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The Crisis of Governance and Modernity: Exploring its Nature from a Moral Perspective

Krisis Tadbir Urus dan Kemodenan: Menelusuri Tabiatnya daripada Perspektif Moral

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to understand the complex relationship between the concepts of governance and modernity. Modernity created a crisis that inhibits achieving goals of governance in its both political and economic terms. The problem of governance can be understood from the arguments put forward by Carl Schmitt in his concept of ‘central domain’. He explained that contemporary human life is governed by the economic logic that describes human behaviour and responsibility as neutral to things and actions. In fact, many scholars have striven to rethink the nature of governance and its limits. Modernity has created its own moral patterns in accordance with the dominant models of governance. Governance itself has been transformed from a moral system of responsibility and transparency to just mere procedures to overcome constraints in controlling a society. Some scholars believe that the problem of corruption derives from lack of moral disposition that dominate ruling elites’ behaviour. This paper examines works of selected scholars in order to understand the relationship between modernity and governance and concludes that there is a need to rethink morality in understanding governance more than just think in restructuring of a range of legal and administrative procedure. There is a need to think radically about the nature of the current moral problem and its latent implications for governance.

Keywords: Governance, Modernity and enlightenment, Crisis of modernity, Governance and morality, Problems of governance.

Abstrak

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Kata Kunci: Tadbir urus, Kemodenan, Krisis Komodenan, Kemodenan dan moral, Masalah tadbir urus

Introduction

The ideas of enlightenment and modernity can be explained by the concept of "secularization". Many scholars have debated the understanding of governance from secular point of view and asserted that such understanding is not as simple as it is commonly thought to be. Rather, it is considerably more complex. Its complexity is a result of many causes, however the issue of most pertinent importance is what Carl Schmitt referred to as our age – The Age of Neutralizations and De-politicizations – based on his concept of ‘central domain’ (Schmitt, 2007). This neutralization that was brought about by modernity has eliminated the standard human life of non-material goals and meanings of existence (ibid, 2007). This means that ignoring the values, perceptions, and concepts from the context hinders our ability to make correct judgments. Neutralization is thus merely a technical process that deprives our conscience from dealing with nature and life with a sense of morality.

The nature of modernity crisis:

The concept of "crisis" is considered as a basic tenet to understand and grasp the nature of transformations with regards to the modernity phenomena which occupied a prominent position in our modern life (Husserl 1970; Strauss, 1972; Habermas, 1988; Arif, 2004a). Many liter-
atures sought to understand its causes and consequences, whether through epistemology, ontology or social issues, through the poles of conflict and consensus (Mouffe, 1993; Habermas, 1988). All systems have tried to manage the conflict by creating consensus through embedding the neutralization over all aspects of life. Hence, the concept of "crisis" is the most important facet of this issue, the one that stimulated us to explore the problematic crises of governance and modernity; to reveal the natural causes that manifested in neutralization-actions.

The crisis of modernity emerged in a number of scholarly literatures. For example, Koselleck (1998) and Voegelin, (1952; 1968) see proponents of enlightenment and modernity as an uprooted and unrealistic group of onlookers who spread the seeds of modern political tensions; tensions that first flowered in the French Revolution. They argue that it was the division that developed between power and morality during the enlightenment that fostered the emergence of this intellectual elite divorced from the realities of politics. Koselleck describes how this disjunction between political authority proper and its subjects led to private spheres that later became centres of moral authority. Eventually, they became models for a political society that took little or no notice of the constraints under which politicians must inevitably work.

Additionally, the progressive bourgeois philosophy, which seemed to offer the promise of a unified and peaceful world, in fact produced just the opposite. Thus, Koselleck (1998) described modernity as a crisis-ridden discourse, as it is a utopian-hypocritical and sanctimonious discourse, and its political benefit is imaginary. This is because the discourse had been established with its own moral values that negated the need for awareness and moral perception by the dominants of the state in the political sphere. In other words, enlightenment has attempted to return to morality and embed itself with the political system by the power of the state. This situation has created a contradiction and a dictatorial structure that is established in the discourse of sovereignty. The disjunction between politics and ethics thus prevented enlightenment from achieving its liberal and autonomic objectives (Koselleck 1998, p. 3-4; Berger & Luckmann, 1995; Arif 2001c).

