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## Transliteration Table: Vowels and Diphthongs

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Source: ROTAS Transliteration Kit: http://rotas.iium.edu.my
Understanding the Decline of Pakistan-US Alliance and the Growing Influence of China in Pakistan

Roy Anthony Rogers*
Noraiz Arshad**
Iftikhar Ali***

Abstract: This article examines Pakistan’s strategic options in order to understand its puzzling behaviour, which can be seen as a hedging strategy against the uncertain future of China-US relations in South Asia. The study sheds light on Pakistan’s perplexing conduct towards its alliances with China and the US under the theoretical framework elucidated by Kuik Cheng-Chwee (2008). On one hand, Pakistan fears becoming excessively dependent on the US for security and economic support, particularly as India and the US forge a stronger alliance to counter China. On the other hand, it worries about getting enmeshed in the growing influence of China in Pakistan, which could come at the cost of its financial, conventional military, and strategic ties to the US. The study maintains that Pakistan is striving to position itself as a crucial security partner of the US in the fight against terrorism, which is currently a fading alliance, and as a strategic ally of rising China, an idea that has received scant attention in academic scholarship.

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Key Words: China, Hedging, Influence, Pakistan, the United States


Kata kunci: China, Pengimbangan, Pengaruh, Pakistan, Amerika

Introduction

Since Pakistan gained independence, the United States (US) has been the most important actor in the regional geopolitics South Asia. During the 1950s, Pakistan was known as the “most allied ally” of the US (Sunawar & Coutto, 2015), and eventually, it became a “major non-NATO ally” during the war against terrorism after the catastrophic events of 9/11. Consequently, the US has a significant impact on Pakistan’s foreign policy, whether through cooperation or non-cooperation with the country (I. Khan, Khatattak, & Marwat, 2014). In response to President Bush’s warning that “every nation in every region had a choice, either you’re on our side, or you’re on the terrorists’ side,” Pakistan decided to join the US in its War on Terrorism (WoT) after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Bush, 2001). Islamabad had no room for maneuvering or peaceful negotiations after Washington threatened to bomb Pakistan “back into the stone age” if it did not comply (Goldenberg, 2006).

Although Pakistan’s participation in the WoT in September 2001 (Malik, Zhilong, & Ashraf, 2019) brought significant financial and military aid, which helped the country recover its military and economic
strength, it also brought forth a myriad of challenges that Pakistan has had to face. However, the obligation to remain in an alliance diminishes when the threat is minimised or removed, and states may seek better security options elsewhere when their interests change (Walt, 1997). The Pakistan-US alliance is also on the decline due to various factors, including a lack of trust and changes in the country’s geopolitical situation. China has significantly impacted on Pakistan-US relations since the 1960s (Lavoy, 2005) and Pakistan is adopting a hedging strategy to balance its relations with both China and the US amid growing geostrategic competition between the two. However, this approach presents a significant challenge to Pakistan’s broader alliance relationships with both countries.

To investigate the research question at hand, a wide range of literature was examined with a broad focus. The available sources mainly concentrated on the alliance between Pakistan and China, while neglecting Pakistan’s current relations with both China and the US amid their increasing geopolitical competition (Blank, 2015; Curtis & Scissors, 2012; Gill, 2019; Z. Hussain, 2017; Kabraji, 2012; Kardon, 2011; D. Markey, 2020a; Singh & Singh, 2019; Small, 2015; P. J. Smith, 2011). Nonetheless, only a limited amount of literature was found that covered the developing trend of relations between the US, Pakistan and China, taking into account the more recent research that highlighted the trilateral conflict and cooperation (Anwar, 2020; Arshad, Rogers, & Daut, 2021; Boni, 2021; M. Hussain & Jamali, 2019; Joshi, 2012; Z. Khan, 2022; D. Markey, 2020b; D. S. Markey, 2013; Schwemlein, 2019). This study aims to address these gaps by suggesting a perspective on hedging, conceptualising the term, and applying it to the case of Pakistan’s alignment behaviour in the China-US strategic competitions in South Asia. Specifically, it explains how Pakistan is reacting under the theoretical framework of hedging, which seeks to balance and manage two different types of relationships that fall into the category of tripartite, but not tandem, relations.

