

# Intellectual Discourse

---

Volume 26

Number 2

2018



**International Islamic University Malaysia**  
<http://journals.iium.edu.my/intdiscourse/index.php/islam>



# CONTENTS

## ***Editorial***

*Ishtiaq Hossain* 513

## ***Special Articles***

Politics of Forced Migration and Refugees: Dynamics of  
International Conspiracy?  
*Md. Moniruzzaman* 519

Roots of Discrimination Against Rohingya Minorities:  
Society, Ethnicity and International Relations  
*AKM Ahsan Ullah and Diotima Chatteraj* 541

Exploring Ways to Provide Education in Conflict Zones:  
Implementation and Challenges  
*Kamal J. I. Badrasawi, Iman Osman Ahmed and Iyad M. Eid* 567

Political Settlement Analysis of the Blight of Internally  
Displaced Persons in the Muslim World: Lessons  
from Nigeria  
*Ibrahim O. Salawu and Aluko Opeyemi Idowu* 595

## ***Research Articles***

Women's Work Empowerment through "Re-upcycle"  
Initiatives for Women-at-home  
*Rohaiza Rokis* 617

The Islamization of the Malaysian Media: A Complex  
Interaction of Religion, Class and Commercialization  
*Shafizan Mohamed and  
Tengku Siti Aisha Tengku Mohd Azzman* 635

Rise of Central Conservatism in Political Leadership:  
Erbakan's National Outlook Movement and the 1997  
Military Coup in Turkey  
*Suleyman Temiz* 659

Language Policy and Practices in Indonesian Higher Education Institutions <i>Maskanah Mohammad Lotfie and Hartono</i>	683
A Novel Critique on ‘The Scientific Miracle of Qur’an Philosophy’: An Inter-Civilization Debate <i>Rahmah Bt Ahmad H. Osman and Naseeb Ahmed Siddiqui</i>	705
Duties and Decision-Making Guidelines for Shari‘ah Committee: An Overview of AAOIFI <i>Muhammad Nabil Fikri Bin Mhd Zain and Muhammad Amanullah</i>	729
Waqf Institutions in Malaysia: Appreciation of Wasatiyyah Approach in Internal Control as a Part of Good Governance <i>Nor Razinah Binti Mohd. Zain, Rusni Hassan and Nazifah Mustaffha</i>	749
Muslim Jurists’ Debate on Non-Muslim Religious Festivals and Its Effect on Muslims in the United States <i>Ali Ahmed Zahir</i>	765
Archaeological Analysis of Arabic-Malay Translation Works of Abdullah Basmeih <i>Azman Ariffin, Kasyfullah Abd Kadir and Idris Mansor</i>	785
<i>Takyīf Fiqhī</i> and its Application to Modern Contracts: A Case Study of the Central Provident Fund Nomination in Singapore <i>Mohamed El Tahir El Mesawi and Mohammad Rizhan bin Leman</i>	807
Revisiting English as a Foreign Language (EFL) Vs. English Lingua Franca (ELF): The Case for Pronunciation <i>Wafa Zoghbor</i>	829
“How did we Choose?” Understanding the Northern Female Voting Behaviour in Malaysia in the 14th General Election <i>Ummu Atiyah Ahmad Zakuan, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, Norehan Abdullah, and Zaireeni Azmi</i>	859

- Unintended Consequences? The Commodification of Ideas  
in Tertiary Education and their Effects on Muslim Students  
*Anke Iman Bouzenita, and Bronwyn Wood* 883
- Ultra Petita and the Threat to Constitutional Justice:  
The Indonesian Experience  
*Muhammad Siddiq Armia* 903
- Methods of Qur’ānic Memorisation (Ḥifẓ):  
Implications for Learning Performance  
*Mariam Adawiah Dzulkifli, and Abdul Kabir Hussain Solihu* 931
- Book Reviews**
- Saudi Arabia in Transition: Insights on Social, Political,  
Economic and Religious Change by Bernard Haykel, Thomas  
Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix (Eds.). New York, USA:  
Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 351,  
ISBN: 978-0-521-18509-7  
*Syaza Farhana Shukri* 949
- ‘Arab Spring’: Faktor dan Impak (‘Arab Spring’: Factors  
and Impact). Edited by Wan Kamal Mujani & Siti Nurulizah  
Musa. Bangi: Penerbit Fakulti Pengajian Islam,  
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. 2015, pp. 164.  
ISBN 978-967-5478-91-8.  
*Mohd Irwan Syazli Saidin* 952
- Faith in an Age of Terror. Edited by Quek Tze Ming and  
Philip E. Satterthwaite. Singapore: Genesis Books,  
Singapore, 2018, pp.150.  
ISBN: 978-981-48-0707-4  
*Rabi’ah Aminudin* 956
- Karl Marx: Greatness and Illusion. By Gareth Stedman Jones.  
London: Penguin Books, 2017, pp. 768. Paper Back.  
ISBN 978-0-141-02480-6  
*Zahid Zamri* 959

