

Stages of development in Arabic philosophical nomenclature: Emergence, progression and stability

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Abstract: The study of the creation of a technical language within an existing natural language reveals to us both the internal and external dynamics of this complex phenomenon. The history of Arabic lexical definitions of different disciplines in the historical Islamic civilization provides us with a wealth of information on how these processes take place at each level of development. In this article while we will be highlighting on the history of Arabic intellectual lexical definitions we will focus on the development of the disciplines that constitute the Arabic philosophical technical languages i.e. *Kalām* and *falsafah*. In each discipline we closely followed the three conventional phases of development i.e. emergence, progression and stability. It should be remarked that though there are distinctive features of each phase, yet there are equally overlaps among these phases. This study brought to our attention the significant place of al-Ta'rifat of al-Jurjānī as the most sophisticated dictionary of sciences in the historical Islamic civilization.

Keywords: Lexical definitions; *Kalām*; *Falsafah*.

Abstrak: Kajian terhadap pembentukan bahasa teknikal dalam bahasa semula jadi dan yang sedia ada menunjukkan kepada kita bahawa dinamik dalam dan luaran fenomena yang kompleks. Sejarah definisi leksikal Bahasa Arab

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dalam bidang yang berbeza ketika tamadun sejarah Islam memberikan kita banyak maklumat tentang bagaimana proses-proses ini dilakukan pada setiap peringkat pembangunannya. Dalam artikel ini, di samping penulis-penulis mengutarakan sejarah definisi Bahasa Arab leksikal secara bijak, mereka juga memberikan tumpuan kepada pembangunan disiplin yang menggandungi falsafah Bahasa Arab untuk Bahasa-bahasa teknikal, iaitu *Kalām* dan *falsafah*. Dalam setiap disiplin, penulis-penulis mengikut secara terperinci tiga fasa konvensional dalam pembangunannya, iaitu kemunculan, perkembangan dan kestabilan. Ia patut diperkatakan bahawa walaupun terdapat ciri-ciri tersendiri dalam setiap fasa, namun terdapat pertindihan dalam kalangan fasa-fasa tersebut. Kajian ini membawa perhatian terhadap tempat yang signifikan bagi *al-Ta'rifat* dalam *al-Jurjānī* sebagai kamus yang canggih untuk bidang sains bagi sejarah ketamadunan Islam.

Kata Kunci: Definisi leksikal; *Kalām*; *Falsafah*.

The preliminary knowledge of any science requires the knowledge of its technical terms; whereas the profound knowledge of such a science entails the knowledge of the conditions and the degree of the progression through which those technical terms have emerged, been developed and established. With reference to the technical languages of the Islamic tradition, we may primarily examine the constructive interaction as well as the dynamics of these conditions and the process of maturation over three main phases, which may be identified as the emergence, the development and the stage of stability.

By the emergence stage of any technical terms for any science we mean the language whereby the pioneers of specific science have carefully selected, aiming at expressing, the main ideas which they have articulated in schematic framework qua a seed of a newborn science. Newborn sciences in early Islamic civilization are like sciences of the *Ḥadīth*, *Kalām*, Islamic jurisprudence and its principles, exegesis, *Taṣawwuf*, sciences of Arabic language, philosophy, etc. Acikgenc (1996) in the following quotation gives some insights on how the pioneers of the early intellectual Islamic sciences have formulated language strategies for the articulation of their technical language:

The early generations of scholars were naturally very simple in their ideas concerning special sciences, although they were extremely sophisticated in their knowledge of religion and related issues, primarily because of the guidance of

Revelation. But soon, as a new generation of scholars began to take over this scholarly tradition, the desire for learning increased; as a result, a group of scholars with a sophisticated scientific mentality emerged.

It is primarily through the efforts of these scientists and many others that a sophisticated technical scientific vocabulary gradually emerged towards the end of the second century of Islam. This technical vocabulary included, among others, the following: *'ilm, uṣūl, ra'y, ijtihād, qiyās, fiqh, 'aql, qalb, idrāk, wahm, tadabbur, fikr, naẓar, ḥikmah, yaqān, wahy, tafsīr, ta'wīl, 'ālam, kalām, ẓann, ḥaqq, bāṭil, ṣidq, kadhib, wujūd, 'adam, dahr, ṣamad, sarmad, azal, abad, khalq, khulq, firāsah, fiṭrah, ṭabī'ah, ikhtiyār, kasb, khayr, sharr, ḥalāl, ḥaram, wajib, mumkin, amr, imān, iradah*, and so on. (pp. 85-86)

Clearly, these scientific terminologies are part and parcel of the Islamic worldview. All these terms have basis in the Qur'ān as well. In fact, they were available in natural language and then developed into concepts with sophisticated and rich meanings that made them available for later technical scientific usage.¹

By the development stage we mean the stage within which those selected key terms have been subject to studies for critical exposition. Such studies² led the researchers to some sort of consensus in connection with the new concepts of conventional meaning of each term. However, the stability of the new meaning, the fruit of such wide consensus, led specific experts in lexicography to constitute the final stage in the light of the rich literature of the critical studies i.e. the studies on which the second stage was achieved. Thus out of such critical studies, those particular lexicographers have carefully sorted out the basic meaning of each single term and recorded it in a clear, accurate and concise manner.³ This final process of recording such technical language in a certain lexicon is the stage of stability. It simply means that the technical terms as well as their sciences have reached the status of maturity as the stage of stability of the technical terms of any science naturally comes subsequent to the stage of maturity of that science. The conditions and progression within which those three phases took place along the early eight centuries of Islamic civilization will be discussed in the following pages.

Obviously, one of the works that focused on the historicity and progression of the technical language on which Islamic sciences have been based is *al-Ta'rifāt* of Al-Jurjānī (d. 816A.H.). This was done at the climax of the development and maturation of these sciences. Clearly, then, *al-Ta'rifāt* reflected the highest level of creating a technical language within a natural language. Evidently, this work marked a decisive moment in the history of Arabic language.

