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_Peter T. C. Chang_
Editorial

In the Editorial of the maiden Issue launched in December 2018, we had briefly mentioned the general nature of the development of human society which provided tremendous rooms especially for the inquisitive and curious minds to explore and investigate human history and civilisation(s). We had also stressed on the fact that the ever-increasing complexity of society offers never ending new issues for analysis to these investigative researchers. As societies become more and more sophisticated, so do the methods and subsequently the findings of the later studies. These new insights and results are too valuable to be left unattended by the public, thus justifying the establishment of thousands of journals to ‘house’ these new ‘discoveries’. This *Journal of Religion and Civilisational Studies* was launched to provide a modest medium for these ideas and thoughts to be shared with a larger audience. As the title suggests, the Journal is primarily meant for accommodating themes and issues related to religion and civilisation although in the broadest sense of the word. We believe that any religion and civilisation-related theme or issue should not be confined only to events and concerns of the past but are deeply relevant to the present and the future. Thus, the articles that are included in our Journal this time reflect these three broad time frames – past, present and future. We trust that each selected article that addresses a particular issue is important in its own right and can be perceived in light of religion and civilisational studies in one way or the other.

As one might be aware, the articles in the previous Issue were all country-specific which allowed the reader to gain deeper insights into the religious/civilisational issues that took place in the respective geopolitical confines. Partly based on the same principle, we selected four main articles and one Viewpoint to form the contents of the current Issue. These are: “The Genesis and Evolution of the Modern Concept of Civilisation in Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Europe” by Mohd Helmi Mohd Sobri, “A Critique of Tadeusz Swietochowski’s Works on the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) under the Prism

With the exception of the first article which is selected to appear first due to the generic nature of its theme and direct relevance to civilisation, the niche of this Journal, the sequence of the other articles is done quite arbitrarily.

The first article by Mohd Helmi Mohd Sobri discusses the historical emergence and transformation of the modern concept of civilisation in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe with the aim of showing how the concept gradually emerged out of the early-modern notion of civility in the second half of the eighteenth century. It is argued that this emergence “needs to be understood in the context of the Enlightenment belief.” It also analyses the use of the terms ‘civilisation’ and ‘civility’ by the earlier writers so as to show the different perspectives on the way human society gradually transformed from barbarism to a more developed stage.

The second article is written by an independent researcher living in Azerbaijan, Elchin Shahinovich Huseynov, and an academic at the Political Science Department of the International Islamic University Malaysia. It is based on the analysis of the works of a Polish historian and Caucasologist, Tadeusz Swietochowski, who is seen as a leading specialist on the modern history of Azerbaijan. The article’s focus is on ‘the views of the Orientalist’ on the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, an independent state which existed only for 23 months (1918-1920) and which is believed to have laid the foundations for the present Azerbaijan. The main contention of this article is that the reliability of some points/views held by Swietochowski is questionable because “some of Swietochowski’s works were written decades ago, before the USSR’s dissolution, when the archives were under Soviet confidentiality.” It was thus suggested that the research should consider “the newly discovered documents while studying the political events
of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries for the objective outcomes.”

The third article on the Role of Muslim Scholars in Kwara Politics by Ibrahim Abdul Ganiyu Jawondo focusses on the interplay between religion and politics in human physical and social environments with special illustration from the case of Kwara in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria. It is argued that these two forces – religion and politics – have continued to influence each other right from the beginning. While there are different perspectives on the relationship between religion and politics with some propagating their inseparability and others their dissociation, the article, based on the premise that “in Islam, there is no distinction between religion and politics” examines the influence of religion in the political activities at Ilorin, the Kwara State capital as championed by its Islamic religious scholars (‘ulama’). The article argues for the inseparability of religion and politics and concludes that “Ilorin’s Islamic scholars played significant roles in the establishment, nurturing, and sustenance of democracy in Kwara State.”

In the final article, Md. Salleh Yaapar discusses the Malay navigation and maritime trade from anthropological and historical perspectives. It narrates and analyses the spread of the Malays as the huge racial group in the Malay Archipelago or Southeast Asia since the last ice age and their trading activities ever since. The first theme emphasises the widely scattered Malays within the Malayo-Polynesian World - to the north as far up as Taiwan, to the south till New Zealand, to the east till Easter Island, and to the west till Madagascar. It then discusses their socio-cultural activities and achievements with special focus on Malay navigation and maritime trade as reflected in their socio-economic history and anthropological profiles.

Meanwhile this Issue’s Viewpoint portrays Peter Chang’s thoughts on the Chinese civilisation’s quest for the great harmony through humanness. It is written against the background of a paradigm shift “as the American Century gives way to a China lead Asian century” and of the development in recent years in China when “Beijing has been returning to traditional philosophical and religious resources to help mitigate social and political challenges at home and abroad.” Contemporary Chinese are said to be eager and ready to re-embrace
their ancient ethos and this paper tries “to provide some insights into this increasingly dominant yet obscure civilisational power” by discussing two foundational Confucian principles namely the Great Harmony (大同 Da Tong) and Humanness (仁 Ren) with the aim of explaining the ancient Chinese world ultimate concerns, i.e. telos, and how they set out to actualise these religious aspirations.

In the light of the above articles and viewpoint, it is pertinent to draw our attention to some highlights. Firstly, in the study of civilisation, or any other studies for that matter, we are fully aware of the coinage and popularisation of new terminologies from time to time. Terminologies normally developed due to the need of time and, quite frequently, a concept or a term which was found to be able to better explain the reality of that particular time might fail to do so in its near or distant aftermath. At the initial stage of its appearance, a terminology might be met with controversy, scrutiny and polemic before it was accepted or rejected with varying degrees of acceptance and rejection. Terminologies that could stand the test of time would prevail and last longer. Such is the case for the term ‘civilisation’ which is still prevailing today. The term was found to also be debated along other terms like ‘civility’ and ‘culture’. In the Arab-Islamic context, the terms like ḥaḍārah, madaniyyah, tamaddun and thaqāfah also underwent such kind of intellectual scrutiny in the course of its journey to reach a more refined notion of civilisation. Khaldunian term of ‘ʻumrān has also undergone a similar kind of process.

In the beginning, people might be grappling not only to understand the new concepts or terminologies but also to comprehend their logic and grounding. At any rate, it is clear that there are limitations to whatever is created by humans and as such one must allow some reasonable room and right for people to be critical towards them so as to ensure a more digested comprehension prior to their acceptance and adoption. It is in this context that critical assessment of others’ ideas, thoughts, works and theories is crucial. It is more so as one’s interpretation of events may not always be universal as it is frequently conditioned by what sociologists call ‘social forces’. Under ‘sociological perspective’, the emphasis is frequently on the influence of social forces like values, culture, norms, laws and people on one’s choices, acts, views or in short on life in its entirety. Hence, it is only logical for the authors
of this Issue’s articles to explore further their respective subjects and analyse them in the light of their own understanding as grounded in their sources and justifications. Mohd Helmi Mohd Sobri’s article, for instance, may be read in the light of this terminological context and so do the revisiting of Swietochowski’s views on Azerbaijan Democratic Republic by Elchin Shahinovich Huseynov and Tunku Mohar Tunku Mohd. Mokhtar.

Secondly, in the context of development and civilisation, today’s reality is certainly not the same as in the past times. This applies to all aspects at both individual and societal levels. Advancement of human knowledge particularly in science and technology has made it possible for the world to be steadily ‘shrinking’ and that the rate of dwindling has become speedier - first by year later by month, by week, by day or even by minute. In each minute, there are numerous new things added to the already complex social entity making ‘cultural lag’ not only a reality of society but the gap that is created between one’s ability to embrace those new things and his old way of thinking becomes wider and hardly bridgeable. In such a situation, development may mean nothing to some people and this causes them to ask such question as: do we feel safer, better and happier with the advancement of knowledge and technologies?

As efforts towards better civilisational creation or/and transformation continue, a look at what were known as modest and ‘traditional’ activities and practices may shed some light for the present generation to take stock. In this context, Roger Garaudy’s words of wisdom might be useful for us to understand the way the past is supposed to be engaged. He philosophises, “to be faithful to our ancestors is not to preserve the ashes of their fire but to transmit its flames.” We believe that good values may come from anywhere. After all, the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ are only names given to the respective geographies. In reality, they both belong to the same Creator. There always are lessons from all cultures and civilisations that can be learnt along with their universal normative and high moral qualities that are instrumental for developing a desired just human civilisation. If what takes place today is found to be equally ‘barbaric’ in essence albeit with modern terms and outlook or in the name of human rights, freedom and democracy, then one has every reason to revisit their past in order to assist them finding better
formula for developing such a civilisation. Thus, a look at how the past Malays dealt with their time in the economic and trading sense, for instance, as highlighted by Salleh Yaafar and Cheng’s analysis of Confucian Da Tong and ren may inspire us in the course of this soul searching. Despite its specific reference to a Nigerian case, Jawondo’s analysis of the role of Muslim scholars there may provide useful insights on the universality of people’s religious role elsewhere.

The bottom line is that, humanity at large expects new knowledge and technologies, as the tangible products of human intellectual progress, to make the world a safer place for living. This may not be achievable if only wars and famine, for instance, become the definers and characteristics of the emerging civilisation. If development today seems to move towards mere fulfilment of the material human needs and ignore their social, psychological, moral, spiritual and inner necessities, one then has every reason to question the legitimacy and benefit of the present developmental process and, subsequently, to offer alternative development philosophies that are more promising in terms of social justice. In this regard, it is perhaps high time to offer and advance such terms in Islamic tradition as rahmah, ta’awun and mahabbah to be part of the vocabularies for the present and future civilisational intercourses. At a more universal level, we must admit that all humans aspire for universal peace, unity and happiness and all this may be found somewhere in our societies. It is in this context that I find it interesting to share the ideas from various traditions and perspectives as found in the articles published in this Issue. They are not only written by authors from different countries and geographies but also related to diverse issues concerning different cultures and civilisations and hence the writings of Malays, Chinese, Nigerians and Azerbaijanis on various subjects and issues of their interest. This to me is a good blend of intellectual inputs from people of diverse backgrounds – political science, arts and literature, history and others - reflecting the multi-dimensional nature of a civilisation and religion particularly Islam.

Like the success of the first Issue, this Issue would not be possible without the cooperation, contribution and assistance of all parties particularly the editorial team led by the hardworking and dedicated Editor, Dr. Elmira. Special thanks are extended to Dato’ Seri Prof.
Dr. Syed Arabi Idid for facilitating the provision of materials for this publication. There are others who have contributed directly or indirectly to the successful publication of this Issue right from the beginning for which we must extend our appreciation and thanks.

Hazizan Md. Noon
Editor-in-Chief
The Genesis and Evolution of The Modern Concept of Civilisation in The Eighteenth And Nineteenth Century Europe

Mohd Helmi Mohd Sobri 1

Abstract: This article discusses the historical emergence and transformation of the modern concept of civilisation in the eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. It demonstrates how the concept gradually emerged out of the early-modern notion of civility in the second half of the eighteenth century. This emergence, it argues, needs to be understood in the context of the Enlightenment belief in progress. Some eighteenth century writers who promoted or believed in the progressive history of humanity saw ‘civilisation’ as a useful concept. Unlike ‘civility’ that merely refers to a static condition and lacks processual connotation, ‘civilisation’ articulates the dynamic process of human history. It enabled writers to show in a more effective way the gradual transformation of human society from barbarism to a more developed stage.

Keywords: The Concept of Civilisation, Enlightenment, Civility, Historical Progress, Civilisation..

Mathematical concepts can be separated from the group which uses them. Triangles may be explicable without reference to historical situations. Concepts such as ‘civilisation’ and ‘Kultur’ are not - Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process.

The word “civilisation” is a word known to many, regardless of whether or not they have the ability to provide the formal or dictionary definition. Rather, they are sufficiently familiar with the term; to know how to make

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sense of it or use it in the context of our average everyday conversation, writing, or action. For instance, labels of library bookshelves that read ‘World Civilisations’, ‘Western Civilisation’, and ‘Islamic ‘Civilisation’ seem sensible enough for us. And we have a feeling that a book entitled ‘Western Civilisation’ is misplaced when we find it on the bookshelf labelled ‘Western Cuisine’. We also have a sense of what people do when they use the term ‘civilisation’ and its derivatives in its context. For example, we know what someone does mean when he or she calls us uncivilised people. This means that even if we are not sure whether the saying is a factual statement, one cannot fail to see that it is an act to degrade. ‘Civilisation’ is also a category by which identity is defined, as it is common nowadays to look at ourselves as belonging to one of the world’s civilisations. Following this, there are individuals who promote the idea of inter-civilisational rivalry, and there are those who challenge that stance by encouraging civilisational dialogue. There is nothing strange about these encounters and experience. They are all too natural, and too familiar. ‘Civilisation’ is just always there in the background while we are navigating our day-to-day life.

As we are so immersed in identifying objects, behaviours, and people around us in terms of their civilisational affiliation, we do not really pay attention that the very category that serves as the basis of this identification and classification, namely, is the concept ‘civilisation’ itself. We hardly ask why we see ourselves, and our similarities and differences in terms of civilisation. The reason why we hardly raise this question is, perhaps, because our familiarity with it makes us difficult to disengage the concept and see it in its own terms. Civilisation is a conceptual lens through which the world and individuals are seen. It is the lens that ensures that the surroundings can be perceived and experienced as civilisational. However, what is often forgotten is how this lens or concept is of a relatively recent origin. The familiarity with civilisation and things civilisational is not actually natural but rather historical, the result of a process that started about three hundred years ago. This paper intends to contribute to this discussion by offering a historical perspective to the concept of civilisation. It rests on the assumption that, to know what ‘civilisation’ is, one cannot simply reflect on the meaning in the abstract; rather, one really needs to understand what the concept has become since the time of its emergence. In the
words of Droysen (1988), “we can completely understand something after we understand how this thing has come to be what it is” (p. 125).

