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Editorial

This December 2021 issue of IIUM Journal of Religion and Civilisational Studies contain articles that deal with wide-ranging topics related to Islam and civilisations. On a more specific note, the articles dwell on the issue of education and Indonesian society, contemporary Malaysian politics, diplomatic history of Indonesian Archipelago, social issues related to Covid-19 and education during Abbasid era.

The first article by Ahmad Salim, Nik Md. Saiful Azizi bin Nik Abdullah, Hairiyah, Riki Perdana and Martalia Ardiyaningrum entitled "Madrasa's Social Capital in the Context of Hilly Communities Dynamics: The Case of Madrasa Maarif Kokap in Yogyakarta, Indonesia" discusses the dynamic relationship between Madrasa Maarif Kokap and the hilly communities in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. It is a case study centered on the importance and utilisation of social capitals by the Madrasa Maarif Kokap for the greater benefit of the surrounding society. The findings demonstrate how the madrasa has successfully played its role as an agent of change, affecting positive social changes in the people's lives, and this was done by making full use of its social capitals including social norms practised among students and teachers of the madrasa, mutual trust developed between the madrasa and the local people, and extensive networks established with the surrounding communities and various institutions. This article throws light on how the running of a learning institution should be done amidst various challenges emanating from globalisation and modernity in the present day. Hopefully, this will inspire other madrasas or learning institutions to identify and optimise their own social capitals in order to improve the quality of education provided to their local communities.

The second article "The Rise and Fall of Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) in Sabah, Malaysia" by Oshin binti Sangkar examines the political situations in the state of Sabah under the rule of Parti

Bersatu Sabah (PBS) or United Sabah Party from 1985 to 1994. Starting with the political history of Sabah in the 1960s and 1970s, the author then articulately explained the rise of the PBS, highlighting on the grievances among the people of Sabah towards BERJAYA state government and how this eventually resulted in the formation of the PBS and later defeat of the BERJAYA party in 1985. Various reasons were given for the people's support to the PBS such as BERJAYA's Islamization policy, the issue of illegal immigration, discrimination against Sabah's indigenous population, Labuan Issue, etc. Despite the promising future, the PBS suffered from a decline by the early 1990s caused mainly by the involvement of UMNO in Sabah's politics and, to a lesser extent, the party's own internal weaknesses resulting in the power of state government to change hands to UMNO in 1994. In short, for students and readers of history, the article provides a thorough and comprehensive analysis of Sabah's politics during the said period, i.e., 1985-1994.

Writing on a controversial historical claim projected by a documentary film entitled "Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara", Tiar Anwar Bachtiar and Nandang Nursaleh co-authored the article "Indonesian Sultanates and Their Alleged Allegiance to Islamic Caliphates: A Historical Analysis of "Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara". Streamed on Youtube platform in August 2020, the film-makers of the documentary maintained that Islamic kingdoms in the Indonesian Archipelago, namely Samudra Pasai, Malaka, Aceh Darussalam, Demak and Mataram, have made allegiance (*bay'a*) to the Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt (during Mamluk era) dan the Ottoman Caliphate, hence rendering the Malay kingdoms as vassal states of the Caliphates. Arguing that the claim is baseless, the authors pointed out that not only did the film-makers fail to understand the true meaning of the concept of 'caliph' and 'caliphate', but their claim was devoid of concrete and solid proofs. The way the authors countered the claim is fascinating where each alleged proof was scrutinised against the historical political background of the Indonesian Archipelago in the 15th-19th century, thus presenting clear arguments or information for readers to fall back on in assessing for themselves the claim made by the film-makers.

Next, Saheed Abdullahi Busari wrote on the issue of food insecurity in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdowns. In an article entitled "Food Insecurity amid COVID-19 Lockdowns: The Phenomenology of Prophet Yūsuf's Food Security Model", the author explores the feasibility of Prophet Yūsuf's food security strategy and action plan, as outlined in some Quranic verses (surah Yūsuf), and how this could be applied to modern Muslim societies to combat food insecurity issue caused by some factors such as low income, unemployment, sickness and disability especially during the pandemic season. Discussed against the background of the incident during which Prophet Yūsuf's interpretations were sought after to interpret the dreams of an Egyptian king, the author argues that the Prophet Yūsuf's model corresponds well with Islamic principles such as the need to avoid wastage and hoarding of basic necessities, and the use of wisdom and knowledge for long-term food planning. The article concludes that if the Prophet Yūsuf's model is applied, this will prevent further problems in Muslim societies caused by food insecurity such as severe socio-economic crisis and political instability.

Finally, Alwi Alatas produced some viewpoints on "Islamic Educational Institutions in the Past: *Kuttāb* and Madrasa" focusing on the development of kuttāb and madrasa particularly during the Abbasid period. The writing is useful for those who seek to trace the origin of these learning institutions which existed since the early centuries of Islam. Although short, the account is full of details and demonstrate the utmost significance attached to these institutions by the Muslim community during the said period. More importantly, it attests to the importance of knowledge or education in Islam, a religion sent down through the Prophet Muhammad s.a.w.

On behalf of the Editorial Board, I would like to take this opportunity to extend my gratitude to all contributors and reviewers who involved in this issue. With all the sound ideas and information contained therein, the articles will contribute to the enrichment of knowledge particularly in civilisational studies and be of interest to students and scholars alike.

Finally, I wish to express my appreciation and gratitude to all members of the Editorial Board, our Editor Dr. Alwi Alatas, Book Review Editor Dr. Kaoutar Guediri and Assistant Editors, Dr. Bukuri Zejno and Sr. Norliza Saleh. This issue will not become a reality without your strong dedication and great efforts. May Allah bless you all.

Fauziah Fathil
Editor-in-Chief
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Madrasa's Social Capital in the Context of Hilly Communities Dynamics: The Case of Madrasa Maarif Kokap in Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Ahmad Salim,[1] Nik Md. Saiful Azizi Bin Nik Abdullah,[2] Hairiyah,[3] Riki Perdana,[4] Martalia Ardiyaningrum[5]

Abstract: This article discusses the social capital of Madrasa Maarif Kokap in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, in its dynamic relationship with the surrounding hilly communities. Using Putnam's social capital theory, this study analyses the close relationship between beliefs, norms and networks with the development of the madrasa. Methodologically, this study used observation and in-depth interviews with 14 selected respondents to collect data. The data was then analysed using a qualitative approach that is enriched with a sociological ethno-science strategy. The result of the study shows that social capital affects the madrasa in its development of academic and non academic programmes. The madrasa has to maintain its social capital as an instrument to fulfil its goals. Many madrasa strive to maintain its respective social capital, preserve norms that will become the legacy of its respective community as well as build trust and enlarge its network with its respective community.

[1] *Ahmad Salim* is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Islamic Education, Alma Ata University. He can be reached at ahmadsalim0305@almaata.ac.id.

[2] *Nik Md. Saiful Azizi Bin Nik Abdullah* is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Education at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur. He can be reached at nikazizi@iium.edu.my.

[3] *Hairiyah* is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Islamic Education, Alma Ata University..

[4] *Riki Perdana* is a lecturer in the Department of Islamic Education, Alma Ata University.

[5] *Martalia Ardiyaningrum* is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Islamic Education, Alma Ata University.

Introduction

Relations among individuals have implications for social change in society, especially in contemporary society, which is facilitated by advances in information technology that make no insulation and distance between individuals. Changes in one aspect of society will have implications in its socio-cultural, economic, educational, political and other aspects.

As an Indonesian education institution, the madrasa provides education from elementary to high school. Education is part of social change and, where possible, social change needs and can be influenced by education (Tilaar, 2002). The relationship between the madrasa and the community is shown by the extent of education services the madrasa provides to the community, which ultimately is the transformation of community. This means that the link between the madrasa and the community is an inseparable form of unity in which the presence of the madrasa is a necessity in bringing meaningfulness or benefits to the community. On the contrary, the building of community systems has also become the driving force towards the change and development of the madrasa in accordance with its goals.

The impact of globalisation has spread into all aspects of society, including in hilly communities (Hatu, 2011; Fuadi & Suyatno, 2020). This reality can be interpreted as the hilly communities' social and societal expectations from the madrasa. Social changes that occur in the hilly communities have become a strong basis for this since most people view the madrasa as both an education and social institution. This means that in the hilly community, the madrasa is expected to be an agent of change for community transformation; if the madrasa offers no meaning to its existence, the hilly community will abandon it. People have high expectations of the madrasa as an agent of change in various aspects of life. The madrasa is seen as an ordinary educational institution that is not only oriented towards mastering knowledge and upholding the noble values of religion, but is also oriented towards lifestyle in many communities, including the hilly communities (Abdullah, 2019).

The implication of changing people's perceptions of the madrasa is more transparent, especially when competing with other madrasa for public attention. A madrasa that can utilise its social capital will be able

to develop its quality and, in turn, will be made a preference of the community concerned. On the contrary, a madrasa that does not utilise its opportunities to pursue its social capital will be abandoned by the community. There is no lasting certainty in the context of ranking or quality of madrasa—all madrasa have the same opportunity to either develop or go out of business (Abdullah, 2019). There is no guarantee that a successful madrasa today will be able to survive in the following year.

Madrasa Maarif Kokap in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, is an elementary-level madrasa that has managed to maintain the quality of its management through ranking and accreditation. It has been ranked for producing the best national exam scores at the Kokap Sub-district level for the last five years. With its predicate, the madrasa, which is located in the hills of Kulon Progo Regency, is able to gain the trust of its community evident in the increase of its student body reaching 160 students. Also, the performance and achievements of this madrasa have received appreciation from its surrounding community.

However, many elementary-level education institutions located in the Kokap Sub-district have not had encouraging developments, both in terms of the quantity of students and their academic and non-academic achievements. As a result, the developments of Elementary Madrasa Maarif Kokap cannot be found in other schools and madrasa at the same level, even though they have good relations with the surrounding community. This means that in the context of social relations, not all madrasa can take advantage of relations with the community that surround them which could contribute to their respective further development, as stated above.

Purpose of the Study

This article explores the social capital and the development of Madrasa Maarif Kokap in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, and its dynamic relationships with hilly community. More specifically, this study aims to answer the following research questions:

1. How does social capital contribute to the development of Madrasa Maarif Kokap within the dynamic of the hilly community?

2. How does Madrasa Maarif Kokap maintain its social capital
    and sustain its own development?

Literature Review

The Hilly Communities' Dynamic

Socially, hilly communities have different characteristics from plain communities. Hefner (1994) states that individual land ownership through inheritance is a social feature of the main hilly community in the island of Java compared to people in the plain community who rely more on buying and selling ownership (Hefner, 1994). Social dynamic is considered to be something that is not feasible in the context of hilly society and is only seen by people who live in the plain land, so the resilience of holding mainstream traditions is an identity of this hilly society.

Besides modernity that reaches all aspects of society, the social transformation of society does not only occur in urban society. Modernity, which is marked by the development of technology, primarily transportation and information, has been able to penetrate into the hilly society. Modernity that is parallel to the rapid globalisation has implications for social change in almost all lives of these people. Mukhibat and Effendi (2020) have stated that the rapid progress of globalisation has created many challenges confronting Indonesia, including shifting the nation's original cultural values because of the increasingly rapid flow of globalisation that is sometimes out of control.

Soekanto (1982) states that social transformation in society affects its social values, norms, patterns of behaviour, organisation, authority, social interaction and other aspects. Social transformation or cultural change is common in society because every society definitely experiences some form of it—even though the changes and developments of people are not the same, each society has its own way of accepting these changes (Hatu, 2011). The way a community accepts and responds to such changes depends very much on the perception and readiness of some of the existing sub-systems of the community in accepting the changes that occur. As quoted by Rudi Volti (2004), William F. Ogburn has stated that there is a link between social institutions in social change that affect one another. He further

states that change in the material field is usually faster than in the
socio-cultural field.

In the context of the Kokap society, the transformation of attitudes
and values can be seen in the dominance of capital, cognitive and
rational thinking compared to the way of transcendent thinking that is
considered as sacred. Some activities that were once considered sacred
have turned into routine, which has distorted their sacredness. One
example of this is the activity of *genduri* or praying to God for salvation.
This sacred activity of *genduri* has been distorted to become an activity
that is more oriented towards distributing alms as a "blessing" to the
invited citizens. The procedure for *genduri* is very short and only
controlled by a few people who are considered to have mastered the
science of religion (Salim, Maragustam & Radjasa, 2018).

Mutual cooperation (*gotong royong*) as a social activity, primarily
on social care, also appears to have shifted. As changes occur in the
livelihoods of people who are not homogeneous in the agricultural
and horticultural sectors and there is also the development of
community recognition in professional expertise, the involvement of
the community in mutual cooperation continues to experience a shift.
Mutual cooperation is changing, meaning that service (*rewang*) towards
people who have certain needs have declined and is now replaced
with experts who receive certain wages, such as masons, decoration
experts and cooks. The community cannot flock to do some mutual
cooperation activities as described above for various reasons that exist
for each individual, including formal work that requires him to go to
work on working days. On holidays, there is not enough manpower to
do a number of jobs that exist in the community. The research result
by Sirait (2016) found that social relations in the Kota Gede society
are not based on personal profession, but the relation of function and
role. This means that the society, including the Kota Gede society, see
gotong royong as a fundamental activity that can create solidarity.

Kromo (refined speech in Javanese) is an indicator of the respect and
courtesy of the younger generation towards older or honourable people.
This type of speech has since shifted as many of the younger generation
are unable to fluently speak it. Society seems to be more permissive of
this reality and accepts that younger people prefer to use Indonesian
language to communicate with older people. This reality is certainly

in contrary to the norms held in high esteem by this community in the past, whereby *kromo* was one of the visible indicators that a person is upholding the norms of politeness and respect for his interlocutors.

The above transformation is more influenced by the increasing dialectics of a community and other communities due to the facilitation of information technology and transportation facilities that are increasingly more accessible. Community dialectics impact the mutual influence of values and attitudes among communities and, furthermore, support a transformation of values that are considered to facilitate them. The preference of values and attitudes that they previously adhered to and maintained could fade if the persistence of the values they believed in are not facilitated by a strong socialisation and externalisation of values (Mustakim, Rouzi & Tumin, 2021).

The dominance of rational and cognitive ways of thinking and pragmatic tendencies of a community influences the society's view of the madrasa. The madrasa, which is seen by the community as an Islamic educational institution that produces quality alumni in religious studies, is shifting and moving towards demands that it serves as both an educational and social institution that not only produces religious scholars, but also the same kind of qualifications as conventional schools. Some of the demands addressed to schools by the community also became demands on the madrasa. Government policies have promoted more alignment between madrasa and school, so the community's perspective on madrasa have also changed. All that is demanded from the conventional school is also demanded from the madrasa, mainly related to educational output. Even the society demands more from the madrasa compared to schools since the former has advantages related to religion. The madrasa is expected to be a plus school that is not only competent in religious studies but also in general science and even certain skills possessed by other educational institutions.

The Social Capital of Madrasa

Social capital—which is defined as a number of components that exist in social organisations, such as beliefs, norms and networks, that can increase the efficiency of society by facilitating some

coordinated actions—has been the strength of the madrasa for a long time (Putnam, 1993). Putnam (1993) also added that trust is needed as a form of willingness to take risks in social relationships. This is based on confidence that other people will do things as expected and will always act in a pattern of mutually supportive actions, so at least they will not act detrimentally to yourself and the group. In Sociology, capital is a source that can be used for productive forces, things that produce, the means of production and the supply of a community's assets (Soekanto, 1985). This means that the madrasa's social capital is an asset owned by the madrasa that pivots on its social status, namely the community. Social capital will always be related to the mutual relationship between the madrasa as an educational institution and its surrounding community (Suwadi, 2017).

Social capital cannot exist and be built without a relationship between the madrasa and its surrounding community. The strength and existence of the madrasa is actually facilitated with its social capital because, basically, its relationship with the community has been supported by social capital, namely trust, norms and networks. With social capital, people are able to achieve an objective that cannot be achieved without good relations and connections (Srimulyani, Afriko, Salim, & Ichwan, 2018). However, the inability of a madrasa in Indonesia to manage social capital will weaken its very existence (Maunah, 2020). H. A. R. Tilaar (2004) reveals that the uniqueness of a madrasa is its closeness to the community, so it would be problematic if the madrasa was unable to manage its social capital. Thus, the social capital of a madrasa is a potential for improving its quality if managed with a relevant approach in line with its surrounding community's demands. The high trust and network of individual madrasa in the community will increase its social capital.

Methods

Research Design

This study used a case study method with a qualitative approach. Qualitative approach was preferable for describing the social capital of the madrasa in the context of the hilly community dynamic. This approach seemed more effective for this study because it enabled the

research data to be explored in depth. Such research is one of basic traditions in social sciences and it is related to people in their respective language and region (Moleong, 2011).

