

and ended up with others – a mixed bag of hotchpotch ideas. It is not scholarly at all.

While Saul lacks rigour, and tends to muddle his arguments, he provides Canadians a beginning from which they may set out on the journey of discovering Canada's complicated roots as a nation. He has identified several areas where Canadians are legitimately failing in nation building, and has given new perspectives to consider while formulating a logical framework of Canadian culture and future policy directions. This book should be on the shelf of anybody who wishes to grasp the fundamental question of Canada. The book is a positive contribution to the growing body of literature on the contribution of the aboriginal towards nation-building of Canada.

The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him. By Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins. New York: Twelve Hachette Group, 2007, pp. 368. ISBN-10: 0446505609 (Paperback).

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In this book Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins chronicle the exploits of Pakistani scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, arguably the most controversial and enigmatic man in global nuclear proliferation. Relying on eclectic sources, such as “hundreds of hours of interviews with people who had firsthand knowledge of the subject matter” (p. 369), public and confidential official documents, court papers, video and audio tapes (p. 369), the book “explores the rise of A. Q. Khan and his role as one of the principal architects of the second nuclear age” (p. xv) and “the most dangerous proliferation operation in history” (p. 331).

The book admits that the reasons why nations seek nuclear arsenal varies. Countries are sometimes “faced [with] enemies who might be deterred by the threat of nuclear retaliation: India feared China,

Pakistan feared India, and Israel is surrounded by hostile Arab countries” (p. 198). Iraq aimed to rule the Middle East “but its weapons programme drove Iran to developing a matching arsenal, North Korea feared the US, South Africa resorted to nuclear weapons, after international sanctions weighed heavily upon the apartheid enclave coupled with a morbid fear of growing Soviet influence in the neighbourhood” (p. 198).

The authors display highly opinionated views such as describing Khan as “a simple metallurgist” that “wreaked enormous damage and played a critical role in ushering in the second age of proliferation” (p. 365). They reason that Khan’s “ego and his nationalism, his skill at subterfuge, and his religious fervour all combined to push the Doomsday Clock a little closer to midnight” (p. 365). Khan was dubbed “a scientist of mediocre skills and great ambition” (p. xv) who having helped Pakistan to build the nuclear bomb, proceeded to spread the technology to “some of the most unstable regions of the world” (p. xv) even under the watchful eyes of US authorities, who ignored intelligence reports, otherwise termed “actionable intelligence” (p. 86). This executive lethargy, complacency and cover-up were constructed as the sacrifice by the US who did not want to offend Pakistan, a close ally in America’s efforts to sustain its cold war struggle against former USSR in Afghanistan and West Asia.

In an apparent contradiction of the authors’ many opprobrious epithets and fusillades heaped on Khan, he bagged a doctorate degree at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium, specialising in the analysis and development of exotic metal alloys (p. 2). Khan, who according to the authors, was “once peripatetic merchant of death” (p. 340), later secured job as a metallurgist at the Physics Dynamic Research Laboratory (known by the initials FDO), a Dutch conglomerate that partners with another firm Urenco jointly owned by Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands, to design and manufacture centrifuges.

Pakistan’s nuclear quest spanned seven US presidential administrations: John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. According to the authors, these American presidents treated Pakistan

with kid gloves and shielded the country from the prying eyes of the Congress, ostensibly in US strategic national interest. The authors argue that Khan viewed the bomb as a victory for Islam against the conspiracy and treachery by Christians and Jews. In truth, crave for an 'Islamic bomb' began after Israel developed nuclear capability by defying the US in the early 1960s.

But Islamism apart, complex factors such as extreme drudgery in Pakistan, the Indian military ascendancy, a palpable fear of takeover of Pakistan by the regional hegemonic power, India, and the latter's detonation of a nuclear bomb in May 1974, all contrived to horn the zeal of Khan to deliver a deterrence weapon for his country.

But his later stock in trade to proliferate the weapon was rationalized on a flimsy reason that Khan was "angered by accusations and criticism from the West, that he had become a nuclear jihadist devoted to payback for grievances real and imagined" (p. 206). For Khan, the nuclear bomb feat was "a strategic defiance of the West and a Muslim success story that brought admiration from hundreds of millions of coreligionists" (p. 206).

Upon the 'mediocre' scientist's advice Pakistani President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, approved two simultaneous routes for Pakistan's nuclear power: first, plutonium as fissile project based in Multan (already in the knowing of the West) and a secret uranium centrifuge enrichment programme to be supervised by Khan and located in Kahuta. The dual-pronged approach guaranteed a speedy, cheaper and hidden nuclear capability for the country in record time. Besides, all leaders of Pakistan (civilian and military) shared the national aspiration that the country should possess nuclear weapon.

