

## ***Da'wah* and Politics Among Muslim Preachers in Contemporary Indonesia**

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**Abstract:** This paper discusses how politics shapes the landscape of Islamic da'wah in Indonesia. In this context, Muslim preachers use da'wah as an instrument of politics. One of the tools used by Muslim preachers to roll political influence into da'wah is through preaching on digital media. Through qualitative studies based on library data, websites and social media, this paper shows that Muslim preachers in contemporary Indonesia can be seen from the critical preaching to the existing secular government. They attempt at Islamizing the state by criticizing the secular state. This article finds that the discourse of globalization has allowed them to get information about Islamic movements in other countries. Second, the rise of Muslim political preachers is influenced by government policies towards the political, social and economic fields. Third, their preaching for political Islam is not focused on normative goals such as the formation of an Islamic state. Instead, they focus on pragmatic goals. Politicians also support their popularity. On the one hand, it provides the diversity of da'wah in Indonesia, but on the other hand, it challenges the established political Islam model.

**Keywords:** Da'wah, Politics, Muslim Preachers, Indonesia, Diversity

**Abstrak:** Makalah ini membicarakan bagaimana politik membentuk lanskap dakwah Islam di Indonesia. Dalam konteks ini, pendakwah Muslim menggunakan dakwah sebagai alat politik. Salah satu alat yang digunakan oleh pendakwah Muslim untuk melancarkan pengaruh politik ke dalam dakwah adalah melalui dakwah di media digital. Melalui kajian kualitatif berdasarkan data perpustakaan, laman web dan media sosial, makalah ini

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menunjukkan bahawa pendakwah Muslim di Indonesia kontemporari dapat dilihat dari dakwah kritis hingga pemerintahan sekular yang ada. Mereka berusaha mengislamkan negara dengan mengkritik negara sekular. Artikel ini mendapati bahawa, pertama, wacana globalisasi telah membolehkan mereka mendapatkan maklumat mengenai gerakan Islam di negara lain. Kedua, kebangkitan pendakwah politik Muslim dipengaruhi oleh dasar pemerintah terhadap bidang politik, sosial dan ekonomi. Ketiga, dakwah mereka untuk Islam politik tidak tertumpu pada tujuan normatif seperti pembentukan negara Islam. Sebaliknya, mereka menumpukan pada tujuan pragmatik. Ahli politik juga menyokong populariti mereka. Di satu sisi, ia memberikan kepelbagaian dakwah di Indonesia, tetapi di sisi lain, ia mencabar model Islam politik yang sudah mapan.

**Kata kunci:** Dakwah, Politik, Pendakwah Muslim, Indonesia, Kepelbagaian

## Introduction

The very prominent initial discussion between religion and modern society can be traced to secularization that developed in the West. Proponents of secularization assume that the more modern society is, the more religion tends to be abandoned in everyday life (Wilson, 1966). However, this view was later refuted by other scholars. Casanova (1994), for example, believes that religion remains relevant and deprived in modern life. Like Casanova, Bayat (2007) holds the same view. According to him, religiosity cannot be separated from the contemporary development of Muslim societies. Furthermore, Bayat refers to this development with some terms like fundamentalism, revivalism, conservatism, fanaticism and extremism, which seem to represent global trends. This shows that religion is still relevant in today's life, even between religion and modernity interconnected.

One case that is explained by Casanova when arguing that religion remained popular in modern society is the emergence of Televangelism in the West. Jerry Falwell, a conservative evangelist with Moral Majority's teachings, appeared to emerge in the United States public space using television channels to reveal that modernity has damaged the order of people's lives. This not only shows that religion is still present in modern society but in turn that the religion and culture of celebrities obtained from the media are engaged with one another. Naggar (2014)

explains that televangelism is a symbol of integration between religion and entertainment, resulting in celebrity culture. Furthermore, Shaima explained that by acting as a public figure such as a popular artist and politician, televangelists have become media celebrities and gained thousands of fans on social media. Therefore, at the same time, social media also becomes a religious discursive space.

