Creative Engagement of Modern Social Science Scholarship: A Significant Component of the Islamization of Knowledge Effort

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Abstract: *Two main currents are clearly discernible in the Islamization of Knowledge literature regarding social science scholarship and its potential for use as a possible source of knowledge in the Islamization scheme. On the one hand, we have those who would rather see the social sciences marginalized, if not completely avoided, being—to them—the defective products of man-made, secularized knowledge. On the other hand, we have those who would call for a full utilization of the social sciences in the Islamization of Knowledge effort. Although the latter do understand the shortcomings of social science theories and methodologies, and are aware of the biased ontological and epistemological assumptions upon which they are built, they would still see that there is a lot to be gained utilizing this type of scholarship. The paper describes and analyzes the arguments normally presented by the proponents of these seemingly disparate views. The consequences (and the perils) of adopting any "pure" version of these positions are discussed. An attempt is made to forge a genuine middle ground among them. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the process of utilization of the social sciences, as an integral part of the Islamization of Knowledge effort.*

The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues, the possibilities and the processes involved in the utilization of "modern" social science scholarship in the general context of developing a unified methodology

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for the Islamization of the social sciences.[1] An attempt will be made here to tackle the issue of whether or not the Islamic social sciences have, in fact, any use for the theories and methodologies developed by "modern" social scientists in their (admittedly, partially misguided) endeavour to understand man and social relationships. Special emphasis will be given to the question of where and under what conditions it would be advisable (or even imperative) to consult social science material with a potential for incorporation into the body of the Islamized social sciences. In the second part of the paper, some guidelines for the process of engagement of "modern" social science scholarship are suggested.

The general framework of the discussion is formed by the first and, in my judgment, the clearest account of the meaning of the "Islamization of Knowledge" and its basic requirements. I refer to the classic paper, *Islamization of Knowledge*, submitted by the late Ismail al-Faruqi at the Islamabad Seminar on Islamization of Knowledge in 1982. The article was translated into Arabic the same year and published in *al-Muslim al-Mucāṣir*, and since then has greatly influenced the Arabic-speaking scholars, thus gaining general accept-ance among Muslim scholars all over the world. In that work al-Faruqi clearly explicated the central role played by the social sciences in modern societies, hence the need for the reform of these sciences as an integral part of the whole Islamization of Knowledge process. An attempt is made in the present work to reflect the major developments in the field since al-Faruqi. In this way, we hope to capture the essence of what constitutes the mainstream of the movement today.

But before we go further, a word on what we mean by the expression "creative engagement" may be in order. Creative engage-ment, in this context, refers to the process of approaching the social sciences in a spirit of "confident" search for the truth; of digesting and assimilating their research findings, their hypotheses and their theories; of rigorously evaluating them in the light of Islamic revealed knowledge; and, most importantly, it refers to the ability to transcend them wherever appropriate, in search of a bold and unhesitant synthesis. Such a level-headed approach would obviate any tendency towards *a priori* rejection of these sciences in *toto* or in part. It also militates against gullible attempts at indiscriminate adoption of the modern social sciences, as if they were universal and immutable in their methods (an attitude, unfortunately, still betrayed by some Muslim social scientists). Creative engagement of "modern" social sciences

cannot then be thought of as a simple-minded exercise involving a little subtraction and a little addition of subject matter here and there. Nor can it be an apologetic attempt to prove that Islam came to the same (inconclusive? of dubious validity?) modern scientific conclusions fourteen hundred years ago. It is a painstakingly serious, disinterested process of searching for the truth about man and human relationships, wherever that truth may be found, and whatever potential it has for being validated.

WHO NEEDS THE "MODERN" SOCIAL SCIENCES ?

