

# Intellectual Discourse

---

Volume 28

Number 2

2020



**International Islamic University Malaysia**  
<http://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/islam>

# *Intellectual Discourse*

---

Volume 28

Number 2

2020

## **Editor**

Ishtiaq Hossain (Malaysia)

## **Associate Editors**

Anke Iman Bouzenita (Oman)  
Khairil Izamin Ahmad (Malaysia)  
Saodah Wok (Malaysia)

## **Book Review Editor**

Mohd. Helmi Bin Mohd Sobri

---

## **Editorial Board**

Abdul Kabir Hussain Solihu (Nigeria)

Badri Najib Zubir (Malaysia)

Daniel J. Christie (USA)

Habibul H. Khondker (UAE)

Hazizan Md. Noon (Malaysia)

Hussain Mutalib (Singapore)

Ibrahim M. Zein (Qatar)

James D. Frankel (China)

Kenneth Christie (Canada)

Nor Faridah Abdul Manaf (Malaysia)

Rahmah Bt Ahmad H. Osman  
(Malaysia)

Serdar Demirel (Turkey)

Syed Farid Alatas (Singapore)

Thameem Ushama (Malaysia)

## **International Advisory Board**

Anis Malik Thoha (Indonesia)

Chandra Muzaffar (Malaysia)

Fahimul Quadir (Canada)

Habib Zafarullah (Australia)

John O. Voll (USA)

Muhammad al-Ghazali (Pakistan)

Muhammad K. Khalifa (Qatar)

Redzuan Othman (Malaysia)

## **Founding Editor**

Afar Afaq Ansari (USA)

---

*Intellectual Discourse* is a highly respected, academic refereed journal of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). It is published twice a year by the IIUM Press, IIUM, and contains reflections, articles, research notes and review articles representing the disciplines, methods and viewpoints of the Muslim world.

*Intellectual Discourse* is abstracted in *SCOPUS*, *ProQuest*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *Peace Research Abstracts Journal*, *Muslim World Book Review*, *Bibliography of Asian Studies*, *Index Islamicus*, *Religious and Theological Abstracts*, *ATLA Religion Database*, *MyCite*, *ISC* and *EBSCO*.

ISSN 0128-4878 (Print); ISSN 2289-5639 (Online)

<http://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/islam>

Email: [intdiscourse@iium.edu.my](mailto:intdiscourse@iium.edu.my); [intdiscourse@yahoo.com](mailto:intdiscourse@yahoo.com)

Published by:

IIUM Press, International Islamic University Malaysia

P.O. Box 10, 50728 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Phone (+603) 6196-5014, Fax: (+603) 6196-6298

Website: <http://iiumpress.iium.edu.my/bookshop>

**Intellectual Discourse**  
**Vol. 28, No. 2, 2020**

**Contents**

<i>Note from the Editor</i>	357
<b>Research Articles</b>	
The Link between Coronavirus and Darwin according to Pervez Hoodbhoy: A Critical Response <i>Osman Bakar</i>	365
The Politics of Manipulation: Malaysia 2018-2020 <i>Abdul Rashid Moten</i>	387
The Theoretical Framework for Measuring Key Intangible Performance (KIP) in Research and Publication Using Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah (MS) <i>Luqman Zakariyah, Mohammed Farid Ali al-Fijawi, Rahmah Binti Ahmad H. Osman, Shukran Abd Rahman &amp; Suhaimi Mhd. Sarif</i>	409
The Concept of Ghulūw in Islam: An Analysis on Its Manifestations and Causes in The Modern World <i>Mohammad Yusri Yubhi Bin Md Yusoff, Thameem Ushama &amp; Adibah Abdul Rahim</i>	433
Transgressing the Terms of Covenant in the Islamic Jurisprudence of International Relations: The Cases of Socotra and Cyprus in Comparison <i>Anke Iman Bouzenita</i>	459
Preventive Measures for a Healthy Life: Towards an Islamic Perspective with Reference to COVID-19 <i>M. Hedayatul Islam, Md Saidul Islam &amp; Fadzli Adam</i>	487

The Effects of Japanese Occupation in Sabah: During and After World War II (1941-1963) <i>Rosdianah Binti Yacho &amp; Arshad Islam</i>	511
Non-Parental Child Custody Rights: A Comparative Perspective <i>Daleleer Kaur Randawar &amp; Akbar Kamarudin @ Abdul Shukor</i>	529
Political Communication and Election Campaigning on Instagram During the 14th Malaysian General Election <i>Kamaruzzaman Abdul Manan, Shafizan Mohamad &amp; Muhamad Mat Yakim</i>	555
ASEAN, China and the South China Sea Territorial Disputes: Analysis of Conflict Management Strategies <i>Siti Noralia Mustaza &amp; Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin</i>	577
Quality Assurance in Higher Education in the Maldives: Are We Listening to the Students? <i>Mariyam Shahuneeza Naseer &amp; Dawood Abdulmalek Yahya Al-Hidabi</i>	599
Going to Hell or Heaven? An Analysis of Malaysian Muslims' Perspectives on Extremism in Religion <i>Rabi'ah Aminudin, Izzuddin M. Jaafar &amp; Elmira Akhmetova</i>	623
Challenges of the Multinational Federation: The Case of Malaysia, 2008-2020 <i>Abdul Aqmar Ahmad Tajudin &amp; Mohammad Agus Yusoff</i>	649
Ongoing Persecution of the Rohingya: A History of Periodic Ethnic Cleansings and Genocides <i>Arifa Sarmin</i>	675
Managing Women's Matter: A Cross-Cultural Study of Doctor-Patient Relationship in Pakistan and Malaysia <i>Adeela Rehman &amp; Nurazzura Mohamad Diah</i>	697

Can U.S. Aid and Assistance Continue Playing  
a Soft Power Role in the Muslim World?  
*Abdullahi Ayoade Ahmad, Mohd Afandi Bin Salleh &  
Abdul Majid Hafiz Bin Mohamed* 715

Leadership Characteristic Features: An Ethical Review from the  
Perspective of the Qur'an and the Sunnah  
*Hamda Binti Khalifah Almuheiri & Mohammed Abdullais* 737

The Bureaucratic Corruption Leading to the Fall of Bengal  
(1700-1757)  
*Md. Abul Bashar* 757

***Research Notes***

The Threat of Terrorism in the Malang Region, Indonesia  
*Gonda Yunitro, Elfatih Abdullahi Abdelsalam, Ishtiaq Hossain  
& Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri* 779

COVID-19 and Rohingya Refugee Camps in Bangladesh  
*AKM Ahsan Ullah, Mallik Akram Hossain & Diotima Chatteraj* 793

***Conference Report***

The 9th International Conference on Business, Relations, and  
Diplomacy (ICOBIRD 2020)  
*Lili Yuyadi Arnakim* 807



