

Sa'īd Nūrsī's Approach to the Principles of Reasoning Vis-à-vis Analogical Inductive Reasoning

Pendirian Pemikiran Said Nūrsī berhubung Pemikiran
Analogis Induktif

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Abstract

Analogical inductive reasoning (*al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*) is to some scholars a controversial issue related to Islamic law and logic. It is argued that this kind of *qiyās* can only afford non-certain knowledge in Islamic law. Bedi'uzamān Said Nūrsī (1876-1960) however, evaluated this kind of *qiyās* and argued that there also exists *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* which affords certain knowledge. This problem may not be appreciated unless information regarding the proofs (*al-'adillah wa al-ūjaj*) and the ways of inference (*is'īnbat*) and argumentation (*istidlāl*) in logic and Islamic law is discussed. For that matter stand of great scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751) have been shared in. They have actually gone the same way with different nuances.

Key Words: Logic, *al-Qiyās al-Tamthīlī*, Analogical Inductive Reasoning, Certain Knowledge, Inference.

Abstrak

Mengikuti beberapa cendekiawan pemikiran analogis induktif (*al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*) adalah satu isu kontroversi berkaitan dengan undang-undang dan logik Islam. Ia telah didebatkan bahawa pertimbangan sebegini akan hanya menghasilkan pengetahuan yang tidak mutlak dalam undang-undang Islam. Tetapi mengikuti Bedi'uzamān Said Nūrsī (1876-1960) terdapat juga ilmu mutlak dalam *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*. Masalah ini tidak akan dihargai kecuali maklumat mengenai bukti (*wa al-'adillah al-ūjaj*) dan cara inferensi (*is'īnbat*) dan argumentasi (*istidlāl*) dalam undang-undang dan logik Islam dibahas. Untuk itu, pendirian Ulama besar seperti Ibnu Taimiyah (w. 728) dan Ibn al-Qayyim (w.751) telah dikongsi bersama. Pendirian mereka adalah serupa tetapi dengan nuansa yang berbeza.

Kata kunci: Logik, *al-Qiyās al-Tamthīlī*, Pemikiran analogis induktif, ilmu mutlak, inferensi

Introduction

Badī'uzzamān Sa'īd Nursī (1876-1960) was arguably Turkey's most prominent Muslim scholar, thinker and reformer in the modern era. His works have had an impact on several branches of Islamic philosophy, preeminently ethics, tafsīr and logic. It is in his discussions of jurisprudence that he displays his mastery of logic. This paper is an attempt to highlight his contribution to Islamic law and logic. It focuses on his approach to analogical inductive reasoning (*al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*) as a means of knowledge, a subject of much debate in the history of Islamic thought.

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In contradiction to those who held that analogical inductive reasoning can yield only non-certain knowledge, Sa'īd Nursī argued that, when properly understood and applied, al-qiyās al-tamthīl can be a means of deriving certain or indubitable knowledge. This paper discusses Sa'īd Nursī's arguments in the general context of Islamic principles of reasoning, including the demonstration of proofs (al'adillah wa al-hujai) and the methods of inference (istinbāt) and argumentation (istidlāl). In this discussion, the views of past scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751) on the issue of analogical inductive reasoning are included, to show how, by taking slightly different approaches, they reached the same conclusion as Sa'īd Nursī.

1. Proofs (al-Adillah/Hujaj) and the Ways of Inference (Istinbāt) and Argumentation (Istidlāl)

The primary objective of logic (*ilm al-mantiq*) includes the study of inference and arguments with proofs. In sources of Islamic logic, proofs have been analyzed under the title of *dalīl* (*adillah*) and *hujjah* (*hujaj*). In logic and mathematics however, proof is an argument that establishes the validity of a particular proposition. Formally, it is a finite sequence of formulas generated according to accepted rules. Each formula is either an axiom or derived from an already established theorem. The last formula is the statement waiting to be proven. That is in general the essence of deductive reasoning methods. Nevertheless, the term proof may be defined as: "A certain kind of linguistic structure associated with a conventional meaning, to be used as the record or report of an inference". According to Muslim scholars, this is the name of an articulated or a logical proof, by means of which something hidden is revealed. It is synonymous with *hujjah* (plea or proof), *bayyinah* (clear evidence), *burhān* (demonstrative proof), *āyah* (sign, token, or mark), and *shāhid* (testimony, textual evidence, or witness), while the *dalīl* specifically means a proof which unfolds or reveals something [and not that which obligates]³. The following is an example of a proof. Ahmad's car is two years older than Ḥammād's car. Ḥammād's car is three years old. Therefore, Ahmad's car is five years old.

We can use proofs only with inference (*istinbāt*) and argumentation (*istidlāl*). The inference is the act or process of deriving a conclusion based strictly on what one already knows. Inference is studied in different fields, while log-

¹He is a Muslim Scholar, Abdurrahmān bin Muhammad Al-Akhḍarī (941 H). He wrote his book in form of poem. Nursī, *Ta'liqāt, Şayqal*, V.III: 163-238.

²He is an Ottoman Scholar who wrote books about *Ilm al-Kalām* and *Mantiq*; Ismā'īl al-Galanbāwī (d.1791). Nursī, *Ta'liqāt, Şayqal al-Islam*, V.III: p.239-330.

³Bedi'uzzamān, Sa'īd Nursī, *Ta'liqāt, Şayqal al-Islam*, Istanbul 1995, VIII, p.318; Ali Sedad, *Mizān al-'Uqūl fī al-Mantiq wa al-'Uşūl*, Istanbul 1303 H., p.69-72; Al-Sarakhsī, Abū Bakr Muhammad, b. Abī Sahl (v.483/1090, *Uşūl al-Sarakhsī*, v. 1-3, Beirut, 1393/1973, op.cit., 1, 277-79; Compare, Henry S. Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning, An Introduction to Logic, Methodology and the Theory of Signs*, New York, Dower Publications, 1967, 408-410.

ic studies the laws of valid inference. Statisticians have also developed formal rules for inference from quantitative data. Artificial intelligence researchers equally develop automated inference systems. Traditional logic is only concerned with certainty (*yaqīn*)-- one progresses from premises to a conclusion, where all premises as well as conclusions are declarative sentences that are either true or false. There are several motivations for extending logic to uncertain “propositions” and weaker modes of reasoning⁴. Before further detailed discussion of proofs (*adillah*), we should however, address two critical questions concerning Logic. The first pertains to the material of proofs and arguments, while the second relates to the five métiers-arts (*ṣinā‘ah al-khamsah*) used in logic and other sciences.

A. The Material of Proofs and Arguments (Mawād al-Adillah): The Premises (Qadāyā)

In logic, an argument (*dalīl*) is a set of one or more declarative sentences (or “propositions”) known as the premises (*qadāyā*) along with another declarative sentence (or “proposition”) known as the conclusion. Each premise and conclusion can only be true or false, and not ambiguous. The sentences comprising of an argument are referred to as being either true or false, not as being valid or invalid; arguments are referred to as being valid or invalid, not as being true or false. Some authors refer to premises and conclusion using the terms declarative sentence, statement, proposition, sentence, or even indicative utterance. Whichever term is used, each premise and conclusion must be capable of being true or false and nothing else: they are truth bearers. Propositions or premises (*qadāyā*) are statements that could either be true or false⁵. *Al-Qadāya Al-Yaqīniyyah* (propositions): Propositions which are known for certain to be true. Only such arguments can result in conclusions that can be known for certain to be true. They are divided into two groups: Firstly, *al-badihiyyāt* which are indubitable propositions which the reason judges for explicit truth. In this category there are six kinds of premises which constitute *burhān* (convincing proof or demonstration). Secondly, *al-naẓariyyāt* that are indubitable propositions as well, but their certainty can be obtained via *al-badihiyyāt*⁶. Nūrsī explains that “Authorities on a science explain *badihiyyāt* and *naẓariyyāt*; others (or laymen) either rely upon such explanations or enter that science to make their own observations.”⁷

⁴Nūrsī, *Ta‘līqāt, Ṣayqal al-Islam*, V.3: p.318; Mahdī Faḍlullah, *Madkhal ‘ilā ‘Ilm al-Mantiq*, p.116-118; Compare, Henry S. Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning*, 410-418.