On the other hand, Binde, (2004, p. 16) indicates the great crisis of modernity that profoundly shook our values and morality, has led to confusion of the value invariants in multiple aspects. This is particularly poignant in the cultural dimensions that influenced social and political structures. Therefore, some attempted to realize the meaning of the crisis in Science in Europe. For Husserl (1970), it is a whole culture crisis; the
most important meaning concerning the sciences is their loss of significance for life. The problem does not lie in modern scientific achievements of the sciences, as their methodological legitimacy is unquestionable. The essence of the problem lies in the "subjectivity mystery" that made European science possible and it thus exists only through some kind of "subjectivity". This subjectivity has to be universal, and should separate itself from its productions. This avoids all questions related to the meaning of the whole human existence (Husserl, 1970). The fundamental question thus is: Can the world and the human existence have meaning, if science only considers things real if they can be objectively observed? (Husserl, 1970). All these metaphysical questions skip (universal) pure facts (Husserl, 1970, p. 49). Husserl defended metaphysics against science' claim of metaphysics' failure, stating that science failed to fulfill its pledges of accounting for all knowledge in the world.

In this context, Bauman (2006) uses the concept of “liquidity” vs “rigidity” in his discussion of the value problem inherent in modernity and its social and political manifestations. That description is considered an introduction to the understanding of enlightenment and the modernity crisis. We thus need to understand the nature of “liquid” modernity as an analytical and interpreting framework in tracing transformations and dealing with the obscurity surrounding their deconstruction; this obscurity derives from the lack of human understanding of reality and the contradictions surrounding this.

This contradiction is a crisis of culture, liquidity, values, and other issues in interpreting reality and understanding its formation that made contemporary man live in “infinite liquidity in lack of absolute relativity” (Arif, [introduction, Abul-Fadl], 1994b, p. 15), which led him to radical thinking on the causes and effects of these transformations. For Taylor (1989, 1999, 2007), who discusses in his book The inherent crisis in Western social patterns and its related roots, those transformations have created problems that necessitated mixing of heritage and modernity. This combination of contradictory patterns has caused confusion and distrust in meaning. This is a trend in intellectuals who carry out discourses on these phenomena while reviewing the controversial relationship between tradition and modernity and linking it to its experienced manifestations, while still examining the relationship between reason and tradition to determine to what extent they are available in the logic of our contemporary life. They draw these discussions to either reveal the reasons behind the failures of the enlightenment project, which was based on the debate of reason throughout history and its progression from the subjec-
tivity stage to objectivity; eventually reaching what is absolutism or tyranny (Habermas, 1990, pp. 140-141).

On the other hand, Gillespie (2008) attempted to study the theological roots of modernity. He tracked its various transformations and the impact of the relationship between God and humanity, starting from the moment of divergence between two great doctrines in Christian Europe. The first was the realistic school that believes in wholeness as a basic tenet and foundation and evidence of such wholeness conferred by the fact that God desired to teach. Other such evidence is that reason and nature reflect each other, and this existence has a goal that emerges from God’s mercy. This philosophy holds that God is known through comparison. Therefore revelation is necessary to understand the transcendent God. The worldly situation in this case can be recognized philosophically, and God is governed and bounded by His wholeness, which exemplifies real ontology. The second doctrine is the nominal one, which is based on the fact that faith alone does not tell us that God is omnipotent. This worldview stresses that He can do whatever is possible; everything exist through His will and the continuity of His will, and therefore wholeness limits the absolute divine power that contradicts His freedom and will. Each contradiction with His parts is a contradiction to His wholeness, which entails rejection of the goals of this existence and the moral values determined by revelation. This is called "individual ontology", which increased the gap between God and humanity, and leads to the spread of chaos, due to a lack of certainty or safety.

Gillespie (2008) argues that the goal of modernity is to make humanity the ruler and possessor of nature, realizing human freedom as being possible. The deeper question that Gillespie thus attempted to answer is whether modernity, in its most secular form, is able to escape the metaphysical and theological problem through which it began; the problem of morality that had manifested in it.

Many scholars explore the roots of the crisis of modernity and enlightenment to understand its various dimensions. For example, Strauss (1989a, 1965) finds that the crisis of modernity in modernity itself, and dealing with it requires deep considerations from outside its classic discourse. While (Arendt, 1958, p. 20) described the current times as dark times; the crisis is the main characteristic of our humanitarian condition, as it lies at the core of our activities, relationships with ourselves, with others and the world. It is thus the basis of our existence in the world and our common life. However, (Schmitt, 2007) thinks that modernity and enlightenment, with their absolute neutrality, have abolished the human
meaning of existence based on the differentiation that is required by the binary nature of friendship and enmity.

The governance problematic
The term "governance" is used widely in the literatures of Public Administration and Public Policy. The present era is also thus called the era of governance. The circulation and popularization of this term in the economic sector has been strongly advocated by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to rationalize the economic progress for development purposes at various levels. Governance infiltrated the political dictionary as one of the crucial concepts necessary to achieve the best results from the public policies of the state; hence necessary to attaining the stability of society. The term "governance" has been evolved as a concept which is considered wider than the concept of government itself. There are diversified definitions of governance according to its expected roles, both with regards to the state and society. These are anchored deeply in two ways: firstly, at the international level, to build a governance perspective to address essential environmental issues. Secondly, at the state or national level i.e. the transition of ideas from state sovereignty to governance, which ultimately refers to the process of statelessness (Osterfeld & Reichert, 1983; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992).