# Ongoing Persecution of the Rohingya: A History of Periodic Ethnic Cleansings and Genocides

Arifa Sarmin\*

**Abstract:** In their own country, Myanmar, ethnic minority Rohingya Muslims have suffered persecution and systematic killings which amount to periodic ethnic cleansings and genocides. They are often dehumanised and frequently subjected to state-sponsored abuses and institutionalised discrimination. This article discusses the origins of the Rohingya in what was the kingdom of Arakan (now renamed Rakhine state) and how Buddhist-Muslim tensions have mounted. It argues that government authorities and Buddhist monkhood in Myanmar as a whole are involved in organised violence against the Rohingya. They incite racial hatred that contributes to the expulsion of the Rohingya community from their country. The exclusionary policies of Myanmar's military government have rendered this ethnic minority stateless and exilic in their own and neighbouring countries. They have suffered systematic oppression, discrimination, civic exclusion, enslavement, mob killing, torture, rape and sexual violence, forced labour, state harassment and so on. In the light of this observation, this article attempts to analyse the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar which dates back two centuries but has received sufficient media attention only recently.

**Keywords:** Rohingya; ethnic cleansing; genocide on the Rohingya; Arakan; Rakhine; Rohingya refugees

**Abstrak:** Di negara mereka sendiri, Myanmar, etnik minoriti Muslim Rohingya menderita akibat penganiayaan dan pembunuhan secara sistematis dan berkala yang mengakibatkan pembersihan etnik dan pembunuhan beramai-ramai. Mereka sering diperlakukan secara tidak berperikemanusiaan dan menjadi

---

\*An independent political analyst based in Dhaka. Email: arifasarmin\_96@yahoo.com

subjek penganiayaan yang disponsori oleh pihak berkuasa serta diskriminasi yang dilembagakan. Artikel ini akan membincangkan tentang asal-usul etnik Rohingya yang datang dari kerajaan Arakan (atau dinamakan kerajaan Rakhine) dan bagaimana peningkatan isu yang menyebabkan ketegangan antara Buddha-Muslim berlaku. Terdapat hujah berpendapat bahawa pihak pemerintah dan sami-sami Buddha di Myanmar terlibat secara langsung menyebabkan keganasan terancang terhadap etnik Rohingya. Mereka meniup api kebencian antara kaum yang menyebabkan kepada pengusiran komuniti Rohingya dari negara mereka. Polisi pengecualian oleh pemerintah tentera Myanmar telah menjadikan etnik minoriti ini tanpa kewarganegaraan dan berada dalam keadaan buangan di negara mereka sendiri dan negara jiran. Mereka menderita akibat penindasan, diskriminasi, pengecualian sivik, perhambaan, pembunuhan besar-besaran, penyiksaan, rogol, keganasan seksual, buruh paksa, gangguan dari pihak berkuasa negara dan lain-lain yang dirancang secara sistematik. Berdasarkan pemerhatian ini, artikel ini akan cuba menganalisis keadaan etnik Rohingya di Myanmar yang wujud sejak dua abad tetapi baru mendapat perhatian pihak media sejak kebelakangan ini.

**Kata Kunci:** Rohingya, Pembersihan Etnik, Pembunuhan beramai-ramai, Arakan, Rakhine, pelarian.

## Introduction

Globally, the exodus of vulnerable people from troubled regions is on the rise. They are driven out of their own countries by political instability, civil strife, war, oppression and genocide. When they arrive in a host country, they become unwanted aliens viewed with suspicion by many and without promise or possibility of return. Reasons for their displacement are often forgotten and the focus is generally more on what potential problems (or benefits) may result from their arrival in the host society. As a result, causes of migration and forced displacement – such as, genocide, state-sponsored repression or other mass violence in the country of origin – remain under-discussed.

In the current refugee crisis in a global context, Muslims are at the receiving end of growing prejudice and hostility and have fled their homes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kashmir, Mali, Mindanao, Myanmar, Palestine, Syria, Xinjiang (East Turkestan) and other places. Political and economic instability compel people to run away in search of safety and life opportunities only to face new sets of challenges. Approximately,



34,000 persons are displaced each day due to violence, political and social unrest, war and many other factors (Finsterwalder, 2016, p. 1). According to UNHCR's annual *Global Trends Report* (released on 19 June 2019), "nearly 70.8 million people were displaced at the end of 2018" ("Figures at a Glance"). Previously, Africa and the Arab world were the regions from which most refugees came. However, in recent times the largest and fastest overflow of refugee comes from Southeast Asia, with Myanmar being the main source.

The Rohingya are a Muslim, ethnic and linguistic minority group of Arakan officially renamed Rakhine State in 1989. The Rohingya constitute the single largest stateless population in the world, as the Buddhist-dominated Burmese administration has been persecuting them for decades and eventually deprived them of citizenship. Over the last decades, the Rohingya people have fled mainly to neighbouring countries in South and Southeast Asia as well as to distant lands in other continents "that do not want them" (Farzana, 2017, p. 1). The government of Myanmar has taken many procedures periodically to denationalise them and categorise them as 'illegal immigrants' from Bangladesh, depriving them of basic human rights, including citizenship and health services. The government has also restricted their movement and access to education.

Rakhine is close to the Naf River, bordering Bangladesh. The Rohingya minority are concentrated mainly in three northern regions of Rakhine – Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung. Accurate demographic information about the Rohingya is difficult to obtain, as the Myanmar government excluded them from the national census data. Compared to other areas in Myanmar, Rakhine is one of the poorest states in the country. Gradually, the situation worsened because of the repression by the Myanmar government over long decades. Mass killings, torture, violence, rape and systematic persecution of the Rohingya have been widely reported in the regional and international media. Given this political-historical background, in this article, the author will provide further details of the Rohingya community and a chilling catalogue of the persecution and maltreatment – at times amounting to ethnic cleansing and genocide – that the Rohingya have experienced over a long period. The discussion in this article is mainly based on archival sources, library research and qualitative evidence.

The term ethnic cleansing often refers to an organised campaign of forcibly removing a specific ethnic group from their homeland. In the case of the Rohingya crisis, though the term is frequently “used as a euphemism for genocide,” it has “no legal status” (Blum et al., 2007, p. 204). In 2017, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Husseini regarded the maltreatment of the Rohingya in Myanmar as “a textbook example of ethnic cleansing” (*UN News*, 2017). However, there seems to be an unexplained reluctance among various stakeholders to call it outright genocide even though, to “emphasize its unclear nature, the term ethnic cleansing is often prefixed by ‘so-called’” (Petrovic, 1994, p. 344). It is widely understood that, as regards the persecution of the Rohingya, even though the term ethnic cleansing is more used, it “overlaps both genocide and ethnocide” (Mirković, 1996, p. 197). The term “genocide” is “commonly used, particularly in political dialogue, to describe atrocities of great diversity, magnitude, and character” (Scheffer, 2006, p. 229); therefore, it carries a more powerful message and heavier moral weight than the term ethnic cleansing does. What is more, “coined during the Second World War,” the term genocide was “enshrined in international law in 1948” (Moses, 2004, p. 540), so it has a clear legal basis. In this article, the author argues that the Rohingya community in Myanmar has periodically faced both ethnic cleansing and genocide and both have been underway in the Rakhine state of Myanmar for a long time.