This study was conducted at Elementary Madrasa Maarif Kokap Kulon Progo in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The main data analysed were qualitative data, namely information from key informants in the form of persons or actors involved in Elementary Madrasa Maarif Kokap and its surrounding area. The number of participants were 14 people, comprising the madrasa principal, three teachers, one staff administrator, four students, the village leader and four residents. The sampling technique used was purposive sampling. The first key informant was asked about his willingness to be an informant and his availability to be interviewed, while the remaining informants were determined by snowball technique. Interview method was conducted in a structured and natural manner, which allowed the participants to convey and express their experience, opinion and honest feelings. Several participants were given interview questions, which they answered in writing using communication tehnology.

Data Collection Procedures

The two techniques of collecting data were interviews and participatory observation. The procedure of this study was carried out by using the interview protocol as a guide for conducting interviews, namely the researchers' introduction, interview questions and confirmation of the results of the interview. In the interview questions, the researchers first asked about the impact of trust, norm and networking on the madrasa. The following questions were developed based on the interview guidelines. Ethical procedures in conducting research were carried out by first asking for permission from the regional office of the Ministry of Religion of the Special Province of Yogyakarta as well as schools; permission was also asked from participants concerning their willingness to be interviewed and recorded. There were no obstacles in this permit process. The researchers also reaffirmed that the results of this study would not reveal the identity of the informants.

Participatory observation was conducted on a madrasa academic consultant for more than 6 months and was supported by observation

guides. The data validity was determined through source triangulation method, namely checking data from one informant to another, and from observation and document.

Data Analysis Techniques

The data analysis technique was carried out according to that of Moustakas (1994), including the manner of describing the results. The researchers then determined the theme—each detailed statement has an equivalent value in the theme and the details were developed without repetition. Grouping the data into meaningful units, the researchers broke down the units and wrote a textual description of their respective experience, including careful examples. Reflecting on the thoughts and by using imaginative variations, the researchers identified all the possible meanings and, through divergent perspectives, considered the frame of reference and constructed how the phenomena were experienced. They then constructed all of their explanations of the meaning and essence of their experiences. This process of expression of the researchers' experience was the initial step, and was followed by the expression of the experiences of all participants. After all these steps were done, the researchers then wrote the combined description.

Results

The Importance of Social Capital towards the Madrasa

Based on observation, on the whole, the madrasa's status is that of a private institution that is mainly established and developed by the community because, historically, it stood on the initiative of the community in response to the development of conventional schools during the colonisation period. Thus, the madrasa is the product of the community. It was created by large organisations, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, other Islamic foundations as well as by philanthropic personalities and organisations (Sunhaji, 2017). The existence of such madrasa has a consequence on the uniqueness of this institution when compared to schools in general. The madrasa's closeness to the community is its main capital needed to develop its education at a higher level.

Trust. Based on the understanding of trust in Putnam (1993), trust will occur if both parties do their equal share so that there is mutual trust and sense of comfort on both sides. A pattern of trust that only involves one party will certainly weaken that trust. Trust is a form of social capital that is very important in order to improve the relations and dialectics of the madrasa with the community, resulting in the development of the madrasa in their own aspects. Without trust between the madrasa and the community, some programmes that may help improve the madrasa will be difficult to realise, particularly those that are directly related to the community.

Based on the interview with the madrasa principal, who was the key informant and has 23 years' of experience working in the madrasa, the trust that has been built between the madrasa and surrounding community was not instant—it was built ever since the madrasa was established and continues to increase. Of course, this trust does not always develop linearly, but fluctuates in accordance with the context of their relationship. The community's trust will continue to be consistent and become an effective social capital of the madrasa because their expectations of the madrasa can be facilitated. Some of these indicators are related to an increase in the number of students, involvement of madrasa activities by the community, namely prayers conducted before the National Examination, and final exams. The fulfilment of community expectations through some of the programmes implemented in this madrasa also supports strengthening community trust in the madrasa. Futhermore, the community's preference for the madrasa has also increased, even defeating schools at the same level in the Kokap community and surrounding areas.

The Madrasa's Norms. As an educational institution under the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organisation, Madrasa Maarif Kokap certainly has norms that are followed by madrasa stakeholders as a pattern of behaviours that are practiced in their daily life. Norms can be used as ethical guidelines for the madrasa and its surrounding communities and will be able to give meaning to the running of madrasa organisations as long as these values are sourced from previously agreed upon noble values and with practices from which they benefit. Otherwise, the norms in the madrasa will not contribute to any effectiveness of its education, and even the existence of the madrasa in certain communities.

Some norms related to the values that serve as a reference for the madrasa's conduct are directly proportional to the norms around the madrasa, an example here being a hilly community that is well known for values or attitudes of mutual respect, courtesy, care and tolerance. These values are also reflected in the norms held by the madrasa as values that must always be built to realise and also achieve harmonisation within the society at large (Izzah, 2013). So, the community's anxiety related to the decline of some values as a result of impending modernity and globalisation is also a concern that the madrasa must respond to so that it can rebuild the values that have become community virtues.

The power of values as a guideline is the sanction imposed on a person or group that violates or does not implement the values correctly. External sanctions are reciprocal and will accept a person or group who does not implement the values. For example, on the value of respect, a person will find it difficult to receive respect from others when he himself never respects them. Someone will find it difficult to get recognition from the community he has been living in if the person concerned has never been directly involved in the social activities of the said community.

Networking. As an educational and social institution, the madrasa is an organisation that cannot possibly exist alone without the support of other organisations or the community. As a private educational institution that was founded from the initiation of the community and has its roots in NU, Madrasa Maarif Kokap has an extensive network, both at the local and national levels. Formally, it is under the management of the Ministry of Religion and is also an educational institution owned by NU. The Ma'arif Nahdlatul Ulama Educational Institution (LP Ma'arif NU) is an institution that manages several educational institutions owned by NU, from elementary to secondary levels and even universities. Through the formal structural network above, this madrasa benefits from a fairly extensive ownership by the Ministry of Religion and LP Maarif.

The result of the interviews with participants shows that the madrasa's network is supported by its strong community. It is able to continue to maintain and develop its network at a broader level, for example, by interacting and collaborating with banks, community

health centres and other socio-religious institutions. Through this network, the madrasa can always optimise its existence in the wider community; networking plays a role not only in its symbolic but also collective legitimacy.

In addition, this madrasa also has a non-formal network that is built through the community, namely through Islamic study groups around the madrasa. This network provides a significant contribution to prospective madrasa student candidates through certain policies. Moreover, there are also a number of activities in the madrasa that involve this group.

Discussion

Maintaining Community Trust

Public trust in the madrasa will be directly proportional to the concrete evidence that is felt by the community in the form of the community's expectations of the madrasa concerned. When a community can benefit from the existence of a madrasa, the strength of the trust in the madrasa will always be maintained. In order to maintain mutual trust between them, Madrasa Maarif Kokap took several steps to convince its surrounding community of its necessity.

The community, especially parents and guardians, know about the activities of the madrasa, including the curriculum implemented, through socialisation. Socialisation is done through several ways, such as meetings between parents/guardians and madrasa committee members, written and oral information conveyed from teachers to parents/guardians through students and the purchase of student worksheets by parents/guardians. Through these various methods, community trust in the madrasa can be nurtured and continuously developed.

The principal has an important role in building community trust in the school. Even in a madrasa that has an established system, the role of the school principal as an actor and public leader has implications for building community trust in the madrasa that he/she leads. The success of the school principal in improving the quality of school education is inseparable from the mastery of his/her competencies and abilities in

playing his/her duties, role and function as headmaster (Khilmiyah, Wiyono, & Suud, 2020). Community trust in the madrasa necessitates community recognition of madrasa stakeholders, and community recognition of the madrasa is manifested in the visibility of the madrasa principal and teachers in several community activities. The benefit of their visibility in the context of the madrasa environment will have implications for the building of community trust in the institution.

The madrasa principal has adequate competency of religious knowledge and is supported by good social competence, so his competency makes it easy for him to socialise in the wider community, be it in the neighbourhood he lives or around the madrasa, which is about seven kilometres from home. Even at the mosque near his house and the madrasa, his involvement as a Friday preacher is a concrete form of community recognition of him. Community recognition of the madrasa principal fosters community trust in the madrasa.

The involvement of teachers in several community activities has certainly also facilitated the improvement of community trust, which ultimately has implications for the madrasa as well. This means that increasing public trust in madrasa stakeholders does not only have implications for them personally, but also has an impact on trust in the madrasa they serve. Madrasa stakeholders do not stand alone as people who are separate from the madrasa they serve, but they will always be integrated with the madrasa concerned (Raihani, 2020). Madrasa teachers are involved in some of the community activities, namely *rewang* (mutual cooperation), primarily in the form of a wedding celebration at a resident's house, either as an emcee, receptionist or spokesperson. The positive perception of the hilly community towards the teaching profession makes it easy for these madrasa teachers to be directly involved in several social humanitarian activities.

The presence of the teachers' roles in several social activities in the community as described above certainly facilitates community trust in them. Community trust in madrasa stakeholders will be maintained from time to time, when their presence benefits the community. The teachers' involvement in several social activities is a tangible manifestation of the community's trust in them for their abilities. The presence of both the principal and teachers as madrasa stakeholders in

some community activities is a form of madrasa socialisation with the community through their personal and social competencies.

The madrasa's academic and non-academic achievements are always related to its quality. Its achievements are integrated into a unified quality that can be seen and felt by the community, especially by parents of students or members of the community. Prominence of one of these achievements will be directly proportional to the madrasa's efforts in its further development based on its vision and mission and elaborated on its achievement plans for a certain year or period.

In line with some of the activities carried out, this madrasa has had several achievements that can increase community trust, at least to gain knowledge of their children at the madrasa concerned. Some achievements—such as excelling in final examination (UN) scores and winning prizes in several competitions—are able to strengthen the trust of parents/guardians of students and the community. The achievements of this madrasa push it towards a superior position and, in turn, prompts an increase in the number of new students from one year to the next. Madrasa students have steadily outperformed students from several other public and private schools in the Kokap Sub-district.

Retention of Values and Norms in the Madrasa

In the context of Madrasa Maarif Kokap, the internalisation of its core values of respect, courtesy, care and tolerance is carried out through learning activities in the classroom, activities outside the classroom as well as several activities that directly come into contact with the community (Dixon, 1968). In classroom learning, the internalisation of virtues and values is carried out in an integrated manner in all existing subjects, most importantly in Islamic religious learning and Javanese language. The internalisation of values or norms in learning is more dominated by the moral model of existing classroom teachers, although other ways are also implemented, such as having a dialogue with students about grounding virtues and values in them. This approach is carried out by considering the psychological condition of elementary school students who are more motivated by imitation of the activities carried out by others, especially the teacher as a role model. Thus,

duties carried out by the teacher through activities inside and outside of classroom learning greatly affects their attitudes and behaviours.

The teacher's behaviour of calling students with the prefix *mas* for male students and "Miss" for female students as well as using *kromo* is one manifestation of him/her being a role model on respect. In Javanese culture, calling someone's name with the prefix *mas* indicates respect from younger people towards older or honourable people, such as someone who has a higher status than most people in a community. A teacher's behaviour has consequences on the imitation of students since he/she is a role model in the classroom and madrasa. For example, students will at least feel ashamed when the teacher uses *kromo* towards them, while they themselves do not use it (Salim, Maragustam & Radjasa, 2018). This behaviour encourages students to imitate their teacher when they socialise with other teachers or friends.

The Inculcation of Values and Norms by the Madrasa

One madrasa activity that is intended to inculcate values in the daily lives of students is that of delivering greetings and smiles. This activity is carried out every morning, whereby every student who comes to the madrasa is welcomed by the teachers and principal with greetings, smiles and handshakes. This form of habituation is carried out by the madrasa in order to instil the values of respect and courtesy in younger people towards older people.

The alms programme for students, which occurs on Fridays, is another programmed activity intended to inculcate social care. This activity is full of awareness of the importance of caring for others. There are at least two tasks in this activity intended to instil values, namely collecting money and donating money. The purpose of collecting alms on Fridays is to visit madrasa students who are sick as well as to offer condolences towards parents/guardians of madrasa students. Through this activity, students are encouraged to not only raise money, but also share with others who are in need of help.

The involvement of students in community service—in the form of cleaning the madrasa environment—is one of the madrasa's activities intended to inculcate social care behaviours. This activity is carried out by students from Grades 3 to 6, except in the second semester for class.

It is carried out on the second Saturday every month to internalise the value of sharing and caring for others. Students are invited directly to watch while carrying out ways to work together to fulfil social needs or others; this activity is an actualisation of one's caring attitude. Here, students are required by the teacher to bring equipment, such as brooms, trash bins, sickles and buckets.

The involvement of students in community service also occurs at certain other events, such as the NU's anniversary and religious public holidays. In the context of commemorating the anniversary of NU and religious public holidays, students and teachers perform community service by cleaning the mosque's environment outside the madrasa in the village of Tejokan Walibuko. Community service carried out by involving students is a strategy to instil social care attitudes that connect them directly to the community and not only to the environment around the madrasa. This strategy is in line with an underlying theme in the Ministry of Religion, which is charity, as indicated in the slogan of charity day. Hence, community service involving madrasa students is a manifestation of madrasa charity in the context of social care for the surrounding community.

The inculcation of tolerance for others is done by involving students in madrasa activities that come into direct contact with the community, one example being when a resident living near the madrasa dies. For such an event, the student representatives are invited to offer condolences to the family of those who died, even if the family or the deceased are Christians. The student representatives who participate in this event are usually appointed from Grades 4 to 6, with consideration of the physical and psychological maturity that they possess to carry out this social activity. This activity is a form of the actualisation of caring attitudes that can stimulate the creation of a tolerant attitude, especially if the condolences offered are to a Christian family.

Madrasa Networking

Madrasa Maarif Kokap maintains a wide network with many formal institutions, such as Elementary School 1 Kokap, Kokap Health Center, Junior High School 1 Kokap, Kulon Progo Resort Police and Kulon Progo Pasar Bank. This collaborative network with several

formal institutions facilitates in building trust and recognition in the madrasa in the public sphere, from which it benefits. In the context of cooperation with Elementary School 1 Kokap, the activities carried out is related to the formulation of teaching materials, while at Junior High School 1 Kokap, it is related to the distribution of student output.

The activities carried out with the Kokap Health Center is in the form of school children immunisation months, health screenings and student-and-teacher health education programmes. The activities carried out with the police is related to the awareness and compliance with traffic rules, while the activities carried out with the Bank are related to savings and loans by madrasa students and teachers. The practice of a savings culture in the madrasa results in savings being channelled directly to this private bank every Friday, where there are officers from the bank who collect student savings from the madrasa. This method has proven to build strong relationships between the madrasa and its wider community.

The madrasa's work relationship with the community has been widely established not only around the madrasa, but even in other regions and across the province. This reality can be seen by the multiple indicators of madrasa students based on the student's regional origin. The Madrasa Maarif Kokap students come mainly from various villages in the Kokap area, and some even come from Purworejo Regency, Central Java. This condition can certainly be interpreted as the widespread of this madrasa network, if we associate it with the geographical condition of the madrasa as a hilly region and the basic level of education provided. Some of the achievements that are recognised about the madrasa by the madrasa stakeholders are enough to contribute to the widespread of its network in the community. Many alumni who hold various positions and social status across various regions have facilitated in building the wide network of the madrasa to the community.

Through various networks in the community, the madrasa can conduct socialisation in the form of several beneficial activities, particularly social and humanitarian activities, that can involve its principal and teachers, which will contribute to its achievements. The involvement of the principal and teachers in offering condolences, *rewang* (mutual cooperation) and other activities in the community is

a tangible manifestation of the madrasa's socialisation with its existing networks in the community.

Community networks are the focal point of madrasa meetings since this concerns the society or community at large, either through existing institutions or private persons. Through this network node, the madrasa can disseminate information about the existence of other madrasa. Socialisation does not have to be only expressed verbally but can also be through concrete actions that meet the needs and expectations of the community concerned.

The relationship between the madrasa and its students' parents/guardians is an unavoidable reality that is essential in order to achieve goals in accordance with the madrasa's vision and mission. The peak of this relationship is realised by optimising the role of the madrasa committee as a forum for the aspirations of the parents/guardians. Suggestions and criticisms from the parents/guardians are channelled through the madrasa committee in the form of committee meetings between both parties. These joint madrasa committee meetings are held at least twice a year, namely during the new school year around July and at the end of the school year in early June. In addition, urgent meetings are also held when required, for example, when a mosque or parking lot needs to be built. In such meetings, several things are discussed that are both related to the progress achieved by the madrasa as well as programmes that need the support of parents/ guardians, such as study tour programmes, camps and extracurricular activities.

The relationship between the madrasa and parents/guardians is also shown through the student contact book. This book contains information about the madrasa's past and future activities as well as work notes and achievements of students. The information in the contact book includes, for example, student exam schedule, holidays and assignments that must be prepared and completed by students. Learning difficulties experienced by the students are also monitored by parents/guardians. In this way, a dialogue space between the parents/guardians of students and the madrasa represented by the class teacher is possible. The relationship between the madrasa and parents/guardians is also maintained when madrasa teachers make personal visits to the parents/guardians' homes if they are concerned with a student's learning difficulties. This activity is often carried out if a

student does not attend the madrasa for more than three consecutive days. The class teacher and several student representatives (usually students whose homes are close to the absent student's home) will visit the absent student in his home.