This paper focuses its study on how politics shapes the da'wah conducted by Muslim preachers in Indonesia. This paper argues that da'wah is not only meant as an effort to invite someone to be better (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*), but at a certain time, the da'wah also leads to Islamize the state. Da'wah, in this context, is not limited to addressing religious issues but also political issues.

The method used in this paper is qualitative. Data sources obtained through libraries, websites and social media. The analysis of this paper is based on a narrative and historical approach. To provide a comprehensive picture of how politics shapes da'wah and is echoed in Indonesia's various discursive spaces, this article is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the relationship between da'wah and Islamic politics in Indonesia. The second part discusses the existence of political Muslim preachers in Indonesia. The third part of this paper discusses the hybridity of the identity of Muslim preachers in Indonesia. Next, the last part of this paper concludes with a conclusion.

### **Da'wah Landscape in Indonesia: From the Kingdom, the New Order to the Reformation Era**

The entry of Islam into Indonesia has unwittingly shown that the practice of da'wah has been going on for a long time in Indonesia. Historically, the spread of Islam in Indonesia took place peacefully and accommodated local culture. Through traders from Gujarat, Arab and Southwest India, Islam entered Indonesia in the twelfth century (Wanandi, 2002). The introduction of Islam in Indonesia went peacefully, not through conquests like in the Middle East or North Africa. The distribution route starts at markets around the coast and gradually moves inland. The peak of Islam's successful spread in Indonesia occurred at the end of the Majapahit Hindu Kingdom in East Java, when the king began to embrace Islam and began to develop from the fifteenth century onwards.

The matter above has shown that preaching takes place without violence, even when it does not have much to do with political issues.

Preachers such as Sunan Kalijaga and others (known as *walisanga*, nine saints) did not try to establish the Islamic caliphate or Islamic state. However, they accommodated surrounding cultures in their missionary activities or known as *cultural da'wah*, as an attempt to Islamize the community rather than Islamize the country or make an Islamic state.

Ricklefs (2008), in his study, calls this *cultural da'wah* with another term that is “mystic synthesis” that is pressing on the three characters, namely a strong sense of Islamic identity, emphasizing the worship of the pillars of Islam and the acceptance of spiritual power. This shows that the accommodative *da'wah* process is inseparable from the role of *da'wah* brought by the Sufism tradition.

Political influence on *da'wah* began to emerge in Indonesia after independence. Many Muslim politicians want to establish an Islamic state. They also received support from a number of Islamic preachers. However, it seems that this effort has not been successful. This can be seen from the 1955 general election in Indonesia, in which the vote of Islamic parties was behind the secular parties. However, Islamic political struggle through elections is not the only channel to realize an Islamic state. A number of Islamist groups also carried out radical movements to realize their mission. For example, DI / TII rebellions in West Java and PRRI in Sumatra carried out large-scale uprisings to establish an Islamic state. However, the country's position seems more potent than the rebellion. It was proven in 1958 that the government was prohibiting the Masyumi Party, which was allegedly allied with the PRRI (Ismail, 2001).

The establishment of the New Order regime brought new hope for Muslim actors to continue their struggle, especially in establishing an Islamic state. The new order regarded that the power of political Islam became its foremost opponent. This is not surprising because the New Order, which was based on military power, saw the political Islamic movement as having great potential to create state instability. In addition, this also relates to the New Order's objectives, which focused on economic development, so a stable national situation was needed. To regulate the stability of the country, the New Order government created a new political scheme by combining the four old Islamic parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti) into the United Development Party (PPP) (Effendy, 2003).

