



## **Preliminary Thoughts on Acquiring Knowledge in Postmodernism and In Islam**

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### **Abstract**

Two of the most important principles in Postmodernism are embracing total relativism and to doubt everything. Both principles advocate skepticism and question the possibility of acquiring knowledge as a true and certain knowledge. The first half of this paper would delineate how the door of skepticism was opened anew by Descartes, and how skepticism later emerged as an epistemological problem and formulated anew by Kant and gave rise to the birth of Postmodernism. The paper would delineate as an example in the era of Postmodernism an attempt in depth psychology of how knowledge can be acquired. But Postmodernism in itself is a paradox. It does not only advocate skepticism and total relativism, but it also works the opposite by strengthening other existing dominant ideologies in the West such as Secularism and Materialism. In the second half of the paper, we would delineate the meaning of knowledge in Islam, and its epistemological framework, since in Islam, knowledge is not a possibility, but it is true and certain, and can be acquired, with the same relative degree of certainty, by the three sources of knowledge, which are sense perception, reason, and revelation. Our methodology is qualitative analysis of many of the works of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas such as *Islam: The Concept of Religion and the Foundation of Ethics and Morality*, *The Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islam*, and *Islam and the Philosophy of Science*.

**Keyword:** Islam, Postmodernism, Islamic Epistemology, Philosophy, Depth Psychology.

### **Abstrak**

Dua prinsip terpenting dalam Postmodernisme merangkumi keseluruhan relativisme dan untuk meragukan segalanya. Kedua-dua prinsip tersebut menyokong keraguan dan mempersoalkan kemungkinan memperoleh pengetahuan sebagai pengetahuan yang benar dan pasti. Separuh pertama kertas penyelidikan ini menggariskan bagaimana perbincangan skeptisisme dimulakan oleh Descartes, dan bagaimana skeptisisme kemudian muncul sebagai masalah epistemologi dan dirumuskan semula oleh Kant dan seterusnya menimbulkan kelahiran Postmodernisme. Kajian penyelidikan ini menggambarkan contoh dalam era Postmodernisme sebagai percubaan untuk mendalami secara psikologi bagi memperolehi pengetahuan. Tetapi Postmodernisme itu sendiri adalah satu paradoks. Ia bukan sahaja menyokong skeptisisme dan keseluruhan relativisme, tetapi juga berlaku sebaliknya dengan memperkuat ideologi dominan lain yang ada di Barat seperti Sekularisme dan Materialisme. Pada kertas penyelidikan yang kedua ini, menggambarkan definisi pengetahuan dalam Islam, dan kerangka epistemologi, kerana dalam Islam, pengetahuan bukanlah kemungkinan, tetapi itu benar dan pasti, dan dapat diperolehi dengan tahap relatif yang sama yang pasti, oleh tiga sumber pengetahuan, iaitu persepsi penerimaan, akal, dan wahyu. Metodologi yang digunakan adalah analisis kualitatif daripada kebanyakan karya Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas seperti *Islam: Konsep Agama dan Asas kepada Etika dan Akhlak*, *Definisi dan Pengalaman Kebahagiaan dalam Islam*, serta *Islam dan Falsafah Sains*.

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**Kata kunci:** Sistem perubatan Yunani, perumusan dos, tahap keagamaan, Pearl-Marwareed, kontur keselamatan, strategi mampan

## 1.0 Introduction

Postmodernism, the subsequent Western ideology after the modern worldview was said to have emerged with the death of its founder, Friedrich Nietzsche, at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nietzsche died in 1900 due to a condition of mental and physical paralysis. Although the illness could be due to his ailing health condition, it is also believed that due to his work and philosophy that made him to such an extreme madness:

You know these things as thoughts, but your thoughts are not your experiences, they are an echo and after-effect of your experiences: as when your room trembles when a carriage goes past. I however am sitting in the carriage, and often I am the carriage itself.<sup>1</sup>

As one commentator of his work said, “He feels his thoughts. He can fall in love with an idea. An idea can make him ill.”<sup>2</sup> This is one way how postmodernism can be introduced in describing its definition. So what is postmodernism? As one writer said, “Like Nietzsche, the postmodern intellectual situation is profoundly complex and ambiguous—perhaps this is its very essence....the postmodern mind may be viewed as an open-ended, indeterminate set of attitudes that has been shaped by a great diversity of intellectual and cultural events,”<sup>3</sup> or as Nietzsche himself said, “All things are subject to interpretation whichever interpretation prevails at a given time is a function of power and not truth.”<sup>4</sup> We would delineate as an example, in the era of postmodernism, an attempt by a well-known psychologist, Carl Gustav Jung, of his work in the 20<sup>th</sup> century on the understanding of human psyche and its role in the possibility of acquiring knowledge. However, before we come to the postmodern era of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, we would delineate first briefly some parts of the Western philosophy that had occurred much earlier than Nietzsche of how the usage of skepticism leads to the denial of the possibility of knowledge and truth. We would delineate first the philosophy of the two

prominent philosophers in the West, whom had peaked in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries respectively, René Descartes and Immanuel Kant.

The second part of the paper would focus on the epistemological framework of Islam, the right methodology of acquiring knowledge and also on the sources of knowledge or the tools of acquiring knowledge in Islam. The main source of reference would be ‘*Aqa’id* (Articles of Belief) of the great scholar al-Nasafi and several writings of Professor Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas which are *Islam: The Concept of Religion and the Foundation of Ethics and Morality*, *The Meaning and Experience of Happiness in Islam*, and *Islam and the Philosophy of Science*.