There is, however, no doubt that some attempts of terminological monographs were achieved before *al-Ta'rifāt* was written. But indeed such previous attempts, as we have explained below, were either naïve or incomplete. Thus, it is significant to notice that no terminological work similar to the encyclopedic effort of *al-Jurjānī* enjoyed that status of full admiration. Perhaps the only exception, which includes few immature and less comprehensive technical terms is *mafātiḥ al-'ulum* of al-Khawārizmī' al-Kātib (1981) (d. 387A.H.). Al-Khawārizmī' in this study touched, very briefly, fifteen disciplines, which he ordered as follows: Islamic jurisprudence and its principles, theology, language, prosody, history, philosophy, logic, medicine, mathematics, geometry, astronomy, geography, musicology, trickery and chemistry. The few key terms of each discipline have been discussed randomly along two essays. The embryonic nature of this work as compared with *al-Ta'rifāt* has been shown in many aspects, such as the technical ones as well as the quantity and quality of the selected terms. For instance, no specific order has been shown for such selected terms. In addition to that, in terms of quantity it is far less than what has been achieved by the *Ta'rifāt*. One example in this regard will be useful. In the chapter of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh*, he defined in brief (in less than two pages), six key terms, which were the main principles of this science i.e. Qur'ān, *Sunnah*, *ijmā'* (consensus), *qiyās* (analogy) etc. (al-Khawārizmī', 1981, pp. 6-8). Under the chapter *fi mawāḍi'āt mutakalimī al-Islām* (conventions of Muslim theologians) he defined, in not more than one page, the following terms: *Shai'*, *ma'dum*, *mawjūd*, *qadīm*, *Muḥdath*, *azalī*, *jawhar*, *khaṭ*, *jism*, *'araḍ*, *ays*, *dhāt*, *ṭafrāh* and *raj'ah* (al-Khawārizmī', 1981, pp. 17-18). Under the chapter *fi dhikr asāmī arbāb al-arā' wa al-madhāhib min al-Muslimīn* (names of Muslim sects) he mentioned seven schools together with their subdivisions (al-Khawārizmī', 1981, pp. 18-23). After explaining the conceptual meaning of the term 'philosophy,' he indicated its divisions as a science (al-Khawārizmī', 1981, pp. 81-82). He selected and

defined only twenty terms in connection with philosophy. Nothing was mentioned in connection with the Sufi technical terms, or any discipline other than what was listed before. Therefore, in terms of quantity, the book is less than one third of *al-Ta'rifāt*. It should be remembered that the *mafātiḥ al-'ulūm* is absolutely the most significant attempt in the field of terminological studies with reference to the time during which the book appeared.

The second attempt is *al-Hudūd fī al-Uṣūl* of Ibn Furak⁴ (d. 406A.H.). Compared with the *mafātiḥ, al-ḥudūd* (Ibn Furak, 1999) one can say it is, certainly, well done in terms of quantity (contains around 200 terms), quality and arrangement, but according to its title, the book is limited to two sciences, namely *kalām* and *uṣul al-fiqh*. Ibn Furak, as a student of al-Ash'ari's students, published this book to serve the school of *Ash'ariyyah*. The editor of this book considered him the scholar of the *Ummah* and revivalist of his century (Ibn Furak, 1999, p. 17).⁵

The other exception is the brief tractate of Al-Āmidī (d. 631A.H.) entitled "*al-Mubīn fī sharḥ alfāz al-Ḥukamā' wa al-Mutakalimīn*" which is, according to the title, limited to some technical terms of philosophy and theology. Sometimes he applied some terms in the field of *fiqh* "perhaps to emphasize the interrelations between those sciences" (Jahāmi, 1986, p. 70). But due to its limited numbers of disciplines, it is far less behind the comprehensiveness of *al-Ta'rifāt*.

In the following pages we have chosen some scientific disciplines to give details in verifying claims stated in the foregoing paragraphs that dealt with the stages, within which the technical language took place.

To investigate each stage in every discipline might not be either realistic or required. Therefore, let us investigate Greek philosophy as foreign discipline rendered into Arabic by non-Arab Christian translators (probably clerics) as has been classified by Badawi (1967, pp. 61-67) and developed apparently by non-Arab Muslim philosophers.⁶ By doing so we will tackle two important phenomena, one of an indigenous science, such as *kalām* as an Islamic philosophy in the true sense (though some scholars in the field may not agree to that), and the other as an alien science which has been adapted in the Islamic civilization.

In this regard, one of the fundamental questions to be asked is the capacity of the Arab mind, reflected in his language, to translate Greek

concepts and philosophical ideas into Arabized Greek terminologies. It is important to keep in mind the differences between the two languages. In addition to that, Jahmi (1986) observed the technical capabilities of those pioneer translators in the two languages and their awareness of the embedded problems (p.13).

Should we regard the translation era of Greek philosophy into Arabic language as an emergence stage of Islamic philosophical technical language? The answer to this question is absolutely no, as long as those Greek translated terms have no roots in the speculative intellectual discourse that preceded or led to the translation stage. But we need to have a deep look into the way these translated concepts have been criticized, evaluated and finally adopted or considered as contradictory to the worldview of the Arabic language. These concepts are mainly related to Greek metaphysics. Perhaps, most of the other terminologies concerning logic, natural sciences and medicine were well received and adapted with Islamic learning as part of human wisdom.

***Kalām* as an emergence stage of Islamic philosophical language**

It is the terminologies of *kalām* that can safely be said to have inaugurated the emergence stage of the Islamic philosophical technical language, as we have already pointed out in the forthcoming paragraphs. Most historians of Islamic philosophy, particularly the westerners, tend to ignore this fact. For example the following observations were given by Kennedy-Day (2003) in her very recent thesis, *Books of Definition in Islamic philosophy*, in which she ignored *al-Ta'rifāt* of al-Jurjāni: and rightly claimed that “books of definitions were evidently indigenous”; this assertion is correct if we completely ignore *al-Ta'rifāt* and the philosophical activities behind it. According to Kennedy-Day (2003):

Scholars of Islamic philosophy have tended to view the history of Islamic philosophy in terms of Greek philosophy. This is due, on its face, to the fact that early Islamic philosophy originated from Arabic translation of Greek philosophy, which formed the starting point for a native philosophy. Since the initial philosophical writings in the Arabic language were translations, someone had to fashion lists of philosophical vocabulary to express technical philosophical language in Arabic. This also led to books of definition, short lexicons of terms used to express foreign concepts. If philosophy

was an imported science, books of definition were evidently indigenous, as they existed in many fields. (p. 9)

In another observation, Kennedy-Day (2003) stated:

When the Arabs began translating Greek texts in the third/ninth century there was not a pre-existing technical vocabulary in Arabic to express philosophical concepts. Rather scholars such as early translators and *falāsifah* had to develop a vocabulary to express philosophical concepts in Arabic. (p. 9)