### **Background of Ethnic Rohingya**

The word ‘Arakan’ – an Arabic word derived from ‘Rukn’ – literally means pillars and semantically refers to the five fundamental pillars of Islam. Arakan has traditionally been associated with Islamic beliefs and practices. Most probably, the name Arakan became popular after the Muslim conquest of the country in 1430 (Yunus, 1994, p. 8). The word ‘Rohingya’ – derived from ‘Rohang’ – has been associated with Arakanese Muslims. This is further evidenced by the fact that, in the state capital city of Akyab (now known as Sittwe), there is still an area called Rohingya para.

Rohingya Muslims settled in Arakan in the eighth century. Afterwards, Bengalis continued to join them from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. Over a long period, they mixed with other Asian races such as “Bengalis, Persians, Moghuls, Turks and Pathans”

who “arrived and settled there” and many of whom were merchants (Sahana, Jahangir, & Anisujjaman, 2019, p. 46). According to some other historical records, Muslims lived in the Arakan kingdom and ruled the region from as early as the fifteenth century beginning “with the historic Mrauk-U dynasty (1430-1785), the golden era in terms of Muslim-Buddhist coexistence” (Hasan, 2017, p. 53).

Buddhist Naramekhla Min Saw Mon (1380-1433), who embraced Islam and is also known as Suleiman Shah, was the founder of this kingdom. He ascended the throne in 1404 and was driven out a year later in 1405. He then reinstated his throne of Arakan in 1430 with the help of Bengal Sultanate’s Sultan Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah (r. 1415-1431). Cultural influence of Muslims on subsequent Buddhist kings manifested in their nomenclature, as many of them adopted Muslim political titles like Shah (Rogers, 2016, pp. 133-34). King Naramekhla preserved Muslim names and inscribed the Kalimāh (the Islamic declaration of faith) on one side of coin and Burmese characters on the other and “maintained sea-going craft with Chittagong seamen” (Harvey, 2000, p. 140).

The Muslim Mrauk-U dynasty lasted more than 350 years until the independent Arakan state was occupied by the Burmese aggressors in 1784. Since then, the Muslim community of Arakan gradually became marginalised, lost their political rights and faced persecution under foreign occupation. Currently, Muslims in Arakan are treated as ‘foreigners’ in their own country. Due to political repression and outright killings, hundreds of thousands of Arakanese Muslims escaped across the border to East Bengal (now Bangladesh). The British colonial government (1824-1948) significantly increased the population of Myanmar by bringing in people from what are Bangladesh and India, mainly to serve their interests. Since Myanmar was part of British India until 1937, “such migration was considered internal” (“Who are the Rohingya?”). Statistics shows that the Muslim population in the country of Myanmar tripled between 1871 and 1911 (Abdelkader, 2017).

In the run-up to World War II, the Rohingya community had an understanding, and sided, with the British and in return the British had promised them partial independence in the form of an autonomous state; conversely, their Buddhist counterparts supported the Japanese. In the aftermath of the battle, the Rohingya were given some important

governmental positions but not a separate land as promised. Worse, the British government categorised them as Chittagongians, Mahomedans and Bengalis. When the Japanese period (1942-1945) started and Britain retreated, the conflict between the Buddhist Arakanese and the Muslim Arakanese flared up. Japan used the former to fight against the British and the British used the latter to retaliate. The Buddhist and the Myanmar army jointly attacked Maungdaw and Buthidaung – two predominantly Muslim townships – and killed 100,000 Rohingya Muslims in the month-long pogrom, making 500,000 of them homeless and internally displaced (Yunus, 2010, p. 35). These large-scale massacres and mass displacements have remained a blot on the annals of Muslims' history in Myanmar and an indelible stigma on the character of the country's military and Buddhist majority. During this major spate of violence, the joint forces of Myanmar military and the Buddhist extremists pushed Muslims to the north and the Buddhist Maghs "occupied the southern half of Arakan" where they now constitute the majority (Yunus, 1994, p. 11).

A so-called attempted military coup in 1976 made the situation more complicated, as it was blamed on both Buddhist and Muslim officers. Then again, in February 1978, long-time military dictator Ne Win (1911-2002) conducted a large-scale pogrom named "Operation Dragon King" (Naga-Min) that caused the death of "tens of thousands of Rohingyas" and mass exodus of more than 200,000 (Parnini, Othman and Ghazali, 2013, p. 136). The Burmese government reportedly executed Operation Dragon King as a political strategy to gain the support of the Burmese majority. The operation targeted the Rohingya under the pretext of them violating nationality laws, even though the presence of Rohingya Muslims in the region is many centuries old.

During the Maruk U Dynasty and British colonial period, Arakanese Muslims and Buddhists lived together peacefully and enjoyed civil freedom. They had a relatively better life until Myanmar achieved independence in 1948. Things turned worse for Muslims after the military coup in 1962. Prior to that, the Rohingya had full citizenship rights, participated in general elections and held various administrative posts. Subsequent political developments and changes in the country led to the introduction of new discriminatory laws that had huge repercussions on minority groups, especially the Rohingya. In 1989, the Myanmar government changed the name of the state of Arakan to

Rakhine in an attempt to erase its historic religio-cultural identity and portray it as a Buddhist state. Therefore, as Farzana (2017, p. 2) argues, “[t]he central problem of the Rohingyas is the question of the group’s political identity and hence its belonging.” Discrimination against the Rohingya further aggravated the inter-ethnic conflicts and tensions as the Rakhine Buddhists took an upper hand, while minority groups were pushed to the margins (Ahmed, 2017, p. 44).

In July 1991, the Burmese government orchestrated “Operation Pye Thaya” (literally, Operation Country of Peace) against Arakanese Muslims, killed many of them and dispossessed many others from their homelands. By April 1992, the number of them crossing into Bangladesh swelled up to 300,000. In the beginning of 2011, Myanmar’s so-called March to Democracy also wrought atrocities on, and killed and displaced, many of the Rohingya. From 2012 to 2017, similar occurrences of violence intermittently took place in the forms of killing, arson, rape, torture and mass property destruction. In 2012-2015, “an estimated 112,500 of them risked their lives on smuggler’s boats in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea in the hope of reaching Malaysia” (Tan, 2017).