⁵Galanbāwī, Ismail Effendi, *al-Burhān fī Fann al-Mantiq*, Istanbul 1310 H, p.50-53; Ghazālī, *Mi‘yār al-‘Ilm*, Cairo, 1960; Cairo 1972, p.153-156; Ali Sedad, *Mizān al-‘Uqūl*, p.52-57.

⁶Galanbāwī, Ismail Effendi, *al-Burhān fī Fann al-Mantiq*, p.52-53; Athīr al-Dīn Al-Abharī, *Mughnī al-Ṭullāb Sharḥ Matn Isaghuji*, p.90; Ali Sedad, *Mizān al-‘Uqūl fī al-Mantiq wa al-Uṣūl*, p.57-68.

⁷Nūrsī, *Letters, The Nineteenth Letter*, p.196.

Al-Qadāyā al-Taqlīdiyyah (propositions): Propositions which the reason judges to be true through hearing from or imitating others. Imitative propositions mean that a person imitates an existing value proposition. Like imitating Muslims (*muqallids*) who imitate well-known scholars on Islamic issues. This kind of premises cannot afford certainty.

Al-Qadāyā al-Zanniyyah (suppositional/conjectural propositions): Propositions that are argued via indications and presumptions but are still probable to oppositions. The conjectural propositions owe their validity to the definitive propositions. For example, if you see someone's horse at his door and judge that he is at home.

Al-Qadāyā al-Jahliyyah (Propositions): They are based completely on ignorance. Like *Ahl al-'ibāḥah* (who claim that everything is permitted)⁸ who claim that everything is lawful. These are completely false propositions⁹.

Muslim scholars however, summarize the conclusions of these premises as follows:

a. If the trueness of falseness of a proposition is found equal without any preference, that knowledge then is *shakk* (doubt). Doubt, a status between belief and disbelief, involves uncertainty, distrust or lack of sureness of an alleged fact, an action, a motive, or a decision.

b. If the trueness of falseness of a proposition has been preferred with a perception and acceptance, that is *taṣdīq* (assent) or *i'tiqād* (belief, opinion).

c. If *taṣdīq* or *i'tiqād* is definitive, doubts are not involved within and is comfortable with facts, that is *yaqīn* (certitude).

d. If *taṣdīq* or *i'tiqād* is comfortable with facts, that is then *al-Jahl al-Murakkab* (compound ignorance).

e. If that *taṣdīq* or *i'tiqād* is not constant and fixed, that is *taqlīd* (imitation).

f. If that *taṣdīq* or *i'tiqād* is not definitive, that is *ẓann* (suspicion).

g. Knowledge relating to *naqīḍ al-maẓnūn* (suspected opposite) (*ū*) is *wahm* (illusion).

h. Knowledge relating to opposites of definitive (*naqīḍ al-majzūm*) is *al-takhyīl* (imagination).¹⁰

Shakk (doubt), *wahm* (illusion) and *takhyīl* (imagination) are all conceptions (*taṣawwurāt*); yet others are assents (*taṣdīqāt*).¹¹

⁸The 'Latitudinarians' (*Ahl al-'ibāḥah*); These are those who stray from the path of mysticism. "Nothing is true, everything is permitted." This is the explanation of *ibāḥiya* in two words. We should not confuse with Latitudinarians in English History. *cp. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. 'ibāḥiya'*.

⁹Galanbawī, Ismail Effendī, *al-Burhān*, p.52-53; Athīr al-Dīn Al-Abharī, *Mughnī al-Tullāb*, Damascus, 2003, p.90.

¹⁰*Takhyīl* is a term from Arabic poetics denoting the evocation of images. It has a broad spectrum of connotations in classical philosophical poetics and rhetoric, and is closely linked to the Greek concept of phantasia. See Geert Jan Van Gelder, *Takhyīl: The Imaginary in Classical Arabic Poetics* (Gibb Memorial Trust, 2007).

¹¹Galanbawī, Ismail Effendī, *al-Burhān*, p.50-52.

B. Al-Qaḍāyā (Premises) Viewed in Terms of their Compositeness of Proofs

There are seven categories of the *Qaḍāyā* (Premises) when viewed in terms of their compositeness of proofs (*adillah*).

a. Al-Yaqīniyyāt (Indubitable Propositions)

There are six varieties of indubitable propositions which can be known for certain to be true and which may consequently be used as premises in demonstrative arguments (*burhān*). According to Nūrsī: “And, unfounded suspicions arising from possibilities of this sort about, for example, the setting of the life of this world and rising of the life of the hereafter, which are among the truths of belief, cause no harm to the certainty (*yaqīn*) of belief.”¹² These include:

(a) First principles, axioms or primary concepts (*al-’awwaliyyāt*), such as the statement that the whole is greater than any of its parts. It is *priori data* (*awwaliyyat*). Another example for that the validity of a division depends on the unity of what is being divided¹³.

(b) Propositions containing their own syllogisms (*Qaḍāyā qiyāsātuhā ma’ahā*), such as the statement that four is an even number.

(c) Sensory propositions based on sense perception (*maḥsūsāt, mushāhadāt*), such as the statement that fire is hot. “It is established by science and reason, and indeed by sensory premises (*mushāhadāt*) that the bonds of the laws governing the heavenly bodies like those of attraction and repulsion, and the conductor and transmitter of forces in matter like light, heat, and electricity is a matter which fills space.”¹⁴ “There is a rule in logic that the supposed propositions in observation (*mushāhadāt*) are indubitable propositions (*bedhiyyāt*). If you deny these indubitable propositions, I will condole you instead of advising you. That is because according to you the knowledge is dead and fallacy is alive.”¹⁵

(d) Propositions based on the reports of a sufficient number of eye-witnesses (*mutawātirāt*) to preclude the statement that Mecca exists, for one believes this statement to be true regardless of whether one has actually been to Mecca or not. Nūrsī adds “there are many *mutawātir* facts that are obvious to men of learning and unknown to others. There are also many narrations that are *mutawātir* to narration scholars, but may not even be regarded as individual reports according to other persons.”¹⁶

¹²Nūrsī, *The Words: The Twenty-First Word*, p.289.

¹³Wael B. Hallaq, *Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians*, Oxford University Press 1993, p.10-11; Ghazālī, *Mi’yār* (Cairo: 1972) p.158-161.

¹⁴Nūrsī, *The Flashes: The Twelfth Flash*, p.106.

¹⁵Nūrsī, *Muhakemat, Sekizinci Mesele*, p. 67 (in Turkish).

¹⁶Nūrsī, *Letters, The Nineteenth Letter*, p.196.

(e) Propositions based on experience (*mujarrabāt, tajrībiyyāt*), such as the statement that scammony¹⁷ is a laxative, which wine is intoxicating, or that fire burns. Nūrsī uses this category to prove the existence of the Hereafter for example: “Through the testimony of reason, wisdom, deduction and experience, the absence of futility and waste in the creation of beings, which is constant, indicates eternal happiness.”¹⁸

(f) Propositions based on intuition (*hadsiyāt*), that is, what might be called bright ideas or brilliant hypotheses supported by experience including the statement that the light of the moon is derived from that of the sun¹⁹. Nūrsī uses this category as follows: “everyone has experienced in himself (*hads*), the inner faculty situated in a corner of the heart which, is the means to diabolical suggestions and temptations and a satanic tongue which speaks through the promptings of the imagination and the corrupted power of imagination, which becomes like a small Satan and acts contrary to its owner’s will and opposed to his desires. These are certain evidences to the existence of great Satans in the world.”²⁰

The first two varieties consist of propositions based purely on reason whereas the last three embody propositions based on information gained through the senses. The fifth variety however, involves propositions based not only on the senses but on induction (*istiqrā’*).

b. Conventional Propositions (Mashhūrāt)

They are propositions held to be true by the great majority of people. An example of such is the statement that lying is evil or that justice is obligatory. Nūrsī uses this category too. He states “the well-known rule, a possibility that does not arise from any proof or evidence is of no importance is one of the established principles in both the sciences of the principles of religion and the principles of jurisprudence (*fiqh*).”²¹

c. Postulated (Presuppositions) Propositions (Musallamāt)

These include propositions admitted as true by one’s opponent in a debate such as the statement that God is one. Nūrsī uses this term quite frequently. He says: “Yes, if the majority of the Islamic nation conformed to the essential teachings and postulated (admitted) propositions of Islam and the ordinances which are well-known and carried them out, then the reading of the Sermon in the known language and the translation of the Qur’an; if it was possible, might have been desirable, in order to understand the theoretical matters of

¹⁷That is a plant of the convolvulus family.

