

The Internal and External Relations of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate during the Rule of Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh (369–405 AH/979–1014 CE)

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Abstract: The struggle for control over Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate, among the Persians, Turks, and Buyids, weakened the Caliph's authority. This led to the fragmentation of the Caliphate, giving rise to various local states and principalities. The Kurds capitalised on this situation, establishing their own authority and creating several Kurdish principalities. Several of these Kurdish principalities gained political and military influence, and emerged as strong states in the region. Notably, the Fatimids, Byzantines, and Romans sought to establish friendly relations with these Kurdish states, offering gifts, valuables, and titles to win their favour. This study delves into the internal and external relations of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate during Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh's reign. The methodology of this study is qualitative and historical analysis, depending on the selected primary and secondary sources. The most important finding of this study is that the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate had robust diplomatic relations with other authorities since its founding. Furthermore, the Buyids designated the emirs of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate. Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh established and strengthened his authority and control over the rocky wilderness of the western region with his military might and support.

Keywords: Ḥasanwayh, Kurd, Emirate, Abbasid, Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh

Introduction

The political and military situation of the Abbasid Caliphate before the establishment of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate was dire due to the rise of several weak and inexperienced caliphs at the beginning of the 4th century AH/10th century CE. This period witnessed a decline in political, military, and administrative stability, leading to the disintegration of the state and its governance. Fierce conflicts among military commanders, ministers, and senior state officials further exacerbated the situation, pushing the country towards political and military collapse. For instance, when Caliph al-Muqtadir Billah (295–320 AH/908–932 CE) came to power as a young and inexperienced ruler, the conflicts and disputes during his reign reached a critical level, posing a serious threat to the Caliphate's survival (Daḥiya, 1946).

Around 315 AH/927 CE, the Zanjis created problems in the Abbasid Caliphate and demanded privileges. They further initiated a revolution, further complicating the situation in the state. Consequently, Caliph al-Muqtadir Billah decided to repress them (Miskawayh, 2000). Several years later, the Caliphate was plagued by conflicts between the Turks and the Dailamites, who had become a prominent part of the Abbasid army in Baghdad (Al-Hamadānī, 1983). This conflict intensified, especially after Caliph al-Radhi Billah assumed power from 323 to 329 AH/933 to 940 CE when he appointed Kurtkin Dailami as a senior leader of the Abbasid forces (Şūli, 1979). The Caliphate had weakened to such an extent that political, military, and administrative instability had spread throughout the capital. This chaotic situation is embodied in the account where ministers who took office were removed in less than a day: "Minister has

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been completed in the patch; he takes off and is then removed after an hour” (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997).

As a result of this instability, various forces emerged, and several emirates were established in the Islamic East and Kurdish regions. The arrival of the Buyids in the region and their subsequent capture of Baghdad in 334 AH/945 CE facilitated the Kurds in creating their own authorities. Thus, the capture of Baghdad by the Buyids marked a new era in Islamic history, different from the previous time, as the policy implemented by the Buyids paved the way for the Kurds to establish principalities. By that time, several emirates were established, and one of the most significant of these principalities was the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate.

The Establishment of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate and the Role of Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh in Consolidating its Power

Establishment of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate

The Ḥasanwayhid Emirate, one of the prominent Kurdish emirates in the western mountainous region, existed in the 10th and 11th centuries CE during the Abbasid Caliphate. This principality was supported by the Barzikani tribe, enabling its establishment (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997). The Aishani tribe, closely connected to the Ḥasanwayhid dynasty, was considered part of the Barzikani tribe. Emirs Windad and Ghanim controlled Nahavand and various areas with numerous brave soldiers (Ibn Khaldūn, 1988a).

The death of Emir Windad in 349 AH/961 CE marked the beginning of the principality’s decline as Emir Ghanim was later arrested by the Shadhanjan tribe, leading to their downfall. Historian al-Ṣadafī identified 350 AH/961 CE as the year in which the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate was established (Al-Ṣadafī, 1907).

There are differing views on the true founder of this principality. Hussein Huzni Mukriani believed that Ḥasanwayh, chief of the Barzikani tribe in 330 AH/941 CE, founded the Emirate. The name “Ḥasanwayh” might have originated from al-Ṣadafī’s reference to Hussein or Husseinī in the book *History of Islam*. Qadir Mohammed cited a text from al-Birūnī mentioning the authority of Mir Badr, the founder of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate (Hassan, 2011).