The involvement of Muslim preachers in PPP can be seen from the presence of the figure of Zainuddin MZ or known as a million people. Between 1975 and 1977, the da'wah of Zainuddin MZ was very prominent in the Indonesian public sphere. Therefore, Zainuddin became an important figure for political parties to get votes from the Muslim community. At that time, the PPP campaign coordinator Ridwan Saidi invited Zainuddin MZ to become a campaigner in the 1977-1985 election with Rhoma Irama, a famous dangdut singer in Indonesia. This indicates that since the New Order, Muslim preachers have been trying to get involved in political issues (Zainuddin, 1997).

In its development, to be able to participate in the general election contestation in 1987, this political party must change its ideological base from Islam to Pancasila while changing its party symbol from the *Ka'ba* (Islamic symbol) to the Star (Tamara, 1988). Suharto's policies related to political Islam, in turn, led to responses from certain Muslim groups. The first group is based on scripturalistic Islam, such as those who join the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII). This group believes that Islam should be practised in Indonesia or *kaffah* (thorough). Therefore, they further argued that the state would formally regulate the teachings of Islam. In contrast to DDI, other groups promoting political Islam are more radical. One of these radical groups is a religious group in the Tanjung Priok Port area. This group was later crushed by the government because of its radical nature.

The second group is the Islamic cultural group. In response to New Order policies, this group felt that Islam could be realized through culture. This group rejects that Islam is officially regulated by the state (Nugroho, 2003). One well-known figure who promoted this idea was Abdurrahman Wahid or known as Gus Dur. He said that using political Islam is dangerous. "Let government regulate, let religious groups take care of their own affairs." (Schwarz, 1994).

The New Order's attitude remained rigid towards political Islam's power, so that the first group changed its Islamic political instruments. For the first group, Islamic parties are no longer an important tool to accommodate Muslim political interests under the New Order rule. DDII is the best example to explain this view. DDII, with the support of a well-known Muslim preacher who was also the central figure of DDII, Mohammad Natsir, was used to spread the superiority of Islamic values over Western values.

After the collapse of the Soeharto regime, the relationship between da'wah and politics was strengthened again. This can be seen from the formation of the Justice Party (PK), which now turns into PKS (Prosperous Justice Party). PKS has a close relationship with the Tarbiyah movement, a social and political movement that emphasizes its missionary activities to establish an Islamic state through the ideas of Hasan Al-Banna. There are at least two discourses that surround the emergence of the Tarbiyah movement. The first is the suppression of the New Order against Islamic politics. Muslim actors' inability to channel their aspirations through political channels made them join the Tarbiyah movement channel Islamic political aspirations. Second, the emergence of the Tarbiyah movement was influenced by global discourse, especially from the Middle East. This is related to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia.

The missionary (da'wah) journey above shows how Muslim groups are trying to implement an Islamic state in Indonesia. It seems that Muslim groups have not run out of ways to realize their mission despite several failures. For example, when they established an Islamic party but lacked support from Muslims and were less popular with secular parties, in their development, they used the da'wah through DDII to realize their mission. Even the DDII figure, M. Natsir, said that da'wah and politics could not be separated (Furqon, 2004).

In its development, especially after the New Order, together with open access to mass media, Muslim preachers still consider the importance of da'wah to be an appropriate step to realize the Islamization of the state in Indonesia. Natsir's ideas about da'wah and politics that cannot be separated are still strongly held by Islamic preachers in Indonesia. They use da'wah as an instrument to launch their Islamic political mission. They even invited their congregants to participate in general elections in Indonesia. Furthermore, they provide recommendations to their congregants to choose candidates for a particular pair who are considered as devout Muslims to be their representatives in the legislative and executive domains. In addition, they also forbid choosing non-Islamic parties that do not fight for the interests of Muslims. In turn, Muslim preachers in Indonesia engage in the practice of identity politics in their preaching.