## 2.0 A Brief Overview of Descartes’s Epistemology

Descartes began his epistemology with radical skepticism, and in the Western history of philosophy, since the time of the Greek Sophists, he was the one who has opened the door anew towards skepticism and analyzing it systematically.<sup>5</sup> To attain truth, Descartes said we have to begin by doubting everything, especially whatever one perceives through one’s sense-perception and imagination, and that nothing is certain, not even of one’s existence.<sup>6</sup> Everything and every proposition has to be under the strict rule of rational investigation and scrutiny before it can be presented to our reason as something “clear, distinct, and free from internal contradiction”<sup>7</sup> and that “we have no occasion to doubt it.”<sup>8</sup> This became his first principle of attaining certain knowledge, that nothing is certain except “that which can be clearly and distinctly conceived.”<sup>9</sup> But what is it that can be “clearly and distinctly conceived” if we have already doubting everything? Descartes proposed that in spite of our doubting, there are two things that are certain to our reason. First is mathematics, which has self-evidence truth and represent the most certain knowledge that can ever be attained by the rational mind, and second his famous philosophical datum: *Cogito, ergo sum*, or I think, therefore I am, which means that in spite of the doubting, the self who is in doubt is certain to be exist.<sup>10</sup> Both of these for Descartes became his paradigms before any further

truth, through “a disciplined critical rationality,”<sup>11</sup> can be deduced from them. Indeed, it is “intended as a method not only of scientific inquiry, nor only of philosophical inquiry, but of any rational inquiry whatsoever.”<sup>12</sup> Thus, for Descartes, the only knowledge which is clear from any doubt is the knowledge that can be verified and justified with the language of mathematics, of which the most familiar example is the knowledge on the natural world.

From his notion of *cogito*, Descartes derived, apart from God, the dualistic hierarchy of beings, that is *res cogitans*, the thinking subject, conscious of his own thinking and doubting, and the fact that he himself exists, and thus applicable only to man, and *res extensa*, the external and the objective world, apart from man, and with contrast to man, it “lacks subjective awareness,”<sup>13</sup> not conscious of its own existence, and mostly material in substance, such as plants and animals.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, just because of the fact that the characteristic of nature is so contrast to man, that it cannot think and reflect like man, that it made up of mostly material and physical substance, that this is why it was inherently measurable in terms of mathematical language and proposition, the other principle or truth which represent itself to the rational human mind as “clear, distinct and free from internal contradiction.”<sup>15</sup> And in fact, nature has clearly manifested itself, especially with the success of Newtonian science, that it does indeed was put into motion in the language of mathematics. And thus, for Descartes, only through mathematics can we attain certain knowledge of nature: “The laws of mechanics are identical with those of nature.”<sup>16</sup> And by applying mathematics to the order of nature, Descartes have explicitly assumed nature as a mechanical entity, devoid of any spiritual, transcendental or teleological significant. God made the universe with its law and order, and then left it to move on its own, just like any mechanical clock or machine, and it is up to the human mind to discover what these laws and rules are in order that nature can be “effectively manipulated to serve the health and comfort of mankind.”<sup>17</sup> In fact, for Descartes, conceiving nature as a mechanical entity is necessary in order for science to proceed and to stand on its own ground, liberating it from any spiritual, religious or subjective constraints of human qualities.<sup>18</sup>

In fact, in the modern worldview since the time of Descartes, the natural science was able to advance and progress rapidly and produced amazing results through the advancement of technology. Indeed, since the success of Newton’s *Principia Mathematica* in penetrating the order of nature, it was no doubt that science has reigned the Western mind as its supreme judge and authority. Nothing above science can replace its supremacy. The Western philosophy, history, art and even religion had to realign themselves according to the narrow scientific vision of Descartes’ philosophy, of which almost every area of human knowledge must be able to be verified by the limited methodology of the natural science which includes such as experiment, observation, logical thinking and precise measurement in the language of mathematics. This narrow vision of epistemology was not, however, accepted wholeheartedly in the Western intellectual movement, and achieved its most sophisticated expression, especially through the Romantics and the Existentialists. The epistemological problem of this philosophy, however, was first brought forward philosophically through the intellectual insight of Immanuel Kant.

## 2.1 Kantian’s Critique of Descartes’ Epistemology

Kant, however, we may say first, has no doubt in the Newtonian science that it could achieve certain knowledge on nature. In fact, one of the reasons his *Critique of Pure Reason* was written is an attempt to guard Newtonian science against the skeptics like Hume, who considered that the principle of causality which has been simply assumed by the Newtonian scientists is merely psychological, with no objective foundational basis, that the only truth one can attain is only through sense-perception, and that there is no truth beyond what our senses had perceived.<sup>19</sup> Kant, however, agreed with Hume that no knowledge is possible without sense-perception, as he said, “All our knowledge begins with experience,” but he said further, “but it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.”<sup>20</sup> Our mind, for Kant, does not passively receives sense data, and began to construct scientific laws according to those data, but on the other hand, the human mind itself is already imbedded with a built-in-framework that shaped the way we perceive and view the world.<sup>21</sup> Thus, whatever we know about

the world reflects the way our mind constructs our external experience and make it intelligible to our point of view.<sup>22</sup> Ultimately the observer cannot go beyond his perspective in order to know the world in itself, as an objective entity, totally beyond of any perspective.

Indeed our mind perceives and channels our sense-experience through certain a priori knowledge, knowledge that is never derived from experience, but is already embedded in our mental organization.<sup>23</sup> These a priori, which in Kantian terminologies is called categories, filtered whatever we receive through our sense-perception, so that the only knowledge which ultimately became intelligible to us is the knowledge whose forms have already been conceived in our mind: "While the matter of all appearance is given to us a *posteriori* (knowledge which is borrowed solely from experience) only, its form must lie ready for the sensations a *priori* in the mind, and so must allow of being considered apart from all sensation."<sup>24</sup> Two of the most important priori in our mind, Kant said are the concept of space and time. Space and time according to Kant are never derived from experience, but they are already presupposed in our experience.<sup>25</sup> In other words, the concept of space and time is already imbedded in our mind, but *only in so far* that they aid our human cognition to make the world become intelligible to our human condition, which is always intertwined in the concept of space and time.<sup>26</sup> Thus apart from our human standpoint, the concept of space and time will become meaningless and we cannot be certain if they have a reality of their own or not. And so does with the concept of causality. We do not derive this concept from experience, but we see cause and effect in the empirical world is only because our mind had applied this concept to our experience.<sup>27</sup>