***Research Note***

“O People of the Book”: An Exegetical Analysis  
of the Ahl al-Kitāb in Qur’ānic Discourse

*Jonathan Alexander Hoffman*

965

***Conference Report***

International Conference on Religion, Culture and Governance in the  
Contemporary World (ICRCG2018) 3-4 October 2018  
(Wednesday-Thursday) 23-24 Muharram 1440.

*Atiqur Rahman Mujahid*

979

# Political Settlement Analysis of the Blight of Internally Displaced Persons in the Muslim World: Lessons from Nigeria

Ibrahim O. Salawu\* and Aluko Opeyemi Idowu\*\*

**Abstract:** The menace of conflicts and natural disasters in different states of the world had spiralled into a global phenomenon of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). These are groups of humans who had helplessly drifted away from their natural and ancestral home due to conflicts and disasters but had not crossed international boundaries into another country. They merely take solace by the protection offered by the spirit and letters of relevant international laws which have domesticated by member states. This paper seeks to answer the question regarding the extent to which the IDPs have become a menace in Nigeria. The paper reveals that many governments' actions are the primary and the root cause of the IDPs while others are recipient of the domino effect. The paper relies on a panel data elicited from thirteen out of the thirty six states in Nigeria. The paper reveals the need for urgent measures by government to douse the upsurge in the number of IDPs. The political settlement analysis was used to proffer a better way of culminating the crises. Recommendations are directed to the individuals, civil societies and the government at all levels.

**Keyword:** Internally Displaced, Nigeria, Political Settlement, Refugee and Urban Violence

**Abstrak:** Ancaman konflik dan bencana alam dalam pelbagai negara di dunia ini telah merebak dalam fenomena global Orang Pelarian Dalam (IDP). IDP adalah kumpulan manusia yang terpaksa melarikan diri jauh dari kediaman

---

\* Department of Politics and Governance, Kwara State University, Malete Kwara State, Nigeria. Email: [ibrahimsalus@gmail.com](mailto:ibrahimsalus@gmail.com)

\*\* Aluko Opeyemi Idowu, Department of Politics and Governance, Kwara State University, Malete Kwara State, Nigeria. Email: [opealukoheavenprogress@gmail.com](mailto:opealukoheavenprogress@gmail.com)

mereka sendiri disebabkan oleh konflik dan bencana alam tetapi tidak keluar dari sempadan negara mereka. Mereka tidak diberikan keistimewaan untuk perlindungan yang ditawarkan oleh undang-undang antarabangsa seperti yang dipersetujui oleh negara-negara anggota. Kajian ini adalah untuk mencari jawapan kepada persoalan berkaitan sejauh mana IDP menjadi ancaman kepada Nigeria. Kertas kajian ini mendedahkan bahawa banyak tindakan kerajaan mereka sendiri menjadi penyebab utama IDP manakala yang lain-lain sebagai kesan domino. Kajian ini bergantung kepada data panel tiga belas daripada tiga puluh enam negeri di Nigeria. Kajian ini juga mendedahkan keperluan langkah segera oleh kerajaan untuk mengelakkan peningkatan jumlah IDP. Analisis penyelesaian politik ini digunakan untuk mencadangkan cara yang lebih baik bagi meredakan krisis. Semua cadangan adalah disasarkan untuk individu, masyarakat dan semua peringkat dalam kerajaan.

