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Propagating an Alternative Solution for Indonesia`s Problems: A Framing Analysis on Hizb ut-Tahrir`s Narratives

Hasbi Aswar*

Abstract: As part of a global movement, Hizb ut-Tahrir has a single mission that is to call Muslim people to implement Islam and *sharī'ah* as the state ideology and law. On the other hand, Muslims should leave the secular ideology adopted in the Muslim world today. This article will discuss HT`s perspective on Islam and secular thought like democracy, nationalism, and liberalism in the Indonesian context. This issue will be explained through framing theory in social movement study that will help understand how a movement perceives the root of the social problem, offers the solution, and invites people to join the movement. This article argues that Hizb ut-Tahrir has used the framing approach to disseminate its ideological and political mission in Indonesia.

Keywords: Framing Theory, Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, Ideology, Secularism, Social Movement.

Abstrak: Sebagai sebahagian daripada gerakan global, Hizbut Tahrir mempunyai satu misi iaitu menyeru umat Islam untuk melaksanakan Islam dan *syari'ah* sebagai ideologi dan undang-undang negara. Sebaliknya, umat Islam seharusnya meninggalkan fahaman sekular yang diterima pakai dalam dunia Islam hari ini. Artikel ini akan membincangkan perspektif HT tentang Islam dan pemikiran sekular seperti demokrasi, nasionalisme, dan liberalisme dalam konteks Indonesia. Isu ini akan dijelaskan melalui teori pembingkaian dalam

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* Lecturer at International Relations Department, Faculty of Psychology and Social Sciences, Islamic University of Indonesia, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Email: hasbiaswar@uii.ac.id

kajian gerakan sosial yang akan membantu memahami bagaimana pergerakan melihat punca masalah sosial, menawarkan penyelesaian, dan menjemput orang ramai untuk menyertai pergerakan itu. Artikel ini berhujah bahawa Hizbut Tahrir telah menggunakan pendekatan pembingkaian untuk menyebarkan misi ideologi dan politiknya di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci: Teori Pembingkaian, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Ideologi, Sekularisme, Gerakan Sosial.

Introduction

Hizb ut-Tahrir in Indonesia (HTI) could be considered as one of the most successful branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir globally. More specifically, in the Muslim world, HT in Indonesia enjoys political freedom as a legal and registered Islamic group compared to other Muslim states that treat this group as dangerous. From 2004 to 2017, HTI has had legal status in Indonesia, making this group free to contact many levels of society in Indonesia, including politicians, academics or intellectuals, businesspersons, students, and others. It also makes it easier to mobilise people to attend its national and international events.

In 2017, however, the Indonesian government revoked the legal status of HTI by issuing a special law. This paper will specifically discuss the HTI`s way of constructing Indonesian political problems from its point of view. This case will be analysed through the framing theory, which will help explain how a social movement creates its narratives on problem solutions and invites people to participate in a movement`s activities.

This descriptive article analyses HTI`s dynamic in Indonesia, focusing on its narrative on Indonesian problems. The primary sources used for this article are collected from HTI`s books, websites, magazines, and seminar papers. On the one hand, secondary sources are gathered from books and articles related to Hizb ut-Tahrir. All the sources are analysed qualitatively to find the main narratives of HTI in Indonesia using the framing theory`s elements, including diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational elements.

Framing Theory

Before mobilising people to participate in collective action, one important aspect of social movement is to socialise a problem to become

a collective identity. Because collective action can only be achieved once a collective identity has been established, collective identity can only be achieved through the socialisation of meaning through the framing process.

Frames have been defined as "schemata of interpretation," a group of ideas, or a collective representation that allows individuals to discover, perceive, identify, and label events in their living space and the world at large. The frame will guide everyone in understanding the world and dealing with whatever events occur in this world. By frame analysis, one can understand the construction of ideas or meanings behind the emergence of certain social movements (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). The frame also guides people's interpretation of what needs to change; why, and how to do it.