It is true, however that in Kantian epistemology that these priori forms of knowledge do not give us any true knowledge that can become intelligible to our human cognition. Indeed, we need experience and reason, posterior and priori knowledge in order for true knowledge to arise in our mind, since the "first provides content without form, the second form without content. Only, in their synthesis is knowledge possible."<sup>28</sup> But this however still does

not leave the fact that priori knowledge is far and above *prior* to any human cognition. It is because of the fact that priori knowledge exists in our mind prior to our experience that knowledge is possible. And only the experiences that conform to these priories will become intelligible to our human cognition; ultimately, "man's knowledge does not conform to objects, but objects conform to man's knowledge."<sup>29</sup> In other words, posterior knowledge merely becomes supportive of what our mind had already presupposed of the empirical world. What our sense-perceptions perceive of the external world is true and reliable only in so far as they are "susceptible" to our human cognition.<sup>30</sup> Thus, we can be certain of the truth of these priories only in so far as they are "applicable only empirically, and not metaphysically."<sup>31</sup> We can be sure that our concept of space, time and causality that we apply in our scientific activities are true only in so far as they are empirically certain, but not knowing "whether these forms necessarily inhere in things in themselves, or only in our intuition of them."<sup>32</sup> In other words, we apply these concept only out of subjective necessity, not out of any foundational basis, since man, left on his own, "could not determine whether his knowledge had some fundamental relation to a universal reality or whether it was merely a human reality."<sup>33</sup> Thus, whatever we receive from the external world had indeed been *subjectively* determined first by our mind. And if we see the world through the mechanistic and mathematical vision of Descartes, that is because we are the one who determines it so, not out of any objective and foundational necessity: "It was Kant's merit to see that this compulsion (for mechanistic impersonal explanation) is in us, not in things."<sup>34</sup> Thus, science could claim certain knowledge, only in so far as the external world seems to be reliable to its own vision, to its own perspective or to its own point of view, thus science could not any longer "arrogantly claim certain knowledge over all reality,"<sup>35</sup> because what it knows, ultimately, is what its own narrow mechanistic vision had supplied. Thus, consequently, we may say that what science had told us so far about nature is not the end of the story, but in fact we can be sure that there is more to nature than what science had claimed it so far to be.

This is the dilemma of the Western mind, of overcoming the complex riddle of comprehending the world and his relationship to it. Now, it seems nothing can be trusted definitely; the traditional Christian religion had long been overthrown from the Western psyche, and now even science and his own reason and cognition itself cannot be trusted wholeheartedly. In fact, the Western mind is looking for another “anchor” in which it could “guide” him to attain certain knowledge on what is it about nature, which seems to move so perfectly and flawless, that relates to his own inner being, that is not subjected to a mechanistic law like nature, but free to choose his own path and destiny, as Kant said “Two things fill the heart with ever new and always increasing awe and admiration: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.”<sup>36</sup>

In fact Kantian philosophy was able to demonstrate the limit of human reason in acquiring knowledge, and this is where lies one of the important principles of postmodernism, which is to doubt and relativize everything, including even the knowledge in natural science, as one writer put it, “In this understanding, the world cannot be said to possess any features in principle prior to interpretation. The world does not exist as a thing-in-itself, independent of interpretation; rather, it comes into being only in and through interpretations.”<sup>37</sup>

## **2.2 The Rise of Postmodernism and the Attempt in Depth Psychology to Acquire Knowledge**

With such a critique on Descartes’ philosophy of science, this does not mean that scientific activities in the West would have come to an end. On the other hand, scientific activities, with its amazing advancement in technology and wide range application in almost every aspect of human life, continue to flourish. However, with the rising concern of only one-sided vision of science and the increasing abuse of scientific knowledge towards human and the natural world, various Western philosophers came out with various kinds of theories in order to overcome the mechanistic dualistic scientific vision of Descartes. Philosophers such as Goethe with his pantheistic view of nature, Hegel

with his Universal Mind or Spirit which is unfolding its realization to perfection in the work of nature, Heidegger and the phenomenologist with their attempt to uncover the existential dynamism of both man and nature in order to overcome the Descartes dualistic and mechanistic vision, Jung with his archetypal psychology and so many others that in one way or another tried to give a more sophisticated and integrated epistemology than the simple mathematical and mechanistic vision that had been proposed by Descartes.

These philosophers and many other philosophers later in the 20<sup>th</sup> century whom has the same minded objective represent a clear example of the manifestation of postmodernism, of which the methodology of acquiring scientific knowledge should not only be restricted to a few tools such as empiricism, rationalism, and precise measurement.

In the politics of the contemporary *Weltanschauung*, no perspective—religious, scientific, or philosophical—has the upper hand, yet that situation has encouraged an almost unprecedented intellectual flexibility and cross-fertilization, reflected in the widespread call for, and practice of, open “conversation” between different understandings, different vocabularies, different cultural paradigms.<sup>38</sup>

We would delineate further as an example in the era of postmodernism, how archetypal psychology of Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) attempted to give a broader methodology in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. However, as we shall see, this is just an attempt out of many attempts in the postmodern age, since one of the characteristic of the postmodern mind is “critical consciousness, which by deconstructing all, seems compelled by its own logic to do so to itself as well.”<sup>39</sup>

One of the epistemological theories in this postmodern age has been characterized as participatory epistemology, as developed in different ways,

especially by the Romantics, such as Goethe and Hegel, and the idea of the psychic archetypal realms as developed by Jung in his depth psychology.<sup>40</sup> Either in philosophy or in psychology, both of them require that the observer to participate actively his total self or psyche in order for nature to reveal its true self to him. In other words, instead of trying to look at nature from “without,” from the subject and object point of view, the observer is required to look at nature from “within.” We will first look at how the archetypal psychology fits into the scheme of the participatory epistemology since it will clarify to us what does the West mean by this epistemology.

During his trip to Africa in the summer of 1925, while contemplating the beauty of the African safari, Jung remarked:

I felt then as if I were the first man, the first creature, to know that all this is. The entire world around me was still in its primordial state; it did not know that it was. And in that moment it would never have been. All nature seeks this goal and finds it fulfilled in man, but only in the most highly developed and fully conscious man. Every advance, even the smallest, along this path of conscious realization adds that much to the world.<sup>41</sup>

This quotation, more or less I think, depicts what the West means by the so-called term “participatory epistemology.” We will clarify further what does this epistemology mean based on the above quotation.