In other contexts, da'wah as an instrument is also understood as the concept of jihad. Jihadist activists use da'wah to implement

an Islamic state. However, they have a different strategy from other Muslim preachers. They did not massively promote the idea of Islamism through the pulpits of mosques or other public spaces, but they incorporated political influence into their da'wah through 'hidden' educational channels. Ken Ward explained that da'wah and education became the right means for jihadists to promote the idea of jihad. This is following the General Guidelines for JI's Struggle (PUPJI) issued by its central leadership council in 1996. The guidelines explain preaching and education as the first step in JI's strategy to realize an Islamic state (Ward, 2008). This da'wah model is slightly different from the da'wah that Muslim political preachers carry out. The jihadist da'wah is not 'open' for the public, while the da'wah done by Muslim political preachers can be known by the public or 'transparent' (open).

In essence, the Muslim preachers conducted da'wah to establish an Islamic State faces the problem of ambiguity. Ambiguity is seen from their contents of da'wah that tend to be interpreted as a protest against economic uncertainty, corruption and other social problems in Indonesia, not merely to implement Islamic state in Indonesia. It is unsurprising that the Muslim preacher also joined with other secular groups that voiced the same issue. Because corruption and other social problems are not solved sometimes and adequately even compounded by state policies, Muslim preachers such as Ustaz Abdul Somad, Ustaz Felix Siauw and Tengku Zulkarnain may always be popular. The content of their sermons will be well received by Millennial Muslims, but they are often seen as "naughty" preachers by the Indonesian government. This is because, to some extent, their sermons' content promotes Islamic values to improve economic conditions and other social problems in Indonesia. They promote the importance of implementing Islamic law as a solution to overcome problems caused by the government's failure to overcome a number of social problems in Indonesia.

There are some main issues that are often promoted by digital Muslim preachers. First, they often promote the importance of choosing pious Muslim leaders. They spread the obligation of Muslims to come and choose righteous candidates on election-day. It is intended that candidates who are considered secular do not have a chance to win. Because according to them that, when the DPR (Representatives), DPRD (Local Representatives), regents, governors, or presidents are devout Muslims, they believe that an Islamic state can be easily realized.

Second, these preachers often ask their worshipers to come and pray five times a day at the mosque. According to them, the mosque is a centre for the activities of the people in the global world. A mosque is a place of worship and a centre for social, economic, cultural and political activities. In short, the mosque is used for activities that have an Islamic tendency and secular activities.

Third, the Muslim preachers oppose the government's policy, which is regarded as not beneficial for Muslims in Indonesia. The issue of communism and Chinese immigrants is one of the important topics delivered during their preaching. For them, the Jokowi government tends to be accommodating to the Chinese, both immigrants and non-immigrants. The climax is when Basuki Tjahja Purnama or who is familiarly called Ahok, was made a deputy governor of DKI Jakarta.

The above explanation shows that Islamic preaching done actually has political tendencies. However, the da'wah that is influenced by political Islam continues to negotiate with the local, national, and global political landscape. Islamic preachers in Indonesia differ greatly from their educational background, organizational culture, and religious ideology, which proves that Islamic preaching in Indonesia is not monolithic. Some of them may try to touch the realm of political Islam, which ultimately leads to the establishment of an Islamic state, but some are only in the realm of Islamization of Muslim societies that aim to make a pious society.

### **The Existence of Muslim Political Preachers**

The presence of Muslim political preachers in Indonesia can be examined in two cases that recently emerged in the Indonesian public sphere. First, in May 2018, the Indonesian government, through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, issued a recommendation of 200 Muslim preachers in Indonesia. This official preacher's recommendations continue to be debated, especially on social media. Some groups oppose this recommendation. They build the argument that the 200 preachers recommended by the government are preachers who are loyal to the government. However, the preachers who often criticize the government are not included in the list of 200 preachers recommended by the government. They also criticized the inclusion of liberal preachers such as Abdul Muqsith Ghazali.