Most sources, however, confirm that Mir Badr founded the principality in 348 AH/959 CE, making him the original founder. His wise policy and adept management allowed him to conquer regions such as Dinawar, Hamdan, Nahavand, and others. He established himself as the successor of the Aishanites until his passing in 369 AH/979 CE (Ibn al-Kathīr, 1991).

Principal Rulers of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate

Ḥasanwayh ibn Barzikani (348–369 AH/959–979 CE). Ḥasanwayh ibn Barzikani (henceforth Ḥasanwayh) is renowned as one of the most powerful emirs of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate. During his rule, he bolstered the Emirate by constructing significant fortresses, with Sarmaj being the most vital (Rojbeyani, 1996). Notably, he distinguished himself from other Kurdish emirs by endeavouring to unite the Kurdish tribes and free them from the constraints of the tribal system (Mohammed, 2022). Ḥasanwayh pursued the expansion of his Emirate and took advantage of regional conflicts to augment his power. He supported the Buyids in their campaign against the Samanids, which earned him their confidence and territorial gifts (Ghalib, 2008). He further strengthened his position by collecting taxes from merchants and affluent individuals in the surrounding areas. In 359

AH/969 CE, Ḥasanwayh launched an attack on Nahavand, defeating its ruler Sahlan ibn Musafir and compelling him to seek peace and a ceasefire (Miskawayh, 2000). However, this action led to a rupture in his relations with the Buyids, resulting in a retaliation attempt led by Ibn al-Amīd. The situation was eventually resolved through an agreement that included financial contributions and loyalty to the Buyids (Miskawayh, 2000).

Ḥasanwayh's rule continued until his death in 369 AH/979 CE, with his burial taking place in Sarmaj Castle. Historical accounts depict him as a just ruler who efficiently managed the regions under his control and discouraged abuse of power by officials (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997). He encouraged tribal chiefs and local officials to maintain security in their territories (Miskawayh, 2000), and his commitment to his country and strong belief in Islam are also highlighted (Rojbeyani, 1996).

Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh (369–405 AH/979–1014 CE). After Ḥasanwayh's death, a dispute arose among his seven sons over the inheritance of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate. Eventually, Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh (henceforth Badr) succeeded in becoming Emir with the assistance of 'Adud al-Dawla of the Buyid Empire (Al-Rūdhrawārī, 2000). Gradually, Badr consolidated his power, becoming one of the most influential and renowned emirs of the Emirate. Historians praised him as a good ruler; Ibn al-Athīr even described him as the best king in the world, following a sound policy in governing his state, leading to peace and security with no thieves (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997). Ibn al-Jawzī also noted that Badr invested a significant amount of money in constructing mosques, monasteries, and markets, as well as providing financial aid to scholars, the poor, and the needy (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1358).

Contemporary historians, such as Zrar Saddiq, highlighted Badr's focus on reconstruction and the construction of bridges, mosques, houses, and agricultural projects (Tawfiq, 2012). Under Badr's rule, the Emirate witnessed strong authority and improved economic infrastructure, making his reign a pivotal period in its history. However, after ruling for more than 30 years, Badr faced a tragic end when his soldiers turned against him, leading to his assassination in 405 AH/1014 CE.

Hilāl ibn Badr (405 AH/1015 CE). Hilāl, the third Emir of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate, did not rule for an extended period. Before the death of his father, Badr, Hilāl rebelled against him. He managed to seize power with the support of the Shazanjani tribe. However, due to his political acumen and good relations with the Buyids, Badr successfully removed Hilāl from power with their help. After Badr's death, Hilāl was eventually appointed as the Emir of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate and bestowed with the title of "Qutb al-'Alī." The Buyids provided an army to support him, but his forces were defeated, and he was captured and killed in the same year (Majhul, 1938). Hilāl's rule, though short-lived, added another chapter of intrigue and complexity to the history of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate.

Ṭāhir ibn Hilāl (405–406 AH/1015–1016 CE). When his father was in dispute with his grandfather and Badr was able to arrest and remove his father from the Emirate, Ṭāhir was hiding in remote areas such as Shahrizor and did not dare to be open. Additionally, he was afraid that his grandfather would take revenge on him instead of his father. In order to take revenge on his grandfather, he secretly prepared in distant areas. After the disappearance of his grandfather and his father's death, Ṭāhir tried to take control of Shahrizor and the surrounding region. Eventually, he attacked the Buyid army and took several of them prisoner (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997).