Persecution on the Muslim Rohingyas progressively worsened over time. The Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (the ultimate authority for all ecclesiastical matters) and the Buddhist monastic associations called Ma Ba Tha or the 969 movement (of which the anti-Muslim radical nationalist organisation is at the forefront) stirred up anti-Muslim hatred. The Nay-Sat Kut-kwey Ye (widely known as Na Sa Ka) or the border security force formed in 1992 perpetrated repression on the Rohingya. It was later renamed Border Security Police (BGP) in July 2013 to hide its hideous past; however, it continued to commit the same human rights violations as perpetrated by its precursor.

In 1994, General Thein Sein’s government stopped issuing birth certificates to Rohingyas. However, around 400,000 of them who had white identity cards were able to vote in the 2008 constitutional referendum; and some of them served in parliament after the national elections of 2010. Tragically, even though the white cardholders were promised full citizenship, they were excluded from the 2014 census and denied citizenship and associated rights completely. The 969 movement pressured the government to pass the “Protection of Race and Religion”

act in 2015, targeting the Muslim population. Accordingly, women's "birth spacing", monogamy, marriage laws (prohibition/regulation on Buddhist-Muslim intermarriages) and religious renovations were made compulsory by law. Later, this group forbade Muslim women to wear headscarf and banned the slaughtering of cows during the Muslim religious festival of Eid al-Adha. Extortion became a common practice of the security forces and the Rohingyas are forced to routinely pay when they intend to cross the various check points set up for the vicious tactic of economic coercion. They are also subjected to systematic extortion on occasions of marriage, childbirth, building or repairing houses and attending to some other necessities. The periodic ethnic cleansing and genocide unleashed on the Rohingya in their own country is not new. The continued persecution of, and discrimination against, the Rohingya Muslims has rendered them stateless and made them one of the most vulnerable minorities in today's world.

### **Enslavement and Statelessness of the Rohingya**

Myanmar is a country of ethno-religious diversity and Rohingyas became stateless because of a delegitimation process that began during the military rule of General Ne Win. Their right to citizenship was denied by the constitution of 1974 and the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act. The Myanmar government introduced National Registration Cards (NRCs) in the 1950s seemingly to verify the citizenship of its population. However, twenty years on, in the 1970s, it stopped issuing NRCs to the Rohingya Muslims. As a result, in 1977, during the nationwide census by the military regime, about 200,000 Rohingyas were forced to flee to Bangladesh as they were declared illegal. The regime stripped the Rohingya of citizenship and associated rights. Among other events that aggravated their statelessness was the Operation Nagamin (Operation Dragon King) which launched a heinous campaign against Rohingyas in 1978 "when many Rohingyas had their official documents confiscated by inter-agency teams of inspectors" (Ullah, 2016, p. 286).

Though the Rohingya have been living in Arakan for many centuries, because of the arbitrary deprivation of citizenship, they became dispossessed in 1962 when Myanmar was ruled by Ne Win's Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). As Rahman (2010, p. 234) puts it: "After the 1962 military coup ... the Rohingyas were systematically denied their civil, political, economic, and social human rights,

culminating in the Burmese Citizenship Act of 1982.” The Citizenship Act of 1982 exclusively targeted the Rohingya community and divided citizens into three arbitrary categories: full, associated and naturalised. A description of these three groups is as follows:

Full citizens are those belonging to one of 135 ‘national races’ settled in Burma before 1823, the start of the British colonisation of Arakan. The Rohingyas do not appear in this list and the government does not recognise the term ‘Rohingya’. Associate citizenship was only granted to those whose application for citizenship under the 1948 Act was pending on the date the Act came into force. Naturalised citizenship could only be granted to those who could furnish “conclusive evidence” of entry and residence before Burma’s independence on 4 January 1948, who could speak one of the national languages well and whose children were born in Burma. Very few Rohingyas could fulfil these requirements. (Lewa, 2009, p. 11)

More specifically, these three categories were distinguished by colour codes: pink cards for full citizens, blue cards for associate or nonindigenous citizens and green cards for the naturalised. By this regulation, associate and naturalised citizenships are subject to withdrawal. Eventually, the Rohingya were denied and delisted from any title of citizenships on the ground that they were post-1823 settlers. This came despite their centuries-old habitation in Arakan. It is worth mentioning here that, prior to 1962 when Ne Win’s military rule began, as citizens of Myanmar, the Rohingya had identity cards issued by the government as well as ration cards issued by the British colonial government. However, in 1962, the government took away the identity cards in the name of verification and never returned them to their owners, who, because of this vicious bureaucratic manoeuvring, lost legal recognition (Parnini, 2013, p. 285).

In 1995, mainly due to the intervention by UNHCR, the Burmese government issued Temporary Registration Cards (TRCs) – also known as white cards – to the Rohingya. However, the government took those cards away from them in May 2015 only to subject them to a complex process of citizenship scrutiny designed in such a way that very few would pass this extremely difficult verification procedure, as they were told to prove that their “ancestors had lived in Myanmar before 1823”

(Yusuf, 2017, p. 110). Those who were qualified as citizen under the law of 1948 would no longer be qualified with the new law even if they could trace their long ancestry and despite their presence in the land which dates back to many centuries. Vast amount of illiterate Rohingyas were unable to prove it for various reasons, including lack of adequate documents. Importantly, such verification was introduced only for Rohingya Muslims and not for other ethnicities. Thus, the government and civic Buddhist extremists worked together to exclude the Rohingya from citizenship. What is more, the term 'Bengali' is being widely attached to them by the political and cultural establishments of Myanmar to describe the Rohingya Muslims as illegitimate foreigners from Bangladesh, while the Bangladeshi government "rightfully" labels them "refugees" who "ought to return" back to Myanmar (Farzana, 2017, p. 2).

The participation of Muslims in the government body of Arakan goes back as early as the fifteenth century. For example, "Rohingya representatives were elected during the colonial administration from North Arakan as Burmese nationals" (Ullah, 2016, p. 287). In 1946, General Aung San (1915-47), father of Aung San Suu Kye (1945-) marked the Rohingya as native people and gave them full rights of citizens. Prior to the military regime that began in 1962, Rohingyas participated and fielded candidates in general elections, and had numerous MPs in parliament and ministers in the cabinet. For example, in the elections of 1951 and 1956, "at least eleven Rohingyas, including women, returned to Burmese Parliament as MPs" (Iqbal, 2017). However, no Muslim was given any ministerial or deputy ministerial portfolios during the period of military regime from 1962 to 1995. Before 2015, a number of Muslims were elected members of parliament from the National League for Democracy led by the current State Counsellor of Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi. However, in the November 2015 general elections, the Rohingya could not participate as candidates. Nor could they vote, as they were made stateless on 31 May 2015. Though this election signalled the end of 50-year of direct military rule and is also called victory of democracy, media coverage little highlighted the fact that the Rohingyas were denied their right to vote in the November 2015 elections.