‘Civilisation’ before ‘Civilisation’

The word “civilisation” has been around for around last three centuries only. In one of the most authoritative English dictionaries in the eighteenth-century, prepared by Samuel Johnson and printed in 1755 C.E., the word ‘civilisation’ carried a completely different meaning from what it is now. Johnson (1755) defines it as a law, act of justice or judgment, which renders a criminal process civil. This, however, is not unique to English language. Across the channel, and in fact, slightly earlier, a French dictionary had also defined ‘civilisation’ in the same way as a: “Term of Jurisprudence. An act of justice or judgment that renders a criminal trial civil” (Bowden, 2009, p. 26). This could be referred to the juridical meaning of ‘civilisation’. This usage of the word, however, is unpopular, short-lived, and declined by the end of the eighteenth century (Bowden, 2009). Nevertheless, the presence of this usage suggests that if the origin of the concept of civilisation were to be traced back, it is vital to know who was the first in Europe to use the term ‘civilisation’ in a non-juridical or legal sense. Generally, scholars who study the history of the concept agree that the new non-juridical meaning of the word ‘civilisation’ appeared for the first time in 1756 in a book entitled, L’Ami des Hommes, which was written by a French aristocrat, Marquis de Mirabeau.

One of Mirabeau’s passages that contains the word ‘civilisation’ points to an interesting fact that the non-juridical meaning of civilisation had been used by his contemporaries at least in conversation that:

If I was to ask most people what civilisation consists … they would reply ‘the civilisation of a people is a softening of its manners, an urbanity, politeness and a spreading of knowledge so that the observation of decencies takes the place of laws of detail’ (Sonenscher, 2016, p. 289).

Based on the quote above, the usage of the term ‘civilisation’ could be closer to its present day’s usage, although it is unclear whether or not the new meaning of the word was also used in England. However,
there is a possibility that Johnson was aware of this different sense of the term but purposely refused to include it in his dictionary. This is inferred from an account given by James Boswell about his conversation with Johnson on 23 March 1772. Interestingly, this conversation took place while Johnson was preparing the fourth edition of his dictionary. Boswell recommended the inclusion of the new sense of the term, but Johnson adamantly rejected it as he found it redundant. To Johnson, the word and the meaning of ‘civility’ was already established and widely used. Boswell, however, disagreed on this very point since he “thought civilisation from to civilise, better in the sense opposed to barbarity than civility” (Boswell, 1847, p. 186). This disagreement between Boswell and Johnson might reflect the divided opinions of their British contemporaries over the issue. Johnson’s view reflects how in that period, the idea of civility was still overshadowing the new concept of civilisation. If these were the cases, then what might have slowed down the reception of the new meaning of civilisation is the cultural dominance of civility.

‘Civility’ before ‘Civilisation’

Students of the eighteenth century knew that ‘civility’ was one of the key concepts in not just British but also European culture at large. Alongside terms such as ‘politeness’, ‘gentility’, and ‘manners’, the word ‘civility’ helped contemporaries in making sense of their standing in relation to the immediate social, cultural, and political environments. In Johnson’s dictionary, ‘civility’ carried several meanings; some of which are close to the modern sense of being civilised. One is “freedom from barbarity; the state of being civilised” and the other one is “Politeness; complaisance; elegance of behaviour” (Johnson, 1755). As a word, ‘civility’ has been used since the Middle Ages. However, it started to become a culturally dominant concept only in the sixteenth century after the publication of Desiderius Erasmus’s *De Civilitate Morum Puerilium* in 1530 (Gillingham, 2002, pp. 281-282). This book taught children how to behave in a civilised manner in different socio-cultural settings. For instance, there were advices on how to blow one’s nose and spit in public. The warm reception of the book throughout Europe is evident by the fact that within Erasmus’s lifetime alone, it was reprinted for more than thirty times and translated into many European languages.
The first English translation appeared in 1532, just two years after the original publication (Elias, 1994, p. 47).

The early modern concept of civility as articulated by Erasmus was the successor of the medieval idea of courtesy. In the Middle Ages, courtesy literatures were produced to teach elite members of society correct behaviours and manners. What differentiated the discourse of courtesy and that of civility is the setting of social action. In courtesy literature, the setting was the manorial household, while the setting of civility was the civil institution. This shift reflects changes that took place in the early modern period which witnessed the increasing participation of aristocrats in civil institutions. For instance, in the Middle Ages, sons of noblemen were educated at their respective households, but starting from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many of them were sent to schools and universities (Gillingham, 2002, p. 286). Therefore, the difference between medieval courtesy and early modern civility is conceivable in terms of the different social spaces that they operated in. There are three things that are known about the cultural hegemony of civility which are relevant to the subsequent discussion on the emergence of the concept of civilisation. First, the socially discriminatory function of civility; second, its emphasis on external decorum and outward appearance; and third, the fact that it was mostly defined and epitomised by the French courtly culture.

Civility was an exclusionary discourse since it privileged those who had it over those who did not. In other words, it was one of the ingredients of the early modern outlook that enabled contemporaries to make sense of their social relations in terms of status distinction. Therefore, it is easy to comprehend how civility served as a marker of status. If one were to read literature on manners, civility, or politeness that were produced in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is evident that their intended audience were members of the aristocratic and gentlemanly classes. They were not meant for peasants, mechanics, tradesmen, or any other species of commoners. In fact, there was a prevalent assumption that people of the lower orders were barbaric and brutish by nature, and thus could never be candidates for civility. This assumption is obvious in the literature of the period. Readers were sometimes discouraged to behave in certain ways simply because those were the ways of peasants and servants. For instance, when a book of manners discouraged the undesirable act of grumbling on what had
been served, it alludes to such a behaviour as “fitting only for an ill-bred mechanic” (The Man of Manners: Or, Plebeian Polish’d, 1737, pp. 5-7). Though difficult, it was not impossible for people of humble backgrounds to attain the gentlemanly status. But once they attained that, they began to look down upon those beneath them. In other words, social mobility in this context simply reproduced and reinforced status distinction.

In a civil or social setting, a gentleman must be as pleasant and agreeable as possible to others. The emphasis, however, was not so much on the genuineness and authenticity of behaviours, but rather on their outward appearance and performance. Socially, this was considered essential if one were to earn respect from one’s inferiors and win the favour of one’s superiors. In the discourse and practice of civility, social life and expectations precede inner authenticity. It therefore involves, among other things, the practice of repressing one’s inner feeling and the exercise of civil dissimulation. Gentlemen, therefore, in this respect, were believed to be naturally different from the members of the lower orders who were emotional and excessive in their behaviours. The ability to control one’s feeling is reflected not only in behaviours but also in speech. According to Peltonen (2003), “Good manners and grace, beauty and attire were important, but speech and words were perhaps the most crucial factor in shaping a gentleman’s courteous image” (p. 55). Many books were written on this subject and one of the most influential books is The Civil Conversation (printed 1574) by Stefano Guazzo. The type of education given to gentlemen was known as liberal education. Unlike modern education, its emphasis is not so much on academic achievement but, rather, on the formation of a gentlemanly personality. As Rothblatt (1976) maintains, “The proof of liberal education lay in behaviour, expressed as style, taste, fashion, or manners” (p. 26). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the standard for civility in Europe was defined by the Italians and the French. Between the two, however, the influence of the latter was much more apparent. Many members of the European upper classes believed that to appear civilised, one must adopt the ways of the French.

The main source of the French model of civility is none other than the courtly culture of the grand and absolute French monarchy. European monarchs and nobles, therefore, modelled their behaviours and courtly practices after the French royal and aristocratic habits. It
had been the practice of those who belonged to the gentlemanly class in England, for instance, to send their sons to France to polish them. Among the aims were for them to acquire not just the French manners, but also the language. In the context of British aristocracy, the French language was deemed important since it was seen as “a prerequisite for entry into high society and high office” (Colley, 2003, p. 165). Many English gentlemen visited the French city, Blois, where the language was believed to be spoken in its purest form (Cohen, 1992). Apart from the language, they studied other things, such as horse riding, fencing, and dancing (Eagles, 2000). For those at home, they read French literature on politeness and civility, many of which had been translated into English. One of the books, for instance, was translated into English was *The Rules of Civility; or the Maxims of Genteel Behaviour*, printed in 1703. “Civility”, as the book maintains, “is a science that teaches to dispose our words and actions in their proper and just places” (*The Rules of Civility; or the Maxims of Genteel Behaviour*, 1703, p. 3).

Francophilia was even more evident among the German ruling elites than their British counterparts. One of the most notable among them is Frederick II of Prussia. Also known as Frederick the Great, the Prussian king spoke French elegantly and was in close contact with one of the leading French philosophers, Voltaire. He believed that the French had set the standard for arts and literature and any literary or artistic piece that failed to meet that standard was deemed inferior. It is, therefore, unsurprising that in some of his remarks, Frederick II looked down upon the German language and literature as he thought they were not as developed as their French counterparts (Elias, 1994, p. 12). In Prussia, German aristocrats only spoke German when they were conversing with their servants or other members of the lower orders (Brunt, 1983). This attitude among German elites was severely challenged by the middle-class intelligentsia who refused to acknowledge the French standard. This challenge contributed to the antithetical relation between civilisation and culture in German thought.

It seems that civility discriminated people, emphasised on externality of behaviours and a predominantly French enterprise. But how was this related to the emergence of the modern concept of civilisation? Indeed, Mirabeau’s usage of ‘civilisation’ with its emphasis on manners and politeness indicates its close affinity with the concept of civility. Perhaps, Johnson was, to some extent, right for not being able to tell the
difference between the two. Yet, in hindsight, it is clear that civilisation is not civility. Johnson’s historical horizon has, to some extent, limited his ability to see the unique potential of the new concept of civilisation. Therefore, if one were to historically explain the genesis of the modern concept of civilisation, one must elucidate how it emerged out of the early modern concept of civility. This requires an examination of continuous elements as well as changes between the two concepts. In other words, to understand the emergence is to empathise with both Johnson and Boswell.

As Koselleck (2002) explains, a new concept “can never be too new not to have existed virtually as a seed in the pre-given language and not to have received meaning from its inherited linguistic context” (pp. 30-31). The concept of civilisation, therefore, certainly inherited some of the assumptions inherent in the idea of civility. One of the most essential assumptions is in terms of its discriminatory function.

As Elias (1994) maintains, both civility and civilisation had “practically the same function,” namely as concepts that express the self-image of the European upper class in relation to others, whom its members considered simpler or more primitive and at the same time to characterise specific kinds of behaviour through which this upper class felt itself different from all simpler and more primitive people (p. 34).

Like the language of civility, the discourse of civilisation also features the normative distinction between the civilised and the uncivilised or barbarian. Therefore, when Sheridan (1789) expressed his admiration for the regulated speech of the French and Italians and compared that to the inferior way of the English, he saw the former as the reflection of “their progress in civilisation and politeness,” while the latter suggests that “we still remain in the state of all barbarous countries.” This usage suggests that to some extent in the second half of the eighteenth century, the words ‘civility’ and ‘civilisation’ could still be used interchangeably. One can also see in Sheridan’s usage how, just like civility, civilisation was also associated with things that are French.

However, why did eighteenth-century Europeans still need the concept of civilisation? People invent a new concept for various reasons. According to Koselleck (2002), a “new concept may be coined to articulate experiences or expectations that never existed before” (p. 31). In other words, the need for a new concept arises if existing concepts
can no longer help in describing, explaining, and making sense of the surrounding world.

‘Civilisation’ in the Age of Progress and Imperialism

What is so novel about the eighteenth-century European experience that made contemporaries feel the insufficiency of ‘civility’ and the need for ‘civilisation’? The eighteenth-century is also known as the Age of Reason and the Age of Enlightenment. The eighteenth-century European thinkers, such as Voltaire, Diderot, and Kant, were the direct heirs of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution. Many of them were inspired by the earlier achievements of Isaac Newton, Galileo Galilei, and other natural philosophers. However, unlike their predecessors who studied nature, they directed their attention to man and society. Their views to a certain extent reflected the self-image of the age and society in which they lived in. Many of these thinkers believed that the society in which they lived in was radically different from those of the preceding centuries. In knowledge, they witnessed the growing force of reason over tradition and revelation, and in economy, they saw the increasing influence of commerce in various aspects of human life.

Therefore, from their standpoint, the history of humanity is a history of progress. As a key concept in the period, progress helped contemporaries to think about the course of human history in terms of linear development. Its influence in the period marks a gradual break from the older cyclical view of history which understands human history in terms of repetition of earlier historical patterns. The idea of progress enabled philosophers and historians in the period to not only radicalise the difference between historical periods but also attribute greater normative significance to the latest. This is because, according to this scheme, the latest period represents the most developed state or condition of human society, which has no precedent in any of the preceding epochs. In that period, those who subscribed to this view of mankind preferred to call themselves ‘moderns’ and those who did not were known as ‘ancients’. The literary battles between the ancients and the moderns pervaded the eighteenth-century French and English intellectual landscapes (Spafadora, 1990, pp. 27-28). The moderns strongly believed that ancient wisdom and standards were no longer relevant to their age, and they could rely on superior knowledge and techniques that they themselves have produced.
In the time when the idea of progressive history of humanity was prevalent in Europe, contemporaries needed new concepts that could articulate its dynamic process. Some of them found that potentiality in the word ‘civilisation’. In this context, ‘civility’ was unhelpful since it was a static term that merely signified a state of affairs or condition, and thus cannot effectively describe a process (Pons, 2014). ‘Civilisation’ can be used to refer to both, a process and a state of affairs. Even as a reference to a condition or state of affairs, ‘civilisation’ strongly implies that it is the result of a process. In other words, compared to ‘civility’, ‘civilisation’ is a better concept to articulate and celebrate human achievements that were seen as the end products of a long historical becoming. One of the eighteenth-century philosophical traditions that utilised the new concept of civilisation in expressing the progressive history of mankind is the Scottish school of conjectural or philosophical history (Mazlish, 2004). Among the notable thinkers that are associated with this tradition are Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and John Millar. They promoted the four stages theory of human history in which the level of development of each stage is understood in terms of the simplicity or complexity of its mode of property relations.

Hence, according to this theory, history began with the hunting-gathering society, followed by the pastoral society, agricultural society, and commercial society. The last type of society which is a contemporary one represents the highest stage of human progress. Through their writings, it is observed that the Scottish writers benefitted significantly from the processual connotation carried by the term ‘civilisation’. Adam Ferguson, for instance, in his entitled Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), talks about ‘civilisation’ as a process of transition from rudeness to a polished state that: “Not only the individual advances from infancy to manhood but the species itself from rudeness to civilisation” (as cited in Elias, p. 43).