The study uses a qualitative methodology, employing thematic analysis to collect primary data through semi-structured interviews of the academicians, diplomats, and other officials from the US, China, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Singapore. By offering granular details about Pakistan’s behaviour towards these two major powers, the study presents a shift in conventional wisdom and highlights a fundamental change
occuring in the empirical understanding of the events of the last two decades in this triangular relationship.

This paper is structured into six sections. The first section serves as an introduction, while the second section provides a theoretical and conceptual overview of the hedging approach. The third section presents the key factors leading to the decline of US-Pakistan alliance, drawing from the thematic analysis findings. The fourth section explores the weakening nature of the US influence in Pakistan and sources of increasing Chinese influence in the country. The fifth section evaluates Pakistan’s hedging responses towards China and the US in the context of China’s growing influence. Finally, the sixth section summarises the study’s findings and provides a comprehensive conclusion. By employing thematic analysis and drawing from primary data collected through semi-structured interviews, this paper offers a detailed and nuanced examination of Pakistan’s hedging approach and its impact on the US-Pakistan alliance.

**Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework provides a foundation for examining Pakistan’s use of the hedging strategy in its relations with the US during the anti-terrorism campaign amid China’s expanding power since 2001. The concept of “hedging” emerged in the 1990s as a term used to characterise state behaviour that “adopts a middle ground between the two traditional strategies of balancing and bandwagoning” (Johnston & Ross, 1999; Lake, 1996). This approach is characterised by a mixture of selective engagement, limited resistance, and partial deference. Generally, it involves a state’s national security or alignment strategy towards another state, which blends cooperative and confrontational elements. However, a broader understanding of hedging refers to a policy that is deliberately ambiguous and implemented without public announcement, as overtly identifying with it could invite pushback from competing great powers. Despite its widespread use, there is no consensus on how the term “hedging” should be defined and applied in International Relations. This is primarily due to the misconception that hedging is a sign of indecisiveness or fence-sitting.

Scholars often compare hedging to balancing or bandwagoning, theories that emerged during the Cold War to describe different approaches for opposing or cooperating with a powerful threatening
state. The concept of hedging gained prominence as scholars examined the unique dynamics of international relations and recognised the insufficiency of existing theoretical approaches (Ciorciari & Haacke, 2019). According to Goh, hedging entails “a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality” (Goh, 2005). Similarly, Kuik Cheng-Chwee posits that hedging involves “a behaviour in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-stakes” (Kuik, 2021). Kuik has provided a nuanced definition of “hedging” which pertains to the “strategy of seeking insurance” with three distinct attributes: (a) a commitment to avoiding taking sides or becoming firmly aligned with a particular position; (b) an effort to implement opposing or contrasting measures to mitigate various security, political, and economic risks; and (c) a proclivity to diversify and establish a backup position.

In this context, Pakistan’s hedging strategy influences its behaviour, enabling it to circumvent the uncertainties and ramifications associated with balancing or bandwagoning. Pakistan’s foreign policy has been complicated by the emergence of China as a strategic and economic rival to the United States. To navigate this complex landscape, Pakistan has adopted a “hedging” strategy aimed at maintaining its relations with both states while also guarding against American threats and warnings associated with the war on terrorism. During the Musharraf administration (2001-2008), there was a general perception that relations between the two states were growing stronger despite Pakistan’s reluctance to join the US coalition against terrorism. Musharraf was even regarded as Bush’s “favourite dictator” (Pollock, 2006) and a personal favourite among third-world leaders (Hoagland, 2007). However, the US Af-Pak policy of Obama administration in 2009, which labelled Pakistan a safe haven for terrorists and rising mistrust caused the close friendship to deteriorate after the end of the Musharraf and Bush regimes (Clary & Siddiqui, 2018). The period between 2001 and 2009 marked Pakistan’s alignment with the US as it pursued a hedging strategy to counter US threats and coercion, while concurrently enhancing its military and economic ties with China. However, following the deteriorating US-Pakistan alliance in the fight against terrorism, coupled with China’s
rise in late 2010, Pakistan’s transition from bandwagoning to hedging strategies toward the US accelerated. This shift was predominantly driven by the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Iftikhar, 2020).