¹⁸Nūrsī, *The Words, The Twenty-Ninth Word*, p.552; Ghazālī, *Mi’yār*, p.160-162.

¹⁹Galanbawī, *al-Burhān*, p.51-52; Athīr, *Mughnī*, p.90-92; Muhammad Riḍa al-Muẓaffar, *al-Manṭiq* (Beirut: 1980) p.279-306; Ghazālī, *Mi’yār*, p.162-163.

²⁰Nūrsī, *The Flashes, The Thirteenth Flash*, p.126.

²¹Nūrsī, *The Words, The Twenty-First Word*, p.289; Ghazālī, *Mi’yār*, p.165-170.

the Sharī‘a and its subtle matters and abstruse teachings. The postulated propositions of Islam such as the five daily prayers, fasting in Ramadan and the unlawfulness of murder, fornication and wine are nonetheless neglected”²².

d. Accepted Propositions (Maqbūlāt)

These are propositions accepted on the authority of someone else such as the statements of scholars and other eminent or esteemed persons. Nūrsī explains the nature of this category as follows “Eighty per cent of mankind are not investigative scholars who can penetrate to reality, recognize reality as reality and accept it as such. They rather accept matters by way of imitation, which they hear from acceptable and reliable people, in consequence of their good opinions of them.”²³

e. Opinions or Probable Propositions (Maẓnūnāt)

These are propositions which are probably true and might be false. Nūrsī provided a good example for this. He said: “Also, when seen both as secondary and superficially, something which is completely impossible may appear to be possible.” One time an old man was watching the sky to see the new moon of Ramadan when a white hair fell on his eye. Imagining it to be the moon, he announced: ‘I have seen the new moon.’ Now, it is impossible that the white hair should have been the moon, but because his intention was just to look for the moon and the hair was in the way as an obstacle, he paid it no attention and thought that impossibility was possible”²⁴.

f. Imagined Propositions (Mukhayyalāt)

These are propositions based on imagination such as wine is ruby and brilliant. Nūrsī compares the verses of the Qur’an and says “...the All-Wise Qur’an contains infinite brilliant, elevated truths, that it is free of images and fancies of poetry..... Understand also from it that the mark of poetry is to adorn insignificant and dull facts with big and shining images and fancies, and make them attractive. Whereas the truths of the Qur’an are so great, elevated, shining and brilliant that even the greatest and most brilliant imaginings are dull and insignificant in comparison with them.”²⁵

g. False (Doxical) Propositions (Mawhūmāt)

These are propositions based on imagination (*wahm*) which we believe to be true, but are not in actuality. Imagination can be alluring and we often hold onto illusions with an intensity that is difficult to explain. Illusions come in degrees of seriousness in which some are much more troublesome than

²²Nūrsī, *The Words, The Twenty-Seventh Word*, p.510-511.

²³Nūrsī, *Letters, The Twenty-Eight Letter*, p.499-500; Ghazālī, *Mi‘yār*, p.170.

²⁴Nūrsī, *The Words, The Fifteenth Word*, p.204; Ghazālī, *Mi‘yār*, p.160-170-171.

²⁵Nūrsī, *The Words, The Thirteenth Word*, p.151; Ghazālī, *Mi‘yār*, p.171-180.

others²⁶. According to Nürsî, "If fear is due to a possibility of one in two, three, or four, or even one in five or six; it is a precautionary fear and may be licit. But to have fear at a possibility of one in twenty, thirty, or forty, is an illusion and makes life torture!"²⁷

C. Five Métiers-Arts (Şinā'ah al-Khamsah) or Varieties of Deducting or Inductive Reasoning According to Premises and Knowledge of Munāzarah

There are five types of deductive or inductive reasoning:

1) Demonstration/Proof (Burhān): The purpose of demonstration is the attainment of truth. Demonstration must mention the syllogistic or deductive arguments (*qiyās*) whose premises consist solely of indubitable propositions (*yaqīnīyāt*), (i.e.,) propositions known for certain to be true. He claims that only such arguments can result in conclusions that can be known for certain to be true. Arguments based either on induction (*istiqrā'*), unless the induction is complete, or on analogy (*tamthīl*) can be used in demonstration when some conditions are met because some do not lead to conclusions known for certain to be true. Muslim scholars define demonstration (*burhān*) as a syllogism composed of indubitable premises for the purpose of producing an indubitable conclusion (*qiyās mu'allaf min yaqīnīyāt li-'intāj yaqīnī*). Nürsî in his collection of the Risale-i Nur used mostly *burhāns* such as below: "There is no god but God to Whose Necessary Existence in Unity points the agreement of all of the purified scholars, with the power of their resplendent, certain and unanimous proofs (*burhāns*)."²⁸ We have mentioned six propositions (*yaqīnīyāt*) which may lead to a *burhān*²⁹.

2) Dialectic (jadal): If any deductive or inductive reasoning is composed of well-known propositions (*mashhūrāt*) that is the dialectic (*jadal*). In classical philosophy, dialectic (*jadal*) means a controversy, the exchange of arguments and counter-arguments respectively advocating propositions (theses) and counter-propositions (antitheses). The outcome of this exercise

²⁶Galanbawī, *al-Burhān fī Fann al-Manṭiq*, p.51-52; Al-Abharī, Mughnī, p.90-92; Al-Muẓaffar, *Al-Manṭiq*, p.292-306; Nicholas Heer, *Ibn Sīnā's Justification of the Use of Induction in Demonstration*, (A paper read at the 1990 Annual Meeting of the Western Branch of the American Oriental Society in Seattle, Washington, and updated in January 2007).

²⁷Nürsî, *Letters, The Twenty-Ninth Letter*, p.559-560.

²⁸Nürsî, *The Rays, The Seventh Ray*, p.163.

²⁹Galanbawī, *al-Burhān*, p.51-52; al-Abharī, Mughnī, p.90-92; al-Muẓaffar, *Al-Manṭiq*, p.311-327; Heer, *Ibn Sīnā*; 'Abd al-Muta'al al-Sa'idī, *Tajdīd 'ilm al-Manṭiq fī Sharḥ al-Khabīsī al-Tahḍīb* (Cairo), p.156-158; Sedad, Mizān, p.103-107.

might not simply be the refutation of one of the relevant points of view, but rather a synthesis or combination of opposing assertions, or at least a qualitative transformation in the direction of dialogue.

3) Rhetoric (*khaṭābah*): any deductive or inductive reasoning composed of accepted propositions (*maqbulāt*) and opinions or probable propositions (*maznūnāt*). It is the art of effective speaking or writing. The purpose of dialectic (*jadāl*) and rhetoric (*khaṭābah*) is not for attaining the truth, but rather to achieve victory over opponents in a debate or to persuade someone to accept certain beliefs regardless of whether the belief is true or not. Since the attainment of truth is not the purpose, dialectic and rhetoric are not restricted to syllogistic or deductive arguments, nor must their premises be indubitable. Both dialectic and rhetoric may include arguments based on induction (*istiqrāʾ*) or analogy (*tamthīl*) and may contain premises that are well-known or widely accepted, but which may not necessarily be true. Rhetoric may even contain premises which are only probably true.