Benford (2000) argues that the individuals construct the frame through the process of negotiating a shared understanding of some problematic conditions or situations they define as requiring change, making attributions as to who or what is to blame, articulating an alternative set of arrangements, and urging others to act together to effect change. Furthermore, frames are developed to achieve specific goals: recruiting new members, mobilising members, acquiring resources, and so on (Benford & Snow, 2000).

The framing process is divided into three stages: addressing a particular event as a social problem (diagnostic), a strategy that will probably solve this (prognostic), and motivation to act on this knowledge (motivational) (Della Porta & Diani, 2006).

The diagnostic dimension of framing analysis refers to the efforts of a particular group or individual to interpret a phenomenon to become a social problem. Interpretations of the problem may differ depending on who interprets it, which creates a contestation of interpretations among actors, including social movements, media, and governments. Using the "frame of injustice" for a social movement is considered the most common to create collective action. The "framework of injustice" means that actors produce interpretations that acts of political authority are deemed unfair. Therefore, in the diagnostic element, while social movements look for social problems, they also identify the source of causality, blame, and agent guilt or so-called adversarial framing or boundary framing (Benford & Snow, 2000). This process, for example,

can be found in the arguments of the anti-globalisation movement, which blames the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank for the greatest responsibility of all victims of neoliberalism.

Prognostic means to build "new solutions, new social patterns, new ways of regulating relationships between groups, a new articulation of consensus and exercise of power." Using prognostics for social movements is quite difficult because it occurs in the multi-organisational field. Framing social movements will face counter-frames from opponents, especially if the opponent has a more rational argument than a social movement. On the other hand, opposing framing activities can affect the framing of a movement by turning movement activists on the defensive (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616) 617. For example, it was shown in the 1990s when hundreds of Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia demanded political reforms but were later branded extremists by the government. Framing by the government then became legitimacy to suppress the opposition movement.

The motivational dimension means that social constructs and interpretations are necessary to convince and legitimise an action to motivate people to engage in collective action. According to Snow and Benford (2000), this dimension provides a "call to arm" or a reason to engage in collective action, including constructing appropriate vocabularies of motive. Therefore, the most important thing in this framing task is how to convince other people or movements to come together in collective action. In this framing task, the so-called agency component is necessary to ensure engagement and maintain participation in collective action. The agency component requires some vocabulary commonly used by social movements: the vocabulary of severity, urgency, efficacy, and propriety (Benford & Snow, 2000).

It is necessary to emphasise that ideology and framing are not the same, although, at the same time, ideology can also be a source of framing. Framing is considered more flexible than ideology. Framing is a product of a culture in which individuals construct their interpretation of social objects and give them meaning. On the one hand, ideology is a unified set of principles and assumptions that provide the key to understanding the world (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). For example, the impact of neoliberalism or globalisation can be felt differently by many

people and movements. Some respond from an ideological lens, such as socialist or Marxist ideology, while others use a different lens.

In this study, HT`s Islamic ideology produces HT's frame against the idea of democracy, liberalism, and nationalism. In Muslim communities, these three ideas are responded to differently depending on how Muslims interpret Islamic texts, as there are conflicting interpretations of this—as a result, determining Muslim behaviour towards these for either welcoming or rejecting it. The framing theory will be used to understand Hizb ut-Tahrir's interpretation of these ideas and how HT makes them a social problem, which is then socialised to others or movements for HT's ultimate purpose.

Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia

From the beginning, Hizb ut-Tahrir (liberation party) has declared itself a political party, and politics has become its job and identity. Elsewhere around the world, the group has consistently shown itself to be a political party working solely on politics. As a political party, Hizb ut-Tahrir has adopted Islam as its ideology and is working to spread Islamic *sharīʿah* ideas among Muslims so that all Islamic societies can understand Islam and, together with Hizb ut-Tahrir, implement Islam as the country's constitution. The group believes that the only accepted state in Islam is the *khilāfah* system. So, for HT, the only job or political activity to pursue today is to rebuild the *khilāfah* state. This message is spread by Hizb ut-Tahrir in more than 40 states worldwide.