Positioned as an asymmetric power between two fierce competitors, engaged in fierce strategic competition for influence and regional hegemony, Pakistan attempts to maintain favourable relationships with both China and the US to ensure its survival through a hedging approach against an uncertain future (Kim, 2018). Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical scenario that depicts Pakistan’s strategic thinking. The following section presents the factors leading to the decline of Pakistan-US relations.

![Figure 1: Hypothetical Relations of Pakistan with China and the US](source: Authors compilation)

**Factors Leading to the Decline of Pakistan-US Alliance**

The alliance between Pakistan and the US has faced a significant decline due to several factors that have contributed to a growing rift in their interests and motives since 2009. A major contributor to this decline has been the reduction in the US economic and military aid for Pakistan during America’s involvement in the WoT between 2001 and 2009. Numerous factors have contributed to the tugged relations between Pakistan and the US. The US accused Pakistan of providing safe havens to terrorist groups, most prominently the Haqqani Network, and alleged support to the Afghan Taliban which caused an aperture in
the relationship, as the US considers Pakistan’s cooperation essential in combating terrorism. Whereas, Pakistan has never accepted the US allegations of supporting the Haqqani Network, instead, it viewed US’s increasing strategic partnership with India as a potential threat to its national security. Resultantly, it led to mistrust and suspicion in the bilateral relations. Additionally, Chinese investment through CPEC in Pakistan’s infrastructure development and increasing military cooperation drifted Pakistan away from the US sphere of influence. More importantly the factors mentioned below have contributed to the decline in the Pakistan-US alliance and lead to its hedging behaviour.

Fluctuating Alliance in the War on Terrorism

Pakistan’s military and economic development have been heavily reliant on US aid during peace and wartime since the country’s independence (Gates, 2010). Consequently, under US pressure and persuasion tactics, such as threats of sanctions as well as economic and military assistance, Pakistan joined the coalition to fight against terrorism and drive out Al-Qaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. Despite differing interests, this alliance remained the most viable option for both parties, given the immediate security threats they faced. According to the US, its involvement in everything from the fight against Soviet communism to the global war on terror was instrumental in addressing Pakistan’s economic challenges and deterring Indian aggression. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, also recognised the significance of Pakistan’s geostrategic position and emphasised the importance of a partnership with the US after independence. Jinnah reportedly stated that “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America...Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed...[on] the frontier of which the future position of the world revolves” (quoted in Haqqani, 2005). The Pakistan-US alliance has been shaped by a complex set of historical, strategic, and economic factors. Despite the differences and challenges they have faced over the years, both countries have also recognised the benefits of a mutually beneficial relationship, particularly in the face of immediate security threats.

Pakistan’s entry into the US-led alliance was more of a threat-centric response than a strategic alliance. The Bush administration’s “coalitions of the willing” doctrine to combat terrorism through temporary alliances raised concerns among many nations, including Pakistan, about the lack
of progress. Despite this, President Bush referred to it as a “mighty coalition of civilised nations” (Hirsh, 2002). Pakistan’s approach to the US alliance was ambivalent due to its alternating support for the Afghan Taliban and its alliance with the US. This led to weakened ties with the US, as Pakistan’s alleged support for anti-American organisations such as the Haqqani Network and other terrorist groups undermined its reliance on US financial and military assistance (A. Nawaz, 2021). During the war against terrorism, Pakistan failed to comply with US demands that conflicted with its national interests and instead strengthened its ties with China through bilateral trade, military cooperation, and political cooperation. This further diminished the significance of the alliance for both sides.

Misalignment of Strategic Objectives

The frequent ups and downs in the Pakistan-US alliance can be attributed to the misaligned objectives of both partners and their history of mistrust indicating a failure of becoming firmly aligned with a particular position. The US-led anti-communist alliance during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was seen in Pakistan as an economic and military support in its conflict with India. However, Pakistan has felt let down by the US on multiple occasions. Pakistan believed that the US will not allow India to confront with it. However, resulting from a contradiction, Pakistan felt betrayed in the wars of 1965 and 1971 against India, and in the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s, and the US withdrawal of its support after fulfilling its interest. Despite these betrayals during the Cold War, another betrayal probably occurred in Pakistan’s perception during its alliance on WoT when the US started decreasing its military and economic assistance. Col. David Smith also noted that the inherent contradiction in the relationship is that Pakistan always feels betrayed by the US and believes that the US has not supported it (C. r. D. Smith, 2019).