Linking fears to capability, Nawar Sharif, who became Prime Minister in February 1997, was confronted with a dilemma after India tested its nuclear bomb in early 1998. President Clinton reportedly called Sharif four times urging him to exercise restraint. Special envoys were sent to Islamabad with the promise of economic assistance. After much deliberation, Pakistan took the bold step in defiance of Clinton's counsel and carrots and allegedly at the instigation of Saudi Arabia, detonated six devices on May 28, 1998 topping India's total. This epoch making event confirmed the status

of Pakistan's nuclear programme and brought the country into the elite club of nuke powers.

Contrary to the authors' systematic methodological sophistry, certain factors such as the US lassitude, President Nixon's resignation due to the Watergate scandal in 1974, US-Soviet Cold war rivalry, the general relaxed attitude by the German and Dutch authorities, and Khan's unfettered financial access guaranteed by Zia-ul-Haq's 'open cheque,' facilitated the actualisation of the nuclear project. Libya allegedly provided \$200 million in two tranches to Pakistan while Saudi Arabia gave an unspecified amount in anticipation of nuclear protection from Pakistan. Thus, many of the specialised equipment on the export prohibition list were sourced and delivered to Kahuta from the open market disguised as civilian components.

In Chapter 22, titled "Inside the Network," the reader is confronted with stark evidences of the Khan-Libyan-Iranian deals uncovered by the CIA, which claimed possession of "proof that two of the most repressive and dangerous regimes in the world – the militant clerics in Tehran and the terrorist sponsor in Tripoli – were trying to develop nuclear weapons" (p. 249). The CIA later decided to plant electronic chips in some crates in which the equipment were shipped "so they could be tracked through every location." Additionally, fabrication of some of the equipment at the national weapons laboratory in the US was sabotaged "to slow progress." Boasting about the penetration of the Khan network, a former CIA chief, George Tenet, said, "We pieced together subsidiaries, his clients, his front companies, his finances, and manufacturing plants. We were inside his residence, inside his facilities, inside his rooms" (p. 250).

But, as usual, nothing concrete was done by the US to attenuate the proliferation by apprehending Khan and smashing the syndicate. The same watch and wait game of 1975 was again played out in July 2001. Clinton stopped the sale of crucial F-16 jet fighters for which Pakistan had coughed up a whopping \$500 million on the condition that Kahuta must be inspected, but Pakistan did not budge. Meanwhile, Khan continued to globetrot around Muslim countries such as Libya and Syria in the 1990s. During a lecture at the Damascus University, he urged Syria to protect itself from the US by acquiring nuclear weapon.

Chapters 27 and 28, titled “The Drowning Man” and “Check Book Proliferation,” respectively, are the most revealing parts of the book. Therein, the authors describe the epochal interception of Libya’s nuclear weapons shipment from Pakistan en-route Malaysia to Tripoli. This network was allegedly used to send electronic regulators and power supplies from Turkey, sophisticated machine tools from Switzerland and South Korea, P-2 centrifuge prototypes from Pakistan, large quantities of high-strength aluminium and maraging steel from Malaysia and Singapore, uranium hexafluoride from China, as well as form flowing latches from Spain to the North African country.

However, Ghadaffi, in a dramatic twist, surrendered all the already warehoused nuclear equipment to the US and the IAEA officials, and announced the country’s complete withdrawal from nuclear weapons programme. He also directed the handing over of huge document design of nuclear bomb procured from Khan to the global atomic energy watchdog as part of the country’s repudiation of the nuclear weapons project. The authors remark that “the enormity of the Libyan programme, and the potential for actually building a bomb, was a dramatic demonstration of the dangers of permitting Khan to operate, even under CIA’s surveillance” (p. 330).

The open disregard of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) and the salience of nuclear bombs even after the end of the Cold War pose a great challenge to the entire world. Under the NPT, nuclear countries have obligations to stem vertical (increasing stockpiles within) and horizontal proliferations (sharing technology with others). The authors marvel that the failure by Pakistani authorities “to halt Khan’s trade with North Korea did not stop Clinton from trying to restore relations with both Islamabad and Delhi” (p. 243). Clinton even expressed his desire to remove sanctions imposed on them after the 1998 test provided they limit their nuclear and missile capabilities because the Americans have “something more important on their agenda than criticising Musharaf or Khan. Osama bin Laden could not be rooted out of his hiding place in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s help” (p. 244).

The role of the Pakistani authorities in the proliferation saga remains a problematic missing link in this book. While Khan tried to shed light on this puzzle before he was incarcerated by the

authorities, unravelling the content of his personal letter described as a “far more extensive document” (p. 342) and insinuations that the embattled scientist had given his daughter, Dina “nearly one hundred pages that constituted an autobiographical account of Khan’s proliferation activities over the years” (p. 342-3) would have been the icing on the cake. But this does not devalue this specialist work which Frantz and Collins put together. Therefore, this book is recommended to scholars of security, strategic studies and international relations.