Some Muslim preachers who have many fans and often voice the Islamization of the country, such as Ustaz Hasan Haikal, Ustaz Habib Rizieq, Ustaz Zulkarnain, Ustaz Abdul Somad and others, are not included in the list. A very striking reason behind their removal from the list is that they often promote the Islamization of the state. This matter is certainly very worrying for the government, mainly related to the prospect of da'wah in Indonesia. In addition, the presence of Muslim political preachers such as Ustaz Haikal Hasan and others shows two important things for the government. First, regarding political Islam, which is the focus of this paper. The second is closely related to the government's fear of the emergence of opposition groups in Indonesian politics. This matter, of course, has implications for the popularity of the general election vote and, in turn, has the potential to weaken the party supporting the government.

Muslim preachers like Ustaz Abdul Somad may not be in any opposition group, but Ustaz Zulkarnain is clearly in opposition. The 212 demonstrations at the Monas (National Monument in Jakarta) placed the Muslim preachers in real political contestation and, in the end, was very worried by the Jokowi government. Good collaboration between opposition groups and a number of Muslim preachers has succeeded in defeating a candidate supported by the government, Ahok, in the 2017 Jakarta governor election contestation.

The second case can be traced from the debate about the way of preaching between Ahmad Mustofa Bisri or who is familiarly called Gus Mus, with Hasan Haikal or who is familiarly called Babe. This is very prominent in social media like Facebook. Regarding how to convey da'wah, for example, according to Haikal that the word "sadikan" in the Qur'an means hard or firm. He also explained the word "baligha" as "piercing the heart". This definition was then debated by Gus Mus who has long been known as a moderate preacher. Gus Mus interprets the word "sadikan" in the Qur'an as good. While the word "baligha" means to touch the heart (Facebook Ahmad Mustofa Bisri on June 6, 2018).

Preachers like Hasan Haikal show the importance of hard ways to do da'wah. This model of da'wah is massively carried out by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). FPI, led by Habib Rizieq, encouraged local people to pray in the congregation and perform basic religious obligations. This later led to radical actions by forcibly closing

nightclubs, billiards, discotheques, karaoke and others since 1998. The FPI group built the argument that Indonesian Muslims are under attack of moral decadence, secularism, liberalism and the threat of Westernization culture. Therefore, they become the most vocal group to require Islamic law implementation in the state constitution (Wilson, 2008).

The above case shows the popularity of Muslim political preachers in Indonesia. They have the potential to change the dominance of traditional religious authorities who may not use social media. Traditional preachers remain focused on the development of moderate Islam rather than efforts to Islamize the country. But the next concern is whether these traditional preachers remain in their traditional culture or keep up with the times along with technological advancements such as new media. This discussion was very prominent in the theoretical debate about religion and the media. Scholars such as Turner, Eickelman and Anderson assume that the presence of new media will weaken the popularity of a cleric or traditional authority (Turner, 2007, Eickelman & Anderson, 2003). However, this opinion was in turn criticized by Muhammad Qasim Zaman, in his opinion that the presence of new media did not weaken the popularity of the 'Ulamā' (Muslim scholars). In turn, the 'Ulamā' persisted and even adjusted to the times (Zaman, 2002). Ahmad Mustofa Bisri, for example, is currently actively using Facebook to promote the importance of moderate Islam. He revealed that Indonesian Islam was a moderate and tolerant Islam, not a radical and intolerant Islam.

In contrast to Mustofa Bisri, who seemed moderate and tolerant, Ustaz Zulkarnain is an example of a prominent Muslim political preacher in Indonesia. In his preaching, he said that "to choose a president, one should choose based on his good physique, not physically weak and thin". He also mentioned that the current government is a very cruel regime and does not appreciate Islam in Indonesia. In a Friday sermon uploaded on Youtube, Ustaz Zulkarnain criticized the government's plan to issue rules about the volume of the call to prayer at the mosque. Actually, his lecture's focus was on religious matters, but then he gave a few minutes to express his criticism of the current government.

Ustaz Zulkarnain is very active on Youtube and Twitter @ustadtengkuzul. Through this social media, he criticized the government

policies several times. His status on April 18 2018, invited a large response from the public. His status published even was quoted on an online newspaper, *medantribunnews*. He mentioned on his Twitter, “during the presidency of Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the salary was enough to fulfil the daily needs. However, during the Joko Widodo presidency, the salary was not enough” (*medantribunnews.com* accessed on January 16 2018).

