sub-category to intellectual sciences comprising the skills and/or arts that were absented in discussions by al-Shāfi'ī and al-Ghazālī. These skills (*funūn*) comprise the disciplines of domestic management, practical economy and social interaction.

With regard to '*ilm al-ḥudūrī*, he is in full accord with al-Ghazālī's idea for '*ilm al-mukāshafah* which is not subject to the concept of *iḥyā'*. With regard to '*ilm al-ḥuṣūlī* and like al-Ghazālī, he emphasizes the purification of soul of the person who will apply the formula of *taṭbīq*. This person should have sufficient knowledge in the Qur'ān and its sciences, the Sunnah and its sciences, the *uṣūl al-fiqh*, Logic and Philosophy. As a traditionalist (*muḥaddith*), he stresses the importance of basing every concept, idea, terminology and argument undertaken on the authentic tradition (*al-ḥadīth al-ṣaḥīḥ*). Therefore, any issue is to be intellectually discussed from a worldview as based on the Qur'an and Sunnah, and

the traditional discourse of Islam's Juristic and Philosophical teachings.

Al-Shāfi'ī, al-Ghazālī and al-Dihlawī held in common the sound knowledge of the Qur'ān, Sunnah, *Qiyās* (religious analogy), Arabic language, Islamic spirituality and Ethics. In al-Shāfi'ī's favour, he is the founder of the methodology of religious analogy (*al-qiyās*) which is known as the science of *uṣūl al-fiqh* thereafter. In their favour, al-Ghazālī and al-Dihlawī also had sound knowledge of Greek Philosophy covering at least Logic and Divinity. Hence, both employed Logic and philosophical arguments via syllogism in their discussions on any issue. In al-Dihlawī's favour, he always based and concluded arguments by quoting authentic traditions. Thus, their frameworks for the concept of acquired knowledge lit the path for later generation to fathom concepts concerning the integration of knowledge.

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¹ Scholars like J. Schact, N.J. Coulson, W.B. Hallaq, Norman Calder, A. Hassan, H. Kamali and others have studied al-Shāfi'ī's scholarship in depth. Their study basically centred on Islamic jurisprudence as al-Shāfi'ī was well versed in the methodology of *al-qiyās* (analogy). Not much research has been done on al-Shāfi'ī's epistemology, especially his classification of knowledge.

² It is worth mentioning here that al-Shāfi'ī's analogy is slightly different from that of Aristotle's syllogism. In Islamic Jurisprudence, Aristotelian syllogism is termed as *qiyās al-tard* (analogy), which is one of the sub topics of the methodology of *al-qiyās* developed by the followers of al-Shāfi'ī.

³ An example of this is the case of beating one's old parents the prohibition of which is deduced from the Qur'anic verse 23, chapter 17; "Say not to them a word of contempt, nor repel them..." Saying something like "uf" is prohibited, let alone beating them as the action of beating is more serious than saying something bad.

⁴ The example is the case of devouring the wealth of orphans as mentioned in the Qur'ān chapter 4:10; "Those who unjustly eat up the property of orphans, eat up a fire into their own bodies; they will soon be enduring a blazing fire." Any action related to eliminating the wealth of orphans is tantamount to eating or destroying their wealth. Thus, it is prohibited.

⁵ For example, confiscating the wealth of unbelievers in war is permitted based on the permission to kill unbelievers in war.

⁶ Deduction is a conclusion reached by reasoning from general laws for a particular case.

⁷ Induction is a method of reasoning that obtains or discovers general laws from particular facts or examples.

⁸ The praiseworthy or noble qualities are repentance (*tawbah*), patience (*ṣabr*), gratitude (*shukr*), hope (*rajā'*), fear (*khawf*), asceticism (*zuhd*), surrender (*tawakkul*), contentment (*riḍā*), love (*maḥabbah*) and others.

⁹ These qualities or those which lead to salvation (*al-munjiyāt*) should be equipped by one to replace blameworthy qualities (*akhlāq al-madhmūmah*) or those

which lead to perdition (*al-muhlikāt*). The root of the vices are like gluttony, excess in sex, excessive speech (*sharah al-kalām*), cursing (*la'n*), false promises (*al-wa'd al-kādhīb*) proceeding from hypocrisy (*nifāq*), lying (*kidhb*), slander (*namimah*), backbiting (*ghībah*), strong anger (*shiddat al-ghaḍb*), rancor (*hiqd*), envy (*ḥasad*), love of the world (*ḥubb al-dunyā*), love of wealth (*ḥubb al-māl*), miserliness (*bukhl*), love of influence (*ḥubb al-jāh*), ostentation (*riyā'*), pride (*kibr*), conceit (*'ujb*) and others.