The rise of ‘civilisation’ as a key concept in European thought coincided with the growth of the modern idea of nationalism. Thus, the potentiality of the concept is observed once again. Unlike ‘civility’, whose usage was merely to denote the quality of certain social classes, ‘civilisation’ could be easily applied to a broader category of human collectivity, such as a nation. After the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century, the concept of civilisation played a vital role in the formation of national self-image. A nation could see itself as the bearer of
civilisation, and it was because of this, had the right and responsibility to spread it to the uncivilised parts of the world. Hence, during the conquest of Egypt, Napoleon reminded his troops, “Soldiers you are undertaking a conquest with incalculable consequences for civilisation” (Elias, p. 43). The concept of civilisation enabled Europeans to project outward their sense of cultural superiority. If European social elites, through the discourse and practice of civility, condescended their inferiors within their own society, European nations now, through the idea of civilisation, could assume the same patronising attitude towards other societies. It is interesting to see how European political elites saw similarities between the brutishness of their social inferiors and the barbarism of the foreign people that they colonised. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, some social commentators believed that the upper classes had successfully civilised the barbarians at home. However, in the colonies, it was widely assumed that the civilising process was still ongoing. In a parliamentary debate that took place on 24 May 1832, English politicians who supported slavery defended their coercive measures in the colonies by reminding their political opponents that the progress from savagery to civilisation is a long and gradual process. Anti-slavery activists were told to recall “the period when there existed in England a class of person corresponding to the slaves of our colonies” and see “the gradual means by which they were emancipated from their condition, and the progress from barbarism to civilisation throughout Europe.” It was asserted that until the indigenous populations of the colonies acquire the habits and manners of civilised people, Europeans should have the right to enslave and rule them (Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 1833, pp. 84-86).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the growing popularity of the word ‘civilisation’ coincided with the second wave of European imperialism. The concept of civilisation was useful to colonial powers as it helped them to legitimise their imperial ambitions. In the 1870s, for instance, French journals coined the well-known phrase mission civilisatrice (civilising mission) to characterise French imperialism. This was consistent with their claim that the aim of their imperial project was “to bring civilisation into empty voids” (Schaebler, 2004, p. 8). While speaking in a conference of the need to colonise Congo in Africa, King Leopold II of Belgium told other European delegates that such a move is vital in order to “open to civilisation the only part of our globe where it has not yet penetrated” (Pella, 2015, p. 127).
From the time it was coined, around the middle of the eighteenth century, until the second decade of the nineteenth century, the word ‘civilisation’ was only used in the singular form. This usage implies the assumption that there is one civilisation, which is of humanity in general; also, there is a singular historical path towards achieving civilisation. Therefore, with this early usage of the term, unlike that of the present time, it is almost impossible for contemporary Europeans to recognise or speak of various societies as civilisations. Even though, according to Braudel, the plural usage of the word was introduced in 1819, it was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that it began to be widely used (Braudel & Mayne, 1994, pp. 6-7). However, it is important to know that not all Europeans in the nineteenth century were interested in the race for civilisation. In some European cultures, civilisation was not seen as the noblest standard of human achievement. This alternative attitude towards civilisation prevailed in the German-speaking world. If the British and the French were in a race with each other to prove themselves the most civilised people, the Germans were simply uninterested and, in fact, refused to recognise civilisation as a legitimate racing track (Bornstein, 2012).

The German Peculiarity

In the nineteenth century German world, the word ‘Kultur’ (culture) had primacy over Zivilisation’ (civilisation), as it was thought to represent the higher standard of human accomplishment. The relation between the two concepts, in this context, was in fact antithetical. When they spoke of Kultur, the Germans had in mind fulfilment in religious, philosophical, and artistic terms. In other words, the term referred to the inward development of the creative and spiritual dimensions of human beings, while Zivilisation, on the other hand, signified the outward and material attainments, as in the economic, political, and technological fields. Since it merely refers to external achievements, Zivilisation was deemed superficial; while Kultur reflects the deeper and more authentic sides of human potential. If the British and the French understood civilisation as something universal and thus should be spread to other human beings, Kultur, on the other hand, is unique to a particular group of people, be it a community or an ethnic group. In other words, it is a concept that celebrates a plurality of values and distinctness of various
human societies. Therefore, German *Kultur*, for instance, is and will always be meant for the Germans, and not to be exported to other societies. But how did this opposition between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* come about?

This contrast originated in the late eighteenth century. As discussed earlier, German rulers and aristocrats in the period modelled their behaviours and manners after their French counterparts. The French-speaking German upper class thought that the French had set the standard for civilisation, which is rational and universal; and to be part of the ‘good society’, one has to observe this standard. For them, German cultural elements, such as language and literature, were inferior. Things that were German were only meant for the lower orders who did not know how to appreciate the high civilisation of the French. This attitude of the social elites was strongly resented by the German middle-class intellectuals. Loyal to their indigenous identity, these intellectuals developed a counter-discourse to the French idea of civilisation. Among the thinkers that spearheaded this movement in Germany are Goethe, Herder, and Schiller. In this counter-discourse, the intellectuals contrasted the superficial and external decorum of the French to the genuine and deeply philosophical attitude of the Germans. The former was called *Zivilisation*, while the latter was called *Kultur* (Elias, pp. 9-20).

It is, therefore, not unusual for German writers throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to use the word ‘civilisation’ in a pejorative sense. They sometimes portrayed civilisation as a destructive force that can corrupt culture. As one of them remarked in 1851 that: “It is humanity’s duty today to see that civilisation does not destroy culture, nor technology the human being” (Braudel, 1994, pp. 5-6). This sharp opposition between civilisation and culture continued to dominate German thought until the beginning of the twentieth century. Oswald Spengler, for instance, talks about the difference between *Kultur* and *Zivilisation* in his well-known masterpiece, *The Decline of the West* (1918); a discussion that is a reflection of his German intellectual inheritance. For Spengler, civilisation refers to “the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable” (Spengler & Atkinson, 1926, p. 31). He then made clear that, “The energy of culture-man is directed inwards, that of civilisation-man outwards” (Spengler & Atkinson, 1926, p. 37).
To sum up, the German case is a strategic one. At the outset, the purpose of this paper is to remind the present generation about the historicity of civilisation as a concept. The peculiarity of the German experience is important in this respect because more than the French and the British cases, it illustrates how the present generation’s attitude towards civilisation is not actually natural; rather, it is merely the result of a specific historical and cultural formation.

Conclusion

Concepts and categories in social sciences and humanities need to be understood in their own terms. However, this is often difficult to be done, especially if the concept is too familiar and appear too natural. In other words, even if it is not formally defined, the people of the present time already engaged with it. Therefore, how do we disengage with concepts that appear too natural? One way of doing that is by historicising them. To historicise something is to defamiliarise or denaturalise it. This is done by demonstrating “how [that] something is the product of history” (Beiser, 2016, p. 44). This paper, therefore, historicises one of the key concepts in social sciences - civilisation. It discussed the emergence and evolution of the modern concept of civilisation, by tracing its origin back into the eighteenth century, and then showed its gradual changes until the late nineteenth century. In approaching the concept historically, this paper did not treat it in isolation from the contexts of its usages. As maintained by Thompson (1972), “The discipline of history is, above all the discipline of context; each fact can be given meaning only within an ensemble of other meanings” (p. 45). Thus, it has been shown how the modern concept of civilisation had emerged out of the early modern context where notions, such as civility and progress, permeated the socio-cultural life of the people. This paper further explained how in the nineteenth century, the sense of being civilised found its deepest expression in European imperialistic ambitions. However, what is explained here is just half of the story. The development in the twentieth century, even though important, is beyond the scope of this paper. The century witnessed a significant conceptual shift as reflected in the assumption that there is not just one, but many civilisations; and when the term began to be increasingly used for descriptive rather
than normative purposes. In other words, that was the process leading towards the familiar understanding of civilisation of today.

References


THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF CIVILISATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPE


A Critique of Tadeusz Swietochowski’s Works on the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) under the Prism of Edward Said’s Orientalism

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Abstract: The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918-1920) (which shall, henceforth, be referred to as ADR) was an independent state which existed for 23 months and laid the ground for the future of Azerbaijan. Today’s Azerbaijan is the inheritor and successor of the ideals and values of the ADR. In 2018, Azerbaijanis around the world celebrated the 100th anniversary of the ADR that showed the importance of this political event in the socio-political life of the nation. This article investigates the “Orientalist” points of view on the ADR in the works of “Azerbaijanist”, Tadeusz Swietochowski. It analyses the standpoints that relegate the importance of this political event. The article provides a contextual analysis in order to find those points. The research found that not all the points on the ADR in Swietochowski’s works are reliable. Some of Swietochowski’s works were written decades ago before the USSR’s dissolution, when the archives were under Soviet confidentiality. Despite the monopoly of Swietochowski in this field, the research suggests taking into consideration the newly discovered documents while studying the political events of the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries for the objective outcomes.

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Introduction

The ADR was the first democratic republic of the Muslim East which was a part of the Orient and subjected to Said’s concept of Orientalism. It is enough to see Russian, i.e. Western historians’ works related to the earlier 20th century, where they identified Azerbaijani people as Muslims of the Russian Empire, and at the same time, depicted them as a people of the Orient.

This article deals with the problem of the distortion of the history of the ADR in Tadeusz Swietochowski’s works. This article aims to answer the following question: Is there any misrepresentation of the history of the ADR and reduction of the political importance of this political event in Swietochowski’s works? The main thesis of this study is that the ADR is the achievement of the Muslim world that is studying in the West through the prisms of “Orientalism”.

The significance of the study is that the ADR is one of the significant accomplishments of Muslim societies. The ADR was the first democratic republic in the entire Muslim East. Despite existing for only 23 months, the ADR reached great achievements regarding democracy, human rights, education, and diplomacy (Mahmudlu, 2005, p. 17), and if it had not been for the military intervention by Soviet Russia, the ADR could have been a role model of a state for the other Muslim countries that emerged at the beginning of the 20th century.

In order to provide an accurate picture of the ADR and its environment and to imagine it accurately, a short review of the historical background of the ADR is required.

Said’s “Orientalism” as a Theoretical Approach

Usage of the term “Orientalism” above implies Said’s concept of “Orientalism”, which was introduced in 1978. Said’s “Orientalism” is not simply as it seems from the name. It is not a specialisation, career, or field of study. Said’s “Orientalism” is the scholarly created angle of view by the systematic conviction and set of beliefs which formed
with the influx of certain and uncertain indicators; indicators which were generated in its turn during the European colonialism under the influence of the idea of hegemony. The Orientalist point of view is the supporter and investor of the idea of privileged culture, i.e. European culture. Simply put, it is the attitude of the Occident to the Orient. This is also a discourse which defined a correlation between the West and the non-West. In other words, “Orientalism” is a misleading, distorting, misrepresenting, and stereotyping of the reality about life, culture, and politics of the East to justify colonialism of the West. It is a way to provide evidence of their colonial policy (Said, 1978, pp. 1-9). In the introduction of the book titled “Orientalism”, Said quotes Karl Marx, where he says: They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented. (“They” refers to the Orient). This quotation demonstrates the reality of how the West is trying to give a justification for the colonial rule. What makes Said’s “Orientalism” important is his (i.e. Said’s) interpretation of the attitude of the colonial West to the East. For instance, Said stated: Orientalism is one of the forms of thinking which is based on the ontological and epistemological difference between East and West (Said, 1978, p. 2).

With consideration that the ADR was part of the Orient, there are some academic works where Said’s “Orientalism” has its place, and they should be investigated in order to reveal the truth. In this sense, Orientalism is the theoretical framework for this article.

**History and Background**

The ADR proclaimed its independence on 28th May 1918, in Tiflis, after the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (Mahmudlu, 2004, p. 28). The reason why the proclamation of independence happened in Tiflis was because Baku, the capital city of the ADR, was occupied by the Bolshevik-Dashnak militants at that time. The liberation of Baku became possible later with the help of the Ottoman State. Nuri Pasha, with the military assistance in facsimile and with the 5th Caucasian Military Division, arrived in Ganja by the request of the President of Interim National Council of the ADR, Mammad Amin Rasulzadeh. The Army of the ADR and the 5th Caucasian Military Division were combined to the Army of Islam of the Caucasus, under the command of Nuri Pasha in Ganja. On 15th September 1918, the
Army of Islam of the Caucasus liberated Baku from Bolshevik-Dashnak militants (Isgenderli, 2011, pp. 164-165). The new era started in the history of the ADR.

Despite that, the capital city was under the occupation of the leaders of the ADR and continued to get international recognition. However, after the liberation of Baku, the foreign policy of the government jumped into the new phase. The ADR was recognised by the Ottoman State, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Iran, Sweden, Ukraine, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Switzerland, USA, Denmark, Greece, Georgia (country), Germany, Armenia, Romania, Crimea, and the Mountainous Republic (Mahmudlu, 2004, p. 11).

One of the main goals of the ADR was the convening of the Parliament (Milli Məclis). Parliament, which officially began to operate on 7th December 1918, comprised of all nationalities and classes of the country. The Parliament seats were distributed in the following order: Muslims (Azerbaijanis) - 80, Armenians - 21, Russians - 10, Germans - 1, Georgians - 1, Polish - 1, Baku Labour Union - 1, and the Baku Oil Industry Union - 2 (Mahmudlu, 2004, p. 151). During its existence, the Parliament held 145 meetings, though 15 of them failed due to the insufficient participation of the members. The biggest party at the Parliament was Müşavat, and the second biggest was the Pan-Islamist party, İttihad (Azərbaycan Respublikası Nazirlər Kabinetinin Yanında Baş Arxiv İdarosi, 1998, pp. 10-12). During the existence of the ADR, Müşavat was the party in power, while the İttihad party was the main opposition.

The ADR made efforts to be recognised as a subject of international law. The ADR sent its delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. However, the delegation was stuck in Istanbul for a while under several pretexts. The Head of Delegation, Alimardan bey Topchubashov had narrated all these artificial barriers in his letters to the Prime Minister of the ADR. It was only after four months that the delegation reached Paris. The Peace Delegation had accomplished several objectives (Topçubaşov, 1998, pp. 10-12). For example, on 12th January 1920, the ADR was recognised as de-facto by the Allied states (Azərbaycan Respublikası Dini Qurumlarla İş üzrə Dövlət Komitəsi, 2018, p. 168). The ADR also planned to open several diplomatic missions. For instance, one of the orders says:
To establish from 1 April 1920 diplomatic missions under the government of the French Republic, His Excellency King of Great Britain, His Excellency King of Italy, United States of the North-America, Germany, Republic of Soviet and Republic of Poland for the next 6 months (ARDA, F. 895, op.3, d, l.45, N81).

However, on 28th April 1920, the Eleventh Red Army entered Azerbaijan and the authority was surrendered to the local socialists. Additionally, the ADR fell on this date, but not the statehood of Azerbaijan.

