forces us to consider – by its quality – are deeper questions that we must face up to if we are to be more than an exotic discipline, acknowledged by many but read by a few.


Reviewer: Abdul Rashid Moten, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia.

_Hoodwinked_, according to its author, is “a case study in government dishonesty” (p. xii). The subject matter is the propaganda campaign that culminated in the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. This book analyses the key Bush administration documents in America’s descent into war in Iraq and compares these documents to the public statements of George Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice and Colin L. Powell in which claims were made regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. It compiles the actual intelligence available to the Bush Administration as it made its case for war. It then shows “how this information was consistently distorted, manipulated, and ignored,” as the president, vice president, secretaries of defense and state, and others, sought to persuade the country that facts about Iraq were other than what the intelligence indicated (p. xi). What the intelligence record shows is that “Iraqi weapons programs were nascent, moribund, or non-existent — exactly the opposite of the President’s repeated message to Americans” (p. xii). Based on his meticulous research, Prados concludes that “deception was systematic and carried out purposefully” (p. xii). He, however, shies away from stating the purposes behind systematic deception.

According to Prados, the Bush administration decided even before September 11, 2001 to overthrow Saddam Hussein. This was to be the beginning of a historic crusade to forcibly remake the geopolitics of the Middle East. To do so, it had to convince allies, Congress, and the public to go along. But the drive for war ran into serious opposition in summer 2003. Prados quotes retired general Brent
Scowcroft’s prescient warning that an invasion of Iraq could turn the whole region into a cauldron and, thus, destroy the war on terrorism. The administration’s response was to craft a scheme to convince America and the world that war with Iraq was necessary and urgent. It launched an all-out public relations campaign involving numerous speeches and the release of declassified intelligence estimates and culminating in Colin Powell’s UN speech in February 2003.

The heart of the book is an analysis of the documents and a paragraph-by-paragraph annotation of where and how they are misleading. The book includes the entire text of the following crucial declassified documents:

1. 1995 CIA debriefing of Iraqi defector and former weapons’ chief Hussein Kamel.
3. October 2002 letter from CIA Director George Tenet to Senator Bill Graham
4. December 2002 State Department/CIA “Fact Sheet”
5. February 2003 text of Colin Powell’s speech to the U.N. Security Council
6. May 2003 CIA Paper on biological warfare production plants

Prados focuses on four issues: (1) the Iraqi nuclear program, (2) unmanned aerial vehicles, (3) uranium from Niger, and (4) Saddam Hussein’s supposed links to Al Qaeda and 9/11. It is well known that during the buildup to the 2003 Iraq War, Saddam Hussein did not have any of these weapons, did not have production programs for manufacturing these weapons, and did not have plans to restart programs for these weapons. There is no evidence even of Saddam’s “intention” to restart these programs at some point. The weapons were not destroyed shortly before the war, nor were they moved to Syria, as claimed. They never existed. None of the Bush administration’s claims about Iraq’s alleged stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, missiles, unmanned drones, or most importantly, Iraq’s nuclear weapons and ties to Al Qaeda, were true.
Prados’s analysis is almost wholly convincing and not at all polemical. He shows that official statements consistently went far beyond the existing evidence. The administration relied on dubious and doubtful sources and did everything to silence the opposition. There were no dearth of sensible people giving honest opinion but the administration was bent upon ignoring alternative explanations. Prados’s analysis of Dick Cheney’s postwar justification (pp. 322–328) is commendable but his examination of Powell’s UN speech (Chapter 6) is highly admirable. Prados finds about thirty-five instances in which Powell was misleading. This is despite the fact that the secretary of state prepared the arguments carefully and presented only those instances which he thought was based upon hard evidence and very convincing to the audience.

Evidently, the Bush administration’s pious rhetoric about strengthening the United Nations was strictly for public consumption. Its talk about alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was crucial because the only avenue offering a legal justification for war was to claim to be enforcing U.N.-disarmament resolutions. President Bush’s repeated assertions that no decision had been made about attacking Iraq were plainly false.

*Hoodwinked* raises two questions worth pondering. First, was the administration’s hoodwinking a deliberate act? There are many, including the national intelligence estimate (NIE), who believe that the deception was largely due to systematic weaknesses, primarily in analytic trade craft, compounded by a lack of information sharing, poor management, and inadequate intelligence collection as well as a “groupthink” mentality. However, Prados believes, with the exception of p. 327 where Prados blames the officials for the error, that the deception was conscious. The motivation behind this deliberate act need to be unearthed. The second question relates to the American media. Did the American political and public information system connive with the administration in this deliberate act of deception? The denial in this respect would imply the impotence of the information system and the need to reform it to serve democracy.

*Hoodwinked* is an important interpretative effort to understand how, and not why America got into the Iraq quagmire. John Prados, an analyst with the National Security Archive and a well-respected,
independent scholar of security and intelligence issues, has done a great job. He has indeed succeeded in combining journalism and scholarship. To be sure, the book is not written from an academic perspective and is not grounded in theory. Nevertheless, the story flows smoothly and is written extremely well. The documents have been handled so meticulously that scholars can read it with benefit. *Hoodwinked* is a valuable research tool for scholars and experts.

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Reviewer: Roy Anthony Rogers, Lecturer, Universiti Malaya, Malaysia.

Unlike Tibet that has received ample international attention and reaction mainly due the efforts of the Dalai Lama, the oppressed Uighurs of Xinjiang living under Beijing’s rule have not received the attention they deserve. Michael Dillon of the University of Durham attempts, in the book under review, to highlight the plight of the Muslims that has been ignored by the world community for a long time.

There are few scholarly studies but are mainly focused on the historical relations between ancient China and the Central Asian kingdoms. Most of the previous works were unable to relate the historical events with contemporary events in Xinjiang. A couple of articles deal with the Muslims but their focus is on past events and the facts are outdated. *Xinjiang-China Muslim Far Northwest* is one of the latest and most up-to-date books that deals with relations between the Uighurs of Xinjiang and Beijing. Unlike most of the previous works, Dillon presents Beijing’s current involvement in Xinjiang in a historical context. The book is divided into four parts. Part one consists of five chapters that provides an insightful background knowledge on the province and the ethnic conflict between the Uighurs and Hans. Dillon describes the geographical position of the province which includes its location, size, topography, demography, geology and ethnicity. He brings the province’s history into life and discusses the origins and development of the Uighur