Despite the applications of governance at many levels at both the international and national level, there still are many great challenges. Whatever crises of nations around the world that have appeared from time to time, along with the accumulated problems of governance, despite the achievements of the latter, have not yet been able to address many of these issues. For example, the World Development Report (WDR, 2017), which carried as its theme “Governance and the Law”, presented significant problematic issues in relation to governance, as identified in three principles:

a) Think not only about the form of institutions, but also about their functions.

b) Think not only about capacity-building, but also about power asymmetries.

c) Think not only about the rule of law, but also about the role of law.

These principles that had been built depended on certain premises: first, the successful reforms are not just about “best practice” to be effective, policies must guarantee credible commitment, support coordi-
nation, and promote cooperation. Second, power asymmetries can undermine policy effectiveness. Hence, the unequal distribution of power in the policy arena can lead to exclusion, capture, and clientelism. Third, change is possible, so the elites, citizens, and international actors can promote change by shifting incentives, reshaping preferences and beliefs, and enhance the contestability of the decision-making process.

Here we may regard formal moral governance as referring to those systems enacted for the purpose of determining, establishing, encouraging and enforcing official ethical standards within an organization (Snell, 2000, p. 281; Snell, & Tseng, 2002 p. 454). As such, the systems may emphasize control in the hard, arbitrary or coercive sense, or through oppressive ideology or imposed identity; conversely, they may suggest 'control' in the sense of a values-lead self-regulation expressed through open inquiry and dialogue; that is, through participative structures (Collier, & Esteban, 1999, p.194). Consequently, the nature of formal moral governance may be identified as having several dimensions and may be characterized to the extent that it is based on procedural justice and open dialogue rather than ideology and role or role-model identification; or based on coercion or rules rather than laissez-faire attitudes.

Kohlberg's framework, as modified by Snell to provide insights about moral reasoning, moral governance and Organizational Moral Ethos in organizations, can help in understanding moral governance. This means it can expound upon how ethical 'standards' develop or are determined and enforced in those organizations; how moral authority emerges on a spectrum stretching from domination through to acceptance based on deferential and then critical trust; how socialization within organizations impacts those beliefs underpinning moral reasoning; and then how individual and 'corporate' perspectives, outlooks and actions are affected. The nature of formal moral governance will influence and be influenced by the Basis of Moral Authority in the organization. In the simplest terms, we may define the basis of moral authority as reflecting the nature of power to define or attribute what is right or wrong, good or bad, what is acceptable as behaviour or outcomes, and what is not. As such, it may reflect the politics of positional legitimacy, hierarchical status, authority and an ability to coerce, dominate, manipulate, disempower, engage in patronage, sponsorship, favouritism and nepotism, or control of access to information etc. It may also reflect expertise, charisma, network maintenance, gatekeeper status, tacit knowledge, rewards; and also reflect notions of deferential or critical trust and faith.
On the other hand, Shamir (2008) explores emerging discursive formations concerning the relationship of business and morality. He suggests that contemporary tendencies to economize public domains and methods of government also dialectically produce tendencies to moralize markets in general and business enterprises in particular. So, he invokes the concept of ‘responsibilization’ as a means of accounting for the epistemological and practical consequences of such processes. Looking at the underlying ‘market rationality’ of governance, and critically examining the notion of ‘corporate social responsibility’, it concludes that the moralization of markets further sustains, rather than undermine neo-liberal governmentalties and neo-liberal visions of civil society, citizenship and responsible social action.

For all the reasons mentioned above, the concept of governance that is related to the morality and ethics dimensions is a problematic conceptual phenomenon. The meaning and understanding of this concept is ambiguous and complex when it comes to the epistemology and ontology dimensions of it, which is embodied in its moral and ethics framework (Shamir, 2008; Underkuffler, 2013). However, the search for the epistemological and ontological roots of the concept of "governance" and its moral dimensions, which have been developed to dismantle political and economic corruption as well as reduce their negative effects in modern societies (World Bank, 2017; Bauman, 2006), have not yet been addressed in a proper manner.