The group was first introduced in Jerusalem by Shaykh Taqiuddin an-Nabahani, an Islamic jurist and scholar, in 1948. In 1953, Hizb ut-Tahrir was declared a legitimate political party but was later banned by the government in the same year. From the 1950s to the 1970s, under An-Nabhani's leadership, the group's work still existed around the Middle East. Under the second leader, Sheikh Abdel Qadeem Zalloom, from 1977-2003, the group has spread to many other countries outside the Middle East, such as Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, Poland, Ukraine, Russia, Australia, Canada, and the United States (Osman, 2018).

From 2003 until now, Hizb ut-Tahrir is led by Sheikh Ata bin Khalil Abu Rashta. Under his leadership, the group expanded globally and

actively worked on the internet as the group's political propaganda medium. The group has its official website in its global centre and national branches. It also has its own YouTube channel, Facebook, Twitter, and other social media. HT`s members are also often invited to discuss contemporary issues in media such as Aljazeera, CNN, and the Australia Times.

As an active work to spread this ideology, Zeyno Baran noted that HT has succeeded in raising global awareness of Islam as the only link between Muslims and the need for a caliphate:

> "HT'S greatest achievement to date is that it has shifted the terms of debate within the Muslim world. Until a few years ago, most Islamist groups considered the notion of establishing a new caliphate utopian goal. Now, an increasing number of people consider it a serious objective. And after decades of stressing the existence and unity of a global Islamic community (umma), HT can take pride in the growing feeling among Muslims that their primary identity stems from, and their primary loyalty is owed to, their religion rather than their race, ethnicity, or nationality" (Baran, 2005).

As a political party, the group seeks to turn the current political conditions dominated by secular ideologies into Islamic ideologies or systems. A secular system based on the separation between religion and politics is now applied in most countries of the world. Characteristics of secular systems are laws made by humans, and the purpose of the political system is primarily for material needs. In comparison, the Islamic system is based on the sovereignty of *sharīʿah*, where only the Quran and Hadith (prophetic tradition) are the primary sources of law in a country. Also, the state's goal is to implement *sharīʿah*, protect and unite the *Ummah*, and carry out *daʿwah* and *Jihād* abroad. As a result, Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects all ideas derived from secular ideologies, including democracy, human rights, liberalism, and nationalism, because they are incompatible with Islamic ideas (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 1953).

To fight for the establishment of an Islamic system or *khilāfah* state, Hizb ut-Tahrir claimed to follow the steps of Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), which are based on intellectual and political activities. HT believes that the Prophet not only taught how to establish the state but also how to fight for it, which HT says is through three

steps: First, the process of cultivars and organising in which Islamic groups or parties begin to gather and educate people with Islamic ideas and create groups or parties. Second, engage with people to develop a shared awareness of the need for an Islamic system and reduce people's confidence in the current political system and regime. In this step also, HT tries to persuade the military force to support its revolutionary ideas once it was ready to do so. Third, establish a caliphate that implements all *sharīʿah* laws (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 1999).

Framing Hizb ut-Tahrir on Indonesia's Problems

In Indonesia, the group was first introduced in the 1980s after Abdullah bin Nuh invited Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi to come to Indonesia. Abdullah bin Nuh was a prominent Islamic scholar living in Bogor, West Java, who founded an Islamic Boarding School *(pesantren)* called al-Ghazali. Bin Nuh met members of HT, mainly from the Middle East, when he visited his son studying in Australia. Later, Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi came, stayed, and carried out his *daʿwah* activities facilitated by Abdullah bin Nuh in Indonesia (Fealy, 2007). From the 1980s to the 1990s, HT's work under Al-Baghdadi's leadership was underground, where HT was not used as a symbol of the movement until political reforms in 1998.