In participatory epistemology, nature is conceived not as a separate entity that can be objectively known by the human mind, outside of human perspective, or nature can only be known only in so far as it “appears” to us, that nature is revealing only its phenomenal aspect to man, that man is incapable of knowing nature in itself, just by the fact that the human mind is “imposing” on nature certain framework, and thus the only thing that the mind can know about nature are the ones that “correspond” to this framework.<sup>42</sup> In participatory epistemology however, though the above Kantian characters of

“subjectiveness” and “interpretiveness” are still retained, just by the fact that the human mind is still the active participant of knowing nature, on the whole, participatory epistemology is trying to go beyond this Kantian mind framework. In other words, instead of analyzing human mental organization only in terms of Kantian categories, this epistemology is seeking something deeper that permeates the human mind. In other words, the “mind” as being conceived by Descartes and Kant had now turned into a human “psyche” as developed by Jung in his depth psychology.<sup>43</sup> Though Jung once said, “I have not the faintest idea what “psyche” is in itself,”<sup>44</sup> generally, there are two main definitions of psyche in Jungian psychology. Psyche is usually defined as the human personality as a whole, that the human self should be viewed in a holistic manner, instead of conceiving it of being composed of a “jigsaw conception of experiences.”<sup>45</sup> The psyche is also viewed as the place where various human experiences—intellectually, epistemologically, psychologically, socially, spiritually, aesthetically and etc.—became intelligible and meaningful to the human self.<sup>46</sup> There are three different levels of human psyche: consciousness, the personal unconscious and the collective unconscious.<sup>47</sup> Only the last one, the collective unconscious, will be our concern here and which consists of two main contents, the human instincts and the archetypes.<sup>48</sup> The latter is the one which gives dynamism and identity to the human self.

The archetypes, just like the collective unconscious as a whole, are “primordial images,”<sup>49</sup> “universal potentialities”<sup>50</sup> or “a pattern of behavior, reaction and experiences that characterize the human species, in the same way that nest-building characterizes the behavior of birds.”<sup>51</sup> In other words, archetypes are not learned through experience, just like Kantian categories are not derived from experience, but they are inherited human themes which give form to our experiences. They are shared by every individual and various cultures around the world, such as archetypes on initiation, abandonment, marriage, childbirth, parenting, God, death, dawn and dusk, and various other motifs which characterize the human species.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the archetypes are also what give us “an accessible felt sense, however inchoate and untutored,

of what is basically good, basically true and basically beautiful.<sup>53</sup> Thus, though Jungian archetypes, in the context of psychology, are usually seemed to be more psychic than cosmic in character, and more empirical than metaphysical, they are in fact for the Jungian psychologists, “the foundations upon which a meaningful life is constituted. Cut off from their vitality and sustenance, we are cut off from authentic community as well as self. Existence becomes volatile and nihilistic.”<sup>54</sup> Thus, the Jungian archetypes, we may say is one of the alternatives that the West can put their “trust” on to, in their quest of finding the next “anchor” of truth.

There is one Jungian archetype, however, which is very important for the Western participatory epistemology, which is the archetype of the self. By this archetype, it is meant that every human being begins with “a state of undifferentiated wholeness”<sup>55</sup> of the self, or in other words, according to Jung, the self (just like the psyche, since the self is part of the psyche) originally, is already complete and perfect by itself, and that every individual has an inborn need to develop it and bring it out into his consciousness in order for him to achieve “a state of self-realization” or “a state of self-hood” or “a fully differentiated, balanced and unified personality of his self.”<sup>56</sup> According to Jung, not many people had achieved this, except for very few individuals, like Jesus or Buddha.<sup>57</sup> Indeed, before we go any further, the so called participatory epistemology can be more or less summarized as follows, that man ultimately will not and can not know about nature and his true relationship to it unless he knows his own “self” first. This is indeed by the fact that nature, as being conceived through this epistemology, in some sense is incomplete by itself and is meaningless<sup>58</sup> to itself, as Jung said above “it did not know that it was,” without the existence of the human mind. The reality of nature, epistemologically and ontologically, is organically connected to the reality of the human mind because nature pervades everything including the human mind itself.<sup>59</sup> Thus, the meaning and reality of nature can only arise in the human mind, but only as Jung said “in the most highly developed and fully conscious man.” In this perspective, not only man, but nature also becomes an active participant in unfolding its true nature to the human mind, “all

nature seeks this goal and finds it fulfilled in man,” but *only* when that mind “is employing its full complement of faculties—intellectual, volitional, emotional, sensory, imaginative, aesthetic, epiphanic”<sup>60</sup>—in order for a more comprehensive empiricism can be achieved. In such knowledge, the human mind “lives into the creative activity of nature”<sup>61</sup> and nature, on the other hand, “becomes intelligible to itself”<sup>62</sup> and “comes into being in that human light called consciousness.”<sup>63</sup>

In other words, according to participatory epistemology, sense-perception and rational mathematical mind of Descartes is not enough for our mind to penetrate the mysteries of nature, but it has “to bring forth from within itself the full powers of a disciplined imagination and saturates its empirical observation with archetypal insight that the deeper reality of the world emerges. A developed inner life is therefore indispensable for cognition.”<sup>64</sup> Thus, the human self needs to get in touch with his true self, i.e. his archetypal self, in order that his mind will get in contact with “the creative process within nature and brings nature’s reality to conscious expression.”<sup>65</sup> But how indeed can this “self-realization” or “self-hood” of the archetypal self being achieved by man? Just like as we have mentioned before that in participatory epistemology, the human mind need to employ all its faculties, and so does in archetypal psychology, he need to bring out and develop all the latent archetypes which inhere in his psyche, in the part of his collective unconscious, into his consciousness in order for his true and unified self to be manifested. And this can be done, according to Jung, by exposing oneself to various experiences, by analyzing one’s dreams and by doing meditation and retreat, in order for the various aspects of the unconscious to unfold and for the many facets of the self to come into being, and thus only then will nature reveal its true self to him.<sup>66</sup>