4) Poetry (*Shiʿr*): any deductive or inductive reasoning composed of *Imagined Propositions* (*mukhayyalāt*). It is a form of literary art in which language is used for its aesthetic and evocative qualities in addition to, or in lieu of, its ostensible meaning. Nūrsī says that “at the time of the Most Noble Prophet Mohammed in the Arabian Peninsula, four things were prevalent: First: Eloquence and rhetoric. Second: Poetry and oratory... Thus, when the Qurʾān with miraculous exposition appeared, it challenged those. First, it made the men of rhetoric and eloquence bow before it; they all listened to it in astonishment. Second, it filled the poets and orators with amazement, that is, those who spoke well and declaimed fine poetry, so that they bit their fingers in astonishment. It reduced to nothing the value of their finest poems written in gold, causing them to remove the famous ‘Seven Hanging Poems’, their pride and glory, from the walls of the Kaʿba.”³⁰

5) Fallacy (*Mughālaṭa*): This is when any deductive or inductive reasoning is composed of semi-*yaqīniyyāt* or *maznūnāt* (*mughālaṭa*). It is a component of an argument demonstrating a flaw in its logic or form, thus rendering the argument invalid in whole. In logical arguments, fallacies are either formal or informal. Because the validity of a deductive argument depends on its form, a formal fallacy is a deductive argument with an invalid form whereas an informal fallacy is any other invalid

³⁰Nūrsī, *Letters: The Nineteenth Letter*, p.257-258.

mode of reasoning whose flaw is not in the form of the argument. Nürsî also names it a *maghlaṭa* (captious question) and defines it as “showing the false as truth and the impossible as possible through satanic wiles like heedlessness, misguidance, *fallacious reasoning*, obstinacy, false arguments...”³¹

Two varieties of premises can be used in dialectic and not in demonstration are: (1) Well-known propositions (*mashhūrāt*); and (2) Admitted propositions (*musallamāt*). Two varieties of premises can be used in rhetoric but not in dialectic or demonstration: (1) Accepted propositions (*maqbulāt*); and (2) Opinions or probable propositions (*maznūnāt*)³².

It should also be mentioned however, that knowledge of *Munāẓarah* (*Argumentative dialogue or debate*) serves as a published record of justification for an assertion. Arguments can also be interactive, in which the proposer and the interlocutor have a more symmetrical relationship. The premises are discussed as well as the validity of the intermediate inferences. We can say that the debate or debating is a formal method of interactive and position representational argument. In argumentative dialogue, the parties involved in dialogue could negotiate the rules of interaction, although in many cases the rules are already determined by social mores. In the most symmetrical cases, argumentative dialogue can be regarded as a process of discovery more than one of justifying a conclusion. Ideally, the goal of argumentative dialogue is for participants to arrive jointly at a conclusion through mutually accepted inferences. In some cases however, the validity of the conclusion is secondary. For this reason Nürsî says: The rule of truth and equity established by scholars of the art of debate is as follows: “Whoever wishes, in debating any subject, that his own word turn to be true; whoever is happy that he turns out to be right and his enemy wrong and mistaken—such a person has acted unjustly.” Not only that, such a person loses, for when he emerges as the victor in such a debate, he has not learned anything previously unknown to him, and his probable pride will cause him loss. But if his adversary turns out to be right, he will have learned something previously unknown to him and thereby gained something without any loss, as well as being saved from pride. In other words, one fair in his dealings and enamored of the truth will subject the desire of his own soul to the demands of the truth. If he sees his adversary to be right, he will accept it willingly and support it happily. If then the people of religion, truth, path and learning take this principle as their guide, they will attain sincerity, and be successful in those duties that prepare them for the

³¹Nürsî, *Letters: The Twenty-Sixth Letter*, p.426; Sedad, *Mizān*, p.103-107.

³²Galanbawî, *Burhān*, p.53-54; Abharî, *Mughnî*, p.87-96; al-Saʿidi, *Tajdid*, p.159-161; Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, p.331-441.

Hereafter. Through God’s mercy, they will be delivered from this appalling wretchedness and misfortune from which they presently suffer”³³.

COMPARISON OF DEMONSTRATION WITH DIALECTIC AND RHETORIC

DEMONSTRATION (<i>Burhān</i>)	DIALECTIC (<i>Jadal</i>)	RHETORIC (<i>Khatābah</i>)
Arguments restricted to: -Syllogism (<i>qiyās</i>) -Complete induction (<i>istiqrā’ tām</i>) -Analogical Inductive Reasoning (<i>al-qiyās al-tamthīlī</i>)	Arguments may include: -Analogical Inductive Reasoning (<i>al-qiyās al-tamthīlī</i>) -Incomplete induction (<i>istiqrā’ nāqis</i>)	Arguments may include: -Analogy (<i>tamthīl</i>) -Incomplete induction (<i>istiqrā’ nāqis</i>)
Premises restricted to: -First principles (<i>’awwalīyyāt</i>) -Propositions containing their own syllogisms (<i>Qadāyā qiyāsātuhā ma’ahā</i>) -Propositions based on sense perception (<i>maḥsūsāt</i>) -Propositions based on the reports of eye-witnesses (<i>mutawātirāt</i>) -Propositions based on experience (<i>tajrībiyyāt</i>) -Propositions based on intuition (<i>ḥadsīyyāt</i>) ³⁴	Premises may include: -Well-known propositions (<i>mashhūrāt</i>) -Admitted propositions (<i>musallamāt</i>)	Premises may include: -Opinions or Probable Propositions (<i>maznūnāt</i>) -Accepted propositions (<i>maqbulāt</i>)

2. *The Ways of Inference (Istīnbāt) and Argumentation (Istidlāl)*

Muslim Scholars including Nūrsī divided *istidlāl* (inference and argument) into two groups:

First group: *istiqrā* and *al-tamthīl* = Inductive inference. New scholars of logic call this kind of inference Induction or inductive reasoning, sometimes called inductive logic. According to Muslim scholars, *dalīl al-istiqrā’*, inductive proof or argument; specifically used to indicate-the method of scientific induction. That is defined as induction, i.e. arriving at a general conclusion or

³³Nūrsī, *The Flashes: The Twentieth Flash*, p.225-226

³⁴Al-Muzaffar, *al-Manṭiq*, p.311-327; Sedad, *Mizān*, p.103-107; Heer, *Ibn Sīnā*

a universal proposition through observation of particular instances, e.g. "All crows are black" or "All ruminants are cloven footed". These will be explained³⁵. *Al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* is included in this group.

Second group: Deductive reasoning and syllogisms (*al-qiyās al-manṭiqī*). Deductive reasoning is the type of reasoning that proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particular information³⁶.

3. Inductive Reasoning (*Istiqrā and Al-Qiyās al-Tamthīlī*)

We will first discuss what kind of induction or inductive reasoning (sometimes called inductive logic or analogical reasoning) fits into the definition of *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* in sources of Islamic *Manṭiq* for there are many types of inductive reasoning. We should carefully scrutinize however, the weak and strong forms of inductive reasoning and compare some examples of *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*.

Muslim scholars defined *istiqrā'* as the arriving at a general conclusion or a universal proposition (*kullī*) through the observation of particular instances (*juz'īyyāt*). Muslim scholars named *istiqrā'* as an *al-qiyās al-muqassam*. In new logic, there is similarity. Induction or inductive reasoning is sometimes called inductive logic, and presents the process of reasoning in which the premises of an argument are believed to support the conclusion but do not entail to it; i.e. they do not ensure its truth. Induction is a form of reasoning that makes generalizations based on individual instances. It is used to ascribe properties or relations to types based on an instances of observation (i.e., on a number of observations or experiences); or to formulate laws based on limited observations of recurring phenomenal patterns. Induction is employed, for example, in using specific propositions such as: "This ice is cold. (or All ice I have ever touched was cold.)...to infer general propositions such as: All ice is cold. As in new logic, there is a similar division, Muslim Scholars and Nürsī have divided *istiqrā'* (inductive reasoning) into the two following groups"³⁷:

A. Strong Induction (*al-Istiqrā' al-Tām*)

Al-Istiqrā' al-Tām means a comprehensive examination of a matter before a definite ruling is made on the issue. This methodology involves exploratory exercise of the applications of general proof on the relevant subdivisions of the ruling followed with exceptions, if any. This exemplifies the nature of

³⁵Al-Sa'idi, *Tajdīd*, p.120-121; Nürsī, *Taliqāt, Şayqal al-Islam*, V.III, p.318-319; Faḍlullah, *Madkhal*, p.118; S. Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning*, 421-425.

