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EDITORIAL CORRESPONDENCE
Comments and suggestions to: alwialatas@iium.edu.my
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Editorial

This June 2021 issue of IIUM Journal of Religion and Civilisational Studies extends our commitment to engage with a wide range of topics related to civilisational studies. All articles included in this issue deal with Islamic concepts and civilisational traits in four different areas namely education, governance, architecture and politics.

The first article is by Saheed Afolabi Ashafa with the title "Rebranding Islamic Studies in Universities in South-western Nigeria: Islamic Finance to the Rescue". It discusses the academic scenario in South-western Nigeria where Islamic Studies, as an academic discipline suffers a setback due to several challenges namely, ideological sentiment, low enrolment of students, uncertain prospect for graduates, as well as high tuition and service fees. To stimulate the interest of prospective students to pursue their study in this discipline and sustain the vitality of the discipline, this paper proposes a holistic review and rebranding of the Islamic studies by introducing Islamic finance into the university curriculum. Not only will this change, argued by the author, render the discipline more functional and relevant with the current global trends especially since the Islamic finance is being widely accepted by corporate bodies and government agencies, but also produce more versatile graduates whose knowledge and skills will fit well into the current socio-economic reality. At the same time, the fusion of the Islamic finance into the current Islamic Studies program will enable the latter to address the problem of paucity of students, hence, making the discipline to remain relevant in the curriculum of the universities in South-western Nigeria.

The second article entitled "Regional Dynamics and Governance in Modern Middle East: From the Ottoman Empire to the Cold War" authored by Ramzi Bendebka provides an overview of regional dynamics and governance in the Middle East which include 22 modern-nation states stretching from Iran to Morocco,

and from Turkey to Sudan. Making use of a Historical Dynamics (HD) approach, the author assesses different historical periods starting with the Ottoman era, then colonial period, independence, nationalism, and the Cold War eras in determining their effects on the Middle Eastern regional governance and dynamics, as well as the future of the region. While the author acknowledges the differences between the Middle Eastern states such as economic structure, form of government, social and ethnic composition as well as religious affiliation, he maintains that they share many similar traits in terms of politics, economic, culture, religion, and historical experiences, which makes the study of the region as one entity and some general observations possible. The study concludes that the regional development and good governance generally took place after independence, with the idea of pan-Arabism as the main factor for the regional cooperation observed among the states at least until the 1990s.

Next, "Historic Jeddah as a Unique Islamic City" by Omer Spahic dwells on the unique traits of Jeddah, a city which originated from a small primitive fishing settlement in 4th century BC and later evolved into a major port and commercial center of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. With the objective to enrich discourses on Islamic urbanism and architecture, the author highlights the city's main features focusing on at first the city's history having been ruled by different powers such as the Mamluks, Ottomans and al-Saʿūd dynasty, and in contact with the West particularly the Portuguese. The author then indulges in the city's cosmopolitan character which is much related to its status as the gateway to the holy city of Makkah where the activity of pilgrimage led to Jeddah becoming a multinational and multicultural city. Additionally, being closely linked to Makkah as an entry point, this contributes to, according to the author, both cities sharing the same fortune and destiny, and finally, the distinctive historical and traditional architecture of the city renders the city one of its kind that it has been recognised as an UNESCO World Heritage site.

The fourth article entitled "Reforming Political Islam: A Critical Reading of Aḥmad al-Raysūnī's Perspectives" by Mohamed Zacky Mohamed Fouz and M. Moniruzzaman critically examines the

views and works of a renowned scholar of Moroccan origin in contemporary Islamic political thought, Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, on the concept of 'Islamic State' where he re-interpreted the concept by developing a new understanding on the nature of state and its role including topics like democracy, equality, plurality and freedom in Islam using the *maqāṣid approach*, which is a broader idea than *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa*. This undertaking by al-Raysūnī was prompted by various conceptual errors of the Islamic State as perceived by Muslim masses and scholars which, if left unattended will affect the foundations of Islamic world views. Nevertheless, al-Raysūnī's views are not free from criticisms particularly since there are a few shortcomings in his analysis with regards to some modern political concepts which leads the authors of this article to conclude that a new analytical model is needed to provide a more accurate concept of Islamic State from Islamic perspectives while taking into considerations the modern socio-political concepts. Still, al-Raysūnī's views deserve attention as they contribute to a new understanding of political Islam regarding the discourse of Islamic state.

This issue also contains a book review entitled *The Faces of Muhammad: Western Perceptions of the Prophet of Islam from the Middle Ages to Today* by John Tolan (published in 2019 by Princeton University Press), contributed by Farhain Zaharani. In reviewing the work which deals with Western perceptions of the Prophet Muhammad saw from the Middle Ages until modern times, the reviewer observes that the perceptions vary, where at first, the Prophet Muhammad saw was described as an imposter and trickster, but these gradually changed where he was depicted in a more positive light, being painted as a religious reformer, lawmaker, and inspirational leader not only for Muslims but also non-Muslims. Such a change calls for explanations and in doing so, the author as noted by the reviewer, highlights the historical contexts which conditioned the Western perceptions, namely some political and religious conflicts that occurred in Europe.

On behalf of the Editorial Board, I would like to take this opportunity to extend my gratitude to all contributors and reviewers who involved in this issue. It is my conviction that their valuable

ideas and works will contribute to the enrichment of knowledge particularly in civilisational studies and be of interest to scholars worldwide.

Finally, my thanks and appreciation go to all members of the Editorial Board, our Editor Dr. Alwi Alatas, Book Review Editor Dr. Kaoutar Guediri and Assistant Editors, Dr. Bukuri Zejno and Sr. Norliza Saleh. This issue becomes a reality due to your dedication, efforts and sincerity. May Allah bless you all.

Fauziah Fathil
Editor-in-Chief
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Rebranding Islamic Studies in Universities in South-Western Nigeria: Islamic Finance to the Rescue

Saheed Afolabi Ashafa[1]

Abstract: Islamic Studies, as an academic discipline, has been scorned over the years with very low patronage as a course of study in higher institutions in South-western Nigeria. This situation has prompted experts in this area of study to publish motivating research in order to arouse the interest of prospective students. Although previous studies have identified some factors besetting Islamic studies as an academic discipline, the most pronounced has been its wavering prospect. The focus of this paper is to address the question of the uncertain prospect of Islamic studies by proposing an introduction of Islamic finance as a sub-study in its curriculum at the university level. This will make the discipline more functional and produce self-reliant graduates of Islamic studies from universities in South-western Nigeria. The universities selected for this study are Lagos State University, Olabisi Onabanjo University and Osun State University. This study is both descriptive and exploratory in its qualitative approach. It is hoped that a more functional discipline will evolve when fully integrated as projected.

Keywords: Islamic finance, Islamic studies, rebranding, South-western Nigeria, university, education.

[1] *Saheed Afolabi Ashafa*, PhD. is a Lecturer in the Department of Religious Studies, College of Humanities and Culture, Osun State University, Nigeria. He specialises in Islamic Economic Thought. He can be reached at saheed.ashafa@uniosun.edu.ng or saheedgarment1@gmail.com.

Introduction

Education is a core concern of Islam since the inception of the religion, especially with the advent of Prophet Muhammad. This fact is well pronounced with the first revelation as encountered by the Prophet in the Cave of Hira. Despite the fact that the Prophet was unlettered, the message compelled him to read repeatedly as if there would be no headway without reading (al-'Alaq: 1-5). Sequel to this, the emphasis on reading and the acquisition of knowledge has since become a crux of the message of Islam. In this regard, advancement in human society has since been attained in proportion to the progress made in education. With this development, every society designs their wellbeing around the philosophy of their educational system. For instance, the National Policy on Education of Nigeria (2004) spells out the various objectives for different categories of learners as conceived by the leaders. The fourth edition of the Policy states that:

> the goals of tertiary education shall be to: (a) contribute to national development through high level relevant manpower training; (b) develop and inculcate proper values for the survival of the individual and society; (c) develop the intellectual capability of individuals to understand and appreciate their local and external environment; (d) acquire both physical and intellectual skills which will enable individuals to be self-reliant and useful members of the society …. (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2004, p. 36)

From the above stipulated goals, it is evident that higher education in Nigeria is meant to produce graduates who will be productive, self-sustaining and independent. In recognition of this philosophy, F.O. Olaleye (2010) reiterates that "educators and trainers need to derive programmes which are appropriate for preparing graduates for the outside world" (p. 32). He notes further that such consciousness becomes imperative because the wealth or poverty of nations depends on the quality of higher education. Consequently, it could be deduced that higher education, irrespective of the discipline, must produce graduates who have a positive impact on the economy of the nation and the society at large.

In relation to the above background, Islamic studies as a discipline has continuously been "diagnosed" with respect to its functionality in

the contemporary society. It is no doubt that Islamic studies is still one of the disciplines that admission seekers into universities hardly choose with enthusiasm. Imam (2007, p. 34) alludes to this fact when he states that despite its contributions, Islamic studies has suffered deprivation in the admission of students and recruitment of staff. Similarly, Owoyemi and Akanni (2017) re-echoes this fear: "Today few people take pride in choosing careers in Arabic and Islamic Studies. For one reason, the shaky nature of the job prospects in those disciplines" (p. 65). From the lamentation above, it is not out of place to conclude that Islamic studies is generally perceived as a discipline that renders its adherents redundant and unemployable.

Sequel to this worrisome state of the discipline, experts in this area of study have continuously reviewed and proffered solutions in respect to better prospective status for Islamic studies. For instance, Owoyemi and Akanni (2017) have identified some job opportunities for graduates of Islamic studies, such as Imamship, spiritual guide for corporate organisations, profession in exorcism, presenters of Islamic programmes in electronic media, authorship of textbooks and proprietorship of schools, among others. While all these are novel ideas, this paper advocates an enhanced capacity for graduates of Islamic studies through a curriculum content review gesture. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to propose a holistic review of the curriculum in which Islamic finance will be fused into the curriculum so as to produce more versatile graduates who can diversify within the scope of expertise acquired in the discipline.

Islamic Education in Nigeria

Islamic education entails Islam wherever it goes, and Nigeria is no exemption. This idea has been expressed by many scholars, including Sanni (2016, p. 354) and Adeyemi (2016, p. 2), quoting Davidson (1990, p. 61). Leveraging on this notion, some scholars opine that Islam and its education first reached the Kanem-Borno empire around seventh century C.E. (Doi, 1984, p. 309), while others hold the view that it was much later around 11th century C.E. (Martin, 1969, p. 16), albeit tremendous development of Islam in Hausaland that is said to have occurred in 14th century C.E. (Gada, 2010, p. 2). It is pertinent to note that Islamic education, as conceptualised in this line of thought,

is a wider scope than Islamic studies as a discipline. Doi (1984) notes that the first notable organised setting for Islamic education was the elementary Qur'anic school known as *Makarantaallo* in Hausa language and which Opeloye (2020) termed as *Ilekewuwalaa* (the tablet school). Gada (2010) claims that Islamic learning in Hausaland was influenced by the influx of Muslim scholars from North Africa, the majority of whom were graduates of the University of Azhar, and other scholars from Western Sudan. Prominent among them were the Wangara, Kumta, Fulani and Borno scholars. This assertion of Gada (2010) further affirms the view that Islamic education did not only arrive in the Northern region first but was equally well established, both informally and formally, in the region. To formalise the system of education in full Islamic ethos, Kazeem and Balogun (2013, p. 109) contend that the Ansarul-Islam society of Nigeria, a Northern-based organisation then, was the first to establish the equivalent of the conventional education setting in 1942.

While the aforementioned way of life has been the situation of the Northerners, their Southern counterparts had a delayed acclimatisation with Islamic culture. This, to date, is loudly pronounced in the ways and manners that both regions relate to in terms of socio-religious culture. It is pertinent to mention that the disparity enhanced the fortune of Western education more than Islamic education in the Southern region and vice versa in the Northern region. Bidmos (2003) notes that:

> Down South, in contrast, where Islamic education had not yielded fruits and impact comparable to the Northern scenario, Western education was immediately embraced with its attendant emergence of a new crop of elitism. Within a short time, a gap was created between the North and the South in Western Education which has remained unbridged till date. (p. 169)

As for the southern part of the country, Islam is said to have found its way into the region (particularly the South-west region) in the second half of the 11th century through the effort of the *Murabitun* (Adebayo, 2005, p. 128). In Adam al-Iluri's view, Islam was introduced in Yorubaland during the reign of Mansa Musa of Mali, which was in the 14th century (Doi, 1984, p. 110). This view was buttressed with explanation that the Muslims in Yorubaland are called Imale, which is a

reference to the main religion in Mali. This point is further hinged on the fact that the Yoruba people came to know about Islam from the traders and ambassadors of Mali who were present in Yorubaland, especially in the then-capital city of old Oyo. While the event that occurred in the 14th century does not necessarily invalidate that which occurred in the 11th century, it suggests that Islam was more firmly entrenched among the people of the Southern region for an extended period (Ashafa, 2020, p. 78). By and large, Muslim scholars who championed the mission of spreading Islam were equally teaching new converts some parts of the Qur'an in Arabic. According to Adebayo (2005, p. 128), this effort resulted in the establishment of Qur'anic schools in the region. It is also on record that such teaching took place in mosques, residences of 'ulamā' (Arabic teachers) and under tree shades. We can reasonably infer that the rapid growth of Islamic education in the Western region occurred in the 16th and 17th centuries since it was during this era that mosques first began to spring up. Oyeweso and Amusa (2016, pp. 37-38) corroborated that the first mosque in Yorubaland, which was built around 1550, belonged to the Jama'ah (congregation) of one Baba Kewu in Old Oyo.

The education system at this stage had its curriculum, which was informal but consistent among the handlers. There was steady progression in the academic structure and reliable outcome observable in the learners. Balogun, as quoted by Adebayo (2005, p. 129), noted that the rate of development in the Southern region was slow compared to that of the Northern region because: (i) there was no direct trade link with the Arab world, and (ii) Muslim education in the Southern region did not enjoy royal patronage as it did in Hausaland, except on a few occasions. This trend continued until the 19th century when significant improvement was launched with the Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodiyo. Adebayo affirmed that the period between the Jihad of Uthman Dan Fodiyo and colonial period witnessed the proliferation of Qur'anic and Ilmi schools (*Ilekewuwalaa*), whereby towns such as Abeokuta, Epe, Iseyin, Iwo and Ibadan became important Islamic centres. Describing the mode of instruction in these schools, Opeloye (1996) quotes Ogunbiyi as follows:

> The mode of instruction is the traditional parrot-like repetition and memorization method. The teacher copies Arabic alphabet on the pupils' wooden slates, then employs

> the choral techniques to teach them. Each letter is taught by describing the shape as it appears on the slate. (p. 165)

This era preceded the development stage in which Sanni (2016) emphatically states that "the first modern centre of Arabic-Islamic studies was founded at Lagos in 1904 by Muhammad Mustafa al-Afandi, Syrian settler in the city" (p. 357).

The same 19th century witnessed the dawn of Western education in Nigeria, which could be said to have brought a setback for Islamic education in the country. Bidmos (2003) notes: "The Western education obstructed the prominence of Islamic Education as elitism was henceforth determined by proficiency in English" (p. 168). This situation hindered the progress of Islamic education while the proprietors of Islamic education who struggled to remain in vogue were compelled to modify their curriculum to reflect Western elements. Some of the Arabic schools in the South-western region introduced Islamic studies and English language as subjects in order to reflect compliance with the trend (Adebayo, 2005, p. 135).

At this juncture, it is apposite to acknowledge that prior to the arrival of the missionaries with Western education, Islamic education had enjoyed a functional status based on available evidence. The Islamic ethos, which was prominent in the scheme of things, had been well entrenched especially in the Northern region. Graduates of the available Islamic educational institutions were employed as administrators and technocrats (Bidmos, 2003, p. 166), this notwithstanding the fact that they were equally qualified as teachers as well as prospective proprietors in their own respect. It could therefore be said that Western education supplanted Islamic education in the dynamics of the contemporary societal demands, which further shattered its influence.

Islamic Studies as an Academic Discipline in Nigerian Universities

Being the first University in Nigeria established in 1948, the University College now known as University of Ibadan operated Arabic and Islamic Studies as an academic unit in the History Department of the University in 1961 (Sanni, 2016, p. 358). It was in 1963 that the first indigenous Vice Chancellor of the University, Kenneth Dike,

established an independent academic department for Arabic and Islamic Studies (Sanni, 2016, p. 358). Next to this was the Abdullahi Bayero College Kano, which was made an affiliate of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria to run diploma and degree programmes in the Arts, including Arabic, Islamic Studies and English in 1962 (Kaura, 2015, p. 37). With this, Islamic studies found its way among academic disciplines in the University from inception, serving as a precursor for subsequent universities to be established. Since this time, the discipline has been a familiar course of study in the country.

It is appropriate to acknowledge that while the Federal Government of Nigeria does not establish any educational institution on the basis of any religion, the religion perceived to be dominant in an area sometimes dictates the nature of disciplines offered in such universities (Adebayo, 2018, p. 49). Despite this assertion made by Adebayo as cited above, Islamic studies has been a popular course of study as a programme in many Nigerian universities. Apart from science and technology-based institutions, it is only a pocket of institutions that do not offer Islamic studies in the entire nation. It is important to clarify that universities in the South-south region of the country offer the course alongside other faiths (especially Christian Studies), which makes it submerged under the religious studies degree. As such, institutions such as University of Port-Harcourt, University of Benin, Akwa Ibom State University and Ambrose Alli University Ekpoma, among others, all have it under Religious and Cultural Studies programme.

In consequence of the uniform model being adopted in the South-south and South-eastern regions, Islamic studies as a discipline is suffering a peculiar challenge that borders on a seeming ideological sentiment. In these regions, most universities do not employ Islamic experts to teach the sketchy content embedded in the religious studies curriculum. Where someone is employed, it is not more than one in most cases. To corroborate this stance, Kilani (2015) in his account narrates:

> The University of Port Harcourt's Department of Religious and Cultural Studies which was established as Department of Religious Studies in 1982 is one of the leading departments with programmes in Religious Studies. At inception, few courses in Islam which include Islam in West Africa, Sirah of the Prophet and Early History of Islam and Modern

> Development in Islam were taught. The courses were taught by Late Professor D. I. Ilega (d. 2008) a Christian of God's Kingdom Society (GKS) denomination until 1991 when NUC accreditation team insisted that an Islamic Scholar be recruited by the University to handle Islamic Studies component of the Degree programme. (p. 86)

The scenario is apparently not particular to the University cited above, but is a general practice in the region to date. It is even experienced in most universities using religious studies model as a course of study. This is the reason why Opeloye (2015) describes it as a model accommodating only a caricature of Islamic studies. Narrating his experience about Obafemi Awolowo University elsewhere, Opeloye (2020) notes:

> the employment of the two [referring to himself and Dr Makinde] was in response to the many years of agitations to employ Muslim Islamists to teach Islam after so many years of mishandling the discipline by incompetent non-Muslim scholars from the inception of the Department in 1962. (p. 152)

Commendably, apart from the above, Islamic studies is taught and learnt at the tertiary institution as either a single, combined or teaching subject (Imam, 2007, p. 33). One can say that the fortune of being introduced at inception in Nigeria's first university has favoured the discipline in most public institutions to date. Most leading public universities in the country were established in the 1960s, such as Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ahmadu Bello University (ABU) and University of Lagos (UNILAG) in this category. After this set were those established in the 1970s, such as University of Benin (UNIBEN), University of Maiduguri (UNIMAID) and University of Ilorin (UNILORIN), among others, to cater to the educational needs of the host communities and manpower required to drive the country's economy. These institutions offer Islamic studies in one form or another, as noted above. In fact, it is also interesting to note that both Usmanu Danfodiyo University (UDU) and Bayero University Kano (BUK) have Islamic Studies as a faculty together with Arts (Bayero University Kano, 2021; Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2021). With this, both institutions have Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies, which makes

it more favourable and attractive for enrolment. A practical example in this regard is Usmanu Danfodiyo University, as cited by Opeloye (2015, p. 114); in relation to the student enrolment of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies for the 2012/2013 academic session, Islamic Studies recorded the highest figure of 708 students among the seven Departments in the Faculty.