HT declared its existence officially after two years of the reformation. The declaration was proclaimed at the First International Conference in August 2000, attended by about 2000-3000 people at *Senayan* Tennis Stadium, Jakarta, and attended by international speakers such as Ismail al-Wahwah (HT Australia) and Dr. Sharifuddin Md Zain (HT Malaysia). Many HT members from other countries, Australia, Malaysia, Jordan, and the United Kingdom, attended the event. The conference declared that HT would step from the first stage (culturing and organising) to the second stage (interacting with *the ummah)* of the three phases to achieve its political goals.

From 2000 to 2017, Hizb ut-Tahrir has hosted hundreds of events, demonstrations, talk shows, seminars, conferences, and published media and books. This is part of HT's strategy in the second stage of *daʿwah* activities to win the hearts and minds of Muslims in Indonesia to support the idea of *sharīʿah* and *khilāfah*. But in 2017, the Indonesian government decided to revoke the group's status as a legal Islamic group in Indonesia because the HT issue is contrary to Indonesian ideology,

causes polarity in society, and threatens Indonesian unity (Aswar et al., 2020).

Working for the *khilāfah*, HT claims, is to follow the methods adopted from the struggle of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH to destroy the existing non-Islamic political system, which is not taking part in elections, coups, including military action. The idea of change and the way to think of problems and solutions are adopted and followed by HT members everywhere in every branch. The only difference is the content or issues they respond to depends on each region in which HT exists (Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir In Britain, 2000).

Diagnostic Dimensions

Sharīʿah and *khilāfah*, as opposed to secularism, are utilised by HTI to persuade Indonesian Muslims through contextualising these narratives in the Indonesian context. First, HTI argues that all problems in Indonesia are due to a secular system that ignores *sharīʿah* law. This secular system then potentially invites foreign countries to infiltrate Indonesian politics (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2011).

Secularism manifests itself in various forms, such as democracy, capitalism, and nationalism, and these brought disasters to Indonesia. In democracy, for example, the authority of the people (representatives) to pass laws can then be used as a tool of the colonial state to infiltrate such representatives in the legislature to produce regulations that serve colonial interests. HTI stated that in Indonesia, there are about 76 products formulated by, and served, foreign countries; such as mineral and gas, electricity, foreign investment, natural resources, bank and finance, agriculture, and water (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, 2009a).

On the other hand, according to HT, political corruption is also inevitable in democracies as the system was created with high cost, for example, in choosing political leaders in the executive or legislature. In 2014, the Indonesian government spent about 14.4 trillion rupiahs (more than one billion USD) for the general election. Legislative candidates spent an average of 1.18 billion rupiahs (approximately 82,600 USD). As for presidential candidates, in 2014, each spent about 61 billion rupiahs. According to HTI, this costly democratic process inevitably invites capitalists to engage in this process that they will demand a return once their candidate wins. In the end, elected leaders will serve only the

interests of their capitalist counterparts manifesting in regulation and other state projects in economic activity. It also resulted in the growth of corruption and nepotism in Indonesian politics (Zaid, 2016).

HTI argued that the problems that arise in democracies stem from the democratic system itself. HTI calls it a structural and systemic problem. Therefore, anyone running for office and winning elections in a democracy will not bring significant change to Indonesia. Elected leaders simply continue the existing systems, laws, and regulations without having the authority to change them fundamentally. Even their authority is limited by other state systems such as the legislature and the judiciary. The participation of Islamic parties in democracy is also uneventful because even though democracy accommodates each party with different ideologies to compete, it does not allow any change to the system and ideology of the secular state. Hence, Muslims' role in politics are limited only to the ritual aspects such as marriage, banking, and *ḥajj* or pilgrimage (Affandi, 2014).