³⁶Al-Sa'idi, *Tajdīd*, p.150-154; Nürsī, *Taliqāt, Şayqal al-Islam*, V.III, p.318-319; Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning*, 421-425; Itkonen, E. (2005), *Analogy as Structure and Process*, Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

³⁷Al-Sa'idi, *Tajdīd*, p.150-151; Nürsī, *Taliqāt*, V.III, p.320-321; Faḍlullah, *Madkhal*, 118; S. Leonard, *Principles*, 421-425; Holland, J.H., Holyoak, K.J., Nisbett, R.E., and Thagard, P.(1986)., *Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

induction: inducing universal from particular. However, the conclusion is at all times certain. A strong induction is thus an argument in which the truth holding premises would make the truth of the conclusion definite³⁸.

Nürsī uses this proof on many occasions in his writings. For example, strong induction for him is about proof on prophethood of Muhammad. Nürsī says: Through the testimony of reason, wisdom, and strong induction (*al-Istiqrā' al-tām*), we can say that since prophethood is a phenomenon of humanity, and hundreds of thousands of individuals who have claimed prophethood and performed miracles have lived and passed away; it is of certainty that the prophethood of Muhammad is superior to all others. For whatever evidences, qualities and attributes made prophets like Jesus and Moses become known as prophets and were the means of their Messengership; they were all possessed in a more perfect and comprehensive fashion by Muhammad (Upon whom be blessings and peace). And since the causes and means of prophetic authority were more perfectly present in the person of Muhammad, this authority was to be found in him with more certainty than in all others.³⁹

B. Weak Induction (*al-Istiqrā' al-Nāqis*)

Imperfect induction, (i.e.) which does not fulfill the conditions of scientific induction as seen in the following statement: “All animals move their lower jaw while chewing food” This is falsified by the fact that in their chewing process, crocodiles move their upper jaw instead. All observed animals move their lower jaw while chewing. Therefore all animals are moving their lower jaw while chewing.

Assuming the first statement to be true, this example is built on the certainty that “I always hang pictures on nails” leading to the generalization that “All pictures hang on nails”. However, the link between the premise and the inductive conclusion is weak⁴⁰. *Al-tamthīl* or *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* is among the weak induction (*istiqrā'*). As for the validity of *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* there are a number of differences among both Sunnī and Shī'ī scholars as well as Muslim Scholars and Nürsī. We will further discuss the *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* in detail.

C. Validity of Inductive Reasoning

Formal logic, as most people learn it, is deductive rather than inductive. Some philosophers claim to have created systems of inductive logic; but it remains controversial whether the logic of induction is even possible. In contrast to deductive reasoning, conclusions obtained through inductive reasoning do

³⁸ Al-Sa'idi, *Tajdīd*, p.150-151; Nürsī, *Ta'liqāt, Sayqal al-Islam*, V.III, p.320-321; S. Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning*, 421-425.

³⁹ Nürsī, *The Letters* (Istanbul: 2002), 19; Letters: 120; *Muḥākamāt: Third Maqālah*, 2029-2030.

⁴⁰ Al-Sa'idi, *Tajdīd*, p.150-151; Nürsī, *Ta'liqāt*, VIII, p.320-321; S. Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning*, 421-425.

not necessarily have the same degree of certainty as the initial premises. Inductive arguments are never binding but they may be cogent. Inductive reasoning is deductively invalid. An argument in formal logic is valid if and only if it is not possible for the premises of the argument to be true whilst the conclusion is false. In induction there are always many conclusions that can reasonably be related to certain premises. Inductions are open; deductions are closed. It is however possible to derive a true statement using inductive reasoning once the conclusion is known.

According to Muslim Scholars, strong induction (*al-istiqrā' al-tām*) can give a certain conclusion (*yaqīn*). However, weak a induction (*al-istiqrā' al-nāqīṣ*) does not provide a certain conclusion (*yaqīn*) and only yields probability (*zann*)⁴¹.

In his work on Logic *Ta'liqāt*, Nūrsī gives detailed information about *istiqrā'*, its validity and its different types. Nūrsī describes the applications and types of inductive reasoning (*istiqrā'*) as follows: "You should know that there is a huge impact and a vast ability for *istiqrā'*. We can say that it is founder of all kinds of knowledge and leader of '*aql bi al-malakah*'. Most scholars unfortunately do not appreciate the importance of *istiqrā'* and have given concise information about it. *Istiqrā'* can be divided into many groups:

One type of *istiqrā'* can provide certainty (*yaqīn*) which is *istiqrā'-i tamm*; like existed information data during this time which was reported by a significant number of narrators in each chain of the narration.

Another type of *istiqrā'* provides certainty because it deals with examining some individuals from one species, looking at the nature of that species. If you research a number of individuals from the sheep species, you will be able to judge the species.

Another type of *istiqrā'* provides certainty because the conclusion is probable, yet a moral conjecture (*hads-i ma'nawi*=infer on slight grounds) combines to that and makes it certain.

The last type of *istiqrā'* provides probability (*zann*) which is *al-istiqrā' al-nāqīṣ*⁴².

4. *Al-Tamthīl, Al-Qiyās al-Tamthīlī (Analogical Inductive Reasoning)*

Our research subject is *al-tamthīl* or *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*. For this reason we will analyze the subject from different aspects. we can assert that there are a number of conflicts regarding this question among Muslim Scholars. One may disagree with our term of '*al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* (analogical inductive rea-

⁴¹Al-Sa'idi, *Tajdīd*, p.150-151; Nūrsī, *Ta'liqāt, Ṣayqal al-Islam*, V.III, p.320-321; S. Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning*, p.421-425; Karl R. Popper, David W. Miller: *The Impossibility of Inductive Probability. Nature* 310 (1984), p.433-434.

⁴²Nūrsī, *Taliqāt, Ṣayqal al-Islam*, V.III, p.320-321; Compare: Farid Jabr-Rafīq al-Ajm-Samīḥ Daghīm-Jyār Jehamī, *Mawsū'at Mustalahāt 'Ilm al-Manṭiq 'Inda al-'Arab* (Lebanon: 1996), p.689-691.

soning), but that however, remains open to discussion; as other terms could be used for that such as allegorical comparison, or representative analogy or reasoning by analogy or comparison.

A. Definition, Concepts and Al-Qiyās al-Tamthīlī or Fiqhī

First of all, the main term is *al-tamthīl* not *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*. *Al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* is one type of *al-tamthīl*⁴³. Some scholars say that *qiyās al-shumūl* is *al-tamthīl* as well. Second, *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* does not belong to *al-qiyās al-mantiqī* (deductive reasoning, syllogism). That is a type of inductive reasoning (*istiqrā'*). Third, according to Nūrsī, most scholars have included *al-tamthīl* among types of weak inductive reasoning. That however, is not true, for Nūrsī claims that there are some kinds of *al-tamthīl* which yield certainty (*yaqīn*) instead of probability (*ẓann*). Some logicians are supporting Nūrsī in modern times support Nūrsī and believe that logicians in old times have unfortunately made mistakes about the validity of *al-tamthīl*. This was because they did not accept that *al-tamthīl* could afford certainty (*yaqīn*). But this is not true. Sometimes *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* is more powerful than normal *qiyās*⁴⁴.

There is a logical debate among Islamic logicians, philosophers and theologians over whether the term *qiyās* refers to analogical reasoning, inductive reasoning or categorical syllogism. Some Islamic scholars argued that *qiyās* refers to inductive reasoning, which Ibn Hazm (994-1064) disagreed with, arguing that *qiyās* does not refer to inductive reasoning, but rather refers to categorical syllogisms, and analogical reasoning in a metaphorical sense. On the other hand, al-Ghāzālī (1058-1111) argued that *qiyās* refers to analogical reasoning in a real sense and categorical syllogism in a metaphorical sense⁴⁵. Other Islamic scholars at the time, however, argued that the term *qiyās*, in reality, refers to both analogical reasoning and categorical syllogisms.⁴⁶ According to Imam Samarqandī there are two types of *al-qiyās*; *al-qiyās al-'aqlī* which is *al-qiyās al-mantiqī* and *al-qiyās al-shar'ī* which is *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*⁴⁷.