Throughout the Cold War and the post-9/11 era, Pakistan and the US engaged in a complex and often confusing reciprocal relationship, with little to no genuine mutual interests between them (Kabir, 2019). Pakistan perceived the alliance with the US would help it to counter India. Conversely, during the Cold War, the US viewed a partnership with Pakistan as a means to deter communism, and in the post-9/11 era, countering the threat of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban became the
priority. Despite these concerns, both nations did not remain steadfast in their goals after 9/11 (Munshi, 2022). Pakistan continued to focus on India, while the US was more focused on Afghanistan. As a result, an uncompromising attitude and conditions on both sides have remained significant, leading to dissatisfaction and attempts at finger-pointing.

The Absence of Veneer of an Alliance

A long-held belief in international relations is that culture and values are entrenched and cannot be easily changed. This is exemplified by Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilisations,” which emphasises the role of values in international relations. Similarly, an alliance built around a shared ideology is more likely to endure (Kim, 2007; Organski & Kugler, 1980). However, despite the potential longevity of ideological alliances, the Pakistan-US alliance lacks an ideological foundation. Adil Najam maintains that this relationship is “transactional on both sides, with neither state seeking an ideological bond. Instead, Pakistan regards the alliance as a source of economic and military aid to its fragile economy, while the US views it as an instrument of calling upon Pakistan’s services when necessary” (Najam, 2019).

Pakistan’s support for US core interests has always been contingent upon financial and military assistance from the US (Zaman, 2019). However, transactionalism is a short-term, zero-sum perspective that prioritises immediate gains over long-term strategic planning in bilateral and issue-specific transactions. As such, transactional relationships do not rely on shared values or long-standing bonds between states (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020). According to Ambassador Riaz Muhammad Khan, Pakistan has not had an alliance with the US since the late 1950s and 1960s. Although there have been periods of cooperation, these have been marked by differences and conditions, making the relationship selective and time-specific. The US only remains involved when it needs Pakistan’s support and then withdraws when it no longer requires it. Ultimately, both sides acknowledge that the relationship is not transparent enough (A. R. M. Khan, 2019).

Thus, the Pakistan-US partnership has been primarily focused on the fight against communism or terrorism and has not evolved beyond a transactional relationship to an ideological alliance. This has resulted in the relationship being labelled as an alliance without any binding legal obligations and lacking the appearance of a strategic partnership.
Instead, it has been based on mutual needs and interests, indicating that it has not been a genuine alliance or strategic partnership.

**Imperialistic Tendencies**

It is not surprising that the US has imperialist attitudes towards Pakistan concerning the underlying issues of the alliance. This is because “American imperialism produces American interests overseas” (Rijnbeek, 2016). Pakistan, being a smaller partner, is always uneasy due to the US’s imperialist character and considers it an untrustworthy long-term partner because of its non-compliance. As Machiavelli warned against allying with larger powers, the US’s stance towards Pakistan has displayed features of imperialist tendencies (James, 2022). During the WoT, the US threatened and bullied Pakistan to achieve its goals, which further reinforces this notion.

Snyder observed that alliances are never entirely stable, and believed that “the fear of being abandoned by one’s partner is always present” (Snyder, 1984). This means that since the post-9/11 period, Pakistan has feared abandonment by the United States due to their unequal relationship. National security concerns have driven Pakistan to establish economic and military ties with the US, and various leaders, such as Prime Minister Imran Khan and former President Musharraf, have demanded fair treatment and respect. In fact, Musharraf expressed his humiliation over how the US had handled Pakistan diplomatically. This admission indicates that the US has shown signs of imperialism, which have contributed to the deterioration of the Pakistan-US alliance in the fight against terrorism and the rise of China’s influence in Pakistan. Additionally, Prime Minister Imran Khan stated that he did not want a relationship where Pakistan was treated like a hired gun and had lost its dignity due to its involvement in someone else’s war (Hathaway, 2019).