**Neutrality and its impact on morality**

One of the most important concepts of Schmitt, the “central domain”, was significant to understand historical transformations. He pointed out that the “central domain” refers to the shift between the different vital areas that came about as a result of the search for a neutral domain free from conflict, and the need to reach common agreement through debate and exchange of views (Schmitt, 2007, p. 82, 89). Each time period has its own “central domain” that shaped its nature (Schmitt, ibid, p. 83). He explains that (p.84) “there are four great, simple, secular stages corresponding to the four centuries and proceeding from the theological to the metaphysical domain, from there to the humanitarian-moral, and, finally, to the economic domain”. Schmitt (2007, p. 81-89) found that concepts and words take on a new meaning with each new central domain that deconstruct them within their framework. In other words, the central domain affects understanding of things; likewise, the moral domain had a sort of effect which differentiated the economic, po-
political and social domain. This does not mean the separation of domains from one another, rather each central domain produces the logic of its own inherent conflict (Schmitt 2007, p. 89-90). Furthermore, the concept of neutrality is that politics loses its meaning and effectiveness and exits it from the ability to act to mere irrelevance. Therefore, the neutrality produced by liberalism and modernity is exploited by the neutrality of modernity instead. This occurs in an important format, thereby inducing neutrality to lose its ability to distinguish in what issues it must make a right decision or confer the right act to maintain its existence.

A good foundation of thought prevents falling into the trap of neutrality; this is a pathway to not understanding the scale of the issue and thus being unable to take proper action (Schmitt, ibid, p. 88-89). The era of the central domain of the present age is "technical", based on material considerations as mentioned above, and therefore all concepts correlate to this (Schmitt, ibid, p, 95). Schmitt (2007, p. 92-93) linked life and the organic aspect between death and the machine, reflecting on our understanding of the logic of politics under the neutrality of technology adopted by the liberal state of individual rationalism. This is associated with a reference to contracts based on natural rights as a source of legitimacy.

Arendts’ profound analytical logic (Elmessiri 1995, 3/355) is that science is a facade of neutrality that conceals the will of power, and a universal possibility that begins to control man in the name of social engineering. For all of these, Arendtly advocated freedom based on public participation in politics versus freedom based on personal interests, the importance of Schmitt is that he agreed with Arendt. Schmitt did so in his own view of liberalism, characterized by neutrality and the fluidity of discrimination in political fields, which he concluded led to the emergence of the totalitarian state - which includes everything under its cloak; to him hence everything can become political. Schmitt's confrontation with liberalism was partaken under the drive to deconstruct the politician; for religion, he defended the inevitability of the inevitable, where the man who freely decides everything important concerns a particular issue - the force that controls man entirely and even existentially (Heinrich 1995, p. 22-23).

Schmitt sees neutrality as a negation of the concept of politics (Ojakangas 2006, p. 23). Schmitt envisions the technological elimination of conflict through the replacement of the necessary diodes to the moral and political decisions of the worldwide perspective. He believes this is at the heart of the metaphysical modernist view of the world, which he
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sees as a facet of the age of neutralization and de-politicization. In this context, Arendt argues that politics has become more complicated, derived from the significance of the fact that it does not lie in the same person and substance as Aristotle believed, but in the relations between the members of society, as it forms in the space outside the individual human being. Relationships therefore elevate human beings and the notion of their differentiation, recognizing the equality of human beings despite their differences. Every absence of difference and differentiation thus leads inevitably to the impoverishment of politics and its decline (Arendt 2003, 1961).

In short, neutrality as the logic of the present age, as Schmitt sees it, created a great moral crisis that made man incapable of endure his responsibility. Thus, the responsibility started leaning on a stick of systems.

The crisis of morality and its relation with governance:

Jackal (1984) and Snell (1993) defined moral ethos as 'a set of force-fields within organizations, comprising everyday norms, rules-in-use, social pressures, and quality of relationships, all of which impinge on members' understandings, judgments and decisions concerning good and bad, right and wrong'. Elsewhere, moral ethos is seen as synonymous with the moral or ethical climate, atmosphere, culture; that is, what constitutes shared member perceptions, assumptions and expectations about how everyday issues and ethical dilemmas are to be viewed and resolved (Snell, 2000, p. 265). However, this definition is not sufficient to fully understand the relationship between morality and its governance.

Underkuffler described it as a crisis of moral predicament that relates to corruption in the clearest possible way:

“It is a searing indictment not only of A’s act but also of A’s character. It is a dispositional concept, which—in this context—establishes the foundational moral deficiency or depravity of the accused. It is a statement not only of what A has done but also of what A has become. The idea of corruption that animates public contexts involves traditional ideas, but it is a far more complex idea. It is an explicitly moral notion, invoking notions of depravity and evil, human frailty and temptation. It imagines corruption as an external force, which attacks and undermines better human impulses. It is not simply an act, or a series of acts. It is the capture of individuals (and political systems) by corrosive, distorting, and decomposing forces. It is self-involvement, self-indulgence, and the loosening and discarding of the restraints of social
bonds. It is (in the terminology that I shall adopt) the idea of the capture by evil of one’s soul” (Underkuffler 2013, p. 3-4).

We would thus be likely to hesitate before rejecting her analysis because, as she explains in her book, Captured by Evil: The Idea of Corruption in Law, corruption is not a tidy legal label but rather often implicates unmanageable extra-legal concerns: unbridled emotions, rampant moralism, public panic, prosecution excess—not to mention the numerous and often inconsistent moral, political, literary, and religious associations that have accumulated around the idea of corruption for millennia in societies the world over.