The presence of political Muslim preachers like Ustaz Zulkarnain does not necessarily weaken traditional Muslim preachers’ authority. Traditional Muslim preachers retain strong authority thanks to their religious claims. They are a group of preachers who have a strong Islamic scientific pathway and often come directly to the Muslim community. In contrast, new Muslim preachers like Ustaz Zulkarnain do not have strong clerical claims. He gained popularity thanks to social media. This explains that social media has the opportunity to give popularity to religious authority. It depends on how much they are able to use the language of social media. A phenomenon that has emerged lately in Indonesia is that traditional Muslim preachers base their authority claims on their religious aspects while also using social media to strengthen and spread their authority, such as Gus Baha, Gus Muwaffiq, Mustofa Bisri and others.

Some political Muslim preachers establish their authority on social media through a style that is attractive. Social media provides a discursive space that provides features of “intimate” interaction between the preacher and his followers. Muslim preachers convey religious messages through video on social media and post statuses about their daily lives. Their followers can comment and interact anytime and anywhere. In addition, these Muslim preachers freely choose the topics of their sermons on social media. This is because social media is free from the intervention of editors and media owners.

In the context of its delivery, *da’wah* is often delivered in an un-Islamic way, for example, anger, so that sometimes this makes the displeasure of others who hear it. *Da’wah* can also be connected with political, economic and other problems. Sometimes *da’wah* is even used as an instrument to manipulate certain interests. Jonru’s case is the best example to explain this. Before he was sentenced to prison, he had actively delivered camouflaged *da’wah*. His ability to use media

language makes him very popular, and he gets many followers. In turn, many of his followers thought that what was conveyed by Jonru was true information. Then this issue has become more prominent thanks to the work of social media buzzers. In the post-truth era, the truth seems vague and depends on how much the buzzers roll the issue as true information.

Efforts to Islamize the country sometimes become an issue that political Muslim preachers roll out. Likewise, Jonru experienced that the Indonesian government ultimately imprisoned him. There are several reasons behind Jonru being sentenced to prison by the government. First, he challenged government authority on Facebook. He often comments on government policies and, in turn, makes his followers trust his status more than the government. Second, the Indonesian government considers that the issue of being rolled by Jonru can potentially reduce the public trust in the government.

The matter above shows that open access to mass media, especially social media, makes anyone talk about religion. This is called democratized religious authority. It means that to talk about religion is no longer a monopoly on the rights of a 'Ulamā'. Everyone has the right to talk about religious matters in accordance with their respective interpretations. In addition, as a result of the development of social media, a lot of digital Muslim preachers have begun to emerge in the da'wah landscape in Indonesia.

### **Social Media and the Hybrid Identity of Muslim Preachers**

Social media opens up vast discursive spaces. This can connect users in the local scope and connect users in a global scope. In short, technological development is driving the globalization process, which is getting faster. This matter also has implications for the stability of the community's local identity because globalization contributes an important role in cultural exchange, ideas, and other ideas that can occur in a short time. Tomlison (1999) confirms that "the globalization of mundane experience may make a stable sense of" local "cultural identity (including national identity) increasingly difficult to maintain, as our daily lives become more and more interwoven with, and penetrated by, influences and experiences that have their origins far away."

Social media innovation has made it easier for Muslims to share Islamic knowledge and teachings without being bound by a specific

time and space in the functional aspect. In turn, other Muslims can access this knowledge through digital spaces and negotiate with their Islamic identity. There are two impacts of the global media on Muslim identity, namely: First, non-Islamic elements as long as they do not conflict with Islamic values are accepted and practised by Muslims in their daily lives. Modernity is the best example here. Muslims do not accept modernity despite Western or non-Muslim products. While Muslim preachers use instruments made by Western companies, in certain contexts, they reject Western ways. In fact, this is an indication of how selectively they became. Muslim preachers anticipate and are aware of the impact that can deconstruct Muslim identity.