Unlike the situation of Islam in the Northern region where Islamic studies is massively studied, Islamic studies is less patronised in the Southern region. The case of poor enrolment is increasingly worrisome and has become a grim prospect in the academia in South-western Nigeria. Most of the universities in the region have a few students in the Department of Islamic Studies or as the case may be in terms of nomenclature. For instance, Opeloye (2015, p. 108) presents the enrolment data of Islamic studies students for these universities as follows: in the 2013/2014 academic session, the University of Ibadan had the highest figure of 85 students (from 100-400 Level), while Ekiti State University had 18 students (100-400 Level). In the 2019/2020 session, Osun State University, which introduced Islamic Studies as a degree programme recently, has eight students only in both 100 and 200 Levels. With a recent rebrand of the Religious Studies Department, Lagos State University is now experiencing a better enrolment status even though the review was on the nomenclature and not on the curriculum. With the current rate of global changes and the socio-economic reality emanating from various crisis, there is a need for urgent re-branding of Islamic studies. Such a rebrand is apposite with bias for Islamic finance, which is currently experiencing global acceptance by corporate bodies and government agencies.

Islamic Finance: A Correlate of Islamic Studies

Islamic finance is an offshoot of the Islamic economic system, which is a branch of study in Islamic thought. As its name implies, Islamic finance cannot be more appropriately incorporated but under the field of Islamic studies as a discipline even though it has not been so from what is obtainable so far. By way of definition, Islamic finance is a type of financing activities that must comply with Shari'ah (Islamic law). Nathie (n.d.) contends that Islamic finance is the application of faith-based norms and principles derived from the Shari'ah in dealing with

financial transactions and trade practices. It relies on text, prophetic rules and injunctions as well as *fiqh*, which is practice codes developed from Islamic jurisprudence. It is also defined as a way to manage money that keeps within the moral principles of Islam (Bank of England, 2021). Warde (2000, p. 20) posits that Islamic financial institutions are those that base their objectives and operations on Qur'anic principles. They are thus set apart from conventional institutions, which have no such preoccupations. From these definitions, it is crystal clear that Islamic finance is a concept that is developed from Islamic sources, which are the basis of Islamic studies as a field of study. Sequel to this, it becomes imperative to explore this branch of knowledge in order to strengthen the capacity of Islamic studies as a functional discipline.

To further advance a rationale for the incorporation of Islamic finance in Islamic studies for a functional and more productive field of academic endeavour, Ahmed (2010) hints that Islamic finance relies crucially on three sets of individuals with complementary skills. These are:

> One, financial professionals who are familiar with conventional financial products, as well as the demand for "Islamic" analogues of those products within various Muslim communities around the world.
>
> Two, Islamic jurists (*fuqahā'* or experts on classical jurisprudence developed mainly between the eight and fourteenth centuries), who help Islamic financial providers to find precedent financial procedures in classical writings, upon which contemporary analogues of conventional financial products can be built.
>
> Three, lawyers who assist both groups in structuring Islamic analogue financial products, while ensuring their compliance with all applicable and relevant legal and regulatory constraints. (p. 309)

The above hint on the appropriate manpower to drive Islamic finance when critically examined suggests that the first skill requires that some courses are injected into the extant curriculum of Islamic studies while implementing the proposed review. Equally, inter-faculty collaboration with appropriate faculties or colleges will come to play

as this is not a strange practice in the system. The second skill identified is simply a familiar arena in Islamic studies albeit concentration now required more on the Sharia-based courses. The third skill is a required collaboration while in practice since the service of legal experts is usually required in most fields, especially when dealing with finance-related endeavours. In a nutshell, Islamic finance coming to strengthen Islamic studies for graduates to become experts and develop a career in finance profession as Islamic experts is just a round peg in a round hole.

University Regulation and Programme Review in Nigeria

National Universities Commission (NUC) is the regulatory body for universities in Nigeria, with one of its responsibilities being the approval of academic programmes of institutions. It is on record that this regulatory body is dynamic in relation to the review of existing programmes and implementation of desirable requests in the aspect of rebranding, which affect change of nomenclature and content of certain programmes or introduction of new ones. For instance, NUC, while explaining its rationale for review of previous curriculum, writes in its Benchmark Minimum Academic Standards (BMAS) (2014) that:

> The curriculum review was necessitated by the fact that the frontiers of knowledge in all academic disciplines had been advancing with new information generated as a result of research. … Other compelling reasons included the need to update the standard and relevance of university education in the country as well as to integrate entrepreneurial studies and peace and conflict studies as essential new platforms that will guarantee all graduates from Nigerian universities the knowledge and appropriate skills, competencies and dispositions that will make them globally competitive and capable of contributing meaningfully to Nigeria socio-economic development. (p. i)

Based on this submission, the review of academic programmes and necessary change of curriculum (including nomenclature) has been witnessed in various instances. The case of History as a programme initially and the emergence of a new hybrid such as History and International Studies introduced in Lagos State University is a good

example. Osun State University has not only borrowed this noble idea but equally adapted it to English Studies and French Language. The institution now has programmes such as English and International Studies as well as French and International Studies. With this type of creativity to enhance the prospect of the concerned programmes, it can be said that the NUC is a dynamic regulatory body that is open to any developmental initiative that is capable of advancing the course of scholarship and civilisation whenever it comes.

Making a Case for Curriculum Review in Islamic Studies: South-western Universities on Call

The low enrolment of students for Islamic studies has been a peculiar phenomenon to the South-western region from inception. This is why Sanni (2016) notes that "a principal objective behind the sub-degree programme (diploma) was to feed the first degree programmes, hitherto suffering from poor enrolment by students with qualified candidates" (p. 358). While Sanni's affirmation is in relation to the diploma programme of the University of Ibadan in Arabic and Islamic studies, Adetona (2007, p. 65) earlier asserted that Lagos State University introduced the diploma in Arabic and Islamic Studies to boost the admission quotes of both disciplines at the undergraduate level. It is pertinent to note at this juncture that such a diploma programme is no more in existence due to the extant policy of relevant government agency on university administration. As such, the problem persists in the region without significant headway. While effort is not abated in finding a lasting solution to this issue, the relatively high fees charged by State Universities has done a more severe blow on the matter. It is now observed that the problem of low enrolment for Islamic studies in particular is being aggravated by the huge tuition and service fees being charged by the private and state-owned public universities. In fact, Adebayo and Jawondo (2018, p. 69) observe that some universities avoid mounting certain courses, including Islamic studies, because they see these courses as having low prospect of employability. Sequel to this observation, the perceived non-prospective Islamic studies now struggle to survive as an academic programme due to the paucity of students.

In view of the foregoing, there is no gain in saying that Islamic studies needs urgent rebranding and time cannot be delayed further if we must sustain the vibrancy of the discipline. The immediate required action is to review the curriculum to comply with current global trends. In agreement with this initiative, Abdulhamid (2017, p. 87) observes that the contents of most universities' curricula are static; they are not reviewed periodically to meet the yearning needs of our changing society. This, according to her, makes learning old fashioned and irrelevant. From this submission, one can note that a curriculum is meant to be reviewed at reasonable intervals so as to incorporate emerging realities but this rarely happens in Nigeria. Equally emphasising the need to repackage, Oyeweso (2010, p. 6603) argues that there is a need for the humanities to re-invent themselves in order to overcome the challenges of relevance that confront them. Considering the choice of words as used by Oyeweso, "re-invent" is not inappropriate but rather suggests that a modification to the appellation "Islamic Studies" may equally be warranted.

It is apposite at this juncture to glance at the curriculum of selected institutions in South-western Nigeria for this exploration. It should be stated that only state institutions are selected for this purpose due to the peculiarity of different tuition fee trends in contrary to federal institutions, among other factors.

Lagos State University (LASU)

Lagos State University was established in 1983, with Islamic Studies introduced as a foundation course in the Department of Religions, among others, in the Faculty of Arts (Opeloye, 2015, p. 105). Below is the presentation of tables showing the courses available for students according to semester from 100 to 400 Levels:

100 Level (First) Harmattan Semester

Code	Title	Unit	Status
GNS 101	Use of Library	2	C
ISS 101	Introduction to Islam	2	C
ISS 103	Introduction to Qur'an	2	C

ISS 105	Early History of Islam from *Jahilliyyah* to Death of the Prophet	2	C
ISS 107	Moral Teachings of Islam (*Tahdhib*)	2	E
CRS 101	Old Testament Background	2	C
CRS 103	New Testament Background	2	C
ATR 101	General Introduction to Religion	2	C
ALL 111	Arabic Conversation II (Subsidiary)	2	C

Source: Departmental Students' Handbook 2016-2020

100 Level (Second) Rain Semester

Code	**Title**	**Unit**	**Status**
GNS 102	Use of English	2	C
ISS 102	*Al-Ibadat* (Rituals)	2	C
ISS 104	The Orthodox Caliphs in Islam	2	E
ISS 106	Introduction to the Study of Hadith	2	C
CRS 102	Critical Introduction to the Old Testament	2	C
CRS 104	Critical Introduction to the New Testament	2	C
ATR 102	Introduction to the Study of African Traditional Religion	2	C
ALL 112	Arabic Conversation IV (Subsidiary)	2	E
ALL 114	Arabic Grammar II (Subsidiary)	2	E

Source: Departmental Students' Handbook 2016-2020

200 Level (First) Harmattan Semester

Code	Title	Unit	Status
GNS 201	Lagos and its Environs	2	C
ISS 201	Textual Study of the Qur'an	2	C
ISS 203	Textual Study of the Hadith I	2	C
ISS 205	Introduction to Islamic Mysticism	2	P
ISS 207	Introduction to *Tafsir*	2	P
CRS 201	The Formative Period of Israelite History	2	E
CRS 203	The Synoptic Gospels	2	E
ATR 203	African Concept of God	2	E
ALL 211	Arabic Conversation VI	2	E

Source: Departmental Students' Handbook 2016-2020

200 Level (Second) Rain Semester

Code	Title	Unit	Status
GNS 202	African History and Culture	2	C
ISS 202	Introduction to Islamic Law	2	C
ISS 204	Introduction to Islamic Theology	2	C
ISS 206	Introduction to Islamic Philosophy	2	E
ISS 208	The 'Umayyad Period of Islam	2	E
CRS 204	Pauline Corpus	2	E
ATR 204	West African Pantheon	2	E
ALL 212	Arabic Reader III	2	E

Source: Departmental Students' Handbook 2016-2020

300 Level (First) Harmattan Semester

Code	Title	Unit	Status
GNS 301	Logic and Philosophy	2	C
ISS 301	Textual Study of the Qur'an II	2	C
ISS 303	Textual Study of Hadith II	2	P
ISS 305	The Mutazillites and their Rationalism	2	C
ISS 307	The Sufi Orders in Islam	2	C
ISS 309	The 'Abbasid Period in Islam	2	E
ISS 311	The *Shi'ah* Muslims	2	E
ISS 313	*Tajwidu'l-Qur'an*	2	E
ISS 315	Islamic Law of *Mu'ammalat*	2	E
CRS 309	Introduction to Christian Theology	2	C
ALL 301	Arabic Phonetic and Phonology	2	E
ALL 317	Textual Analysis of Qur'an	2	E

Source: Departmental Students' Handbook 2016-2020

300 Level (Second) Rain Semester

Code	Title	Unit	Status
GNS 302	Logic and Philosophy	2	C
ISS 302	Islamic Family Law for Non-Law Students	2	C
ISS 304	Islamic Law of Succession and Administration of Estate	2	E
ISS 306	*Al-'Ash'ariyyah* or Islamic Scholasticism	2	C
ISS 308	Philosophers in Islam	2	C
ISS 310	*Al-Mufassirun*- Commentators of the Qur'an	2	E
ISS 312	The *Sirah* and *Maghazi* Literature	2	E

ISS 314	Revivalism and Revivalist Movement in Islam	2	E
ISS 316	Comparative Religious Studies	2	E
ISS 318	Research Methods in Islam	2	E
ISS 320	Islam and Modern Science	2	C
ISS 322	Islam in Spain	2	E
CRS 310	Christian Theology	2	C
ALL 302	Development of Arabic Grammatical Studies	2	E
ALL 312	Arabic Literature in Early Islam and Umayyad Spain	2	E

Source: Departmental Students' Handbook 2016-2020

400 Level (First) Harmattan Semester

Code	**Title**	**Unit**	**Status**
ISS 401	Textual Study of the Qur'an III	2	E
ISS 403	Textual Study of the Hadith III	2	E
ISS 405	Islamic Criminal Law for Non-Law Students	2	E
ISS 407	The Mystics of Islam	2	E
ISS 409	Islamic Political Thought	2	C
ISS 411	The Fatimid Rule	2	E
ISS 413	Islamic Laws of *Wasiyyah* and *Waqf*	2	C
ISS 499	Research Project	4	C

Source: Departmental Students' Handbook 2016-2020

400 Level (Second) Rain Semester

Code	**Title**	**Unit**	**Status**
ISS 402	Modern Development in Islamic Law	2	E
ISS 406	Textual Readings on Theology	2	E

ISS 408	Islamic Economic System	2	E
ISS 410	Islam in West Africa	2	E
ISS 412	Islam's Interpretation of History with Special Reference to Ibn Khaldun	2	E
ISS 414	Islam and the West	2	E
ISS 416	Special Qur'anic Text	2	E
ISS 418	Ottoman Period of Islam	2	E
ISS 420	Advanced Studies of the Qur'an	2	E
ISS 422	Islam in Yorubaland	2	E
ALL 404	Translation: Arabic/English/ Arabic	2	E
ALL 418	Introduction to Modern Arabic Criticism	2	E

Source: Departmental Students' Handbook 2016-2020

Olabisi Onabanjo University (OOU), Ogun State

Olabisi Onabanjo University (OOU), formerly Ogun State University, was established in 1982. The University started with Religious Studies but created Islamic Studies and Christian Religious Studies in 1991 (Opeloye, 2015, p. 105). This institution, just as others in the South-western region, has been facing the challenge of low enrolment of students in Islamic Studies programme. For instance, according to the statistics supplied by Dr. Akanni Akeem (the current Head of Islamic Studies Unit) for the 2019/2020 academic session, there are 13 students in 100 Level, eight students in 200 Level, and eight and 11 students in 300 and 400 Levels respectively. In considering the courses available in the curriculum operated in this institution, it is important to point out that they are related with those of LASU presented above. Hence, for the reason of limited space, few courses that are not featured above will be outlined. Such courses include: Sources of Islam (ISS 117), Sources of Christianity (CRS 118), Introduction to Fiqh (ISS 125), Religions and Human Values (REL 213), Science of Islamic Jurisprudence (ISS 228), Introduction to Entrepreneurship Skills (GNS 204), Introduction to Entrepreneurship Studies (GNS 205), Introduction to the Sociology of

Religion (REL 313), Works of Al-Ghazali (ISS 331), Islam and Gender Questions (ISS 432) and Islam and Civil Society in the Globalizing World (ISS 438).

Osun State University (UNIOSUN)

Osun State University (UNIOSUN), according to the information available on its website (Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria, 2021), was established in 2007. It did not run Islamic Studies programme until recently when the course took off with the pioneer set of students in the 2018/2019 academic session. Now in the third year, this institution has only 15 students across the levels for Islamic Studies. The low enrolment may not be unconnected with the perceived high tuition fees being charged in the institution. This has been noted by Opeloye (2015, p. 113) when he identifies "new fees regime" as one of the reasons for the declining fortunes of Islamic studies in the South-western region. Curriculum wise, the Islamic Studies programme in UNIOSUN operates similar content with other institutions around, as noted above. Areas of departure from others may be noticed with courses such as Introduction to Economics (ECO 101), Mathematics for Islamic Studies (MTH 107), Introduction to Psychology (PSY 112), Basic French (GNS 211) and The Ikhwanu Safa (ISS 409). Other courses are contained in either institutions as listed above.

A painstaking examination of the curriculum, as currently operated in Islamic studies for these institutions, calls for a review to foster professional inclination in the output. On the one hand, the fees currently charged seem unappealing to prospective students of humanities in general and Islamic studies in particular. According to Opeloye (2015, p. 114), students of humanities often do not see a reason why they should pay any fees near the amount charged for professional courses. Going by this assertion and the current reality in relation to the number of students, one may not expect anything better so soon, unless something revolutionary is adopted.

On the other hand, it is in consonance with this that a hybrid of Islamic studies and Islamic finance as a course of study will be a better replacement or alternative to the situation at hand. In the view of Oyeweso (2010, p. 6604) by creating hybrid disciplines, the strengths

of the humanities are made available to the cognate discipline and vice versa. Consequently, the proposed hybrid of Islamic studies and Islamic finance will draw strength from management sciences while equally shedding strength to the latter. In addition, Opeloye (2020b, p. 408) recommends that the rebranding of Arabic studies and Islamic studies as disciplines should be considered so as to reflect contemporary global perspectives.

The novelty that will possibly be created from having a hybrid of this nature will in itself be a strength of patronage in the region. Despite the fact that correlation is clearly established between Islamic finance and Islamic studies, no institution in the South-western region has the courage to venture into this unique initiative. As noted by Adebayo (2018, p. 54), Bayero University has established the Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance in 2011, which has been running various postgraduate programmes for individuals who seek to upscale and update themselves for better prospects in the society. With this development, a similar gesture in the South-western region will definitely attract some beneficial interests to the region and set a competitive precedence in the country. To create a template for a take-off, such courses that could be injected in the proposal include but may not be limited to: Islamic Economic System, Introduction to Islamic Cooperatives, Risk Management and Takaful, Introduction to Islamic Jurisprudence and Public Finance in Islam, Islamic Capital Market, Islamic Financial System, History of Islamic Finance, Islamic Asset Management and Investment as well as Zakat and Waqf Management.

These courses, along with others as deemed relevant, are to be spread across the academic levels from simple to complex. Students can be introduced to the courses from the first year of the degree programme, with more advanced courses being slated for the penultimate and final-year classes for specialisation purpose. It is equally important to mention that graduates from this programme can proceed to acquire further certification with related professional bodies, such as the Institute of Islamic Finance Professionals. This is akin to what operates in other professional disciplines.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Islamic studies as a discipline in the university has been a foundation course of study from the inception of university education in Nigeria. The discipline emerged as a development from the various models of Islamic education that accompany the religion of Islam in every part of the country. Despite the longstanding posture it enjoys, a myriad of challenges continues to beset its fortune over the years. These perennial hitches range from ideological sentiment, low enrolment of students and wavering prospect to high tuition fees. In order to address these multiple challenges, there is a need to review the existing curriculum and introduce a revolutionary paradigm shift of a hybrid model with specific interest in Shari'ah-based finance. With this initiative, there can be a new orientation and unprecedented trend for traditional Islamic studies in South-western Nigeria. In relation to the foregoing presentation, this study therefore offers the following recommendations:

1. Universities in the South-western region should introduce the hybrid of Islamic studies and Islamic finance as an alternative or replacement to the conventional Islamic Studies programme in order to professionalise the discipline.

2. The existing curriculum used by universities in the South-western region should be reviewed in order to incorporate Islamic finance components, as proposed above.

3. There should be collaboration with cognate institutions and faculties in order to enhance the smooth transition and necessary exchange of machineries where required.

4. *Awqaf* (endowments) institutions should consider scholarship for Islamic studies students so as to subsidise educational expenses in the current era of new fee regime by various educational institutions.

5. National Universities Commission, as the regulatory body, should consider the merit of this argument in the view to adopt the proposal of introducing Islamic studies and Islamic finance as an academic programme in Nigerian universities.