There are several social institutions that network with the madrasa and have contributed greatly to the latter's socialisation to the wider community. The educational organisation of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Hargorejo Branch and Group of Islamic Studies are a few such institutions or groups of people who have networked with the madrasa and have made a major contribution to increasing the quantity of students. Through the three axes of this institution, the relationship between the madrasa and the public can be carried out optimally. These interrelated networks form a node to socialise the existence of Madrasa Maarif Kokap.

The NU Hargorejo branch is an NU organisation at the village level. Through this NU Branch, the madrasa is socialised with a variety of instruments, mainly through a number of preaching/public study sessions. The public study session is a space for interaction between people and, through this activity, the madrasa becomes socialised. The study activity is usually carried out as a top event to commemorate certain events, such as Maulid and Muharram, at the end of the learning process. As a private educational institution owned by several mainstream organisations, namely NU, this madrasa has several advantages, especially in networking with several other institutions under NU. Masyithoh Sambeng Kindergarten is an early age educational institution that contributes greatly to the input of madrasa students. Almost all graduates of Masyithoh continue their study at this madrasa.

Trust is a critical social capital for the development of this madrasa. The relationship between networking and trust is mutually binding and influential, so the two cannot be separated. Through trust, madrasa networks can always be maintained and enhanced and, moreover, building networks can reaffirm people's trust in the madrasa. Through this node, social capital consisting of beliefs, norms and networks can contribute significantly to the development and existence of madrasa. In the context of the current social changes of hilly communities, it is essential to own and maintain this social capital. Without keeping the

relationship between the madrasa and its social capital, the development of madrasa in the context of community change is a steep step that is difficult to be done.

According to Putnam (1993), social networks and norms that are mutually responsive are social capital, physical capital and human capital. Social networks create values, both individually and collectively. Putnam always reforms the social capital theory that he reveals. In the transformation of the theory put forward, social capital is always associated with trust, norms and networks, but there is a renewal of quality in existing aspects. For example, social capital significantly impacts a community, but more so one that has more participation in its development of social capital so as to obtain its full benefits.

In the next stage, Putnam emphasises that networking and norms would have a higher impact on the development of individuals and organisations, provided that they are bound by strong social values, both in the context of bridging or binding. Fraternal bonds and friendships can be defeated by social ties that lead more to building identity and reciprocity or bridging social capital. Social capital in the form of binding will lead to the bond of exclusive identity, maintenance of homogeneity, mobilisation of solidarity and development of specific reciprocity. He further explains that the higher the social capital of a community, the higher the level of democracy in that community and, in the next stage, it will increase the development of the community (Putnam, 1993). Aspects of power relations that exist in society that also affect relations and dialectics of the society at large, do not get a place in Putnam's discussion. The stressing of the language is directed more towards the building of social capital as the basis for developing a democratic society.

Meanwhile, in Bourdieu's context, social capital is associated with efforts to form social agents in the habitus of individuals who construct their world. According to him, social capital is related to fixed relationship capital and provides useful support when needed. According to him, the strength of this network can be used as social capital because it can be converted into material capital. Similar to Putnam, Bourdieu does not elaborate on the details of the subject of social agents who can build and maintain networks into individual habitus, so they can be used firmly as social capital (Dkk, 2005).

The community around Madrasa Maarif Kokap and their power and patronage relations are still visible in the dialectical reality of this society at large. The leader of the NU Branch Office, Islamic boarding school and mosque prayer group is a religious figure (kyai) who has a high social status in the community around the madrasa. As a result, he can use his status to influence the community in the progress of Madrasa Maarif Kokap. The power relations and patronage that occur also facilitate the reciprocity of relations in this hilly community.

In Foucault's (2003) opinion, the role of power relations is played more as a guardian of strength from existing powers. It is not necessarily associated with someone who has a structural position in power over his subordinates, but rather on one's ability to maintain the power relations he has, so that the relationship is maintained with indicators that can affect other individuals without coercive and intimidating pressures. Through the existing power relations node supported by the satisfaction of the surrounding community over the existence of this madrasa, the existing social capital, especially networks and trust, contributes meaningfully to the development of the madrasa. So, the preservation of social capital owned by the madrasa is greatly influenced by the link between several homogeneous domains, especially the mainstream NU organisation. This relationship has an increasingly strong bond because it is facilitated by the conditions of traditional Javanese society.

Conclusion

The findings of this study suggest that social capital consisting of beliefs, norms and networks in the community has strong implications for the development of the madrasa located in Hilly Menoreh Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Structure, trust and networks between the madrasa and its surrounding community contribute to the ease of the madrasa in socialising through a number of its programmes—these two types of social capital will encourage the community to place their trust in the madrasa. This bond of trust and network is strengthened by norms as reinforcements between them. These norms comprise tolerance, respect, appreciation and courtesy, all of which have tied trust and networks to form the madrasa's social capital. In the era of social change, in these multi-dimensions, this madrasa can develop its potential to embrace the vision and mission it has established.

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The Rise and Fall of Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) in Sabah, Malaysia

Oshin Binti Sangkar[1]

Abstract: Sabah is one of the states in Malaysia that has a unique political development after the formation of the country. Unlike other states that were ruled by a national party known as Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu or United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Sabah was initially governed by the state's local political parties founded by the people of Sabah themselves. One of the local political parties that ruled Sabah was Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS). PBS is a party that was often involved with controversies during its reign as the state government. The rule of the PBS state government received a different reaction not only among the Sabah people, but also among the federal government leaders. Hence, this article examines the political development and situation of Sabah's political arena under PBS from 1985 to 1994. The article specifically observes the establishment and development of PBS in defeating the previous ruling party, Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah or Sabah People's United Front (BERJAYA), and focuses on the reasons for the establishment of PBS as a new party in the political arena of Sabah in 1985. Moreover, the rise of PBS as a national party and its eventual collapse as the ruling party of Sabah's state government will also be analysed.

Keywords: Sabah, Malaysia, Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS), Barisan Nasional (BN), United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (BERJAYA).

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[1] *Oshin Binti Sangkar* is a Master candidate in the Department of History and Civilization at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur. She can be reached at oshin2536@gmail.com.

Introduction

Sabah is one of the 13 states in Malaysia and it is located in the northern part of Borneo. Its land borders with the Malaysian state of Sarawak and Indonesia's Kalimantan region. Sabah's capital city is Kota Kinabalu, which is also its biggest city. There are 33 indigenous groups in Sabah who communicate in more than 50 languages and 80 ethnic dialects. "Kadazan-Dusun" is the largest ethnic group in Sabah and forms almost 30% of the total population. Sabah is famously known for its tourism and rich natural resources. Among the attractions of the state is Mount Kinabalu, which is the highest point of Sabah as well as of Malaysia. The state has long mountain ranges on the west side, which forms parts of the Crocker Range National Park. Kinabatangan River, which is considered as the second longest river in Malaysia, also runs through the land of Sabah (Sabah State Government, 2021).

In 1961, the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, proposed the formation of an independent country known as Malaysia (Oh, 1967). This country would consist of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei Darussalam (Selamat, 2016). The proposal shocked many people as it was never previously discussed with the states involved. Moreover, this proposal was obstructed by Indonesia and Philippines and, thus, this issue created conflicts with both countries (Osman, 2008). Nevertheless, the idea of this formation remained and it was set in motion. However, Brunei Darussalam withdrew from the formation at the last minute. On September 16, 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was established with the union of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak. Eventually, on August 9, 1965, Singapore was separated from Malaysia due to several horrendous conflicts that escalated to racial riots (Selamat, 2016).

Malaysia practises a system of democracy that is based on the federation system in which the federal government is led by the Prime Minister. Under this system, each state surrenders part of its power to be administered by the federal government, as stated in the Federal Constitution. For example, financial, defense, education, foreign affairs and many other matters will be under the power of the federal government. However, there are matters that are still under the power of the state. Moreover, Malaysia also practises a constitutional monarchy, whereby Malaysia has a king who is referred to as His Majesty the Yang

Di-Pertuan Agong. At the national level, His Majesty the King is one of the hereditary Rulers of the nine states and the Conference of Rulers. These hereditary Malay Rulers have the power to safeguard the customs and traditions of the Malays and handle the administration of Islamic affairs in each state (Pejabat Penyimpan Mohor Besar Raja-Raja, 2021).

Unlike other states that have their own king, His Majesty the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong is the Head of Islam for states that do not have a king, such as Penang, Malacca, Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal Territories. His Majesty the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong also holds the position of the Supreme Commander for the Malaysian Armed Forces. In contrast to the monarchy system that is usually practised by many monarchy countries, His Majesty the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong does not have absolute power because his power is subjected to the Constitution and he may only act under the advice of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Meanwhile, at the state level, the hereditary Rulers are still the Heads of State and may carry out their duties according to the advice of their respective Chief Minister. In the case of Sabah, the head of the state government is the Chief Minister, who is chosen by the majority of the State Legislative Assembly and appointed officially by the Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governor). Hence, the Chief Minister is the Head of the State Cabinet (Parliament of Malaysia, 2021).

Osman (2008) claimed that even though Sabah joined the Federation of Malaysia, unlike the other states in the Malay Peninsula, it was specially ruled by the state's local party. Since the formation of Malaysia in 1963, Sabah's local political party has been ruling the state government under the coalition of Barisan Nasional or National Front (BN). However, the political landscape changed when the national political party known as Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu or United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) became the ruling party in 1994 after successfully defeating Parti Bersatu Sabah or Sabah United Party (PBS), which was the former ruling party of the state (Osman, 2008).

The Political History of Sabah

Sabah—which was previously known as North Borneo—was under the British rule, specifically the British North Borneo Chartered Company, from 1879 to 1941. Japan successfully occupied Sabah in 1941 when

World War II erupted, causing the British to lose its power over the state. However, Sabah was once again colonised by the British in July 1946, when the Japanese surrendered to the Allied powers and ended World War II. From then, Sabah became a British crown colony until the formation of Malaysia in 1963. Malaya's Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, proposed the formation of Malaysia, which consisted of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei territories, in 1961 during a conference in Singapore (Tze Ken, 2015). This proposal shocked many parties, especially Sabah, because it had never been discussed with the leaders from the respected state. Hence, the British established a commission to observe the reactions of the people of Sabah regarding this matter. As a result, two-thirds of the majority accepted this proposal with conditions (20-Point Agreement), while one-third of the people did not agree with the idea (Osman, 2008).

Nevertheless, the idea for the formation of Malaysia was successful and North Borneo managed to gain its independence and change its name to Sabah. The newly established country, Malaysia, can be considered as one of the countries that practises the politics of ethnicity (Hashmi & Majeed, 2015). This can be seen in Malaysia's politics, where most of the political parties in the country practise ethnic-based politics. The internal structure of both the state and the federal governments plays a major role in the development of ethnic-based politics. The unequal distribution of resources, social gains and opportunities to rise and survive are among the factors that lead to the politicisation of ethnicity by any party. This has been practised long before the formation of Malaysia, especially in the Malay Peninsula. A 2014 study by Idris and Mohamad found that the multi-ethnic society in the country led to the establishment of political parties that are based on ethnicity, such as the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) and Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). However, these three political parties were united under a notable coalition in Malaya known as Parti Perikatan, which was later formally changed to Barisan Nasional (BN). Hence, it is not surprising that this ethnic-based politics has also been practised in the political arena of Sabah, especially since the state is populated with a multi-ethnic society. According to Osman (2008), the ethnic-based political parties are Sabah Chinese Association (SCA), United Pasok Momogun Kadazan Dusun Organisation (UPKO) and Sabah United Party (PBS), where the majority of the party members are

Kadazan Dusun, Murut and many other ethnic groups. Hence, ethnic-based politics is not something new in the political arena of Sabah.

Ever since Sabah gained independence with the formation of Malaysia, the state government has been ruled by a local party founded by the people of Sabah. There were several local political parties that ruled Sabah from 1963 to 1985 before PBS took over power as the ruling party. Among the local political parties that previously ruled Sabah were United Sabah National Organisation (USNO), United Kadazan National Organisation (UNKO), United Pasok Momogun Kadazan Dusun Murut Organisation (UPKO), Sabah Chinese Association (SCA) and Sabah Indian Congress (Osman, 2008). However, the political situation in Sabah at that time was unstable, causing these local parties to rule for a short period of time. There were only two parties that managed to rule Sabah for more than five years—USNO-SCA Alliance from 1967 to 1976, and Sabah People's United Front (BERJAYA) from 1976 to 1985—both of which were under BN.

In the beginning, Sabah's political atmosphere was unstable due to the power struggle between the two main leaders of Sabah, namely Donald Stephen from UPKO and Datu Mustapha Datu Harun from USNO. The situation worsened when issues of discrimination were raised, causing these local parties to not be able to rule the multi-ethnic and multi-religious state for a long period of time (Ongkili, 2003). The dispute affected the relationship between the ethnic groups in Sabah, causing the intervention of the federal government in the political crisis of the state. Nevertheless, the intervention of the federal government in Sabah's state affairs later created uneasiness and prejudices among the Kadazandusun leaders and the community towards the federal government (Yusof, 1999). During the rule of USNO-SCA (also called the Alliance party), the state government increased pressure by not only demanding for greater autonomy of the state, but also threatening to withdraw Sabah from Malaysia if the federal government does not grant any of the state's demands. According to Osman (1992), this situation led to the establishment of Parti Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah (BERJAYA), a new multi-racial political party led by Donald Stephens (Fuad Stephens), Harris Salleh and Peter Mojuntin on July 15, 1975.

This new party successfully won 28 out of the 48 seats contested in the 1976 state election, defeating USNO and ultimately reducing

tensions with the federal government. After their win, Donald Stephens was appointed as the new Chief Minister of Sabah on April 15, 1976. However, his position was later replaced by Harris Salleh. Under the leadership of Harris Salleh, the relationship between the state government and federal government became cordial. Later on, the year of 1985 witnessed the rise of a new local party known as Parti Bersatu Sabah or United Sabah Party (PBS), challenging BERJAYA to become the new state government. This party received tremendous support from indigenous groups, especially the Kadazan Dusun and Murut, which are the two largest ethnic groups in Sabah. This newly founded political party managed to defeat BERJAYA led by Harris Salleh, and set up the new state government of Sabah after winning the state election in 1985 (Yusoff, 2001).

The Rise and Development of PBS in Sabah

According to a study by Yusoff (2001), PBS was founded in March 1985, before the 1985 Sabah state election, and the founder of this party was Tan Sri Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan (henceforth known as Pairin). One of the reasons behind the establishment of this party was the act of firing Tan Sri Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan as a state minister and the decision of the state government to downgrade Tambunan as a district after BERJAYA lost to Tan Sri Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan in the 1985 state election (Osman, 2008). This act consequentially offended Sabah's indigenous groups because Tan Sri Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan was seen as a respected leader by them (Bagang & Puyok, 2021).

After Tan Sri Datuk Seri Panglima Joseph Pairin Kitingan won the election in Tambunan, he then confidently decided to form a new party (PBS) because the majority of the Kadazan and Chinese population were unhappy with the BERJAYA state government, especially on the issues of Islamisation and illegal immigrants in Sabah (Osman, 2008). Islam as a religion has increased in followers from 37.9% in 1960 to 65.4% in 2010. This statistic shows that there is somewhat an increasing number of Muslims in Sabah ever since the formation of Malaysia (Adnan, 2013).   Furthermore, the PBS leaders accused the state government under BERJAYA of doing nothing regarding the issue of Filipinos immigrants in Sabah. Even though these Filipino immigrants,

most of whom were Muslim refugees, stayed in the state for only a short period of time, they were already granted Malaysian citizenship. The report saw an increase in the number of illegal immigrants in Sabah, from 80,000 under the USNO state government in 1976 to over 300,000 in 1985 under the BERJAYA state government (Yusoff, 2001). As a result, the public was extremely frustrated with the state government and scared that these Filipino immigrants will expand Sabah's Muslim population. These sensitive issues created tension, especially with the indigenous groups of Sabah who are mostly non-Muslim.

In addition, PBS party also rose in prominence due to discrimination against Sabah's other indigenous groups, especially the Kadazan. The establishment of PBS party was to fight for the rights of indigenous groups, especially after the former Chief Minister, Harris Salleh, combined all ethnic Bumiputra, including those of Filipino and Indonesian descent, in the native category in the 1980 Census (Osman, 2008). This action was considered as one of the ways for the BERJAYA's government to eliminate certain ethnic identities, which offended the people of Sabah, especially the Kadazan Dusun and Murut. Moreover, the leader of the BERJAYA state government also strongly promoted Malay influence in Sabah. Harris Salleh weakened the Kadazan Dusun influence by categorising all ethnic groups in Sabah into one ethnic label known as pribumi (indigenous group) to replace various tribal identifications in the state (Puyok, 2011). As a result, many ethnics groups, especially the Kadazan Dusun, were upset as it was seen as a means to eradicate their ethnic identity.