**Kata kunci:** Pelarian dalaman, Nigeria, Penyelesaian politik, Pelarian, Keganasan urban

## Introduction

The internal displacement of people among nations is a global challenge. There are over 65 million people in dire need of protection and assistance as a consequence of crises and various disasters resulting in forced displacement all over the world. These people include refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and asylum-seekers. Globally, over 40 million people are displaced within their own country, while more than 21 million are refugees, and over 3 million are asylum-seekers. An estimated 12.4 million people were newly displaced due to conflict or persecution in 2015. Alarmingly, fifty one percent (51%) of the global refugee population are children under 18, the highest proportion in a decade. In addition, women and girls represent fifty percent (50%) of the entire refugee population (UNHCR Global Trends 2015; IDMC 2016).

Syria remains the world's largest country of origin for refugees in 2015 with over 4.9 million people, followed by Afghanistan with over 2.5 million, and Somalia with over a million people. They are followed by South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic, Myanmar/Burma, and Eritrea. Around four-fifths of the world's refugees have fled from areas of crisis to neighbouring countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan



and Turkey. **Turkey is the largest refugee-hosting country** with 2.5 million refugees. Turkey is followed closely by Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Ethiopia and Jordan (UNHCR Global Trends 2015). A **total of** about forty one million (40.8 million) internally displaced people (IDPs) were displaced as a result of conflict and violence at the end of 2015, an increase of about three million (2.8 million). Currently the states most impacted are Syria (6.6 million) and Colombia (over 6.3 million). They are followed by both Iraq and Sudan with over 3 million each. Yemen, Nigeria, South Sudan, Ukraine, DRC and Pakistan complete the list of the top ten countries, which together account for seventy five percent (75%) of the world's IDPs (IDMC 2016).

The phenomenon of internal displacement, however, is not new. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA 2003), the Greek government argued to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in 1949 that people displaced internally by war should have the same access to international aid as refugees, even if they did not need international protection. India and Pakistan repeated this argument after partition. Recognition of internal displacement emerged gradually through the late 1980s, and became prominent on the international agenda in the 1990s. The chief reasons for this attention were the growing number of conflicts causing internal displacement after the end of the Cold War and an increasingly strict international migration regime.

It has been estimated that between 70% and 80% of all IDPs are women and children. Displaced persons suffer significantly higher rates of mortality than the general population. In addition, they remain at high risk of physical attacks, sexual assaults, abduction, and frequently deprived of adequate shelter, food and health services. The overwhelming majority of internally displaced persons are women and children who are especially at risk of their basic rights being abused. Internally displaced people tend to remain close to, or become trapped in zones of conflict, where they could be caught in the cross-fire and at risk of being used as targets or human shields by insurgents.

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, created in 1998, restate and compile existing international human rights and humanitarian law germane to the internally displaced. In addition, it also attempts to clarify any grey areas and gaps in the various instruments with regard

to situations of particular interest to internally displaced people. The Guiding Principles note that arbitrary displacement in the first instance is prohibited (Principles 5-7). Once persons have been displaced, they retain a broad range of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, including the right to basic humanitarian assistance (such as food, medicine, shelter), the right to be protected from physical violence, the right to education, freedom of movement and residence. Even political rights, such as the right to participate in public affairs and the right to participate in economic activities are retained (Principles 10-23).

The IDPs in Nigeria grew through a dramatic scale of progression. There are about three million (3.3 million) IDPs across Nigeria with Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States having 1,434,149; 136,010, and 131,203 IDPs respectively. The primary root cause of the crises which led to internal displacement is uneven development and mass poverty in the region. This scenario piled up and lingered in the polity for a long time with little to no attention from the state governments. These eventually triggered ethno-religious sentiments, resulting in the emergence of violent insurgence groups such as the Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen Insurgencies. This paper seeks to make a synopsis of the state of IDPs in developing states, particularly Nigeria, in world politics and to proffer a leeway for countries in protracted conflicts in developing states and other polities.

The theoretical framework of political settlement analysis as used in this paper explains the operation of amicable settlement, and the phenomenon of the build-up of the current social crises nemesis leading to internal displacements. The leeway out of this nemesis are also analysed in the framework. Conclusions is premised on the fact that many lives lost would not have been lost if the actors and stakeholders involved in the menace had seek for constructive collaborations to mitigate the crises instead of political alignment melancholy, ethnical chauvinism and religious bigotry paraded over national development. The recommendations are centred on collaborations between both international and local stakeholders so as to judiciously utilise available resources to rehabilitate IDPs back to their homes and minimise the root causes of crises in the community through a collective development approach.