Another issue of democracy, HTI stated, is the dependence of Indonesia to liberal international organisations: WTO, IMF, World Bank, APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and AEC (ASEAN Economic Community). These institutions can be a restraint on Indonesia in formulating economic policies for the benefit of the people, rather they even weaken Indonesia's political capacity to develop its politics, economy, and military (Ishaq, 2014).

This argument becomes the reason of HTI's abstinence in Indonesian general elections. According to HTI, basically voting in elections is allowed in Islam *(mubāḥ),* in Islamic jurisprudence, referred to as *Wakālah* (representation). However, it can turn out to be *ḥarām* (unlawful) or *ḥalāl* (legitimate) depending on the purpose of the representation. If a person represents another person in a legitimate activity, it becomes legitimate; on the contrary, if that representation is for unlawful activity, it becomes unlawful or *ḥarām*. In terms of engaging in elections aimed at electing representatives or leaders to make laws and implement secular laws and systems, according to HTI, it is unlawful and sinful in Islam. It is against the principle of *Sharīʿah*: *"Wasīlah (medium) that can definitely bring to ḥarām (forbidden) activities are also ḥarām (forbidden)* (Al-Islam, 2009).*"*

However, HTI allows someone who wants to get involved as a member of the legislature but on certain conditions: should be from

Islamic parties and running without collision with secular parties, no bribery, fraud, and fake; campaign with ideas and programmes inspired by Islam; parliament as the place to do *daʿwah* in implementing *sharīʿah*, resisting colonial domination, and controlling the government; and must be consistent (Al-Islam, 2009).

On the other hand, HTI believes that although there will be benefits from participating in election, no significant changes have been achieved through it. The regime is changing, but the system is still the same. The secular democratic system itself is what makes Indonesia worse. So, according to HTI, participating in elections is not just a way to bring about change for Indonesia. Hence, the best way to change is to follow the method of change exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) which is the method of the social change a la Islam (Interview with Ismail Yusanto, 2014).

Another problem that goes hand in hand with democracy is neoliberalism or capitalism. This idea minimises the state's role in organising the economic aspects of a country. For HTI, this idea is a tool to weaken the country and turn it into a corporate state where the leading players who get more benefits are businesses and the wealthy people. Neoliberalism deprived Indonesia of control over most of its vast natural resources and state public ownership to private companies/ individuals: in the oil and gas industries, coal, gold and copper, agriculture, telecommunications, consumer goods, banks, insurance, capital markets, and media. As a result, Indonesia lost its primary resources to provide accessible services to its people. It ended with economic, social, cultural, political, and military crises ("Indonesia Dicengkeram Neoliberalisme dan Neoimperialism," 2015).

Nationalism, for HTI, is another issue that contributes to the problems of Indonesia and the Muslim World. Nationalism damaged Muslims from one country to more than fifty nation-states. Indeed, this idea weakens the *Ummah* and is vulnerable to infiltration by foreign powers. Nationalism contrasts with Islam because of its basic idea that people are bound by nations, while in Islam, people are bound by Islamic creeds. In addition, in Islam, the concept of a state must be one state for all Muslims, not separated. With the Islamic State, and the Caliphate, Muslims will have a strong state that can take on the current capitalist countries led by the United States and its allies (Al-Jawi, 2014).

According to Ismail Yusanto (2014), in Indonesia's history, the heroes who fought for Indonesian independence against Dutch colonialism were motivated only by the spirit of Islam, not by nationalism. Nationalism is an emotional construct that makes it very temporary and weak. Many ruling regimes claim to be nationalist in Indonesian politics as President Megawati (2002-2004) and Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014); in reality, they only served neoliberal economies that prioritise foreign over national interests. Ismail Yusanto, (2014), HTI spokesperson, argued that the way Islam loves Indonesia should be on an Islamic basis that can save Indonesia from capitalism, liberalism, and secularism (Interview with M. Ismail Yusanto, 2014).