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Regional Dynamics and Governance in Modern Middle East: From the Ottoman Empire to the Cold War

Ramzi Bendebka[1]

Abstract: The modern state's concept as an institution with specific boundaries has been recently introduced in the Middle East region. As a result, without referring to modern regional history and development, there will be no appropriate explanation of the nature and features of present countries in the Middle East, starting with transforming the Islamic *Khilafah* into separate states and the role of different powers, events and issues in shaping the region. Therefore, this essay presents a comprehensive overview of regional governance that can be an alternative to studying separate Middle Eastern states. This study's main objective is to analyse and highlight governance in different historical periods that affected the Middle East's regional dynamics. In doing so, the Historical Dynamics (HD) approach has been used to understand regional governance, coherence and systems. Despite the fact that the Middle East states have several internal differences, the region remains sufficiently integrated and shares fundamental civilisational, political, economic, religious, and historical experiences to provide an intelligible unit of study and a clear understanding. The researcher starts from the Middle East and North Africa's conceptual reality and provides a brief outline of the region's most essential characteristics. Then, he identifies and analyses governance during the Ottoman Empire, colonial periods, independence, nationalism and the Cold War phases.

Keywords: Middle East region, governance, Islam, Ottoman, colonialism, independence, Arab nationalism.

[1] *Ramzi Bendebka*, PhD. is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Fundamental and Interdisciplinary Studies, IIUM. He specialises in Muslim World issues, Middle Eastern studies and International Studies. He can be reached at bendramzi@gmail.com.

Introduction

To conceptualise regional dynamics, one must first explain what region is "Middle East" as a terminology is an invention of the West (Hilal & Jamil, 2001, p. 3). Hilal and Jamil (2001) state that "The East, and its adjectival form (oriental), connoted in the European mind more than just a geographic locale" (pp. 21-22). The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) as a region had arisen during the colonial era and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. As a concept and a structure with clear borders, the state has been recently introduced to the MENA region, with partial exemptions, namely Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, and Oman (Ayubi, 1995, p. 60-65). Hence, the term "Middle East" encompasses the current nation states in the region that resulted from European colonialism in the 19th and 20th centuries.

The Middle East cannot sufficiently be defined in terms of culture. A term like "Arab World"[2] cannot be applied to countries such as Iran, Turkey, and some other nations with predominantly non-Arab populations. The term "Islamic World" is also not pertinent for some Muslim countries located outside the MENA region. The inclusion of non-Arab countries such as Turkey and Iran in the region are valid. The Turkish region was the center of the Ottoman Caliphate that controlled the MENA region for approximately four centuries. There is also the geographical proximity with Arab countries (Syria and Iraq in particular), shared culture, history, religious thoughts, practices of Islam and a worldview which comes from a primary source for all Muslims (the Qur'an).

Along with the spread of Islam, areas adjacent to the Arab World were frequently integrated politically, economically, socially, and militarily, contributing to a cultural and political heritage that has been relatively homogeneous and integrated. (Dumper & Bruce, 2007). Furthermore, the Arabic language is widely spoken among the political, economic and religious leaders. Turkey and Iran have a lot more in common with the Arabs than they do with the non-Arabs. Israel and South Sudan are the only exceptions in this research. The latter is a new state which split from Sudan, and it is too early to consider it as part of the Middle East because of shortage of data and information. More

[2] According to the World Bank (2016), the Arab World comprises members of the League of Arab States. https://data.worldbank.org/country/1A.

noticeably, there is barely any resemblance between Israel and other Middle East countries, either in history, politics, religion, language, culture or economy (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014). Because of that, Israel and South Sudan are not included in this study.

The Middle East is a dynamic interplay of states and peoples, traditions, thoughts, interests, and goals. The Middle East encompasses a region that stretches from Iran to Morocco, as well as from Turkey to Sudan. This covers 22 nations, consists of 20 Arab League members (including the West Bank), Turkey, and Iran. Despite several differences among the countries, the Middle East region is significantly interconnected and shares a core of political, economic, historical, and religious experiences to provide a coherent unit of study (Bendebka, 2016).

The Middle East Region: An Overview

The term "Middle East" requires many different definitions. Throughout this study, "Middle East" corresponds to the region's operational definition, including 20 countries within the Arab League, coupled with Turkey and Iran (Yousef, 2004).

According to the Human Development Indicators Rank (World Bank, 2017), land area, energy resources and population are critical drivers for a state's development and to reinforce its power. The global population increased to around seven billion people in 2012. Developing countries became the main contributors of this, and accounted for and increase of 92% (OPEC, 2014). The Middle East has a population of about 503 million, larger than that of Europe (480 million) and of the United States (315 million). The Middle East's population comprises 7% of the inhabitants of the world. Ten countries in the Middle East – Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Sudan, Turkey and Iran– comprise almost 90% of total population in the region.

Concerning land area, data from the World Bank (2018) shows that Algeria, the largest country in the region as well as in Africa, encompasses more than 2 million square kilometers, followed by Egypt, Iran, Libya, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, each of which possesses a land area of more than 1 million square kilometers. The next largest countries are Turkey, Yemen, Morocco and Iraq, each covering between 0.4 and 0.8 million square kilometers. The other countries in the region possess a

land area of less than 0.1 million square kilometers, except for Palestine and Bahrain, the smallest countries in the region, that have less than 0.01 million square kilometers (The World Bank, 2018).

Population trends are reflected in economic growth rates. In 2012, the average of the Middle East's economic growth rate was 3.2% per annum, quite close to the world's average of 3.4% (Anthony, Rey & Mendez, 2013). However, the rate was diverse among the existing countries. The economic growth rates in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Mauritania, Kuwait and Oman were higher than 5%. The growth rates were more than 3% in Algeria, Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Tunisia. The remaining growth rates in the Middle East scored less than 3%, the lowest of which in Iran and Sudan with -1.9% and -10.1% respectively (IMF, 2013).

The Middle East is stereotypically perceived as Arab, Muslim and conservative, despite the fact that the countries in the region vary in their economic structures, forms of state, social composition and historical evolution. All the countries are Muslim-majority, and all of the countries are primarily Arabic speaking, except for Turkey and Iran. All countries are predominantly Sunni,[3] with the exception of Iran, which is largely Shia,[4] Bahrain, with Shia-majority citizens, and Iraq and Lebanon, with

[3] Sunni constitute at least 85 percent of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims. It is the largest branch within the Muslim community. Four legal schools of thought guide Sunni life – Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali – to develop practises of the example of the Prophet. Although Sunni Islam includes a variety of schools in law, theology, attitudes and perspectives depending on the historical context, the geographical location, and culture, the Sunnis generally share some essential features, including recognition of the legitimacy of Muhammad's first four caliphs (Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, and ʿAlī). http://www.oxford Islamic studies.com/a article/or /t125/e2280 (Accessed March 2, 2021).

[4] Shia Islam is an Islamic branch with the belief that Prophet Muhammad has named ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib as the only successor (Imam). Shia believe that only God has the right to nominate the Prophet's successor as a prophet is appointed by God alone. They believe that God has chosen ʿAlī to succeed Muhammad as the first infallible caliph of Islam. The Sunnis are somewhat different from the Shia in their theological beliefs and religious practices, like prayers. See Britannica for more details: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shii (Accessed March 2, 2021).

almost equal populations of Sunni and Shia. Some countries such as Egypt, Lebanon and Syria have a sizeable Christian-minority population, while others such as Morocco, Iran, Iraq and Algeria are diverse in terms of language and ethnicity. With the exception of Mauritania, Djibouti and Yemen (rated as the least developed countries), all the countries in the region are considered as developing countries, albeit with some differences (UNCTAD, 2014).

The Production of Oil and Middle East Regional Governance

The emergence and rising influence of oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Algeria, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar have been a key feature of Middle East economic growth over the last century, until recently (Carkoglu et al., 1998; Luciani, 2017).

Based on World Oil Outlook (2014), Saudi Arabia has total shares of 15.9% oil production, making it the largest oil reserves globally, followed by Iran at 9.4% and Iraq at 9%. The fourth highest country in the region is Kuwait, with more than 6% oil reserve, followed by UAE (5.9%), Libya (2.9%) and Qatar (1.4%). Consequently, the Middle East is a region from which the most enormous components of global oil and gas supplies come from. Therefore, the world energy power is concentrated in the Middle East (Figure 1). Middle Eastern countries also fall into the following categories in terms of regime economic types:

1. Oil economies but lacking in other resources: Libya and the Gulf countries
2. Mixed oil economies: Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Iraq and Iran
3. Non-oil economies: Tunisia, Jordan, Turkey and Morocco

The last two categories have a more diversified economy and their resources include oil, large populations and agricultural land. Even though lacking of other resources, the countries in the first category have the world's most significant oil reserves.

With the exception of several countries, primarily the oil-producing Gulf countries, the Middle East region shares similar characteristics with the other countries in the Third World. One of them is internal

structure due to the historical pattern of state formation based on the state's central government and personal governance (Noble et al., 1993, p. 11). As Mohammad Salman Hassan states, "In the Arab world, there are no state-to-state economic agreements or cooperation, only person-to-person ones" (Ferrara, 2016, p. 69). Therefore, the use of revenues for economic, social and political development is always based on the central government and its will.

Furthermore, the Middle East region has been influenced by civil and inter-regional conflicts, disputes and terrorism. Therefore, most of the revenues and expenditures have been heavily spent on the military rather than social and economic development. For instance, in the Middle East, oil-exporting countries have increased yearly actual spending by 3.6%, while non-oil exporting countries saw real spending rise by around 7.8% (IISS, 2013). On the whole, defense spending in the region rose from USD155.9 billion in 2012 to USD166.4 billion in 2013. Saudi Arabia continues to be the highest military spender in the Middle East, accounted for 31.6% of the overall spending or more than USD50 billion (IISS, 2013).



Figure 1: Distribution of Proven Oil Reserves in (2019)
Source: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), World Oil Outlook.

Concerning regional governance, in 1960, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed, which comprised eight countries out of 12 MENA countries. Initially, OPEC intended to protect its members, each one a weak developing nation, from the maneuvers of an informal cartel of international oil corporations (Fisher & Ochsenwald, 1990, p. 552). In Geneva and then in Vienna in 1965, OPEC defined its vision and formed its Secretariat. In 1968, it introduced the "Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries," which emphasised that all countries have the inalienable right to exercise permanent control over their natural resources for the sake of national growth. By 1969, the group had grown to 10 members (OPEC, 2020). OPEC gained international reputation during the 1970s and 1980s as its members held the reins of their domestic oil industries and acquired a significant say in setting the price of crude oil in global market. At certain junctures, oil prices increased sharply in an unpredictable market, for example, the one caused by the Arab oil embargo in 1973, as a pressure on pro-Israeli countries (Fisher & Ochsenwald, 1990). In 1990 and 1991, prices moved less dramatically compared to the 1970s and 1980s, and OPEC effective action had reduced the market impact of Middle East hostilities. However, globalisation, regionalism, technological advancement, and other high-tech movements were pursued in a more integrated oil industry, which adapted to the post-Soviet environment (World Oil Outlook, 2014).

Remarkably, OPEC itself has not fully controlled the world oil market. Now and then, there have been some differences among Middle East members of OPEC; for instance, Libya, Algeria, Iraq and Iran have often pressed for the increase of prices (Fisher & Ochsenwald, 1990, pp. 555-557). The position of Saudi Arabia is based on its gargantuan oil reserves and also that it sells about 40% of OPEC productions. Therefore, the process of regional oil governance is ambiguous and based on crucial states' interests.

The Frame of the Study

A region is a dynamic entity because various aspects change with time, especially governance and member states' relations. Various studies and analyses for regional dynamics lead to different types of governance. Therefore, a Historical Dynamics (HD) approach gives an in-depth

understanding of regional governance, coherence and system. It tells us that political and economic practices evolve over periods, with each phase/period depending on the previous one or how one neutralised another; for example, the independence phase/period neutralised the colonial phase/period. The events and way of governance that took place in the Middle East region during the previous period must be addressed to drive the development of history, such as the reforms, the state creation, and the revolution (Hinnebusch, 2003, 2014). The ability or inability of governance in the Middle East region depends very much on its regional history. Thus, in order to understand how governance works, we need to study different historical periods and how they affected the region's governance. In doing so, we focus on how external factors, such as colonialism and the Cold War, and internal factors, such as Ottoman rule, have affected the Middle East's regional governance. The HD approach also informs us of the ongoing feedback mechanism between the type of governance that exists at a given time in the Middle East's history and the region's related dynamics. As a result, understanding the historical context is crucial in determining the Middle East region's dynamics.

Also, in the HD approach, we can describe how different sub-state entities interact with each other within the region, as in the Ottoman Empire, and how other outside states can affect colonialism in the Middle East region (Turchin, 2004). This description can be done by tracing the way of governance in order to understand the dynamics of the region. Observing the Middle East region's historical dynamics by highlighting the way of governance can allow us to understand the differences between states and help other studies to predict the Middle East's future regional dynamics. Therefore, this essay presents an overview of the Middle East region, the Ottoman period, European colonialism, independence, nationalism and the Cold War.

Governance and Historical Dynamics in the Middle East Region

In a multi-polar international system, where the world is divided into many geographical cores or "regional worlds," regionalism has become a characteristic of world politics (Buzan, 2011; Acharya, 2011). Since the idea of "area" and the governance of a given region are closely related, it is essential to understand how regions have traditionally been

organised and administered. Although the term "regional governance" is commonly used in textbooks, it is rarely described or conceptualised (Herz, 2014: Nolte, 2016). Söderbaum (2013), drawing on Rosenau, thus gives a definition of regional governance "as spheres of authority at the regional level of human activity which amount to systems of rule, formal and informal, in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control" (Söderbaum, 2004, p. 224). Despite the fact that Fawcett and Serrano do not provide a precise description, they tend to prescribe to a complex concept of regional governance that refers to the setting and enforcing of rules by a regional body such as the institutions that exist within a given geographical space (Nolte, 2016). On the other hand, governance is the management of a specific state or region by actors who have the authority to govern, which is either given by force or voluntarily by states.



Figure 2: Study Organisation

In a broad sense, historical data collection is the collection of information about past events, periods, and thoughts on a specific topic, such as about regional governance in our case. To be precise, historical data includes most data collected about the Middle East region, whether manually or automatically. Among many possibilities, sources include books, articles, reports, treaties and agreements as well as various other documents that can be useful for analysis. The data have been divided based on the studied periods. After collecting the data, the second step was to find a logical and comprehensive connection between the

historical events, engagements and decisions of different influential powers and their relationships with regional governance.

Results and Discussions

As a result of World War I, the map of the Middle East has entirely changed. The Turkish Republic and Iran are the only countries whose pre-war border remains essentially unchanged in the region. The region had experienced dramatic changes which seriously impacted the whole population, disrupting centuries of social, political, commercial and cultural relations. These extensive changes still reverberate almost a century later. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Ottomans faced a number of internal and external problems that included colonial intrusion and escalating rebellion in the provinces. The Ottoman Caliphate finally ended with the Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) treaties. This section will discuss the Ottomans and Western colonialism.

The Ottomans and Cohesion of the State

Middle Eastern scholars and books on the history of the Middle East and Arab-Islamic states pay little attention to the Ottoman period, even though the Empire began in the 16th century and lasted nearly five centuries. With a few exceptions, it encompassed the vast majority of the Arab nations, and it was a period that had the most significant influence on governance practices in the Arab world. This attitude among the Arabs might be influenced by the West that tends to regard the entire Ottoman era, including the previously flourishing centuries, as a period of deterioration that is unworthy of attention (Ayubi, 1995, pp. 65-66). Ayubi approves the remarks of Albert Hourani (1981):

> Many of the things Middle Eastern countries have in common can be explained by their having been ruled for so long by the Ottomans; many of the things which differentiate them can be explained by the different ways in which they emerged from the Ottoman Empire. (p. 66)

The Ottoman Empire was extensive territorially, within which various communities with different ethnicities, languages and religions lived. This required good administrative institutions to safeguard the unity and

cohesion of the state. Society in the Ottoman Empire was divided into two separate categories. The first, the people were organised into religious communities or *millets* (Shaw & Cetinsaya, 2009). The second society was divided based on their affiliation with the government, separating government officials and those who worked in the military from those who were not involved in those institutions. The reign of Suleyman the Magnificent was notable for Ottoman power and affluence, as well as the rapid development of its political, economic and social systems (Wittek, 1938). The Ottoman rulers maintained the old Middle Eastern social divisions, with a small ruling class at the top known as the *askeri*, or "the military," whose functions were chiefly limited to maintaining order and securing financial resources to sustain itself and fulfil its responsibility. The second, which was the bulk, was the ordinary class of *rayas* (*reaya*, or "the flock"), structured into independent communities based on religion (*millets*) or economic pursuits (*esnaf*, or "guilds"). They were in charge of the other aspects of life that were not administered by the government (Alderson, 1956; Lowry, 2003).

After a long period of insecurity caused by frequent Mamluk fighting in Egypt and the Levant, Ottoman authority brought the much-needed order (Ayubi, 1995, p. 67). When the Ottomans conquered Arab lands, they incorporated the Mamluk parallel hierarchy and allowed it to coexist, often side by side, with a smaller but formally more authoritative Ottoman hierarchy (Ayubi, 1995, p. 69). Provincial political power appeared to operate more independently from the capital during the 17th and 18th centuries. Almost everywhere in the Middle East and Mediterranean territories, the central government had become less important, with local distinguished families playing a more significant role in most people's daily lives. Prominent provincial families dominated the whole sections of Ottoman politics. The Hasan Pasha family (Mamluk), for example, dominated and ruled Baghdad's political and economic affairs for the entire 18th century (1704–1831), while the Jalili family played the same role in Mosul. Algeria was ruled by Nasruddin Barbarossa, while Egypt was ruled by powerful men such as Ali Bey (Quataert, 2000, p. 47).

However, the Ottoman rule in Arab countries was characterised by several features that led to its decline, including the central authority's weakness and the emergence of separatist movements in the Arab countries (al-Sallabi, 2001).

The first feature was the sufficiency of imposing nominal sovereignty over the states. Among its most essential manifestations is an Ottoman governor's appointment, minting currency in the Sultan's name, sending the annual tribute and praying for the Sultan on the pulpits. Therefore, the powers of the governor (*pasha*) were limited to some tasks. As a result, the sects formed by national and religious minorities played a significant role in social services (e.g., education, health) and economic activities. Secondly, it was due to the spread of corruption and injustice. Since the governors were buying their positions, their main concern was to collect the most considerable amount of money before the expiry of their mandate, which usually did not exceed one year; this marked their rule with corruption and injustice (al-Sallabi, 2001, p. 529).

As a result of all this, the Ottoman state's weak political influence on the people of the Arab states gave rise to the emergence of local forces that knew how to exploit the anger among the Arab people and to lead the revolution against the central authority. Some of them even found encouragement and support from foreign powers (al-Sallabi, 2001, p. 300). These movements appeared in different regions of the Arab countries, the most important of which were: the movement founded by Fakhr al-Din in the Levant which led to Lebanon's independence under his rule and his family's rule between 1585 and 1635 AD; and The Great Ali Bey Movement in Egypt, in which the Mamluk, Sheikh Al-Balad Ali Bey the Great used the Russo-Turkish war outbreaks to declare his independence in 1770 AD (al-Sallabi, 2001, p. 376).

Due to this deterioration in the Ottoman Empire and the ensuing consequences, the conflict and competition among the various European countries to share their possessions in what is called in European history as the Eastern Question resulted in the fall of parts of the Empire under the economic, and then political, domination of some of these countries (al-Sallabi, 2001, p. 336-339).

The Ottomans ruled in Islam's name, but they tolerated other religions as well as other ethnicities. Tolerance became a religious principle as well as a political practise to enhance stability and peace in the region (Pappé, 2005). Each religious community had the right to exercise its laws and regulations. Various refugee groups had always been welcomed by the city of Istanbul, including the Jewish refugees who fled from Spain due to the Inquisition in early 16th century. The

Ottomans were not of Arab descent, and they did not assert their sovereignty based on ethnicity, as future Middle East rulers did. Their disregard for ethnicity was the best explanation for their ability to maintain power for nearly five centuries (Pappé, 2005, pp. 17-18).