Underkuffler (2013) and Bukovansky (2006) argued to assert that corruption is the essence of evil, and the corruptor undergoes the corruption seductions. The real problem is that corruption is embedded in our moral and social norms and standards. This thorny relationship that poses itself, especially in light of the economic and social differences that constitute the images and forms of violence, develops within its own existence a state of permanent war within the social body. However, this war must be channelled within specific channels so that the body, ergo the social body, can survive. This is precisely the function of power relations, that is, the function of politics in general.

In Heidegger’s (1977) and Jonas’s (1984) diagnosis of the problematic modern question concerning technology, they posit the golden promises of modern technology have turned into a threat, and that technology is inseparably linked with this threat. The enframing is a way to uncover the world where not only nature but also human beings are revealed as part of a standing reserve. Thus this notion holds that through technique and technology, nature is just a raw material for manipulation. In this technological enframing of the world, human beings see everything as orderable, as part of a standing-reserve. Even man is seen as a part of a standing-reserve. This kind of deconstruction of the world is not in itself a threat amongst other threats, but actually the threat of import.

Heidegger concludes that art is a way of uncovering the world, which ultimately functions as some sort of counterbalance to the technical-instrumental uncovering of the world. Jonas meanwhile looks at it from a moral perspective: In modern times, technique and technology has becomes the measure of progress. It has become so important that it is to be understood as the driving force for progress, as the principle form of human development (Bernstein 1995, p. 17). Technology has become the calling of mankind. Yet we have ourselves become objects of technological manipulation: Research on techniques on how to extend life, to
commit behavioural control and to engage in genetic manipulation points to an unknown territory fringing the outlook of making. This carries with it profound ethical implications; technology is made into an ethical problem. But the situation requires a totally new contemplation on ethics. Traditional ethical theory is rooted in suppositions that are of a different kind than those we face in a modern technological civilization.

The moral field is limited to the common present timeline, and future perspectives are limited to people’s expected lifetimes. But why do these limitations require a completely new contemplation of ethics? The shortcomings of traditional ethics become evident in an analysis of how modern technology affects our actions. The use of advanced technology involves collective actions. Actions for which the person acting, the action itself and its effect are no longer identical to those found in the intimacy sphere. And we cannot know the full consequences of these actions, its damaging effects on nature and future people. But this does not mean that we are not responsible. Both nature and future generations are subject to our collective actions; we therefore have obligations toward them. They constitute a major part of our dimension of responsibility because we can manipulate these things by the use of technology, and nature and future people must therefore be included in ethical reflections. The consequences are irreversible and cumulative, i.e. they pile up. It is therefore impossible to predict the totality of their effects in an indeterminate future (Light & Rolston, 2003). And what is regarded as “constants” can potentially undergo changes given the new field of genetic technology. The human condition is therefore the subject of reshaping techniques undergoing research today. This renders it problematic to speak of a “constant” and “unchangeable” human nature. Moreover, it puts the question of moral responsibility towards other people in a new light. Modern technology’s golden promises have turned into a threat because it has caused serious degradation on our foundations of existence, i.e. nature; it also has the potential to change human nature. A new set of ethics for the technological civilization is therefore seen as an urgent necessity.

On the problems regarding the rationalizing of life under a liberal philosophy, Kahn explains that what we need is an important means of subsistence. Liberalism in itself cannot provide these means, Kahn claims, because it separates desire from morality. This is because the liberal discourse continually encourages the rationalization of all aspects of life. There is no limit to the extension of this rationality. Hence, the faculty of the "unquestioning critical mind" continues to press on until there
is a sharp split between the pure practical mind and the silent private whisperings that the body instructs us through. Thus, the mind and its interests become the only tools available to us in the liberal structure to make meaningful decisions - hardly enough to construct a meaningful life. Thus respect for morality and respect for the desires of the body cannot establish a decent relationship. There must be more than a "fun life" (Kahn 2004).

Binde (2004, p. 16), argued that the belief in historical and cultural relativism has stripped values of their holiness and turned them into mere coverings, disguised by authoritarian mechanisms, which contributed to the undermining of philosophical, religious and artistic beliefs that hold truth, goodness, and beauty as absolute values. He (Binde 2004, p. 16) added that this great value crisis that has profoundly shaken the social underpinnings these last two centuries has led to a confusion of value constants in multiple directions. (Sztompka 2007) explained that the focus now is on the values that members of society carry, and the way values help them to give meaning to their lives, rather than the values held by sociologists.