On the whole, this is an attempt of depth psychology of trying to overcome the Descartes dualistic and mechanistic vision, that is “by making the experience of the world an event inside the subject,”<sup>67</sup> instead from “outside.” It is also an attempt of trying to give some concrete empirical background and foundation to participatory epistemology, which is more

philosophic and speculative in manner. This attempt, however, as we can see, is not without any weaknesses. Most of the terms in archetypal psychology, such as self, psyche, collective unconscious and archetype, are not clearly defined. There seems to be no definite agreement among the psychoanalysts on what do these terms really stand for. Moreover, they are derived mostly from the empirical observation, and thus they do not have any transcendental or metaphysical foundation. For example, if we take the archetypes, every interpretation of them remains an “as-if,”<sup>68</sup> and the human psyche will never be able to get in total contact with “the ultimate core of meaning”<sup>69</sup> of the archetypes, which remains as “an unfathomable mystery.”<sup>70</sup> Whatever it is that we perceive as an archetype in the empirical world is only a reflection and an approximation to this core, and thus their manifestation can vary depends on the cultural-context which they finally became manifested. Hence, the archetype of “God” doesn’t have to be the same from one culture to the next.<sup>71</sup> Ultimately, this implies, that there should not be any clear guideline on how the archetypal self can be brought out into being, no clear guidance on how the state of “self-realization” can be achieved. Yet, depth psychology seems to be taking “the characteristic of a religion, a new faith of modern man,”<sup>72</sup> and could be one of the last “saviors” for the Western man: “many reflective individuals began to turn inward, to an examination of consciousness itself as a potential source of meaning and identity in a world otherwise devoid of stable values.”<sup>73</sup>

Even though in the age of postmodernism, with its emphasis on plurality and relativism, as John Dewey at the start of the 20th century said that “despair of any integrated outlook and attitude [is] the chief intellectual characteristic of the present age,”<sup>74</sup> or as a writer puts it, “Everything could change tomorrow,”<sup>75</sup> there is still however the need or the quest to find some “stable” answers about life and about the world we live in.

The postmodern era is an era without consensus on the nature of reality, but it is blessed with an unprecedented wealth of perspectives with which to

engage the great issues that confront it.<sup>76</sup>

The task is formidable, which is “not unlike having to string the great Odyssean bow of opposites and then send an arrow through a seemingly impossible multiplicity of targets.”<sup>77</sup> And out of these states of irresolution and the “unstable paradox”<sup>78</sup> of postmodernism, works of many scientists in the forefront of research on the human brain claim to be the “most stable” in solving our dilemma of looking for answers about our life:

There are facts to be understood about how thoughts and intentions arise in the human brain; there are facts to be learned about how these mental states translate into behavior; there are further facts to be known about how these behaviors influence the world and the experience of other conscious beings. We will see that facts of this sort exhaust what we can reasonably mean by terms like “good” and “evil.” They will also increasingly fall within the purview of science and run far deeper than a person’s religious affiliation. Just as there is no such thing as Christian physics or Muslim algebra, we will see that there is no such thing as Christian or Muslim morality. Indeed, I will argue that morality should be considered an undeveloped branch of science.<sup>79</sup>

This is a clear manifestation that religions are being given the back door in terms of even deciding what is right and what is wrong for human beings to conduct and manage their life. And thus just another example of the workings of secularism and materialism which had gripped the Western world for the past hundreds of years, as a Western scientist himself admits, “The scientific community is predominantly secular and liberal.”<sup>80</sup>

### **3.0 The Epistemological Framework of Islam**

For the next part of the paper, we will focus on the epistemological framework of Islam and the right



methodology of acquiring knowledge. We will see that there are many similarities between what we have mentioned above, as an example of postmodernism, which is the Western participatory epistemology, in the form of depth psychology, with the Islamic epistemology and metaphysics, but the latter, as we shall see has a stronger metaphysical foundation and has a much more comprehensive and systematic approach than the former. In Islam we also do not deny that we could acquire knowledge from sense-perception and also from our own reason, but however these two sources are not enough to acquire knowledge since the most important sources of knowledge in Islam and of which every other knowledge has to referred to is none other than the Qur'an and the Sunnah or the Traditions of the beloved Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). Many great Muslim scholars in the past such as Imam al-Ghazali in his *al-Munqidh min ad-Ḍalāl* (Deliverance from Error) has discussed the limitations of reason. In other words, how reason or *'aql* is being defined in Islam as is not the same as "the mind" being conceived by Kant or "psyche" as being conceived by Jung. We would discuss further a brief definition of *'aql*, the meaning of knowledge, and the right methodology of acquiring knowledge in Islam.

Before we proceed, let us make it clear that in Islam there is a hierarchy of knowledge, just as there is a hierarchy of existence. Knowledge generally is divided into two types: first as knowledge (*'ilm*) itself which refers to the Qur'an and the Traditions of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) himself, and second, knowledge as information (*ma'lūmāt*), which is knowledge that does not derive from both of these sources but humans have acquired it from their own intellectual effort, e.g., knowledge in sciences, businesses, politics and etc.<sup>81</sup> The first type of knowledge is considered as the real knowledge (*'ilm*) since a person who knows and practices this knowledge can become, by the Mercy of Allah SWT, a knower or an *'ālim*. In other words, the purpose or the objective of the first knowledge is none other for a human being to become a true servant (*'abd*) or *khalifah* of Allah SWT. The second type of knowledge, however, has no direct objective for a person to become an *'abd* or *khalifah* of Allah SWT. However, the knowledge can be considered as *'ilm* if the one who seeks the knowledge applies the right

methodology of acquiring knowledge as has been set in Islam and utilizes it also in according to the *Syarī'ah* of Allah SWT. Then only then would the person who possesses the knowledge would be called an *'alim*. Otherwise, the knowledge is only considered as information (*ma'lūmāt*) and the person who carries the knowledge, moreover, is more liable to utilize the knowledge against the *Syarī'ah* of Allah SWT. This hierarchy of knowledge is directly linked of how knowledge is being defined in Islam and what is its right methodology of acquiring knowledge.