Another reason for the establishment of PBS was the different views held by the party as opposed to those of the leaders of BERJAYA, especially regarding the issue of Labuan in 1984, where the chief minister decided to give Labuan—one of the territories of Sabah that is rich with oil—to the federal government. Furthermore, BERJAYA state government also gave excessive emphasis on developing urban areas while neglecting rural areas, which caused the people of Sabah to fight for development in rural areas as well. As a result, PBS participated in the 1985 state election and won 25 seats, while USNO managed to win 16 seats and BERJAYA only managed to win six seats. However, PBS's victory in the election caused the 1986 Sabah riots, also known as the Silent Riot, which occurred in major towns of Sabah, such as Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan and Tawau. The reason behind this riot was due to

the dissatisfaction of the other parties, especially BERJAYA and USNO, towards PBS for winning the 1985 state election. As a result, the federal government decided to hold a re-election in 1986. Subsequently, the 1986 state election witnessed even a bigger victory for PBS as it won a majority of 34 seats, which was nine more than in the previous election, while USNO only managed to get 12 seats (Osman, 2008).

As a result, BERJAYA—which was supported by the federal government and previously controlled the Sabah state government—lost its power dramatically to the newly established party. PBS's victory in winning the majority of the seats saw the emergence of a non-Malay, non-Muslim state government that was not part of the BN coalition. Nevertheless, the PBS leaders later decided to join BN after winning the state election in 1986 to prevent another riot. However, the leader of PBS, Pairin, and the federal leaders, especially the then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, did not have a good relationship (Osman, 2008).

The Fall of PBS in Sabah

During the reign of PBS as the ruling party of the Sabah state government, the PBS leaders tried to solve the problems faced by the Sabah people and the fought for the rights of Sabahans by demanding an increase from 5% to 20% of the oil royalty from the federal government (Kok-Wah, 1996). The PBS government also demanded that Labuan should be returned to Sabah as it was previously part of the state. The leaders believed that Sabah deserved to get an increase in the oil royalty because it is one of the states that is rich with oil and has significantly contributed to the oil and gas industry. Therefore, the leaders wanted to use this opportunity to upgrade the economic sector and further develop Sabah. In addition, as the ruling party of Sabah, PBS also demanded the implementation of the Borneonisation policy for all federal posts in Sabah. This is to ensure that the Sabah people would have a better chance and opportunity to hold a high position in federal posts in Sabah. Moreover, the state government also asked the federal government to review the Internal Security Act (ISA) and demanded that Sabah has its own radio stations and television network (Osman, 2008).

Other demands of the Sabah state government were requesting the federal government to control the issue of illegal immigrants, especially

those from the Philippines and Indonesia who came to Sabah without proper documentation (Yusoff, 2001). Putchucheary (1985) claimed that the state government demanded that the federal government should take action by sending these immigrants back to their respective countries to control the situation. The new state government believed that the influx of the illegal immigrants should be controlled in order to secure not only job opportunities for the Sabah people but also the state's security. Yusoff (2001) stated that in July 1988, the state government decided to implement a new immigration policy whereby all foreigners who entered Sabah without valid travel documents will be deported back to their respective countries. This action, however, caused the anger of the federal government because the policy was implemented without its consultation.

In contrast to the Sabah state government's demands, the federal leaders decided not to return Labuan to Sabah and, instead, stated the benefits of turning Labuan into an offshore financial centre. The federal government also insisted that an increase in oil revenues specifically for Sabah would only serve the interests of Sabah and this would not be fair to other states that do not have such valuable natural resources. Consequentially, the federal government accused PBS as Sabah's new ruling party of fanning "anti-federal" sentiments in response to the state government's demands for greater state autonomy (Yusoff, 2001). When the federal government did not seem to grant any of PBS's demands, the party decided to pull out from the BN coalition five days before the 1990 state election (Osman, 2008). The party used a famous slogan—*Sabah untuk orang Sabah* or "Sabah for Sabah people"—during this election to gain support from the people. This slogan was considered as being anti-federal, anti-Malay Peninsula and even anti-Islam. Therefore, the federal government considered PBS's decision as a backstabbing act.

Regardless, PBS received immense support from the Sabah people and successfully won a majority of 32 seats in the election, while USNO under the coalition of BN only won 12 seats. As a result, PBS once again gained victory and became the ruling party of Sabah's state government. However, the victory of PBS in forming the state government led to the coming of UMNO as the national party in 1991. The coming of UMNO was one of the federal government's strategies to reclaim Sabah from the opposition party. UMNO had planned for this particular strategy to win back Sabah in time for the 1994 state election. Among its other

strategies under the BN coalition was the use of the slogan *Sabah Baru* or "New Sabah" and a few agendas promised for Sabah, especially on matters regarding school infrastructure, building a university and developing the economy of the state (Osman, 2008).

As tensions between the federal and the state governments intensified, Sabah's Chief Minister Pairin unexpectedly dissolved the State Legislative Assembly on January 10, 1994, a week before a scheduled verdict on charges that he had violated his power by granting a contract for the construction of two-storey shop-houses to a business allegedly owned by one of his relatives. With the verdict of his corruption trial about to be revealed, Pairin calculated that he could count on a sympathy vote from ordinary Sabah people. The court found him guilty of wrongdoing, but he did not have to resign as Chief Minister because the judge's fine of RM1,800 was less than the RM2,000 minimum necessary to eliminate him from office (Yusoff, 2001).

In a blow to Pairin's intentions, the BN coalition got a huge boost shortly after the State Legislative Assembly was dissolved when Yong Teck Lee, PBS's then-Vice President and State Minister for Industrial Development, declared that he was leaving PBS and established a new faction called the Sabah Progressive Party (SAPP). At a press conference, Yong stressed the importance of unity between the state and federal governments in order to reintegrate Sabah into the national development process. He said that if PBS was re-elected, the Chinese business class, which accounted for 70% of Sabah's economy, would actually face more burdens. Following its formation, the leaders of SAPP and BN had a series of meetings. Anwar Ibrahim, the then-Deputy Prime Minister, declared in Kota Kinabalu on February 4 1994 (three days before nomination day) that the newly created SAPP has been admitted into BN and would contest in the state elections on BN's ticket (Yusoff, 2001).

While Yong defected to BN, Tun Mustapha, a long-time hero of the Sabah Malay-Muslims, resigned as federal Minister for Sabah Affairs and declared his support for PBS. Mustapha's defection was to show his support towards PBS in the 1994 state elections. This move was supposed to give PBS a significant portion of the Muslim vote that would have otherwise gone to UMNO in Sabah, given the party's strong public standing in the state (Yusoff, 2001). As stated by Bagang and Puyok

(2021), PBS was projected to win the election as a result of this growth
by the vote-pulling forces of Pairin, the widely respected *Huguan Siou*
(Paramount leader) of the Kadazan.

The majority of the Sabah people still supported PBS in the 1994
state election, where once again the party won the election with 25
seats, while BN managed to win 23 seats (Osman, 2008). It was evident
that PBS's performance was poor compared to the 1990 election in
which it secured 36 seats. PBS received 49.5% of the vote (compared to
53.9% in 1990), the BN coalition received 46% and the remaining votes
went to candidates from minor parties or independents. The Chinese
vote swung the election in favour of BN. Yong Teck Lee secured a
comfortable majority in his Likas electorate, as did two other Chinese
ex-PBS assemblymen who ran for election in Sabah's east coast. After
the results were announced, the chief minister's swearing-in ceremony
was delayed for 36 hours because the Yang di-Pertua Negeri (Governor
of Sabah), who had been appointed by the federal government, appeared
to be ill and unwilling to see Pairin. Pairin waited at the palace gates,
claiming that he wanted to avoid a repetition of the humiliating incident in
1985. Pairin was then sworn in on February 21, 1994, after a declaration
was created that had been signed by all of PBS's winning candidates
and contained their promises of allegiance to the party (Yusoff, 2001).

However, before the PBS-led government could settle into power,
the UMNO-led opposition soon promoted defections from PBS by
providing numerous offers. As a result, three PBS assemblymen
defected to BN within two weeks. These allegations were refuted by
UMNO Secretary-General, Mohamed Rahmat, who said that several
PBS Supreme Council members defected because they lost faith in the
party's leadership "due to the poor election results: they were leaving
the PBS for the betterment of their people and not for selfish interests".
Pairin agreed to call new elections and urged the Yang di-Pertua Negeri
to dissolve the Assembly (which was yet to convene) to avoid further
defections, but the Yang di-Pertua Negeri declined, insisting that
because BN now had the numbers, it should be given the chance to form
a government (Yusoff, 2001).

On March 14, 1994, Pairin's younger brother, Jeffrey, who had
recently been released from prison but was still facing corruption
allegations, crossed over to UMNO's side. Jeffrey insisted that his

decision was inspired solely by a desire to improve relationships with the federal government in Kuala Lumpur and had little to do with his political aspirations. He also expressed his desire "to see more local involvement in the federal machinery and more support devoted to Sabah" (Yusoff, 2001). Three weeks after the election, six members of the State Legislative Assembly left PBS to join UMNO (Osman, 2008). The act of party hopping by these six members of the State Legislative Assembly resulted in PBS's loss of its majority seats. According to Osman (2008), on March 17, 1994, Pairin Kitingan and PBS were forced to step down from the state government because BN now had the majority seats. Hence, this marked the end of Sabah's ruled by local party (Chin, 2014).

The 1999 state election witnessed the increasing popularity of UMNO under the BN coalition, as BN won 31 out of 48 seats (Osman, 2008). As a result, PBS decided to re-join the BN coalition in 2000 after seeing the dominance of BN in Sabah. This situation shows that sometimes the interests between the local people of Sabah and the federal government clash with one another, causing the state-federal relations to become strained. In addition, the ethnic-based political system is not an easy matter to manage by the state government, especially in creating unity at the state level, when Sabah is home to numerous ethnic groups. Hence, in many historical stages, Sabah's local political parties would find themselves joining the BN coalition once again.

Conclusion

Ever since Sabah gained its independence, the state's political development has been greatly influenced by the leaders, ethnicity and popularity of its political parties and the relationship between the state government and federal government. The fate of any party will be based on the manifesto it offers to the people of Sabah during elections. A party that is able to give the best manifesto will have a greater opportunity to win elections. However, if the particular party is unable to fulfil or deliver its manifesto to the people, it will lead to its downfall in the following elections. In the case of PBS, the party gained prominence due to its sensitive sentiments to issues of Islamisation, ethnicity, discrimination and many more that were created by the previous ruling party, BERJAYA.

Such issues negatively affected the Sabah people's confidence in BERJAYA and led to their change in support to other parties, particularly PBS. Henceforth, PBS managed to become the ruling party of Sabah for nine years, from 1985 to 1994. However, due to PBS's demands towards the federal government, especially regarding the sensitive issues of Labuan, Borneonisation policy, oil royalty and many more, tensions occurred between the state and federal governments, which later contributed to the fall of PBS in 1994. Consequently, Sabah's political tension gave UMNO the opportunity to enter the state's political arena, and it eventually ruled the state until 2018. Subsequently, it indirectly forced PBS to re-join the BN coalition in 2000 as a component party due to BN's dominance in the political arena of Sabah.

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Indonesian Sultanates and Their Alleged Allegiance to Islamic Caliphates: A Historical Analysis of "Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara"

Tiar Anwar Bachtiar[1] and Nandang Nursaleh[2]

Abstract: This study aims to discuss the contents of a documentary film entitled *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara*, which was released on 1 Muharram 1422H (August 20, 2020). The central claim of this documentary, which is also the main discussion of this study, is that the kingdoms in the Indonesian archipelago (Samudra Pasai, Malaka, Demak, Aceh Darussalam and others) have pledged allegiance to the centers of the caliphate in Egypt and later in Turkey. The study intends to discover whether such an allegiance really occurred and if these Islamic kingdoms were vassals of the Islamic caliphate. This study concludes that this claim is weak by using the methods of discourse analysis, historical analysis and the *fiqh al-siyāsa* approach. The Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago did not pledge allegiance to any center of the Islamic caliphate, even though the relationship between these centers of power was likely intensive.

Keywords: Caliphate, allegiance, Islamic kingdoms, Indonesian archipelago, international relations, *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara*.

Introduction

On 1 Muharram 1442H (August 20, 2020), the public discourse of Indonesian Muslims was appalled by a controversy. The trigger was a ban on a documentary film entitled *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara* (or *Traces*

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[1] *Tiar Anwar Bachtiar* is a lecturer in STAI Persatuan Islam Garut. He can be reached at tiarab@staipigarut.ac.id.

[2] *Nandang Nursaleh* is a lecturer in Universitas Padjadjaran Bandung. He can be reached at nandang.nursaleh@unpad.ac.id.

of the Caliphate in the Indonesian Archipelago) that was streaming on YouTube earlier on the same day. The Indonesian government asked YouTube to stop streaming this documentary. The ban made netizens curious, which, in turn, made the documentary more sought after. The filmmakers resorted to various ways so that the documentary could still be available online. The documentary then became available for viewing on Facebook after a particular page was created and managed by the filmmakers; it was also made available through another link on YouTube after they erased the term "caliphate" and changed the title to *Jejak Islam di Nusantara* or *Traces of Islam in the Archipelago* (Khilafah Channel, 2020).

The controversy also attracted many people into discussions, both online and offline. Seasoned historians, such as Azyumardi Azra and Peter Carey (Gunawan, 2020), were even directly involved. Ismail Hakki Kadi, a Southeast Asian historian from Turkey, also shared his views, although he did not directly mention the documentary. In an interview with the Turkish news agency, *Anadolu Agency*, Ismail Hakki Kadi commented that the Turkish-Ottoman relationship with several sultanates in Java or Sumatra was not hierarchical (Azzam, 2020).

If any question were to arise, it would be about why the presence of this documentary caused controversy. The answer is not related to the quality or content of the documentary itself, but to the term "caliphate" in the title. In the last five years, since the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) was disbanded in 2017, the word "caliphate" has often been viewed negatively and has become the target of criticism after the word *jihad* also previously received the same stigma. The word "caliphate" was then associated with radicalism and even separatism. This stems from the maneuvers of the HTI movement itself, which always affirmed that the caliphate is the only standard Islamic political system. The democratic system practiced in Indonesia today is considered as a *kufr* (disbelief) system, so any product that is born of a democratic system is a product of *kufr*. Therefore, Pancasila—Indonesian national principles—and its derivative laws are also considered as a product of the *kufr* system. This propaganda is frequently repeated since HTI has always firmly clashed between "caliphate" and "democracy" (al-Amin, 2012). As a result, this has become common knowledge. At the same time, the producer, script writer and all source persons of this documentary were known as

activists of HTI. Therefore, it is no wonder that this documentary has been associated with HTI.[3]

This is what caused many people who do not understand the different views of the term "caliphate" among experts to be influenced and think that this "caliphate system" is contrary to the democratic system implemented in Indonesia today. Similarly, the government overreacted by assuming that the "caliphate" is a threat to Pancasila and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). This imprudent assumption then gives rise to unwarranted fear. When the word "caliphate" is heard, or if someone is campaigning for it, it is immediately assumed that the existing system in this country will be destroyed.

The fear that haunted the government and its quick reaction to the streaming of *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara* made this documentary even more sought after by many people who became curious about its content. The authors were interested in watching the documentary not because they were also curious about the content, but to know how detrimental the documentary actually is that the government decided to ban it. After paying attention from beginning to end, the authors believe that the narrative of this documentary is ordinary. There is nothing that could have potentially harmed the current government, let alone reject the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). There are no deliberate attempts to provoke treason against the government or express any separatist idea. This documentary only tells about the emergence of the Islamic caliphate after Prophet Muhammad died, its spread throughout the world and its relation with the Islamic kingdoms in the Indonesian archipelago. However, the timeline of this documentary ends in the 16th century, during the Demak Sultanate.

Until now, the Indonesian government has not published any official letter or broadcast about this documentary. Therefore, we are unable to substantiate exactly that the government officials asked YouTube so the latter would stop the premier release of this documentary on its platform. However, it could be speculated that the disband of HTI—which

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[3] One of the sources of information is Ismail Yusanto, who is a prominent person in Indonesia and known as a spokesman of HTI. Other persons, such as Salman Iskandar, Hafizh Abdurrahman and Rokhmat Labib, were also known as activists of HTI.

promoted the issue of caliphate—by the government, along with the release of this documentary with the same theme, lead the government to officially request YouTube to drop this documentary. If this were true, we can also guess that the reason for this was that this documentary was deemed a threat to the Republic of Indonesia because it was considered as a way to propagate about the caliphate. However, this consideration is an exaggeration. In fact, books that detail the history of the Islamic caliphate and the Islamic sultanates in Indonesia have been published for many decades now. These books are even taught in various Islamic educational institutions, from elementary to university. However, such teachings have not caused Muslims to become hostile to the Republic of Indonesia until now.

The problem that will be explored in this study, however, is related to historical claims. As a documentary, this film contains many historical claims that are different from the widely accepted history. The narrative constructed by this documentary leads to the conclusion that the Islamic kingdoms in the Indonesian archipelago, namely Samudra Pasai, Melaka, Aceh Darussalam, Demak and Mataram, have made allegiance (*bay'a*) to the Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt (in Mamluk era) dan the Ottoman Caliphate. If this claim is valid, then hierarchically, the Islamic kingdoms in Indonesia were direct subordinates (vassals) of these Islamic caliphates. This claim, if true, will undoubtedly revise the general view among historians who hold that the Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago were independent from the caliphates (Abdullah & Endjat, 2015). Therefore, this paper intends to examine the extent of the accuracy of this claim.