Prognostic Dimension

The next step in the framing process undertaken by a movement is an effort to build "new solutions, new social patterns, or new ways of regulating relationships between groups, consensus and the exercise of power in a society or state" (Benford & Snow, 2000). This is to respond to the root of the problem that has been spelled out through the diagnostic dimensions.

Through diagnostic elements, HT explains that Muslims have two problems, namely the internal and external aspects. From the external side, the attack from the enemies of Islam distances Muslims from the teachings of Islam itself by dividing the unity of Muslims politically and imposing ideas that are contrary to the teachings of Islam. This effort is made either with direct or indirect activity, like through Muslim figures. This is what HT says keeps Muslims occupied in thought even though it is physically and militarily independent. The second factor is the internal factor, where Muslims are far from their religion by only practicing Islam in pieces. On the other hand, they claim to be Muslim, but their life practice is no different from non-Muslims.

The root of the problems that exist according to HT is the absence of Islamic life in which the state applies Islamic *sharīʿah* to all aspects of life. The absence of a caliphate that has collapsed since 1924, according to HT, is the source of the catastrophe of the destruction of Muslims. Therefore, the main solution is to uphold the caliphate as a method to enforce the laws of Allah SWT both in terms of economic, political, social, cultural, and others.

In terms of solutions to all existing problems (prognostic), HT explained that upholding the caliphate, beside as a solution to the problem of Muslims, it is also an obligation for Muslims to uphold it. This obligation, according to HT, has been stated in the Qur'*ā*n, *Sunnah*, *Ijma'* (the consensus of prophet companions) as the only system recognised by Islam and different from other systems of government including empire, monarchy, federal state, and republic or democracy (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2005b). The function of this system is to apply the laws of Allah and his messenger and carry out *da'wah* to the whole world.

HT explained four important pillars of the *khilāfah* state system. The first principle is that sovereignty is in the hands of *sharīʿah*, not belonging to humans or people. It means that the primary source of law is only Allah's law, *sharīʿah* law. Man-made laws are considered transgressions and sins if they violate these provisions (Hizb ut-Tahrir, n.d.,). This principle clearly reinforces HT's attitude towards democracy and the modern state that makes sovereignty in the hands of the people. The second principle is that power is in the hands of the people, which means that it is the people who have the right to choose the leader to manage their affairs. Furthermore, *bayʿah* is a formal process to appoint a leader that is a statement of public loyalty to the elected leader.

The third principle is the obligation for all Muslims to appoint a caliph to unite Muslims in a single polity. HT considers the existence of a nation-state that divides Muslims as a violation of *sharīʿah* law, and it weakens the unity of the *Ummah*. The fourth principle is that a caliph has the authority to carry out legislation to be applied in a society (Hizb ut-Tahrir, n.d.).

Historically, Hizb ut-Tahrir explained that the concept of an Islamic state had been applied by Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and then continued by the caliphs of the four dynasties from the 7th century CE to the 20th century CE. During that time, no law was applied except Islamic law in all aspects of life: political affairs, law, economy, social, education, the system of government, and foreign policy (Regulation of life in Islam) (An-Nabahani, 2002, p. 58).

The impact of the application of this system, according to HT, is tremendous on human civilisation. Islam transformed the Arab nation from a low-thinking, ignorant, fanatical level to a nation capable of thinking brilliantly and spreading Islam to various regions such as

Persia, Iraq, Shām, Egypt, and North Africa. Islam can merge these different Muslim nations by eliminating the barriers of their national identity with Islam (An-Nabahani, 2002, p. 63).

In the regulatory aspect of society, HT explained that Islam does not distinguish between Muslims and Non-Muslims, all are protected to the same degree, including the obligation of the state to ensure justice and security. In science, the world has been indebted to various scientific discoveries in Islamic civilisation, such as in medicine, astronomy, mathematics, physics, chemistry, engineering, and others. In terms of international politics, the Islamic State, or caliphate, has also proven to be the world›s number one state for centuries, capable of leading society with full justice, security, and prosperity. While the secular system, according to HT, will not produce the good and progress in society because of its damaged character and contrary to the teachings of Islam (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, 2009).