Posing a rhetorical question such as the above may—to the uninitiated—seem absurd. For others, it may at least seem an unfitting opening to a discussion of the possibility of the utilization of the social sciences. However, it is important to deal with this question here because it is not as simple as it may appear. This is a complex, multifaceted issue, steeped in strong sentiments on both sides. First, we have those who see revelation—in its certainty—as the "only" source of anything good at all. They also note the miserable state of affairs resulting from the secular, pseudo-scientific attitudes prevalent in the social sciences. It would hardly be surprising if they come to the conclusion that social science scholarship is worthless in comparison to what they have. On the other hand, we have those who are still caught in the illusion of the (by now almost defunct) belief that "science can save us!" They are those who still revel in talking about—not carrying out—experimentation and mathematical modelling in the social sciences as if to say that *this is science* and *this is certainty*. So where do we go from here? The truth, it seems, lies somewhere in between these two extremes. Each has a valid point to make, but the problem lies in the inability of either side to see and to concede the truth in the other's argument.

We have to honestly admit, at the outset, that the modern social sciences do, in fact, leave a lot to be desired. They have historically charted for themselves a questionable one-sided, positivist-empiricist path, that apparently, has led them to a dead end. To borrow Wilber's terminology, they have confined their vision only to the realm of knowledge offered by the empirical "eye" of the senses, with some assistance from the mental "eye" of reason, while completely blinding their "eye of contemplation," of the transcendental, of religion.[2] This myopic vision, which has been dominant for a long time in the modern social sciences, has been used to justify not only condemnation of the

social sciences for these shortcomings, but also the categorical rejection of anything that belongs to these sciences altogether.

Although one may "understand" the motive behind a highly exaggerated response on the part of some, a knee-jerk reaction can hardly be justified. Such a rejectionist position seems to be grossly ill conceived and unproductive. We can identify at least three groups of considerations that need to be carefully examined and elaborated upon at some length here. These are:

1. The pragmatic/realistic considerations;
2. The processual/methodological considerations; and
3. The substantive considerations.

We will dedicate the following part of the paper to a fuller discussion of these concerns in detail before moving on to a description of the processes and the procedures for creative engagement of the social sciences.

1. The Pragmatic/Realistic Considerations

Realistically speaking, nobody can question the fact that the methods, models, and theories employed by modern social sciences are the tools of the trade for armies of present-day professionals, currently leading contemporary societies in almost all walks of lives. Those specialized in the modern social sciences prescribe for us ways to conduct our business and run our political institutions. They not only teach our young, but also presume to advise us on how to manage our family life and conduct our social relationships. In this way, they are instrumental in shaping our future. Educators the world over teach from textbooks that exhibit a bias in favour of "social scientific" ideas, which may be flawed. Students emerging from such an education system may not be sensitive to the possibility of these ideas being flawed. If the Islamization of the social sciences is ever to make possible the replacement of these ideas with Islamized ones, we cannot afford but to start from where the people are, as a prelude to helping them move forward.*

Dire pronouncements against the modern social sciences, thus, do not serve any productive function. Professionals and educators have first to be convinced that there is indeed an alternative, and that it may be a better one for that matter. Negativistic pronouncements may serve cathartic, psychological functions for those who are impatient with the

state of affairs in the social sciences, but they are self-defeating and unproductive in the long run. At the same time, for rejectionist claims to have any credibility, its proponents have first to successfully establish, as a fact, that modern social sciences are completely valueless or that there is nothing there that could be salvaged and be put to good use—a view that I will take issue with shortly.

2. The Processual/Methodological Considerations

Some non-social scientists and some well-meaning social scientists may argue that there can be no "Islamization" of the social sciences except through *exclusive* reliance on Islamic sources, the Noble Qur'ān, the Hadīth and the contributions of great Muslim scholars over the centuries. If we accept the idea of "combining the two types of reading (in the *Iqrā'* verse of the Noble Qur'ān): that is Revelation and the cosmos" as the core concept of the Islamization of Knowledge, then we can hardly confine ourselves to one single reading as a basis for Islamized knowledge. Al-Alwani has convincingly elucidated this point and has discussed the negative consequences of this one-sidedness elsewhere.[3]