Now, perhaps, it is significantly important to reflect on this question: how could philosophy be ‘imported’ to a language if it had no philosophical speculative structures similar to the original one? That could be possible if and only if the translator created a new language parallel to the existing natural language. Since the act of translation, when it reached the stage of maturation, reflected a new worldview, then one can say that the technical language does have its roots in the original language. However, we do agree with Kennedy-Day (2003) that translated terms belong to the Greek philosophical tradition as long as we confine ourselves to these terms. It should be noted that the technical language of Islamic philosophy in general, is far more developed than the Greek translated terms. Thus, the position of Kennedy-Day (2003) might be a correct interpretation of the history of philosophical activities that resulted in the definition of philosophical concepts and terminologies, if we mean by Islamic Philosophy to be the only philosophical tradition of Muslim peripatetic philosophers. It seems the restrictive approach of Western historians was behind this narrow understanding of the technical philosophical tradition in Islam. Farābi (1970) (d. 339A.H.) himself declared that “the philosophy, which is practiced in the Arabs land today, is Greek” (p. 159). In that sense it is true that most likely the same philosophical technical language clothed in a transparent Islamic garment through which the loins of linguistic alien elements, which in some cases could be said it corrupted the structure of Arabic language as Jahmi observed (1998, p. ix). It is certainly true that as stated by Jahmi (1986), “the structure of a sentence, whether in quantity or quality, is different from language to another” and the mere translation of an equivalent sentence will miss the point or at least will be far less than accurate (p. 15). In all cases it will be a misrepresentation of the philosophical activities of the Muslim if we follow the restrictive

attitude of western historians of Islamic philosophy, due to which we cannot accept the era of the translation as the “starting point for a native philosophy”- the position taken by Kennedy-Day (2003, p. 9). Obviously this is not a natural development or a progressive line of development of technical language of any philosophical activity rightly ascribable to Islam. It is rather likely to be considered as some sort of deviation from the proper and natural methodology that rules the emergence, development and establishment stages of a terminology that belongs to a new born science in specific geographical and cultural territory.⁷ Thus we need to look for another initial stage that at least stimulated Muslim minds to evoke the translation stage while desiring to improve the already existing vocabulary or seeking more philosophical solutions for internal religious problems. In other words, we need to know the new spirit which inspired Muslim scholars to raise questions that have had epistemological, ontological and axiological nature.⁸ Fakhry (2000) stated:

In fact, the first stirrings of this spirit took a distinctly political, and often tragic, form. Because of the close correlation in Islam between the spiritual realm of religion and temporal realm of politics, the earliest theological controversies between the Qadaries, or advocate of free will, and the traditionalists, or advocates of divine predestination, revolved around the question of political accountability. Did the Umayyad Caliphs have the right to carry out the most repressive policies or perpetrate the most heinous crimes with total impunity, since their actions were all decreed by God? Qadari theologians like Ma‘bad al-Juhani (d. 699) and Ghaylān al-Dimashqi (d.743) challenged those arbitrary claims and asserted the responsibility of the Caliphs, as well as their loyalist subjects, for their unjust deeds. (p. 2)

Accordingly, some major religious concepts were articulated by key terms that have been reinterpreted, as most of these terms and their vocabulary already existed in the Muslim revealed knowledge and given prime or general interpretation during the Prophetic period. Revision and reinterpretation were done to these terms to satisfy the need of this period of specific political theology on which the above quotation has been cited. The civil war and repressive measures of Umayyad regime made Muslims differ on genuine meanings of some central key terms, which prior to this did not have any disputes around

their intended meanings. Those terms like *imān*⁹ (faith), *Qadar*, (divine predestination in connection with question of human free will), *‘adl ilāhi*¹⁰ (Divine Justice), *ta’wīl* (indirect interpretation of revealed text, “hermeneutics”), *imāmah*¹¹ (imamate), *kabirah* (grave sin) etc. were the focus of a new theological debate around their precise meanings and moral implications.

In line with the most authentic available reports, we may consider Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī¹² (d. 110A.H.) and figures like Ma‘bad al-Juhānī’ (d. 83A.H.), Gaylān al-Dimashqī (d. 730A.H.), the second caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (d. 101A.H.), Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128A.H.) and Wāsil ibn ‘Aṭā’ (d. 131A.H.) as the first speculative philosophical thinkers in Islam. It is noteworthy that these men, as we would see, were either regular members in Al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī’s educational circle¹³ or his closest friends. However, all of them were influenced by Al-Baṣrī’s intellectual charisma. Al-A‘mash reflects on Al-Baṣrī’s intellectual charisma when he says, “Al-Ḥasan was much concerned with wisdom until he became its spoke person” (Ibn al-Jawzī, n.d., p. 5). It was also reported that ‘Āisha, the learned wife of the Prophet (s.a.w), while she was listening to Al-Baṣrī inquired, “who is this whose talk resembles the talks of the Prophets?” (‘Imārah, 1988, p. 15).

It seems that Ma‘bad al-Juhānī’ (d. 83A.H.) was the first who openly used theological language, as it was reported in *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* that “the first who offered theological discussion on free will was Ma‘bad al-Juhānī’” (quoted from Ibn Qutaybah, 1969, 484). Ibn Qutaybah (1969) reported:

Once Ma‘bad interrogated al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī: “O Abū Sa‘īd these rulers shed the blood of Muslims and seize their property and claim that their acts occur only according to *qadar*”. Al-Baṣrī reacted, “the enemies of God are lying.” (p. 441; Watt, 1962, p. 27)

Upon the order of the caliph ‘Abd al-Malik’s letter to al-Baṣrī (written around 700) (Cook, 1981, pp. 117-123), Al-Baṣrī replied and stated clearly his overly positive position on the notion of *Qadar*. Al-Baṣrī (1988) substantiated his stand consistently, clearly and bravely through the following qur’ānic verses:

(2:26/27/286), (3:182), (4:65/66), (5:16), (6:125), (7:29/51), (8:42), (9:18/51), (11:33/34), (16:90), (17:23/53), (19:59),

(20:50/79/85), (22:10), (26:99), (27:40/64/85), (33:67), (34:50), (38:61), (39:7), (41:40), (51:56), (56:24), (74:38), (76:3), (87:3), (92:12/13,). (p. 15)

The *Risālah*, as Watt (1962) correctly stated, “makes it clear that he believed that human beings can choose freely between good and evil” (p. 27). But it was clear also that Al-Baṣri’s position was not as radical as the early group led by Gaylān, whom he denied the foreknowledge of Allah with reference to the future incidents of human acts. Ess (1997) summarized Baṣri’s position as follows:

God creates only good; evil stems from men or from Satan. Man chooses freely between the two; but God knows from all eternity what man will choose. He only “leads him into error (*iḍlāl*) if man has first given him occasion for this through his sin. (p. 369)

Thus, he was considered as moderate *qadari* as he was trying to stand between two extremes.¹⁴ It seems that he was forced to take such step, which is merely a reaction against the inhuman and irresponsible attitude of Ummayyad political leaders. It should be noted that he was trying to take the position of a respondent when he received ‘Abd al-Malik’s letter accusing him as the first originator of *kalām*. The letter of ‘Abd al-Malik states:

...The prince of the believers had come to his knowledge a talk on the description of *qadar*, which ascribed to you. He [i.e. the prince] did not hear similar to it from any body in the past and we did not know any one of the Companions, whom we have witnessed, had uttered such a talk. (‘Imārah, 1988, p. 114)

However, Baṣri, as it seems, did not deny the accusation as an initiator of a systematic argument on the notion of *qadar*, but this position, for him, was a reaction:

We innovated *kalām* on it [*qadar*] when people innovated the denial of it [*iḥdthnā al-Kalām fihī ḥayth aḥdath al-Nas al-Nakirah lh*]. When the innovators [*muḥdithūn*] innovated *kalām* [*aḥdathū al-kalām*] on their religion I mentioned from the book of Allah what refutes their saying and innovation. (‘Imārah, 1988, p. 117)

‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, although he wrote an anti-Qadarite epistle (al-Iṣfahani, 1980, pp. 35, 346), has been classified as another moderate *qadari*¹⁵ whose involvement on this issue has been summarized as stated by Acikgenc (2014):

God knows that one will commit sin, although he is still able to refrain from that sin. Therefore, God’s knowledge has only the function of recording, not that of effecting the action of the sinner. (p. 275)

Extremists and moderate *qadarites* seem to have had gracious theological discussions, as Ibn Nabatah reported that Gaylān¹⁶ engaged with Caliph ‘Umar II in a peaceful discussion on the doctrine of *Qadar* although no one was able to convince the other. However, according to the report, the Caliph concluded his discussion with an advice to Gaylān to abandon such a dangerous doctrine. But, according to Al-Tabarī, the environment of tolerance was turned into a tragic scene when Ghaylān asked Maymūn ibn Mihrān in the presence of Caliph Hishām, “Does God will that sins should be committed?” Mihrān replied, “Are sins committed against God’s Will?” At this point Ghaylān was executed, as it was said that he was unable to reply.

Wāsil¹⁷ (d. 131A.H.), who was widely accepted as the founder of the Mu‘tazilah school, broke with his first teacher Abu Hāshim ‘Abduallah ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah on the issue of the imamate (Al-Sharastāni, 1948, p. 64; Al-Murtaḍā’, n.d., p. 11) and next with his second teacher al-Hasan al-Baṣri over the question of “great sinner” (Fakhry, 2000, p. 15). None of his works are extant today, but Ibn Khalliqān (n.d.) states that he wrote several books and pamphlets on political problems, and the most part of his scholarship was dominated by theological and philosophical issues (p. 11). A list of those works was cited by Ibn al-Nadīm (1997) such as *kitāb aṣnāf almurji’ah*, *kitāb al-tawbah*, *kitāb al-Manzilah bayin al-Manzilatayin*, *kitāb al-Fatwah* and *kitāb al-khuṭab fi al-Tawḥīd wa al-‘adl* (p. 209). As he was the originator of the middle state between faith and infidelity, Shahrastāni (1948) stated that he also denied the attributes of God as *ilm*, *qudrah*, *irādah* and *ḥayātiyah* (p. 39).

Undoubtedly, the half-century of serious and hot debates that extended up to 150 A.H. matured the new spirit, which was spearheaded by the men whom we have mentioned a short while ago, particularly

their names and their main ideas. It was the seed of technical language of a philosophy that, due to its subject matter and language, deserves to be ascribed to Islam. To us, such as movement, as a trend of thinking, was the most significant intellectual discipline in the history of Islamic civilization as it influenced, and sometimes originated, other important sciences¹⁸ that led the *ummah* to the zenith of Islamic civilization. To us, the carriers of this spirit, who planted the seed by raising such questions, were the true pioneers of this stage. Accordingly, they were the originators of native Islamic philosophical thinking, whether the stem of the seed was grown uprightly on the lines and desires of the planters or had some sort of deviations. This remains true, whether or not the official circles of ‘Islamic philosophy’, particularly the broad trend, probably represented by Kiki (2003), has recognized such planters as pioneers of early and genuine Islamic speculative philosophical language and thinking.

For those we have cited and given the title of ‘pioneers’, they have been called *mutakalimūn*. While *mutakalimūn* were given such a name, the science which they initiated was called ‘*kalām*’.¹⁹ The emergence of *kalām*, at least during this early stage, was supposed to be considered as internal natural progression, having an internal legitimacy and nativity (in terms of notion, arguments, problems and language), and above all based on pure ‘discursive Islamic thinking’.²⁰

What about the theoretical knowledge which is primarily derived from ‘discursive thinking’? The early Islamic scientific conceptual scheme used the term *kalām* to refer to this kind of knowledge. As such *kalām* meant ‘speculative knowledge’. The earliest reference in this regard can be taken from Ḥasan al-Baṣri’s (d. 728A.H.) letter in which he states that “we initiated the speculative study of *qadar*; just as people initiated the denial of it” (*aḥdathnā al-kalām fihī*) (Obermann, 1935, p. 145; Ritter, 1933, p. 68). It is also reported that once our Prophet’s wife, ‘A’ishah, heard Ḥasan al-Baṣri speaking, and asked: “who is this discoursing with the word of the veracious” (*man hadha alladhī yatakallam bi kalām al-ṣiddiqīn*) (quote4d from Al-Raḥim, 1992, p. 21). In this sense, *kalām* comes very close to the term ‘philosophy’ as it is used today; i.e., speculative thinking. It is clear why Muslims chose the word ‘*kalām*’ for this kind of knowledge, for *kalām* means ‘language’ or ‘speech’, but not in the ordinary sense. It rather refers to the kind of human language which is discursive. In this sense, it comes close

to the term 'logos' in the Greek scientific conceptual scheme. It may be translated into English as 'discourse', but in the technical sense of today's Western scientific terminology, it means precisely 'philosophy' (Acikgenc, 1996).