Buyid Emir Fakhr al-Dawla requested Ṭāhir to release the prisoners in order to establish contact with them and get their confession, to which the latter agreed. Moreover, he swore to Shams al-Dawla and reaffirmed his decision to obey him. As a result, Shams al-Dawla returned some of his father and grandfather's properties in the important areas of Shahrizor

and Dinwar to Ṭāhir as a reward. Finally, these areas returned under the rule of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate (Ghalib, 2008).

After regaining control of some areas, Ṭāhir announced that he is the new Emir of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate. However, a few Kurdish tribes in the western mountainous regions did not recognise his rule, especially the Shadhanjan and Lur tribes. Due to Ṭāhir's lack of experience in administration and politics, he was unable to convince these tribes otherwise (Beg, 1931). Soon, a fight happened between Emir Abū al-Shawk al-ʿAnnāzī and Ṭāhir. To avoid further defeat, Abū al-Shawk expressed his willingness to cooperate with Ṭāhir, and they strengthened their relationship through political marriage. However, this relationship was short lived, as Abū al-Shawk attacked Ṭāhir in 406 AH/1016 CE, thereby killing him and defeating the Ḥasanwayh army (Zaynel, 2012).

As a result, Abū al-Shawk ended the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate, and the region was occupied and ruled by the ʿAnnāzīd Emirate until their fall. The Barzikani tribe also disappeared after the destruction of the principality and is not mentioned in later sources.

Internal and External Relations of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate during the Reign of Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh

The Internal Relations between Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh and Other Kurdish Rulers

When Badr came to rule the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate, he implemented good policy by establishing strong and extensive relations with Kurdish military leaders and tribes, including the Aishanid, Barzikani, Shadhanjan, Gawani, Guran, and Lur tribes who served under his rule. Consequently, numerous prominent military commanders—such as Abū ʿIsā Shadi, Warmi son of Muḥammad al-Gawan, Khoshini son of Massoud, Haydi son of Saadi, Dulfī son of Mala, and many other Kurdish leaders—served in the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate.

With his increase in power, territorial expansion, and good relations with the Buyids, Badr's relations with the Kurdish leaders deteriorated from lack of communication. For instance, after 397 AH/1007 CE, ʿAmīd al-Jawish entrusted the protection of the trade routes of Khorasan to ʿAnnāzīd Emir Abū al-Faṭḥ Muḥammad ibn ʿAnnāz. This led to a conflict between Abū al-Faṭḥ and Badr, who perceived the former as a threat to his power (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997; Rojbeyani, 1996).

Furthermore, in the late 4th and early 5th centuries AH, or around 11th century CE, the good relations between Badr and the Guran tribe deteriorated, especially after the tribe came under the rule of Shams al-Dawla and reaffirmed their support for him (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1358).

Badr also faced conflicts within his own family, notably in 400 AH/1009 CE, when his son, Hilāl, rebelled against him, resulting in the defeat and capture of Badr and his army. Eventually, the Buyids were able to free Badr, help him regain his power, and return Hilāl to him as a prisoner. However, new conflicts between Badr and the Guran tribe resurfaced (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997). In 404 AH/1015 CE, the Guran tribe fought against Badr with the help of Shams al-Dawla, and this time they defeated Badr, leading to his eventual death and the end of his rule (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1358).

From these events, it becomes evident that Badr initially had good relations with the Kurdish authorities in the western mountain region. Due to his soft policy towards the Kurdish tribes and leaders, he gained their support. However, as his power expanded and his relations

with the Buyids grew stronger, he distanced himself from a few Kurdish tribes, leading to deteriorating relations. Eventually, the Kurdish kings and chieftains grew tired of his power and sought opportunities to remove him, which ultimately resulted in his demise at the hands of the Kurds.

The External Relations of Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh with the Abbasid Caliphate and Buyid Rulers

It is plausible to state that the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate had good relations with the rulers of Baghdad due to its geographical location. Since the Emirate was located near Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid Caliphate, it always maintained good and balanced relations with the Caliphate authorities, including in religious and political affairs. This was a sign of religious support for Badr's power. The principality also had good relations with the Buyids, which increased their hold in the region. In particular, after Badr's came to the power and became the ruler of the Emirate, he was able to strengthen his position in the region through his intelligence and competence. Relations between Badr and the Abbasid Caliph can be observed mainly in the conferring of titles and Badr's close ties with the Buyids.