Methodology

The method used in this paper is discourse analysis, which is best suited to analyse the contents of *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara* (Sabur, 2012; Gillen & Alan, 2006). The discussion of the contents of the documentary uses two approaches, namely the historical method approach (Gottschalk, 2006) and the *fiqh* method approach, especially Islamic political jurisprudence (*fiqh al-siyāsa*) (Muhajir, 2017). The historical method approach analyses aspects of historical claims about the relationship between the kingdoms of the Indonesian archipelago and the Islamic caliphates. Meanwhile, the political *fiqh* approach is

used to understand Islamic politics in the past through the fundamental conceptions of Islamic law. This is because the political act of power that formally bears the name of Islam generally must have legitimacy in *fiqh*.

Results and Discussion

Synopsis of Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara

According to Nicko Pandawa, who is the screenwriter, this documentary was inspired by his thesis in fulfilment of the degree programme in History of Islamic Civilization (SPI) at the State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. His thesis was later published under the title *Khilafah & Ketakutan Penjajah Belanda: Riwayat Pan-Islamisme dari Istanbul sampai Batavia, 1882-1928* (*Caliphate and the Fear of the Dutch Colonisers: History of Pan-Islamism from Istanbul to Batavia 1882-1928*). Therefore, it is possible that during his thesis data collection process, Nicko was motivated to turn it into a documentary film, an idea that he eventually realised.[4]

Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara begins with a narrative about the so-called "Islamic Caliphate" from 632 AD to 656 AD. This period began with the reign of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (632 AD) and ended with the reign of ʿUsman ibn ʿAffān (656 AD). For some reason, the reign of Ali bin Abi Talib was not included in the initial account of the formation of this Islamic caliphate. This documentary defines the caliphate itself as "a government structure regulated according to the Islamic teachings as brought and conducted by Prophet Muhammad during his lifetime, and then continued by the Rashidun". This form of caliphate was also continued in the Umayyad, Abbasid and Ottoman periods.

Moreover, this documentary narrates that the Islamic caliphate had spread to all corners of the world, including Indonesia. The

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[4] This information was received by the authors from Nicko himself and was strengthened by his interviews in several YouTube channels. Some of these interviews were dropped from YouTube when this article was written. However, a few YouTube channels related to this claim can be found, such as that of Moeflich H. Hart (2020, October 24). In fact, we can also find many similarities between the documentary and the script writer's thesis.

spread of Islam to the Indonesian archipelago also led to the birth of Islamic political power in this region, which then submitted or pledged allegiance to the center of the Islamic caliphate. The main reason for the allegiance of political rulers in this region is that those who spread Islam to this region were actually direct envoys of the "caliphate".

To prove this narrative, this documentary shows several pieces of evidence: first, the letters of Caliph ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz of the Umayyads to the King of Srivijaya, which occurred between 717AD and 720AD (Azra, 2004) and; second, the discovery of coins from the Umayyad dynasty in Sumatra. After all, the above evidence do not actually show the allegiance and submission of any local king to the Umayyad caliphate. However, the evidence is used as a prelude to frame that, later, the first Islamic kingdom in the Indonesian archipelago, namely Samudera Pasai in Aceh, had pledged allegiance to the Abbasid dynasty. This claim is different from the theory, developing so far, that the birth of Islamic political power in the region was due to cultural encouragement from people who had previously embraced Islam (Abdullah & Endjat, 2015; Abdullah & Lapian, 2012).

The narrative about the existence of *bay'a* (pledge of allegiance) to the Islamic Caliphates begins with the existence of a tomb in Aceh that is claimed to be a descendant of the Abbasid rulers, namely the tomb of Shadrul Akabir Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Abdul Qadir bin Yusuf bin Abdul Aziz bin Al-Mansur Abi Jafar al-Abbasi (d. 1413 AD). This information is taken from the inscription on this tomb. According to this documentary, the father of the deceased was said to have come to Transoxiana and Delhi in India. His presence was highly respected in those places. Even the ruler of Delhi always pledged allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphate, even though it collapsed in Baghdad in 1258 and moved to Cairo three years later. In addition to the ruler of Delhi, the newly established Ottoman ruler, Bayezid I, also pledged allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo. Allegiance to a caliph was considered as the *zeitgeist* (spirit of the times) of that time. So, with this assumption, it is possible that the ruler of Samudera Pasai also pledged allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo at that time. Therefore, the existence of the tomb of the descendants of the Abbasid Caliphs in the burial complex of the royal family of Samudera Pasai in Kuta Krueng Aceh is considered as an indication of the possibility of a *bay'a* to the Abbasid Caliphate.

Armed with the "belief" about the existence of Samudera Pasai's pledge to the Abbasids, the narrative of this caliphate network continued with the sending of Samudera Pasai's envoy to Java, namely Maulana Malik Ibrahim (Sunan Gresik). Still relying on the analysis of the tombstone inscription, this documentary believes that Maulana Malik Ibrahim is an important person in Pasai. By connecting Sunan Gresik with the rulers in Pasai, this documentary seems to suggest that the spread of Islam in Java through the establishment of the Kingdoms of Demak, Cirebon and Banten had a solid relationship with the Aceh-Abbasid connection. This documentary has not yet provided an in-depth analysis of Islam in Java. According to the producer, the documentary film sequel about Java is still in production. However, with this entry point, it is strongly suspected that the direct connection through the allegiance to the Ottoman Caliphate, which succeeded the Abbasids in Cairo, by the Javanese rulers will be the narrative's focal point.

Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara itself then focuses again on the continuation of the story of the Acehnese rulers after the ruling power was no longer in the hands of the Pasai kings, but in the hands of the Aceh Darussalam kings centered in Banda Aceh. Since the rulers in Aceh and the caliphate changed, the documentary tries to build a new argument about the allegiance of the Sultan of Aceh to the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey. Again, the focus of this documentary is based on the inscriptions of graves in Aceh, some of which are said to be related to the Ottoman rule, such as the tombs of Turkish soldiers in Gampong Pande.

In this section, the argument is strengthened by the existence of two letters from the Sultans of Aceh to the Ottoman Caliphate in Istanbul. Both were asking for Aceh to become part of the Ottoman Caliphate. The first letter was from Alauddin Riayat Syah in 1566. The second letter was sent in 1849 by Ghauts Sayful Alam, vizier of the Sultanate of Aceh, to the Ottoman Governor of Jeddah, Mehmed Hasib Pasha. In the letter, it is stated that the people of Aceh and Sumatra are subjected to the Ottoman Caliphate. Several other sources that are considered secondary by the documentary were then used to reinforce these two letters, such as the graves of the Turks in Aceh and coins from the Ottomans. Apart from Aceh, the Ottoman assistance to Demak, Melaka and even Ternate is also briefly mentioned.

The concluding narrative of the documentary emphasises on the existence of a functional power relationship, which in the history of Islamic politics was marked by *bay'a*:

> With such an extraordinary achievement, of course, Baabulllah did not stand alone. There is a bond of solidarity with the sultans of Aceh, Java, and the Philippines. The bond is as one ummah—bonding with one creed, the Islamic creed. The bond with one spirit, the spirit of jihad, and the bond with one leadership because all the sultans in the archipelago were submissive and respectful to the Ottoman Caliphate (Khilafah Channel, 2020).

Caliphate in Islamic Jurisprudence (Fiqh)

What is meant by "caliphate" in *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara*? The concept of the "caliphate" must be discussed first before examining the data and interpretations presented by the documentary because the entire narrative centers on the conceptualisation of the word "caliphate" itself. Two people can both say "caliphate," but their concept of the word may differ. For example, the concept of the caliphate in the discipline of Islamic history can be different from the concept of the caliphate in the discipline of *fiqh*, which is projective or legitimate. Likewise, the understanding of the concept of caliphate between Islamic movements could also be different. In Indonesia itself, several Islamic groups use the term "caliphate" with different definitions. In fact, there are those whose movement leaders have been called as "caliphs". In Cileungsi, West Java, for example, there is someone claiming to be the "caliph" who leads the Jamaatul Muslimin Hizbullah movement (Mi'raj Islamic News Agency, 2017). There is also a "caliph" in Lampung who claims to be the leader of the Jamaatul Muslimin movement (Damarjati, 2019). They define the word "caliphate" according to their respective understanding so they could tenaciously claim their leader as a caliph.

Before discussing the legitimation of existing Caliphs in history by Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), firstly, we have to elaborate on the definition of "caliphate" itself by Islamic jurists (*fuqahā'*). Imam al-Mawardī, in his prominent book entitled *al-Aḥkām al-ṣulṭāniyya*, did not name the Islamic state leader with only the single title of "chaliph". He did not differentiate between the term "caliphate" and *imāma*.

Hence, al-Mawardī (2006, p. 15) notes that "*imāma* was used for those who are the descendants[5] of prophet missions as guardians of religion (*al-dīn*) and governors of the umma." Al-Mawardī's concept of *imāma* (caliphate) was mostly referenced by other jurists. For example, the modernist jurist, Rashīd Riḍā, referred to al-Mawardī when he discussed the definition of "caliphate" in his book, *al-Khilāfa wa al-imāma al-ʿuẓmā*. He states that the definition of this term by Sunni scholars was not taken from al-Mawardī's concept (Riḍā, 2013). From this term, we know that in Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), the man who assumed such a responsibility was called "caliph" or "imam". The term "*sulṭān*", "*walī*", "*amīr*" and other names known in Islamic political history have more political connotation rather than sharia's connotation. Meanwhile, these terms are not different with "caliph" and "imam" in its essential meaning.

In Islamic history, the term "caliph" or "caliphate" is determined based on the person's acknowledgment as well as the legitimacy of other contemporaries for his claim. The actual existence of his power also supports this recognition. Therefore, after Prophet Muhammad's death, the Rashidun are all called "caliph" by consensus among Muslim historians. Likewise, the Umayyad rulers are all called "caliphs". The Abbasid rulers were the same, until their reign collapsed in 1258 AD. However, at the same time, ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Dākhil, a descendant of the Umayyads who managed to escape when this caliphate collapsed in 750 AD, declared himself an independent ruler in Andalusia who did not acknowledge (did not give allegiance to) the Abbasids in Baghdad. Therefore, historians, such as al-Suyūṭī in his book entitled *Tārīkh al-khulafāʾ*, still referred to him as "caliph" because Muslims in Andalusia pledged allegiance to him as caliph and there was a clear territory of authority. The Andalusian ruler of the Umayyad dynasty later openly declared the reuse of the title "caliph" by ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Nāṣir (313-350 H) in 316 H (al-Suyūṭī, 2013). The use of the title "caliph" was a response to the declaration of a new "caliphate" in Cairo by the Fatimid dynasty.

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[5] The adverb "descendant" in Arabic used is *khilāfa*. This adverb that is then used as a term of Islamic state leadership is "Caliphate" and the man who takes this responsibility is called "caliph".

Meanwhile, the Abbasid Caliphate under the reign of al-Muqtadir was getting weaker. As a result, at that time, at least three dynasties were using the title "Caliphate", namely the Abbasids, the Fatimids (Thaqqusy, 2015; Muir, 1963) and the Umayyads in Andalusia. Although the title of "Caliph" was only used during the time of ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Nāṣir, historians still use it to refer to the Umayyad rulers in Andalusia since ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Dākhil, who came to power in 138H as a "Caliph" (al-Suyūṭī, 2013). This indicates that the term "caliphate" is used by historians loosely.

This loose use of the term "caliphate" also caused al-Suyūṭī to continue to refer to the Abbasid descendants, who were protected by the Mamluk dynasty in Cairo after the destruction of Baghdad in 1258 AD (656H), as "Caliph". In fact, when they fled to Cairo to take refuge under the Mamluk rulers who managed to stem the Mongol attack in 1260 at the Battle of Ain Jalut, the heirs to the Abbasid throne no longer had power. Real power was in the hands of the Mamluk dynasty. Most likely, the Mamluks, who were the descendants of freed slaves, did not have enough legitimacy to claim to be a "caliphate" because Muslims still believed that the caliph must be of Quraysh descent. The Abbasids, Umayyads and Fatimids were dynasties of Quraysh descent. Therefore, each of them dared to claim their dynasty as a "caliphate".

Before and after the split of Islamic rule into the dynasties of the Abbasids in Baghdad and the Umayyads in Cordova, various smaller Islamic dynasties also separated themselves independently from the two caliphates. These dynasties are, for example, the Rustumiya Dynasty, the Idrisid Dynasty, the Aghlabid Dynasty and the Bani Zeri Dynasty. These dynasties ruled in North Africa or the Maghreb region (now Morocco and Tunisia). There were also the Tulunid Dynasty in Egypt and the Bani Hamdan Dynasty in Syria, among others. These dynasties did not claim to be a caliphate and did not pledge allegiance to other (independent) caliphates (Egyptian Islamic Research and Studies Team, 2005).

What is the status of these independent dynasties from a *fiqh* perspective? Historians and experts of history must understand this because it is significant in understanding the dynamics of power of the past of Islamic politics. The unity and division of Islamic political power have been studied by previous *fiqh* experts, who gave birth to different

fiqh views. The task of the historian himself is not to choose a legally more decisive view, but to use all these different views to analyse the factors of religious thought underlying the integration and disintegration of Islamic political power. As kingdoms that made Islam their political foundation, their actions still must have legal (sharia) legitimacy.

Basically, as exemplified by Prophet Muhammad and the four Caliphs, the leadership of the Muslims can be held by only one person. This also happened during the Umayyad Caliphate. However, the seeds of division began to appear during the Umayyad era. The split occurred when there was a caliphate dualism between Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī, who received allegiance in Iraq (Kūfa) shortly after his father, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, was buried, and Muʿāwiya, who was also sworn in as Caliph in Damascus (Shallaby, 2008). Power and leadership were legally valid for both men. The peace between them marked the unification of these two caliphates several months later. The legitimacy of the two powers indicated that Islamic power had begun to split, although it would be reunited later.[6] Even before that, for several years, Muʿāwiya did not give his *bayʿa* (acknowledgment as Caliph) to ʿAlī since the latter became a Caliph until his death. Indeed, Muʿāwiya did not mention himself as Caliph. However, since he gave no *bayʿa* to ʿAlī as Caliph, it meant that he declared himself as an independent power that is separate from ʿAlī's power. Ibn Taymiyya said that both ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya were valid as leader in their own region (Taymiyya, 1998).

The above situation, of course, never happened during the time of Prophet Muhammad. Nonetheless, the *qaṭʿī* law was based on events during Prophet Muhammad's time and the clear and firm texts of the Qurʾan and Sunnah. Therefore, scholars opted for the process of *ijtihād*. *Ijtihād* must incorporate arguments from the time of Prophet Muhammad, even though it is only *qiyāsī* (based on analogic reasoning),

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[6] The incident where Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī and Muʿāwiya reconciled is called *Am al-Jamāʿa* (Year of Unity), which occurred in the 41st year of Hijri. The two reconciled on the initiative of Ḥasan ʿAlī, who wanted to end the conflict and slander that occurred among the Muslims. Since Ḥasan, who had been pledged as Caliph, and Muʿāwiya were in the same position, Ḥasan chose to hand over his power to Muʿāwiya. This situation indicated that, at that time, there were two concurrent caliphates in Kūfa (Iraq) and Damascus (Shām), each with legality of its own power.

because current situations are not the same as what happened during his time. If this step cannot be conducted, the determination of legal status can be based on general *qaṭʿī* law by considering all other legal-making tools.

In this regard, there are different views on the emergence of two leaders in one period. For example, some *fiqh* scholars believe that it is not permissible to have more than one Muslim leader in a certain period. However, many *fiqh* scholars argue otherwise. In conditions that do not allow a leader to control areas that are too far from the center of power or other pressures, Muslims can have other powers separate from pre-existing powers (*taʿaddud al-khilāfa*). This is the view of one such *fiqh* scholar named Imam al-Ḥaramayn al-Juwaynī. According to him, this view is also the view of his teachers, Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī and Abū Ishaq al-Isfirayainī. Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdadī and Imam al-Qurṭubī also shared the same view; the same goes with Ibn Taymiyya, followed by al-Shanʿānī and al-Shawkānī (Murad, 2019).

The permissibility of *taʿaddud al-khilāfa* in this situation is a response to the emergence of various Islamic political powers that were independent of each other during the time of these scholars. This situation occurred for the first time during the Abbasid Caliphate, which was centered in Baghdad. At the same time, the Emir in Andalusia declared himself an independent leader when ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Dākhil managed to save himself after the collapse of the Umayyads in Damascus. Even during the time of ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Nāṣir, the grandson of al-Dāhkhil used the title "Caliph" and *Amīr al-Muʾminīn* in Andalus (al-Suyūṭī, 2013, p. 790).