Interaction with more efficient European administrative systems did not benefit the Ottomans. This situation, however, improved the position of Jews and Christians in Ottoman territory because it brought with it an impartial measure of secularism and demanded the well-being of non-Muslim inhabitants living in Ottoman territory. Furthermore, such reservations had become a justification for European colonial interference and invasion. When this situation arose, the impetus for change came from the state itself. While the leaders adopted a reformist discourse to deal with the expansion of Western rule, the people resisted this reform (Pappé, 2005, p. 20).

The disadvantaged groups of this reform, particularly in the 19th century, such as the *'ulamā'* (Muslim scholars) and aristocracy, adopted a counter-reform based on tradition and religion. Their discourses were eventually turned into political activity in competition with radical secularising leaders and their opponents who protested against the state's secularisation—the reforms led to a more centralised Ottoman government. Between 1908 and 1924, the Ottomans vanished, after ruling the Middle East for more than five centuries.

Since the mid-19th century, there has been no sovereign power in North Africa. The Ottomans gave up control of some Arab countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia. They signed several treaties with the West, especially after World War I, including the Treaty of Serves in 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Most of the MENA territories fell under Western rule, as described in the following Articles in the Treaty of Serves (1920):

> Article 118:
>
> "Turkey recognises the French Protectorate in Morocco and accepts all the consequences thereof. This recognition shall take effect as from" March 30, 1912.
>
> Article 119:
>
> "Moroccan goods entering Turkey shall be subject to the same treatment as French goods."

> Article 120:
>
> "Turkey recognises the French Protectorate over Tunis and accepts all the consequences thereof. This recognition shall take effect as of May 12, 1881. Tunisian goods entering Turkey shall be subject to the same treatment as French goods."

This does not include the dozens of agreements and treaties involving Great Britain, Russia and France, which divided the Ottoman territories among these European powers and declared the expiration of the Muslim Caliphate through 1916's Sykes-Picot Treaty and 1917's Balfour Declaration. Mustafa Kemal and his army entered Istanbul and declared the founding of the Republic of Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne (Kia, 2008, p. 152). Mustafa Kemal explained his generation's refusal of the nation's stale and unprofitable Ottoman past in a lengthy address to parliament. It is so famous that it is referred to as 'The Speech' in Turkish. In the early years in power, he devoted his government to carrying out reforms, which he dubbed revolutions, aimed at convincing the Turkish people to abandon their Ottoman heritage, renounce religious domination, and accept the modern secular state (Finkel, 2005, pp. 2-3).

Another major reason for the decline was the agricultural character of the economy. While Europe experienced the Industrial Revolution in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman economy remained primarily based on agriculture. The Empire certainly lacked the manufacturing facilities needed to compete with France, Great Britain, and even Russia. Consequently, its economic development was relatively stagnant, and its surplus in agriculture was used to repay loans to European creditors. Therefore, during World War I, the Ottoman Empire lacked the industrial experience required to produce the ammunition, heavy weapons, iron, and steel needed for railroad buildings to support the war (Lieven, 1999).

European development and growth in the economic field also led to the transformation of the Ottoman trade from a transit trade that generated enormous profits for the Empire to a trade based on the direct exchange between low-priced Ottoman raw materials and expensive European materials. Reducing the state's resources led to damage to the small industries of the Empire. The lack of resources caused the government

to resort to burdening the population with taxes, which harmed both local merchants and peasants, many of whom were forced to abandon their lands. As a result, large areas of the Empire were transformed into dead lands, one of the causes of frequent famines (Khalid, 2019).

The Colonial Domination Period and Governance Style

No proper understanding of the current Middle East states' nature and characteristics can be acquired without referring to the period of colonialism. The colonial era is a critical factor in determining post-independence levels of political stability, cultural discourse, economic development, and other issues (Lee & Schultz, 2012). Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the central states and the Middle East region's armed forces were weak, and the economy had reduced to the point where no government could exercise authority within the Middle Eastern countries. As the situation in many states worsened, colonial powers such as the United Kingdom, France and Russia tried to maintain order in their respective spheres of influence within the Ottoman Empire by occupying them, as was the case in Iran, Iraq and Syria. This was the first of several violations of state sovereignty in the 20th century, contributing to the escalation of Middle Eastern bitterness towards foreign intervention (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

As a system of governance and with the gradual establishment of colonialism, the Middle East region gradually lost control of its foreign policy and economy. The colonial powers established major settlements against the will of indigenous peoples and rulers, integrating their control over government institutions (Ziltener & Kunzler, 2015). In Egypt, for example, France and Great Britain established public finance administration in 1876, well before the military occupation of the country in 1882. The British pursued a similar strategy in the case of Persia (Gerber, 1987). Meanwhile, indigenous governments in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt existed only nominally. Under the name of indigenous governments, additional officials from England and France were introduced, gradually gaining a higher level of control. As a result, the balance of power shifted. There was no such nominal government in Sudan; instead, it was direct administrative control, with almost all senior positions held by the British (Hourani, 2002; Ismael, 2000).

The postwar Middle East was almost entirely an Anglo-French preserve (Rogan, 2005). Algeria (1830–1962) and Djibouti (1862–1977) were French colonies. Tunisia and Morocco were protectorates from 1903 to 1956, while Syria and Lebanon were administered as League of Nations Mandates (Ziltener & Kuenzler, 2015).

Egypt, on the other hand, gained independence in 1922 but remained directly under British influence until 1956 due to a restrictive treaty. Sudan was ruled by the British until 1956. Aden, or South Yemen, was also a British colony at the time. Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq were retained as mandates, and Britain's interests in the Persian Gulf were safeguarded through treaties with the reigning governments in Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain, dubbed the Trucial States anti-piracy treaties, or "truces" signed between Britain and those countries. Similarly, Oman was under informal British control. Libya, which was an Italian colony from 1911 to 1951, Iran, which was ruled by Russia until 1919, and Palestine, which was ruled by Israel until recently, were notable exceptions to the region's Anglo-French division (Ziltener & Kunzler, 2008; Louise: 2009).

Based on Figure 3, Britain had colonised eight Middle Eastern countries, namely Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Emirates, Yemen and Sudan. France controlled seven countries in the region: Morocco, Algeria, Djibouti, Syria, Lebanon, Mauritania and Tunisia. This was followed by Italy in Libya, Portugal in Oman, Russia in Iran and Israel in West-Bank and Syria.



Figure 3: Middle East Colonies for Each Colonial Power
Source: Ziltener and Kuenzler (2008), "Impact of Colonialism- A Research Survey".

In terms of government, British colonialism focused on economic interests and concentrated on indirect rule. French colonialism placed a greater emphasis on cultural ties and favoured a policy of direct rule (Ayubi, 1995, pp. 447-449). Both forms of colonialism were involved in profiting out of their territories. Both Timothy and Ayubi agree that colonial powers "enframing" the populations they governed or subjecting them to order and discipline enabled them to be managed and understood (Timothy, 1988).

Most of the new states today experienced colonialism at certain periods in the last two centuries (Hensel et al., 2008). According to Kortright (2003), colonialism is the establishment and control of territory for a long period of time by a foreign power over a subordinate and *other* separated and secluded people from the natural ruling power. Features of colonialism have included ruling and legal domination over another society, political and economic dependencies and institutionalised cultural and racial discrimination. Colonial domination may be imposed through military force, expropriation of resources and labour, incarceration and objective murders; the main goal of colonialism is exploiting both the indigenous people and their land.

According to Khoury (1987, p. 58), the French theory of assimilation was strictly implemented in Algeria and, to a certain degree, in Tunisia to turn Muslims into French citizens and to integrate their society and economy with France. The colonial government also employed its army as a coercive force. In Syria, to prevent the country from reunifying politically, the French government used a variety of legal and territorial strategies.

Shafiqul Huque (1997), on the other hand, argued that people's lives were forever changed as a result of colonialism. Furthermore, they have reached a point where the legacy of dependency affected their future life and development after independence. When colonialism was withdrawn, the situation became more complicated because it did not result in simple and absolute independence but rather substituted one dominant power by another with almost similar governance methods. Such observations often leave a mix of impressions that lead to confusion, mistrust, and immaturity.

Europeans brought their cultures, religions and traditions to justify and implement their presence in the MENA region. Because of this

occupation, some of the local values, *turāth* (heritage) and religions were substituted with European ones (Green & Luehrmann, 2017).

Previously, many Middle Eastern Muslim countries were part of the Ottoman Caliphate. For 12 centuries, up to the early 19th century, Islamic doctrine, the Sharia, had successfully dealt with customary law and local customary practices to emerge as the sole moral and legal force guiding society. This "law" was unique, recognised as a core structure of general norms by the societies and the dynastic forces that governed them (Hallaq, 2012).

France invaded Egypt in 1798. The invasion of the Islamic world had a traumatic impact, and the psychological issues that resulted from it are still present today. Even though the French occupied Egypt only for a short time, Hallaq (2012) claims that "the ease with which the French invaded the country shattered the Muslim confidence in superiority to the West."(p. 12).

Abdelilah Belkeziz (2010), in his book entitled *The state in contemporary Islamic thought*, pays attention to the impact of colonialism on the Sharia. According to the author, the first of these factors was the colonial occupation of Arab and Islamic countries. What emanated from that in strengthening its political power through its institutions and introducing its political and administrative structures had isolated the Muslim countries from Islamic Sharia logic (Belkeziz, 2010).

The secular structure was then enforced from above by imperial powers, and the people had no choice but to accept it. These secular thoughts and ideas could not compete with the Sharia, nor could the Sharia be excluded from its 13 centuries existence as the centre of influence and referential authority. The issue, however, was not limited to the colonial era. Instead, after the end of overt foreign colonisation, it continued to play its role. How did the colonial powers do that to the Muslim societies in the MENA region?

To answer this question, Abdul Rashid Moten (2011) has explained how the colonial powers have Muslim societies:

> The major victim of colonial domination was the Muslim's self-image and cultural identity. [It] was due to the colonial policy of progress and enlightenment through education

> planted in the colonies. Educational policy was geared at transmitting the European cultural values to the natives and to make available to the colonisers a group of clerks, collaborators and cronies to continue the cultural onslaught of the West…people were selected for higher studies. They were educated in the colonial legal system. They were then entrusted with running the educational institutions set up in the colonies to develop a new, educated Western elite class. The traditional leadership was systematically destroyed. The *'ulama'*…were routed out in favour of those who studied Western law and education. A foreign-oriented local leadership was imposed upon the people who became the heir to the imperial powers. This class became voluntary or involuntary instruments of intermediate domination for the pauperisation and the Westernisation of Muslim societies. (p. 346-347)

The continuous colonial domination began with educational policy and concluded with the Westernisation of Muslim societies. Paradoxically, MENA countries have often found that the effort to counter Western domination has involved internal political, social and economic re-organisation and the implementation of concepts foreign to their own traditional values. Thus, the people from the MENA region have found themselves encountering the dilemma of either directly adopting Western "modernising" ideas or totally rejecting them, with the consequence that the resistance to Western economic and developmental models has indirectly kept the region under colonialism.

On the other hand, ideological, religious, ethnic and other divides simmered just below the surface of nationalist movements. For a while, the colonised nations managed to overlook their differences to unite and work together against the colonial powers (Green & Luehrmann, 2012).

Territorial Independence and Nationalism in the Middle East Region

Within the Middle East region, the states favouring a regime type and constitution had very different concepts and thoughts about what the constitution and regime should achieve in terms of domestic economic, political and social order, as well as external relations with the West. Once the type of regime and constitution were established,

the differences among Middle Eastern state members emerged, making effective governance appear impossible (Cleveland & Bunton, 2016).

In response to colonial rule, nationalist movements emerged within new Middle Eastern states (Tibi, 1971, 1987, 1997). This situation would leave the Middle East region divided between a widely held dream of Arab cohesion and unity and nation-state reality, enhanced by nationalists' struggles for independence (Louise, 2009). Concerning regional governance, the Arab League, founded in Alexandria in 1945, was the first initiative of a concrete organisation to realise Arab nationalism (Salamé, 1979; Salary, 1989). Several institutions and organisations were established under the Arab League, and several agreements for security and economic cooperation were signed (Farrell, Hettne, Langenhove, 2005, pp. 188-189). The Arab League was also the region's first effort at regional cooperation (Hourani, 1962). The Arab League's top priority was to protect independence and sovereignty; the "Issue of Palestine" was a major item on the agenda:

> The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the relations between the member states, the coordination of their policies to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.
>
> Since the termination of the last Great War, the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine…has come to an end. She has come to be autonomous, not subordinate to any other state. The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be settled by the parties concerned. …The states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine. Until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the Council of the League should take charge of selecting an Arab representative from Palestine to take part in its work. (Arab League, 1945: Article II; Annex I Regarding Palestine)

During these years, the Palestine question focused on Arab politics and Arabism, serving as a factor that politically and ideologically united the Arab world (MacDonald, 1965, pp. 33-38). Although the Palestine question has continued to be top priority for the Arab states, they soon

came to practise their politics *vis-à-vis* the issue of the freedom of Palestine (Helena & Schultz, 2003).

However, the contradictions between Arabism and state-building (nationalism) quickly became apparent. Serious disagreements have emerged among Arab states regarding the type of unitary state that should be the primary objective and, as a result, the type of governance that is effective after independence. The United Arab Republic, made up of Egypt and Syria, was the only concrete confederative state. It was declared in 1958 but ended immediately in 1961. Thus, pan-Arabism provided one form of regional political identity between 1945 and 1970, which served as a foundation for regional governance and cooperative projects in terms of organisations (Farrell, Hettne, Van Langenhove, 2005, p. 191). However, this had a greater impact on ideology and discourse than on practical consequences. State-building projects demanded the promotion of state interests and state nationalism. As a result, regional governance under the umbrella of pan-Arabism was based on state-to-state relations (Farrell, Hettne, Van Langenhove, 2005, pp. 188-189).

Halliday (2005), on the other hand, argued that Arab rulers have acted as a single actor in political statements concerning the conflict with Israel. There is an idea of political unity in the wars between Arab states and Israel, in the joint statements from the Arab League and the Arab states, in the hindrance to independent action determined by ideological unity, in the boycotting of Israeli products and communication with Israel. The Arab–Israeli conflict resulted in a series of major wars (1948–1949, 1956, 1967, 1969–1970, 1973, and 1982) as well as an endless series of minor military clashes within and around Israel (Beinin & Hajjar, 2014). These wars primarily involved Israel and its neighbours, as well as a mix of states (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan) and non-state actors (PLO and Hamas) (Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

Several countries (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, and Tunisia) were directly engaged in significant ways against Israel, providing financial, rhetorical, and sometimes military support. Almost all Arab countries were involved in these wars to some extent, even if only verbally, and it had a significant impact on inter-Arab politics, especially on the fading and eventual departure of Egypt as the leader of Arab nationalism and the resulting opportunities for other regional

powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq to bid for that role (Tibi, 1997, 1998; Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

Below the surface of pan-Arabism, there has always been suspicion and grave ideological polarisation between Arab monarchies and the so-called progressive Arab republics (Luciano, 1990). The 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states gave a severe blow to pan-Arabism. Rather than moving ahead on the track of pan-Arabism and forming an integrated regional entity, during the 1970s the state system was gradually strengthened (Owen, 1992, pp. 90-92).

The 1979 Egypt-Israel treaty was a direct outcome of the 1978 Camp David Accords. As a result, Egypt, one of the most influential Arab states, ended its hostility and recognised Israel. The consequences of this treaty on inter-Arab politics included an immediate attempt to isolate Egypt from the Arab states community and a decision to oppose further negotiation for peace settlements between other Arab countries and Israel (Vatikiotis, 1997, p. 37). Another necessary outcome of the treaty was the reorientation of Egypt's governance and foreign policy toward the West, as well as the development of a better relationship with the United States. This change marked the end of the Soviet Union's previous active and vital role in the region (Vatikiotis, 1997, p. 37).

On the other hand, identifying an opposition or enemy has frequently been a critical step in developing nationalism (Polese et al., 2018). For example, once the concept of Arab nationalism was established, it developed into an idea and a political force for independence, followed by establishing a new state in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq, (Kramer, 1993). Therefore, Arabism's main role was to build Middle Eastern states based on Arabic language, culture and heritage. At first, Turkish nationalism opposed it, but after that, European ideologies were accepted in parallel with their occupation of the majority of Arab countries. As a result, Arab nationalists could no longer claim Islamic heritage. This was also worthy of note for the Arab nationalists since Islamic heritage was synonymous with the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the region in the name of Islam for nearly five centuries (Bendebka, 2020).

Finally, political interests and nationalism took a de facto lead over Arabism, though Arabism retained its ideological role. Other regional integration has taken sub-regional blocs based on certain interests, such

as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

Governance during the Cold War in the Middle East Region

The main characteristic of this period is the changing ways of governance in different phases and stages. The crisis in Turkey, Iran, and other countries in the region, interconnected with great power hostility in late 1945 and early 1946, led to tensions between the Soviet Union and its Western-American allies. These crises were part of a broader re-organisation of power dynamics in the region, threatening the Western position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Iran was crucial to these because it possessed huge petroleum reserves as well as the world's largest oil refinery in Abadan. Furthermore, its geography served as a barrier between the Soviet Union and the oil fields in the Persian Gulf (Halliday, 2005). The crises in Turkey and Iran occurred due to declining British power, intense regional rivalries with the Soviet Union, and internal political polarisation (Yalansiz, 2012). The two countries were affected by WWII. Iran was occupied by British and Soviet forces, with US troops stationed there to control the delivery of supplies to the Soviet Union. While technically neutral, Turkey carefully adjusted its allegiance from a pro-Germany to a pro-Allied position as the tides of war started to shift.

During another period of the Cold War, Britain, fearful of losing control of the Suez Canal, planned the establishment of the Middle East Command (MEC) and Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), in which the United States, France, and Turkey would participate. In addition to that, in order to prevent the spread of the Soviet's influence into the Middle East, the US tried to involve more states in the region in its policies. Non-Arab countries, such as Turkey and Iran, would play significant roles in this strategy. Following the renewal of the British-Egyptian agreement, the British proposed that Egypt should join the Middle East Defence Organisation. However, the efforts were ineffective because Egypt no longer preferred to be free of British pressure (Yalansiz, 2012).

According to Khalidi (1984), Marcus (1989), Haliday (2005), Harper and James (1994), the Middle East's Cold War evolution can

be divided into four historical periods: 1) 1946 to 1955; 2) 1955 to 1974; 3) 1974 to 1985; and 4) 1985 to 1990. During the first period, the main focus of Soviet-Western rivalry was on the non-Arab countries bordering the USSR, namely Turkey and Iran. During this period, the Soviet Union lacked both the will and the capability to challenge the West in the Arab world.

However, by the second phase, the Soviet Union had established itself as an important ally of many Arab nationalist movements and governments, the most significant of which were Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria. During this time, Arab nationalism, working closely with Moscow, posed a serious challenge to Western dominance (Haliday, 2005). When the revolution and wars were pitted against the Western allies, regional wars such as Algerian (1954-1962), Arab-Israeli, and Yemen (1962-1970) were conducted in East-West antagonism (Marcus, 1989).

The Middle East became an essential part of the East-West rivalry for strategic positions in the Third World during the third period of the Cold War. Between 1970 and 1979, Egypt gradually expelled the Soviet Union. Moscow has maintained its position in other Arab countries, including Iraq and southern Yemen. During the 1970s, the United States expanded its influence in the Arab world.

The fourth phase of the Cold War started in 1985, with the election of Mikhail Gorbachev as Soviet leader. Gorbachev's initiatives, along with policy shifts by regional countries, were visible in the latter part of the 1980s in several territories, for example, the end of the Iraq-Iran War in 1988, the proclamation of the state of Palestine in 1988 and 1990, and the merger of the two Yemens, pro-western North and pro-eastern South, to form a single state. It can even be said that the Cold War had ended earlier in MENA than in any other region of the world (Halliday, 2005, p. 100).