In short, the moral values of self are essential. Those who sacrifice for the sake of principles they believe in can do so only with sincere consciences; while those who indulge in their fantasies and propagate their whole lives to satisfy these desires, for them sacrificing these pleasures is not a viable option. This is the core of the moral decay of modernity and enlightenment; the notion that made the individual self dependent on their desires and fantasies, building the basis of his thinking and judgment on these things (Strauss 1972, p. 222-223).

**Governance as Discourse of Morality**

The hard relationship between governance and morality is reflected in many of the literatures that have studied it deeply. For example, Rubin (2015) deals with the problem by relative perspective, lamenting the decay of morality, norms and values, and it related facets are being rapidly eroded and substituted for empty hedonism. He enlightens us that the changes in morality have gone hand in hand with changes in the dominant mode of governance throughout the course of history. For instance, in the Early Middle Ages, a moral system based on honour gradually developed. In a dangerous world where state power was declining, people depended on the bonds of personal loyalty that were secured by showing generosity to their followers and violence against their enemies. And when state power began to revive again in the High Middle Ages
through the efforts of the European monarchies, and Christianity became more institutionally effective and more spiritually intense, a new morality emerged. This was the morality of higher purposes, it demanded that people devote their personal efforts to achieving salvation and their social efforts to serving the emerging nation-states.

The modern era, which began in the late 18th century, has seen the gradual erosion of this morality of higher purposes and the rise of a new morality of self-fulfilment and hedonism, one that encourages individuals to pursue the most meaningful and rewarding life-path. In short, according Rubin, the clash between this ascending morality and the declining morality of higher purposes is the primary driver of contemporary political and cultural conflict.

In this context, (Scanlon 2008) explores the moral permissibility of an action. That permissibility may seem to rely on an agent’s motives and reasons for accomplishing an action. Furthermore, he claims that the apparent dependence of permissibility on the agent’s reasoning in such cases is merely a failure to distinguish between two kinds of moral valuation: valuation of the permissibility of an action and valuation of the way an agent decided what to do. That leads us to an important distinction between the permissibility of an action and its meaning: the significance for others of the agent’s willingness to act in this way. An action’s meaning depends on the agent’s reasoning for performing it in a way that its permissibility does not allow. Blame, he argues, is a response to the meaning of an action rather than its permissibility. This analysis leads to a novel account of the conditions of moral responsibility and to important conclusions about the morality of blame.

These issues that are mentioned above have raised vital questions regarding the success of governance in enforcing its promises and achieving its goals, especially in light of this relativity morality that have dominated our lives. However, the philosophical reasons behind our avoidance of the moral governance is clearly delineated in Alasdair McIntryre's classical book After Virtue in 1981, which briefly states that the Aristotelian approach to interpreting things is disposed of in favour of a rational justification for morality according to the Enlightenment project of the 18th century. We can therefore find ourselves in a slippery slope that ultimately leads to the need to give up any justification for teleological ethics. This then leads to what McIntryre calls the concept of emotivism, which adopts moral conflict as inevitable as a result of this perception.
The significance of morality is apparently confirmed by Habermas (2006, p. 150-151) and its extent and significance are explored deeply in his later writings. For him, the principles of freedom and collective social life, the behaviour of independent life and freedom, the morality and conscience of the individual, human rights, and democracy, are all direct legacy of the morality of Jewish justice and the morality of Christian love. This legacy, which has not changed much over the course of its usage, has been the subject of continuing financial allocation and reinterpretation to this day. There are no other alternatives to it, and in light of the current challenges of the post-national composition, we continue to learn from this heritage, and everything else is thereby irrelevant.

Arendt sees that morality has thus collapsed into a mere set of mores, manners, customs and conventions to be changed at will – not with criminals, but with ordinary people, who, as long as moral standards were socially accepted, never dreamt of doubting what they had been taught to believe in (Arendt 2003, p. 54). She also discusses the issue of values at a deep level of human action and theorizes on great acts of good. She affirms that it is these act that stems from the self, even if those committing to them are not aware as such (Arendt 1958, p. 74). These actions are a type of work whose executors do not seek to make the acts known, yet they have a special characteristic that distinguishes them from other works. The secrecy of these works is the very factor that make them morally good. This secrecy is thus necessary for the true nature of charitable work, which lies in selflessness and denial of interest; an act of good must be intrinsic human nature (Arendt 2003, p. 123). She points out in a very clear statement that if this work takes on a public persona, it loses much of its moral defence: “goodness that comes out of hiding and assumes a public role is no longer good, but corrupt in its own terms and will carry its own corruption wherever it goes” (Arendt 1958, p. 77).