The different views among scholars regarding this issue indicate that the caliphate is a branch (*furuʾ*) issue in Islam. However, this matter does not cause a person or group of Muslims to leave their religion. Therefore, such differences of opinion should be treated fairly and not excessively. This attitude will make us appreciate the efforts of Islamic leaders and activists to establish Islamic rule in various parts of the world, even though they take different steps and strategies.

One appreciative view that considers the differences of opinion in *fiqh* above, for example, can be found in Shawish Murad's article entitled *Ḥukm taʿaddud al-aʾimma fī dār al-Islām*.

> As for when the Muslims' outstanding leadership has disappeared, the saying of the Islamic leaders has become a reality, befell the Muslims, and cannot be denied anymore. Thus, like it or not, we must use the opinion of the scholars who allow the number of leaders in a state of urgency (*dharurah*) to maintain the existence of the Islamic community. Therefore, every Muslim in various regions must obey their respective leaders and take allegiance to them. Furthermore, leaders are also obliged to protect the people under their control by enforcing Islamic criminal law (*ḥudūd*), fulfilling their rights, and upholding justice and equality, until Allah SWT allows the establishment of the unity of Muslims throughout the Western and Eastern hemispheres under one leadership. (Murad, 2019, p. 800)

This is identical to the view of Ibn Taymiyya, who lived during the Mamluk dynasty in Egypt and other Middle Eastern regions. He also witnessed the division of power of the Muslims and said:

> The Sunnah is that the Muslims only have one leader. The rest are only their representatives. If it is unavoidable that some people leave the single leadership because of the disobedience of some other people, while the existing leadership is weak (unable to unite the people again), or for other reasons, eventually several leaders emerge. In this situation, every leader is obliged to enforce the law (ḥudūd) and fulfill the rights (of the people). (Taymiyya, 2001, p. 111)

However, several Islamic movements contend that only their view on the concept and practice of the caliphate is correct. Therefore, only their version of the method of enforcing Islamic rule is considered to be in accordance with the sharia. This assumption is relatively extreme in negating other views. Actually, the attitude to choose a particular view that is considered the strongest is the right of every individual or group. However, when this attitude is followed by an attitude that only one's choice is correct while ignoring other views, then this is where the problem occurs. The problem is perceiving something that is not absolute as absolute; in other words, does not want to negotiate a case that is actually very negotiable.

One example of where such views and attitudes can be found is in the doctrines and teachings of Hizbut Tahrir (HT), parent organisation of

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). This cross-border network organisation is very passionate about re-establishing the caliphate in the form of a single leadership. In HT's view, the caliphate is a system of state management based on Islam, meaning it must have the following four primary characters: (1) there is only one caliphate; (2) power (*sulṭān*) is in the hands of the people; (3) leadership (*siyāsa*) is in the hands of sharia; and (4) only the caliph has the right to pass down (*tabanni*) sharia laws into legislation. If one of the primary characteristics above does not exist, then the system is no longer a caliphate system (Al-Nabhani, 2002: 231). Based on the above principles, HT rejects the concept and practice of more than one caliphate, the national state system practiced by the majority of Muslim countries today as well as the democratic system. All these systems are considered as being incompatible with sharia and cannot be called "Islamic leadership".

In the context of understanding and writing history, this kind of view will lead to difficulties. For example, suppose we follow the principles conveyed by Al-Nabhani above. In that case, we will find it difficult to accept the fact that in the course of history, the divisions that occurred within the Muslim *umma* (community) are facts that are impossible to refute. Furthermore, the separation of one territory from another Islamic territory will also be challenging to accept theoretically. However, these difficulties will be easily overcome if we return to the diversity of views of both classical and contemporary *fiqh* scholars. They have already faced, and even experienced, the divisions of Muslims in this political field. However, suppose from the beginning that the diversity of *fiqh* views regarding the caliphate—which can significantly help us understand historical facts conceptually—has been rejected by the Hizbut Tahrir. In that case, difficulties and confusion in understanding Islamic history cannot be avoided.

Examining the Caliphate Traces in the Indonesian Archipelago

After analysing the conceptual weakness in the use of "caliphate" that ignores the diversity of views, the current section will examine the claim that the Islamic sultanates in Indonesia pledged allegiance to the caliphate in Cairo and then Istanbul. The fundamental conceptual weakness of *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara* is the idea that throughout history, up to the end of the Ottoman Caliphate, the Muslims were always

ruled by a "single caliphate". The documentary tries to support this idea by presenting historical facts that are considered "very convincing".

Therefore, these historical facts need to be thoroughly examined, the first of which is the number of sultanates in Indonesia, which were in the hundreds, if we count those whose territories were small. There were a number of large sultanates, such as those of Aceh Darussalam, Palembang, Demak, Cirebon, Banten, Mataram, Banjar, Pontianak, Malaka, Kutai Kartanegara ing Martadipura, Gowa, Ternate, Tidore and so on. Second, if it were true that these sultanates became natural subordinates of the Ottoman Caliphate, what evidence has this documentary found? Is it just one, two, three, or is it all? If it unveiled only one evidence that shows a central-regional relationship between the Ottoman Caliphate with a certain sultanate in the archipelago and not in other sultanates, then the evidence cannot be used to determine the exact relationship between the Ottoman Caliphate and the other sultanates. In politics, an independent sultanate had its own policy, which was either the same or different from that of other independent sultanates. The policy of the Aceh Sultanate could either have been or not been the same with the Sultanates of Demak, Banten or Cirebon. Therefore, this documentary has to present more substantial evidence from each Sultanate in the archipelago to defend its claim. If not, then the claim will fall automatically.

As far as the authors observe, the effort to prove the existence of political relations between the Islamic caliphate in the area that we currently know as the Middle East—whether in Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo, Andalusia or Istanbul—and the Indonesian sultanates is relatively complex. This difficulty stems from the absence of historical sources, both in Indonesia and in the early Islamic centers of power. The absence of evidence, of course, does not absolutely mean that the relationship did not exist, regardless of the form of the relationship. However, without evidence, historians cannot write any history. In historical methodology, there is an adage that if there is no document, there is no history. Thus, one cannot write and make any claims about history without evidence from the past. If we continue to insist on making historical narratives, even without evidence, then what we create is merely fiction or fantasy.

However, the documentary *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara* seems ambitious to prove its claim that all sultanates in the Indonesian

archipelago pledged allegiance to the Ottoman Caliphs and even to the Abbasids in Cairo (Mamluk). Unfortunately, this claim is hard to prove and even leads to deeper misconceptions. This is because there is actually nothing new regarding the various data presented in the documentary. All of the historical data are commonly known by experts who study the history of Islam in the archipelago. The data presented include: (1) Srivijaya letters to the Umayyad Caliph (2) three graves in Aceh that are allegedly of descendants of the Abbasids who had a diaspora in the Aceh region during the time of Samudera Pasai; (3) the spread of Walisongo's (Nine *Wali*/Islamic preachers) *da'wa* in Java during the Majapahit Kingdom; (4) the Walisongo's role in the establishment of Demak, Cirebon and Banten Sultanates; (5) the arrival of the Portuguese and the Dutch colonisers; (6) the resistance of the Demak, Aceh and Tidore Sultanates against the Portuguese; and (7) several written sources in the form of correspondence that allegedly showed a *bay'a* by the Sultanate of Aceh to the Ottoman Turks.

The data disclosed above are mostly related to the Aceh region, especially Samudera Pasai and Aceh Darussalam. In the documentary, Samudera Pasai was said to have "pledged allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo in the early 15th century". Unfortunately, the information used is only tombstone inscriptions whose historical data have not been corroborated with written documents that support the interpretation of the documentary. The inscriptions say nothing about *bay'a*, so the claim is very weak. Historically, until now, the authors have not found any data that can prove the allegiance or show that the Samudera Pasai kingdom was a vassal of the Mamluks or Abbasids based in Cairo. Thus, the documentary does not present substantial evidence for its main narrative that revolves around the claim about the influence of the caliphate in the archipelago. The narrative also somewhat confidently states that Samudera Pasai spread Islam throughout the archipelago and conquered regions that were not controlled by Islam. Again, this conclusion is not supported by proper facts to prove that there was a kind of "order" from the Abbasid Caliphate to Pasai to spread Islam and conquer distant lands. This shows that the conclusion drawn are mostly opinion-driven, and not based on solid scientific data.

After discussing Samudera Pasai and Aceh, along with the abovementioned weak evidence—namely the tombstone inscriptions, which do not provide any concrete proof for its claim—this documentary

suddenly jumps to the story of Walisongo and their role in Java. It confidently narrates that these Islamic preachers were the messengers of the kingdom of Samudera Pasai and assigned to Islamise the kings of Java. Just as before, it does not provide solid evidence. To convince the audience, this documentary only states that the first preacher among the Walisongo, Sunan Gresik (Maulana Malik Ibrahim), is a descendant of the ruler of Samudera Pasai. This genealogical claim alone is still highly contentious because the main argument for this claim was the inscription on the tombstone of Sunan Gresik, and the inscription is not legible.

Moreover, by using the inscriptions as the only evidence to suggest that Walisongo were envoys of Samudera Pasai, perhaps *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara* intends to convey that if Walisongo succeeded in spreading Islam in Java and establishing the Sultanates of Demak, Cirebon and Banten, then the mission of the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo to conquer Southeast Asian region (including Indonesia) would have been successful. This documentary will most likely claim that the emergence of the other Islamic sultanates in Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and West Nusa Tenggara, of which it has no time to discuss, are exclusively the result of official missionaries of the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo and the Ottomans in Istanbul. Therefore, the Islamic sultanates in the archipelago are valid and legitimate as part of a "single caliphate" that ruled the whole Islamic world.

Bombastic claims, such as those mentioned above, often ignore facts as the basis for historical analysis. The facts stated above are only limited to Aceh. Even then, they have not firmly showed that Aceh was under Ottoman rule. It may be true that Aceh requested to become a vassal of the Ottomans, but did the Ottomans accept it? Until now, there has been no official data from the Ottomans on this matter. A request to become a vassal does not prove that Aceh was ever a vassal. An official Ottoman record must prove the status of Aceh as an Ottoman vassal. If the allegiance of Aceh is still not firmly established, then the allegiance of other kingdoms outside Aceh will require stronger and independent evidence.

The data claimed as evidence of allegiance between the Ottoman Caliphate and Aceh were reported by the Portuguese apothecary, Tomé Pires, from his journey to Aceh and the narrative of *Hikayat Aceh*. These

two pieces of evidence have been interpreted differently by historians. However, they only prove that during this period, there was an intensive relationship between the Ottoman Caliphate and Aceh (Samudra Pasai). This relation was more likely a usual international relationship between the two states, rather than a *vassalage* relationship (Lombard, 2006). Meanwhile, Anthony Reid posited from the same pieces of evidence that there was a *vassalage* relationship between these two states. However, he concluded that the allegiance was very weak and pointed out that it was unlike the one between the Ottoman and Hijaz, for instance. This allegiance was only a strategy of the Sultan to face the Portuguese invasion. Therefore, the allegiance no longer existed after the era of Sultan Ala' Ad-Din Ri'ayat Syah Al-Kahhar (2011).

Conclusion

The claim that all Islamic sultanates in the Indonesian archipelago pledged allegiance to the Islamic Caliphate in Cairo (the second period of the Abbasid Caliphate under the Mamluks) and the Ottoman Caliphate in Istanbul, which was propagated in *Jejak Khilafah di Nusantara*, has elemental methodological weaknesses from the perspective of history. First, it ignores the fact that there are various understandings of the terms "caliph" and "caliphate", both theologically and historically. The rejection of the historical reality of thought that underlies the emergence of power dynamics and the caliphate in Islamic history is the leading cause of misunderstanding of the caliphate's history in Islam. Second, the facts presented by the documentary to show that the Islamic sultanates in the Indonesian archipelago were vassals that gave their pledge of allegiance to the Abbasid and Ottoman Caliphates are very vague and not based on concrete evidence; thus, the claim generated from them is mere conjecture. Since the data are not concrete, the conclusion is then actually an opinion, not a scientific finding. As a result, scientifically, the narration of this documentary is fragile. It will eventually lead to suspicion that this documentary has more propaganda elements than historical education.

The screenwriter and producer of this documentary should be more open-minded and consider the various views of *fiqh* on the caliphate and not forcefully impose a certain interpretation on existing historical facts simply for the sake of that interpretation. Nor should they make

claims without solid evidence. If one wants to prove the existence of the unity of Muslims throughout the world, the proof of the unity of "knowledge" is easier to be found and pointed at. This is because the teachings of Islam are grounded in "knowledge", which has obviously been spread by Islamic scholars, preachers and teachers. This unity of knowledge is not affected at all by political divisions. This knowledge factor, more than power-related politics, can be used as the primary basis for the formation of *jamāʿat al-Muslimīn* (unity of Muslims). The unity of Muslims will indeed be more solid and complete if Muslims are under one political leadership. However, the existence of a political division in the Muslim world is not necessarily a sign that Muslims are divided in faith.

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Food Insecurity amid COVID-19 Lockdowns: The Phenomenology of Prophet Yūsuf 's Food Security Model

Saheed Abdullahi Busari[1]

Abstract: Food insecurity has been on the rise since the emergence of the first COVID-19 lockdown due to low income, unemployment, sickness and disability. This situation may snowball into a perpetual socio-economic crisis, triggering insecurity in health care and political instability in the society. For instance, the COVID-19 lockdown has affected access to food kitchens, food banks, school lunch programmes and other social food initiatives for the needy and poor in the society. Food insecurity deeply affects people without a stable job, single mothers with limited income and unemployed heads of households with young children. Against these backdrops, this study explores the phenomenological interpretation of Quranic exegeses on Prophet Yūsuf's food security strategy and action plan. The study has found that modern Islamic socio-economic principles are congruent with the food security model of Yūsuf (a.s.) in terms of even distribution of wealth and avoiding wastage and hoarding of essentials, except for protecting the interests of the people and the market. The study extracts and interpolates Prophet Yūsuf's food security model to modern Muslim societies.

Keywords: Food insecurity, COVID-19 lockdown, Yūsuf model, phenomenology interpretation.

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[1] *Saheed Abdullahi Busari* is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Fiqh & Usul al-Fiqh, Abdul Hamid Abu Sulayman Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur. He can be reached at saheed@iium.edu.my or mrbusarisaheed@gmail.com.

Introduction

Food insecurity is deeply rooted in poverty due to decreases in agricultural markets and economies. It is not always limited to poverty but encapsulates challenges of accessing nutritious food and a balanced diet for human survival and wellbeing. Temporary food insecurity may be influenced by income, employment, race/ethnicity and disability. The risk of food insecurity increases when money to buy food is limited or not available. This situation may accelerate into perpetual food shortage, generating socio-economic imbalance and political instability in the society (Maxwell, 2012). Food insecurity increases social inequalities in health care through diseases such as obesity and malnutrition. Sustainable food security must address the entire interest of supply chain elements, including the production, transportation, storage and accessibility of consumers to essential needs (Govindan, 2018).

However, the COVID-19 pandemic is the latest disruptive event that has influenced a major aspect of human endeavours in the present time. One of the immediate measures that was introduced by policymakers and governments across the globe is lockdown and movement control order. Public health experts have suggested that reducing social interaction and maintaining physical distancing are the most effective mechanisms to prevent the spread of the virus. As such, the implementation of lockdowns has affected the socio-economic survival of the people. An average household will have to resort to other options for the supply methods of basic needs, such as food, clothing, medical needs and access to education (Falcato, 2021). On the other hand, stakeholder individuals, businesses and government agencies are significantly challenged in addressing the supply chain of basic household needs, especially food. The status quo in the production, storage and supply of basic needs has been disrupted and there is a dire need for a sustainable emergency mechanism to cater for the production, storage and supply of basic needs to combat any socio-economic threat of food insecurity (Chakraborty et.al., 2020). The study will interpolate the food security model of Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) to the King of Egypt to the contemporary food insecurity situation across the globe. According to a UN report, surges in COVID-19 cases have led to the loss of over 24 million jobs and the global GDP dropped to 1.5%, triggering a significant effect on basic amenities on the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the society. Partial and total lockdowns of manufacturing and business

sectors have disrupted the food supply and increased panic buying and hoarding. The UN report suggests the need for governments to create short-term social protection mechanisms to address the challenges of food insecurity during the COVID-19 pandemic (High-Level Panel of Expert on Food Security and Nutrition, 2020).

This study aims to extract the food security model of Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) and its application to modern Muslim societies. The remaining sections of the study encapsulate the causes of food insecurity during COVID-19 lockdowns, Islamic macro-economic principles on supply chain, phenomenological interpretation of Quranic verses on Prophet Yūsuf's food security model and the proposed model of Yūsuf's food security model to modern Muslim societies.

Food Insecurity during COVID-19 Lockdowns

Food insecurity is mainly caused by the socio-economic inability of accessing food resulting from challenges in income, employment, race/ethnicity and disability. An average household's accessibility to food depends on the level of income against food prices in the market. Studies have shown that the level of poverty is proportionate to food access when other things are constant (Warr, 2014). However, policymakers across the globe have realised the importance of short-term financial assistance to citizens to mitigate the effect of COVID-19 and lockdown of economic activities. The majority of households experiencing food insecurity during COVID-19 was a result of disruption in employment income, unavailable food assistance and challenges of panic buying (Men & Tarasuk, 2021).