The movement of the Rohingya was restricted due to 1982 Citizenship Law, and later even the white cards of the Rohingya were declared null



and void by the Thein Sein government (2011-16). Carrying the tags of ‘illegal’, ‘immigrants’, and ‘foreigners’, they have been barred to travel or work within and outside their locality and became socially isolated. They have to pay money to the authority if they want to move out and the amount is determined based on the length of time they want to travel or stay outside their village.

It has become a customary practice for the Myanmar army personnel and the police to exact forced labour from the Rohingya people – men and women – some of whom are even killed if they refuse to offer such labour (Lowenstein, 2015, p. 10). One ulterior motive behind extracting such forced labour is as follows:

[F]orced labour usually lasts for 2 weeks to months. NASAKA targets those people who have wives and young daughters or sisters. As they were taken away for forced labour, their wives, sisters and daughters are left without any security. This is the time NASAKA people jump on them like crazy dogs to rape them without any resistance. (Ullah, 2016, p. 294)

Those who are subjected to forced slavery or forced labour are given inhuman and degrading treatment. The security forces (Na Sa Ka) are the main arbiters and perpetrators of forced labour. There are three prevalent types of forced labour wrested from the Rohingya: guard or sentry duty, daytime drudgery (from dawn to dusk), and portering.

Sentry duty is a coercive system that forces every able-bodied Rohingya man to work for the army on a perennial basis from nightfall to morning without any rest or reprieve. It is amongst the most dreaded sort of forced labour and is commonly accompanied by extortion and physical harassment. Penalty in the form of monetary fine and physical punishment is imposed if one fails to perform this forced labour the way the army wants. Daytime drudgery from dawn to dusk is the second form of forced labour and involves agricultural work, construction and repairs of infrastructures, cleaning and other menial work in the houses of the army personnel. There is no way to avoid this forced labour without paying huge amount of financial compensation to the military which is beyond the means of ordinary Rohingyas. Portering is the third and worst type of forced labour in which Rohingyas including underage children have to accompany military to inhospitable places like jungles,

wildernesses, high mountain slopes and other uneven terrains and carry residential, industrial and military loads. As Giannini (1999, p. 8) describes:

One particularly notorious method of forced labor is portering in which villagers are forced to carry the ammunition and supplies of the military. In addition to maltreatment by the soldiers, porters often have to act as human minesweepers, and many are killed or injured. Porters who are sick, injured, or cannot carry their heavy loads are often beaten and left behind in the jungle to die. Women porters often have to serve “double duty,” carrying the loads during the day and being raped by the soldiers at night.

As mentioned before, security forces prey upon Rohingya women in their houses when male members of the family are away on forced labour. Rape and other forms of sexual harassment are perpetrated, as women and girls stay alone without capable male members. If someone refuses or fails to comply, Ns Sa Ka thugs hang them on a tree and beat them. In the face of these most vicious forms of persecution and exploitation, eventually, the Rohingya are left with two choices: bearing these and other modes of ill treatment or leaving their homeland for an uncertain future.

The Myanmar government has continued denying all reports of crimes committed by its forces which include destruction of the Rohingya villages, beheading men and women in broad daylight, rape and killings of minors and other atrocities. These injustices have been compounded by the government’s blockade of almost all forms of international humanitarian aid, including everyday necessities such as foodstuffs, clothes and medical supplies from reaching the Rohingya people who are desperately in need of them (Abdelkader, 2017).

Additionally, a number of riots and conflicts broke out in various segments, as many amongst the Arakanese sought autonomy, re-affirming their centuries-old existence in the region and their birth right to citizenship. As mentioned earlier, the situation deteriorated subsequently when Ne Win came to power in a bloodless military coup in 1962 and started large-scale persecution of Rohingya Muslim minorities and for the first time ever, declared them foreigners (Baroud, 2017). Playing religion and race cards, Ne Win made radical changes in the demographic composition of Arakan between 1963 and 1974 and

subjected the Rohingya to social, religious and political exclusion and genocidal extermination. He also started a vilification campaign against the Rohingya, ejected many Muslim police personnel and banned all Rohingya cultural organisations.

### **The Most Recent Genocide**

After liberation from British colonial rule in 1948, the Burma Socialist Party came to power, but hatred and targeted violence against the Rohingya continued. As of 2012, “over two million Rohingyas in Rakhine and a million more reportedly live in surrounding states” (Zak, 2012) whereas only about 1 million people reside at the start of 2017 (“Myanmar Rohingya” p. 24). The Rohingya population has continued to decrease because of mass killings, displacements and dispossessions, and forced birth control. The population control policy prohibited Rohingya couples to have more than two children, or the children will lose the right to go to school, take a trip or acquire property and the police forces will be ready to fine and imprison them anytime. The discriminatory two-child policy has endangered “women’s physical, emotional, and mental health in violation of international law”, as it has impacted the wellbeing of children (Abdelkader, 2014, p. 520).

In early 1978, there was an exodus of nearly 200,000 Rohingyas to Bangladesh, as the Myanmar government launched the Rohingya genocidal operation of Naga Min (King Dragon). The survivors were intimidated and many of them left their homesteads and entered Bangladesh. Tens of thousands of Muslims were thrown into jail, many Muslim women and girls were raped in front of their parents in their homes and in the detention centres; and these practices were repeated in every spate of ethnic cleansing and genocide on the Rohingya. In 1991-92, hundreds of thousands of Rohingyas were forced to swell up into Bangladesh in the face of serious state repression.

In the recent past, repression started under the pretext of a horrific but unsubstantiated media report involving the rape and subsequent murder of a Buddhist woman allegedly by her Muslim employers on 28 May 2012. A group of Muslims who were travelling on a bus were forced off on their way back home and beaten to death by a mob of few hundred Buddhists. More violent outbursts of mayhem erupted against Muslims in areas such as Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung. Later Muslims were attacked in the state capital of Sittwe. The government decreed that

no Muslims would go to masjids for religiously compulsory Jumu'ah (Friday) prayers. Muslims ignored the decree and were subjected to harsh punitive measures and ferocious savagery at the hands of military and security forces as well as the police and the notorious Na Sa Ka. Political repression was becoming worse, as riots, attacks, casualties, burning houses, causing blood spill became widespread; dead bodies were littered on the street, burnt alive; nearly a thousand of Rohingyas were murdered, and their lands, occupied and confiscated by Buddhist crooks. As a result, as many as "140,000 Rohingyas were put in the squalid IDP (internally displaced person) camps and are branded as refugees ... while the Rakhaings were relocated in the occupied houses" (Hasan, 2017, p. 57). In 2012 alone, approximately 2,000 Rohingyas were killed, 140,000 were displaced and 50,000 fled to Bangladesh. Nearly 100,000 escaped to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia by sea (Yunus, 2010, p. 64).