The mechanism for electing leaders in Islam is also inexpensive, according to HTI, because only the caliph is directly elected through elections or by representatives of the people in the assembly of the *Ummah* (house of representatives). On the one hand, officials under the caliph are appointed directly by the caliph because of their status as an aide. The house of representatives can also be directly elected by the people, but its function is only supervision and providing input to the ruler, not making laws. This mechanism covers the huge costs for the electoral process as in the democratic system (Hizb ut Tahrir Indonesia, 2009; Zaid, 2016).

On the other hand, in terms of economic issues, HT argues that *sharīʿah* guarantees the basic needs of every community, education, health, security, food, and board. The state utilises all its natural resources for the welfare of the people, while privatisation, liberalisation, and revocation of subsidies should not be carried out in an Islamic state. For Indonesia, which has a wealth of abundant natural resources, the correct management of the country will make the country's finances abundant to serve its people.

To do that, Islam suggests that a state be independent in its political thoughts and policies from foreign thoughts and intervention. States should not cooperate with international institutions that can deprive a state of its political sovereignty. It should also not cooperate with the

IMF and the World Bank, which are symbols of neoliberalism and global neo-imperialism (Al-Jawi, 2015).

Regarding nationalism, Shiddiq Al-Jawi (2014) revealed the concept of the caliphate is clearly superior to the idea of nationalism. The concept of nationalism is weak because it stands on emotional and artificial foundations such as song, flag, language, and history. The idea of a nation is imaginary because many countries are made up of several nations but simply described as a nation, such as Indonesia and the United States of America. Some regions have one national identity but different countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, which are Malay in nature. In addition, in the application aspect in a state, nationalism can be filled by the ideology of secularism, Marxism, or socialism, and other ideologies.

While in the concept of an Islamic state, Al-Jawi (2014) contended that the binder of society is not a nation or tribal identity but an Islamic creed, and the highest state's interest in all its activities is not in the national interest but the interest of Muslims, through the application of *sharīʿah* domestically and the spread of Islamic *daʿwah* abroad. In terms of territorial boundaries, the *khilāfah* state will continue to develop, not be fixed like a nation-state. It will develop along with the activities of *daʿwah* and *Jiḥād* carried out by the state. Furthermore, the only source of law is. The flag used is only one flag of *tawḥīd*, a black flag that is written with white *tawḥīd* word called *Rāyah,* and a white flag that is written with black *tawḥīd* word called *Liwa'*. The official language used is only Arabic as a unifying language of Muslims, even though it is also not forbidden to use the local language as a colloquial language (Al-Jawi, 2014). Fighting for the caliphate will be considered as obedience to Allah SWT while fighting for the nation-state will be worth the maximum (Al-Jawi, 2014).

Motivational Dimension

The most important thing in this framing task is how to convince people or other movements to unite in collective action. This dimension of motivation requires a vocabulary to ensure the involvement of individuals or other movements in an attempt to change. Commonly used words are emergencies/severity, urgency, effectiveness, and feasibility (Benford & Snow, 2000).

HTI uses the motivational dimension to invite Muslims in Indonesia to participate in the *da'wah,* calling for the caliphate. HTI emphasises that by referring to *Qur'ān* and *Sunnah,* establishing a caliphate is an obligation for Muslims, and if it is neglected, it is then considered a sinful action, and will get punishment from Allah SWT. HTI quoted the *ḥadīth* of the Prophet Muhammad narrated by *Im**ā**m* Muslim, that "whoever dies, while on his shoulders there is no *bay'ah* (declaration of allegiance) to the *im**ā**m* or caliph then he dies like the death of ignorance (Hizb ut-Tahrir, 2005)."