Moreover, we have always to bear in mind the fact that the great Muslim thinkers' magnificent works have, unfortunately, not been developed or cumulatively expanded upon, by their successors or the heirs to their legacy. The result is a formidable gap in the conceptual development of Islamic scholarship which, in its time, was supposed to have had the same standing that, today, the modern social sciences have. Anyone involved in theory construction and research activities knows the forbidding difficulties involved in attempts to do research based on theoretical concepts characterized by a high level of abstraction. These may be very convincing and interesting in themselves, but they are of little help considering the specificity required by research. To make the leap from the very abstract notions found in the heritage of Muslim scholars of the past, in an effort to translate them into concrete concepts that lend themselves to use in real-life research today, may be prohibitive indeed. However, these difficulties may be alleviated with the introduction of judicious doses of the concepts and definitions already in existence within the modern social sciences. We do not, in many cases, have to reinvent the proverbial wheel to prove our originality. Chauvinism should certainly have no place in scientific activity—couched as it may be even in religious sentiments. We may remember, in this context, the Qur'anic

warning "...and let not hatred of a people incite you not to act equitably; act equitably, that is nearer to piety..."(5:8).

3. Substantive Considerations

Now, if we could agree that modern social sciences do have something to offer to the Islamization process, the question would be: which of the constituent parts of the social sciences are more promising, and what is the nature and extent of that promise? Like any other science, we can identify the components of the social sciences, which we will examine in order to decide whether, and the degree to which, they can be utilized within the framework of the Islamization process:

    a.   research findings, validated observations, facts;
    b.   research methods, data-collection techniques;
    c.   models, analytical tools; and
    d.   theories, theoretical frameworks.

Research findings: This should be the least controversial component of all. Or is it? After all, it could be easily argued that research findings are the incontrovertible outcomes of rigorous, painstaking, systematic research, which have withstood the test of correspondence with the objective, external world. However, as current debates in the philosophy of science have clearly shown, "scientific" observations are not made in a vacuum. They are mostly arrived at within an overarching presence of certain explicit or implicit theoretical frameworks which, in turn, derive their overall meaning from the prevailing paradigm. Observations are thus as good and as useful as the theoretical frameworks in reference to which they were made to start with. Observations, then, are inseparable from theories.

But, on the other hand, it can hardly be denied that validated observations still say something about aspects of reality, in and of themselves, irrespective of the interpretations we give (or impose upon) them. So, it seems reasonable to conclude that research findings (or validated observations) in the social sciences do have some utility for the Islamization effort. But there are certain important qualifications to this statement. First, validated observations have to be dissociated from any unworthy (from an Islamic perspective) theoretical frameworks they are attached to. Second, they should not be taken for absolutes, because they reflect social and cultural contingencies, which may not be relevant or replicable in other situations. Third, and somewhat related to the previous point, they basically describe the *status quo* in the

context of the present civilizational array. Thus, they can lay no claims to being a standard or measure that determines any "universal" normative truths outlasting their time and place—something that, in the Islamic perspective, is seen as the prerogative of revealed knowledge.

Research methods and techniques: This component also should not pose serious questions in the minds of many. After all, as long as we are talking about a number of "discrete" research designs and data-collection techniques, there should not be that much to argue about. In this respect, i.e., taken as a discrete collection of technical instruments, they can be seen as neutral and the least controversial. However, once they are seen within the general framework of the guiding epistemological principles, serious problems start to present themselves. Again, the utilization of these innocent-looking tools is very much tied to the paradigm that provides the logic of their use.

Consequently, one can expect that a paradigmatic shift (like the one that seems to be called for by the proponents of Islamization) would normally mean, among other things, the development of additional, more relevant, methods and techniques. It should also mean a re-evaluation of the relative weight given to specific techniques currently in use. A case in point is the de-emphasis on experimental designs (emphasized by the empiricist tradition) with increasing emphasis on collaborative, participative techniques, which is now advocated by the post-empiricists as the new paradigm.[4]

On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that most current research methods and data-collection techniques are potentially useful as part of the Islamization of the social science effort, however, again with some qualifications. First, there should be every expectation that "new" methods and techniques will have to be devised to cater for the research needs of areas hitherto untouched by the positivist-empiricist paradigm, for example, methods and techniques capable of dealing with the study of spiritual determinants of behaviour. Second, some current techniques may need modification to fit into the new Islamization paradigm. How to conduct a household interview, for example, may definitely be subject to different rules when conceived within the Islamic perspective. Third, the emphasis given to a particular technique in current use may also change when used within the Islamization paradigm.