According to Prof. al-Attas, since all knowledge comes from God, the epistemological definition of knowledge in Islam, "with reference to God as being its source of origin, is the arrival of meaning in the soul; and with reference to the soul as being its active recipient and interpreter, knowledge is the arrival of the soul at meaning."<sup>82</sup> By meaning it is meant the meaning of the thing or the meaning of the object of knowledge that is sought to be known. For example, in observing the natural world, as a Muslim we do believe that what we are observing is a Sign of God. By this we mean that the world is only a symbol and as a symbol, it has a deeper meaning which points to something else, which is God. Thus, the true knowledge about the natural world occurs when that knowledge doesn't point solely to the object itself, but it points ultimately to God, the hidden and the right meaning of the symbolic natural world. This is also why meaning is also defined as "the recognition of the place of anything in a system which occurs when the relation of a thing has with others in the system becomes clarified and understood."<sup>83</sup> For example, in the study of nature, the observer should be aware, not only of the true nature of the world in relation to God, the One who creates that world, but also where does his own self fit into the whole scheme of creation, in relation to God and also in relation to the world, the object under his observation. This is because everything which existed in this world has its own specific *difference*, that the "fundamental nature of reality is difference."<sup>84</sup> We believe that these specific *differences* should be kept in mind, since only by acknowledging that things differed from each other, only then can their reality, the *haqiqah* or "reality is that by which a thing is what it is"<sup>85</sup> can be known: "it is rather the 'being-distinct' from any other that

makes a thing to be what it is, for it is only by virtue of distinction that realities have come into existence.”<sup>86</sup> Thus, man needs to know his own self first, where does he fit in the whole system of the creation of God, and acts accordingly as what has been commanded by Him, in order for the right knowledge to be materialized in his intellect and consciousness.<sup>87</sup>

Man, according to the Holy Qur’an, has been created as a God’s *khalīfah*, His vicegerent on earth, on whom God had bestowed *amānah*, the trust to rule according to God’s Divine Will and Pleasure.<sup>88</sup> Also, man according to the Holy Qur’an is created as a God’s servant (*‘abd*)<sup>89</sup> and that the sole purpose of his existence is to serve God since he is indebted (*dana*)<sup>90</sup> to God for bringing him into existence. And how does the Holy Qur’an guide man in order for his true self, as the servant of God, to be revealed? Man is created to have a dual aspect, on the one hand he is created to have an animal soul (*al-nafs al-hayawaniyyah*) and on the other hand he has a rational soul (*al-nafs al-nātiqah*).<sup>91</sup> His rational soul is his true soul, the soul which testified during his Covenant (*mithāq*) with his Lord before he was brought to this world.<sup>92</sup> Thus man is already created in a perfect state, but when he came to this world, being attracted to worldly things that only satisfy his sensual pleasure, he forgot (*nasiya*) his true purpose of creation, as the Prophet (SAW) says, man is “composed of forgetfulness.”<sup>93</sup> Thus it is the function of revelation to point man to “return”<sup>94</sup> to his true nature, that is by submitting (*aslama*) his animal soul under the power and authority of his rational soul. This submission is the right way, the middle way (*al-wasat*),<sup>95</sup> the proper way of putting one’s souls in their right and proper place.<sup>96</sup> It is about being just to oneself first, before one can be just to ‘rule’ God’s earth as His vicegerent. It is also about returning oneself to one’s “natural state of being called *fitrah*.”<sup>97</sup> *Fitrah* is the pattern in which God has created all beings, the law of God, *sunnat Allah*, in which everything has their own right and proper place, and submitting themselves according to God’s manner of creation.<sup>98</sup> Thus just like the natural world is submitting itself to God’s law and order, man must submitted his animal soul under the subordination of his rational soul, by following the way that has been

prescribed in the Holy Qur’an and brought by the Prophet (pbuh) (i.e., *arkan al-iman* and *arkan al-islam* and all the virtues prescribed by Islam such as right intention, truthfulness, sincerity, patience, generosity and etc.) in order for him to reach the level of ‘excellence’ (*ihsan*)<sup>99</sup> where his true self will come into being, that is as the true servant (*‘abd*) of his Lord.

Moreover, this disciplining of the animal soul has so much importance in the Islamic epistemology since we maintain that all knowledge (either of the Visible World or of the Unseen World) comes from God, and is acquired through three channels: sound senses, true report based on authority, and sound reason.<sup>100</sup> The great scholar of Islamic theology, ‘Umar Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 537 A.H./1142 C.E.) wrote in his famous work *‘Aqā’id* (The Articles of Belief in Islam):

The means of obtaining knowledge for the creatures are three: first, the five senses; second, true report; and third, reason. The five senses are hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch; and by each of these five senses one is informed concerning that for which it is appointed. True report is of two kinds, one of the two is report that is successively transmitted (*mutawatir*), that is report that is established upon the tongues of people of whom reason cannot conceive that they would purpose together on a lie.....The second kind is the report of the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless and give him peace, confirmed by miracle .....As for reason, it is a cause (that is, an instrument) of knowledge also.....<sup>101</sup>

Sound senses comprise of two parts, the external senses which include touch, smell, taste, sight and hearing, and the five internal senses which include the common sense, the representation, the estimation, the retention-recollection and the imagination, all these which “perceive internally the sensual images and their meanings, combine or separate them, conceive notions of them, preserve the conceptions thus conceived, and perform the intellection of them” respectively.<sup>102</sup> True report is also comprised of two parts, first is the true report based on a group of

people or a community of scholars that it is inconceivable for them to agree upon a lie and second is the true report of the Messenger of God, which is the Revelation.<sup>103</sup> For the last channel, sound reason, it is ultimately connected through the intermediary of the intellect. Human reason is one of the aspects of the intellect, which is a spiritual substance and inheres in the heart, the seat of intuition.<sup>104</sup> Thus, the perfection of human reason does not involve only the perfection of its physical aspects, such as the perfection of a critical mind in according to a mathematical and a logical manner, but the perfection of reason will also involve the perfection of the spiritual aspect of man, that is his heart, the spiritual organ which receives knowledge from the Divine Realm and where Truth is recognized and affirmed. Thus, in order for knowledge to be illuminated in the human soul, or in other words, in order for the soul to be thoroughly prepared to arrive at the meaning of the object being seek to be known, and for God to bestow that meaning to the human soul, that soul need to prepare itself both physically and spiritually, in order that his senses, both external and internal, and his reason will become “sound,” and his heart is ready to receive the right intuition.

Thus, any kinds of knowledge, in order for it to become truly meaningful to the human soul, must be applied to the heart of man whose soul has returned to its true and original nature, which is as His Lord true servant. This is the heart which is referred to in the verses of Mawlana Rumi’s *Mathnawi* below:

If you apply knowledge (only) to your body, it is like a poisonous snake.