Food supply is derived from agricultural products, but the increasing modern society has given rise to the need to improve the supply chain of agricultural products, such as food products. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the food supply chain has been partly affected and the agricultural workforce, production and processing firms as well as the transportation system that are categorised as essential workers are also affected. Imported food supplies became less stocked, while the medical supplies and other essentials triggered panic buying (Mead et.al., 2020). The situation of the pandemic lockdown has threatened sectors that rely on import and export goods. As such, the emergency of food supply

shortage has engulfed the vulnerable categories of society with hunger, health concerns and poverty. During the food insecurity scourge, the unemployed households have been mostly affected in building emergency reserves for the lockdown due to poor health and diseases. Moreover, irregular income earners such as factory workers, labourers and petty traders have been equally severely impacted (Tiutiunnykova & Skochko, 2020).

The study of the British Society of Immunology (2021) suggests that most health casualties of the COVID-19 pandemic are categories of people with low immunity who were unable to adapt and fight the virus in their body. It is interesting to note that a balanced diet with organic food is one of the means of building a sustainable immune system. However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, over four million lives have been exposed to the said virus due to deficiency in the immune system caused by global food insecurity and poor nutrition (Suri, 2021). According to the World Health Organisation, the unprecedented threat of COVID-19 to lives, health and food security across the globe cannot be over-emphasised. The majority of the agricultural workers and immigrant farm labourers have abandoned farming due to lack of social support, unsafe working conditions in transportation and limited government support measures to adhere to government standard operating procedure (SOP) (World Health Organization, 2020).

Islamic Macro-economic Principles on Supply Chain

Moving goods from farm and manufacturing sites to the end-users is the basic process of the supply chain. Dawei Lu (2011, p. 9) contends that "supply chain is defined as a group of inter-connected participating companies that add value to a stream of transformed inputs from their sources of origin to the end products and services that are demanded by the designated end-consumers."

Supply chain management is the effective interaction of stakeholder elements in the transfer of goods and services. This interaction provides a strategic and operational framework for the movement of products from the manufacturers to the end-users (Croxton et al., 2001).

The supply chain is faced with several management issues in modern times. The study by Bala (2014) explicates that sustainable supply chain

management needs to address the issue of integration between sections of the supply chain. There is also the need to address the information sharing process and designed network between the stakeholder elements in the supply chain management. For instance, the farmer, wholesaler, retailers and end-users cannot work in silos and expect the effective transfer of products from the farm to end-users. Islam, as a way of life, portrays socio-economic, political and spiritual solutions to every challenge in society. It promotes an economic cooperative and prohibits the unnatural hoarding of essential goods and services in the society (Busari et.al., 2021).

Ta'āwanu is an act of cooperation and an Islamic fundamental principle that encapsulates goodness (*birr*) and piety (*taqwā*). However, the exegeses of al-Qurṭubī explain that the command of Allah (S.W.T.) in the following verse on cooperation relates to the socio-economic, political and spiritual relationship among the people: "Cooperate with one another in goodness and righteousness, and do not cooperate in sin and transgression" (al-Maidah: 2). Islam encourages togetherness among people and activities of preaching cooperation to others. Cooperation in *birr* is expected among all creations, such as humans, animals and the environment, while inculcating taqwā towards Allah (S.W.T.) as the Creator of all (Olanrewaju & Busari, 2019).

Islam prohibits the hoarding (*iktināz*) of goods and products that inconvenience elements of the supply chain, but permits provident (*iddikhār*) storing of unused or undemanded items for future use. The concept of hoarding in economics is the process of purchasing and warehousing a large number of goods to sell at a higher price in the future. Hoarding is usually triggered by intent speculation to benefit from a future price hike. The prohibition of hoarding in Islam stems from the principle of prohibiting the consequences of misrepresentation in market information, fraud, cheating and forgery, as well as to enhance transparency between the stakeholders in the supply chain (Abdul-Rahman, 2003).

The traditions of Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) emphasised that "no one hoards except one in error" (Muslim, 2006, p.1228, no. 130). Islam does not prohibit the act of purchasing and warehousing for future use or sale based on needs. For instance, someone can purchase real estate with the intent of selling in the future at profit. However, the act of

hoarding essential products, such as food, with the intent of stockpiling based on unnatural speculation in order to benefit from a future price hike is prohibited (Arafah, 2016).

Moreover, the higher objective of the lawgiver on the protection of wealth entails permissibility of all lawful businesses and prohibition of unlawful transactions and their mechanisms. The *maqāṣid* (higher objectives) in the protection of public wealth and interest includes the prohibition of trading of alcohol, swine, usury and hoarding against public interest to benefit future price hikes (Zughaibah, 2014). According to Ibn Ashur (2013), the maqāsid of wealth is to ensure even circulation among the people in cash and kind as commodity or investment because wealth is a general right of the nation in the management, distribution and preservation of public wealth (Ibn Ashur, 2013).

The significance of wealth in classical and modern times remains as the means of human survival whereby people exchange wealth in the form of goods and services to satisfy their needs. In essence, one of the significant intents of the lawgiver on wealth is to allow open and even circulation among the people in a society. Therefore, Islam prohibits the act of hoarding essential wealth and the creation of artificial bottlenecks for the flow of resources among the people (Zughaibah, 2014).

> And those who hoard up gold and silver and do not spend it in the Way of Allah, give tidings unto them of a painful torment. (al-Tawbah: 35)

The exegeses of Ibn Kathīr (774 H) illustrate that wealthy people are the third category of leadership in a society after scholars and spiritualists. In essence, the wealthy are a significant segment in the leadership of a society because they can dictate the flow of wealth and economic activities. Nevertheless, the Quran emphasises the punishment of Allah (S.W.T.) upon those who acquire wealth and hoard them at the expense of the poor by refusing to contribute to *zakāt*, *sadaqa* and other *infāq fī sabīl-Allāh* (spending on the path of Allah) (Ibn Kathīr, 1997).

An intentional stockpiling of wealth at the expense of public needs and the socio-economic survival of the society is prohibited in Islam. Allah (S.W.T.) says in the Quran:

> And let not those who [greedily] withhold what Allah has
> given them of His bounty ever think that it is better for them.
> Rather, it is worse for them. Their necks will be encircled by
> what they withheld on the Day of Resurrection. And to Allah
> belongs the heritage of the heavens and the earth. And Allah,
> with what you do, is [fully] Acquainted. (Al-Imran: 180)

Besides the evidence of the prohibition of hoarding found in the primary sources of sharia, scholars have discussed rules of exception for stocking up to maintain socio-economic structural adjustment on one hand and political stability and security on the other. According to the interpretative analysis on the jurisprudence of Imam Aḥmad (780 H), the prohibition of hoarding is mainly for food items because they represent the essentials needs for human survival (al-Rabbāṭ & ʿĪd, 2009). Another piece of evidence to further clarify that stocking up on personal food for future use is not hoarding is based on the Hadith of Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.), who "was selling the palm trees of Banu an-Nadhir and withholding for his family the food of their year" (al-Bukhārī, 2002, p. 1364, no.5357).

In supply chain management, there are certain policy measures in the transfer of goods and services from the manufacturer to the end-users. Government agencies and policymakers in charge of product supply management might need to control, reduce and regulate the flow of goods and services to protect the economy and the people. Scholars of Islamic economics have distinguished between unlawful hoarding and permissible stocking up of essentials for rainy days ahead. Under normal circumstances, some seasonal agricultural products might be in surplus and to avoid wastage, a preservative measure is required to stockpile for future use of export to other places for economic exchange (al-Qāsim, 2020). Business strategists have also contended that there is a difference between stock keeping for use and stockpiling for retail sale. In essence, storing products for personal use is permissible because it neither disrupts the market supply nor leads to price increases, and therefore does not harm people. Another relative dimension of hoarding in the contemporary market is warehousing imported goods. There is a need to ascertain the nature and purpose of the business in order to distinguish between warehousing imported goods and intentional withdrawal of goods from the market because the dynamics of importation goods from distant markets may not cause harm to the market (al-Qāsim, 2020).

Although Islam strongly prohibits hoarding to protect the rights of the people and the market, there are situations where stocking up on goods and essentials is necessary and in line with the basic principles of preventing wastage, protecting the market and structural adjustment to provide for future needs. Firstly, economic and provident stockpiling of goods and services for a certain long or short period might be necessary when many people do not need them at the moment so as to avoid wastage. Some seasonal products and services are in high demand at a particular time of every year. The intent of stocking up in this context is not hoarding for the advantage of a future price hike—rather, it is meant to lessen the burden of the people in their future demands (al-Ṣanʿānī, 2009). For example, school materials and student writing materials are essential and in high demand from the beginning to the end of the school year and in low demand during holidays, such as the summer holiday.

Secondly, stocking up on goods with low demand and following future market prices, especially at a higher profit, is permissible if it is based on market regulation of demand and supply. According to the fatwa of Lajnah al-Daimah (1999), safekeeping for the future is permissible if there is low demand at a particular time in order to avoid economic loss from damage wastage. For example, winter clothing is cheaper in summer because of low demand versus market supply. Some wholesalers and retailers might have to stock up on low demand until winter, during which several people will have to do shopping and are in most need of it. Nevertheless, it is required that every producer, wholesaler and retailer in the supply chain should follow the price rule on the market, rather than take advantage of desperate buyers. Finally, the intent of stocking up on goods and services is a significant determinant of sharia compliance and permissibility. This means that stocking up on essential goods for personal and family use in the future is permissible and not categorised as prohibited hoarding (Arafah, 2016).

Perceived Lessons from Quranic Verses on Prophet Yūsuf 's Food Security Model

The blessing of Allah (S.W.T.) that gave Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) the knowledge and wisdom to interpret dreams serve as a means of victory throughout his predicament. An entire chapter in the Quran is dedicated to the story and events of Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.), suggesting how important

the lessons and reflection are in every time period and situation of human endeavour. Allah (S.W.T.) says in the Quran at the end of the chapter:

> There was certainly in their stories a lesson for those of understanding. Never was the Qur'an a narration invented, but a confirmation of what was before it and a detailed explanation of all things and guidance and mercy for a people who believe. (Yūsuf: 111)

The beginning of the scene in the chapter is centered around the mercy of Allah (S.W.T.) on Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.), which is depicted in his knowledge, wisdom and ability to interpret the dreams and situations of the people and society. Despite the previous calamities of being thrown in the well by his brothers and the plot of seduction that led him to imprisonment, Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) meets two other men who had dreams. Here, he does not hide the gift and blessing of Allah (S.W.T.) and, instead, tells them the meaning of their dreams. Consequently, one of the two prisoners with him gains his freedom and becomes a bartender at the palace. The freed prisoner does not forget that Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) has the knowledge to interpret dreams, even in the presence of the King. After the interpretation of the dreams and the plot of seduction is made obvious, the King honours him with a high position, but Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) prefers to be in charge of the storehouse (Haider, 2015).

The Importance of Knowledge and Wisdom in Leadership and Addressing Universal Socio-economic, Political and Environmental Challenges

Allah (S.W.T.) gave Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) two things upon maturity: wisdom (*ḥikma*) and knowledge (*'ilman*). According to the exegesis of Imam al-Baghawī, *ḥikma* means prophethood, which includes the ability to interpret dreams and make a precise statement. On the other hand, *'ilman* means religious jurisprudence and understanding several things and situations of the human relationship with other creatures, such as animals and the environment. Imam al-Ṭabarī explicates that hikmah means understanding matters and situations, while 'ilman means knowledge of things and creatures (al-Baghawī, 1997).

> And when Joseph reached maturity, We gave him judgment
> and knowledge. And thus We reward the doers of good.
> (Yūsuf: 22)

Maturity (*rushda*) is one of the criteria required to attain the legal capacity to perform obligations (*ahliya al-adha*) in sharia (Busari et al., 2019). It can be inferred that the knowledge and wisdom that Allah (S.W.T.) bestowed on Prophet Yūsuf (a.s) eventually prepared him for future engagements and challenges. Maturity plays a significant role in his complete reliance on Allah (S.W.T.) during the tribulations from his siblings and the wife of the honoured person (*imra'a al-ʿazīz*). Moreover, Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) demonstrated a high sense of maturity in knowledge and wisdom when interpreting the King's dream.

It can be stated that one of the significant events in the life of Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) that manifested the blessing and favour of Allah (S.W.T.) in him through *hikma* and *'ilman* was when he was in prison while the King had a dream and there seemed to be no one among his emissaries and chiefs who could interpret its meaning and implication until someone suggested that a prisoner called Yūsuf can do it, after which the King ordered for him to be sent immediately (Ibn Kathīr, 1997).

> And the king (of Egypt) said; "Verily, I saw (in a dream)
> seven fat cows, whom seven lean ones were devouring, and
> seven green ears of corn, and (seven) others dry. O notables!
> Explain to me my dream, if it be that you can interpret
> dreams." (Yūsuf: 43)

The exegesis of Imam al-Ṭabarī explains that the King initially gathered the witches, the priest and soothsayers to interpret the dream but they declined to offer any form of explanation because they felt that the dream narrative seemed intertwined and too complex for them to interpret (al-Ṭabarī, 2001).

> They said, "[It is but] a mixture of false dreams, and we are
> not learned in the interpretation of dreams." (Yūsuf: 44)

The Permissibility of Dream Interpretation based on Revealed Knowledge and Wisdom

Even though Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) was in jail while the King had a dream, he seized the opportunity to encourage the King and his subjects to embrace Islam and established his prophethood as a chosen and special personality. Imam al-Qurṭubī explains in his work that the freed prisoner now attending to palace services heard the announcement that the chiefs and soothsayers of the King could not interpret the dream and proclaimed that he could do that for the King (al-Qurṭubī, 1964).

> But the one who was freed and remembered after a time said,
> "I will inform you of its interpretation, so send me forth."
> (Yūsuf: 45)

The exegesis of Imam al-Baghawī illustrates that the bartender had leverage on his former relationship with Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) for dream interpretation while they were in prison together. Therefore, the freed prisoner asked him to interpret the King's dream and, perhaps, there may be an opportunity for the people and the King to know about him and his gift of knowledge and wisdom (al-Baghawī, 1997).

> [He said], "Joseph, O man of truth, explain to us about seven fat cows eaten by seven [that were] lean, and seven green spikes [of grain] and others [that were] dry - that I may return to the people; perhaps they will know [about you]." (Yūsuf: 46)

Policy and Action Plan Preparation for Socio-economic Disruptions

Al-Ṭabarī explains that the seven fat cows (*sabʿa simān min al-baqara*) and green crops (*sanābila al-khudur*) here refer to seven fertilised years, while seven lean cows (*sabʿa ʿijāf*) and dried crops (*sanābila yābisāt*) refer to seven barren years. This means that after seven fertile years, there will come seven barren years that will be calamitous, unless preparations are made beforehand for survival (al-Ṭabarī, 2001).

> [Joseph] said, "You will plant for seven years consecutively; and what you harvest leave in its spikes, except a little from which you will eat.

> Then will come after that seven difficult [years] which will consume what you saved for them, except a little from which you will store." (Yūsuf: 47-48)

Savings and Preparation for Hard Times based on Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Knowledge

The classical approach to farm produce preservation is that grain stored in its natural husk tend to last longer without any modern preservatives. However, in the modern context, the principles derived from the strategy of Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) here is an applicable sustainable mechanism for preserving farm produce. Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) explained to the King that the seven years of hardship will be followed by ease with sufficient rainfall for crops and animal farming. The exegesis of al-Ṭabarī mentions that the year of surplus after hardship is signified by the rainy season and availability of fruits, such as grapes, for beverages, and animals for dairy products (al-Ṭabarī, n.d.). Imam al-Baghawī explains that the rainfall is a symbol of safety and relief after the seven years of barren land and hardship. The rain is a source of production and the proceeds from that are olives and grapes, which represent abundance, food security, nutrition and good life (al-Baghawī, 1997).