Analytical tools and models: Once more, we come to another safe area for borrowing from the social sciences. Models, such as the "social

systems" model, are abstracted representations of reality used to help us gain insight into the workings of complex phenomena, ranging from personality systems to societal and global systems. Analytical tools and methodologies, such as "Social Problem Analysis," provide technically sound categories and procedures which help us grasp otherwise unfathomable problems so as to devise social policies and social programmes to help us tackle these problems. Statistical analytical tools provide another example of the sophisticated techniques available for immediate use, with hardly any need for modification. These are normally neutral tools and formal constructs to be filled in with whatever items of information are deemed theoretically appropriate by the analyst. They can be likened to good servants to any master. They could also be developed and modified as the need arises, in light of the new paradigm. Such models and analytical tools are an asset for the Islamization effort.

Theories and theoretical frameworks: Now for what is, in fact, the most problematic part of the modern social sciences as far as the Islamization of the social sciences is concerned. Theories are, in a way, a translation of the "imagination" emanating from the guiding paradigm into abstract constructs, thus reflecting and "magnifying" its shortcomings as well as its merits. So here is where we must be duly cautious; it would not even hurt to be overly sceptical. A process of systematic examination, evaluation, and sifting out should guide our search for what is useful of the so-called theories found in social science literature before accepting any for inclusion into the Islamized scheme. The social sciences are notorious for theoretical chaos on the one hand and for pretentiousness on the other. Very few scholars came closer to unveiling these and other characteristics of contemporary social sciences better than Sorokin.[5] What he said in the fifties, still holds true today. What he predicted for today has been actualized to the letter! More elaboration is needed in the discussion of the issues involved in extracting whatever is still useful in the theoretical insights of social science. Most of what appears in the next part of this paper under the heading "Processes and Procedures" is described with "theoretical" constructs in mind.

The good news is that the Islamization of the social sciences may have allies from some unexpected quarters. The social sciences should not be perceived as a monolithic entity. Neither are they closed systems of inquiry. Self-correction has always been seen as an attribute of good science. The social sciences are not an exception, although one

might not appreciate the slowness of social scientists in their attempts to live up to that ideal. It may be said that, throughout the history of the social sciences, there has hardly been lack of dissent. Dissenting voices have, with varying degrees of success, been trying to point out neglected aspects, or to steer a course away from the reigning paradigm. The dissident views of outstanding scholars can, at times, be the best allies of those who are pursuing new synthesis—such as that of the Islamization of the social sciences. In my humble judgement, the work of Pitrim Sorokin—who is, incidentally, hailed as the "world's greatest sociologist" by Zimmerman in his book by that same title[6]—can help (and may well have already done so) establish the theoretical and methodological foundations on which the Islamization of the social sciences could very comfortably be based! Anyone familiar with his work may argue that Sorokin does not have a special interest in Islam as such. However, it could be argued that his elucidation of what he calls the "integral" approach to knowledge very much approaches the ideal sought by the Islamization of Knowledge. On the basis of his vast research on "Social and Cultural Dynamics" through millennia, he comes to conclude that, among other things, that the only hope for the survival of modern civilization is in the ascendancy of the "idealistic principle" which blends "faith, reason and empiricism."[7] Sorokin describes how, in short (but magnificent) periods of history, a creative, harmonious integration of the "sensate" truths of the senses, the "rational" truths of reason, and the super-sensory, super-rational, "ideational" truths of faith has actually been achieved.[8] More recently, others have taken positions which may also prove to be very useful in this respect. Of special importance here are the works of Roger Sperry in neuroscience,[9] those of Maslow in his "Theory of Metamotivation" in the area of personality theory,[10] and that of O'Doherty's on Psychology and Religion[11]; and even more ambitious, the work of Capra[12] and that of Augros and Stanciu.[13]