⁴³Compare: Ulfat Kamal al-Rubi, *Al-Mathal wa al-Tamthīl fī al-Turāth al-Naqdī wa al-Balāghī*, *Journal of Comparative Poetics*, no. 12, p.75-103; Nūrsī, *Ta'liqāt, Sayqal*, V.III: p.320-321.

⁴⁴Daghim-Jyran Jehami, *Mawsū'at*, p.689-691; Nūrsī, *Ta'liqāt, Sayqal*, V.III, p.320-321.

⁴⁵Al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muhammad, *Al-Mustaṣfā min 'Ilm al-Uṣūl*, V.III (Al-Madina), p.481-587.

⁴⁶Abd al-Muta'al al-Sa'idi, *Tajdid 'ilm al-Mantiq Fi Sharh al-Khabisi al al-Tahthib*, Cairo, p. 150-151; Bediuzzaman, Saied Nursi, *Taliqāt, Sayqal al-Islam*, VIII, p. 320-321; Muhammad Ridha Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, Beirut 1980, pp. 268-270; Ali al-Subki, *Al-Ibhaj Fi Sharh al-Minhaj*, Cairo 1987, v. III, pp. 5-27..

⁴⁷Al-Samarqandī, *Mizān al-Uṣūl*, p.555-560.

Muslim scholars, jurists and Mutakallims disagreed about *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* (inductive reasoning); because inductive reasoning covers *istiqrā* (mostly strong inductive reasoning) and *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* (mostly weak inductive reasoning). Muslim jurists are divided into groups about yielding certain knowledge and whether or not it is suitable only for the soothing of the mind and convincing the listener in discussions, and thus is only employed in rhetoric⁴⁸.

We can conclude that *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* is an analogy which we can define as the cognitive process of transferring information or conclusion or ordinance (*ḥukm*) from a particular subject (the analogue or source) to another particular subject (the target). In a narrower sense, analogy is an inference or an argument from a particular to another particular, as opposed to deduction, induction, or abduction, where at least one of the premises or the conclusion is general. The word analogy can also refer to the relationship between the source and the target themselves, which is often, though not necessarily, a similarity⁴⁹.

We may conclude that *al-tamthīl* (analogical reasoning) is a comprehensive term. There are some types of it which yearn certainty. But for this conclusion, the premises must be certain premises. For rareness of these situations in *al-tamthīl*, most logicians and scholars have judged that *al-tamthīl* cannot provide certainty but probability⁵⁰.

If the relation between the source and the target is similar (*tashbīh*), we could call this type of *al-tamthīl*, *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* or *al-qiyās al-fiqhī*. In Sunnī Islamic jurisprudence, *qiyās* is the process of analogical reasoning from a known injunction (*naṣṣ*) to a new injunction. According to this method, the ruling of the Qur'an and Sunnah may be extended to new problems provided that the precedent (*'aṣl*) and the new problem (*far'*) share the same operative or effective cause (*'illah*) or similarity in *'illah*. The *'illah* is the specific set of circumstances that trigger a certain law into action. Both Sunnī Islam and Shī'ī Islam share Qur'anic interpretations, the Sunnah and Ijmā' (consensus) as sources of Islamic law, although the two sects differ significantly with regards to the manner in which they use these sources. The sects also differ on the fourth source. Sunni Islam uses *qiyās* as the fourth source, whereas Shī'a Islam uses *'aql* (intellect). The Shī'a views the use of *qiyās* (analogy) as being an innovation which can easily lead the user to erroneous conclusions regarding matters of Fiqh. In Uṣūl al-Kāfī, in the chapter on knowledge, one finds many traditions cited from the Shī'a Imams that forbid the use of

⁴⁸Nürsī, *Ta'liqāt, Şayqal*, V.III, p.320-321; Compare: Daghim-Jyrrar Jehami, *Mawsū'at*, p.689-691.

⁴⁹Faḍlullah, *Madkhal*, p.213-215; Ghazālī, *Mi'yār*, p.165; Al-Sa'idi, *Tajdīd*, p.150-151; Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, p.268-270.

⁵⁰Al-Sa'idi, *Tajdīd*, p.150-151; Nürsī, *Ta'liqāt Şayqal*, V.III: 320-321; Al-Muzaffar, *al-Mantiq*, p.268-270

*qiyās*⁵¹. “Those who give fatwas without the knowledge of the abrogating and the abrogated, the clear text and that which requires interpretation, they will face destruction and lead others to their destruction”⁵²

There are four pillars for *qiyās*: *maqīs* (*far*‘=target subject); *maqīsun ‘alayh* (*‘asl*=source subject); *jāmi*‘ (*‘illah*=cause, similarity) and injunction of *‘asl*. *Qiyās* is meant to seek similarity between new situations and early practices, especially those of the Prophet. The function of *qiyās* is to discover the cause or *‘illah* of the revealed law so as to extend it to similar cases. Wine drinking, for example, is prohibited by explicit text. The cause for the prohibition are its intoxicating effect, hence whenever this cause is found prohibition will become applicable.”⁵³

No one at all can [give an opinion] on a specific matter by merely saying: It is permitted or prohibited, unless she/he is certain of the [legal] knowledge, and this knowledge must be based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, or [derived] from *ijmā*‘ (consensus) and *qiyās* (analogy)⁵⁴. *Qiyās* is “part of Islamic Law ... that is subject to modification according to the needs and requirements of the changing times and it is this part of Islamic Law which endows it with wide possibilities of growth and advancement and makes it fully capable of fulfilling all the needs of an expanding human society in every age.”⁵⁵

B. The Conditions, Validity of Al-Tamthīl, and Some Muslim Scholars’ Approach to this subject

Muslim scholars have spoken about the means of knowledge and have argued that *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* does not afford certain knowledge only under certain conditions. However, there are some conditions for *al-tamthīl* and *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* to afford certain knowledge. The validity of *al-tamthīl* is a controversial problem among Muslim Scholars. The Shī‘ites view the use of *qiyās* (analogy) as being an innovation which can easily lead the user to erroneous conclusions regarding matters of Fiqh. But Sunnī ‘ulamā think that *al-tamthīl* and *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* can provide probability, but not certainty⁵⁶. Sa‘īd Nūrsī however, thinks differently. As we mentioned before, according

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, p.268-270; Al-Subkī, *Al-‘Ibhāj*, V.III: 5-27; Hallaq, *Ibn Taymiyya*, p.48.

⁵³Al-Subkī, *Al-‘Ibhāj*, V. III: 5-27; Muhammad Muslehuddin., *Philosophy of Islamic Law and Orientalises* (Kazi Publications, 1985), p.135; Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, p.268-270.

⁵⁴Al-Subkī, *Al-‘Ibhāj*, V. III: 5-27; Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, p.268-270; Al-Shāfi‘ī, *Al-Risala: Treatise on the Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence*, Trans. by Majīd Khaddūrī; (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts Society, 2nd Edition, 1987), p.78.

⁵⁵Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, p.268-270; Sayyid Abū al-‘Alā Mawdūdī. *Islamic Law and Constitution*, 8th Ed. (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1983), p.60.

⁵⁶Al-Ghazālī, *Mi‘yār*, p.119-130; Al-Sa‘īdi, *Tajdīd*, p.150-151; Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, p.268-270.

to Nürsī, most scholars have included *al-tamthīl* among types of weak inductive reasoning. That is not true. This is because he claims that there are some kinds of *al-tamthīl* which yearn a certainty (*yaqīn*) not probability (*zann*).

We would like to summarize some opinions for Muslim scholars.