The ADR, in its short lifetime, had achieved significant results related to all spheres of life. The ADR is the first country in the entire Muslim world that adopted a law regarding women’s rights on political participation. The ADR presented to women the right to vote and to be a candidate. It was mentioned in Article IV of the Declaration of Independence of the ADR on 28th May 1918 that: The ADR guarantees to all people within its borders full citizenship, civil and political rights, regardless of ethnicity, religion, madhhab, class and gender (National Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Declaration of Independence, 1918, Archive document, f.894, list.10, 192, p.3).³

Another notable decision of the ADR was about higher education. Despite Ittihad Party’s struggle, after four months of heated discussions, the first university of the ADR, Baku State University, was established on 1st September 1919. The resistance of Ittihad was about the language issue. They claimed that there is a shortage of teachers who can teach in Azerbaijani language. However, the Müsavat Party’s main concern was to start laying the foundations of education for further development (Azərbaycan Respublikası Nazirlər Kabinetinin Yanında Baş Arxiv İdarəsi, 1998, p. 9). The founding of the State Bank of the ADR (Mahmudov, 2004) and the adoption of the law regarding citizenship (ARDA, F.970, list.1, 201, p. 7, 7 arch., 8, 8 arch.) were eminent acts in order to strengthen an independence and to liberate the economy from the all-Russian economic system.

³ Translation by Elchin Huseynov.
The facts stated above were the grand events which were the achievements of the Muslims of Transcaucasia. However, historians, political scientists, Orientalists, and other experts of the study area of the West claim that all these achievements of the ADR were the result of the influence of Russia and the West, i.e. of the Occident (Swietochowski, 1991, p. 56). There is truth that colonialism by the Russian Empire (1828-1917) had its impact on the events which had been done; however, this impact was not a contribution to the development. The policy of the Russian colonialism resulted in the political awaking of the Azerbaijani people.

“Orientalism” on the ADR and Their Refutation in Swietochowski’s Works

There are a few researchers who wrote about the history of Azerbaijan during the early 20th century. However, the existing literature is enough to research on “Orientalism” on the ADR. It could be claimed that the monopoly of this field in the West was in the hands of Swietochowski. He wrote several works regarding Azerbaijan, especially about the ADR. Swietochowski was a Polish historian and Caucasologist who was born in 1934, in France, and died in 2017, in the USA. He received his degrees from Warsaw and Columbia Universities. His field consists of the history of the ADR and the process of making the national identity of the Azerbaijaniis. He was a professor at Monmouth University.

Additionally, he worked with the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies at the Wilson Centre, and lectured at the Warsaw University. He was known as an “Azerbaijanist”. His doctoral dissertation also was about Azerbaijani history between 1905-1920.

Accordance of the Title with the Reality

Edward Said, in his book, “Orientalism”, mentioned titles as the indicators of Orientalist points many times. For example, he examined Lewis’s works related to Islam and the Arabs, and mentioned the retitled work from “Revolt of Islam” to “Return of Islam”, where Lewis intended his Orientalist views (Said, 1979, p. 316). In this regard, the title to be analysed below could be examples of the Orientalist’s points.
In 1985, Swietochowski published a book titled, “Russian Azerbaijan, 1905-1920: the shaping of a National Identity in a Muslim Community”, by the Cambridge University Press. The title of this book is what catches attention first because during the specified time interval, Azerbaijan was a member of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (the confederation that was established after the fall of the Russian Empire in Transcaucasia in April 1918), and then in May, Azerbaijan proclaimed its independence in 1918 (See p. 3). However, “Russian Azerbaijan” implies that Azerbaijan is a part of Russia or Azerbaijan under the occupation of Russia. No matter what was written in the book, the title of the book creates prejudices and has an undeniable influence on reducing the political magnitude of the time. It could be claimed that the title of the book depicts a standpoint of Swietochowski on Azerbaijan of a specified period.

Sectarianism in Political Orientation

The most interesting and disturbing fact at the same time, which should be taken into consideration, is Swietochowski’s method of study of the Azerbaijani society where he insistently stressed on the sectarian diversity of the Azerbaijani society. In Swietochowski’s works, sectarianism is the main reason for the differences of the political orientations. The reasons justified are that the Shia Azerbaijanis were on the side of Persia, but the Sunnis felt that they belonged to the Ottoman State. He also argued that Shia Azerbaijanis voluntarily joined the Russian Empire against the Ottoman State and the Sunnis supported the Ottoman State during the Russo-Ottoman conflicts (Swietochowski, 1980, p. 1). This is clearly stated in another work:

The Shiite—Sunni split ran deep, and it found its reflection in Azerbaijani attitudes toward the nineteenth-century Russian wars. The Tsardom was able to make use of the Shites against Turkey not only in 1828 but also in 1853-1855 as well as against the anti-Russian resistance spreading from Dagestan. By contrast, the Sunnis showed signs of restiveness at the time of Russo-Ottoman conflicts, tending to give support - sometimes armed support - to the Dagestanis; finally, many of them demonstrated their disposition by joining the outflow of Muslim emigrants from Russia. (Swietochowski, 1985, p. 8)
However, Azerbaijanis, despite their madhabs, always felt sympathy for the Ottoman State. There is evidence in the memoirs of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, an Azerbaijani patriotic thinker, public figure, governmental official, and one of the founders of the ADR. He wrote in the book titled, “Sixty-Seven Years After” (edited by his son, Samet Ağaoğlu), that during the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman war, the Tsardom (Tsar residence) demanded guarantees from authority representatives of the Azerbaijanis, that the Muslims will not support the Ottoman State. Nobody dared to do this, except Ağaoğlu’s uncle, Mirza Muhammed, who promised them guarantees. Fellow countrymen asked him, “Why are you risking so much with taking this responsibility?” He answered: “If our people (people of Shusha, the city in Azerbaijan) will have enough determination and courage to resist against Russia I am always ready to sacrifice myself for that” (Балаев, 2018, p. 21). Considering that Mirza Muhammed was one of the influential Muslim Shias of the Shusha, the myth about the influence of the madhabs on the diverseness of political orientations of the Azerbaijani Muslims failed. Substantially, what was mentioned in Ağaoğlu’s reminiscence is a demonstration of the real face of Russian colonialism. Mirza Muhammed was convinced that people would not join the Ottoman State forces because of lack of determination and courage, and not because of differences in madhab. The lack of determination and courage was the result of the policy of the colonialism by the Tsar.

Sectarianism in Self-Determination

Moreover, Swietochowski divided Azerbaijani society into two main identification groups: Shia and Sunni. He argued that Shia people identified themselves with the Persian perspective, while the Sunnis are with the Ottoman State perspective. While investigating the literary renaissance of Azerbaijan, he mentioned that:

As opposed to the case of the Shiites, there are no clergy in the Sunni branch of Islam. Also, the Sunnis were more receptive to the idea of a Turkic revival, given their cultural gravitation toward Turkey, even though it was weaker than that of the Shiites toward Persia. (Swietochowski, 1985, p. 27)
He then concludes by saying: “While the intelligentsia experienced an evolution that took it in quick succession from Pan-Islamism to Turkism to Azerbaijanism, the masses remained on the level of umma consciousness with its typical indifference to secular power, foreign or native” (Swietochowski, 1985, p. 193).

Thus, by saying that people remained to be under the ummah consciousness, it means that the theory of the separation of the society by identifying themselves with madhabs towards the Ottoman and Persia failed because the ideology of belonging to the ummah rejects this kind of identification.

However, it is the common trend in the works of Western scholars or the way of seeing Muslim society by the West, such as by dividing Muslim society into madhabs that are reflected in Swietochowski’s works. Despite that, the Russian Empire always tried to divide the Muslims of Transcaucasia into madhabs, conforming with the principle of “divide and rule”. The Pan-Islamic way of thinking was widely spread among people.

Sectarianism in Publishing

Furthermore, Swietochowski categorised publishers of the journals and newspapers of the early 20th century by their madhabs. He mentioned that, at the end of the 19th century, publishers of the journals and newspapers were Sunnis. He then mentioned that the newspaper, “Kaspi”, was sponsored by Haji Zaynalalbaddin Tagiyev (Swietochowski, 1991, p. 56). However, Haji Zaynalalbaddin Tagiyev, who was one of the famous millionaires in Azerbaijan, was a Shi’a Muslim. Therefore, the ownership of newspapers had no sectarian significance.

The Ottoman Language Issue

The literary language and its impact on the creation of national identity was one of the main paths of Swietochowski’s researches. He studied various newspapers and journals from the 19th-20th centuries. His classification of the newspapers, as mentioned above, were based on madhabs and the language differences. It is true that there were published newspapers and journals in Russian and Turki (Azerbaijani). However, Swietochowski’s points linked the activities of the newspapers in the
Turki language to the missionary activities operated by the Ottoman State. For example, he mentioned that the newspaper, “Füyüzat”, was published by Ali Bey Huseynzadeh, an Azerbaijani patriotic thinker and one of the founders of the ADR. He described the newspaper “Füyüzat” as the main project of the programme of “Ottomanisation” (Swietochowski, 1991, pp. 57-58). He did not mention the fact that, at that time, the Azerbaijani language which was called Turki was almost the same as the Ottoman language. However, the Russian Empire tried to show that they were different languages because the Tsardom was afraid of rapprochement of the people. This evidence is shown by an Azerbaijani scholar and the father of the satirical genre in Azerbaijani literature, Mirza Alakbar Sabir, in his reactions and attempts of translating the Ottoman language to Turki. In one of his poems, which was later published in the book titled, “Hophopname”, he wrote:

“Osmanlıcadan tərcümə Türkə” bunu bilməm
(I do not know (I do not recognise) the translation from Ottoman to Turki)

Gerçək yazıyor gəncəli yainki hənəktir
(Ganjali writes true or ridicules it)

Mümkün iki dil birbirinə tərcümə amma
(It is possible to translate two different languages into each other, but)

“Osmanlıcadan tərcümə Türkə” nə deməktir?!)
(What does it mean to “translate from Ottoman to Turki”?!)

4 (Sabir, 2004, p. 343)

Swietochowski also, in another work, mentioned that in the 1919’s programme of the Müsavat party (the party in power during the existence of the ADR), it stated that, the teaching of the “Ottoman dialect” was obligatory and the ADR was heavily dependent on the Ottoman State, in terms of imported teachers and the educational system (Swietochowski, 1991, pp. 59-61). All these factors were called “Ottomanisation” by Swietochowski. However, it should be considered as the help of the brotherly country to the newly established state. Moreover, there is a difference between language and dialect.

4 Translation by Elchin Huseynov.
Swietochowski’s Evaluation of the Ottoman State’s and the British Presence in Baku

In Swietochowski’s view, the politico-historical assessment of the military assistance of the Ottoman State to the ADR for the liberation of Baku from the Bolshevik-Dashnak militants in September 1918 is fascinating. Even though the Ottoman State soldiers were invited by the Interim National Council of the ADR to liberate Baku and stop the genocide of Muslims by the Armenians (Kazımzade, 2016, p. 11-13), Swietochowski, like most Western scholars, described this political event in his books and articles as an occupation. Generally, Swietochowski divided the history of the ADR into three main phases, where the first phase is the Ottoman State’s “occupation” (Swietochowski, 1980, pp. 20-21). However, the invitation in itself denies the notion of occupation.

Additionally, Swietochowski wrote that: “Unlike Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan was not recognised by the Istanbul government, and the brotherly occupiers regarded her as a territory to be joined to Turkey” (Swietochowski, 1980, pp. 20-21).

However, there was a signed agreement between the ADR and the Ottoman State in Batum, on 4th July 1918. In order to support the idea of the Ottoman State’s “occupation” of Baku, Swietochowski did not recognise the Batum agreement of 4th July 1918 as a recognition of the ADR by the Ottoman State. Nevertheless, the agreement was signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ADR, Mammad Hasan Hajinski, the Head of Interim National Council of the ADR, Mammad Emin Rasulzadeh, and the Minister of Justice of the Ottoman State, Khalil Menteshe. This agreement was the first international agreement which was signed by the ADR. It is enough to look at articles of the agreement to prove that this agreement was a recognition of the ADR independence by the Ottoman State. The agreement says that the ADR and Ottoman State will build peaceful, friendly, and good neighbourly relations. Also, coordinates of the borders between the two countries were given. The most important article here for the ADR was the 4th Article which stated that, in case of the need of military help, the Ottoman State can undertake the task of sending military assistance to the ADR. Furthermore, the agreement was mentioned about preparing a legal base for the opening of diplomatic missions (Hasanli, 2009, pp.
Based on this agreement, the ADR requested help from the Ottoman State for liberation of its capital city.

At the same time, Swietochowski described the British occupation of Baku as a rescuing it from the Ottoman State. After World War I, the Ottoman State had to withdraw military troops from the Caucasus as well as from the ADR. Instead of the Ottoman State’s forces, the Allied countries sent British General, General Thomson, to Baku as a representative. Swietochowski also called this an “occupation” but described it differently. He described General Thomson’s residence period in Baku as a development of the governmental institutions on the liberal-democratic line. Additionally, Swietochowski referred to reports regarding the decision of withdrawal of the British forces in 1919, where Thomson reported that the decision caused fear among the local people and they called this act an “act of perfidy” (Swietochowski, 1980, pp. 23-25).

It is interesting that Swietochowski also mentioned that the Azerbaijani people loved and believed in the Ottoman State’s forces and mentioned how the people greeted the Army of Islam on the roads (Swietochowski, 1985, p. 131).

The standpoints stated above evoke interest, especially in the description of the stay of the Ottoman State’s and the British Empire’s troops in Baku. Swietochowski’s arguments show the Ottoman State as an occupier of Transcaucasia and in the opposite, the Allied countries, i.e. Great Britain, as a rescuer and defender. It can be claimed that the points stated above are preconceived.

Moreover, Swietochowski’s conclusion regarding the reasons for the fall of the ADR is debatable. He stated that the surrender of the authority by socialists was so easy because people did not understand the notion of a nation-state. He wrote:

> The idea of an Azerbaijani nation-state did not take root among the majority of the population; the very term nationalism was either not understood by them or, worse, it rang with the sound of a term of abuse, a fact the Communists exploited in their propaganda against the Azerbaijani Republic. This might help explain why the overthrow of the republic was amazingly easy. (Swietochowski, 1985, p. 193)
His line of arguments tend to show that there was a big gap between the people and the leaders, and it is because of that that people did not fight against the Bolsheviks (Swietochowski, 1985, p. 193). However, the real reason for the fall of the ADR was the military intervention of Soviet Russia (Göyüşov, 1997, p. 123). The leaders of the ADR understood reality and could not just let people die in an unfair war without any assistance. The British occupation also had its impact on this. The presence of the British military troops prevented the building of a healthy defence system. That is why the leaders of the ADR allowed the power shift in the ADR to the local socialists. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks found social support in Azerbaijan, represented by local socialists and Armenians.