Dissident and fringe views should be seen for what they, in reality, are. In most cases, they represent the genuine insights of intelligent, honest scholars who are still functioning within the prevailing cultural milieu. They mainly provide a critique from within, and so are still bound by, and committed to, the same intellectual heritage. Very few among them have succeed in breaking free from the grips of their cultural environment. Sorokin is one of the few. He is the exception. In contrast, Maslow's work (referred to above) illustrates the rule rather than the exception. He starts, in a masterful way, by identifying

and describing in very formal statements what clearly looks, in every way, like the spiritual dimension of most religious teachings. He describes in detail the way the spiritual dimension motivates human behaviour. He even uses (with due apologies and disclaimers) religious terms such as mission, vocation, and oblation in his descriptions. But that is as far as he can possibly go, given the cultural taboos of the scientific community in which he functions. Although he convincingly adds that the "spiritual life" which he broadens to include "the contemplative, religious, philosophical, or value life [are] proper subjects for scientific study and research," he goes on to say that spiritual life is "clearly rooted in the biological nature of the species. It is a higher animality," in an evolutionary sense.[14] He thus imposes on the reader his unwarranted and unsubstantiated denial of anything of a supernatural nature. He gives us mere assertions in this particular respect, without ever proving them.

The point we are trying to make here is that insights such as those of Maslow—with formal statements translated in terms amenable for research—can be fruitfully utilized with the proviso that their limitations are fully recognized. But it is the duty of Muslim social scientists, of course, to go the extra mile in search of the truth, on the basis of the "truth" of revelation.

PROCESS AND PROCEDURES

We hope that it has become clear by now that "creative engagement" of the modern social sciences holds great promise for the Islamization effort. The complexities of the situation have also been highlighted. Some of the aspects of these sciences were found to be more amenable than others for direct utilization or adaptation within an Islamic scheme. But it has to be emphasized here that such utilization can never be a hit-or-miss venture. Researchers have to approach the task equipped with a clearly defined, coherent set of procedures to ensure protection against hasty judgment, unwarranted conclusions, or flagrant omissions. We may now proceed to shed some light on the basic elements of the process of utilization and the procedures involved in it. A possibly useful framework for that process may be comprised of the following:

Mastering modern social science scholarship;

2.   Analysis of the historical development of the social sciences, and identification of their ontological and epistemological

underpinnings;

3. Taking stock of the general framework of the Islamic world view and the basic principles upon which it is based;

4. Appraisal and rigorous critical assessment of modern scholarship from an Islamic viewpoint;

5. Sorting out the clearly-in-error, the misinterpreted, the parts-missing; from what is clearly valid and usable; and

6. The final reconstruction, validation, and realignment.

1. Mastering Modern Social Science Scholarship

Mastering the relevant subject matter of the modern social sciences is a must for the Islamization of the Social Sciences. That does not necessarily mean that any attempt at the Islamization of a subject should perforce include some content from the counterpart area of the social sciences. All it means is that we can never know if there is anything relevant and usable in the modern social sciences except on the basis of first-hand knowledge of the respective area. On the other hand, working in an already crowded field of ideas puts the burden of refutation of whatever exists in the social sciences on our shoulders. Also, any claim of the superiority of an Islamic alternative has to be substantiated. The incumbents would normally be satisfied with what they have, or so they appear. Even when they recognize that there are certain deficiencies in their theoretical systems, they tend to see this as natural. They are likely to tell us that their science is still in its infancy, and that all they need is to do more research, in other words, "more of the same." To get their attention at all requires thorough knowledge of what they do have, as well as the honesty and modesty, on our part, to acknowledge and give credit to the worthy among their achievements.