Conclusion

An examination of the modern history of the Middle East's regional dynamics and political regional coherence from different perspectives and different modern periods help to illuminate Middle Eastern countries' present state. This examination was carried out to see the Middle East's

history, recent attempts (Cold War and pan-Arabism) and processes to further its regional dynamics. It was done by explaining, analysing and highlighting governance in different historical periods that affected the Middle East's regional dynamics.

Trans-state power, supra-state identities, and global level forces have always been exceptionally pertinent in Middle Eastern states, competing with loyalties to territories. The weak regional and state governance in the Middle East was caused, in part, by global subordination, mostly during the colonial period and trans-state penetration during the independence, nationalism (pan-Arabism), and Cold War phases. Moreover, the Middle East region was susceptible to adverse events and weak governance in the past and state-building periods after independence.

For the past two centuries, the Middle East region's history was deeply affected by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the upsurge of Western-European military and economic power. In this matter, the main factors of the decline of the Ottoman Empire were weak economic growth, dependence on agriculture, corruption, difficulties in controlling its vast territories as well as the rise of nationalism in Arab countries, especially during the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. Different events such as the re-drawn regional map after World War II, decolonisation, the Cold War, the advent of independent countries, oil production and the way of governance have all hastened the formation of the Middle East region and have a direct effect on its cohesion. Attempts at regional development and good governance have flourished in the Arab world after independence, including creating some regional institutions, though these efforts have not led to the establishment of a functioning regional system. Until the 1990s, most attempts were produced based on the idea of pan-Arabism, rather than other stronger links that can be economical and social.

Furthermore, the ideological basis of pan-Arabism was to integrate the "artificially divided" Arab states. Thus, regional governance in the Middle East ranges from building a sense of regional awareness or community (soft regionalism) and consolidating regional groups and networks to the pan- or sub-regional groups formalised by inter-state agreements and organisation (hard regionalism).

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Historic Jeddah as a Unique Islamic City

Spahic Omer[1]

Abstract: This article discusses Historic Jeddah as a unique Islamic city. The focus is on the city's rich history, its cosmopolitan character, its status as the gateway to Makkah and its distinctive architecture. The article aims to enrich discourses on Islamic urbanism and architecture. It concludes that Historic Jeddah's morphology successfully met all the imposed environmental, socio-economic, cultural and religious requirements. The natural surroundings, the people and built environment were ingeniously integrated into an invigorating and vastly enriching urban as well as civilisational environment, which, even though relatable to time, space, styles and typologies, surpassed them all.

Keywords: Jeddah, Makkah, history, architecture, environment.

Introduction

The built environment of al-Balad (the Town), which is the most historic area of the city of Jeddah—city and major port in the central Hijaz region, western Saudi Arabia—is unique. That is, primarily, due to the uniqueness of the city's history and geography as well as socio-economic and religious status. The city evolved on the eastern shore of the Red Sea from a small primitive fishing settlement in about 350 BC to a major port and commercial hub of the modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is now the second largest city in the Kingdom, after Riyadh. It is nicknamed the Bride of the Red Sea. It is also regarded as the capital

[1] *Dr. Spahic Omer* is an Associate Professor at the Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). His research interests cover early Islamic history and civilisation, as well as the history and theory of Islamic built environment. He can be reached at ospahic@iium.edu.my.

of Saudi economy and tourism. Today, al-Balad area serves as the historic and cultural centre of the entire city of Jeddah. It is the latter's soul. This article describes the main aspects of the distinctiveness of Historic Jeddah. The focus is on the city's rich history, cosmopolitan character, status as the gateway to the holy city of Makkah and its al-Masjid al-Haram and also architecture.

Rich History

The history of Jeddah is very rich. It is normally divided into two broad historical periods: pre-Islamic and Islamic (al-Anṣārī, 1981). The latter period is then divided into five main phases: early Islamic, Mamluk, Ottoman, the early or pre-oil-discovery Saudi phase and the subsequent post-oil-discovery Saudi phase.

On December 23, 1925, ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz bin Saʿūd victoriously entered Jeddah and declared himself the "King of Hijaz, Sultan of Najd and its Dependencies." It was only in September, 1932 that the country was named Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz bin Saʿūd as its first king (al-Lyaly, 1990, p. 24).

Prior to the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in 1938—after which enormous riches started pouring into the coffers of the government and its citizens—the city of Jeddah underwent no dramatic changes in terms of its built environment and spatial morphology. The city's development was spontaneous and unhurried, while the citizens' lives were, in equal measure, day-to-day and easy-going. However, following the discovery of oil and the emergence of a powerful and booming oil industry as the nerve centre of the country's fast-thriving economy, the city of Jeddah entered a phase of rapid expansion and modernisation. Its fate with the recurring ups and downs signified a microcosm of the situation of the entire country.

The latest phase could be called as a modernisation phase. It was then that a gradual deviation from traditional built environment styles and the people's traditional ways of living started to occur. It was then, furthermore, that the recoiling tradition became increasingly irreconcilable with the invading modernity, both at the conceptual and operational planes. Symbolic of this tense relationship between the two realms was the demolition of Jeddah's wall in 1947. Only a few

remains of the wall are available today, a sign of the ultimate victory of modernity and its standards of living over tradition and its own ways of life.

There are no detailed accounts about the pre-Islamic settlement of Jeddah, especially with regard to its particular characteristics and social structure. However, the mere existence of reports, even though sketchy, testifies about Jeddah's uninterrupted historical importance and role in the region.

According to some accounts, Ḥawwā' or Eve, the wife of the first man and prophet on earth, Ādam, was buried in the city. There is an archaeological site towards the north-east from the city's Makkah Gate that is called the tomb of Ḥawwā'. It allegedly contains the grave of the mother of all mankind, even though there was never any archaeological evidence that could support that claim. Therefore, according to certain beliefs, Jeddah means "grandmother." To many people, however, this is simply a myth. Ibn Jubayr—a famous Spanish Muslim traveller who traversed much of the Muslim world from 1182 to 1185—rightly commented that "God best knows concerning it" (Ibn Jubayr, 2001, p. 70).

According to another interpretation, Jeddah was named after the leader of the Arabic tribe of Quḍāʿa, Jidda ibn Jurhum ibn Rayyān ibn Hilwān ibn ʿAlī ibn Isḥāq ibn Quḍāʿa, who settled there in about 115 BC after the collapse of the Dam of Ma'rib in Yemen.

Some scholars yet believe that the area of Jeddah was inhabited as early as during the Stone Age. Some even imply that the Persians might have played a prominent role in the city's genesis. Hence, the name "Jeddah" could also be derived merely from the city's geographical location, that is, from the word *juddah*, which in Arabic means "seashore." This is the view of al-Muqaddasī (2001) and Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (1979). Al-Muqaddasī (2001) recorded that Jeddah (Juddah) is a city on the seashore, "from which circumstance it derives its name" (p. 72).

At any rate, these discussions and disagreements themselves demonstrate how long and rich the history of Jeddah is (al-Anṣārī, 1981; Bagader, 2016). Ibn Jubayr (2001) remarks that in Jeddah, there are many ancient remains, which show that the city is very old. In keeping

with some accounts, even Alexander the Great, who died in 323 BC, once stopped over in Makkah. Then, he undertook his sea voyage to the West from Jeddah, which, as early as at that point, functioned as a seaport (al-ʻAmūdī, 2018).

Subsequent to the arrival of Islam, Jeddah first rose to prominence in about 647 when the third rightly-guided Caliph, ʻUthmān b. ʻAffān, converted it into the port of Makkah. The latter lay about 80 kilometres away. With that, Jeddah was rendered as the gateway to the holy city of Makkah, which is the site of Muslim pilgrimage (ʻUmra and Hajj).

Since Makkah was perennially the object of all Muslims' spiritual cravings, the currency of Jeddah, as the former's gateway, thus dramatically increased too. It also became the object of many people's attention and interests. One of the early prominent Muslim settlers in Jeddah was Salmān al-Fārisī, a famous companion of the Prophet (pbuh) (al-ʻAmūdī, 2018).

Before Caliph 'Uthmān's decision, Jeddah was no more than a small village, as Makkah's port was al-Shuʻayba, a town southwest of Makkah and about 15 kilometres south of Jeddah (Buchan, 1980). Caliph 'Uthmān's making Jeddah, rather than maintaining al-Shuʻayba, as the port of Makkah was, firstly, due to security reasons because al-Shuʻayba proved more vulnerable than Jeddah to pirate raids from the sea. Secondly, it was due to the overall natural environment of Jeddah, which seemed more pleasant and conducive. It is said that the Caliph once bathed in the sea at Jeddah and liked it very much (Buchan, 1980).

Henceforth, in the minds of all pilgrims and visitors to the holy places, Jeddah was always bracketed together with Makkah and Madinah. They constituted a triangle of spiritual transformation and drive.

> Nevertheless, it was several centuries before Jeddah became truly integrated into the international trade and pilgrimage networks as part of the Incense Route. In the early Islamic centuries, it chiefly served as the port of entry from Egypt, whence most of Makkah's foodstuffs and clothing arrived. (Bagader, 2016, p. 158)

During the especially latter periods of the centralised Umayyad state and the first period of the Abbasid state, the socio-political situation of

Jeddah—together with the rest of the Hijaz cities and villages—was relatively peaceful and straightforward. Not much has been recorded in history books about it and its affairs during those two periods. Generally, whatever has been mentioned revolves around it being the main civilian port that served fishermen and sea travelling pilgrims from near and far for ‘Umra and Hajj.

However, as the strong centralised Abbasid government in Baghdad disintegrated, various independent and semi-independent states and dynasties started emerging on the Muslim political scene, often with questionable legitimacy, starting with the Tulunids in Egypt and ending with the Mamluks, principally in Egypt and Syria. The latter were overthrown and succeeded by the Ottoman Turks, who, to a large extent, succeeded in uniting much of the Muslim world and in restoring as well as unifying Muslim religio-political authority in the form of the caliphate.

During those often difficult and challenging times, the socio-economic and religious forte of Jeddah, as the converging point and gateway to the holy lands, was always the target. The fast-changing Muslim political landscape and its leading protagonists could not possibly overlook the opportunities the city presented for seeking a political legitimacy. They knew only too well that whoever controlled the holy places—Jeddah included as their entryway—enjoyed an upper hand in perennial confrontations for controlling the people’s hearts, minds and political destinies. Those dynamic political conflicts and clashes made the affairs of Jeddah ever more at once eventful and impactful.

The vast potential of Jeddah was recognised and cultivated throughout its prolific history. This was not done only by the administrations of the successive Muslim states and governments, but also by some, albeit transitory, non-Muslim regional political powers. An example is the brief occupation of Jeddah in 703 by pirates from the neighbouring Kingdom of Axum, which was a naval and trading power in Ethiopia that ruled the region from about 400 BC to the 10th century.

Another example is the continuous Portuguese raids throughout the 16th century in Arabian waters and, on a couple of occasions, on Jeddah itself. The cemetery of dead Portuguese soldiers can still be found within the old city of Jeddah today and is referred to as the site of the Christian

Graves. The dead Portuguese were buried at the site due to difficulties in transporting their bodies back to Iberia by sea (al-Shareef, 2011).

As a result, the Mamluk Sultan, Qānṣūh al-Ghūrī, built a strong wall around the city in 1506 or 1507, with further additions in 1514 or 1515. In charge of the construction was Husami Husayn al-Kurdī, the governor of Jeddah (King, 1998).

Having secured full control of Jeddah in 1517, the Ottomans rebuilt—or just modified and strengthened—its weak wall in 1525, following their victory over the Portuguese Lopo Soares de Albergaria's Armada in the Red Sea. Nonetheless, it seems that Jeddah was a walled and fortified city well before the Mamluks. Al-Muqaddasī (2001) referred to it as such in the 10th century. Naser-e Khosraw (1986), a Persian traveller, did the same a century later. He wrote that Jeddah was a large and prosperous coastal city and had a strong wall on the edge of the sea. There were two gates: one towards the east and Makkah, and the other towards the west and the sea.

However, it appears as though the pre-Mamluk wall was neither as strongly built nor as earnestly maintained as its subsequent counterparts. It might not have even surrounded the entire city, rendering it vulnerable. When Ibn Jubayr (2001) visited Jeddah in 1183, slightly more than a century after Naser-e Khosraw, he did not speak about the wall. Rather, he spoke about its surviving traces as part of the city's general decline. The wall might have been repaired half a century later, though, and might have had as many as four gates (King, 1998).

According to Abdulla Y. Bokhari, since its inception as the port of Makkah, Jeddah, with few interruptions, remained a prosperous harbour and trade centre, despite interferences by the Dutch, the British and the Portuguese. It was a walled city for about a thousand years. Its first wall surrounded the city on its three land sides. The wall was presumably built by the Persians towards the end of the 10th century to protect the city from hostile nomads. Hence, the entire sea side needed no protective wall since the sea was its natural protection. Its second wall, which added a sea wall, was completed in about 1511 (different dates given by scholars might indicate different levels of construction and completion), either by the Mamluks themselves or by one of their vassals, to protect the town from the Portuguese (Bokhari, 1983).

During the 16th century, Jeddah became part of the Ottoman Empire. In the 18th century, the British and French East Indies companies established trading stations in the city, which enhanced its commercial functions. Early in the 19th century, Jeddah was established as a diplomatic centre with the appointment of British and French Consuls, thereby allowing the leading foreign powers to increasingly interfere and dictate local as well as regional affairs. The Ottoman domination of Jeddah lasted for about four centuries until they were defeated by Sharif Hussain bin Ali, with the assistance of the British, in 1919 (Alharbi, 1989).

Sharif Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī declared a revolt against the Ottoman Empire, seeking independence from it and the creation of a single unified Arab state, spanning from Aleppo in Syria to Aden in Yemen. Sharif Ḥusayn then declared the Kingdom of Hijaz, with him as its king. Later, King Ḥusayn was involved in war with ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz bin Saʿūd, who was the Sultan of Najd. King Ḥusayn abdicated following the fall of Makkah in December 1924, and his son, ʿAlī ibn Ḥusayn, became the new king. A few months later, ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz bin Saʿūd conquered Madinah and Jeddah via an agreement with Jeddans, following the Second Battle of Jeddah. He deposed ʿAlī ibn Ḥusayn, who fled to Baghdad and eventually settled in Amman, Jordan, where his descendants became part of its Hashemite royalty. As a result, Jeddah came under the sway of the emerging al-Saʿūd state and dynasty in December 1925 (Abū Dāwud & Zaʿzūʻ, 2017). In 1932, the new state was renamed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Cosmopolitan City

By virtue of being the gateway to the holy city of Makkah—which the Holy Qur'an calls *Umm al-Qurā* (Mother of all Settlements) (al-Shūrā: 7), towards which the believing hearts are made to incline and hanker for (Ibrāhīm: 37) since this is where al-Masjid al-Ḥarām (the Holy Mosque) is located and also appointed as the first and most consequential house of worship for mankind (Āl ʿImrān: 96)—Jeddah, too, was thereby greatly affected. Although it was not a sacred city by any stretch of the imagination, it certainly always stood out as a social and economic hub on a par with its twin cities, Makkah and Madinah, and sometimes even surpassing them.

For example, in the 11th century, Naser-e Khosraw documented that Jeddah was a large and prosperous city. It had good bazaars and its population was 5000. However, at the same time, he wrote that in Makkah, there were not more than 2000 citizens, with an additional 500 foreigners. At the time of Naser-e Khosraw's visit, there was a famine in Makkah, for which reason a number of people had left (Khosraw, 1986).

Most people nowadays come to Makkah for 'Umrah and Hajj, principally through Jeddah. For instance, statistics show that in each of the last 25 years, an average of five million pilgrims visited Makkah and more than 75% of them passed through King 'Abd al-'Azīz Airport in Jeddah. The Saudi Ministry of Hajj further reported that 25% of these travellers intentionally visit Jeddah for various social, economic and tourist reasons (Bagader, 2016).

Among the millions of pilgrims who, throughout the centuries, travelled to the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah, some settled in Jeddah and became citizens. Therefore, the social structure of Jeddah always consisted of different ethnic groups, with direct and indirect impacts on the architecture of the city, especially its houses. Jeddah, thus, became a cosmopolitan and multinational city, with a mix of cultures that have adapted to life in the main gateway to Makkah (Bagader, 2016). Just as in the case of the cities of Makkah and Madinah, Jeddah's multinationalism and multiculturalism became the main feature of its unique identity (al-Anṣārī, 1981). Moreover, it became a microcosm of the soul of the Muslim eclectic world, culture and civilisation.

Regardless of who politically ruled over them, Jeddah, Makkah and Madinah, in essence, always belonged to all Muslims. It follows that the rulers of the three cities should not feel as persons of power and authority. Rather, they should feel as servants of the Muslim *umma* (community) and its most magnanimous interests and standards.

Most of the people who traditionally came and settled in Jeddah were from Egypt and Yemen because Jeddah was dependent on them for its sustenance. Water was scarce in and around the city, while the surrounding country produced virtually nothing (King, 1998). In most cases, historically, whoever ruled Egypt, ruled Hijaz as well. Consequently, Jeddah's continuously thriving trade with Egypt and Yemen never failed to impress its insightful visitors.

As seen earlier, some consider that Jeddah was first founded as a fishing colony by the Yemeni Quḍāʿa tribe, which had left Yemen after the collapse of the Dam of Ma'rib. Not only historically but also presently, the social, economic, cultural and architectural configuration of Jeddah could not possibly be grasped without taking into account the influences of Yemen and the Yemenis. Thus, in the old and most historic part of the city, there is still a district that is called Ḥarrat al-Yaman (the Yemeni District). Certainly, there was always more to this District than its mere location and direction, for it is customarily—and superficially—held that the Yemeni District is called as such only on account of its location in the south of the city and its orientation towards Yemen. The same elaboration holds true regarding Ḥarrat al-Shām (the Levantine District).

Moreover, since the Ottoman Empire ruled substantial sections of the Arabian Peninsula for about 500 years, beginning with gaining the allegiance of the Hijaz region of western Arabia in 1517 and lasting up to the end of both the Ottoman rule and World War I in 1918, some Turks—as well as the citizens of diverse territories ruled by the Ottomans, such as Syria and the Balkans—migrated and settled in the central Hijaz region (Makkah, Madinah and Jeddah). However, according to William Ochsenwald (2015):

> … [not many] Turkish-speaking Ottomans settled in Arabia. The few who did stay were soon assimilated into Arab society. Turkish poetry, Turkish tiles, Turkish miniature painting, and a host of other cultural accomplishments and techniques were not extended on a large-scale basis into Ottoman Arabia. (p. 27)

This was mainly because of the vast distance between the heartland of the Ottoman Empire and the Hijaz territories, which was rendered more complex and challenging by the slow speed of transportation, communication and interactions. (Ochsenwald, 2015)

It is interesting to note that there is still today in Jeddah a house that belonged to a Bosnian named Kāmil Darwīsh al-Bosnawi. This house is located in Ḥarrat al-Shām (the Levantine District), opposite the Zāwiya (present-day Mosque) of Abū ʿInba. Towards the end of the Ottoman rule in Hijaz, Kāmil Darwīsh, due to his knowledge of Turkish, Arabic and English languages, served as a secretary and translator in the Ottoman

administration. He was based in the city of Taif. However, after the fall of the Ottoman rule in the region, he moved to and settled in Jeddah. He was among the first—perhaps the very first—to teach English language in the city after the establishment of the modern Saudi Arabia. He did so in a facility at the ground level of his house. Today, the house is often highlighted as a place worth visiting ("Al-Riyādāt al-ahliyyah," n.d.). Uncharacteristically, the house has several large windows at the ground level, confirming that it was designated for a public interest.