If you apply it to your heart, it becomes your friend.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, the more he knows, the more he would remember and submit himself to his Lord, since the purpose of studying and knowing is not merely just to know, but to know in order to remember and revere Him.<sup>106</sup> There is a Malay proverb which describes accurately about a knowledgeable person in Islam:

Be like the paddy plant, the bigger and healthier it is, the more it will bow down towards the earth, but not

be like the weed, the bigger and healthier it is, the more it will look up straight to the sky.

Thus only then can man, as God’s vicegerent or His *khalifah* on earth, and by His Will, rules His earth in accordance to His Divine Will and Purpose. He is being guided and knows on what are the right ways and manners to utilize the knowledge that has been given to him, so that it will not go against *sunnat Allah* and brought chaos to His creation.

Moreover, a true servant of Allah SWT is bestowed with wisdom in order for him to give a correct judgment on what are the limits of truth of every object of knowledge.<sup>107</sup> In Islam, we believe there is a limit of truth in every object of knowledge, in order that the pursuit of truth would not be an endless and useless search, even when it is already clear that it goes beyond the capacity of man or beyond what revelation has dictated it to be. Moreover, the limit of truth will become apparent when the right and proper place of everything in the whole scheme of creation is known.<sup>108</sup> In other words, the wisdom is also given in order for man to be just by being able to render each and everything in the cosmos to their right and proper place. As we have mentioned before, the reality of thing is their specific difference that distinguish them from everything else. Thus, the nature of truth in Islam must correspond and cohere with this wisdom and justice, as being dictated by God through His revelation, since we believe only by assigning each thing to their right and proper place, can their true nature be revealed.<sup>109</sup>

This method of getting to know the limit of truth of object of knowledge and their right and proper place constitute what we called in Islam the method of *ta’wīl*, which is the method of getting to know the ultimate meaning of things.<sup>110</sup> For example, the Qur’anic verses as a Sign (*ayat*) of God are interpreted according to the dual method of *tafsīr*, that is for the verses that are already clear and intelligible by itself (*al-muḥkamāt*), and the method of *ta’wīl*, that is for the verses of which their meaning is obscure and ambiguous (*al-mutashābihāt*). Thus, for example, in the study and interpretation of nature, it should also be done with the method of *tafsīr* and

*ta'wīl*, since nature also as a Sign of God has a dual aspect, an aspect that is clear and apparent to our normal human condition, and an aspect that is obscure and hidden from our normal corporeal existence.<sup>111</sup> Also just like in the Qur'anic interpretation where the interpretation of the ambiguous verses is based on the verses of which their meaning is already clear and established, and so does with the study of nature, its aspects that are not clear and cannot be grasp directly through our normal physical experiences should be grounded upon the aspects of nature that is already clear and established, especially through the authority of revelation.<sup>112</sup>

But we maintain here, this is not only of some kind of naive scientific procedure, of putting scientific problems under the guidance of revelation, or referring back to revelation merely for a support for scientific theories or trying to find answers to scientific questions when scientists fail to find them within their normal scientific procedure. On the other hand, the method of *ta'wīl* is the method of getting into the "ultimate, primordial meaning" of nature.<sup>113</sup> It presupposed that nature has a dual aspect, an aspect that is clear to our sense-perceptions, such as that we see nature as a separate entity, separate from us and separate from its Creator, and an aspect that is ambiguous and hidden from us, such as its aspect as a Sign of God, which cannot be directly experienced by us, but was told to us through His Revelation. In other words by saying that nature as a Sign of God implies to us that nature considered as a thing in itself, apart from God, is *unreal*, since as a Sign of God, it is only *real* when we consider it only in relation to God, and what we perceives of the phenomenal world which surrounds us is nothing more other than the "modes and aspects of a single and dynamic all-encompassing Reality."<sup>114</sup> That is why we said the arrival of knowledge is the arrival at the meaning of the thing, or put it in another way, the arrival at the ultimate meaning of nature, as a Sign of God, not to the thing in itself, since the thing in itself is *non-existent* ('*adam*), but only in relation to its Lord, can it be said to be an *existent* (*mawjūd*).<sup>115</sup>

#### 4.0 Conclusion

On the whole, the fundamental difference that separates the Western participatory epistemology and

the epistemological framework of Islam is a clear acknowledgement of the latter of the importance of revelation in having an important place in the process of attaining knowledge. Thus God as the One who revealed that Revelation has a significant role in the epistemology of Islam, in bestowing His knowledge to man, and man as the recipient of that knowledge, has to strive and struggle in accordance to the rules and conduct that has been described by the Bestower, in order for his self to be worthy to receive His knowledge. The Western participatory epistemology, on the other hand, instead of making God as the Bestower of knowledge, regards nature as the final judge to "decide" if man is ready enough to receive its true manifestation. Nature here seems to be conceived like a powerful mysterious being, guarding its secret from man, while man on the other hand is not certain on what are the right ways and manners in order for nature to reveal its true self to him. Thus, nature here became like a God to man. Furthermore, even if God is mentioned in the participatory epistemology, He is usually conceived only like some spiritual entities, with no firm metaphysical ground, and no higher than man himself, the one whom in this epistemology, is the active commander, the person who is in charge, the judge, who has the final say on what and how knowledge can be attained. Moreover, though the philosophers or the psychologists feel the importance of "retreating" back to their inner selves, it is their empirical observation and discursive speculation, which could have different interpretation from one philosopher to the next, became their final balance of scale in deciding their epistemological framework. It is rather of having various viewpoints, not certain how true it is one's speculation corresponds to Reality which became their final paradigm, as Jung said, "The older I have become, the less I have understood or had insight into or known about myself...I exist on the foundation of something I do not know. In spite of all uncertainties, I feel a solidity underlying all existence and continuity in my mode of being...The more uncertain I have felt about myself, the more there has grown up in me a feeling of kinship with all things."<sup>116</sup> Thus it is the fate of the postmodern man.

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<sup>4</sup>[http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/1938.Friedrich\\_Nietzsche](http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/1938.Friedrich_Nietzsche)

<sup>5</sup>Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas, *Islam and Secularism* (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993) 22-23.

<sup>6</sup>Tarnas 276-277.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid. 276.

<sup>8</sup>Bernard Williams, "Descartes, René," *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, 1967 ed.

<sup>9</sup>Tarnas 277.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid. 276.