But does the mastery of social science scholarship mean that every Muslim social scientist has to be an expert in all the diverse social science disciplines? With the explosion of social science theory and research, hardly anyone can aspire to achieve that feat in a life time. What is required, in reality, is a familiarity with the common concepts that cut across the social sciences in general, the historical background against which they developed, and the basic methodological issues normally encountered. This should, naturally, be coupled with detailed, in-depth knowledge of the specific field we are interested in.

2. Historical, Ontological, And Epistemological Underpinnings

A deep awareness of the ontological and epistemological foundations upon which the social sciences are built, and how are these intertwined with their historical development is a necessary precondition for any effort directed towards the Islamization of these sciences. Lacking such awareness, Muslim social scientists may be intimidated by the aura of "science" attached to the social sciences, perpetuated by many social scientists suffering from the arrogance of "scientism" syndrome. Or they may, possibly, declare their disagreement or rejection of the precepts of modern social sciences—but for the wrong reasons. There is no need for every Muslim social scientist to analyze—on his own—the historical, ontological, and epistemological underpinnings of the social sciences. This is a *fardh kifāyah*—once adequately accomplished by some, the rest are spared the toil. But what is important is that everybody consciously and adequately take stock of the fruits of that toil. This aspect of the Islamization of the social sciences can hardly be overemphasized. One can venture the opinion that without it, we would be prone to making only superficial and hollow assertions, indiscriminately accepting or rejecting this or that aspect of the social sciences, lacking substance or even conviction.

3. Identification Of the Islamic Alternative

Although this phase of the process does not seem, at the first glance, to belong to a description of how the social sciences may be utilized, on further reflection, its role should become clearer. As a matter of fact, one cannot move to the next step of evaluating modern scholarship without clearly identifying the Islamic criteria upon which to base our evaluations. Here, it is necessary for us to be equipped with a full understanding of the basic Islamic ontological and epistemological assumptions which inform the Islamic world view. These would be used as the measuring stick against which social science knowledge would be assessed. A word of explanation may be in order here. The overhasty may construe this statement as though it were a call for an unwarranted superimposition of the Islamic creed, as a substitute, upon verified or verifiable facts. It has to be emphasized here that the unjustifiable imposition of preconceptions to negate established "facts" can never be condoned. However, when it comes to hypotheses, or theoretical frameworks, by all means! The reason should be obvious enough. Theories depend to a large extent on imagination or "conjecture," as Popper and others[15] would put it, to give meaning to

partial, discrete facts. That is why evaluating them against Islamic principles can hardly be described as a superimposition on facts. On the contrary, in the realm of theory building, introducing new sources of plausible hypotheses may be seen as a desirable enrichment of a very much needed "free market" of ideas, as René Dawis [16] puts it. But then, like all theoretical propositions, it is through validation in the real world that we can judge the truth of new and old propositions. Another important point to remember is that the social sciences are not entirely about facts; they are as normative as they presume to be factual, i.e., they are also about values and preferences. Such questions of value are not "settled" by reference to so-called facts. Neither can they be settled in relation to particularistic frames of reference, for this would ultimately degenerate into bottomless relativism. Such values can only be decided upon by a superobjective, transcendental, all-knowing one— God. And that, indeed, is one basic defining characteristic of the Islamic perspective.

4. Sorting out, Contrasting with the Islamic Perspective

This is the phase for which, until this point, the stage was being set. Social science concepts, propositions and theoretical formulations can now be judged in relation to the Islamic perspective on man, society, and the universe. Whatever is found to be congruent with the Islamic perspective may be accepted. Whatever is not, should be discarded. On the basis of the above discussion, it should be clear that we do not expect incongruencies between valid observations, on the one hand, and the well-established Islamic conceptions of human behaviour and societal arrangements on the other. Neither do we expect a lot of contradictions when it comes to research methods/techniques and analytical tools. The basic problem with these would be in the way they are used in the prevailing paradigm. This brings us face to face with the worst incongruencies: those between social science theoretical frameworks and Islamic perspectives on human behaviour and social relationships. These have to be closely examined and re-examined to distinguish whatever is valid and constructive from what is not. We should not shed any tears over what does not prove to be in line with the Islamic world view in these theories. What we are throwing away, we have to remember, are not facts but conjectures.