The second impact is that Muslim preachers utilize digital media to study the teachings of Islam and the Islamic world. They actively learn about Islamic traditions and culture that are practised in other regions. The searching machine known as Google became their channel to explore Islam in other regions, and in turn, the knowledge they gained through Google was shared with their followers. However, although some preachers use digital media to search for Islamic knowledge, some other preachers also have a strong scientific background. They pursue education in Islamic-based countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Through their religious knowledge, a few of them promote Islam that is practised explicitly by the Muslim community of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They are trying to purify Indonesia's Islamic religious traditions with genuine Islamic traditions coming from the Middle East.

The two effects above show that globalization has shaped the hybridity of Muslim preachers. Their interaction with social media allows them to be Islamic and modern. In this case, modern refers to the use of social media to deliver their sermons. Islam, in this case, refers to their efforts to study Islamic traditions in other countries. In short, that digital media, as a result of globalization, emphasizes the hybridity of the identity of Muslim preachers. Hybridity here refers to Pieterse (1994), who said that "one of the original ideas of hybridity is syncretism." This shows that the identity of Muslim preachers is more complex because, on the one hand, they still maintain their local Islamic values, but on the one hand, others they also want to share global Islamic values.

As a result, it is rather difficult to determine Muslim political preachers' organizational culture and ideology, such as traditionalists,

modernists, Salafis or others. Some of them may show a tendency towards the Islamic group, but some may not. Ustaz Abdul Somad, for example, can be categorized as a traditional preacher. The proximity of Ustaz Abdul Somad with Nahdlatul 'Ulamā' (NU), for example, can be seen when he often fills lectures in Sidogiri Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) and traditional Pesantren of Al-Munawir Krapyak. He also became administrators in the NU organization. However, when looking closely at his sermons' content on social media and his educational background (Al-Azhar University and Al-Hasania Morocco), he cannot easily be included in traditional preachers. In fact, the contents of his sermons sometimes reflect traditionalist, Salafi, and even HTI ideas (See the UAS lecture during the Riau Khilafah Conference at An-Nur Mosque in 2013).

Although these Muslim political preachers have complex organizational ideologies and cultures, at least they contribute to establishing an Islamic state or Islamization of the state. This can be seen in the daily lives of Muslims in Indonesia. Although they live in economic constraints, lately, more and more Muslims attend the mosque and perform the pilgrimage. They are also active in recitals and actively watch da'wah broadcasts through television and social media. This phenomenon at least begins from the New Order era. Robert W Hefner (2000) states:

On December 6, 1990, President Soeharto beat a large mosque drum ( *bedug* ) to open the first national conference of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals. He was shattered in one fell swoop, one of the most enduring stereotypes of New Order politics. Here, after all, was a man long regarded as a staunch defender of Javanist mysticism and Pancasila pluralism giving his blessing to an elite Muslim organization openly dedicated to the Islamization of Indonesian society. Most observers were aware that the president had made a few concessions to Muslims in the late 1980s. But no one had expected Suharto to depart so boldly from the New Order politics' ground rules by sponsoring a Muslim lobby in the state. With this action, it was said, the president was doing more than increasing Muslim participation in elite politics. He was "playing the Muslim" card against those in the military and pro-democracy movement, which had begun to challenge his rule. New Order politics would never be the same.

Hefner's explanation above shows that apart from Soeharto's motives for Islam in Indonesia which are considered to give appreciation to Islamic activism in Indonesia, one must understand that Islam has the potential to be used as a political alliance in Indonesia. Even now, the impact of Islamization after the New Order has made Indonesian Muslims become more religious or what Bruinessen (2013) calls the term 'conservative turn'. Then after Soeharto, Islam was also the main target for the political interests of certain groups. These methods are used by political actors from Islamic and secular parties and assisted by Muslim preachers.