**The US-China Strategic Competition in South Asia**

The US-China strategic rivalry has significant implications for South Asian dynamics. China has posed challenges for the US in various economic and military arenas in different regions (Monck, 2018). As a result, the US National Security Strategy, disclosed in December 2017, identified China as a “revisionist power” and a “strategic competitor” of the US, marking the onset of a new era of competition with China that seeks to “shape a world that is against US values and interests” (Trump,
2017). Additionally, India and the US have formed a strategic alliance to counter China’s military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, prioritising their strategic actions against it (P. Smith & Kartha, 2018). This has led smaller Indo-Pacific nations to seek alternative strategic options due to China’s geopolitical rise and counteroffensive with the US. As Julian Gewirtz notes, “China aims to increase its geopolitical influence through the Belt and Road Initiative, an international network of infrastructure projects, and to strengthen ties with other economies worldwide. China is de-Americanising rather than deglobalising” (Gewirtz, 2020).

In this emerging geopolitical scenario, Pakistan is moving closer to China and seeking to rely less on the US. According to Dr. Asfandyar Mir, this “has less to do with US policy and more to do with China’s grand strategy of integrating proximate regions to mainland China with trade and infrastructure projects. Pakistan’s struggling economy and the reluctance of the US to provide hard cash for defence and economic needs made it easier for China to make inroads. Even if US policy were more favourable towards Pakistan, China’s significant involvement would have made it challenging for Pakistan to rebuff China’s advances” (Mir, 2019).

Pakistan’s Geographic Proximity and Internal Dynamics

Pakistan’s strategic location makes it important for superpowers like the US to maintain friendly ties with it. Pakistan shares borders with Afghanistan, China, India, and Iran, which makes it a critical player in the region. Additionally, Pakistan serves as a gateway to the Arabian Peninsula, Central Asia, and the Gulf, which are vital trade hubs and sources of economic stability for neighbouring nations (S. Nawaz, 2020).

Geopolitical features and constantly changing geographic conditions play a significant role in shaping a state’s priorities and commitments (Bisley & Phillips, 2013). Therefore, Pakistan’s perception of the US is influenced by its geography and its neighbours. The United States has long been concerned about Pakistan’s proximity to destabilising Afghanistan and India, which makes the relationship between the two countries all the more important to maintain.

Pakistan-US relations have been affected by several significant issues related to the country’s internal dynamics. One of the top issues
is political violence and extremism, as Pakistan has been accused of supporting militant groups. Furthermore, Pakistan is dealing with the negative effects of Afghanistan’s ongoing war, which is taking a toll on its weak policy structure and leading to high “deadweight” costs. Since its independence, Pakistan’s military has dominated civilian governments, and there have been repeated attempts at coups. Military generals have also been known to exploit their position in the coalition for personal gain (D. Markey, 2021).

The dynamism of military dominance in Pakistan has various advantages in terms of financial, political, and security interests that have close ties to China, which is exerting growing influence in the region (Siddiqa, 2019). Despite CPEC being heavily tilted towards Beijing’s interests, the Pakistani military sees it as a way to counter US diplomatic demands and potential threats. This presents a significant opportunity for the Pakistani army to strengthen its military ties and access advanced technology in the long run. Due to the deteriorating relationship between Pakistan and the US, the military is keen on cultivating its relationship with China to counterbalance the threats posed by India and the US.

The United States’ Tilt Towards India

Pakistan has been aggressively attempting to boost its beleaguered economy and address security issues due to the power imbalance with India. The Kashmir dispute has been a source of conflict between the two nations for the past seven decades, sparking three wars in 1948, 1965, and 1999 (Cheema, 2020). Consequently, Pakistan has always viewed India as a potential threat, leading to a foreign policy that is both aligned with the US and heavily focused on India. The US de-hyphenation policy, aimed at severing historical ties with both India and Pakistan, has further decreased Pakistan’s intrinsic value in serving US interests. As a result, the relationship between Pakistan and the US has become primarily transactional, prompting Pakistan to hedge against American policies. In contrast, the US has been placing increasing emphasis on India in its policy discussions (Pant & Joshi, 2017).