<sup>12</sup>Williams 345.

<sup>13</sup>Tarnas 278.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid. 277.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid. 278.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid. 279.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid. 280.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid. 337-338.

<sup>20</sup>Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965) 41.

<sup>21</sup>Tarnas 343.

<sup>22</sup>Roger Scruton, *Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) 39.

<sup>23</sup>Tarnas 343.

<sup>24</sup>Kant 66.

<sup>25</sup>Tarnas 343-344.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid. 344.

<sup>28</sup>Scruton 17.

<sup>29</sup>Tarnas 346.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid. 421.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid. 344-345.

<sup>32</sup>Kant 80.

<sup>33</sup>Tarnas 348.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid. 421-422.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid. 349.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid. 350.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid. 397.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid. 402.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid. 422-435.

<sup>41</sup>Roger Brooke, *Jung and Phenomenology* (London: Routledge, 1991) 54.

<sup>42</sup>Tarnas 434.

<sup>43</sup>Brooke 9.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid. 63.

<sup>45</sup>Calvin S. Hall and Vernon J. Nordby, *A Primer of Jungian Psychology* (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1973) 32.

<sup>46</sup>Brooke 52.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid. Although the existence of the human psyche is speculated mostly from empirical observation, this does not mean that, according to Jung, it inheres in the human brain, since "not only it involves more than thinking, but because thinking is not necessarily done with the head either" (Brooke 69).

<sup>48</sup>Ibid. 15.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid. 160.

<sup>1</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1969) 12.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Richard Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991) 395.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid. 17.  
<sup>51</sup>Ibid. 16.  
<sup>52</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>53</sup>Ibid. 92.  
<sup>54</sup>Ibid. 157.  
<sup>55</sup>Hall 82.  
<sup>56</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>57</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>58</sup>This does not mean however that nature in itself is meaningless, since even without the reflection of the human mind, “its existential density remains. The dawn is still a glorious divine moment of “insatiable delight”.” (Brooke 59)  
<sup>59</sup>Tarnas 434.  
<sup>60</sup>Ibid. 435.  
<sup>61</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>62</sup>Ibid. 434.  
<sup>63</sup>Brooke 55.  
<sup>64</sup>Tarnas 434.  
<sup>65</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>66</sup>Hall 41, 52, 89.  
<sup>67</sup>Brooke 114.  
<sup>68</sup>Ibid. 144.  
<sup>69</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>70</sup>Ibid. 16.  
<sup>71</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>72</sup>Tarnas 387.  
<sup>73</sup>Ibid. 384.  
<sup>74</sup>Ibid. 401.  
<sup>75</sup>Ibid. 402.  
<sup>76</sup>Ibid. 409.  
<sup>77</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>78</sup>Ibid. 402.  
<sup>79</sup>Sam Harris, *The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values* (New York: Free Press, 2010) 4.  
<sup>80</sup>Ibid. 5.  
<sup>81</sup>S.M.N. al-Attas, *Risalah Untuk Kaum Muslimin* (Kuala Lumpur: Institut Antarabangsa Pemikiran dan Tamadun Islam, 2001) 57.  
<sup>82</sup>Al-Attas 133.  
<sup>83</sup>S.M.N. al-Attas, *The Concept of Education in Islam* (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, 1991) 15.  
<sup>84</sup>Al-Attas, *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam*, 132.  
<sup>85</sup>Ibid. 131.  
<sup>86</sup>Ibid. 132.  
<sup>87</sup>Ibid. 116.  
<sup>88</sup>“We did indeed offer the Trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they refused to undertake it, being afraid thereof: but man undertook it—he was indeed unjust and foolish” (*Al-Ahzab* (33): 72).  
<sup>89</sup>“I have only created the jinn and man that they may serve Me” (*Al-Dharyyat* (51): 56).  
<sup>90</sup>Ibid. 42.  
<sup>91</sup>Ibid. 58.

<sup>92</sup>“When thy Lord drew forth from the Children of Adam—from their loins—their descendents, and made them testify concerning themselves (saying): “Am I not your Lord?”—they said: “Yea! We do testify!”” (*Al-A‘raf* (7): 172).  
<sup>93</sup>*Kashf al-Khafa’*, 2 vols. 4<sup>th</sup> pr, Bayrut, 1985, vol.2, p.419, no.2806. Al-Tabarani, al-Tirmizi, Ibn Abi Shaybah, from Ibn ‘Abbas. Quoted from *ibid.* 144.  
<sup>94</sup>Ibid. 59.  
<sup>95</sup>Ibid. 93.  
<sup>96</sup>Ibid. 65.  
<sup>97</sup>Ibid. 51.  
<sup>98</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>99</sup>Ibid. 200.  
<sup>100</sup>Ibid. 118.  
<sup>101</sup>Umar Najm al-Di>n al-Nasafi, *‘Aqa>’id*, ed. and trans. Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (Kuala Lumpur: Dept. of Publications of Univ. of Malaya, 1988) 66.  
<sup>102</sup>Al-Attas, *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam*, 118, and see further al-Attas’s “The Nature of Man and the Psychology of the Human Soul” in his *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam*.  
<sup>103</sup>Ibid. 121.  
<sup>104</sup>Ibid. 119.  
<sup>105</sup>Quoted from Prof. Alparslan Açıkgenç’s article “The Muslim Encounter of Technology,” p.2.  
<sup>106</sup>“Men who celebrate the praises of God, standing, sitting, and lying down on their sides, and contemplate the (wonders of) creation in the heavens and the earth, (with the thought): “Our Lord! Not for naught hast Thou created (all) this! Glory to Thee! Give us salvation from the Penalty of the Fire” (*Ali ‘Imran* (3): 191).  
<sup>107</sup>Al-Attas 134-135.  
<sup>108</sup>Ibid. 129.  
<sup>109</sup>Ibid.  
<sup>110</sup>Ibid. 138.  
<sup>111</sup>Ibid. 135-136  
<sup>112</sup>Ibid. 136.  
<sup>113</sup>Ibid. 138.  
<sup>114</sup>Ibid. 136.  
<sup>115</sup>Ibid. 195, and see further al-Attas’s “The Intuition of Existence” in his *Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam*.  
<sup>116</sup>Brooke 62.

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