## Conceptual Clarification

### Refugee

According to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, the definition of “refugee” is outlined as a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is now living outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or due to such fear or panic, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. Subsequent international instruments, such as the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, have expanded this definition for some states to persons fleeing the general effects of armed conflict and, or, natural disaster (UNHCR 2016).

A crucial requirement to be considered a “refugee” is crossing an international border. Persons forcibly displaced from their homes that cannot or choose not to cross a border, therefore, are not considered refugees even if they share many of the same circumstances and challenges as those who do. Unlike refugees, these internally displaced persons do not have a special status in international law with rights specific to their situation (Redmond 2009). Refugees are persons who are forced to leave the country in which he or she lives because of a well-founded fear of persecution. Such persecution may stem from race, religion, nationality, political opinions, or membership in a social group. An international agreement, adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 1951, established this definition in international law. The definition of a refugee is sometimes extended to people who flee their countries because of wars, human rights violations, and other disturbances. In popular usage, the term *refugee* is applied more generally to any individual who has been forced to flee from his or her home.

People who flee their homes seek *asylum* (safety and protection) in another country. According to the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” However, not all countries wish to host refugees. Some countries fear that refugees may compete with the

citizenry for scarce resources, or that their presence may worsen racial, ethnic, religious, or economic conflict. In addition, the host country may not want to upset relations with the country of origin by accepting its refugees.

Refugees receive assistance from international and local organizations in acquiring necessities such as food, shelter, and healthcare when they seek asylum in another country. These organizations house the refugees in refugee camps until it is safe to return to their home country. If returning appears unlikely, they seek to resettle the refugees either in the host country, or another country. However, some refugees remain in camps for years. For many refugees, the flight to safety is not the end of the ordeal, but only its beginning (Redmond 2009).

The Encyclopaedia Britannica (2012) opined that a refugee is any uprooted, homeless, involuntary migrant who has crossed a frontier and no longer possesses the protection of his former government. Prior to the 19th century, the movement from one country to another did not require passports and visas; and the right to asylum was commonly recognized and honoured. Although there have been numerous waves of refugees throughout history, there was no refugee problem until the emergence of fixed and closed state frontiers in the late 19th century. By the 1920s and '30s, the tradition of political asylum deteriorated considerably, partly due to the growing insensitivity to human suffering, and partly because of unprecedented numbers of refugees (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2012).

### **Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)**

The most commonly applied connotation is the one coined by the former UN Secretary-General's Representative on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Francis Deng (1994), and used in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GP): Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border (OCHA 1999; Federal Republic of Nigeria 2012).

The main difference between IDPs and refugees is that the internally displaced remain within the borders of their own country. Refugee

status entitles individuals to certain rights and international protection, while being an IDP is not a legal status because they are still under the jurisdiction of their own government and may not claim any additional rights to those shared by the refugees. However, IDPs are often in need of special protection, not least because the government responsible for protecting them is sometimes unwilling or unable to do so, or may itself be the cause of their displacement.

Despite the differences in legal status and of entitlement to aid from the international humanitarian community, the causes of displacement and the experience of being displaced are often similar for both IDPs and refugees. Much like refugees, IDPs often feel like strangers in their place of refuge where the local population may be from a different ethnic and or religious group and, or, may speak another language. Consequently, IDPs may not feel welcomed, despite sharing the same citizenship as the host population (Barutciski, 1999).

Generally, people who migrate voluntarily are not considered refugees. At the same time, not everyone who is “forced” to migrate is considered a refugee. People who flee persecution or violence, but do not enter another country are considered Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) rather than refugees. Others not classified as refugees but as IDPs, are people who are forced to leave their homes because natural disasters such as floods, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and droughts (Redmond 2009).

IDPs have been forced to leave their homes in search of safety; either fleeing armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations or natural disasters. They are often more vulnerable to rights abuses than other migrant groups because there are fewer international and national legal instruments that apply directly to IDPs. In addition, they tend not to receive the same international recognition and subsequent protections that refugees do because they have not crossed an international border. While scholars, institutions, and international organizations have increasingly focused on IDPs, there are still many unanswered questions, and humanitarian and human rights responses continue to seek better ways of understanding and responding to the needs of IDPs.