This shift in emphasis towards India reflects an entirely new status for the United States when it comes to Pakistan and India.
While Washington’s relationship with Pakistan has been described as “complicated but necessary,” its relationship with India has been described as “an affair of the heart” (Qazi, 2012). As ties between India and the US strengthen, it is inevitable that relations between Pakistan and the US will continue to deteriorate. Given the significant characteristics of Pakistan’s relationship with the US during the WoT, China has an opportunity to replace American influence in Pakistan.

The Declining Nature of the US Influence in Pakistan

This section discusses the diminishing influence of the United States in Pakistan. While the terms “power,” “control,” and “dependence” are often used in conjunction with “influence,” it is important to note that influence is a distinct concept. It focuses on the process and perception of an elusive and difficult-to-measure phenomenon. Ownership and influence can lead to dependence, even if only momentarily, for those who are influenced, regardless of the duration (Tahir-Kheli, 1982). The US international standing and foreign policy are widely acknowledged to be in crisis by commentators and policymakers across the political spectrum (Dobbins, Tarini, & Wyne, 2020). Despite the fact that China and Russia’s economies and militaries are not comparable to that of the US, the unprecedented affluence and military supremacy of the US are under threat from these two military and economic giants. As Fareed Zakaria notes, “the largest trend today is the decline of American influence, not the decline of American power. The country remains economically and militarily in a league of its own. However, there is a decline in the United States’ desire and capacity to use its power to shape the world. The creator, upholder, and enforcer of the existing international system is retreating into self-centred isolation.” (Zakaria, 2017)

To demonstrate influence, there are several traits that accurately describe the assumptions of US influence in Pakistan since 1947, particularly after 9/11. Firstly, influence is a partnership between a source (the US) and a target (Pakistan) where the latter is the responding actor. Secondly, it is context and problem-specific, as the US sphere of influence is limited to the period in which it manifests itself, such as the Soviet-Afghan war or the war on terrorism since 9/11. Therefore, as the situation in Afghanistan changes, so will the US influence in the region.
Thirdly, influence is short-lived, and therefore, the unbalanced Pak-America alliance during the Obama administration from 2009 resulted in a decline in US influence over Pakistan. Fourthly, it is a complex interrelationship that rationalises the Pakistan-US asymmetrical connection. Finally, there is no interline of accomplishment costs on either side. Another defining characteristic of influence is that it encompasses a wide range of applications, from military and economic aid to arms control (Tahir-Kheli, 1982).

As a result, from the Cold War era until post-9/11, US policies towards Pakistan were heavily influenced by military and economic aid, including arms transfers, which often served its geopolitical and strategic interests in South Asia. However, over time, China has surpassed the United States in terms of outsourcing arms supplies to Pakistan. This suggests that China is exerting greater international influence on Pakistan by bolstering its ability to procure weapons.

![China–US arms supply to Pakistan (2009–2019)](image)

Source: SIPRI (SIPRI, 2020)

Figure 2: China–US arms supply to Pakistan (2009–2019)

Similar to the data presented in Figure 2, Pakistan’s growing dependence on Chinese weaponry since 2001 has weakened the structural influence of the US in Pakistan, reducing its vulnerability to Chinese assistance in developing its own domestic armament production capabilities. While Pakistan’s strategic relations with the US have strengthened since 9/11, the recent US withdrawal from Afghanistan and shifts in its interests due to the China-US geopolitical rivalry have the potential to significantly alter these ties.
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Source: SIPRI (SIPRI, 2020).

Figure 3: China-US arms transfer to Pakistan (2001–2019)

Additionally, as illustrated in Figure 3, the US was unable to reduce its economic and military aid and arms transfers to Pakistan in the initial decade of the Afghan conflict. However, starting in 2009, the US began to decrease its economic and military aid, as well as arms transfers, as part of its strategy to persuade Islamabad to align with its interests in Afghanistan and South Asia, using a carrot-and-stick approach (Staniland, 2011). In exchange for economic and military aid and weapons supply, despite differing objectives with the United States, Pakistan opted for limited American influence to accommodate its own interests.