Coming back to summarize the main point, we are aiming to specify the exact beginning and extension of the period that we had called 'the emergence stage of philosophical technical language in early Islam'. One may refer in this context to the selective language of the selective intellectual dialogue that was based on early Muslim civil war's political theology, which raised speculative issues that required metaphysical answers. However, we may limit the emergence stage of the early philosophical technical language to this period, where the civil strife led to this spirit of discord that shaped the metaphysical orientations of each group at the time. Since the assassination of the third caliph 'Uthmān (d. 35A.H.) up to the end of Ummayyad regime 132 A.H., a serious beginning of Greek works had been translated by the efforts and coordination of 'Abdullah ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. 659A.H.), through whom Muslims received the first Arabic copies of the *Categories*, *Hermeneutica* and *Analytica priora* of Aristotle during the time of the 'Abbāsīd caliph Al-Manṣūr (754-773 A.D), as observed by Fakhry (2000, p. 7).

Absolutely, after this date, it is nearly impossible to put forward a claim for originality or Islamicity, neither for ideas nor for technical terms. The internal Islamic theological debates still continued (through works of Mu'tazilah, Ashā'irah, Maturdiah, traditionalists, Shi'ah, independent thinkers) to produce new terms, as we noticed in the *Hudud* of Ibn Furak (d. 330A.H.), most of them are hybrid, like *khair* (good), *khalā'* (vacuum), *ḥad* (definition), *ḥarakah* (movement), *shar* (evil), *ḥusn* (good), *ḥaqīqah* (truth), *qubḥ* (bad), *tawlīd* (generation), *kasb* (acquisition), *kumun* (immanence) *kawn* (generation), *dhāt ilahiyah* (divine essence), 'Arad (accident), 'ilm (knowledge) *jawhar* (essence), *jism*, *mahiyah*, (quiddity), *al-Juz' al-ladhi lā yatajaz'* (part that can not be further divided), etc.

The demarcation between *Kalām* and philosophical technical language

Since the middle third century AH/middle ninth century AD, 'while theological trends'²¹ were still dominating the intellectual arena, a new

terminological trend that was gradually attempting to segregate Greek philosophy from *kalām* was born through the contributions of the peripatetic philosophers, namely Al-Kindī (d. 256A.H.), Al-Fārābi (d. 339A.H.) and Ibn Sinā (d.428 A.H). This terminological segregation between the two fields continued for at least two centuries i.e. from the mentioned date up to the adventure of the latest *Asha'irah* led by Al-Rāzī (606 A.H) and Al-Jurjānī (816 A.H) per se. This trend united the intellectual language of its age, where no distinction was made between philosophical and theological languages. That was clearly shown in *Mahsūl* of Al-Rāzī, which served the latest rational Sunni trend before the appearance of *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* of Al-Jurjān, where the schema of philosophers was strictly applied in both books. It should be remembered that logic received more attention in the way it was translated, adapted and criticized. This intellectual activity developed a wealth of technical terms and conceptual framework which was shared between Islamic sciences and philosophy.

Kindīan style as paragon of extreme development in the stage of hybrid terms

Before definitely immigrating to Greek philosophy, Al-Kindī (d. 256A.H.) started his intellectual journey as a Mu'tazilī theologian. However due to the pure rationalism of the Mu'tazilah, the Kindīan transformation was supposed to be a normal development. Perhaps it is also due to the strong theological background of Al-Kindī, that it is right to consider him as a bridge though which *kalām* problems have been transferred into Greek philosophy. No doubt he admired the newly imported science, known as *falasafah*, which is Greek philosophy per se. Perhaps due to this this he wrote a book entitled *al-Ḥath 'Alā Ta'alum al-Falsafah* (Exhortation to Study Philosophy) and, interestingly enough, defended it against its traditional opponents using a funny trapping argument. (Fakhry, 2000, p. 22). For him, the argument goes like this, philosophy is either necessary or unnecessary science; if it is necessary then we must study it, otherwise we have to prove the opposite claim, but to do so one needs to apply philosophical approach, which simply means that one needs to philosophize in order to understand philosophy. This for Al-Kindī shows the inevitability of philosophy (Al-Kindī, 1950, p. 105).²² Again, such fondness for philosophy made him to declare that the grandfather of the southern Arabs, Qaḥṭān, was the brother of Yunān, the grandfather of the Greek (cited in Bore, n.d.).

It was said that he worked as translator in the Abbasid palace for the purpose of rendering Greek philosophy into Arabic (‘Uṣūbi‘ah, 1882, p. 207; Boer, n.d., 178). This was too difficult to be accepted, perhaps, for more than one reason. For instance, he was a native Arab in terms of ethnicity and tongue. There is no report about his travelling abroad or association with non-Arabs for education or any other purpose. Equally there is no authentic report that indicates he mastered Greek or Syriac languages, let alone that he did not mention that he was involved in such activities.²³ However he might have been employed to improve or edit translated works of non-Arab translators and that limited contact may have given him limited access to understand some foreign key terms, but not to make him a proper translator as claimed by Marwah (1997, p. 172).

On the basis of available authentic resources, Al-Kindī can safely be declared as the first author of a dictionary of terminologies in the field of philosophy, if we ignore *al-Ḥudūd* of Jābir ibn Ḥayān (d. 200A.H.) because of the doubts regarding its authorship authenticity.²⁴ Al-Kindī’s work is titled *Risālah fi ḥudūd al-Ashyā’ wa rusumihah* (Epistle on definitions and descriptions of things). The epistle was found and published for the first time by M. A. Abu Raidah (1950, pp. 165-179). Reading over Abu Raidah’s (1950) copy we would like to make the following observations:

- i. There are 109 main and sub-main key terms covered in the subject of philosophy (e.g. *falsafah*, *hayula*, *surah*, *jawhar*), metaphysics (e.g. *malā’ikiyyah*, *‘ilah ulah*), physics (e.g. *al-ruṭbah*, *al-ḥrārah*, *kimiyyah*, *maḥsus*), logic (e.g. *al-Sidq*, *al-Muḥāl*, *al-Kul*), mathematics (e.g. *al-D.arb*, *al-Jadhr*; *al-Qismah*) ethics (e.g. *al-najdah*, *al-‘iffah*, *al-mukhāda‘ah*), mystical psychology (e.g. *al-injizāb*, *garizah*, *al-Maḥabah*, *al-‘ishq*) and other related fields.
- ii. Most of the terms were given concise definitions.
- iii. Al-Kindī did not define *al-Hadd* [the definition] although most of his successors started their books of definition with it.²⁵
- iv. This observation on Kindīan philosophic style of language was mentioned by Al-A‘sam (1997) was that philosophers after Al-Kindī did not use some terms that he mentioned in *Fi Ḥudud al-Ashyā’ wa Rusumihā* such as *ḥinah*, *ayis*, *twahum*, *jurm*, *rawiyyah*, *najdah*, etc (p. 41).