However, Muslim preachers and political actors' efforts to Islamize the country through the power of Islam are not easy to implement due to the hybridity of their identity caused by globalization. On the one hand, the hybridity of the preachers' identities makes it easy for them to Islamize the country, but on the other hand, this becomes an inhibiting factor. Digital media, on the one hand, makes it easy for them to launch their mission to Islamize the country, but on the other hand, through digital media, they can access sources of knowledge outside of Islam, such as Western economic and political problems.

As a result, many Muslim preachers have produced very prominent business innovations in Indonesia. Ustaz Yusuf Manshur founded the Paytren, a digital application in the economic sector. Ustaz Abdullah Gymnastiar also founded a number of innovations in the field of business, such as MQ Net, MQ Training, MQ Doll, MQ Water and others. In addition to these two popular preachers, Ustaz Abdul Somad also includes preachers who use a market economy's logic. He sells his books and uploads his videos to Youtube.

Apart from the economic sector, other preachers also collaborate with secular political parties. The 212 demonstration is the best example to explain this phenomenon. The action that took place in Monas, Jakarta, and was led by Habib Rizieq showed good cooperation between preachers and secular parties such as Gerindra, which Prabowo Subianto and other parties oversaw. This collaboration shows two identity hybridities, namely Islam and secular, to realize the mission of Islamization of the country. But, of course, the target of Islamization is slightly different from Islamization which Islamic groups only carry out. Nevertheless, Muslim preachers believe that Islam and da'wah are two inseparable things.

The identity of the preachers at least reduces their efforts to Islamize the country. The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), for example, has now become more lenient and accepts Pancasila as the state ideology. Nevertheless, according to Maarif (2012), it is necessary to examine whether PKS really has totally accepted Pancasila or is it just a ploy for them to make their party big on a religious basis, which in turn ends in efforts to establish an Islamic state. This question, according to Maarif, will certainly be answered when PKS occupies a strong position in the government.

### **Conclusion**

Da'wah and politics are actually inseparable. There are times when da'wah and politics interconnect with one another. The connection between da'wah and politics can be traced from the beginning of independence. Although their proponents failed to implement political Islam's goal, during the Old and New Order periods, da'wah for political interests was very clear. A well-known Muslim preacher and politician, Mohammad Natsir is a Muslim actor who promotes da'wah and politics. After the dissolution of Masyumi in the Old Order era, Natsir and his friends had new hopes for the New Order. However, it turns out that their hope is not realistic, so that Natsir established the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), which focuses on the matter of preaching. In short, when he founded DDII, Natsir wanted to do politics through da'wah to Islamize the country.

After the New Order collapse and entering the era of reform and open access to mass media, some popular Muslim preachers emerge. They are very popular and admired by young Muslims in Indonesia. The presence of digital media influenced by the discourse of globalization contributed to an important role in their popularity. On the one hand, these Muslim preachers create a diversity of proselytizing in Indonesia, but on the other hand, they challenge the traditional religious authority.

Not infrequently, the Muslim preachers have inserts and participate in the political discourse of governance. They echoed the state's Islamization, which was seen as a solution to overcome the economic crisis and government policies that were seen as difficult to implement. Their da'wah is slowly being influenced by politics. However, their efforts to Islamize the state are sometimes hampered by their hybridity, which is derived from globalization and modernization. Globalization



makes it easy for them to obtain religious information in other countries, which in turn inspires them to be applied in Indonesia. Modernization allows them to interact with various elements of modernity, such as capitalism and others. Therefore, sometimes their missionary missions focused on establishing an Islamic state are covered by, for example, their economic motives. In addition, the government's policies and positions are quite strong, so that these inhibit their political mission in da'wah. Despite this, the political influence of da'wah in Indonesia by Muslim preachers is still being negotiated. The Muslim preachers will always use the da'wah infrastructure and media as an arena of negotiation in this context.

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