Conferring of titles. The conferring of titles by the Caliph to rulers was a sign of strong relations between the Caliph and the authorities in an Islamic territory; it was also a sign of respect and a symbol of recognition of political power. In addition, the kings and officials who were bestowed titles by the Caliph were those with ranks and positions, and these titles were given according to their work and skills (al-Pasha, 1957). Therefore, given the position of Badr and close relations between them, Caliph al-Qadir in 388 AH/988 CE gave him the title of “Abba al-Najm.” At the same time, the Caliph decided to recognise Badr's authority in the western mountain region and even made him the supervisor and brigadier general of the said region (Bartold, 1983).

However, several sources indicate that Badr initially did not like the title given to him by the Caliph and, given their mutual respect, conveyed his dissatisfaction to the Caliph. Since the Caliph was satisfied with his good deeds and appreciated his work, he gave Badr the new title of “Naṣīr al-Dīn wa-l-Dawla.” This was done because the Caliph did not want to dishearten Badr, who also relied on the support of the Caliphate.

Badr's given title has two important aspects, the first being his religious aspect because he was known to have performed numerous religious services in the state. Secondly, the title reflects Badr's extensive power, which he used to support and serve the Caliphate. Badr also became known as “Nasruddin” because he spent thousands of dinars annually on religious services and coordinated with the Caliph in religious matters (Rojbeyani, 1996). Sources mention that Badr spent 5,000,000 dinars annually to provide a safe route for pilgrims to Makkah (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1358). He also repaired the roads leading to Makkah and Madinah, so the amount of money he spent annually in this endeavour was more than 20,000 dinars, in addition to funding the people (Anṣār and Muhājirīn) from Makkah and Madinah, as well as aiding the needy in Baghdad (Al-Rūdhrawārī, 2000). Badr also renovated more than 2,000 mosques, houses, and other religious places. It was mainly his services to the poor and needy that made the Caliph give him the title of “Naṣīr al-Dīn” (Al-Rūdhrawārī, 2000).

Meanwhile, Badr's bestowed title of “Naṣīr al-Dawla” traces back to the political and military support he provided to the Abbasid Caliphate. That is why Buyid Emir Bahā' al-Dawla directly asked the Caliph to give the title of “Naṣīr al-Dawla” to Badr (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1990). Receiving this title is a testament of the greatness and strength of Badr's position. On the same day Badr was given this title, the Caliph also gave him the authority to supervise the brigade of

the mountainous region. This brigade was of unprecedented importance, and the Caliph gave the person who took this post a white silk cloth decorated with religious slogans (Al-Šābī, 2000). Besides that, Badr was awarded another title, namely “Amīr al-‘Ajal,” which was obviously awarded to those with extensive powers and dominance across regions (al-Pasha, 1957). Badr’s name was also read in Friday khutbah (sermon) as a way to make known of non-Arab kings around the capital (Rojbeyani, 1996).

It is noteworthy that all the titles and monikers that the Abbasid Caliph gave to his emirs, ministers, and officials had no religious connotations, except for Badr due to his religious contributions to the Abbasid Caliphate (al-Kutubī, 1973). These titles were a recognition of the legitimacy of Badr’s authority and rank among the kings and officials. Although there were many Kurdish and non-Kurdish kings who sought for titles from the Caliph, and even sent a lot of money and gifts to the Caliph and the palace of the Caliphate, it was in vain. Thus, it can be deduced that Badr maintained friendly relations with the people and was given more than one title from the Abbasid Caliphate due to his close relationship with the Caliph.

Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh’s relations with the Buyid rulers. Badr maintained generally peaceful and close bilateral relations with the Buyid authorities, even though there have been tensions and wars between them. The Ḥasanwayhid Emirate often provided military aid to the Buyids in order to defeat their opponents, since Ḥasanwayh previously helped the Buyids against the Samanids, and he made the Buyids defeat the Samanid Empire (Ibn Khaldūn, 1988b). Therefore, after the death of Ḥasanwayh, Badr was supported by ‘Adud al-Dawla to become the ruler of the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate and imposed power over the entire region, even expanding and imposing more hegemony in the region. This friendly relationship between them continued, even after ‘Adud al-Dawla’s death. During this time, Badr showed loyalty by helping ‘Adud al-Dawla’s mother, Ummmajad al-Dawla, and spending more than thousands of dinars annually to serve the family as tribute. Badr was able to expand the influence of power in Buyid areas, especially in the city of Ray. He was also often consulted by Ummmajad al-Dawla in her many affairs, which is a sign of his competence on one hand, and proof of deep trust between them on the other hand (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1990). Badr also had a special position with Bahā’ al-Dawla, so he requested the Caliph to give him more important titles and recognise his authority in the western mountainous region. He respected Badr and acknowledged his authority. He considered him greater than himself, so he called him. Such diplomacy between them is evidence of Badr’s religious and military position, and also shows that his position was higher than that of Shams al-Dawla of the Buyid Empire. Moreover, this indicates that Shams al-Dawla considered himself as a follower of Badr (Ghalib, 2008). The stable relations between Badr and the Buyids, which often led to social integration, occurred mainly through political marriage and the exchange of gifts and letters.

Political marriage. Political marriage was a way to strengthen political, military, economic, and social relations between the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate and the Buyid Empire. Such an alliance strengthened and protected both sides from foreign attacks. In 380 AH/990 CE, Badr wedded his daughter to the eldest son of Fakhr al-Dawla, named Majd al-Dawla. In doing so, they were able to forge, strengthen, and maintain the family line for the future (Majhul, 1938).

Exchange of gifts and letters. The exchange of gifts and letters between Badr and the Buyid authorities was a sign of respect and trust between them—it was indicative of their strong relations. Badr sent money and gifts to the authorities of Buyids, the most prominent example being sending thousands of dinars annually to Fakhr al-Dawla’s family after the latter’s death (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1358). On the other side, the mother of Majd al-Dawla neither did anything nor made any military decision without consulting Badr. For example, in 378 AH/997 CE, when the region of Ray was attacked by the Ghaznavid Empire, Sayyida Shīrīn sent a letter to Badr, seeking advice on how to protect herself from the confrontation and succeed in the battle (Al-

Rūdhrawārī, 2000). This situation was repeated in 388 AH/988 CE when Qābūs ibn Wushmagīr invaded and captured the city of Gorgan. This city was rich with agricultural products made in the region, and was considered as one of the most important agricultural cities. Sayyida Shīrīn sent a letter to Badr, seeking instructions on the ways to proceed in such a dangerous situation. In response, Badr informed her that she should not take any political or military action because the situation was unfavourable to her and she could not fix this problem at the moment (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1990).

This kind of communication and consultation was a sign of the utmost trust, loyalty, and concern exhibited by both sides in times of need. The areas under Badr's rule also became a refuge for those who had been affected and needed his help.

Political and Military Relations between Badr ibn Ḥasanwayh and the Buyids

Friendly Relations

The close relations between Badr and the Buyids trace back to the reign of Ḥasanwayh, which was not only social and advisory, but also led to political and military cooperation and assistance in times of need. Ḥasanwayh, the father of Badr, provided military aid to the Buyids during the conflict between the Buyids and the Samanids. This act opened the way for Badr to follow in his father's footsteps. In 371 AH/981 CE, when a conflict arose between Qābūs ibn Wushmagīr and 'Adud al-Dawla, Badr decided to join the war with a large force and defend 'Adud al-Dawla against Qābūs ibn Wushmagīr (Al-Rūdhrawārī, 2000).

Eventually, the Buyids were able to defeat Qābūs ibn Wushmagīr's army with the help of Badr's army. Fakhr al-Dawla then requested Badr to help him capture Gorgan, to which the latter agreed (Al-'Ataybi, n.d.). It is worth mentioning that Badr, due to his power in the region, often interfered in family and ruling matters of the Buyids. His role in determining the Buyid rulers led to him being often called "our great master" (*sayyidinā*) (Al-Ṣābī, 2000). In 372 AH/982 CE, after the death of 'Adud al-Dawla, the Kurds of the Barzikani tribe led by Muḥammad ibn Ghānim tried to rebel against the Buyids, but Badr sent an army to defeat them (Ibn Khaldūn, 1988a). In 373 AH/989 CE, another war broke out between Fakhr al-Dawla and the Kurds from the Barzikani tribe. Even though Muḥammad ibn Ghānim succeeded, Badr established a peace treaty between Muḥammad ibn Ghānim and Fakhr al-Dawla (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997).