Conclusion

If you belong to the Orient, you are subjected to Said’s concept of “Orientalism”, thus being misrepresented. While a few international scholars have investigated the ADR’s history, the existing literature is essential to understand how the West sees and evaluates the ADR and its activities. There is no doubt that at the time when Swietochowski did his researches about Azerbaijani history, there was a lack of primary sources and archival documents due to Soviet confidentiality. Most of the secondary sources which were used by Swietochowski were written in the first half of the 20th century after Sovietisation. As we now know, “Sovietisation” means changing the history of the nations in order to set up a new identity – Soviet citizenship. Therefore, the reliability of the sources is disputable.

There are some conclusions of the analysis above. It started from the book title issue to the assessment of the fall of the ADR. Swietochowski’s method of investigation of the society, insistent separation of locals into madhabs, and putting this classification to the base of the social structure could be concluded as “Orientalist” points. Furthermore, Swietochowski’s points analysed above showed jaundice on the Ottoman State and the ADR; the points, such as calling the liberation of Baku by the Army of Islam as an occupation, and blaming the Ottoman State in missionary activities by calling it “Ottomanisation”.

This research suggests that while studying this field, owned especially by Swietochowski, the newly discovered primary sources and the written secondary sources after the USSR dissolution should be taken into account. Swietochowski’s works have an undeniable significance related to the history of Azerbaijan. However, new researches are needed to make objective outcomes without misrepresentation of reality.

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Books and Articles


The Role of Muslim Scholars in Kwara Politics up to the Fourth Republic

Ibrahim Abdul Ganiyu Jawondo

Abstract: Man is both a religious and political animal. Borne out of an in-depth thinking and observation of things in his environment, man came to the understanding, perhaps, through intuition, about the existence of a supernatural being who controls things that are beyond human comprehension. Thus, he fashioned out ways of worshiping Him. Man’s thought was later confirmed through revealed books which refined man’s ways of worship. As man increased in number and lived communally, there was the need to control human behaviour. Thus, the art of governance evolved. Both religion (traditional) and politics are the products of man’s physical and social environments. The two, right from the outset, have continued to influence each other. In matters of religion, politics is brought to bear and vice-versa. Scholars of religious history are varied in opinion as to the relationship between religion and politics. While some believe they are inseparable, there are some who believe that their marriage is that of inconvenience and therefore, they should be separated. In spite of all this, the two concepts complement each other in all human societies. In Islam, there is no distinction between religion and politics or all other aspects of life. In fact, Islam has been described as a complete way of life. This paper examines the influence of religion on the political activities championed by the Ulama class (Islamic scholars) of and in Ilorin, the Kwara State capital. This paper avers that religion and politics are twin sisters that should not be separated. Furthermore, it concludes that Ilorin’s Islamic scholars played significant roles in the establishment, nurturing, and sustenance of democracy in Kwara State in the Fourth Republic.

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Introduction

Ilorin, the capital of Kwara State, upon which this research is focused on, is a settlement on which many researches had been done, and yet, it is still begging for more ink because of its complexities and progressive development in all ramifications. Researchers have established that the name “Ilorin”, given to an important city which has turned into the capital of Kwara State in this modern time, was a derivative of either Ilu-Erin (abode of elephants), Ilo-Irin (a place where iron implements were sharpened), Ilu-Irin (deposit of iron), or Ironi (city of alligator pepper) depending on the opinion of either a researcher or a discussant. Ilorin, up to 1800, referred to a fraction of the present municipal, but by 1823, with the establishment of the Emirate system, the system became added to the name as was the case in other emirates to become Ilorin Emirate. The emirate system made the name elastic as it then spread far and wide through the efforts of Muslim soldiers, scholars, and merchants who were agents of Islam and representatives of the emirate authority. Until 1823, Ilorin comprised of different hamlets with decentralised authorities but with mutual relationship. Since 1823, it became a conglomerate under the banner of Islam and with Sharia as the system of governance. With the Sharia in place, the ‘ulama, constituted the legislative class that advised the Emir on matters of the Sharia. The status of Ilorin evolved from being the seat of the emirate to being the province capital and currently, the capital of the Kwara state of Nigeria. As a capital city, all activities start there and radiate to the suburb. As the epicentre of Islamic learning, the activities of scholars often begin in the city and their effects spread over to the other local governments and beyond. Thus, using the five local governments in the emirate as a focus readily represent the rest of the local government areas, and using the Muslim scholars of Ilorin and in Ilorin also represent the other Muslim scholars in the suburb.

Generally, religion is regarded as a body of truths, laws, and rites by which man is subordinated to the transcendent being, owing to his intuition of the sacred, ultimate reality, and his expression of that awareness (Adeniyi, 1993). In Nigeria, there are three major religions: African Traditional Religion (ATR), Islam, and Christianity. The focus
of this paper is on the Muslim scholars and their political activities. Thus, Islam, the backbone of their activities, needs to be examined in brevity. Islam is regarded as a religion of peace and a way of life. More specifically, it is a means of complying with divine ordinances which are demonstrated by approaching and worshipping God in order to escape His wrath and earn His favour (Ilega, 2001). Adherents of monotheistic religions of the world count on God for safety of their lives and property, security of territories, victory at wars, and peaceful co-existence in the society (Ilega, 2001).

On the other hand, politics has to do with seeking and exercising of power (Tansey, 1995). In Nigeria, political power is sought through two major means; peaceful (civil rule) and forceful (colonialism and military). The concern in this paper is the peaceful means which is the civil rule, particularly the Fourth Republic which began in 1999.

Exploring the Nexus between Religion and Politics

Man, according to political scientists, is a political animal which distinguishes him from other lower level animals. At the same time, man, according to the sacred books, is the vicegerent of God on Earth, which places on him the management of God’s order and resources (human and material). Thus, man on Earth is both political and spiritual or vice-versa. Consequently, since man handles both the spiritual and political fronts, it will be hard to separate the two concepts; politics and religion. This is in contradistinction of a cross section of man’s call for the separation of the two because of the belief that politics is dirty and evil, while religion is good and godly (Akama, 2001). In Nigeria, the debate on the separation of religion from politics has been on for a while but in practice, the affiliation between the two gets stronger on daily basis. Thus, religion is not only taken into politics but also there is politics in religion (Kukah, 1993).

At this juncture, it is important to stress that the attributes of God from all the monotheistic religions show that God is the custodian of both religion and politics which He institutionalised in human society (Quran 16: 90). There is no authority or power, except from God. He gives it to whoever He pleases; hence, all authorities on Earth have been instituted by God (Dopamu, 1987). Leaders are therefore accountable not only to
men but also to God. Their subjects obliged them more importantly for reasons of religion, which compel them to obey constituted authority (Davidson, 1965).

Consequently, if these are the features of religion and publics, then they need not be separated. In fact, politics could be regarded as a convenient vehicle for achieving all of the goals of religion and vice-versa. In addition, moral values, which is the bedrock of religion, often appeals to the conscience of the politicians to arrive at more rational decisions that are capable of promoting national survival (Adeniyi, 2001).

Islam transcends the borders of being a mere religion. Rather, it is a complete way of life (Abdul, 1973; Quran 4: 22, 65: 7, 2: 168). Thus, politics, which is just an aspect of human endeavour, is not left out. The Prophet of Islam was all-in-all to the Muslims, as were the companions during their lifetimes. They were religious and political leaders of the Muslim State and commanders-in-chief to the Muslim soldiers (Khan, 1990). Thus, in Islam, emphasis is placed on purposeful and honest leadership as a means of attaining peace in the society (Quran 16: 90, 4: 58).

In Nigeria, Muslim scholars have been noted for playing leadership roles. For instance, in Borno, the ‘ulama played a significant role in the establishment, stability, and longevity of the empire. The ‘ulama served in various capacities, such as imams, qadis, wazirs, treasurers, scribes, chief of police, diplomats, and charm makers as early as in the reign of Mai Selemna (C. 1194-1221) and under the successive administration in Borno (Balogun, 1984; Omolewa, 1986).

In Hausaland, starting from Kano to Katsina and other parts like Nupeland, rulers and ‘ulama patronised one another for good government and sustainable administration. In Yorubaland, particularly in Southwestern Nigeria, the activities of scholars in administration are well noted. According to records, during the late 18th and the early 19th centuries, rulers in the Nigerian region eagerly sought to obtain assistance of one scholar or another “in establishing long distance trade, strengthening relations with Muslim states of North-Africa, writing dispatches and orders for summoning military aid, for the issuing of administrative directives to provincial governors, for disseminating propaganda, for recording history” (Clarke, 1982).
The Antecedents of Muslim Scholars in Ilorin Politics

The Islamic scholars in Ilorin have a long standing tradition of political participation and state governance. The earliest scholars, such as Shaikh Solagberu and Shaikh Alimi were powers to reckon with before and after the formation of the Emirate system in 1823. These personalities who were leaders of their independent communities in Ilorin had served as diviners and advisers to Afonja in his bid to establish an empire of his own in Ilorin (Johnson, 1973).

Scholars in Ilorin, since the establishment of the Emirate system in 1823, have been a prime factor in the politics of the Emirate. The scholars were the learned men who interpreted the Sharia. They were indispensable in the affairs of the Emirate and could be categorised into three – the councilors or royal advisers, the diviners, and the theologians. The categorisation is conjectural because no strict boundary was maintained. Anyone could perform any role at any given time and opportunity. Strictly speaking, the advisory scholars were the three principal Imams of Ilorin – Fulani, Imale, and Gambari – who co-opted renowned scholars of their choice when the occasion demanded. The Emir issued orders after due consultation with the advisory scholars. In 1889, the Chief Imam of Ilorin, on the order of Emir Aliyu, prepared a treaty between the Emir and Macdonald, the agent of the Royal Niger Company (RNC) (Danmole, 1980). The scholars’ leadership role in the performance of religious rites endeared them to the masses. Hence, they became an important intermediary class between the Emirate authorities and the masses.

From 1895 onwards, there was a drastic British encroachment on Ilorin. The people looked up to the scholars for advice on their survival and the Emirate system. The scholars, through their preaching and open antagonism to the British, mobilised the masses against the British. The scholars then provided a strong base for the defence of the Emirate against the British colonisers who were regarded as infidels. Although the Emirate was eventually conquered in 1897, the scholars persisted in their antagonistic attitude to the British authority in Ilorin.

With the establishment of the British colonial administration in Ilorin, the Emirate became a state within a state because the Emir who was the overall head in the Emirate was then subjected to the British rule. The adoption of the indirect rule system put the Emir at the helm
of affairs in the Emirate, and therefore, the scholars retained their advisory positions to the Emir. However, as a result of the series of political delimitation of the Emirate, which started in 1906, there was a gradual reduction in the size of the Emirate to its present size, which encompasses Ilorin West, East, South, Moro, and Asa local government areas of Kwara State. This, of course, affected the influence of the Emir and the scholars respectively (Jawondo, 2003).

However, unrelented efforts of the scholars at preaching and teaching in various districts of the Emirate and migration of Muslims from other neighbouring towns to the districts for religious, social, and economic activities, increased the population of the Muslims (Danmole, 1980). This increased the relevance of the scholars in the Emirate. In effect, the scholars became the sustainers of the political authority of the Emir. With democratisation, which began in 1951, the scholars became more politically relevant. Apart from having control over the dominant Muslims, they were also believed to have possessed spiritual powers to assist political office seekers to attain their objectives. Thus, political associates, leaders, and office seekers patronised the scholars for prayers, to enable them win elections and secure positions.

Furthermore, there was the general belief that the Emirate scholars were the brains behind the traumatic death of the Ilorin Talaka Parapo group. The group, which was formed in 1954, challenged what they described as misuse of power by the traditional elite of the Native Authority (Dudley, 1968). The group aligned with the Action Group Party of Nigeria and won elections in 1956 and 1957 in the Ilorin Emirate (Bello, 1986). However, because of its strong alliance with the Action Group and support for the proposal to merge Ilorin with the West, the scholars were opposed to the party. They saw the move as a threat to the existence of Islam, which the Emirate represented. The scholars, therefore, preached and prayed against the move. By 1958, crisis had engulfed the Talaka Parapo group and, by 1959, it could no longer make an impact on the political activities of the Emirate. The Talaka Parapo was disorganised and this was attributed to the spiritual powers of the scholars. The development popularised and increased the relevance of the scholars in the realm of politics. Since the First Republic up to date, the political influence of Muslim scholars in the Ilorin Emirate politics has been on the increase. Successive governments in Kwara State reached out to them for one assistance or the other.
Muslim Scholars and Kwara Politics in the Fourth Republic

Islamic scholars in the Ilorin Emirate played significant roles in the emergence of the Fourth Republic. Their position, as spiritual leaders in the Emirate, gave them this advantage. The Emirate population, which is essentially Muslim, has a lot of respect for the scholars as spiritual leaders.

The scholars attained this great influence and power in the society because, apart from being recognised as spiritual leaders, they have been demonstrating administrative ingenuity in the Emirate. The advisory scholars instituted the Council of Scholars, which comprised of all the renowned scholars in the Emirate. By the close of the 20th century, the scholars had organised themselves in such a way that they were interconnected with one another and consulted each other through well designated fora. The three imams, Fulani, Imale, and Gambari have a number of coordinators in their wards that were chosen from the ratibi imams in their quarters.

These coordinators were the eyes and ears of the imams at the ward level. Moreover, the ratibi imams constituted the intermediaries between members of the wards and the three Imams. This system, apart from building an aura of respect and royalty around the principal imams, also empowered the quarters’ coordinators as it enabled them to have full control over their areas. The principal imams held meetings with the coordinators at interval. This arrangement spread the popularity and influence of the principal imams down to the grassroots. It, therefore, enhanced their political value. Top politicians and political office seekers lobbied them for political support.

Having known how Muslim scholars in Ilorin were launched into the political scene, it is important to examine the strategies employed by them to mobilise political support for politicians during the Fourth Republic. As the European missionaries prepared Africans psychologically for colonialism in the 19th century, the Ilorin scholars prepared the masses for the Fourth Republic. The scholars did this through persistent heart-piercing sermons in the media, at Islamic and social functions, Jum’ah and Eid prayers, as well as designated preaching centres.