5. The Reconstruction

This is the real challenge for those involved in the Islamization of the

social sciences. Now that we have sorted out the pearls from the
pebbles, how do we proceed to pick up the pieces and how are we
going to integrate them to create a unified system of Islamized
knowledge? This particular aspect of the process of utilizing social
science knowledge requires all the ingenuity and the creativity Muslim
social scientists can muster. One may ask: how do we reconcile the call
for unlimited creativity to bring together elements of disparate origins
with the other requisites of science such as scepticism and self-
correction? If every Muslim social scientist tries his best to bring
together valid insights from the social sciences and from Islamic
sources, then claims that he has "Islamized" his subject, does that mean
we might end up with an infinite number of supposedly Islamized
theories? What is the mechanism through which we can narrow the
differences between individual *ijtihāds*? This brings us to the issue of
validation, a question broader than the very limited scope of this paper.
It is a question of immense importance and needs a more compre-
hensive treatment of the general area of the "methodology" of the
Islamization of the social sciences.

Suffice it is to say that creativity cannot be equated with a free-for-
all, with no bases for reaching a consensus on inter-subjective
judgments on the validity of the proposed integral formulations. The
established procedure here would—in the best of the scientific traditions
of rigor and precision—consist of deriving hypotheses from the integral
theoretical frameworks reached (the ones that combine the best of
social science and Islamic insights) and testing these hypotheses in
"total" reality. Formulations that withstand the test move up on the
ladder of explanatory robustness. Ones that fail the test have to undergo
the necessary modifications to make them more tenable. This is how
the Islamization of the social sciences becomes a continuous,
progressively valid, open system rather than being—as some
fear—merely a collection of fantastic idiosyncratic claims ornamented
by misplaced jewels of Qur'anic verses and Prophetic Hadīths.

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Notes

1. An account of the different phases of the development of such a
comprehensive methodology can be found in Ibrahim A. Ragab, "Islamic
Perspectives on Theory Building in the Social Sciences," *The American*

Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 10 (1992): 1-22.

2. Ken Wilber, *Eye to Eye: The Quest for the New Paradigm* (Boston: Shambhala, 1990), 3-7.

3. Taha Jabir al-Alwani and Imad al-Din Khalil, *The Qur'ān and the Sunnah* (Herndon, Virginia: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1991), 8-11.

4. Peter Reason, & John Rowan, eds., *Human Inquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research* (New York: John Wiley, 1981).

5. Pitrim A. Sorokin, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences* (Westport: Greenwood, 1956).

6. Carl Zimmerman, *Sorokin: The World's Greatest Sociologist* (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan, 1968).

7. Michel Richard, "Introduction" in Pitrim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1985 ed.), ix, xi.

8. See, Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, also his, *The Crisis of Our Age* (Oxford: One World, 1941).

9. See Roger W. Sperry, "Psychology's Mentalist Paradigm and Religion/ Science Tension," *American Psychologist* 43 (1988)8: 607-613; also see, Roger W. Sperry, "In Defense of Mentalism and Emergent Interaction," *The Journal of Mind and Behavior* 12 (1991)2: 221-246.

10. Abraham Maslow, "A Theory of Metamotivation" in Hung-Min Chiang, ed., *The Healthy Personality* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1977).

11. E.F. O'Doherty, *Religion and Psychology* (New York: Alba House, 1978).

12. Fritjof Capra, *The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).

13. Robert M. Augros & George N. Stanciu, *The New Story of Science* (Chicago: Gateway Edition, 1984).

14. Maslow, "Metamotivation," 39-43.

15. *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 15th ed., s.v. "Positivism and Logical Empiricism."

16. René V. Dawis, "Of Old Philosophies and New Kids on the Block," *Journal, of Counselling Psychology* 31 (1984): 468.

17. For some discussion of this issue see Ragab, "Islamic Perspectives on Theory Building."