- v. Although he lived during the first stage of the translation period where the meanings of terms had not yet been established, yet, Al-Kindī kept avoiding the use of many transliterated terms contrary to his successors. He used only *haulah* and *uṣṭuqus*. But in the same *risalah* he mentioned ‘*unṣur*’, which seems to have an equivalent meaning to *uṣṭuqus*. For *hayula* (prime matter) he has selected an interested Arabic equivalent that was *ṭinah* (clay). Beyond *ṭinah*, one can see that the Qur’ānic technical languages simultaneously with its metaphysical worldview on the theory of creation are still ingrained in the subconscious of Al-Kindī’s mind. This point is absolutely against Kennedy-Day’s (2003, pp. 12, 27, 59) observation that Al-Kindī’s philosophical vocabulary was consciously selected far away from the language of the Qur’ān.

One noteworthy point is that Al-Kindī deliberately chose terms to avoid religious connotations, in some instances thereby isolating philosophy from theology and Qur’anic studies.

He may also have been distancing himself from theology, by indicating a technical vocabulary for philosophy. He may have hoped to protect himself from religious controversies by expressing his ideas in non-religious language.

- vi. The last paragraph in the quotation by Kennedy-Day (2003) mentioned above is completely contradicting our observation on his definition of philosophy, which perhaps indicates the first attempt of Islamicizing philosophy in the history of Islamic thought. Thus Al-Jurjāni himself, as trying to serve this point, quoted Al-Kindī’s definition of philosophy sustained by traditional Prophetic report while completely avoiding Al-Kindī’s direct successor, namely Al-Farabi (d. 339A.H.), whose definition may possibly meet Kiki’s observation.

By way of comparison, we have stated below Al-Jurjanī’s (n.d.) followed by Al-Kindī’s and Al-Fārābī’s (d. 339A.H.) definitions of philosophy:

Philosophy is to exert effort in obtaining eternal happiness in accordance to the manner of Allah as long as the human capacity permits. As the Prophet (s.a.w) has ordered, saying

“conduct yourselves according to the manners of Allah i.e. resembling Him in knowledge and spirituality.” (p. 142)

Al-Kindī (1950) gives six definitions for philosophy:

Philosophers *al-Qudamā'* had defined philosophy by some definitions:

1. From its name derivation which is the love of wisdom because (the term *failasūf* [philosopher] is a compound from *felā* which means ‘one who loves’ and *soufā* which is ‘wisdom’).²⁶
2. They defined it with reference to its manner, as to conduct according to the manner of the Almighty Allah as much as the human capacity permits. By this, it is meant that man should possess perfect virtue.
3. It means to give much more concern to the matter of death, which is (i.e. death), to them, divided into two. The first is natural, which occurs when the soul abandons the usage of the body. The second is to kill the hedonic aptitude [of the body], and this [last meaning of death] is what they meant, because killing of sensual appetite is the way that leads to virtue.
4. The mother of the sciences [*šinā'ah al-Šinā'āt*] and the wisdom of *wisdoms* [*ḥikmah al-Ḥikam*] is another definition given to it.
5. It is ‘to know yourself,’ a principle of honorable ultimate aim and deep-rooted [meaning].
6. However, the essence of the definition of philosophy is to consider it as a science dealing with eternal and universal matters in terms of reality, quiddity and cause. (p. 172)

According to Al-Fārābī, “Definition and quiddity of philosophy is to know things as they are.” (al-Fārābī, 1960, 80). “Philosophy produces certainties while religion produces convictions, [thus] philosophy precedes religion in time.” (al-Fārābī, 1354, 41).

The theological thinking as well as its technical language completely disappears in al-Kindī’s peripatetic successors, namely Al-Fārābī (339/950) and Ibn Sinā (428/1037). We have patiently checked over their main books to see how they react when they come across *kalām* issues. In most cases this issue was avoided. Interestingly enough, we

can find a pure peripatetic philosophic language in the rare cases in which they have interacted with *kalām* terms, even though those terms are basically Qurānic vocabulary such as *ibdā'* (al-Fārābi, 1960, p. 103; al-Fārābi, n.d., p. 6; Ibn Sinā, 1963, p. 42), *iḥdāth* (Ibn Sinā, 1963, p. 43), *khalq* (Ibn Sinā, 1963, p. 43), *qidam* (Ibn Sinā, n.d., p. 117, 218), etc.

Fakhry (2000) cited al-Fārābi's definition of *kalām* as follow:

Theology is defined as the art of supporting, by recourse to rational discourse, the beliefs or actions prescribed by the lawgiver, as well as refuting contrary beliefs or actions. This, in fact, was the double function of *kālām*, as we have seen in the case of Mu'tazilah. Al-Fārābi was undoubtedly thinking of them in his formulation of the definition of *kalām*. (p. 40)

Another example is the latest peripatetic Ibn Rushd, who believes that *Kalām* had been employed to defend [religious] views which possibly are believed to be correct [i.e. whether those views belong to Islam or other religions]- '*ilm al-Kalām yuqṣad bih nuṣrah arā' qad u'tuqida fihā annahā ṣaḥīḥah* (Rushd, n.d., p. 44). Thus the peripatetic philosophers disagree with the non-peripatetic who stated clearly that *kalām* should be employed based on the axioms constituting the creed within the Islamic framework.²⁷

Al-Fārābi crystallizing the Arabic philosophical language

Al-Fārābi²⁸ does not have a book on definition as other philosophers, but his *kitāb al-Ḥuruf* (book of letters) and *al-Alfāz al-Mustakhdamah fi al-Manṭiq* (terms employed in logic) were considered as cornerstone in the process of establishing new system of philosophical Arabic vocabulary quite far from the familiar rules and structure of Arabic language. Jahmi (1986) is a productive contemporary author on terminology of classical Islamic philosophy who has discussed al-Fārābi's *kitāb al-Ḥuruf* and stated:

We have investigated most of the philosophers' books that concern with Arabic philosophic vocabulary. But we do not find a profound study, in analyzing the problems that emerged due to interaction between thought and language and between foreign terms and native ones, similar to the direct analysis of al-Fārābi's *Book of letters*. In which our philosopher treated the philosophic linguistic problem quite different from the

familiar methodology of his contemporary grammarians and thinkers. Thus through him we have reached to the point where we could easily distinguish between language of the Arabs before and after the emergence of philosophy. (p. 93)