In 387 AH/997 CE, Badr once again saved the army of Bahā' al-Dawla from starvation and destruction when they were surrounded by the army of Abū-l-Faḍl ibn al-'Amīd. Bahā' al-Dawla's army would have been defeated, but Badr was able to save them from a terrible consequence (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997). Moreover, in 397 AH/1006 CE, at the request of Sayyida Khātūn, the grandmother of the Buyids, Badr sent his army to regain control of the city of Ray and restore full power to Sayyida Khātūn (Mustawfi, 1910). Badr was always the decisive force in the Buyid family's continual conflicts. The tasks undertaken by him for the Buyid family and their political and military assistance at the end of his rule proved fruitful during the conflict with his son Hilāl. In 400 AH/1009 CE, when Badr was defeated by Hilāl and taken prisoner to a fortress to forfeit his power and fame, he secretly wrote a letter to Bahā' al-Dawla, asking to be rescued from Hilāl. In response, Bahā' al-Dawla sent an army led by Fakhr al-Mulk against Hilāl. Not only did they successfully defeat Hilāl in battle and take him prisoner, but they also returned power to Badr (Mustawfi, 1910). This support from Bahā' al-Dawla to Badr was a sign of the friendly relations between Badr and the Buyid family.

Unstable relations

During the entire period of Badr's rule, he not only established friendly relations with the Buyids, but also often became embroiled in their internal conflicts as well as conflicts of political and military interests. Badr's support for one side and the lack of support for the other side often complicated the situation in the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate, as he failed to strike a balance between the prominent Buyid leaders.

Tensions over refugee shelters. Due to the conflict among the Buyid rulers, several ministers and officials were forced to leave their areas and move to one under Badr's rule in order to live in peace. They hid as refugees until they were able to reappear in the political and military arena. For example, in 381 AH/991 CE, following a dispute between Bahā' al-Dawla and Abū Naṣr al-Khawashaz, Bahā' al-Dawla took Abū Naṣr hostage and imprisoned him. However, Abū Naṣr soon escaped from prison and sought asylum once he reached Badr. Badr accepted his request and sent a special representative to bring him, but he died on the way before reaching Abū Naṣr (Al-Rūdhrawārī, 2000). Later, in 389 AH/999 CE, a war broke out between Bahā' al-Dawla and his sons, 'Adud al-Dawla Bakhyar on one side, and Abū Naṣr and Abū al-Qāsim on the other side. 'Adud al-Dawla Bakhyar triumphed, while Abū al-Qāsim was forced to escape from captivity. Abū Naṣr fled to Shiraz and Abū al-Qāsim sought refuge with Badr, which the latter granted (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997).

Once again, due to the war between Majd al-Dawla and the minister Abū al-'Abbās al-Dabbī, the latter was forced to leave his kingdom and move to the territory of Badr. This situation caused Sayyida Khātūn to become angry with Badr, and many people took advantage of this tension to create discord in their relationship. One of these people, Abū 'Alī al-Khatir, worked hard to ruin Badr for his own benefit. He succeeded in securing a ministry position easily and expanded his power while also attempting to break the relationship between Majd al-Dawla and Badr. However, Abū 'Alī al-Khatir soon lost and was removed from his ministry position, following which another person named Abū Sa'īd Muḥammad tried to secure the position. Upon learning of this incident, Badr promptly intervened and returned Abū al-'Abbās to his former post. For this purpose, he sent a force of 3,000 soldiers led by Abū 'Isā al-Shādhī ibn Muḥammad to Majd al-Dawla to forcibly return Abū al-'Abbās to his position and take revenge on Abū 'Alī al-Khatir. Abū 'Alī al-Khatir had previously managed to strain the relationship between Badr and Majd al-Dawla's mother (Sayyida Shīrīn), but Badr stopped his scheme, thus the ministry position was returned to Abū Sa'īd. Abū Sa'īd was able to hold this position for two years, after which soldiers and officials rebelled against him, and he was forced to leave his position and move to an area under the control of Badr. Abū 'Alī al-Khatir then regained the ministry position, but since Badr did not recognise both his position and authority, he began to oppose Badr again. Subsequently, not only did Abū 'Alī al-Khatir strain relations within the Buyid family, but he was also able to use Badr's son, Hilāl, against his father. Hilāl was able to defeat Badr in battle and conquer his territory, imprisoning the latter in a castle (Al-Ṣadafī, 1907).