The scholars, most of whom were professional preachers, attracted large audience at their preaching centres on ordinary days. During the
Ramadan, the audience usually multiplied. At the formative stage of the Fourth Republic, the scholars appealed to Muslims to participate effectively in the political activities to enable them to have a say in the political decisions and have worthy representatives in the government that would be formed. They justified their arguments with the Quran, hadith, and personal deeds and experiences of the companions. The call by the Muslim scholars influenced the participation of the Muslims in such a way that politics became well-discussed at various occasions and even in the mosques. This popularised political activities in the nooks and crannies of the Emirate.

The political office-seekers and party stalwarts attended open-air sermons and lavished money on the scholars to earn their favour and those of their staunch admirers. This enhanced the chances of the existing political parties – Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) (APP), All Peoples Party (APP) now called All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), and Alliance for Democracy (AD) and their flag-bearers to win active supports for their success at the polls. The scholars and the Emirate Muslims also capitalised on the advantage of the closeness of the politicians and office seekers to them, and their sermons, to seek financial assistance to renovate old or build new mosques, the Qur’anic schools, or purchase materials for use in the mosques and schools. The parties’ response to these demands usually determined who won at the polls. Those that responded to the financial needs of the scholars either as a group or as individuals usually benefited from the spiritual powers of the scholars. It could be inferred that the presence of money bags in the APP who paid the desired tribute to the scholars in Ilorin were responsible for their success at the 1999 polls in Kwara State.

Consequently, upon swearing in the elected officers, prayers were offered by scholars at various mosques and at any given opportunity for the success of the leaders. The scholars then changed the theme of their preaching from active political participation to good governance. They preached absolute honesty and transparency to the leaders in the discharge of their duties and responsibilities to the electorates. On the other hand, the people were advised to be obedient to constituted authorities. Ustaz Abdul Rasak Aduagba, admonishing the political leaders, made them understand that whatever a leader does on the position of authority, only time shall tell, as he said that, “all of you (who) are leaders (the elected and the electorate) and you shall be made
to account for your stewardship before the community and Allah” (Aduagba, 2001).

The scholars assisted the government in disseminating information about government programmes and policies to the populace. Such programmes like the prevention of HIV/AIDS, environmental sanitation, proper sewage disposal, family planning, family support, and child abuse awareness were well discussed from the Islamic point of view. They offered prayers at various Jum’ah mosques for both a successful tenure and the survival of the nation on occasions, such as Independence Day, May Day, and Armed Force Remembrance Week. At the annual Hijrah celebrations, prayers were usually offered for the government.

Consequently, in order to sustain and improve the rapport between the scholars and the government, the government reciprocated the gestures of the scholars through different means. Indeed, some scholars were given cars, Hajj tickets, contracts, cows, rams, and a host of other things during the Islamic festivals (Aminullah, 2001). However, barely after two years, disagreements occurred within the All Progressives’ Party, which was the ruling party in the state. It started between the Governor, the late Alhaji Mohammed Lawal and his political godfather, the late Abubakar Olusola Saraki. It is difficult for one to establish the cause of the rancour but oral sources believe that the issue of the second term in the office had strained their relationship (Lawal, 2001). Thus, it is no wonder that the late Shaikh Kamaludeen Al-Adabiyy admonished them so that the two camps should be aware that power belongs to Allah and He gives it to whoever He likes (Kamal, 2002).

As a result, the party became factionalised into Lawal’s and Saraki’s groups. According to oral sources, vindictive steps were taken by the government against the loyalists of Saraki, who held positions in the government, and they were subsequently removed from office (Abdul Rahman, 2002). Some of the affected officers were the late Barrister Kayode Elensina and Alhaja Nimota Ibrahim, who were commissioners for education and women’s affairs, respectively (Elesinla, 2001). Political thugs were recruited and armed to oppress and attack supporters of each group. This led to the loss of lives and property. Given this lawless situation, the scholars, through their preachings, called for order, peace, and harmony among the leaders and the society at large. They reminded
them that God is not at peace with those whose brothers’ lives and property are not safe from their atrocities, and that life is sacred and should not be taken unjustly (Aduagba, 2001).

Furthermore, a series of arbitration groups, such as those by the late Shaikh Kamaludeen, the late Justice Saidu Kawu, and the late Justice Mustapha Akanbi led committees which were formed to settle the rancour between the two parties. Unfortunately, the committees could not achieve peace. The crisis deepened as it attained an ethnic dimension: Yoruba, particularly the Aare family, versus the royal Fulani.

Oral sources reveal that some of the scholars who had remained antagonistic to lawlessness became tribalised. Such scholars were said to have openly supported the government because they believed in the Yoruba cause. However, it is important to stress here that the issue of tribalism was not important in the political crisis of the Fourth Republic in Kwara State. Rather, personality clashes and egoism were much more responsible. The scholars and people supporting the government were not necessarily from the Yoruba stock. Rather, they cut across the different sections of Ilorin and Kwara State at large.

In fact, some scholars were on the side of the late Lawal who led the government, while some were on the side of the opposition group led by the late Saraki within the same party. It is important to stress that rather than the use of the tribal factor to describe the attitude of those scholars, the financial and other types of benefits from either of the groups informed their actions. The political thugs took advantage of arms in their possession to rob and kill people at will. Innocent individuals were attacked, injured, or killed (Punch, 2001). This made the police declare curfew in Ilorin, the state’s capital. The curfew, which was between six am to six pm, affected the religious obligations of the Muslims. Many Muslims could not go to mosques to perform the dawn and dusk prayers. This incident agitated the minds of the scholars and rather than appealing to the warring parties for peace, they appealed to God to bring peace to Ilorin at whatever cost. A series of prayers and sacrifices were offered to God individually and collectively, covertly and overtly, and within and the outskirts of the town to bring about peace in Ilorin.

These prayers were generally believed to have brought about a change to the late Lawal-led government, which was believed to
be tyrannical and vindictive. The attitudes of some scholars after the elections confirmed this assertion. With the announcement of the election results, the thematic concern of the scholars changed from appeal to God for bringing peace to thanksgiving for the peace being ushered in. This, therefore, alludes to the assertion that the exit of the leadership of Alhaji Muhammed Lawal was the handiwork of the scholars because he was either rightly or wrongly judged to be oppressive and tyrannical, not only to co-politicians but also to some Muslim scholars. He was accused of planning to dethrone the Emir, the symbol of the emirate. The masses, who were not the cause of the problem, bore the brunt of the conflict. On 7th August 2003, a special prayer was organised and offered to Allah at Ilorin during Eid at the praying ground by the Ilorin Emirate scholars to appreciate the return of peace to Ilorin. Prayer was also said for the new Governor, Abubakar Bukola Saraki, and members of his cabinet.

Furthermore, congratulatory messages to the incumbent Governor, Bukola Saraki, by the public were characterised by statements showing that the past regime was believed to be oppressive and was brought to a halt by the scholars. For instance, most of the congratulatory messages included individuals whom the public believed were oppressed and persecuted by the last administration, and more importantly, prominent Islamic scholars for their spiritual efforts to bring Kwara State back to its former glory as the home of peace.

It is important to stress here that most of the scholars got involved in the political scene in their efforts to ensure peaceful atmosphere rather than for material gains. This is not to say that there were no scholars who were observed to be partisan. In fact, there were some scholars who enriched themselves and their reputation as scholars suffered for it.

In Nigeria, since 1999, when the Fourth Republic was established to date, there have been five phases: 1999 – 2003, 2003 – 2007, 2007 – 2011, 2011 – 2015, and 2015 – 2019. In Kwara State, the first phase government which was that of the APP, was led by the late Rear Admiral Alhaji Muhammed Alabi Alao Lawal. The second and third phases were led by Governor Bukola Saraki (the Senate President to Nigeria’s 8th Assembly) under the PDP, and the fourth and fifth phases were led by Governor Alhaji Abdulfatai Ahmed under PDP in the first tenure, and later, the APC in the first three years of the second tenure, and again
back to PDP. In each phase, the Muslim scholars played a constant role of preparing the minds of the electorate for election by urging them to take an active role devoid of rancour. When the government was formed, they admonished leaders to rule with the fear of Allah to whom they are accountable. At the same time, the masses were urged to obey their leaders. While all politicians patronised the scholars to garner support to win elections, the government often extended the dividend of democracy to some members of the scholars’ leadership. Prominent scholars who were known for their political comments on radio, television, and public sermons during these periods include Alfa Sanu Shehu, Alfa Adugba, Alfa Bukhari Musa, Abubakar Imam Aliagan, Aminullahi Olohunoyin, Alhaji Ibrahim Abdullah, Alhaji Olayiwola, Alfa Lukman Isale Koto, Alfa Olaoti and his group, Husein Arikewusola, Alfa Imam Mahmud Adewole, and several imams of Juma’ah mosques among others. Thus, it is important to stress here that in Kwara State today, the ‘ulama play an active role in ensuring the survival of democracy. Consequently, the question of separating religion from politics is largely of less importance among the ‘ulama.

Conclusion

This paper surveyed the role played by Muslim scholars in Ilorin, Kwara State’s capital since the emergence of the Fourth Republic in 1999. The paper has established the fact that Muslim scholars in general and of Ilorin and Kwara State in particular, have had a long-standing opportunity of participating in decision making for their specialised knowledge. Based on the legacies, the current ‘ulama class in Ilorin got themselves involved in democratic governance with a view to sustaining democracy in the state. They participated through their sermons, prayers, and even open support to candidates of their choice in pre-election, election, and post-election activities. The fact that the ‘ulama are held in high esteem gives them influence over the Emirate Muslims in particular, and Kwara’s Muslims in general. The politicians of the Fourth Republic exploited this influence by lobbying them to mobilise the masses to support them. This brought about a symbiotic relationship between the two parties. While the scholars mobilised support for the politicians, the government catered for the welfare of the participating scholars in cash and the kind. However, it should be
said that the relationship between the two parties could get strained as a result of misrule, and loss of lives and property that characterised the tail end of the late Governor Lawal’s government in 2003, and Bukola Saraki’s and Governor Abdulfatah Ahmed’s government in Kwara State in 2018-2019.

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Malay Navigation and Maritime Trade: A Journey Through Anthropology and History

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Abstract: This paper attempts to explore the history of the Malay navigation and maritime trade which started during the third century. The goal of this paper is to identify the significant yet relatively not widely-known contribution of the Malays during ancient times in the history of navigation and maritime trade. This research is very important because it provides an insight into the trading mechanisms, ship construction, and maritime navigational skills of the Malays, which have been documented in ancient Chinese literary works. This paper focuses on the Malays, Malay navigation, and Malay maritime trade in ancient times. The method used for this research is secondary analysis of existing historical and anthropological data and sources. This study discovered that the Malays during ancient times possessed sophisticated navigational skills, were skilled at constructing large ships, and travelled and traded with countries as far away as the Middle East and Africa.

Keywords: Navigation, Maritime, Malay/Melayu, Malacca, Srivijaya, China, India.

Introduction

The Malays are made up of a huge racial group originally based in Sundaland (Benua Sunda), now normally referred to as the Malay Archipelago or Southeast Asia (Oppenheimer, 1998; Santos, 2005). Since the last Ice Age, they have been widely scattered within the Malayo-Polynesian World – to the north as far up as Taiwan, to the south until New Zealand, to the east until Easter Island, and to the west until Madagascar. Their socio-cultural activities and achievements,
especially the core Malays in the Archipelago, have long been known and of interest to the outside world, though not much within the community itself.

Thematically, this paper will concentrate on Malay navigation and maritime trade as reflected in their socio-economic history and anthropological profiles. In the following discussion, the term “Malays/ Melayu” refers mainly to the core group in the Malay Archipelago, but in certain cases includes those within the rest of the Malayo-Polynesian World.

The Malays

Historically, the Malays and their lands were known worldwide at least since the second century. The Greco-Egyptian scholar, Ptolemy (90-168 C.E.), for example, in his book Geographia (152 C.E.) referred to them as Μαλεου Κώλον (“Maleu-Kolon”). Specifically, the term refers to the western part of the Golden Chersonese, i.e. the Malay Peninsula. The name “Kunlun” has also been noted down in Nanchouiwuchih (南州異物志) by Wan Zhen (万震), a well-known Chinese historian of the third century (Wang, 1968, pp. 60-64). In both accounts, the Malays were highlighted for their navigational skills and trading abilities.

In terms of nation-building and foreign relations, by 535 B.C.E., there was Kedah Tua towards the north-western side of the Peninsula. The state was already engaged in export-oriented iron smelting activities. In the seventh century, there was a kingdom known by the name of Melayu near Jambi, in Sumatera. It was later incorporated into a bigger kingdom (then empire) called Srivijaya, based at nearby Palembang. Though based in Sumatera, the empire had tremendous influence on other islands in the Archipelago as well as on Champa and Funan, in what is now Indo-China. In Java, for example, its king, Dharanindra, built the famous Borobudur in 770 C.E.; King Samaratungga completed it in 825 C.E.

Srivijaya remained in power until the 14th century with a lasting unifying effect on the Malay Archipelago and part of Indo-China. Numerous groups in the region, including Champa, recognised their shared identity and referred to themselves as Melayu (Malays), with their homelands called tanah Melayu (Malay lands). In the Archipelago,
this includes Jambi, Palembang, Minangkabau, Siak, Kampar, Rokan, Pane, Kampe, Aru, Mandaileng, Tumiang, Perlak, Samudra, Lamuri/Aceh, and Barus in Sumatera, as well as Langkasuka, Kedah, Kelantan, Pahang, etc. in the Malay Peninsula (Andaya, 2001, p. 32).

Figure 4.1. Map of the Srivijaya Empire between the 10th and 11th centuries (“Srivijaya Empire”, n.d.)

Srivijaya had a long history of mercantile, cultural, and religious ties with India, China, and the Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East. Around 860 C.E., for example, Sri Maharaja Balaputra built a monastery at Nalanda University, in Bihar, India. In 1006 C.E., Sri Vijaya Maravijayattungavarman constructed Chudamani Vihara in Nagapatinnam, Tamil Nadu. In fact, long before that, Srivijaya had been the stopping point for Chinese Buddhist pilgrims on their way to India. In 671 C.E., for example, a Tang Dynasty monk, I-Tsing, travelling in a Persian ship, stopped by Srivijaya and its vassal state, Kedah Tua, on his way to study Buddhism in Nalanda. In Srivijaya, he studied Sanskrit, Malay, and Buddhism for six months, before proceeding to India on a large ship belonging to the Raja of Srivijaya. Later, I-Tsing returned to Srivijaya and stayed from 689 C.E. to 695 C.E., studying and translating books on various aspects of Buddhism (I-Tsing, Muller, & Takakusu, 2006).