A) Ibn Taymiyyah has criticized the rules of logic and claimed that they cannot afford certain knowledge at all. He argues that scholars of logic claim that *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* does not afford certain knowledge; but *istiqrā'* could afford it. According to logicians, *qiyās* (syllogism) is stronger than *istiqrā'* (induction) and *istiqrā'* (induction) is stronger than *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*. According to Ibn Taymiyyah however, this is not true; because *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* could afford certain knowledge. He refuses the proofs of logicians. According to him there is no difference between *qiyās-i mantiqī* and *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*; if they claim that the former could afford certain knowledge they have to accept the same conclusion for the latter.⁵⁷ According to Ibn Taymiyyah, *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* is stronger than *qiyās* (syllogism) in affording knowledge; because to prove anything with *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* is easier and far clearer.⁵⁸

B) Ibn al-Qayyim talks about *ḍarb al-'amthāl* and *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*. He mentions some examples and definition such as “the process of analogical reasoning from a known injunction (*naṣṣ*) to a new one” and “comparing injunctions” or “comparison of something to another thing in its injunction”. Ibn al-Qayyim argues that it is “explaining a reasonable thing with a tangible thing”. We would like to mention an example from the Qur'an which Ibn al-Qayyim has evaluated; this verse as an example: “*Their likeness is as the likeness of one who kindled a fire; then, when it lighted all around him, Allāh took away their light and left them in darkness. (So) they could not see.*”⁵⁹ Ibn al-Qayyim has evaluated and mentioned some examples with regards to *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*. The first example is the following verse from the Qur'an: “*O you who believe! Avoid much suspicion; indeed some suspicions are sins. And spy not, neither backbite one another. Would one of you like to eat the flesh of his dead brother? You would hate it (so hate backbiting). And fear Allāh. Verily, Allāh is the One Who forgives and accepts repentance, Most Merciful.*”⁶⁰ He says that this is the best example for *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*. The Qur'an has compared the tearing and ripping of a Muslim's dignity with the

⁵⁷Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al-Radd alā al-Mantiqiyīn*, (Pakistan: Dār Tarjumān al-Sunnah, 1976), p.208 ff.

⁵⁸Farīd Jabār, Samīh Daghīm, Rafīq al-Ḥacām and Jīrār Jahamī, *Mawsū'at Muṣṭalahāt-i 'Ilm al-Mantiq 'ind al-Ḥarab*, (Beirut: Maktabah Lebanon, 1996), p.689-91.

⁵⁹Qur'an, 2:17; Muhammad ibn Abū Bakr Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzī, *I'lām al-Muwaqqi'īn 'An Rabb al-'Ālamīn*, V. I (Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1996), p.116 ff.

⁶⁰Qur'an, 49:12.

tearing and ripping of one's dead brother's flesh.⁶¹ Nūrsī agrees with this explanation of *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*.

Some contemporary logicians in the Muslim World and some famous Muslim scholars are supporting Nūrsī in this issue⁶².

We could mention most important conditions for that:

The injunction of source (*ḥukm-i 'aslī*) should not be peculiar for the source subject. The injunction of source (*ḥukm-i 'aslī*) should not be *ta'abbudī*.

"There are certain matters of the Shari'a concerning worship which are not subject to reason, and are performed simply because they are commanded. The reason being for them is the command. There are others however which have 'reasonable meaning.' That is, they possess certain wisdom or benefit by reason of which they have been incorporated into the Shari'a. But it is not the true reason or cause; the true reason is the Divine command and prohibition. Instances of wisdom or benefits cannot change those matters of 'the marks of Islam' in worship; their aspect of pertaining to worship preponderates and they may not be interfered with. For instance, someone may say: "The wisdom and purpose of the call to prayer is to summon Muslims to prayer; in which case, firing a rifle would be sufficient".⁶³ The injunction of sources (*ḥukm-i aslī*) should not be an exceptional injunction⁶⁴.

Nūrsī raises a question relating to the subject and replies to his own. He contributes new matter to the definition of *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* (analogical reasoning) and uses it in his works as a proof for the pillars of Islamic faith. He says answering the question relating to analogical reasoning:

"A Question: You say: "You make much use of (*al-tamthīlī*) in the form of comparisons in the Words. Whereas according to the science of logic, this form of *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* does not afford certainty. A logical proof is required for matters of certain knowledge."

The Answer: It has often been stated in the science of logic that *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* does not afford certain knowledge. However, there is a certain type of this form of analogy that forms a proof more powerful than those proofs consisting of certain knowledge used in logic. Also, it is more certain than that sort of deduction. This type of analogy is as follows:

It demonstrates the tip of a universal truth by means of a partial comparison and constructs its judgment on that truth. It demonstrates the truth's law in a particular matter, so that the vast truth may be known and particular matters may be ascribed to it. For example, a tree's fruits and leaves are all shaped

⁶¹ Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzī, *Iḥlām al-Muwaqqi'īn abb al-Ālamīn*, vol. I, pp. 130 ff

⁶² Daghim-Jyrrar Jehami, *Mawsū'at*, p.689-691; Nūrsī, *Ta'liqāt, Şayqal al-Islam*, V.III: 320-321

⁶³ Nūrsī, *The Letters*, 29; Letter, p.534; Compare: Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Mustaşfā*, V. III: p.565-566.

⁶⁴ Nūrsī, *Ta'liqāt, Şayqal al-Islam*, V.III: 320; Compare: Daghim-Jyrrar Jehami, *Mawsū'at*, p.689-691.

and formed at the same time, in the same fashion, easily and perfectly, in a single centre and through a law issuing from a command. This is a comparison or parable demonstrating the tip of a mighty truth and universal law. It proves the truth and the truth's law in a truly decisive form, so that, like the tree, the mighty universe displays and is the field of operation of that law of truth and mystery of Divine oneness.

Thus, *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* employed in all the Words are in this form and are more powerful and afford more certainty than the categorical proofs of logic (deductive reasoning)⁶⁵.

C. Applications and Types of Al-Tamthīl (Analogical Reasoning)

According to Nūrsī, there are many applications and types for *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*. *Al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* may be used in all kinds of knowledge including Islamic Law, *ʿIlm al-Kalām* and *Tafsīr* and in all other conversations. However, the main criterion of its application is the Islamic pillars. We should remember that these application places for *al-tamthīl* are not directly *al-tamthīl* but rather, that this reasoning may be used in these applications. For this reason, Nūrsī call these applications as *masālik al-tamthīl*. We will mention some examples only:

Nūrsī uses *al-tamthīl* directly in proving the resurrection and says:

“Indeed, the Almighty Disposer of this world’s affairs creates in every century, every year and every day, on the narrow and transient face of the globe, numerous signs, examples and indications of the Supreme Gathering and the Plain of Resurrection.

Thus in the gathering that takes place every spring we see that in the course of five or six days more than three hundred thousand different kinds of animal and plants in the course of five or six days are first gathered together and then dispersed. The roots of all the trees and plants, as well as some animals, are revived and restored exactly as they were. The other animals are recreated in a form so similar as to be almost identical. The seeds which appear, in their outward form, to be so close to each other, nonetheless, in the course of six days or six weeks, become distinct and differentiated from each other, and then with extreme speed, ease and facility, are brought to life in the utmost order and equilibrium. Is it at all possible that for the One Who does all of this anything should be difficult; that He should be unable to create the heavens and the earth in six days; that He should be unable to resurrect men with a single blast? No, by no means is it possible!

If you have understood this parable (*al-tamthīl*), now look further and see how the Pre-Eternal Designer turns over in front of our eyes the white page of winter and opens the green pages of spring and summer. Then He inscribes on the page of the earth’s surface, with the pen of power and destiny, in the

⁶⁵Nūrsī, *The Words: Thirty-Second Word - Second Stopping-Place* - p.643; Compare: *Mawsūʿat*, p.689-691

most beautiful form, more than three hundred thousand species of creation. Not one encroaches upon another. He writes them all together, but none blocks the path of another. In their formation and shape, each is kept separate from the other without any confusion. There is no error in the writing. That Wise and Preserving One, Who preserves and inserts the spirit of a great tree in the smallest seed, no bigger than a dot - is it permissible even to ask how He preserves the spirits of those who die? That Powerful One Who causes the globe to revolve like a pebble in a sling - is it permissible even to ask how He will remove this globe from the path of His guests who are travelling to meet Him in the Hereafter?"⁶⁶

b) Nūrsī uses in *Munāzarāt* the type of '*imā bi al-ḥukm 'alā al-mushtāq*'. He uses this type in answering the question "What is your opinion about the Qur'anic verse: "O you who believe! Do not take the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors" (5: 51). In light of this verse, can you say that Muslims and Christians should be friends?" Nūrsī explains this verse from different aspects. One of them being that if the judgment is based on derived evidence, the source of the derivation shows the reason for the judgment.