In any case, the political, environmental, social and even gender history of Hijaz was reasonably influenced by the Ottomans. It is yet believed that "the Ottoman Empire in Arabia succeeded in notably slowing the encroachment of European imperialism into the heart of Islam" (Ochsenwald, 2015, p. 23). All this occurred despite the modern governments in the Arabian Peninsula tending to ignore the Ottoman Empire's historical role in the region, with some yet displaying a degree of antagonism towards it: "This is in part caused by the present ruling elites, who in most cases consist of members of dynasties that were historical enemies of the Ottomans" (Ochsenwald, 2015, p. 23).

Finally, during the early epochs in particular, the role of the Persians was also notable, becoming at one stage more significant than any other. Travellers and explorers regularly referred to a sizable and prominent Persian community in Jeddah. It is said that in the 10th century, the city's trade was in their hands. They also built the city's first fortifications and wall. They were very wealthy and their palaces were spectacular. Lofty domed houses were likewise connected with them, their wealth and their architectural boldness and creativity (King, 1998).

At one point, the Persians had to be expelled from the city, perhaps owing to some little-known political reasons and jealousy, and also in order to diminish their immense influences. This was done most probably by ʻĪsā bin Jaʿfar al-Ḥasanī, the Emir or Ruler of Makkah from the late 960s to the early 970s. The said Emir ruled the region firstly on behalf of the Ikhshidids in Egypt and then of the Fatimids also in Egypt. Nevertheless, the great reputation and legacy of the Persians continued to be felt and appreciated well into the 13th century, as frequently highlighted by travellers and explorers (King, 1998).

However, the presence of the Persians significantly waned afterwards. It did to such an extent that John Lewis Burckhardt, who

stayed in Jeddah in July 1814, did not even mention the Persians as members of the city's demography. Regarding the reason for such a situation, Burckhardt himself gave a hint when he said:

> It deserves notice here, that the Persians were not always permitted to come to the holy city (Makkah); being notorious heretics, who conceal their doctrines only during the Hajj, that they may not give offence to the Sunnis. In 1634, a few years after the temple of Makkah (al-Masjid al-Haram) had been rebuilt, (Ottoman) Sultan Murad IV commanded that no Persian of the sect of Ali should be allowed to perform the pilgrimage, or enter the Baytullah. This prohibition was complied with for several years (after which it was rescinded). (Burckhardt, 1829, p. 251)

Indeed, a series of wars between the Ottomans—who ruled over the holy cities in Hijaz —and the successive Shia dynasties in Iran (Persia) from the 16th to 19th centuries was the main cause of such a state of affairs. It was a case of religion being politicised and politics being religionised.

Consistent with reports, the Persians moved to Jeddah after the decline of the town of Siraf on the Iranian coast of the Gulf, following an earthquake or a volcanic activity. Siraf was an internationally-renowned port, especially during the first Abbasid period. During the heyday of the Silk Road, most of the trade intended for Asia was conducted through Siraf (King, 1998; "Siraf," n.d.; "Siraf: Iran," 2006). Its people were well-known merchants. Regarding the presence of the Persians from Siraf in Jeddah:

> … [it] opens up an interesting possibility of connections between the architecture of the Iranian coast of the Gulf and the Red Sea shore in the medieval period. This diaspora from Siraf seems to have had a broad influence around the shores of Arabia and East Africa. (King, 1998, p. 41)

Ibn Jubayr yet has suggested that Jeddah might have had some close pre-Islamic connections with the Persian culture and civilisation. Furthermore, the Persians might have played an indirect role in the city's genesis. Ibn Jubayr, thus, has said that outside Jeddah, there were ancient constructions that attested to the antiquity of its foundation.

> It is said that it was a Persian city. It has cisterns hewn from the hard rock, connected with each other and beyond count for their number. They are both within and without the town, and men say that there are three hundred and sixty outside the town, and the same within. We indeed saw a great number, such as could not be counted. But in truth the things of wonder are many. Glory to Him whose knowledge encompasses them all. (Ibn Jubayr, 2001, p. 71)

Ibn Battuta (1983), too, wrote in the 14th century that Jeddah was an ancient town, which is said to have been built by the Persians.

Be that as it may, al-Muqaddasī's 10th century account on the matter appears at once most revealing and most comprehensive. It confirms that Jeddah was a safe and densely inhabited fortified city. It had many rich citizens whose livelihood was trade. It was the aim of many Egyptians and Yemenis to settle therein. It was their entrepôt and emporium. Nevertheless, the Persians dominated the city's demography and, naturally, they left their lasting imprints on the city's built environment. Their many palaces were described by al-Muqaddasī as extraordinary (*'ajība*). However, the people in the city faced serious troubles getting water even though the city had many ponds or cisterns (*birk*). As a result, water was obtained from afar (al-Muqaddasī, 2001).

On balance, about the cosmopolitan character of Jeddah in 1814, Burckhardt has recorded the following, adding an amount of hitherto unknown details and without mentioning the Persians whatsoever:

> The inhabitants of Jeddah, like those of Makkah and Madinah, are almost exclusively foreigners. The descendants of the ancient Arabs who once peopled the town, have perished by the hands of the governors, or have retired to other countries. Those who can be truly called natives are only a few families of sherifs, who are all learned men, and attached to the mosques or the courts of justice; all the other people of Jeddah are foreigners or their descendants. Of the latter, those from Hadramaut and Yemen are the most numerous: colonies from every town and province of those countries are settled in Jeddah, and keep up an active commerce with their native places. Upwards of a hundred Indian families (chiefly from Surat, and a few from Bombay) have also established themselves here; and to these may be added some Malays

> and people of Maskat (Oman). The settlers from Egypt, Syria, Barbary, European Turkey, and Anatolia, may be still recognised in the features of their descendants, who are all mixed in one general mass, and live and dress in the same Arab manner. The Indians alone remain a distinct race in manners, dress, and employment. (Burckhardt, 1829, p. 14)

Seven years earlier, in 1807, Domingo Francisco Jorge Badia y Leblich (known by his pseudonym or nom de plume as Ali Bey el Abbassi), who was a Spanish explorer, soldier and spy, wrote in his "Travels of Ali Bey" that Jeddah had about 5,000 inhabitants. They appeared to the author to have sprung from a mixture of "the Negro, Abyssinian, Indian and Arab nations." Some even looked like Chinese people. The intermixing between the men and female slaves of Abyssinia as well as Negresses was common (Bey, 1816).

Richard F. Burton (1964) reported in 1853 that only Indians numbered no fewer than 1,500 in Makkah and Jeddah, besides 700 or 800 in Yemen. To him, such a body required a Consul to look after their interests.

Gateway to Makkah

Jeddah's biggest importance always lay in the fact that it was Makkah's gateway or entry point. It was its port on whose especially economic success the former's economic functioning mostly depended. Thus, al-Muqaddasī (2001) rightly dubbed Jeddah as the *khizānah* or *khazānah* of Makkah, which could be understood as (the source of) the latter's prosperity, yet subsistence, and its treasured dependency. It was also its granary.

As such, Jeddah was also somewhat regarded as part of the cradle of Islam. In realistic terms, it could hardly be separated from its twin (mother) city, Makkah. If controlling Makkah and Madina, and having a ruler's name mentioned in the sermon of the Friday Prayer (*ṣalāh al-jumuʿah*) in the two cities' holy mosques signified a prerogative of sovereignty and a source of legitimacy for whoever wanted to dominate the Muslim world, the same applied to Jeddah as well, albeit in the practical and operational, rather than theoretical and theological,

meaning of the principle. Jeddah and Makkah have always been mutually dependent in fortune and destiny (Bokhari, 1983).

From the very beginning, Jeddah had two, maybe even three, prominent mosques. Two mosques have been attributed to the second rightly-guided Caliph, ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb. One mosque has even been attributed to the Prophet (pbuh) (King, 1998). Ibn Jubayr has said that although two Jeddah mosques were attributed to Caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, some still believed that one of them, which had two pillars of ebony wood (later known as the mosque of ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān), was built by the fifth Abbasid Caliph, Hārūn al-Rashīd (Ibn Jubayr, 2001).

However, about some of those viewpoints, ‘Abd al-Quddus al-Anṣārī raises some serious doubts. He believes that since Jeddah first rose to prominence in Islamic civilisation in about 647 when ‘Uthmān b. ‘Affān, the third rightly-guided Caliph, converted it into the port of Makkah, he questions how Caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb could possibly have built mosques in it. He states:

> There is something wrong with this view (that ‘Umar built a mosque, or mosques, in Jeddah). Jeddah was not an (established and developed) settlement at all during his reign. So, how could there have been in the city a mosque—or more—built by ‘Umar? (al-Anṣārī, 1981, p. 564)

The reputation of Jeddah was further strengthened by the myth that Ḥawwā’ descended from Heaven to the location where the city of Jeddah was subsequently established. Her husband, the first Prophet and the father of mankind, Ādam, on the other hand, was sent to India. They searched for each other and later met in Makkah. They did so at the locations of Muzdalifa and ‘Arafa, where, as a result, partly, some of the most important pilgrimage (Hajj) rituals are annually conducted ever since (Ṭarāblisī, 2006).

When she died, Ḥawwā’ was buried in Jeddah. Her grave was one of the reasons for the city’s age-old existence as well as name (Jeddah meaning “grandmother”) (Burton, 1964). Ibn Jubayr has said that the burial site of Ḥawwā’ had an ancient and lofty dome. The edifice was erected to illustrate the blessedness and excellence of the place.

Although the mentioned stories about Ḥawwā’ and Ādam are mere myths and legends—for which there is no sound evidence from

the revealed knowledge, except for some weak (*ḍa'īf*) Hadith and accounts of the *salaf* (predecessors), which had been obtained from the knowledge of the People of the Book and, thus, cannot be relied upon and trusted—the relationship between Jeddah and Makkah, in this manner, was additionally enhanced. This was particularly the case at the spiritual level. Since time immemorial, it goes without saying that Jeddah and Makkah were inseparable and their names were mentioned in the same breath.

Judging by the description of Ibn Jubayr, the burial place of Ḥawwā' must have been the object of people's, or rather pilgrims', keen attention and visitation. To some, such amounted to a form of mini-pilgrimage, in that the place was conceived as a source of blessing and distinction. This appears to have been particularly plausible during the time of Ibn Jubayr's visit and afterwards because that was a time when the unhealthy phenomena of erecting structures over the graves of eminent individuals (architecture of death), thus architecturally glorifying the dead, were gaining momentum in most parts of the Muslim world. Outstanding elements of funerary architecture were similarly reported in connection with Makkah and Madinah. As unfounded and superstitious as it was, paying homage to Ḥawwā' and her tomb, either on the way to Makkah and Madinah or upon their return, was to many pilgrims an additional bonus and privilege. Today, however, the supposed grave is devoid of any noteworthy architectural mark, and rightly so. The local authorities do their best to make sure that the place is not turned into a pilgrimage site.

On the account of Jeddah's remarkable reputation and role, many of its residents were honourable and upright, and had noble ancestors. Many belonged to the Holy Prophet's household (*ahl al-bayt*). Ibn Jubayr, thus, has observed that "most of the inhabitants of this town (Jeddah) and the surrounding desert and mountain are Sharifs, 'Aliites, Hasanites, Husaynites and Ja'farites – may God hold in His favour their noble ancestors" (2001, p. 71).

Ibn Jubayr then goes on to describe how hard their lives had been at that time, which could serve as an indicator that the economic life of Jeddah itself was going through some difficult spells.

> They lead a life so wretched as to break the hardest stone in compassion. They employ themselves in all manner of

> trades, such as hiring camels should they possess any, and selling milk or water and other things like dates which they might find, or wood they might collect. Sometimes their women, the Sharifahs themselves, would share in this work. (Ibn Jubayr, 2001, p. 71)

Architecture

For centuries, commencing with the seventh century that witnessed the inception of the eclectic Islamic culture and civilisation, the city of Jeddah functioned as a major port for Indian Ocean trade routes. It was also the gateway for Muslim pilgrims from all over the world to the holy city of Makkah. These twin roles saw the city develop into a thriving multinational and multicultural hub. It was only natural then that Jeddah evolved a distinctive architectural tradition rarely matched anywhere else in terms of authenticity, meaning and value. As a result, the historic section of Jeddah, called al-Balad, was recognised in 2014 as one of several UNESCO World Heritage sites in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

It is comprehensively stated in a UNESCO document about the unique architecture of Historic Jeddah:

> Historic Jeddah is an outstanding reflection of the Red Sea architectural tradition, a construction style once common to cities on both coasts of the Red Sea, of which only scant vestiges are preserved outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the nominated property. The style is characterized by the imposing tower houses decorated by large wooden roshan built in the late 19th century by the city`s mercantile elites, and also by lower coral stone houses, mosques, ribats, suqs and small public squares that together compose a vibrant space. ("Historic Jeddah," n.d.)

> Historic Jeddah reflects the final flourishing of the Indian Ocean sea trade after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the introduction of steamboats that linked Europe with India and Asia. This brought enormous wealth to many merchants who built lavishly decorated houses, and it also led to developments of suqs and mosques. In addition, the increase in seagoing vessels allowed many more pilgrims to make the pilgrimage to Makkah, resulting in an expansion in

> the provision of accommodation for these visitors. ("Historic Jeddah," n.d.)

> The cityscape of historic Jeddah is the result of an important exchange of human values, technical know-how, building materials and techniques across the Red Sea region and along the Indian Ocean routes between the 16th and the early 20th centuries. Historic Jeddah represents this cultural world that thrived, thanks to international sea trade; possessed a shared geographical, cultural and religious background; and built settlements with specific and innovative technical and aesthetic solutions to cope with the extreme climatic conditions of the region (humidity and heat). ("Historic Jeddah," n.d.)

The architecture of Historic Jeddah (al-Balad) truly enjoyed all the qualities of an original and genuine style. Moreover, it embodied all the intrinsic and transcendent considerations that are expected from an Islamic architectural style. As such, Jeddah's architecture did not only reflect the city's natural features, history, demography, strategic location and religious predisposition, but also, through its visual relationships, tactile characteristics, expressive powers, dynamic functionality and strong desire to be human principles-oriented, it surpassed the parameters of time and space, styles and typologies. It rose and dwelled at the plane of satisfying the requirements of Muslim psychology, character and spirituality. It made the lives of people not only discernible and comfortable, but also meaningful, rich and stimulating. The sheer form and aesthetics were only one side of the phenomenon.

Above all, the remarkable architecture of Jeddah was an expression of human values and beliefs, articulated so eloquently through its spatial presence and connectivity with the rest of the surroundings. Its high quality and durable local as well as imported building materials fostered the ideas of timelessness, continuity and fortitude. It enhanced human thought, experiences and senses. The universality of natural and human goodness, coupled with the universality of man's heavenly purpose and everyday struggles, was also brought closer to human cognition and spiritual appreciation.

In Jeddah, it follows that the universal and the local, the foreign and the indigenous as well as the homogenous and the heterogeneous were

all brought together and integrated in a subtle aggregate, which was enlivened and consolidated by the universal spirit of human dignity, purpose and destiny. By virtue of being a cosmopolitan and all-inclusive urban environment, Jeddah was always ready to share its architectural and artistic riches with the rest of the world. It was always ready to give and take.

Excellent workmanship in traditional Jeddah buildings, their composition on the basis of an intricate visual balance and "broken" symmetry of both general and human scale and proportion, rich decoration that stimulates the senses and the capacities of the mind and soul and, lastly, an overall rhythm that results from the regular and harmonious repetition and reverberation of forms, shapes, details and functions have all rendered the city's morphology to speak for itself. The city's unique architecture made Historic Jeddah function as an open-air or living-history museum. It became tantamount to frozen music, which resonates even now, especially through the sixth sense of perceptive visitors.

Thus, along the lines of Vito Acconci's statement that architecture is not about space but about time, and of Jim Rohn's affirmation that whatever good things we build end up building us, it could likewise be said that the only way to truly comprehend and appreciate a successful architectural narrative is by an awakened consciousness and mind, predicated on the total performance of such a narrative and how much it succeeded in making people's lives better, more meaningful and enjoyable. The physical and artistic dimensions of architecture represent a fascinating window into its yet more consequential intangible dimensions, which pertain to the world of ideas and values. Indeed, good architecture is lived and appreciated at all levels of human presence and operation. Both life and architecture (built environment) are inextricable; they are sometimes even seen as synonymous.

Moreover, the architecture of Jeddah (al-Balad) was environmental, for it duly addressed its surrounding environmental parameters. Through its design processes, procedures, buildings as net products and their performances, it respected the capacities of the environment, capitalising on its advantages and mitigating its disadvantages.

The architecture was also sustainable because it sought to address and minimise the potential negative environmental impact of buildings

through efficiency and moderation in the use of materials and energy, and by considering the space the development occupies and its wider ecosystem. In general, "this trend is about a conscious approach to energy use and ecological conservation, carefully considering the impact in the short term and the consequences for future generations" ("How sustainable architecture is changing," n.d.). The sustainability philosophy is "to ensure that the actions taken today don't have negative consequences for future generations and comply with the principles of social, economic and ecological sustainability" ("Sustainability in architecture," n.d.).

This is why in the construction of traditional Jeddah houses, four main building materials were used: coral stone, which was extracted from the nearby underwater reefs and the shore of the Red Sea (Nyazi & Sağıroğlu, 2018); purified clay used as mortar and water proofing for the floors, roofs and lower parts of the external coral stone walls, which were techniques unique to the city of Jeddah; teak wood, which was imported from neighbouring local areas or from abroad, such as India, and was used extensively for both construction and decoration purposes and, lastly; gypsum, which was locally produced and used mainly for decorating façades and framing doors and windows, and was painted white as a form of protection against the elements. (Murtada, n.d.)

As stated by Hisham Murtada:

> … the construction materials used in the houses of Jeddah indicate the ability of residents to integrate with the surrounding environment. As Jeddah has no mountains or forests, and its soil is salty and weak, inhabitants turned to the sea as a major source of construction materials. (Murtada, n.d.)

All these later proved to be the main reason behind the exceptional beauty, durability and sustainability of Jeddah's architecture (Murtada, n.d.).

About the underlying structural properties of coral stone and how it needed to be protected and safeguarded by other building materials in order for its advantages to be optimised, Hisham Murtada furthermore states:

> As it was light and weak, it was protected from humidity and air salinity with a thick layer of lime plaster (nora)

> and wooden pieces (ganadel) that absorbed cracks resulted from stone size reduction after drying. This has maintained the survival of many buildings for more than 400 years. (Murtada, n.d.)

Conclusion

Historic or traditional Jeddah (al-Balad) was indeed a distinctive Islamic city on the account of its rich and diverse history, multicultural and global character, status as the gateway to and port of Makkah and its unique architectural identity. The city's morphology satisfied and integrated the imposed environmental, socio-economic, cultural and religious requirements. The natural setting, the people and built environment were subtly unified in an exciting, exquisite and enriching urban as well as civilisational environment, which, even though relatable to time, space, styles and typologies, surpassed them all.

The city of Jeddah oozed an aura of timelessness, perpetuity and transcendence. It still tells a human story, not just through the endless horizontal and linear historical episodes, but also through the infinite vertical tiers of metaphysical orientation and reality. Its profundity lies in the ideas and values it personified. It is no wonder then that the exquisiteness and exuberance of Jeddah have been recognised in colloquial terms by branding it the Bride of the Red Sea. For similar reasons, in 2014, UNESCO has inscribed Historic Jeddah on its World Heritage list. It is worth emphasising that UNESCO's recognition is owed much to the city's architectural and urban inimitability, as to its overall universal cultural and civilisational importance and value to the Saudis, all Muslims and the whole world.