Pakistan’s Hedging Responses Towards the US under Rising China’s Influence

Initially, to avoid US coercive actions, Pakistan adopted a limited bandwagoning strategy. However, as China’s influence grew and the US expressed concerns over China’s CPEC project under the BRI strategy, Pakistan chose a hedging strategy that rejected pure balancing and pure bandwagoning. This decision was made to prevent being drawn into superpower conflicts. Balancing is not strategically necessary for Pakistan’s asymmetrical relationship with the US since most threats posed by the US during the time of under-discussion alliance against terrorism were actual rather than prospective. Pursuing pure balancing may also backfire, as Pakistan’s alliance with the Taliban could lead to hostility from the US, turning potential threats into real ones.
Additionally, economic conflicts may pose risks to Pakistan’s trade relations with the US, which is a crucial market for Pakistani exports. Hedging, a strategy with multiple components, falls between balancing and bandwagoning, as defined by Kuik Cheng-Chwee’s parameters (see Table 1).

Table 1: Pakistan’s hedging responses towards the US under rising China’s influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Balancing Strategy (Pure Form)</th>
<th>Hedging Strategy</th>
<th>Band Wagoning (Pure Form)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect-Balancing</td>
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<td>Dominance Denial</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Economic-Pragmatism</td>
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<td>Binding-Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited-Band Wagoning</td>
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</table>

Pakistan’s strategy for maintaining a balance in its relationships with the United States and China involves a combination of pure-balancing, which entails rejecting the influence of one superpower, and pure-bandwagoning, which involves aligning with the other superpower. This approach can be visualised on a spectrum that measures the level of acceptance and rejection of power. To analyse Pakistan’s hedging strategy, we can refer to Kuik Cheng-Chwee’s study (Kuik, 2008), which identifies five elements of hedging as under:

1. **Economic-Pragmatism**: The concept of economic pragmatism refers to a state’s ability to maximise its economic interests through trade and investment links with a Great Power, regardless of any political differences. This practice designates a neutral point on the spectrum since economic interests have
no bearing on a state’s acceptance or rejection of particular powers (Kuik, 2008). Despite political differences with the US during the Cold War and after 9/11, Pakistan has consistently emphasised economic pragmatism in its dealings with both China and the US since its independence. Although the US is Pakistan’s main trading partner and receives 17% of its exports, Pakistan’s trade with China is only 8%, but it is increasing due to Chinese investments made under the CPEC projects (Keeryo, Mumtaz, & Lakhan, 2020). In each case, Pakistan’s economic considerations influenced its strategies for developing economic relationships with both China and the US.

2. **Binding–Engagement**: Kuik defined engagement as a state’s policy of establishing and maintaining contacts with a Great Power to create communication channels, increase voice opportunities, and influence its policy choices. Binding, on the other hand, involves enmeshing a power in regularised diplomatic activities to institutionalise relations. The combination of binding and engagement aims to socialise and integrate a Great Power into the established order, neutralising its revisionist tendencies (Dexian, 2013; Kuik, 2008, 2021). Pakistan’s engagement strategy with the US dates back to the Cold War era, when it acted as a mediator between China and the US to facilitate their diplomatic ties. After 9/11, Pakistan aimed to establish and maintain ties with the US to receive economic and military aid and influence its policy decisions on the war in Afghanistan. Despite the waning of the Pakistan-US alliance and shifting US interests due to geostrategic competition with China, the US has maintained a unified stance toward Pakistan in organisations such as the FATF, IMF, and World Bank. As a symmetrical power, Pakistan attempted to enlist China’s help to avoid US pressure tactics in key situations because Chinese lending terms have the advantage of being appealing for two reasons: firstly, they do not place the same level of importance on the financial or political stability of the borrowing country as demanded by organisations like the IMF, ADB, or World Bank; secondly, borrowing from China often includes additional benefits such as access to technology and skilled labour from China, which are not typically offered by other international
lending institutions (Raju, 2021). Similarly, after 9/11, the US aligned its interests with those of Pakistan in the alliance against terrorism, resulting in coordinated efforts to provide economic and military support and ensnare Pakistan in IMF bailout packages. However, when the US interests diverged, Pakistan and the US pursued separate paths, such as during the Afghan peace process and the war on terror.