In another incident in the same year, the police "fired on a crowd of Rohingyas who demanded the release of a Rohingya fisherman's body", as the former held it after killing and refused to hand it over to the bereaved family (Grieboski, 2013). Army intelligence officers persecuted Rohingya Muslims and locked up and torched many masjids. Many fled to other countries, but for the majority of Rohingyas reaching new shores was not possible for reasons of logistic and economic difficulties, while others were preyed upon by human traffickers. Those who were in their land were "trapped in a cycle of acute discrimination, trafficking, poverty, detention, extortion and deportation in the areas to which they migrated" (Parnini, Othman and Ghazali, 2013, p. 136). Violence against women and girls was rampant, as the border guards and other security forces detained them mainly for sexual exploitation and abuse, while those who chose to flee and travel by boat for safety became prey for pirates who captured them and extorted sex in exchange for shelter and onward passage.

In October 2016, another round of oppression began under the pretext of an incident allegedly involving a group of Rohingya insurgents calling themselves Harakah al-Yaqin (Faith Movement). In two weeks from 9 October 2016, hundreds were killed, numerous women were victims of sexual abuse, including violent rape, and thousands of homesteads were damaged or destroyed mainly through arson attacks and then cleared. Because of such widespread persecutions, killings and other cruelties,

as many as 75,000 Rohingyas took shelter in Bangladesh in that year alone and added to the many more who had fled there earlier (Hasan, 2017, p. 57). As of early 2019, the number of all Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to Bangladesh exceeded one million.

The latest horrendous genocide and exodus began on 25 August 2017, following reports that the so-called Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) allegedly conducted sneak attacks against police and military posts. The dissemination of such news was actually a vicious hoax designed to provide a cover up for a premeditated genocide against the Rohingya. According to Rohingyas who fled to the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar to escape genocide in Arakan, ten days before the putative ARSA attacks, the Myanmar military personnel had visited Rohingya houses in order to take by force all sharp objects such as kitchen knives and other knifelike household tools. This sudden spate of raids and seizures was intended to make sure that the Rohingyas would have little or no means to defend themselves when they would face the pre-planned genocide and cleansing operations (Akon, 2017). In about a month after the 2017 genocide on the Rohingya had started, according to Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), about "6,700 Rohingya, including at least 730 children under the age of five, were killed" (*"Myanmar Rohingya"*). A victim who managed to escape from Myanmar to Malaysia reminisces:

On the first of April, the president of Myanmar declared in the national news that there would be no more attack on Muslims' buildings. The announcement sent us a wave of relief, but later we realized that it was nothing but a diplomatic nicety of paying lip-service to political correctness. The following day, as schools began to re-open, a group of extremists burnt a school close to the place I lived, killing all students except few who managed to escape. I trembled at the thought of innocent children and teenagers being murdered in such a cruel manner. (Phyu, 2017, p. 96)

Approximately, 10,000 Rohingyas were murdered in the latest harrowing killing spree and the majority of them were killed by shots and others were burned alive or beaten to death. Soldiers, policemen, local militias and Rakhine Buddhist extremists burned down hundreds of villages to the ground, slaughtered and gang-raped women and butchered children indiscriminately. The genocide that happened in the Maungdaw village

of Tula Toli received widespread media attention, as some of the worst violence is believed to have occurred there. According to the survivors, “residents were rounded up on riverbanks and shot as they tried to flee” (McPherson, 2017). The security forces gathered women and girls into groups and then gang-raped them before killing. Thus the Burmese government forces have committed brutal and systematic rape and sexual assault against Rohingya women and girls as part of an ethnic cleansing programme.

A large number of Rohingya people left their homes by crossing the Naf River in overloaded boats. Sometimes fragile boats carrying men, women and children sunk in the river on the way to Bangladesh. The recent major genocides of 2012, 2014 and 2016-2017 cost tens of thousands of lives. In the phase of the 2017 conflict, the Commander-in-Chief of Myanmar Army Sr. Gen. Min Aung Hlaing declared to complete the “unfinished business” of “clearing the Rohingya” (Hookway, 2017). As mentioned before, in 1962, General Ne Win seized power and made stern policies to declassify the Rohingya by violating their basic human rights. He cancelled the Rohingya language programme in 1965 which was broadcasted in the Burmese Broadcasting Service that catered mainly to the Rohingya audience.

In the recent decades, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya people have sought a safe future out of Myanmar to *escape* grave human rights abuses *and* sexual violence *perpetrated by the security forces*. A census in 2009 showed that there were 500,000 Rohingya people in Saudi Arabia and 50,000 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The number of resident Rohingyas in Pakistan has been estimated at 250,000 (Anwar, 2013, p. 415). This estimation does not include Rohingyas who held Pakistani passports and migrated to other countries from Pakistan. A Rohingya victim who has been residing in Malaysia and whose spouse was gang-raped by the Burmese security forces many times recalls:

I attempted to commit suicide many times because I could not help her. She looked at me helplessly. I could not commit suicide when I thought about my daughter. One day I woke up early after I heard sound from outside and looked from the window, then I saw dark smoke from my shop. They set fire on my shop. The same day many shops and homes of Rohingyas were burnt down. I felt my last resort for our

livelihood was gone. I decided to move out of the country.  
No more here. (Ullah, 2016, p. 295)

The government and Buddhist monks deliberately marginalised and exploited the Rohingya financially, transferred their private businesses to the government, closed down their social and political organisations and launched a comprehensive campaign against them. As a result, torture of the Rohingya has become an institutional practice and their sources of earning and livelihood diminished. A Rohingya refugee describes his suffering in Myanmar thus:

[W]e used to boil taro leaves for food for days. We could not afford to buy salt to add to taro leaves. We used to collect it from roadside but even often police and army people would drive us away. My uncle died a few days before we left. He died of hunger and lack of treatment. We failed to make some food available to him. He died.... (Ullah, 2016, p. 292)

Rohingya people have fled to many countries where they now face a new set of difficulties. Persecuted in both home and host countries and losing hope of durable solutions, they have become increasingly desperate to seek a safe future (Azad & Jasmin, 2013, p. 26). Sadly, they are still fleeing their homeland and the suffering of the survivors who cannot manage to flee has remained unabated. A 10 September 2019 report of the BBC shows that the Myanmar government have built army barracks in the sites of homes that the army and Buddhist extremists burnt and destroyed in 2017 (it forced approximately 700,000 Muslim Rohingyas to flee). It is obvious that the Myanmar government has no intention to give Rohingya lands back to their owners. Such an audacious move of the Myanmar government has been possible mainly because of silence of the international community and the connivance of regional powers. In the words of a visitor to the Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh's Cox's Bazar:

The world will continue to watch, mostly in silence and apathy, while a whole generation sinks and drowns. But perhaps a final question is worth asking here: who is more unfortunate – the oppressed and persecuted Rohingya, or the 'free' whose conscience is dead? (Yunus, 2019)

## Conclusion

Systematic daily humiliation, eviction from farmlands, mass displacement from homesteads, demolitions and burning of many masjids, houses, schools, and restriction on travel even to perform Hajj are some routine maltreatment against the Rohingya people in Myanmar. They are subjected to a state sponsored violence, discriminated against socially, financially, politically and religiously, and deliberately excluded from citizenship and associated rights. In spite of the bleak picture, perhaps the Rohingya people have not stopped believing that truth and justice will prevail and their misery will end one day.

The Myanmar government is directly involved in subjecting the Rohingya to abuse and discrimination. The government machineries including the media portray them as 'foreign' inhabitants, enemies of the country and a threat to social stability. Despite decades-long oppression and sporadic genocidal violence on the Rohingya Muslims, no punishment has been meted out to the perpetrators and there is no good gesture from the Myanmar establishment to accept them as equal human beings and equal citizens. As violence escalated, regular mistreatment and misery increased, the people began to flee to Malaysia, Thailand, Pakistan, India (reportedly Jammu and Kashmir), Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, while most pour into neighbouring Bangladesh by crossing the Naf River.

The world powers seem to stay silent in the midst of statelessness and refugeehood of the Rohingya people. We have not seen the Myanmar government pursuing any effective measures to take them back to their homeland. Anti-Rohingya campaigns and Buddhist extremist atrocities still continue with abandon and impunity, while the world seems to have forgotten the Rohingya population in Myanmar. The Myanmar state media and judicial system are biased against the Rohingya, and there is little hope of any solution coming from inside Myanmar. Meaningful interventions to repatriate the Rohingya refugees and to restore their rights should come from the international community and organisations. It is time to put human rights over economic or strategic interests and stop perpetrating and condoning genocides on the Rohingya. The Organisation of Islamic Co-operation (OIC) should spread their hands actively by using all political and diplomatic tools to put pressure on the Myanmar government to solve this problem.



## References

- Abdelkader, E. (2014). "Myanmar's democracy struggle: The impact of communal violence upon Rohingya women and youth." *Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal*, 23(3), 511-42.
- Abdelkader, E. (2017, September 21). "The history of the persecution of Myanmar's Rohingya." Retrieved on 15 January 2019 from <<https://theconversation.com/the-history-of-the-persecution-of-myanmars-rohingya-84040>>.
- Ahmed, H. (2017). "A Piece of My Heart." In Raudah Yunus and Md. Mahmudul Hasan (ed.), *Displaced & Forgotten: Memoirs of Refugees* (pp. 43-56). Kuala Lumpur: Iman Publication.
- Akon, A. S. (2017, September 28). "Ethnic Cleaning Pre-Planned." *The Daily Nayadiganta*. Retrieved on Oct 19, 2019 from <<http://www.dailynayadiganta.com/detail/news/255618>>.
- Anwar, N. H. (2013). "Negotiating new conjunctures of citizenship: Experiences of 'illegality' in Burmese-Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrant enclaves in Karachi." *Citizenship Studies*, 17(3-4): 414-428.
- Azad, A., & Jasmin, F. (2013). "Durable solutions to the protracted refugee situation: The case of Rohingyas in Bangladesh." *Journal of Indian Research* 1(4): 25-35.
- Baroud, R. (2017, September 16). "The Genocide of the Rohingya: Big Oil, Failed Democracy and False Prophets." *IslamiCity*. Retrieved on Oct 6, 2019 from <<https://www.islamicity.org/13067/the-genocide-of-the-rohingya-big-oil-failed-democracy-and-false-prophets/>>
- Blum, R., Stanton, G. H., Sagi, S., & Richter, E. D. (2007). "'Ethnic cleansing' bleaches the atrocities of genocide." *European Journal of Public Health*, 18(2): 204-209.
- Farzana, K. F. (2017). *Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees: Contested Identity and Belonging*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- "Figures at a Glance". UNHCR. Retrieved on May 22, 2019 from <<https://www.unhcr.org/ph/figures-at-a-glance>>
- Finsterwalder, J. (2016). "Refugee influx: Repercussions and research agenda for service scholars." *Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services*, 37: 177-181.
- Giannini, T. R. (1999). *Destructive Engagement: A Decade of Foreign Investment in Burma*. Bangkok: EarthRights International.
- Grieboski, J. (2013). "An urgent call for justice for Rohingya Muslims." *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*. Retrieved on April 24, 2019 from <<https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online>>

- edition/an-urgent-call-for-justice-for-rohingya-muslims-by-joseph-k-grieboski>
- Hasan, M. M. (2017). "The Rohingya Crisis: Suu Kyi's False Flag and Ethnic Cleansing in Arakan." *Irish Marxist Review*, 6(19): 50-61.
- Harvey, G. E. (2000). *History of Burma*. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services.
- Hookway, J. (2017, September 2). "Myanmar Says Clearing of Rohingya Is Unfinished Business From WWII." *Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved on Oct 6, 2019 from <<https://www.wsj.com/articles/myanmar-army-chief-defends-clearing-rohingya-villages-1504410530>>.
- Iqbal, I. (2017, September 27). "Locating the Rohingya in time and space", *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved on Oct 6, 2019 from <<https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/locating-rohingya-time-space-170927100542729.html>>.
- Lewa, C. "North Arakan: An open prison for the Rohingya in Burma." *Forced Migration Review*, 32: 11-13.
- Lowenstein, A. K. (2015, October). *Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is genocide occurring in Myanmar's Rakhine State? A legal analysis*. Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School, Fortify Rights. Retrieved on Oct 6, 2019 from <[https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Yale\\_Persecution\\_of\\_the\\_Rohingya\\_October\\_2015.pdf](https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Yale_Persecution_of_the_Rohingya_October_2015.pdf)>.
- McPherson, P. (2017, December 14). "6,700 Rohingya Muslims killed in one month in Myanmar." *The Guardian*. Retrieved on Oct 6, 2019 from <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/14/6700-rohingya-muslims-killed-in-attacks-in-myanmar-says-medecins-sans-frontieres>>.
- Mirković, D. (1996). "Ethnic conflict and genocide: Reflections on ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 548(1): 191-199.
- Moses, A. D. (2004). "The Holocaust and genocide." In *The historiography of the Holocaust* (pp. 533-555), edited by Dan Stone. Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- "Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis." BBC, 24 Apr 2018. Retrieved on Oct 6, 2019 from <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561>>.
- Parnini, S. N. (2013). "The crisis of the Rohingya as a Muslim minority in Myanmar and bilateral relations with Bangladesh." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, 33(2): 281-297.
- Parnini, S. N., Othman, M. R., & Ghazali, A. S. (2013). "The Rohingya Refugee Crisis and Bangladesh-Myanmar Relations." *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal*, 22(1): 133-46.