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Reforming Political Islam: A Critical Reading of Aḥmad al-Raysūnī's Perspectives

Mohamed Zacky Mohamed Fouz[1] and M. Moniruzzaman[2]

Abstract: This paper critically analyses how Aḥmad al-Raysūnī employs the *maqāṣid approach* in reforming the concept of 'Islamic State' of Political Islam. Al-Raysūnī argues that the concept of Islamic State has many conceptual lapses which threaten the foundations of the Islamic world view. He further suggests that those conceptual issues can be overcome by developing a new understanding on the state and its role based on the *maqāṣid approach*. However, this paper notes that the perspectives of al-Raysūnī did not produce a holistic critique on the foundations of the theory of Islamic state as such. It is because the *maqāṣid approach* and its constituent elements such as *maṣlaḥa* and *mafsada*, *wasīla* and *maʾālāt,* which al-Raysūnī uses as his analytical framework, do not cover the analytical depth required to study modern political concepts such as state, law, and sovereignty that are rooted in highly philosophical arguments. Hence, this paper highlights the need for developing a new analytical model that can help to build critical Islamic perspectives while taking foundational, conceptual and philosophical considerations of modern socio-political concepts into account.

Keywords: Islamic political thought, *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa*, Aḥmad al-Raysūnī, Islamic state

[1] *Mohamed Zacky Mohamed Fouz* is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur. He can be reached at zackymfm@gmail.com.

[2] *M. Moniruzzaman* is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), Kuala Lumpur. His research interests cover comparative politics and political economy of the Muslim world. He can be reached at mmzaman@iium.edu.my.

Introduction

Aḥmad al-Raysūnī is considered to be one of the most influential scholars and jurists who have been shaping the discourse of contemporary Islamic political thought. He is an expert in traditional *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* (universal objectives of Sharia) studies and a native of Morocco, where the historical legacy of *Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa* discipline is rooted. Al-Raysūnī's views and opinions on the key concepts of Islamic political thought have generated large debates among Islamists, and secular counterparts alike, in the Islamic world. Al-Raysūnī being the chairman of the International Union of Islamic Scholars, replacing the founder-chairman Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, has further pushed him to the center of the polarising discourse on modern Islamic political thought. As a result, al-Raysūnī is positively recognised as *faqīh al-ḥurriyya* (free-thinking jurist) by some scholars (al-Raysūnī, 2011). Contrarily, some others have labeled him, negatively, as a scholar who has been trying to re-define the Islamic political thought by following the western liberal political framework (al-Muṭairī, 2018). That said, al-Raysūnī has recently argued that the emerging space for intellectual discussions regarding Islamic political thought after the Arab Spring highlights that the very phenomenon of Arab Spring has not only just triggered events of revolutions in order to ensure political rights of individuals but also is an intellectual revolution against political ideas that are being, repeatedly, legitimised in the name of religion (al-Raysūnī, 2012).

This paper attempts to explore how Aḥmad al-Raysūnī operationalises the framework of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* to reform the theory of Islamic state of political Islam. In reading al-Raysūnī's views, this paper argues that *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* has contributed to a considerable extent in reforming slogans and the issues of prioritisation of agenda of political Islam. Yet, *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* and its operational terminologies fail to produce a holistic philosophical critique on the discourses of political Islam. To further elaborate on this argument, the remaining parts of this paper are organised into seven sections. Section two discusses a brief biographical note on al-Raysūnī's life and works, followed by his justifications on why the discourses of Political Islam should be reformed. Section four elaborates on his methodology in approaching *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* as a field of study. Section five presents al-Raysūnī's critical reading on the concept of Islamic state. And the sixth section offers a critical analysis of al-Raysūnī's thought, followed by a conclusion.

Aḥmad al-Raysūnī and His Works

Al-Rassouni was born in the northern Moroccan province of al-Arāish in 1953. In 1978, he earned his first degree in Islamic studies from the University of Qarwiyyin in Fez, Morocco. He later moved to the University of Mohamed V and obtained his master's degree in the discipline of *Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa*. Finally, he completed his Doctor of Philosophy in the fundamentals of Islamic Jurisprudence, *Uṣūl Fiqh*, on the concept of state in Islamic jurisprudential studies in 1992. From 1986 to 2006, he served a professor of fundamentals of Islamic Jurisprudence and *Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa* studies at the University of Mohamed V in Rabat. After 2006, he joined the International Fiqh Academy in Saudi Arabia as the chief-instructor and the supervisor for a project related to Islamic legal maxims. At the same time, he served as a visiting lecturer of *Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa* at the University of Bin Zayed in United Arab Emirates and the University of Hamad Bin Khalifa in Qatar. Simultaneously, he contributed as chief-academic consultant to the International Institution of Islamic Thought (IIIT), USA as well. Apart from these academic engagements, al-Raysūnī has served as the chairman of the al-Tawheed and Islah movement from 1996 to 2004 and the founder president of the collective body of Islamic organisations in Morocco. Since 2019, he serves as the president of the International Union of Islamic Scholars after serving for a long time as the member of its executive committee.[3]

Aḥmad al-Raysūnī's central theme in his academic works is *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa*. His academic contributions have attracted the Islamic intellectual community due to a number of reasons. Firstly, among his most extensive studies, is his work on the founding father of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa*, Imam al-Shāṭibī. This study on *maqāṣid* theory of Imam al-Shāṭibī has been translated into more than five languages. In addition to that, he has authored many books and scholarly articles concerning the foundational ideas of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa*, such as *Foundational principles of Islamic sharīʿa*, *Introduction to* m*aqāṣid al-sharīʿa*, *Authorities of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* and *Maqāṣid framework*: *Its importance and principles*. On Islamic political thought, al-Raysūnī produced many important books dealing with various topics, such as

[3] These notes on al-Raysūnī's biography are taken from his website. See: raissouni.net

the nature of Islamic state, democracy and freedom in Islam, in which he skillfully elaborated his new framework of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* in an attempt to re-interpret the concept of Islamic state.[4] To mention a few, Islamic thought and contemporary political issues, Jurisprudence of revolution and Jurisprudence of protest and change are notable publications of him on the subject.

Rethinking Political Islam: A Survey of al-Raysūnī's Views

Political Islam emerged in the post-colonial context of the Muslim world, arguing that establishing an Islamic state is paramount for the survival of Islam (Affan, 2019). That state is to be recognised as "Islamic" once it accepted that its primary duty is to implement *al-Sharīʿa* (Sayyed, 2014). The need for an Islamic state arises from the understanding that it is considered to be sinful for a Muslim community to live in a state where Sharia is not in practice (Irfan A, 2008). These are the vital three pillars of Political Islam. Aḥmad al-Raysūnī has continuously argued in his writings and public debates why such discourses of political Islam must be reformed for a better future. For him, those narratives of political Islam had developed as reactions, either to still growing dominance of western colonial powers or to the increasing secularisation attempts by nationalist political elites in the Muslim world. In response, Islamic movements and Islamic thinkers have embarked on a counter project to produce new political theologies such as the theory of Islamic State. Such an attempt emerged within the general climate of the ongoing liberation struggle in the Muslim world against the economic and ideological interferences of colonial powers. Given these backgrounds, the general Islamic political thought movement adopted the nature of liberation movement. Hence, al-Raysūnī views that the general reformative nature of Islamic scholarship had been taken over by the dominant reactionary over-politicised slogans (al-Raysūnī, 2019b). As a result, the Islamic thought, and its epistemic grounding have been negatively affected by the very reactionary nature of discourses of political Islam. To put it more clearly, according to him, the pre-modern Islamic thinking was

[4] The list of al-Raysūnī's books are available in his website. See: raissouni.net

more "Islamic'" than discourses of post-colonial political Islam in terms of epistemological outlook (al-Raysūnī, 2013a).

Secondly, the contemporary writings on political Islam had brought the realm of politics, political behavior, and political choices of an individual into the domain of fundamentals of Islamic religious creeds while politics was purely a worldly affair in the pre-modern Islamic thought. Thus, new terminologies started to emerge offering blurred binary notions such as "purely Islamic political system" as opposed to "un-Islamic political system". Modern secular systems and philosophies had been approached and evaluated in theological terms as "anti-Islamic" whereby the traditional Islamic thought treated these issues based on the theory of *maṣlaḥa* or public well-being. Therefore, for al-Raysūnī, the objectives or capacity of various political systems must be judged by a more rigorous framework, developed in light of the overall value system of Islam and not by politicised slogans (al-Raysūnī, 2019a).

Finally, al-Raysūnī argues that the reactionary nature of post-colonial Islamic political thought had generated substantial negative implications on the broader world view of Muslim societies. One of those is the discourse which promoted the idea that Islam is in total war with all the other civilisations and there is no middle ground where Islam and other civilisations can meet and communicate with each other (al-Raysūnī, 2019c). Consequently, a radical choice was presented before the Muslim community that they should be loyal either to the Islamic order or to other un-Islamic systems in realising their socio-political aspirations. In the context of such a bipolar view, some started to argue that there will be no future for Islam and its civilisational message until the western civilisation collapses and no future for Muslims until the West is defeated and its power is exhausted. Muslims should work primarily to corner the western civilisation first before thinking about building their own civilisation (al-Raysūnī, 2019c). Against all these critical readings about the political Islam, al-Raysūnī argues that it is paramount to reform existing political thought of political Islamism and its fundamental assumptions. In addition to that, he argues that *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* can play a vital role in overcoming the methodological gaps of existing discourses of political Islam and its theory of Islamic state (al-Raysūnī, 2014b).

Al-Raysūnī's Framework: From *Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿa* to *Maqāṣid Approach*

Maqāṣid al-sharīʿa has been developed and sustained as a 'legal concept' which explains the objectives behind each ruling of Islamic jurisprudence or *fiqh al-Islāmī* (Kamali, 2008). Traditionally, the following five key objectives are identified as foundational core-objectives of *al-sharīʿa*: the protection of life, religion, intellect, wealth and progeny. Interestingly, al-Raysūnī argues that *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* and *maqāṣid approach* (purposive) are two different concepts with two different theoretical implications. While *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* deals with *fiqh*, *maqāṣid approach* is a way of thinking and analysing issues in the light of broader objectives of Islamic Sharīʿa (al-Raysūnī, 1999). Those broader objectives are derived following an inductive approach (*al-manhaj al-istiqrāʾī*). This means, instead of sticking into individual fragmented texts of Islamic primary sources to justify a particular Islamic value or Quranic norm, resorting to an approach of the holistic reading over primary sources whereby one can derive more sophisticated and border objectives, themes and values, such as freedom, equality, plurality, participation, human rights, and environmental protection that can address the contemporary conditions of human life. Accordingly, these broader set of values and objectives have the potential to guide the process of producing sharia perspectives on complex cross-disciplinary issues such as constitutionalism, politics, and economy (al-Raysūnī, 1999).

The theory of *maqāṣid approach* transcends the strict nature of traditional legal domain that revolves around the question of whether human action is permissible or not in a narrow sense. Hence, *maqāṣid approach* is a broader idea than *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* as the latter is attached with purely legal tools while the former tries to broaden the scope of Islamic world view to a considerable extent and gives an Islamic thinker enough theoretical luxury in developing Islamic perspective on modern socio-political concepts. Furthermore, al-Raysūnī argues that *maqāṣid approach* enables Islamic scholars to evaluate complex social issues, and to integrate different and seemingly opposing notions and to analyse diverse schools of thought in light of an Islamic holistic perspective (al-Raysūnī, 1999).

According to al-Raysūnī, *maqāṣidī approach* has three foundational dimensions in its operational domain. A jurist must take all those dimensions into account while using the theory. In the first dimension, a jurist must be able to recognise elements which lead to both the benefits (*maṣlaḥa*) and harm (*mafsada*) of a given reality, a phenomenon or a concept in the light of Quranic higher values. Afterwards, he must evaluate benefits as opposed to elements of harm in order to understand the weightage of both in that given reality. This valuation process is the key cornerstone of holistic thinking to produce a coherent perspective of *maqāṣid approach*. It is because there is no human theory or social policy in this world that is neither pure nor impure completely. The sharply mixed realities can be approached only by a proper valuating process.

The second dimension is that a jurist must be well informed to differentiate the elements related to objectives (*maqāṣid*) and those of means (*wasīla*) in dealing with concepts or a phenomenon. In other words, he must understand whether a given theory or policy is related to means in achieving an objective or it deals with an objective per se. Here, the jurist's focus should be more attached to achieving the objective rather than debating peripheral issues around the means. In this respect, al-Raysūnī (1999) says:

> Means carries the same importance and value as the objectives carry in *al-Sharīʿa*. It is because the means are the instruments to realize the objectives. Yet, the means are not entitled to achieve the '*same respect*' as the objectives do. It is because the means get its value behind its service for the realization of the objectives. We need to know that realization of objectives is to be considered as the primary matter of concern of a jurist than the means and he should maintain a more flexible attitude towards means. (p.82)

The third dimension is the consequential study or *maʾālāt*. He says that studying the consequences before developing a final report on a concept or context is an integral part of *maqāṣid approach* (al-Raysūnī, 2014a). The *maʾālāt* dimension argues that a jurist must be capable enough to justify whether his stance about a given context or a concept would meet already learned border values and objectives of *al-sharīʿa* and would not contravene it in the long run at any cost.



Diagram 1: *Maqāṣid Approach* Framework

Al-Raysūnī's *Maqāṣid* Framework and the Concept of Islamic State

To start with, al-Raysūnī states that Islam never argued that it has a unique political system or exemplary state structure in any case. Instead, it presents a set of general political values and ethics which can be contextualised and applied in various and changing environments. Hence, the term "Islamic political system" is a faulty idea generated by the reactionary nature of discourses of political Islam, and it is incoherent with the very Islamic philosophical principles. Political system is a political and constitutional term which describes the structure of governance and its frameworks. In addition, it explains the method of power distribution, rights, and responsibilities among the authoritative organs of a governmental structure and it discusses boundaries and the relationship among the state institutions. Furthermore, the concept of political system speaks to how a ruler and a government should be elected, how the accountability mechanism must be operated upon them and how a government should be removed from power. This is what a political system means in the constitutions today and is subject to

take different institutional shapes according to different contexts. In this sense, Islam does not have a unique political system; rather what it offers are principles, directions, and foundational ethics such as justice, consultation, participation, superiority of Islamic law and accountability. Islam requires the observation of those higher values in the process of building a political structure and to impart it within the institutional framework of governance (al-Raysūnī, 2019d)

In the light of these arguments, al-Raysūnī refutes the general understanding of Muslims about the concept of the caliphate as the ideal model of the Islamic political system. He argues that Islamic scriptures give priority and importance to ethics, objectives, principles, and values and it does not give any significance for the models. Moreover, Islam always demands that its values and objectives should be realised in any possible circumstances. It does not bother about whether it is under a so-called caliphate or any other political system. Contrarily, even the caliphate is not Islamic if those Islamic political values are not respected. He says that the sharia only forces us to practice those values, objectives and general rules in political realm and it does not require from us to establish something called a "caliphate" or an "Islamic caliphate" or a "state of caliphate" (al-Raysūnī, 2014c). In addition to that, al-Raysūnī argues that:

> We can't find an authentic text which pushes us to establish a state in the name of Islam and there is no any text which even motivates us to do so in comparison to very many texts which talk about other mandatory duties of Islam. (al-Raysūnī, 2019c)

The traditional Islamic thought had argued for the need for a political authority, not because of the dictation of the Islamic textual sources; rather it was just a collective consensus based on the reality, and thus the science of politics was always located under the category of *maṣlaḥa* or public wellbeing by the traditional scholars (al-Raysūnī, 2019a). In this regard, he disagrees with Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on the latter's view that the presidential system is closest to pure Islamic political system over parliament democracy, in commenting on the constitutional changes in Turkey. Here, al-Raysūnī says that:

> Sheik Qaradawi had said as such based on his knowledge on Islamic political history where the caliph kept most of the

> powers with him. Yet, my personal opinion is that the closest political model to the Islamic world view is the one which realizes the political ethics of Islam such as stability, public well-being, and justice as long as Islam does not present us with distinguished political models. (al-Raysūnī, 2018b)

Furthermore, he justifies this view arguing that the governance of first four caliphs is considered to be noblest in Islamic tradition because of the attributes of their governance such as justice, freedom, transparency, and accountability, not for the political model they followed (al-Raysūnī, 2019d).

Having argued that Islam does not have a specific political model, al-Raysūnī further attempts to de-construct the idea of the Islamic State. In that process, while he agrees with the argument that the need for an Islamic state is inevitable in the current global order, he strongly questions theoretical significance of the idea of Islamic state that is given by political Islam. Political Islam considers realisation of an Islamic state as an objective of Islamic mission and all the problems that Muslims face would be solved once it is achieved. The Islamic state, to al-Raysūnī, has to play only a narrow performative role (*wasīla*) to build an exemplary Muslim community and, thus, it should not be identified as an "objective of Islam" or as a "matter of survival issue for Islam" (al-Raysūnī, 2019a). In other words, the Islamic State is not a solution for all the problems that Muslims have been facing throughout the last century. It had never been seen an "anchor of Islam" in the historical evolution of Islam either (al-Raysūnī, 2012a). In order to reinforce this argument with textual support, al-Raysūnī explains, that the Islamic primary sources and its teachings generally address the mainstream society and demand them to implement Islam in a given context. Contrarily, the teachings of the Quran never address to rulers or political leaders as such. This is to build a strong understanding that mainstream society is the guardian of the Islamic message and not the state or ruler. Yet, the discourses of political Islam had linked all of those teachings, in one way or other, to the state organs and the ruler, thereby systematically de-graded the position of the mainstream society in social change as opposed to the role of the state (al-Raysūnī, 2012a). Islam motivates Muslim society to strive in realising its values and principles by using its available state institutions as "means". He further writes:

> The concept of state in Islam is considered to be just a means not an objective per se. To say this, 'means' or 'waseela' is also an integral part of al-Sharīʿa or half of al-Sharīʿa or some time more than half. Thus, someone who disagrees with the performative role of the state as a means, not an objective in al-Sharīʿa is a purely ignorant. In this regard, Imam ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al-Salām says: 'there is no doubt that appointing the judges and political leaders are categorized as means to achieve public and private well-being or Maslaha'. (al-Raysūnī, 2019d)

Standing on these very premises, al-Raysūnī attempted to transcend the dichotomy of Islamic state as opposed to nation-state discourse, which was fashioned by the political Islam literatures. As long as the state is considered to be a means to achieve the objectives of Islam, the need for an Islamic state will decrease gradually whenever the existing nation-state provides opportunities to realise the values and ethics of Islam and to observe Islamic rules and regulations in public and personal life of the society. In that sense, the very existing state structure could be a part of the Islamic state from a functional perspective. Hence, the case for the realisation of an Islamic state is not a zero-sum game that necessarily generates a stiff competition with the existing nation-state system. If the objective of Islam is to impart its values on the society and to reshape them in accordance with its world view, then the existing nation-state system offers quite an amount of space to put that into practice. In addition to that, most of the state institutions strive to spread public values and public order within society. Those values are very closely related with Islamic political values, were they to be understood through the theory of *maqāṣid approach* (al-Raysūnī, 2019c).

Whether the Islamic state is flexible enough to accommodate the idea of democracy and civic rights without any limitations is a general debate within political Islam circles. However, with the advent of the Arab Spring, the scope of this controversy has extended, and its pace has accelerated (Esposito & al-Najjar, 2014). In this debate, the conservative schools of political Islam promote an understanding that unrestricted democratisation will have a negative impact on the Islamisation of a population. It means that the idea of democracy will pave the way, in a Muslim country, to legalise un-Islamic norms and

values and to use voting power against Islam and its fundamentals. Thereby, Islamic fabric of the country will collapse gradually to the core in the long run. Al-Raysūnī invalidates this common observation on both the conceptual and practical grounds. Practically speaking, according to him, Islamic life of Muslim world had been spoiled throughout the last century not because of democracy but because of dictatorship and autocracy (al-Raysūnī, 2013a). To him, if the majority of people of a Muslim country voted against the Islamic fundamentals in a free and fair election or through democratic means, it gives a simple message that they do not like the interference of Islam in their social life. In that case, instead of trying to change their attitude towards Islam by using political machinery such as elections or constitutional changes, Islamic preachers should rethink their strategies to engage with the people with proper awareness programs and civic activities. Moreover, the basic logic of the Muslim community is that they will never cross the border limitations of Islam. If they might have crossed the red line in any given situation, it does not mean that the problem is with the system rather the issue is with the people and their world view, which could not be changed by the constitutional provisions or state structure because it is a matter of inner faith (al-Raysūnī, 2012a).