Like the third century Wan Zhen, I-Tsing referred to the Malays as “Kunlun”. Regarding their appearance, he noted that, “Kunlun people have curly hair, dark bodies, bare feet and they wear sarongs”. This description fits the famous 526-539 C.E. sketch of a Langkasuka Malay
diplomat to Liang Dynasty China shown below. Like I-Tsing, the Tang Dynasty Chinese were, in general, familiar with the Malay language and referred to it as Kunlun-yu.

![A Chinese painting of a Langkasuka diplomat (“Portraits of Periodical Offering of Liang”, n.d.)](image)

The Malay language has numerous branches and variants. Among them is the Ma’anyan language which was spread from the Malay Archipelago to faraway Madagascar by waves of incredible maritime migrations. One of the migrations specifically took place approximately 1200 years during the period of Srivijaya from the present region of Kalimantan in Indonesia in the ninth century, around 830 C.E. (Murray et al., 2012). In Madagascar, the Malays became the ancestors of the Malagasy people, with their well-known Merina Kingdom. Meanwhile, Ma’anyan developed into what is now referred to as the Malagasy language, which is still widely spoken in Madagascar (Otto, 1991).

Meanwhile, Islam came to the Archipelago as early as 674 C.E., with the establishment of a Muslim settlement in Sumatera headed by an Arab. However, intensive Islamic da ‘wah was started only in the early 12th century, by various faqirs and shaykhs. Thus, Hindu-Buddhism was slowly replaced by Islam. Local documents indicate that the first Malay states to accept Islam were Samudra and Perlak in Sumatera. The states were later merged as Pasai which ultimately became the first centre of Islamic learning in the Malay Archipelago.

The process of Islamisation was stepped up during the Sultanate of Malacca in the 15th century. Malacca soon replaced Sriwijaya which ceased to exist in the 14th century. Its entrepôt was, for a long time, a thriving trading centre, a meeting point between merchants from China,
India, Arabia, Persia, and even Europe. Along with the traders also came Islamic preachers. Thus, from Malacca, Islam and the Malay language (with the Jawi script) were quickly spread to the four corners of the Archipelago. Later, both Islam and the Malay language would become important indicators of Malay identity within the Malay Archipelago and parts of Indo-China, especially Champa.

Unfortunately, in 1511, Malacca was attacked, captured, and colonised by the Portuguese. It was later taken over by the Dutch, and finally colonised by the British until Malaya’s (later Malaysia) independence in 1957. At the time of the Portuguese attack, Malacca was still a bubbling international commercial centre, a Venice of the East, with merchants coming from all over the world.

![Figure 4.3. The Malacca Straits trade route between 1400-1511](Image retrieved from Shu, 2017)

**Malay Navigation**

To discuss Malay navigation in the past, it is important to note that it was closely related to international maritime commerce going back at least to the third century B.C.E. During this time, there was already a network of maritime trade routes stretching all the way from Western Europe to East Asia and down the east coast of Africa. Within this very early and vast network, Malay traders and navigators were already very much in action. In discussing Chinese maritime commerce and shipping during the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E. to 221 B.C.), Hill (2004), for example, points out that:
Roman and Arab ships dominated the Egypt to India trade, but most of the trade between India and China was carried by Malay, Indonesian and Indian ships. It seems it was only later that Chinese ships regularly travelled to India. It was rare, however, for Chinese or Roman citizens to make the complete round trip journey between China and Egypt.

Hill (2004) goes on to say that, “Some of these ships were very large for their day and are said to have carried up to a thousand passengers and cargoes of over a thousand tonnes.” This is in line with the observation made by a third century Chinese historian, Wan Zhen. According to the historian, the Kunlun were great ship builders, sailors, and traders. They built and sailed large vessels known as “Kunlun-po” (Malay ship), measuring 200 feet long, 20 feet high above water, with four sails, cargos of 900 tons, and 600-700 people (Wang, 1968).

Indeed, the Malays were among the first people to be involved in giant-size shipbuilding, advanced navigation, and long-distance maritime trade. According to Shaffer (1996, p. 12), by at least the third century B.C.E, the Chinese had witnessed Malay sailors and traders approaching their shores in huge ocean-going vessels (Kunlun-po, colandiophonta) from the so-called Kunlun islands in the southern seas. They were also aware of the fact that the islanders were exceptional navigators. As sailors, they were not technically equipped with compasses, maps, or charts. Rather, they sailed and journeyed across oceans only with the aid of “celestial navigation”. As Shaffer puts it, quoting from Taylor (1976):
The Malay sailors were highly skilled navigators, sailing over the oceans for thousands of miles without a compass or written chart. They navigated by the winds and the stars, by the shape and colour of the clouds, by the colour of the water, and by swell and wave patterns on the ocean’s surface. They could locate an island when they were still like 30 miles from its shores by analysing the behavior of various birds, the animal and the plant life in the water, and the patterns of swell and waves (Shaffer, 1996, pp. 11-12).

The Chinese at that time were also aware of the fact that the Malays were skilled and innovative builders of the large ocean-going vessels. In fact, they learnt a lot about shipbuilding technology from the latter. Again, as Shaffer puts it, quoting from Johnstone (1980):

The Chinese also knew these islanders as builders and as the crews of ocean-going vessels engaged in long-distance overseas trade. The Chinese, in fact, appear to have learnt much from these sailors. The Malays independently invented a sail, made from woven mats reinforced with bamboo, at least several hundred years B.C.E., and by the time of the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E. to 221 B.C.) the Chinese were using such sails (Shaffer, 1996, pp. 11-12).

Third century C.E. Chinese descriptions of the foreign vessels indicate that they were of the type called jong by the Malays, a local term later adopted by European languages as junk. A typical jong is a large vessel with multi-layered hulls. Quoting from Manguin (1980), Shaffer (1996) explained:

On average, the jong could carry four to five hundred metric tons, but at least one was large enough to carry a thousand tons. The planks of the ships were joined with dowels; no metal was used in their construction. On some of the smaller vessels, parts might be lashed together with vegetable fibres, but this was not typical of larger ships. The jong usually had from two to four masts plus a bowsprit, as well as two rudders mounted on its sides. Outrigger devices, designed to stabilise a vessel, were
used on many ships but probably were not characteristic of ships that sailed in rough oceans (p. 13).

Additionally, in the history of international navigation, Malay sailors were also the first to use the balance-lug sail for their jongs and ghalis (galleys). This has been recognised as an invention of global significance.

Balance-lugs are square sails set fore and aft and tilted down at the end. They can be pivoted sideways, which makes it possible to sail into the oncoming wind at an angle of to tack against the wind – to sail at an angle first one way and then the other, in a zigzag pattern, so as to go in the direction from which the wind is blowing. Because of the way the sides of the sail were tilted, from a distance it looked somewhat triangular (Shafie, 1996, p. 13).

The Malay square balance-lug is not only significant in that it could be used to sail into the oncoming wind. More than that, it has also given the inspiration to the triangular lateen sails later developed by sailors of other nations and regions.
Malay ingenuity in navigation was still observed during the Sultanate of Malacca in the 15th century. However, the size of the ships was slightly reduced. *Mendam Berahi* (Supressed Desire), the famous ocean-going *ghali* (galley) of Sultan Mahmud Shah, for example, was only 180 feet long, with three sails, 100 peddles, and a capacity for 400 crews and fighters.

![Mendam Berahi](Google Image)

However, Malacca’s *ghalis* and *jongs* were generally still bigger than contemporary Chinese ships. Thus, according to the Portuguese chronicler, Tomé Pires, in his *Suma Oriental* of 1515, in Canton, the vessels of Malacca were usually asked to anchor far from the harbour. This is because their big size could be dangerous to Chinese ships which were mostly smaller. In fact, Malacca’s *ghalis* and *jongs* were also bigger compared to the Portuguese *galleon*. When he was in the midst of attacking Malacca, Afonso de Albuquerque, for example, was shocked to see them, and referred to them as “World Shakers”.

![Malacca’s jong and the Portuguese galleon](“A sketch of the Malay jong”, retrieved from Musa, Rodi, & Muhammad, 2014)
The historical discussion above has clearly shown the sophisticated navigational skills and great achievements of the Malays. At the same time, it has shown that during pre-Columbus times, they were the only people dispersed across the vast oceans. Thus, as Ishak (2007) aptly notes:

Today the Malays in very diverse ethnic and sub-ethnic groups are found in a vast world extending continuously from Madagascar off the east African coast in the west, through the vast Malay Archipelago in Southeast Asia, to the Hawaiian islands and Easter island in the far east of the Pacific Ocean and to New Zealand and the Chatham islands in the deep south of the Pacific Ocean and to Taiwan in the north, in all covering about 2/3 of the southern hemisphere (p. 33).

The following section will discuss the Malay maritime trading activities and their achievements.

**Malay Maritime Trade**

Malay maritime trade started in the third century B.C.E alongside with, and in close association with, Malay navigation. In fact, trade or commerce was the main motivation for the Malays to “navigate across seven oceans” and to travel as far away as China, India, the Islamic Caliphate states, and Madagascar. Generally, where ever they went, the Malay navigators and sailors carried with them local products from the Malay Archipelago, or those that were brought to their shores, and those which they purchased from overseas.

Historians indicate that in the first century C.E., vast fleets of Malay outrigger ships went back and forth to Aden in the Middle East, and some Malays even settled there (Shaffer, 1996, p. 16). They were supplying the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean markets mainly with cinnamon (*kayu manis*), a popular spice product among the people there.
At the same time, Malay sailors also travelled to as far as the East African coastal states, as well as to Madagascar, where many of them settled down. Aside from cinnamon, they always carried with them various other flora and fauna, including bananas, coconuts, cocoyams (*keladi*), and chicken, as well as the famous Malayo-Polynesian musical instrument - the xylophone. Aside from economic gains, the Malay trading activities had long lasting socio-cultural impacts, too. For example, κανέλα or *kanela*, the Greek word for cinnamon, is ultimately derived from the Malay word *kayu manis*, through Phoenician and Hebrew languages (Hill, 2004). Similarly, *edi* the Igbo word for cocoyam is derived from the Malay word *keladi*. As discussed earlier, Malay communities who settled in Madagascar contributed even more, socio-culturally, for they themselves became the ancestors of the present-day Malagasy people, who dominate the huge island nation. Additionally, the Malayo-Polynesian Ma’anyan language which they brought from the Borneo part of Srivijaya is still widely spoken.
As indicated in the previous section, in East Asia, the Malays had long been trading with the Chinese. In fact, they were the first to initiate the shuttle trade with the East Asian giant, specifically in the third century C.E. In the long history of Malay commercial activities with China, among agricultural products exported to the country were rice and areca nut, including its palm, known in the Malay language as pokok pinang. Rice and its plant, pokok padi, were mostly exported to the southern region of China by the Champa Malays during the Song Dynasty (960-1279). The Champa variety of rice was very much favoured by the Chinese for various reasons. First, it was drought-resistant. Second, it ripened even faster than the existing local Chinese varieties. Third and finally, it could be cultivated on terraces around hilly slopes. Thus, by 1012, the Champa rice was introduced even in the lower Yangzi and Huai river regions (Embree, 2015, p. 839).

The other agricultural product exported by the Malay traders to China was the areca nut and its palm. The product was so well-received that the palm was extensively cultivated, especially in Guangdong, Yunnan, and Fujian (Kong, 2010, p. 60). In fact, even the Malay term, pinang, was adopted and became bing lang in Mandarin.

Malay maritime trade was at one of its heights during the Srivijaya period which in China, more or less, coincided with the Tang and Song dynasties. Srivijaya’s power was based on its control of international sea trade of the day. Her main concern was to secure highly lucrative trade arrangements with China, and to a certain extent, India and Arabia, in order to serve their large markets. This was possible with natural products collected from Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and the eastern islands, as well as those gathered at Srivijaya’s entrepôts, such as Bhoga, the capital city, and Kadaram or Kedah Tua, from neighbouring countries.

Other than natural products, Srivijaya also exported human resources to China. These include labourers, household servants, and security guards cum martial arts experts, commonly referred to by the Chinese as Kunlun nu (Kunlun/Malay slaves). During the Tang Dynasty, numerous Kunluns/Malays from the Malay Archipelago travelled back and forth to China. Many resided there, especially in Guangdong. Among them, the martial arts experts and security guards were a special class of people. Their prowess impressed the Chinese and became the source of inspirations to amulet makers and, especially, literary authors of the
wuxia (chivalric romance) genre. An interesting example of the wuxia is the famous story of “The Kunlun Nu” (崑崙奴) by Pei Xing (825-880 C.E.) which portrays a Malay security guard cum martial arts expert named Mo Le who is invulnerable, capable of flying, and has other supernatural abilities (Xing, Jue, & Roney, 2013). This literary piece had been a main source for other artistic pieces, and has been adapted into a movie, “The Promise” (2005), with Mo Le’s name changed to Kunlun.

![Figure 4.11. Mo Le in Pei Xing’s chivalric romance flying from roof to roof with his master Cui and the master’s sweetheart.](image)

Aside from China, the Malays also had strong commercial ties with India. In fact, Malay maritime trade with India goes back even further. As revealed by the recent findings of Universiti Sains Malaysia’s Global Archaeological Research Centre (GARC), it should have started at least approximately 1,900 years ago, especially involving the kingdom of Kedah Tua in the north of the Malay Peninsula. The kingdom was known as Kadaram to ancient Indians, Kalaha to ancient Arabs, and Cheh-Cha to ancient Chinese. Its name was mentioned early in Sanskrit literary works, such as the famous *Kathasaritsagara* (Ocean of Stories). Later, in the 12th century, it was also recorded by Al-Idirisi, an Arab traveller and geographer, in his book *Ar-Rujjar* (1154).

At around 535 B.C.E., Kedah Tua, located at present day Lembah Bujang, was already a cosmopolitan entrepôt, exporting iron, beads (*manik*, especially from Sungai Manik) rattan, resin, areca nuts, *sepang* wood, elephants, ivory, and other local products to India and the Middle East, and even Sofala (in modern-day Mozambique). Strategically located between India and China, Kedah Tua served merchants from both the East and the West. USM’s findings at the Sungai Batu archaeological site in Lembah Bujang from 2009 confirm vibrant iron
smelting and other metallurgical activities as well as maritime trading activities in the vicinity back to four centuries B.C.E. (Lee, 2016).