- Petrovic, D. (1994). "Ethnic Cleansing-An Attempt at Methodology.) *Eur. J. Int'l L.*, 5: 342-59.
- Phyu, H. P. (2017). "If Only They Knew." In Raudah Yunus and Md. Mahmudul Hasan (ed.), *Displaced & Forgotten: Memoirs of Refugees* (pp. 91-105). Kuala Lumpur: Iman Publication.
- Rahman, U. (2010). "The Rohingya refugee: A security dilemma for Bangladesh." *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies*, 8(2): 233-239.
- Rogers, B. (2016). *Burma: A Nation at the Crossroads*, rev. ed. London: Random House.
- Sahana, M., Jahangir, S, & Anisujjaman, M. (2019). "Forced Migration and the Expatriation of the Rohingya: A Demographic Assessment of Their Historical Exclusions and Statelessness." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 39(1): 44-60.
- Scheffer, D. (2006). "Genocide and atrocity crimes." *Genocide Studies and Prevention*, 1(3): 229-250.
- Tan, V. (2017). "Over 168,000 Rohingya likely fled Myanmar since 2012." UNHCR Malaysia. Retrieved on 22 May, 2019 from <<https://www.unhcr.org/en-my/news/latest/2017/5/590990ff4/168000-rohingya-likely-fled-myanmar-since-2012-unhcr-report.html>>
- Ullah, A. K. M. A. (2016). "Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: Seeking Justice for the "Stateless"." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, 32(3): 285-301.
- UN News. 2017. "UN human rights chief points to 'textbook example of ethnic cleansing' in Myanmar" (11 September 2017). Retrieved on Oct 28, 2020 from <<https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/564622-un-human-rights-chief-points-textbook-example-ethnic-cleansing-myanmar>>
- Yusuf, I. (2017). "Nationalist Ethnicities as Religious Identities: Islam, Buddhism and Citizenship in Myanmar." *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 34(4): 100-119.
- Yunus, M. (1994). *A History of Arakan (Past & Present)*, Chittagong: University of Chittagong.
- \_\_\_\_\_. (2010). *Rohingya Genocide: Motives, Strategy and Causes, Prospect of Ending & Solution*. Tokyo: Toshima-Ku.
- Yunus, R. M. (2019, September 24). "Tales of Mothers: From Rohingya Refugee Camp with Love." *AboutIslam.net*. Retrieved on Oct 19, 2019 from <<https://aboutislam.net/family-life/muslims-4-humanity/tales-of-mothers-from-rohingya-refugee-camp-with-love/>>.
- Zak, R. (2012, September 19). "Backgrounder: The Rohingya of Myanmar." *Geopolitical Monitor*. Retrieved on Oct 6, 2019 from <<https://>>

[www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/backgrounder-the-rohingya-of-myanmar-4728/](http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/backgrounder-the-rohingya-of-myanmar-4728/)>.



# In This Issue

## *Note from the Editor*

### *Research Articles*

**Osman Bakar**

The Link between Coronavirus and Darwin according to Pervez Hoodbhoy: A Critical Response

**Abdul Rashid Moten**

The Politics of Manipulation: Malaysia 2018-2020

**Luqman Zakariyah, Mohammed Farid Ali al-Fijawi, Rahmah Binti Ahmad H. Osman, Shukran Abd Rahman & Suhaimi Mhd. Sarif**

The Theoretical Framework for Measuring Key Intangible Performance (KIP) in Research and Publication Using Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah (MS)

**Mohammad Yusri Yubhi Bin Md Yusoff, Thameem Ushama & Adibah Abdul Rahim**

The Concept of Ghulūw in Islam: An Analysis on Its Manifestations and Causes in The Modern World

**Anke Iman Bouzenita**

Transgressing the Terms of Covenant in the Islamic Jurisprudence of International Relations: The Cases of Socotra and Cyprus in Comparison

**M. Hedayatul Islam, Md Saidul Islam & Fadzli Adam**

Preventive Measures for a Healthy Life: Towards an Islamic Perspective with Reference to COVID-19

**Rosdianah Binti Yacho & Arshad Islam**

The Effects of Japanese Occupation in Sabah: During and After World War II (1941-1963)

**Daleeer Kaur Randawar & Akbar Kamarudin @ Abdul Shukor**

Non-Parental Child Custody Rights: A Comparative Perspective

**Kamaruzzaman Abdul Manan, Shafizan Mohamad & Muhamad Mat Yakim**

Political Communication and Election Campaigning on Instagram During the 14th Malaysian General Election

**Siti Noralia Mustaza & Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin**

ASEAN, China and the South China Sea Territorial Disputes: Analysis of Conflict Management Strategies

**Mariyam Shahuneeza Naseer & Dawood Abdulmalek Yahya Al-Hidabi**

Quality Assurance in Higher Education in the Maldives: Are We Listening to the Students?

**Rabi'ah Aminudin, Izzuddin M. Jaafar & Elmira Akhmetova**

Going to Hell or Heaven? An Analysis of Malaysian Muslims' Perspectives on Extremism in Religion

**Abdul Aqmar Ahmad Tajudin & Mohammad Agus Yusoff**

Challenges of the Multinational Federation: The Case of Malaysia, 2008-2020

**Arifa Sarmin**

Ongoing Persecution of the Rohingya: A History of Periodic Ethnic Cleansings and Genocides

**Adeela Rehman & Nurazzura Mohamad Diah**

Managing Women's Matter: A Cross-Cultural Study of Doctor-Patient Relationship in Pakistan and Malaysia

**Abdullahi Ayoade Ahmad, Mohd Afandi Bin Salleh & Abdul Majid Hafiz Bin Mohamed**

Can U.S. Aid and Assistance Continue Playing a Soft Power Role in the Muslim World?

**Hamda Binti Khalifah Almuheiri & Mohammed Abdullais**

Leadership Characteristic Features: An Ethical Review from the Perspective of the Qur'an and the Sunnah

**Md. Abul Bashar**

The Bureaucratic Corruption Leading to the Fall of Bengal (1700-1757)

### *Research Notes*

### *Conference Report*

ISSN 0128-4878 (Print)

ISSN 2289-5639 (Online)