3. **Limited–Bandwagoning**: A state may pursue a bandwagoning strategy and align with a major power to advance its long-term interests or avoid a great power that poses a direct threat to its pre-eminence (Koga, 2018; Kuik, 2008). According to Stephen M. Walt, alliances are formed in response to threats, and states may choose between balancing or bandwagoning when faced with significant external threats (Walt, 1987). Pakistan initially adopted full-scale alignment with the US during their alliance in the war on terror to maximise its interests and minimise threats. Pakistan maintained its alliance with China while adopting pure bandwagoning (PB) with the US, resulting in a zero-sum scenario for the US. Later, Pakistan shifted towards a partial alignment for policy coordination with the US on specific issues. Pakistan became increasingly reliant on China for support and adopted limited bandwagoning (LB) with the US while still maintaining its alliance with China. Comparing Pakistan’s PB and LB with China and the US respectively, it can be seen that Pakistan is tilting towards China for its core national interests, as evidenced by its full embracement of PB with the China “to share the benefits” (Wu, 2016).

4. **Dominance–Denial**: The politics of dominance denial is a political approach aimed at preventing smaller states from undue interference and influence by dominant powers (Bloomfield, 2016; Kuik, 2008). In this policy, smaller states like Pakistan engage with other major powers in regional affairs to boost their diplomatic influence and resilience, as exemplified by Pakistan’s efforts to involve China and Russia in the Afghan conflict (Kuik, 2008). Unlike pure balancing, which focuses on balancing military power, dominance denial is not achievable by Pakistan as a weaker power against the US. To counter US threats, Pakistan sought to balance political power with China’s
assistance, while still maintaining the dominance denial policy. Throughout the Afghan conflict, Pakistan fully embraced a stance of denying US dominance, which was evident in its efforts to maintain a balanced relationship with the US while making the US more reliant on Pakistan in the war. The dominance denial policy has been in place since the beginning of the Pakistan-US alliance but became more prominent during the Obama administration in 2009 when Pakistan was labelled as a safe haven for terrorists (Aslam, 2012).

5. **Indirect–Balancing**: Indirect balancing differs from “soft balancing” in that it relies on military actions rather than informal alliances to address uncertainties, as opposed to balancing power. In the case of Pakistan, the strategy of indirect balancing is aimed at reducing apprehensions caused by US pressure tactics and Indian threats. Pakistan is partially practicing indirect balancing by strengthening its military capabilities through defence cooperation with China and reducing its dependence on US defence technology. The distinction between indirect and direct balancing may reflect Islamabad’s perceived threat from Washington. If the US is seen as a clear threat, Pakistan may turn to China and Russia as growing supporters in its regional affairs. However, if there are no signs of US threats, Pakistan will likely continue its indirect balancing stance towards the US in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan, as a symmetrical power, is attempting to balance potential risks from the geostrategic competition between China and the United States, as well as from the ambiguous regional order, by implementing a two-pronged strategy. Specifically, Pakistan seeks to safeguard its long-term interests by responding to US pressure tactics and maximising returns on China’s CPEC investments and US military and economic aid.

**Conclusion**

The article concludes with the aforesaid reasons behind the deterioration of Pakistan-US relations. Despite pressure for strategic independence, Pakistan carried out costly and unpopular US policies to build a trustworthy image in Washington. However, the increasing unreliability of the US forced Pakistan to shift its strategic partnerships towards
closer collaboration with China, though China’s broad strategy and rivalry with the US also provided Pakistan with more opportunities to address US concerns.

While the breakdown of the Pakistan-US alliance cannot be primarily attributed to China, it is clear that the US prioritised its own interests and favoured India over Pakistan in light of China’s growing influence in the region. In response, Pakistan relied heavily on economic and military aid from China, which diminished American influence in Pakistan. Throughout, Pakistan employed a range of hedging strategies, including balancing, bandwagoning, partial cooperation, negotiating, and cultivating alternative allies through China. This has led to a significant shift in Pakistan’s security policy and relationship with the US, with Pakistani security interests taking precedence over US strategic priorities.

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