Conceptually speaking, Islamic world view does not revolve around systems or models but values and ethics. Otherwise stated, Islam attempts to connect with the political realm through its ethics and values. Simultaneously, Islam assigns the human experience and knowledge to develop systems, means, and models which suit them in different contexts providing that those models should reflect Islamic values and ethical codes. In line with this framework, democracy is a system of political management and a mechanism to process the people's consent. Moreover, democracy is a mere system that can be practiced in any context and it has the potential to flourish, despite the cultural and linguistic differences where it operates. Hence, it will be an epistemic lapse if democracy, by its definition, is portrayed as a competitor to Islam on theological grounds. Instead, it can be customised according to Islamic world view and needs of the Muslim world (al-Raysūnī, 2013a).



Diagram 2: Modern State in Perspective of al-Raysūnī's *Maqāṣid Approach* Framework

Al-Raysūnī's Theory of Islamic State: A Critique

Closely observing the structure of al-Raysūnī's arguments, it is clear that he carefully maneuvers the different dimensions of *maqāṣid* approach to question the ideological essence and the world view of political Islam. Starting from the basic narrative of political Islam, that Islamic state opposes the secular nation-state, al-Raysūnī succeeded in forwarding a convincing argument that the current nation-state system, even if it is a purely secular one, is not an anti-thesis to the Islamic world view in principle. Given the essence of Islam as a religion of moral messages, values, and objectives, Muslims should think to maneuver the state

institutions and organs in the light of those objectives and values. By bringing the dimension of acquiring *maṣlaḥa* and warding off *mafsada* perspective, he further argues that there are more common spaces and values, such as constitutionalism, human rights, education development, and economic prosperity, which can bring the Islamic world view and its perception of benefits/ public wellbeing close to aspirations of secular nation-states and its institutions. Given such a situation, it is irrelevant to ideologically confront the modern secular nation-states. Moreover, he stresses that the demarcation line between a so-called Islamic state and nation-state is not as clear as popular opinion perceives it. Otherwise stated, "*Islamic-ness*" of a state is a "shifting paradigm" where even a so-called Islamic caliphate can be un-Islamic at one point if it does not reflect the Islamic value orientation in its operation. As such, al-Raysūnī disagrees with the concept of Islamic state and its significance itself. By employing the idea that *maqāṣid/objectives* should overrule *wasīla/ means*, he dismisses the idea of political Islam, that Islamic state must be seen as a matter of survival for Islamic theology and its community. For him, it is illogical and irrational to argue that Islamic state, as merely an institutional system, is the cornerstone of social change in Islamic perspective.

Along with that, the thread of al-Raysūnī's arguments strives to bring the civil society aspect into the framework of Islamic political thought. After making a consequential study (*maʾālāt*) over the journey of post-colonial Islamic thought and its practical implications, he argues that the engagement of political Islam with the concept of state on theological and ideological grounds has led to the uneven glorification of the state and its significance at the expense of the community empowerment. Drawing the experiences of pre-modern Islamic past, al-Raysūnī states that Islamic religious scholars, historically, attempted to build the community first instead of depending much on political leadership and, thus, they could be able to expand the civilisational contribution of Islam across the globe, despite the fact that political system was tainted by various elements of illness in the Islamic history. The textual sources also talk to community, not to rulers or the state. With the support of historical facts and textual backing, it is paramount to reorient the reform thoughts towards building the capacity of the communities. In addition to that, the overall objective-based approach of al-Raysūnī discovered the crucial element of "self-rule" or "community centeredness" within

the theory of democracy and civil state as it gives more controlling power to people over the state. Hence, he believes that theory of democracy and civil state can potentially pave the way to realise the political aspirations of the Muslim community, in the long run, by strengthening the community-first approach. The autocratic rule never provided such a chance and it was the cause for the disastrous downfall of the Muslim world and its civic activism during the post-colonial period. In short, it is possible to argue that the underlying logic of these perspectives can invalidate or, at least, challenge three important aspects of political Islam and its propagation strategies with regard to Islamic state. Firstly, al-Raysūnī discredited the uniqueness of an Islamic state in comparison to other secular nation-states; secondly, he degraded the significance of the Islamic state; and thirdly, he questioned the centrality of an Islamic state and its productivity.

Having said that, al-Raysūnī, however, is not ready to question the political Islam by challenging the foundations of theory of 'the Islamic state' of political Islam. This is obvious when he mentions that there cannot be any political system which can be called "Islamic" unless it declares openly that it accepts sharia as the supreme authority (al-Raysūnī, 2018a). Moreover, he again says that Islamic state is one of the basics of Islam and it is the primary guardian of the Islamic life (al-Raysūnī, 2018a). Even though he could be able to produce a convincing way out to overcome the conflict zone between the Islam and democracy controversy, he again endorses the same narrative that has been regenerating the very dilemma for decades. He says that Islam goes right against democracy in one significant point as the later gives the supreme authority to people while the former to *al-Sharīʿa* (al-Raysūnī, 2012a). These are the key narratives which have already pushed political Islam into conceptual mess for last few decades. One can ask why al-Raysūnī still repeats those foundational narratives of political Islam, even though he questioned the uniqueness, centrality, and significance of Islamic state through his arguments. Perhaps, it is not in al-Raysūnī's interest to safeguard the legitimacy of political Islam, which unconsciously makes him stick to the established principles of political Islam. Alternatively, one can argue that al-Raysūnī could not capture the real crisis of political Islam. In other words, al-Raysūnī's theoretical framework does not help him to trace the fundamental philosophical/ conceptual problem of the Islamic state discourse of political Islam.

That said, the core problem of the post-colonial political Islam does not only lie within the issue of prioritisation of the state over the community or mixing the means with objectives or mixing religion with worldly affairs. Instead, it attempted to present a type of Islamic political thinking that did not give much attention to philosophical/conceptual world view that governs the concepts of modern political philosophy such as state, law, and power. To put it differently, the modern state is a product of modernity and it has its own philosophical roots and world view. The enlightenment concepts of hyper rationality, individual freedom, natural rights, and social contract are the cornerstone of modern state (Sayyed, 2014). The modern state argues that it is the most civilised method to transform the communities into smart citizens. Besides, it further perceives that realising the statehood is the highest point of emancipation for a community. Moreover, the modern state uses power and authority, as the expression of the collective will of the people, to produce laws and to control its subjects. Hence, it has its own materialistic world view on human behavior and how to manage it.

Unfortunately, political Islam adopted the theory of state while ignoring the above-mentioned important aspects of its philosophical assumptions. It took the abstract concept of state and its agencies for granted. Hence, this conceptual unclarity led to the interpretation of Islamic political theory along the lines of modernist philosophical premises. Consequently, political Islam argued that power and authority are vital to safeguard the continuity of Islamic life and its moral worldview. In addition to that, it attempted to impose norms of sharia over the population through the legal agencies of modern state, arguing that application of sharia is a basic feature of an Islamic state. As such, it says that realising an Islamic state is the highest obligation of a Muslim community, following the arguments of modern state. These very concepts of state power, law and considering statehood as marks of emancipation are euro-centric/ modern in terms of their world view. Yet, al-Raysūnī supports, unconsciously, these foundations while attempting to reinterpret or re-strategise the content of idea of the Islamic state by utilising *maqāṣid approach*. Interestingly, this conceptual confluence has created conflict of interest between Islamism's political aspirations and the conceptual requirements of modern state. The conflict is reflected within al-Raysūnī's arguments themselves, although he critiqued the

many vital dimensions of political Islam by using a more sophisticated tool of modern Islamic thought, *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa*.

For example, in the case of democracy, al-Raysūnī accepts that democracy is Islamic as it reflects the people's power and as he sees it as a means to achieve certain political ends. Yet, when it comes to the discussion of who has the supreme authority in the Islamic state, he endorses that the supreme authority of the Islamic state is with God and not with the people. These perspectives and understandings of al-Raysūnī go right against the norms and principles of modern democracy. It seems that he attempted to disconnect the question of supreme authority of the state from the issue of democracy or tried to approach both problematic questions distinctively that need two separate responses, in light of Islamic world view. Here, al-Raysūnī implicitly misses the point that modern state, in its abstract form, is the collective will of its people. Democracy offers a channel to materialise "the will of people" aspect in policy and law-making process. The whole paradigm that operates behind the debate is the modernist perspective on human beings as autonomous and rational agents, which is closely connected to democracy and its operational dimensions of people's sovereignty. Hence, the ideas of state, general will of the people, democracy and law are not fragmented concepts if we take the whole intellectual edifice of modern political philosophy into account (Hallaq, 2013). Lack of focus on these aspects, on al-Raysūnī's part, has led him to produce self-contradictory observations in debating state, authority and democracy.

Another point to ponder here is that the modern state is an idea that had emerged to regulate the public interest based on abstract rationalist calculations, not by religious orders, at its essence. In other words, the concept of state and its components are fundamentally secular in its epistemology (Al-Moustafa, 2016). As a result, once we take the construct of state for granted or we see it as a phenomenon that is a neutral actor in terms of endorsing a certain world view, this very understanding prevents us from exploring the conceptual implications of the very construct. In political Islam's case, it took the idea of state for granted. Eventually, that acceptance forced itself to adopt conflicting conceptual positions in the question of the state's supreme authority, legal order, and democracy. Furthermore, it is important to note that conceptual grounding of modern state does not suggest that it is just a matter of means, as al-Raysūnī attempts to project using the tools

of *maqāṣid approach*. Instead, it is a powerful machine that can shape human life as it wishes. If this process of social engineering, by using the power in the name of the collective will, is the duty of a state, can it be labeled as mere a means? As an alternative, Islamic world view does not acc̣ept such social refashioning by using the state power either.

On these critical notes, one may understand the complexity of the issue and structural constraints inherent to the Islamic juristic instruments such as *maqāṣid*, *wasīla*, *maṣlaḥa* and *maʾālāt* in producing a conceptual critique on the foundational problems of political Islam. It is because, the concepts such as state, democracy and authority revolve around deep philosophical assumptions that cannot be tackled by employing simple framework of *maqāṣid approach* and its tools such as *maṣlaḥa*, *wasīla* and *maʾālāt*. But it is obvious that al-Raysūnī's theory has contributed to reform the existing understanding of political Islam regarding the discourse of Islamic state to a greater extent.

Conclusion

The recent discourses on reforming the Islamic political thought have largely been influenced and driven by developing a *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* paradigm. The theory has been seen not only as an appropriate prism but also as an idea that gives a required elasticity, at critical junctures, to reconcile Islamic political ethics with the requirements of modernity. Specifically, this trend dominates the overall direction of the debate of Islamic political thought as an aftermath of the trump of liberal world order in the post-cold war context. Moreover, some scholars have been seeing *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* paradigm as a liberating force, from the narrowly defined ideological approach to the politics of Islamist movements. Against this background, this paper critically examined al-Raysūnī's discourses, that resulted from the *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* paradigm, in reforming the theory of Islamic state, which is the central theme of political Islam. As such, this analysis explained how far the contemporary maqāṣid al-sharīʿa debates and its instruments can help in dealing with the complexities of political Islam. Considering the arguments of this paper, it is possible to conclude that *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* debates have provided crucial theoretical avenues to clarify, to a greater extent, the most important dilemmas that post-colonial Islamic political thought has faced for decades. Yet, as the paper shows, the

theoretical framework of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* has its own issues and constrains when dealing with philosophical foundations of political modernity such as the state, law and people's sovereignty. Moreover, the theory cannot be employed to analyse more than just the functional perspectives of concepts. In other words, the paradigm does not offer tools to exercise vigorous comparison between political theories that emerged out of different philosophical outlooks. Al-Raysūnī's arguments, in this regard, are a clear case in point to learn the prospects and limits of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿa* discourse and its application in the realm of political science, in particular, and social sciences in general.

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Book Review

John Tolan, *The Faces of Muhammad: Western Perceptions of the Prophet of Islam from the Middle Ages to Today*, Princeton University Press (2019).

by Farhain Zaharani

Following the outbreak of Crusades, "Islam" and "the West" have become increasingly hostile to each other that on the part of the West, a new discipline, Orientalism consequently emerged portraying Islam in a bad light as manifested in various cultural and intellectual products such as paintings, books, movies, and documentaries. The antagonism intensified further after the 9/11 attacks and with the widespread of Islamophobia, acts of terrorism committed by some so-called Muslim fundamentalists, and the emergence of groups like ISIS and Talibans, the image of Islam suffered even more that today it tends to be viewed as a religion of terror by many non-Muslims throughout the world.

Controversial polemics regarding Islam in the West, particularly in Europe, have existed for a long time and this continues until today. In the Western narratives, attempts have often been made to find flaws in Islam which were then presented in media and academia in a misleading and distorted manner. Of these narratives, Orientalist and modern Islamophobic approaches stand out in depicting the negative image of Islam. However, in the 21st century, the narratives gradually changed as the concept of religious unity gained attention leading to a new approach in the West hinting on the importance of peace and interreligious dialogues, and the need for better understanding and respect for other religions.

Prof. Tolan's book addresses the political rivalry between two major religions, Islam and Christianity with some significant historical events

such as the occupation of Jerusalem, the rise of the Ottoman Empire and the advent of colonialism being highlighted as contributory factors for the changed image of the Prophet Muhammad from an imposter to a notable hero. This book is one of the alternative writings that fulfil the gap in European scholarship regarding Western perceptions of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, who was known in the West as either Machomet, Mahomet, Mathome, Mafometus, Mouamed or Mahoma throughout the course of Christian-Muslim relations right from the Middle Ages until modern times. In this work, the author, who specialises in the European and Muslim world histories, deals with the Orientalists' perceptions of the Prophet Muhammad, discussing some historical contexts in Europe that shaped the formulations of such images.

The beginning of the book provides us with illustrations of the various early negative European perceptions of the Prophet Muhammad such as an imposter and trickster. Conflicts within the corrupted clergy system, intense friction between Catholics and Protestants coupled with political upheavals in Europe however, led to the change in the image of the Prophet Muhammad that he was depicted as a religious reformer, a lawmaker as well as an inspirational leader even for the Europeans. The change took effect as the Christians wanted to uphold the simplicity of Christianity and purify their own religious views by making use of the reformed image of Islam and the Prophet which promoted the essence of monotheism. In the book, various issues are also discussed which include religious denominations, political conflicts between the Muslims and Christians since the beginning of the crusades, colonialism and the emergence of the idea of religious toleration.

The author analyses how the Prophet Muhammad and Islam are depicted in Christian epics, debates and books as the Europeans justified their colonial endeavors along with their political propaganda. Tolan maintains that instead of scrutinising the Prophet Muhammad from the lens of Muslims, he is interested in the evolution of the image of the Prophet propagated by Europeans throughout the Christian-Muslim relations. He noted that while Europeans of the earlier period sought to find errors in the Prophet and his religion, later scholars however envisaged the Prophet Muhammad as a true reformer instead

of an imposter, hence signifies the transformation of the Western image of the Prophet Muhammad and Islam in Europe.

The transformation of knowledge with the democratisation of reading and writing in the European continent, especially in Britain and in France, during the 17th and 18th centuries compelled the Europeans to look at the role of the Prophet differently. This led to the production of several volumes of books and translations of the Quran analysing the origins of Islam and the mission of the Prophet Muhammad based on their understanding through time and space. As Western scholars came into contact with Muslims, it familiarised them with the Islamic perspective and this in turn helped them to understand the Prophet differently resulting in more positive images being portrayed through books, pictures and drama plays.

The Faces of Muhammad consists of nine chapters. The first chapter introduces an image of the Prophet as an idol. It discusses the origins of Islam as a religion of Saracens, a group of pagan idolaters who worshiped the idol called 'Mohamet'. The Christians opposed the imaginary idol-worshiping religion of Saracens as this teaching was contrary to the principles of Christianity.

Chapter 2 confers the image drawn by the Europeans of the Prophet Muhammad as an imposter and trickster. In this chapter, the author describes how Europeans in the 12th century until the 16th century, based on their own understanding, viewed the revelation transmitted to the Prophet.

Chapter 3 discusses the change in the image of the Prophet in Europe due to the coming of Muslims to Spain. While the Europeans actively wrote condemnatory remarks on Islam and the Prophet Muhammad in preventing people from embracing Islam as they had a political agenda in uniting Christianity under one kingdom, at the same time, the works of Moriscos were studied and Muslim sources caught their attention for a more objective or balanced analysis of the Prophet Muhammad.

As highlighted in chapter 4, with the expansion of the Turks to European lands, Europeans began feeling insecure and thus started to blame themselves having been imbued by the idea that they must have committed a sin and the Turkish invasion was their punishment sent by God. Indeed, in their views, the emergence of the Turks was one of God's

punishments for the Christian schism into different sects, the Catholics and the Protestants. The two sects had involved in severe conflicts that spread across Europe, breaking apart the European religious unity. At the same time, Islam continuously became the subject of debate along with the Catholic and Protestant arguments.

Moving to chapter 5, Tolan highlights the change of the image of the Prophet Muhammad in the 17th century. A British author, Henry Stubbe, was the first to suggest the Prophet as an influential religious reformer, whose teachings curbed corrupted monotheism emanating from for instance, the Christian clergy system. He believed that the Prophet promoted pure monotheism through the principle that a human being should be responsible for his own relationship with God and no one else.

The appraisal of the Prophet Muhammad as the champion of true monotheism in Islam started in France as explained in chapter 6. Napoleon Bonaparte learnt about Islam and saw the "beauty" in the religion. He even drew inspiration from the Prophet as he saw him as a great statesman and hero. Some scholars in the meantime, were amazed by other aspects of the Prophet's personality, particularly his modest lifestyle and generosity, as discussed in chapter 7.

Chapter 8 deals with how European Jews started to realise that their teachings were quite close to Islam, that certain Islamic teachings were similar to their own Talmud causing some to admit that the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad led to a pure monotheism. Starting in the 19th century during which modernisation was at its final stage, several Orientalists such as Montgomery Watt and Hans Kung set an initiative to understand Islam and in doing so, had criticised the Christians for being too exclusive without recognising the existence of other religious beliefs and practices.

Tolan concludes that all religions deserve respect, and no religion should be degraded by other beliefs. The world would then become a peaceful place if religious peace existed, as explained in the last chapter of the book.

Few solutions and guidelines are drawn for the public to accept and interact with the followers of other religions. Overall, the author successfully described how the European perceptions of the Prophet

Muhammad slowly changed through time due to the impacts of political and religious turmoil taking place in Europe.

In an unbiased manner, this book reveals the less known historical contexts of European views and debates for the various images of the Prophet Muhammad as an idol, a trickster, a great lawmaker and a reformer. These narratives reflect the Orientalists' viewpoints and their interpretations of the image of the Prophet based on some historical events and their impacts on the internal dynamics, thoughts and politics in/of Europe. The availability of sources, literacy rate, political and religious developments have been the main reasons for why the image of the Prophet Muhammad kept evolving over time. Apart from the contrasting images i.e., negative and positive, there is also a neutral image of the Prophet projected by a few prominent figures in the Western academia.

Not focusing on the dark side and the negative views only makes this book quite different and unique compared to other writings. The discussions on Islam and the Prophet seem to remain relevant and fascinating to European scholars until today. Even though the friction between Islam and the West will likely continue, this book could ease the effort towards an improved relation between them.

Furthermore, in my opinion, this book is as much of value for non-Muslims as it is for Muslims. It provides a much-needed understanding of how the perceptions of Islam in Europe have evolved through time and they are not totally monolithic. It is also of interest to Muslim readers as it explains in depth how the perceptions of Islam, the Prophet and the Muslims in general are very much connected to European issues and fears.