Sungai Batu is, so far, the oldest civilisation site in Southeast Asia. As explained by the GARC Director, Professor Dato’ Dr. Mokhtar Saidin, various other ancient relics have been discovered in Lembah Bujang by using the Optically Stimulated Luminescence (OSL) technique. This includes those representing maritime activities, including administrative blocks, warehouses, jetties and sunken ships or barges, and even religious/ritual structures (Lee, 2016). Generally, the ancient ships or barges measure about 40 to 50 feet in length. It is believed that these are relics of some of the vessels used to transport commodities in the maritime trade with India, the Middle Eastern states, and China (Middleton, 2015).

![Figure 4.12. Relics of trading ships at Sungai Batu](image)

Apparently, the kingdom was populated by both locals as well as foreigners who arrived during different periods from India and the Middle East. In the seventh century, the kingdom was subjugated by Srivijaya. However, maritime trade went on uninterrupted for centuries. Kedah Tua benefitted not only from the normal maritime activities, but also from the trans-peninsular routeway developed along the Muda and Patani rivers. This enhanced the India-China trade.

![Figure 4.13. Map of the early Kedah Tua kingdom and the early trans-peninsular routeway](image)
In 1025 C.E., Rajendra Chola I of the Chola Dynasty from Tamil Nadu, India, launched naval raids on the ports of Srivijaya. The aggressive king and his forces managed to occupy Kedah Tua for some time. This weakened the Malay kingdom and finally led to the decline of its maritime trading activities. The main motive for the Chola king to attack Kedah and other Srivijaya ports was to forcefully gain control of their bubbling commercial activities.

Malay maritime trade was revived much later with the establishment of the Sultanate of Malacca in the 15th century. Beginning from around 1400 C.E., successive sultans of Malacca did their best to attract maritime traders from China, India, the Islamic Caliphates, and Europe to come over to Malacca. From time to time, entrepôt infrastructure and management were upgraded and maritime policies and laws were enhanced. Steps were taken to protect Malaccan waters from pirates and piracy. Diplomatic relations were strategically established with significant countries, such as China, Japan, India, Turkey, and the Islamic Caliphate states. Thus, Malacca quickly became an international maritime trading centre and Malay merchants carried their products near and far. Up to the beginning of the 16th century, maritime trading business at Malacca’s entrepôt was always bubbling. Quoting Cortesao (1967; as cited in Elegant, 1999), Elegant says:

Five centuries ago, Malacca hosted 2,000 ships each day…
Cargoes of mace (kulit buah pala), nutmeg (buah pala),
cloves (bunga cengkih), sandalwood (kayu cendana),
teab, porcelains and silks passed through Malacca on their
way to Europe. From the islands of the Archipelago to the south came camphor, birds’ nests, pepper (*lada hitam*), musk (*kesturi*), gold and ivory (*gading*). And from the West, mostly carried by traders from South Asia and the Middle East, came cotton, weapons, incense (*setanggi*), opium (*candu*), dyes, silver and medicinal drugs (Elegant, 1999, p. 45).

The description goes on to say:

> It was a place where Gujratis, Tamils, and Bengalis from India lived and traded in secure harmony with Malays, Chinese and Arabs, a city of 100,000 where 84 languages could be heard in the markets. The Malay sultans who ruled Malacca ensured that the strait was free of pirates. Goods could be stored safely in hundreds of well-guarded godowns; the city’s law were administered fairly to both Malaccans and foreigners (Elegant, 1999, p. 45).

Indeed, that was Malacca, the Malay maritime powerhouse in the 15th century. As such, it is not difficult to understand why the contemporary Portuguese chronicler, Tomé Pires, made it clear to his readers that, “Whoever is lord of Malacca shall have his hands on the throat of Venice” (Ludher, 2015). Similarly, it is not difficult to understand now why Afonso de Albuquerque, representing the Portuguese nation, attacked and conquered Malacca in 1511, resulting in the abrupt decline, or demise, of both Malay navigation and maritime trade.

**Conclusion**

The historical cum anthropological discussion above has clearly shown the sophisticated navigational skills and great achievements of the Malays in pre-modern times. They had extra-ordinary talent and skills not only in constructing large ships, but also in travelling across oceans ahead of most other peoples. The crossing over to Madagascar on outrigger ships via the perilous Indian Ocean, for example, was indeed a great feat difficult to surpass.

At the same time, the discussion had also shown the great accomplishment of the Malays in the past as maritime traders. They
were great maritime traders not only around their home waters, but also in faraway places, including China, India, Arabia, and even Madagascar. It is also amazing to discover that their navigational and trading activities did not only bring about monetary gains, but has also had anthropological, social, and cultural impacts on the places and peoples they interacted with. In fact, they had managed to change the demographic scenario of the world, with people of Malay stock now occupying approximately 60 per cent of the circumference of the earth. All of this was achieved without force or violence.

It is unfortunate that the marvellous Malay achievement as navigators and maritime traders are not much discussed or made known to the current generation of Malays. Even more unfortunate is the fact that the exceptional knowledge and skills both in navigation and maritime trade are now lost. It is imperative that immediate and strategic steps be taken collectively by Malay communities across the Malay world to recover or revive them.

References


References for Pictures


Viewpoint

The Chinese Civilisation Quest For The Great Harmony (大同 Da Tong) Through Humanness (仁 Ren)

Peter T. C. Chang

The 21st century world is in the midst of a paradigm shift as America’s dominance gives way to a China-led Asian century. This is engendering expectations as well as trepidations not least because of the uncertainties that come with any changes, but the current transitional pains are compounded by our unfamiliarity with today’s reemerging power, which is China. To start with, by most account a communist state by name only, how the PRC (People’s Republic of China) will reshape the existing international order remains unclear and a source of anxiety to many. In recent years, Beijing has been returning to traditional philosophical and religious resources to help mitigate social and political challenges at home and abroad. As the Marxism sway diminishes, the contemporary Chinese seem eager and ready to reembrace their ancient ethos. Even so, a revitalised traditional China could well continue to be an enigma. This is because the Sinic civilisation with its Confucian underpinnings, espouses a view of the universe and belief system that is still relatively little understood by the non-Chinese world.

This paper is an effort to provide some insights into this increasingly dominant yet obscure civilisational power. In doing so, this paper will focus on two foundational Confucian principles, namely, the Great Harmony (大同 Da Tong) and Humanness (仁 Ren). Through these dual

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concepts, this paper will explain what constitutes the ancient Chinese world’s ultimate concerns, i.e. telos, and how they set out to actualise these religious aspirations.

We start with an overview of the Chinese organic cosmology, where all things are perceived as essentially one. The doctrine of the Great Harmony is an outshoot of this unified view of the universe, which in turn defines ancient China’s ultimate spiritual quest, namely, to achieve the harmonious co-existence of all things.

This study then examines the Humanness principle, which is an ethical precept key to the realisation of this grand vision. The Chinese frame this as a relational quest, in which harmony is achieved through the dispensation of compassion towards others. The doctrine of the mean (中庸 Zhong Yong) is another fundamental concept, whereby harmony is attained by pursuing the middle pathway.

The essay ends with a discussion at two critical social political strategies and institutions. The first is the concentric circle approach whereupon the quest for harmony begins from within the self, expanding outwards to embrace the family, society, state, the wider world, and the cosmos. The second, a central actor in the collective endeavour, is the sage king. Chinese sages believe that when bestowed with benevolent kingship, peace and order will prevail under the Heavens, heralding the Great Harmony.

**The Great Harmony (大同 Da Tong)**

The Tao gives birth to One,
One gives birth to two.
Two gives birth to three
Three gives birth to all things.

All things have their backs to the female
and stand facing the male.
When male and female combine,
all things achieve harmony.
Ordinary men hate solitude.
But the Master makes use of it,
Embracing his aloneness, realising
He is one with the whole universe.²

In one ancient Chinese account of the origin, the beginning was the Way (道; Dao). This uncaused source of the universe is also at times variously associated with an all-encompassing cosmic field of energy called the Chi (氣).

![Cosmic energy field, Chi](image1)

*Figure 3.1. Cosmic energy field, Chi (Chandra X-ray Observatory Center/NASA; as cited in McKinnon, 2017)*

![Yin and Yang](image2)

*Figure 3.2. Yin and Yang*

In this version of the origin, existence came into being when the Dao and the Chi divide into two, begetting a bifurcated yin and yang reality: light and darkness, hot and cold, material and spiritual. These are distinct yet symmetrical spheres, conceived as in a synthetical

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rather than antithetical relationship. Together, they perform a circular ‘dance’ that powers the flow of Chi, sustaining the phenomenal world. Thus, according to the ancient Chinese, out of the one, came forth the harmonic two, begetting in union the melodic whole (Wing-Tsit, 1963, pp. 65-90).

This imagery of monistic dualism defines the Chinese metaphysical aspirations. When asked about human beings’ ultimate concern, the Confucian exhortation is to live in concord with the Great Harmony; i.e. to synchronise the interconnected polarities in each and every person’s reality: body and soul, feminine and masculine, and this-worldly and other worldly, into a balanced state of existence. By so doing, we are said to have achieved the harmonious co-existence of all things, in unison with the cosmic Dao.

Humanness (仁 Ren)

The Chinese practical quest for cosmic union is governed by sets of ethical imperatives. Chief among them is the Confucian virtue of Ren, variously translated as benevolence or humaneness. In plain terms, Ren connotes the true essence of being a human, namely, to be proper. In Confucius’s words, “One should see nothing improper, hear nothing improper, say nothing improper, do nothing improper” (Analects 12: 1; as cited in Legge, 1971, p. 36).

One distinct trait to this Analects universal exhortation to propriety, common to all world traditions, is the Confucian focus on the relational dimension. The logogram for Ren is, in fact, a composite of two distinct common Chinese characters:

人 + 二 = 仁

Simply put, Ren is the conjoining of and interaction between two persons. This coupling underscores the Confucian emphasis on the social aspect of moral self-cultivation. To become Ren, one has to develop these virtues in conjunction with the other. “Wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others” (Analects 6:30; as cited in Legge, 1971, p. 15).
In Confucianism, the cultivation of *Ren* does not happen in a social vacuum but in the complex matrix of a communal order. Indeed, the Confucians were highly critical of individualistic spiritual quest that is detached from the world. The Buddhist monk’s retreat into solitary isolation, in pursuit of personal enlightenment is one practice that has been subjected to harsh Confucian criticism.

**Doctrine of the Mean (中庸 Zhong Yong)**

The emphasis on relational bond is complemented by another central theme of Confucian thought, the Zhong Yong, commonly translated as the ‘doctrine of the mean’.

![Figure 3.3. Zhong Yong (LEO33-Sofokli at English Wikipedia, 2012)](image)

These two characters express a broad Confucian ideal covering almost every aspect of human life. In practical terms, Zhong Yong signifies a wide spectrum of traits and virtues: ranging from moderation, rectitude, sincerity, equilibrium, and balance.

In sustaining human relationships, for example, one is extolling to preserve a rapport neither too intimate nor too remote. Likewise, in emotional expressions, neither in sadness nor in happiness should one be excessive: unbridled celebration can be as detrimental as uncontrolled wailing.

The overarching principle of Zhong Yong is to stay close to the centre and keep clear of the extremes. By staking out the middle pathway, we live in sync with the harmonic law of nature, thus manifesting the virtuoso of a holistic personhood.

**Concentric Circle**

The telos of a Ren and Zhong Yong guided relationship is to achieve the harmonious co-existence of all things. This is, undoubtedly, a grandiose
aspiration. However, the Confucian pathway to actualising this idealistic vision is through a realistic pragmatic action plan.

Their strategy is to divide the grand scheme into a series of concentric circles, beginning with the foundational appeal to cultivate the individual self. Once the personal is attended to, attention is then expanded outwards through layers of widening groups from family to communities, provinces to nations, and the larger world to the wider universe.

“When the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace throughout the world” (Great Learning, 1: 4).

Through this map of enlarging centres of influence and interests, the Confucians’ plan is to take a step by step approach in realising the Great Harmony. This incremental scheme underscores the Confucian priority and mindfulness that the ultimate telos is in fact the accumulative effects of small steps and building blocks, with the self and nucleus family forming the core. Unless these essential substructures are secured, the superstructure would have been laid upon fragile footing.

**Sage King**

Confucian universalism exhorts all to strive towards the Grand Harmony. Famed for its sanguine view of human as good by nature,
the Chinese idealists also concede that human potentials are realised unevenly, resulting in differentiated moral development. As such, though egalitarian at base, people do assume varied stations within the Confucian enterprise. In this hierarchical scheme where all possess a role but with variegated parts, the Confucian accord the greatest importance to one particular actor - the sage king.

A key tenet underpinning the Confucian benevolent kingship is that in order to govern others, one must first govern oneself according to the Heavenly Principles. If fulfilled, the personal virtue of a cultivated, upright sovereign could spread beneficent influence throughout the kingdom.

“When the ruler is benevolent, all are benevolent. When the ruler is righteous, all are righteous. Once the ruler attains rectitude, the state is well governed”.

This idea of ethical rulership is linked to the doctrine of non-action (无为Wu Wei). The Confucians are convinced that when a sagely Emperor sits upon the throne, the power of his exemplary stature alone is sufficient to bestow peace and order under the Heaven, without much effort. In such a scenario, in the words of Wu Wei: the less the king does, the more gets done.

Differently put, by being the ‘calm centre’, the virtuous Monarch sets the standard upon the rest of kingdom revolves in unison. The Chinese believed that when these exceptional though rare wise rulers do appear, their presence would advance humanity’s progress towards the Great Harmony.
Conclusion

The PRC is in an unprecedented phase of radical transformation that is also emitting rippling effects on the makeup of the next world order. One factor that will potentially impact the outcome of these changeovers is the ancient Chinese philosophical and religious outlook, which is fundamentally at odds with the prevailing secular modernity worldview.

Subscribed to a unique organic cosmology, existence in the Confucian narrative emerges from, and will eventually return to Dao, or the Chi, the unified fountain of life. Meanwhile, with Ren and Zhong Yong, our task in this life cycle is to sustain a balance and rebalancing of the yin and yang coupling. At the social political level, through the expanding concentric circles of engagements and endowment of ethical leadership, the Chinese civilisation strives to bring about harmonious co-existence of all things.

As the 21st century China transits towards a postmodern age, the erstwhile atheistic PRC is expected to reembrace certain elements of its sacred heritages. This could reset the contemporary Chinese milieu upon its Confucian roots, a return to the past that will have profound implications for the future of China and the world at large.

References


Reference (Figures)