However, *the Book of letters* could be summarized as follows²⁹:

1. Primarily the author, as faithful to Aristotelian ideas, borrowed the title of *kitāb al-Ḥuruf* from the letters *al-Ḥuruf* that formed the chapter headings of the Aristotle's metaphysics. For instance, book of *dāl* is considered as Aristotle's philosophical terms. Thus from ibn al-Nadim we know that what al-Fārābī did is an explanation for Aristotle's categories (Al-Nadim, 1997, p. 323).
2. Al-Fārābī discussed in part 1 the particles *ḥuruf*, names *asmā'* and relations *nisbah* of the categories.
3. Gradual transformation from the physical meaning of the terms (as Jawhar in public meaning) to mental or abstract meaning.
4. Philosophical meanings, as we learn from him, are capable of encompassing the individual, particulars and universal categories (Al-Fārābī, 1970, p. 139).
5. In part 2, Al-Fārābī discusses language in terms of the relationship between nations and languages, and in part 3 he discusses interrogative particles.
6. It was said the philosophical Arabic technical language had reached the stage of maturity by this book. However, our general reaction to this observation is that Al-Fārābī constitutes a difficult style of writing which makes his attempt of reforming Arabic philosophical language more sophisticated and rigorous in terms of clearness, fluency, eloquence and elegance. That was perhaps due to the abnormal socio-religious and cultural circumstances within which the progression of this language took place within a dramatic tragedy. The most important factor in this tragedy, as we indicated previously, was that the foreign philosophical terms had been translated into Arabic by non-Arab clergy translators and was probably improved and explained by non-native speakers who were far better in their command of the language and yet completely accepted the Aristotelian metaphysics with few modifications. A good example of this is the position of Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina; because of this

acceptance of Aristotelian metaphysics they failed to create parallel Islamic metaphysics based on Qur'anic terminology. Thus, *Mawsu'ah Muṣṭlahāt al-Falsafah 'Ind al-'Arab*, the most contemporary reliable publication has stated:

The formulation of [Arabic] philosophic language was achieved, to some extent, quite far from the familiar one which we have come to know in the rules and grammars of the Bedouin Arabic. Whoever investigates the language of the first translators and early philosophers would find it was lacking eloquence, fluency and elegance in terms of word structure, linguistic [sentence] composition and style of writing. Thus everyone will come to know how the [Arabic] philosophic phrase has been formulated, at the first phase, according to the structure of Greek and Syriac languages. And then it was established according to the mentality of foreigners who do not have knowledge of Arabic such as Turks, Persian and non-Arabs in general. (Jahmi, 1986, p. ix)

Unfortunately to us such heavy legacy of al-Fārābī's Aristotelian philosophy is perhaps one of the main obstacles in reforming new philosophical terms that, at least, will be understandable for those who properly know the Arabic tongue and look forward for a metaphysical vocabulary that originates from the Qur'ān (Badawi, 1967, p. 83).

Ibn Sinā's (1963) *Kitāb al-Ḥudūd*

The third and last attempt in Muslim peripatetic endeavors in constituting philosophic Arabic technical language was *Kitāb al-Ḥudūd* of Ibn Sinā (d. 428A.H.).

Here are some main points on this book:

1. It consists of 73 main and sub-main key technical terms, which could be divided into three main subjects, namely metaphysics, physics and logic.
2. Contrary to the previous efforts of Al-Kindī and Al-Fārābī on this issue, Ibn Sinā started *Kitāb al-Ḥudūd* with the 'concept of definition' in a way that historians considered him as pioneer of "the theory of definition" in history of Islamic philosophy (Al-A'sam, 1997, pp. 67-69). However, he completely followed, particularly in this book, the Aristotelian theory of definition.

Kennedy-Day (2003) extended this noteworthy point with valuable observation when she states:

Ibn Sinā's writings owe a substantial debt to the content and style of al-Kindī's *On Definition* even though al-Kindī did not discuss definition per se as will become apparent. As is typical in Islamic manuscripts, Ibn Sinā did not formally acknowledge a debt to al-Kindī's work, even when quoting him directly. Ibn Sinā was also influenced by al-Fārābī, especially in his views on what constitutes a definition. (p. 47)

The comparison between Al-Kindī's *fi ḥudūd al-Ashyā' wa rusumihā* and Ibn Sinā's *Kitāb al-Ḥudūd* will reveal to us that the latter took from the former seventeen terms ('*aql, ṭabi'ah, ibdā', Haulā, 'Unṣur, ṣurah, jawhar, ḥarakah, zamān, makān, falak, ijtimā', ḥarārah, burudah, yabusah, ruṭbah, al-Bāri*). We understand from above that he added and defined around 56 new terms.

Stage of theological reappearance in a philosophical technical language

Perhaps the theoretical mysticism by which Ibn Sinā concluded his scholarly life paved the way to such a stage. But there is no doubt that the approach, ideas and technical language applied in Al-Ghazālī's (d. 505A.H.) books were the real beginning of such a stage. It seems to us that Al-Ghazālī (1961) was aware of the critical situation of segregating *kalām* from philosophy, and thus he wrote his *Ḥudud* to serve this stage which was completed and established by the latest *Ash'ariyyah* in general and Al-Rāzī (d. 606A.H.) and Al-Jurjānī (d. 816A.H.) in particular. While the former manifested this stage in his entire scholarly works in general, and his *Maḥsūl* in particular, we found that the latter practiced such language as an idea in his *Sharḥ al-Mawaqif* and recorded it as theo-philosophical nomenclature- sustained by linguistic, juristic and traditional approach- in his *al-Ta'rifāt*. Such intellectual trend of such stage was discussed in section 2, of this translation.

Concluding Remarks

By the time Al-Jurjānī wrote *al-Ta'rifāt*, the criticism of Aristotelian metaphysics by al-Ghazālī and others was well received and contributed a great deal to a new philosophical language where *kalām* became

more philosophical in both its language and content. In addition to a meaningful translation of logical language, both Islamic metaphysical and ethical languages were developed by then. Therefore, when Al-Jurjānī wrote *al-Taʿrifāt* the monopoly of Aristotelian metaphysics and its impact on other branches of philosophical thinking has been completely substituted by a well defined Islamic technical vocabulary that made the writing of *al-Taʿrifāt* possible.

It should be noted that these three phases of development slightly overlap, but they equally provide us with a set of a useful categories for understanding the phenomenon of the development of a technical language within a natural language.