On the other hand, modern law is the dominant form of the myth of sovereign will, and its adoption means acceptance of the political will of people who change their moral standards as circumstances require (Hallaq 2012). For governance to succeed the slogan should be "morality is to guide human actions, if it be autonomous, then it must rest on universal and eternal principles of truth and justice, principles that transcend the manipulation and whims of a positivist entity. It must determine the limits of human actions, drawing a line of separation between what can and cannot be done and curbing the domain of the rational when this leads to the violation of its own domain"(Hallaq ibid, p. 157).
Additionally, the morality of governance discourse is quite complicated, and is a fundamental issue in current political systems that have become morally neutral on fundamental issues. This has made (Khan, 2004) things hard and induced relevant parties to rethink liberal philosophy, based on the principles of Carl Schmitt, who is one of the greatest opponents of Western liberalism. Khan tried to establish a new vision of liberalism and revive it in accordance with a moral logic based on the group as a central tenet rather than an individual as the core facet.

For example, responsibility is one of the most important pillars in which governance achieves its purposes, establishing or implementing decisions and actions, or bearing in mind their consequences. The problem is that responsibility is a value parameter in which ethical and moral values are procedural. The difference between the value and the truth, between the self and the subject, between the person and the procedure, between the text and the reality, or the reality and the duty, decomposes the effectiveness of responsibility. This thus becomes a functional responsibility based on the implementation of the response without bearing to consider the nature of what is being done. This is based on the removal of the consequences of responsibility on the state, society or individuals, as each party exchanges its own self-sufficiency by transferring it to the other parties to rest their conscience on. They thus depend on each other to confirm the system is functioning properly, whose components necessitate the necessary decisions and actions, or even thinking, take place. There are experts and specialists who make these decisions, and our ability to adapt to them and not discuss them is the responsibility we hold (Arendt, 2003; Jonas, 1984; Bernstein, 1995; Shamir, 2008).

Many factors have led to a decline in the general sense of responsibility in these matters; perhaps the most prominent is the one discussed in this research. The spread of relativity, which argued that all facets of the different interpretations of reality had some modicum of truth, resulted in the absence of a final reference to explain the meaning of existence and deprived the decisions or actions committed of a final significance. The chaos of nihilism, which "replaced the values that create chaos, is a general mess of values" (Strauss 1965, pp. 13-14). Within the context of his own categorization, Strauss places the responsibility for the public sphere of society on the state, with the economic logic of various perspectives on human decisions and actions affecting their choices. This makes the responsibilities entrusted to them affect economic conditions that...
at the borders of benefit or profit, setting them as a final ruling condition for decisions making in public settings.

This sheds more light on political irresponsibility, which he sees as inherent in modernity. Thus, for him, the passage from classical prudence and caution to the modern rupture with tradition is a radical change of the conditions of the modern life-in-common. In challenging modern impudence, Weber's positions on secularization, the disenchantment of the world, the insolubility of the conflict between ethics and politics, and the "polytheism of values," no longer entail, according to Strauss, the need to reflect on the persistence of theological structures (rather, what is a stake in Weber's position requires deeper political scrutiny.)

Arendt's critique is based on a deep understanding of politics as the essence of freedom and the awareness of the disappearance of that freedom with the rise of absolute totalitarian regimes. These regimes considered violence legitimate to achieve political aims, which led to the need to favour the working man (Marxism) at the expense of the active man. Therefore, the meaning of human existence and freedom is the meaning of politics, Arendt explained.

When freedom is negatively understood, argued Arendt, every actor appears to limit the freedom of another. Here political freedom becomes identical with acting out the sovereign will-a shift that Arendt characterized as “the most pernicious and dangerous consequence of the philosophical equation of freedom and free will.” It is on the ground of understanding politics in terms of anomic agents acting out their conflicting wills that the content of politics becomes power and power becomes ultimately instituted as “the monopoly of legitimate violence.” Setting this against Arendt's own concept of politics as the real constitution of what it means to be “acting in concert of a plurality of men - if men wish to be free, it is strictly sovereignty they must renounce”- Hobbes deconstructs this using the paradigmatic liberalism, which becomes an anti-political thought that pars belief in excellence (Arendt 1990, 39).

Of course, to experience the pain of this unbearable intimacy, some intimacy must take place notwithstanding. The Socratic idea of "being out of harmony" implies a duality in unity: that “I, as one, am also two-in-one”. For Arendt, this duality only arises in the experience of thinking: the “two-in-one discourse with myself that happens in solitude”. Thinking takes place without a natural end or purpose (except as a kind of by-product). It is not dependent on intelligence or sophistication and is naturally satisfying. Moreover, this internal experience of plurality
is the basis by which we individualize ourselves; "An individual's personal quality is precisely his 'moral' quality" (Arendt 2003, p. 79).