Thus, it can be inferred that the harbouring of refugees and support of rebels by Badr had a negative impact on his overall friendly relations with the Buyids. They opposed him until the early 5th century AH/11th century CE, which led to war with the Buyids.

Tensions and military conflicts. Although Badr established good and friendly relations with the Buyids, there were also instances of strained relations due to some developments and changes in power as well as the assumption of power by certain Buyid rulers. There were several military clashes between Badr and Buyid officials in an attempt to take revenge on each other. For example, in 376 AH/986 CE, Sharaf al-Dawla invaded and seized

Baghdad from the control of his brother, Ṣamṣām al-Dawla, thus becoming the main ruler in Baghdad. His immediate next step was to send troops to seize the mountainous region in order to establish his power there as well as to destroy Badr. This was because Badr had previously been a supporter of Fakhr al-Dawla, who was the uncle of Sharaf and Ṣamṣām al-Dawla. Moreover, Badr supported Ṣamṣām al-Dawla in political and military affairs, so their good relationship threatened Fakhr al-Dawla since the Emir's stay in the region would stir dangerous problems for him (Al-Rūdhrawārī, 2000).

Therefore, Sharaf al-Dawla sent a large force led by Qaratkin Jashyari to take over the areas of Badr, causing clashes between the two forces of Qaratkin and Badr in 377 AH/987 CE. Sharaf al-Dawla's main goal was to destroy both of his enemies at the same time while also removing much of Qaratkin's power by killing him, and to take revenge on Badr by destroying his power. Initially, Badr was defeated and he retreated, but he later returned with a strong army and attacked the Buyid army, resulting in the defeat, capture, and killing of many, while Qaratkin quickly fled to Baghdad (Ibn al-Jawzī, 1358). The victory of Badr in his first confrontation with Sharaf al-Dawla was an important achievement for him and increased his power in the region.

On the contrary, Badr's victory affected relations between him and his principality (Rojbeyani, 1996). In 397 AH/1007 CE, his power in the mountainous region was threatened, especially after the death of Qalī, the owner of the road to Khorasan. Brigadier al-Jayush of the Buyid army entrusted the protection of this road to an enemy of Badr, named Abū al-Fath Muḥammad ibn Annāz. Badr refused to accept it and formed a large force of friends and supporters led by Abū Ja'far al-Hajjāj, who was the main enemy of Brigadier al-Jayush. Badr also formed the army of Amir Hindi ibn Sa'īd and called in the forces of Abū al-Ḥassan 'Alī ibn Mazbad al-Asadī and a large number of Kurds from the region, totalling to more than 10,000. They attacked Baghdad under the leadership of Badr and besieged it for a while. On the other side, Brigadier al-Jayush attacked the areas of Badr and was about to occupy them when Badr sent a letter to Brigadier al-Jayush, within it stating:

You could not lift the siege of Baghdad when the Oqaili forces were only a few meters away from capturing it and you had to make an agreement with him. Now how can you invade our country, so I have a lot of money and wealth that you do not have, so if I fail, then use my money to strengthen the fortresses and give the money to my population, but if you break then the supporters are blaming you, so I would like to send you some gifts and make a peace agreement. Thus, both sides resolved the issue peacefully and signed a peace agreement (Ibn al-Athīr, 1997).

Although there were peaceful relations, there have been many clashes and wars between Badr and the Buyids.

Conclusion

The findings of this study indicate that from its inception, the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate maintained positive relations with the Buyid authorities. Nevertheless, the Buyids exerted significant influence in the selection of appointed emirs for the Ḥasanwayhid Emirate. Furthermore, owing to his authority and support, Badr successfully consolidated his power and control over the mountainous territories of the western region. The Abbasid Caliphate bestowed upon Badr many titles in recognition of his exemplary reputation and assistance to the impoverished. Badr also maintained excellent connections with the majority of the Buyid monarchs. His strategy originally fostered strong internal relations, which attracted several tribes in the region to him. The Ḥasanwayhid Emirate ultimately declined and disintegrated due to the power struggle between sons and fathers, culminating in the 'Annāzī's takeover.

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