The importance of the caliphate, according to HT, is exemplified by the companions of the Prophet, who were willing to postpone the Prophet's funeral after death to focus on choosing the leader after the Prophet. Similarly, Umar ibn Khattab as the second caliph, limited the election period of the caliph to three days. According to HTI, the attitude of prophet companions towards the election of leaders is proof of the urgency of the caliphate for Muslims because it is strongly related to the life and death of Islam and Muslims (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, 2011).

Not only that, HTI explained that the caliphate is a historical inevitability because it has been promised by Allah and his messengers contained in the verses of the *Qur'ān* and *ḥadīth* of the Prophet. As the popular *ḥadīth* is often conveyed by HTI, narrated by Im**ā**m Aḥmad that Muslims will be in the five phases of history, the prophetic phase, the rightly guided caliphates phase, the phase of biting power *(mulkan 'āḍḍan),* the phase of coercive power *(mulkan jabriyyatan),* and the last phase of the return of the caliphate that follows the prophetic method (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, 2011).

From factual conditions, the caliphate, according to HT, is an urgent need for a world damaged by the implementation of the secular capitalist system. Capitalism creates a gap between rich and poor countries. A vulnerable financial system collapses and free-market myths benefit only the rich. Democracy, too, promised freedoms to result in moral damage, destruction of creeds, destruction of families, and free sex. In the legal aspect, the law is used as a means for capitalists to colonise and exploit the people's wealth (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, 2011, p. 44).

Khilāfah, according to HTI, will lead the world so that people can live together to support each other, share, and help each other without the arrogance of nationality and territoriality.

> Fighting for a caliphate for HTI is an obligation that is worth a great reward but must be with the Prophet's demands, namely non-violence, politics, and intellectual. "If one reward is so great, then how great is our intercession: hundreds, thousands, even millions of people who get the blessings of Allah SWT. Remember that it is this Islamic caliphate that we are fighting for that will carry out Islamic treatises to the whole world and be a way for people to convert to Islam in droves, *Subhānallah*!" (Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia, 2011, p. 49).

Conclusion

Hizb ut-Tahrir is a global movement that has been in dozens of Muslim countries covering various continents such as Asia, Australia, Europe, America, and Africa. In Indonesia, this movement has been present since the 1980s but with a movement that is still hiding. After political reform in Indonesia, HTI began to actively move openly through various methods such as demonstrations, seminars, lectures, media publications, and so on. Major agendas have been held by the group since the 2000s until it was finally dissolved by the government in 2017 on charges of radicalism, against state ideology, and endangering the country's stability.

During the struggle of HTI in Indonesia, this group invites people to fight together by using three basic elements used by social movements in general when moving, namely diagnostic elements by making secularism ideology the root of the problem in Indonesia. This secularism ideology gave birth to derivative systems such as democracy, human rights, capitalism, and nationalism that made Indonesia damaged and colonised.

The second element used by HTI is prognostic, which provides solutions to problems that occur in Indonesia due to secularism through the enforcement of *sharīʿah* and *khilāfah*. The *khilāfah* is a political system that will apply *sharīʿah* law in all aspects of life by indiscriminately ensuring justice, welfare, and security for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

Then the motivational element becomes the ultimate element of this group by emphasising the obligation to uphold *sharīʿah* and *khilāfah* for Muslims and the retribution of great sin for those who neglect it.

The caliphate is also part of the promise of Allah and his Messenger, which will indeed happen. Those who fight for it will get a reward that will continue to flow when the caliphate is upright. The *khilāfah* is also considered an urgent necessity because secularism is considered to be ruining human life.

During its activities in Indonesia for approximately 20 years, until it was dissolved, it is obvious that the sequence of framing used by HTI can be seen from its speeches, lectures, discussions, and media they produced, such as leaflets, magazines, tabloids, and online media. The message conveyed by HTI through such framing, however, proved to be not only simplistic but also controversial. Its ban in 2017 halted the propagation of such message to the general Indonesian public.

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