We find that there is an advanced theory endeavored by (Rabie, 2007b, 2/39) on the need to separate intellectual and ideological attitudes and social systems, a phenomenon that emerges only in mature societies. Hamad detailed the requirements of these versions in his book, "The Second Islamic World". With the emergence of Muhammad, the Seal of the Apostles, the Prophets copied the Jewish mystical system, with all its algebraic attributes. This human launch culminated in the emergence of the religion of the prophets, namely Islam, for all people. Therefore, for (Arendt 1961, p214), it renders the faith incapable of acting in its political sense and deprives it of its right to contribute to the management of humanitarian affairs, i.e. the emptying of its political content. However, this undertaking at the same time reveals the human capacity to commit (Arendt 1958, 314). Herein lies the importance of Habermas' assertion of Arendt's attempt to revive the public political arena so that citizens can regain their rights in freedom and contribute to decision-making.

What, for example, are the moral and intellectual foundations of free-living? Once freedom is institutionally and externally procured, consideration of what Strauss referred to as "the formation of character" is a necessity to follow. Neglect of the souls of individuals (a classical concept) along with the institutional creation of a sphere of freedom impervious to the law inevitably declines into what Strauss called "permissive egalitarian-ism" where what is secured and upheld is not conscience or reason, but the individual with his urges (Strauss 1972, p 222).

Freedom is not a phenomenon of will; that is the notion explained in the concept of Liberum arbitrium; that is, the freedom of choice, which is the act of deciding between two providers; those who’s recommendation you wish to abide and those you wish to disregard. The choice is predetermined by a motive that quickly starts to influence the subject as soon as the indicated inclinations take effect (Arendt 1961, p196). "Freedom is based on the abilities of human consciousness, which is the essence of the universe. Hence it is imperative for a person to be fully responsible in the determination of his life, as revealed by God’s guidance and mercy, and be responsible for how he understands all matters of his life so that the things that have no knowledge will not be subdued "(Hamad, 2012, p. 43).

Arendt dismantles the idea that politics is a choice which strives to achieve an objective that is explicit about its means of verification, because that carries with it the implication that the choice of politics bears
with it the logic of purpose and means, which is a material perception that makes it a mere means to achieve tribal ends (Arendt 1961, p. 92). Therefore, Hannah Arendt approached the issue of evil from a political perspective, apart and distinct from all theological and moral interpretations. For her, she is not connected to any metaphysical tendency, and her analysis is not based on any absolute principles that refer to what is sacred or religious. She only considers what is human and can only be understood in relation to He who is human! This is because it is through his act, people come out of their humanity. This has been variously referred to as a black hole, an ice abyss, and thus it is thought this black hole devours everything, leaving only the horror of the inhuman absolute. Evil is what makes the human beings live in a state of rupture between our humanity and inhumanity; this notion is thus ultimately the lack of conformity of the human with himself. One of the effects of this rupture is the difficulty of grasping the sense of evil and understanding its significance, which is ultimately what is unacceptable or incompatible with this issue. The presence of abstention therefore, the higher degree of its presence and multiple forms, the greater the reluctance to understand.

This flaw came from the interpretation of human nature. The essence of modernity was the rationality of man and his ability to control his destiny and the world, namely, the self and the environment, and the ability to control and contain it. But what happened to the ‘Enlightenment man’, or as Agnes Heller (1978) named ‘The Renaissance Man’, is the transition from the rigidity of rationality in its early stages to the fluidity of the real world in our reality as it goes beyond the approach of the "rational choice" (Lichbach 2003). This far exceeded what Arnold Brecht considered the central dispute within the field of political theory between the path of Kant and the path of (Brecht, 1959). Arndt's approach thus embodies freedom and necessity, where action expresses freedom, and labour expresses necessity (Arendt 1958, p. 137).

In short, this paper ultimately agrees with Arendt's concern that morality as a set of universal prescriptions for behaviour is two-fold. First, the very structure of universal normative claims makes it easy to adopt them unthinkingly, so that we lessen our ability to act as thinking moral agents the more we rely on them. Second, they are absolutely unreliable; they occupy a place so general and unquestioned in our thoughts that quite often others just as general and unquestioned can replace them. Since such claims lead to thoughtlessness, they fail to provide us with the tools for real moral critique and evaluation. They may reinvigorate particular moral codes, but they actually undermine rather than strengthen
moral agency. Arendt is therefore defending moral agency, not arguing for its irrelevance.

**Conclusion**

Theories of governance in relation to political or economic system, and in the public or private sphere - are all governed by the framework and environment that created them, and their implementation have thus been worked on in different levels. In addition, the governance discourse has a moral content that is expressed by many of its pillars, such as responsibility, transparency, etc. The problematic issue is that this moral system does not have the embraced environment which is working to activate pillars of morality and motivate human behaviour in our communities and institutions; instead concepts of governance have become mere administrative and legal procedures. Thus, the content of governance has rather been omitted from its original vision.

Therefore, any development of a discourse of governance must depend on two visions: first, a theory of morality that has the capability of meeting national and global challenge; and secondly, a framework that depends on the cultural principles that societies embrace and coexist with.

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