In applying this principle to the interpretation of this verse, we can hold that the prohibition from friendship with Jews and Christians is effective only when they reflect Jewishness or Christianity. But, we may conclude, just as not all of the characteristics of an individual Muslim necessarily reflect the teaching of Islam, so also, not all of the qualities of individual Jews or Christians reflect unbelief. We should not forget that in *thamthīl* the similarity is very important. We should find the similarities in sacred texts. If Muslims find in a Jew or Christian qualities that are in agreement with Islamic teaching, they should consider those qualities praiseworthy. It is those good qualities that form the basis for friendship with Jews and Christians⁶⁷.

c) Nūrsī uses *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī* in type of *sabr* and *taqṣīm* (*sondage and division=dilemma*)⁶⁸ to prove the prophethood of Muhammad:

"Muhammad is either God's Messenger and the highest of the prophets and the most superior of creatures, or, God forbid, he has to be imagined to be someone without belief having fallen to the lowest of the low because he lied concerning God, and did not know God, and did not believe in His punishment. And as for this, O Devil, neither you nor the philosophers of Europe and hypocrites of Asia on whom you rely could say it, nor could you say it in the past, neither shall you be able to say it in the future, for there is no one in the world who would listen to it and accept it. It is because of this that the most corrupting of those philosophers and the most lacking in conscience

⁶⁶Nūrsī, *The Words: Tenth Word (Ninth Truth)*, p.92-93.

⁶⁷Nūrsī, *Ta'liqāt, Ṣayqal*, V.III: 320-321; Nūrsī, *Munāzarāt*, V.II: 1944.

⁶⁸Fakhruddīn Muhammad al-Rāzī, *Al-Maḥṣūl fī 'Ilmi Uṣūl al-Fiqh* (Beirut: 1999) V.IV: 223-1226; Al-Ghazālī, *Al-Mustasfā*, V. III: 618-620.

of the hypocrites, even, admit that ‘Muhammad the Arabian (PBUH) was very clever, and was most moral and upright.’

“Since this matter is restricted to these two sides, and the second one is impossible and no one at all claims it to be true, and since we have proved with decisive arguments that there is no point between them, for sure and of necessity, in spite of you and your party, Muhammad the Arabian (Peace and blessings be upon him) was God’s Messenger, and the highest of the prophets and the best of all creatures.”⁶⁹

We have mentioned only three examples regarding the application of *al-qiyās al-tamthīlī*; Nürsī however mentions more than three applications. For example, ‘*ijmā*’ (the consensus of the Ummah (the community of Muslims or followers of Islam), *al-naṣṣ* (the divine speech), *tard-i ḡhayr-i sāliḡ* (inherence and exclusion=co-extensiveness), *al-mushābahat* (similarity), ‘*ilghā*’ *al-fāriq*, *al-‘aks* (co-exclusiveness=conversion), *al-dawr* (vicious circle with two types), *tanqīḡ al-manāṭ* (exact investigation of cause and motive), *taḡqīq al-manāṭ* (exact verification of cause and motive), *takhrīj al-manāṭ* (exact extracting of cause and motive), *al-munāsabah* (convenience) and *al-waṣf al-munāsib* (suitable qualification)⁷⁰. Nürsī uses all kinds of *al-tamthīl* in his *Risale-i Nur* Collection.

5. Deductive Reasoning (*Al-Qiyās al-Manṭiqī* = *Syllogism*)

Deductive reasoning (*qiyās*) is reasoning which uses deductive arguments to move from given statements (premises), assumed to be true, to conclusions, which must be true if the premises are true⁷¹. Muslim Scholars have written extensively about this kind of reasoning and used it to prove the pillars of faith especially in proving existence of God.

The classic example of deductive reasoning, given by Aristotle, is the following:

All men are mortal. (Major premise=*kubrā*)

Socrates is a man. (Minor premise=*ṣuḡhrā*)

Socrates is mortal. (Conclusion=*natījah*)

The basic difference between these two can be summarized in the deductive dynamic of logical progression from general evidence to a particular truth or conclusion; whereas with induction, the logical dynamic is precisely the reverse. Inductive reasoning starts with a particular observation that is believed to be a demonstrative model for a truth or principle that is assumed to apply generally.⁷²

⁶⁹Nürsī, *The Words: Fifteenth Word*, p.204-205; *Ta’līqāt, Ṣayqal*, V.III: 320-321; Compare: Daghim-Jyrrar Jehami, *Mawsū‘at*, p.689-691

⁷⁰Nürsī, *Ta’līqāt, Ṣayqal*, V.III: 320-321; Al-Ghazalī, *Al-Mustaṣfā*, V.III: 618-668; Compare: Daghim-Jyrrar Jehami, *Mawsū‘at*, p.89-691; Faḡlullah, *Madkhal*, p.136.

⁷¹Ibn Sīnā, *Al-‘Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt*, V.I (Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1960), p.207.

⁷² Mahdī Fadhlullah, *Madkhal ila ‘Ilm al-Manṭiq*, Beirut 1979, pp. 167-212.

The syllogism (*al-qiyās al-mantiqī*) is at the core of deductive reasoning, where facts are determined through the combining of existing statements. A syllogism (Greek: συλλογισμός = "conclusion," "inference"), (usually the categorical syllogism) is a kind of logical argument in which one's proposition (the conclusion) is inferred from two others (the premises) of a certain form.⁷³ On numerous occasions in his writings, Nūrīsī has used *al-qiyās al-mantiqī* Imam Samarqandī calls it as *al-qiyās al-'aqlī*⁷⁴.

Conclusion

Nūrīsī was a great expert in the knowledge of logic and other Islamic sciences. He wrote two books on logic. The first book, *Qizil İjaz* which is an interpretation of *Kitab al-Şullam fī al-Mantiq*⁷⁵. Second one is *Ta'liqāt* on al-Burhān for al-Galanbawī⁷⁶. Nūrīsī has used all types of reasoning including inductive and deductive proofs to prove the pillars of faith and Islam. Nonetheless, it can be said that he has explored a lot of new things regarding *al-tamthīl*, *istiqrā'* and *al-qiyās al-mantiqī*. He has proved that *al-tamthīl* can afford certainty and not only probability. In this paper we have summarized some of his opinions and have given some examples from his explanations. For this reason at the end Nūrīsī said, at the end of the Thirty-third Word:

“God willing, this Thirty-Third Word of Thirty-Three Windows will bring to belief those without belief, strengthen the belief of those whose belief is weak, make certain the belief of those whose belief is strong but imitative, give greater breadth to the belief of those whose belief is certain, lead to progress in knowledge of God -the basis and means of all true perfection- for those whose belief has breadth, and open up more brilliant vistas for them.”⁷⁷

⁷³Muhammad Ridha Al-Muzaffar, *Al-Mantiq*, Beirut 1980, pp. 203-268; Abd al-Muta'al al-Sa'idi, *Tajdid 'ilm al-Mantiq* Fi Sharh al-Khabisi al al-Thadhib, pp. 120-147; Bediuzzaman, Said Nursi, *Taliqāt, Şayqal al-Islam*, VIII, p. 318-330; Henry S. Leonard, *Principles of Reasoning*, 421-425; Irving Copi, 1969. *Introduction to Logic*, 3rd ed. Macmillan Company

⁷⁴Nūrīsī, *Muḥākamāt: Third Maqālah*, p.2029-2030; Al-Samarqandī, *Mizān al-Uşul*, p.555.

⁷⁵He is a Muslim Scholar, Abdurrahmān bin Muhammad Al-Akhḍarī (941 H). He wrote his book in form of poem. Nūrīsī, *Ta'liqāt, Şayqal*, V.III: 163-238.

⁷⁶He is an Ottoman Scholar who wrote books about *'Ilm al-Kalām* and *Mantiq*; Ismā'īl al-Galanbawī (d.1791). Nūrīsī, *Ta'liqāt, Şayqal al-Islam*, V.III: p.239-330.

⁷⁷Nūrīsī, *The Words: Thirty-Third Word*, p.723.