> Then will come after that a year in which the people will be given rain and in which they will press [olives and grapes]. (Yūsuf: 49)

Figure 1: Prophet Yūsuf's Economic Recovery Strategic Plan: A
Food Security Model

Regular Years of Farming and Production
(Seven-year Surplus)

Management for Tighter Margin
- Trim expenses
- Stock up / thin out
- Manage financial position

Seven-years Drought

Crop Variety Selection/ Diversification

Irrigation Management

Season & timing of irrigation

Sustainable Crop Storage

Drought Defence Mechanism

Sustainable Future (Secured Food)

Discussion

Food insecurity was on a rise during the early COVID-19 lockdown
as a result of reduced socio-economic activities. Apart from challenges
in food production, the shortage of food during the COVID-19
lockdown triggered panic buying, which stressed the food supply chain.
Even though governments across the globe have been responding to
the challenges of food insecurity, this study explicates the relevance
of Prophet Yūsuf's food security model to modern realities. Prophet
Yūsuf's food security strategy and action plan, according to the
interpretation of the King's dream, delivers several Islamic economic
recovery plans that are useful for contemporary society. Figure 1 depicts
the policy and practical recommendations of Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) to
the King of Egypt. For the researcher, it seems that Prophet Yūsuf's
dream interpretations for one of the prisoners and the King showcase

that Islam promotes the sharing of wealth, knowledge and wisdom with others in need. Figure 1 also depicts another implication of the interpretation of the King's dream, that is, the King offering Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) a higher position, though the latter preferred the position of storehouse minister. By implication, Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) was placed in a better position to implement a solution to the potential challenges based on the King's dream. The Quran emphasises that Allah (S.W.T.) blessed Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) with the knowledge and wisdom needed to interpret dreams and address issues in society. In contemporary reality, the solution of Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) represents the knowledge and wisdom needed to manage surplus and provide a sustainable mechanism for any challenging drought in the future. The interpretation suggests the need for a sustainable management of farm produce on one hand and applicable drought defense mechanism on the other hand. Considering the methodology of Prophet Yūsuf's interpretative approach of the King's dream, it showed the extent of his knowledge and scope of wisdom not only by offering a mere interpretation of the dream, but also by proffering a 14-year strategic plan in dealing with the meaning and consequences of the dream. The first seven years were the years of surplus while the following years depicted socio-economic hardship, especially from food security. Prophet Yūsuf's interpretation of the King's dream postulated the consequences of the future, for which he suggested a comprehensive panacea to address the food insecurity challenge. The encounter of Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) with the King in this manner thereafter was the main reason for his release from prison. The dream interpretation suggested a dire need to enforce the saving and maintenance of plantation through tighter margin, crop diversification, irrigation management and sustainable storage system during the first seven years such that only harvested crops should be consumed. The second part of the seven years would be challenging and, thus, there was a structural adjustment strategy of managing and distributing the limited food resources among the people in the society. The interpretation suggested the need for Egypt at that time to be frugal in consumption in the second seven years to survive the drought, surely after which the subsequent years would yield surplus. The precise interpretation and explanation of the consequence of the dream suggest that Prophet Yūsuf (a.s.) was not just versed in dream interpretation, but also an expert in socio-economic strategy. The explanation of action outlined by him for food security was by rationing consumption, stockpiling

surplus products and preserving them for the future. He was not merely a bearer of revealed knowledge, but an expert in economic planning and management skills. This study recommends that Islamic institutions and scholars lead the way in proffering solutions to the socio-economic challenges of the people. Policymakers should always be prepared for emergencies like famine, earthquakes and floods through sustainable strategic action plans. When properly managed and controlled, threats and undesirable situations can be converted to opportunities, just as Prophet Yūsuf's interpretation of what seemed as threatening, for which he advised the government and was eventually hired to lead the economic recovery action plan in Egypt.

Prophet Yūsuf's economic recovery strategic plan for food security suggests the need for an average government and policymakers to focus on future and long-term planning for sustainable production and distribution of food, especially during an economic crisis. Although the dream came to the King, who was an unbeliever, it was later interpreted by a prophet of Allah (S.W.T.), thus suggesting the need for partnership to achieve socio-economic and environmental security and stability in the society.

Conclusion

Food insecurity during the COVID-19 lockdowns seems as a situational challenge, but experts have warned of subsequent waves. In the later part of 2021, studies have reported, the consequences of the Alpha, Beta, Delta and Gamma variants of the COVID-19 virus, which is threatening the vaccination agenda in several countries (Pereira & Oliveira, 2020; Piret & Boivin, 2021). This study has found that hoarding essential resources with the intent of exploiting the people and inflicting hardship is prohibited in Islam. The intentional withholding of basic needs, such as food, drink, clothing and medical materials, are the consequences of hoarding (*iḥtikār*), which is prohibited in Islam, while savings (*iddikhār*) of personal needs is permissible. Nevertheless, there is a need for a robust framework to take care of the socio-economic and environmental needs of the people in every society. This study has found that the first wave of the COVID-19 outbreak in 2019 and its apparent impact across the globe have forced people, organisations and governments to think about the dire need to explore and uphold sustainable provisions of necessities

for the people. Since food is one of the most essential needs for the survival of life, developing a contemporary and applicable framework for food security seems essential (*darūriyya*) based on the principles of *maqāṣid sharīʿa*. This study has found that the COVID-19 outbreak is one of the wills of Allah (S.W.T.) that has been decreed and, yet, there is a solution based on knowledge and wisdom. The development of COVID-19 vaccines and the global vaccination agenda championed by the United Nations and powerful countries is a laudable approach in health policy. However, the policymakers need to address the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on food production, storage and supply from the farms and producers to the end-users. The modern supply chain is more challenged in this trying time, but nevertheless, Muslim nations may borrow credence to the approach and methodology of Prophet Yūsuf 's food security strategy plan based on the interpretation of the dream of the King of Egypt during his time. This study is mainly a qualitative interpretative study of Prophet Yūsuf 's food security strategy and action plan. However, further studies can explore other Islamic principles and food security strategies based on the Quran and Sunnah.

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Viewpoints

Islamic Educational Institutions in the Past: *Kuttāb* and Madrasa

Alwi Alatas

In Islam, education has a very important position for it equips man with knowledge or *'ilm* which is necessary for human beings to lead their lives in the righteous path. Dissemination or transmission of knowledge is hence, indispensable and for that purpose, educational institutions are needed. Ever since the inception of Islam in 7th century Arabia, Muslims have optimised the use of these institutions, exemplified for instance, in mosques, *kuttāb* and madrasa so that the disseminated education or knowledge would benefit all. This article will highlight the emergence and development of *kuttāb* and madrasa in Islamic history, especially during the Abbasid era, so as to help us understand how Islamic educational institutions played their role in history.

Primary Educational Institution: *Kuttāb*

The first revelation to the Prophet (pbuh), started with the word *iqra'* (QS 96: 1), reflecting on the importance of knowledge and things related to it. The place of knowledge, from Islamic point of view, is in the chest of an *'alim* (scholar), and those who want to pursue knowledge are encouraged to come to and study with those who possess knowledge. Therefore, the core of an educational institution is the teacher, or someone who has knowledge and is capable of teaching. Thus, when an educational institution or school emerges and develops with all its facilities, it is essentially the extension of the teacher.

Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (2018, p. 17) defines knowledge as "the arrival of the soul at the meaning of a thing or an object of knowledge". The soul that can understand this meaning is obviously belong to the human beings, not to the schools or colleges. Therefore, without the authority of good teachers that possess knowledge and *adab*, the schools, colleges, or universities are just meaningless entities. Being proud of great facilities, but at the same time undermining the roles of the teachers who are knowledgeable and have *adab*, is a false understanding of education. Mistakes like this will only give birth to confusion and errors, as Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud (2020, p. 32) expresses in his book of poetry, *Jalan Pulang* [Way Home]:

> Budaya Dungu leburkan Nizamiyyah dengan kuasa dan fitnah
> Menggantikan Hujjatul Islam dengan Hassan bin Sabbah
> Penjarakan sarjana dengan peraturan dan halangan
> Menutup kebenaran dengan amaran dan sanjungan
>
> [Culture of stupidity extinguishes Nizamiyya with clout and calumny
> Replacing Hujjatul Islam with Hassan ibn Sabbah
> Incarcerated the scholars with regulations and hindrances
> Concealing the truth with admonition and adoration]

In another part (2020, p. 9), he writes:

> Bolehkah khinzir dikalungi permata
> Kera dihadiahkan mawar berharga? …
> Pabila ilmu ketandusan makna:
> Keras suara penentu wibawa
>
> [Is a pig worth of wearing a jewel necklace
> A monkey is awarded a precious rose? …
> If knowledge is deprived of meaning:
> The loudness of the voice determines the authority]

In the early period, when the Prophet (pbuh) was in Mecca, the companions used to gather and study at the house of al-Arqam ibn Abī al-Arqam or in other places with very simple facilities. When the Prophet and his companions moved to Medina and built the Prophet's

Mosque in that city, the mosque played a major role in the process of education and transmission of knowledge.

Since then, even to the present day, mosques still play an important role in the field of education. With the passing of time, different types of educational institutions emerged, some with their own buildings, though mosques remain an important part of educational process. Among the new institutions were *kuttāb* and madrasa.

It is important to highlight that madrasa in the past was not a primary or secondary educational institution like what we find today in some Muslim countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia. Madrasa in the past was an institution of higher education, more or less comparable to a college.

Unlike madrasa, the *kuttāb* (or *maktab*) that existed since early Islamic history and derived from the word *kātib* (means 'writer'), was to provide basic education (Landau, 1985). The use of the word *kuttāb* for elementary school has appeared since the lifetime of Abdullah ibn Umar, the junior Companion of the Prophet, as narrated from Anbasa that he saw Ibn Umar greeting children (*ṣibyān*) at the school (*al-kuttāb*) (al-Bukhari, 1971, p. 654, hadith No.1044). However, its existence in this early period was of course still very limited.

Teachers in this institution, like for example in Baghdad in the early 4th century of Hijri, were called *mu'addib*. In *kuttāb* or *maktab*, at least in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries, Muslim children studied the Qur'an, writing and calligraphy, foundational belief (*iʿtiqād*), and poetry (Makdisi, 1981). Some elements in this curriculum may be difficult to understand in the context of modern society. However, it was only natural to understand that the curriculum directly or indirectly had transmitted the Islamic worldview to the students agreeing to their age.

The terms *kuttāb* and *maktab* were generally interchangeable, but in certain areas such as Nishapur in northeastern Iran they both represented different phases of education. ʿAbd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī (d. 529/1134), a Shāfiʿī scholar of hadith, entered the maktab in the city when he was five years old and studied al-Qur'an and basic *aqīda* (creed) at the institution. At the age of ten, he entered *kuttāb* and studied literature and copied and memorised books related to this field. Apart from that,

kuttāb or *maktab* was also a basic education for those who want to continue to a higher level (Makdisi, 1981).

The Emergence And Development of Madrasa

As previously mentioned, after taking basic education, students could continue their education to a higher level. In the beginning, this was not pursued through institutions, but through individual scholars. The most popular field in the higher education was Jurisprudence or Islamic Law (*Fiqh*), yet some studied other fields such as Arabic, *Kalam* (Theology), or Philosophy, as well as other fields of science such as Medicine.

After the formation of *fiqh* schools (*madhhab*) in the 2nd and 3rd centuries of Hijri (8th and 9th centuries CE), the field of Jurisprudence which was taken up by many higher-level students would be confined to the line of the four *fiqh* schools (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī).

Initially, the classes of Jurisprudence took place at the mosque (*masjid*), usually for four years. The need for housing for the teachers and the students made this institution developed from *masjid* to *masjid-khan* (a mosque with residential buildings around it) and then to madrasa. The *masjid-khan* flourished on a large scale in the 4th/10th century, while madrasa flourished in the 5th/11th century (Makdisi, 1981).

Madrasa comes from the Arabic root *darasa* which means "to learn". However, prior to and during the development of this institution, this word had become a special term for Jurisprudence. The word *darrasa*, which actually means "to teach" or "to instruct" in this context had a meaning of teaching Jurisprudence. The word *dars* is used for Jurisprudence lessons and Jurisprudence teachers are referred to as *mudarris*. Thus, at least at the beginning of its development, a madrasa could be referred to as a college of Islamic law (Makdisi, 1961).

Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083), an expert of the Shāfiʿī school of jurisprudence who became the first professor of the Nizamiya Madrasa in Baghdad, for example, is mentioned by al-Fārisī (1989) as an Iraqi *faqih* and *mudarris* in Baghdad. He taught (*darrasa*) Jurisprudence in Baghdad for over thirty years. Another scholar, Ismāʿīl ibn Ẓāhir (d.

479/1086), studied *Fiqh* (*darasa al-fiqh*) during his youth with Abū Bakr al-Ṭūsī and the activity took place in the mosque (al-Fārisī, 1989).

The emergence of madrasa as colleges of law, again, showed the popularity of the field of Jurisprudence among the existing branches of scholarship. However, this does not mean that Jurisprudence was the only field taught in madrasa. The aforementioned Ismāʿīl ibn Ẓāhir, for example, taught Ḥadīth (Majlis al-Imlā') for many years at the Nizamiya Madrasa (al-Fārisī, 1989). Likewise, the level and composition of the lessons given in madrasa may not be exactly the same from one madrasa to another, though there might be existed a number of textbooks that were studied in these institutions. In addition, the emergence of madrasa did not stop the teaching of Jurisprudence at the mosques.

Due to its gradual development from one phase to the next, it is not easy to determine when exactly the madrasa appeared for the first time in history. Some sources mention about al-Qarawiyyin Mosque in Fez, Morocco, which was built by Fatima al-Fihriya in 859 and a madrasa with the same name and location that is still functioning today.

Referring to this narrative, Madrasa al-Qarawiyyin can be considered as the earliest madrasa in history. However, it is not clear whether the term madrasa was used in the first place for this educational institution. In addition, at least in recent times, this educational institution has a different curriculum from the madrasa in the center of the Abbasid caliphate, so that it is also categorically different from the madrasa described earlier. It is said that Madrasa al-Qarawiyyin teaches Mathematics, Medicine, Logic, Astronomy, History, Geography, and Music, as well as the Qur'an and Jurisprudence (FSTC, 2004), in contrast to the madrasa in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Egypt that emphasised Jurisprudence and religious sciences.

There are some who think that the first madrasa in history was Nizamiya that was founded by Nizam al-Muluk (d. 485/1092) in Baghdad in 459/1067. However, this view is inaccurate, because before the establishment of Nizamiya several other madrasas were already existed in the Islamic world.

Although it is not easy to trace the first madrasa, at least we know that madrasa had already emerged in the early 11th century CE. Besides

Baghdad, Nishapur was also a prominent city for education during this period. The names of the madrasa were usually not clearly stated, but the madrasa was known for its main scholar who led the institution.

Prior to 418/1027, there was a madrasa led by Abū Isḥāq al-Isfaraynī (d. 418/1027), an important theologian and scholar of the Shāfiʿī school whose classes were attended, among others, by Shaykh Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī and al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī. Unfortunately, it is not specified when exactly this educational institution was founded, though it is clearly mentioned as a 'famous madrasa in Nishapur' (Ibn Khallikān, n.d.).

ʿAbd al-Ghāfir al-Fārisī (1989) mentions the existence of an educational institution in Nishapur led by al-Isfaraynī since 410/1019-1020, replacing Abū Ṭāhir al-Ziyādī, but the class was in the mosque and he calls it by the name *majlis al-imlā'* which was usually associated with the science of Hadith. However, this may be a different institution from the one mentioned by Ibn Khallikān.

Several decades earlier, in 391/1001, Abū ʿAlī al-Daqqāq, a Sufi shaykh, founded a madrasa in the city of Nishapur. This madrasa has *tadhkira* sessions (*majālis al-tadhkīr*), which were typical among the Sufis, and possibly a Ḥadīth session (*majlis al-imlā'*), but there is no mention of the Jurisprudence subject in it. Apart from that, this madrasa was then continued by al-Daqqāq's son-in-law, namely Abū al-Qāsim al-Qushayrī, and after that was known as al-Madrasa al-Qushayriyya (Halm, 1986). Al-Qushayrī was buried with his teacher at the madrasa (Ibn Khallikan, 1843).

Ibn Khallikan (1843) also mentions briefly the Madrasa al-Bayhaqī in Nishapur that was founded by Imam Abū Bakr al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066) who was an expert on ḥadīth and also a leader of the Shāfiʿī school of Jurisprudence. Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī studied at this madrasa after his father, who was also a great scholar, passed away. Abū Muḥammad al-Juwaynī, the father of Abū al-Maʿālī, died in 438/1047 (al-Fārisī, 1989; Ibn Khallikan, 1843). Imam al-Bayhaqī only started his teaching activities in Nishapur after he returned to the city in 441/1050 and a class was held, led by him and attended by scholars and jurists. It is also stated that he came and taught at the Suyurī Madrasa in that city (al-Fārisī, 1989: 104). Unfortunately, it is not clear whether this madrasa (Madrasa al-Bayhaqī) was an upgraded form of the class he led

before or a continuation of the Suyurī Madrasa or a different institution. In spite of that, Madrasa al-Bayhaqī was for sure established before Imam al-Bayhaqī passed away in 458/1066.

Madrasa, of course, did not only arise and develop in Nishapur. In 1012 in Baghdad, a madrasa was already existed and founded by Shaykh al-Sarakhsī. Al-Sarakhsī died while trying to stop the conflict between the adherents of different schools of law that occurred at the madrasa that year (Makdisi, 1961).

In 459/1067, Nizamiya Madrasa in Baghdad was founded by the Saljuk Vizier, Nizam al-Muluk. After that, Nizamiya was also built in Nishapur and several other important cities. Nizamiya would later play an important role in strengthening and expanding the academic tradition in the Sunni world.

In the following periods, apart from the madrasa, there were also many other educational institutions that represent different branches of religious knowledge, such as the Dār al-Qur'an and Dār al-Ḥadīth, *ribāṭ* and *zāwiya* for the Sufis, as well as medical schools. No doubt that with the establishment of these various educational institutions, there emerged numerous Muslim scholars and scientists, particularly during the Abbasid era, who in turn contributed to the advancement of Islamic civilisation.

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