Finally, the choice of both *kalām* and *falsafah* (philosophy) from the different disciplines of sciences that have been developed in the historical Islamic civilization. This process reflects the internal and external dynamics of this complex phenomenon of the creation of a technical language within an existing natural language.

Endnotes

1. Perhaps, the most comprehensive studies regarding this issue were done by Rahman (1998). In addition to that two of his earlier works, i.e., Rahman (1994) and Rahman (1995) also deal with the issue.
2. Such studies were usually done under authoritative exegetes and were based on descriptive, etymological and analytical studies.
3. Clearness, preciseness and conciseness are the basic distinction between lexical terminological studies and the other publications. See Khuzām (1993, p. 10).
4. Imām Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan; see his full autobiography in- Ibn Ḥazm (1975, vol. 1, p. 75), Ibn Ḥazm (1975, vol. 4, p.162) and Ibn Khalkān (n.d., p. 272).
5. For good analysis of the book see the editor's introduction pp. 43-53.
6. The role of Al-Kindī as a pure Arabic philosopher cannot be omitted in this context.
7. As such we do not go against translation as secondary option for improving or increasing local technical vocabulary but we have many negative observations on the immigration of Muslim minds towards the translated Greek philosophy as was instructed and demonstrated in the history of Muslim thought.

Generally speaking, it wasn't cooked on a calm fire, and those who demonstrated it do not have the culture of Arabic language as we explained in the forthcoming pages.

8. As far as our knowledge is concerned, axiology, ontology and epistemology are the triple sides that constitute the triangle of philosophy.

9. The definition of *imān* (faith) with relation to the deeds and knowledge, or whether it increases or decreases, is different from one school to another.

10. Waṣil and Mu'tazilah in general, understood this metaphysical term according to the physical language, which expressed the term '*Adl*' (justice) according to the understanding of human rationalism within the scope of this physical world, whereas the majority of Muslim thinkers differentiated between the application and concept of the term within the two realms. See for instance how Ibn Ḥazm (1975, p. 174) deliberates on such a term. Also see Al-Shahrstānī (1948, p. 42).

11. It is beyond question and very obvious that the Kharijites, Shi'ites and Sunnis have varying views on the issue of Imamate.

12. Many of the later schools, due to Al-Ḥasan's broader approach, tried to trace their origins to his thought. See Al-Zarkashi (n.d., p. 26), Bukhārī, Watt (1962, pp. 27-28) and Watt (1998, p. 78).

13. Although Baṣri was not an Arab, Muhammad 'Imārah (1988, p. 15) describes him as "the first intellectual leader of the first intellectual school in the Arabic-Islamic history and that he and his friends were the first seeds of school that enlightened the events of this history".

14. Some reports mentioned that he retreated from gadar, see Ibn Sa'ad (n.d., p. 127). But depending on 'Abd Al-Jabār (1947, p. 83), 'Imārah quoted that if he did so, it is because he responded to the advice of his friends who requested him not to declare his views frankly, as this was against the official rules of Umayyad governors.

15. 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī calls him the first Sunnite *mutakalim*. He did so, perhaps, based on 'Umar's radical qadarism. See Cook (1981, pp. 124-136).

16. Gaylān ibn Marwān al-Dimashqī al-Qibṭī. He served the government of Umayyads holding a position of secretary at Damascus, see Ibn Al-Murtaḍā (1988, p. 25), Al-Dhahabi (1374 pp. 154, 319, 323, 392) and Al-Nadīm (1997, p. 149), attribute to him a collection of treatises of 2000 pages called Gaylaniyāt.

17. Abu al-Huṣayfah Wāṣil ibn 'Atā' al-Ghazzāl. He was born in Madinah around 80A.H. More information about him is available in Ibn Khalkān n.d., pp. 7-11) and Hassan (1886, p. 19).

18. Such as *Al-Fiqh, uṣul al-Fiqh* (Al-Ghazālī), philosophy of history (Ibn Khaldun), philosophy of logic or critique of logic (Ibn Taymiyyah), mystical philosophy (Ibn 'Arabi) *tafsīr* (Zamakhshari, Al-Rāzī), medicine and psychia-

try (Abu Bakr al-Rāzī), atomic theory of late *Ash'ariyyah*, etc.

19. Sometimes you may find some historians of Islamic philosophy mention the Greek term (λόγος) which means word or idea whenever mentioning the term *kalām*. It would be a historical mistake if any Greek influence was understood on the formation of *kalām* as an Islamic term. See the footnote written by M.A. Abu Raydah in Boer (n.d., p.19).

20. A few Muslim historians of intellectual legacy led by Ibn Khaldun believe in *'Ilm al-kalām* as an alien discipline; whereas Al-Ghazālī led the other part which believes in the originality of that science. See Dughaim (1998, p. viii).

21. i.e. according to the distinction of the west, which segregates between philosophical and theological Islamic thinking.

22. See also M. Fakhri (2000, p.23).

23. Aside from the reasons that we have cited above, Abu Raidah believe that Al-Kindī did not know Greek and so he failed to analyze the Greek compound term (*filosofia*) from which philosophy was derived. See Al-Kindī (1950, p.172).

24. Depending on the principle of falsification, 'Abd al-Amir al-A'sam affirmed that the book should be rightly ascribed to Jābir, regardless of the reasonable observations on the text and on Jābir's productivity as an author, as long as no reliable information suggests another author to have carried out such work. See Al-Muṣṭalah al-Falsafī 'ind al-'Arab, al-Muasasah al-'Arabiyyah Ildirāsāt wa al-Nashr, Beirut (1997).

25. Al-Fārābī (d. 339A.H.) does not have an independent book of definitions like the famous Muslim philosophers, but such a definition is found in his book, see Al-Fārābī (n.d., pp. 64, 101). See Ibn Sinā (1963, pp. 4, 10) and Al-Ghazālī (1961, p. 141).

26. As we maintained before, Al-Kindī' has been criticized in this derivation analysis, as he had no proper idea about Greek language. See Abu Raidah's criticism in Al-Kindī' (1950, p. 172).

27. See al-Ghazālī (n.d., p. 16), al- Jurjāni (al-Jurjāni, n.d., p. 155) and Ibn Khaldun (1978, p. 363, 392).

28. Many reports indicate that al-Fārābī's first teachers were Christian professors; see Badawī (1967, pp. 45, 62, 64) and Uṣaibi 'ah (n.d., p.135).

29. In this summary we owe Kiki (2003, p. 35), Jahāmi (1986, pp. 91-105); also see Al-Nadim (1997, p. 323).

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