It may be possible to identify two main views, or schools, in this debate. On one side of the debate are the UN and the Brookings-Bern

Project on Internal Displacement (2004) (formerly the Brookings-SAIS project). They have been advocates for a separate humanitarian category of IDPs, an argument that continues to dominate the tone of most IDP research. The opposing view is represented by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Based on humanitarian principles and the realities of the field, the ICRC is critical about working with the internally displaced people as a separate humanitarian category, and on the grounds that the ICRC does not separate between IDPs, refugees and other civilians affected by conflict (Brookings-Bern, 2004).

## **Theoretical Framework**

### **Political Settlements Analysis**

Internally displaced persons are mostly forcefully evicted from their homes due to conflict situations. Conflicts can be settled in a more peaceful atmosphere amidst all odds if the warring factions and actors give reconciliation a chance. The series of conflicts in Nigeria that resulted in a mammoth crowd of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) can be laid to rest on the platform of mutual understanding between state and non-state actors. There is growing recognition within the international development community that political settlements can be a significant factor in determining the success or failure of a state. Instead of accepting the political status quo as a given, the political settlements framework implies that international actors recognize they have a degree of influence in shaping the direction and balance of power in elite politics, which in turn shapes institutions of development, security, and governance. While many current models have focused on reforming a single set of issues or sectors, the political settlements approach focuses on the central structure of power that determines the overall pace and direction of development and change in a country.

The political settlements that we observe today have evolved over time, sometimes as the product of many years of struggle, often violent, between contending elite groups. The evolution of political settlements in developing countries often resembles a game of musical chairs; constantly shifting elite factions come in and out of power over time. In unstable or fragile regions, new political settlements may emerge every few years as dominant elites seek to consolidate power by any means necessary, often leading to a winner-take-all political environment (Parks and Cole 2010). As societies evolve, political elites are more likely to

follow certain patterns of political competition and cooperation, leading to the establishment of more robust and durable political settlements.

The concept of political settlements has emerged through convergence of thought by a diverse group of theorists, researchers, and practitioners. First, some political economists have been trying to formulate a new theoretical basis for understanding the barriers to development in national contexts through a critique of new institutional economics. Second, a small group of bilateral donors and international development agencies have been tackling the problems of establishing a more durable foundation for peace and long-term development in the context of violent conflict and extremely weak government (Mushtaq 2009; Brown and Gravingholt 2009; Jonathan and Putzel 2009). Third, a few international development organizations, driven by deep local knowledge and decades of on-the-ground experience, have generated new thinking and experimentation with relevant programmatic models (Jonathan and Putzel 2009).

Recent DFID literature provides a sound working definition of political settlement as an expression of a common understanding, usually forged between elites, about how power is organized and exercised (DFID 2010). Other definitions have been used to capture aspects of political settlements, including elite-enforced social orders, informal balance of power, and informal rules of the game (Jonathan and Putzel 2009). The fundamental insight of the political settlements framework is that governance, stability, and the quality and pace of development are viewed as the outcome of struggles and ensuing arrangements among powerful elites. These struggles largely involve informal processes of conflict, negotiation, and compromise. Political settlement is a descriptive term that characterizes the nature of the arrangements among elites to manage conflict.

The political settlements framework provides an alternative approach to understanding conflict resolution capable of displacing citizens and influencing factors that shape development, governance and security. This framework places the power and interests of key political, economic, and security actors at the centre of the development process (Parks and Cole 2010). These actors use their influence to proactively shape and adjust formal institutions of governance, as well as policies to help create and maintain conditions that advance their interests. From

this perspective, state institutions are seen as malleable, even highly malleable, in earlier phases of development and in unstable and fragile environments.

The political settlements framework is useful for rethinking development in the context of nearly all developing countries. However, it is particularly relevant for countries affected by protracted conflict, fragile conditions, and state failure which result in the global crises of internally displacement of people and refugees. According to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), inclusive and stable political settlements are considered a critical foundation for both state building and peace building, and ongoing fragility and violence are often directly associated with highly exclusionary, predatory, unstable, or entrenched political settlements. Recent discussions within development policy circles have focused on how state building and peace building can support the emergence of inclusive, robust, and ultimately sustainable political settlements in the aftermath of war.

#### **Factor Conditioning Political Settlements:**

1) A powerful, excluded elite faction “opts in” to the political settlement: When a powerful elite group that formerly sought to destabilize existing arrangements joins the political settlement, the settlement becomes more durable. In addition, it may make the settlement more inclusive, if the group represents a significant portion of the population that was previously excluded. One possible scenario is when a ruling coalition brings new political factions or opposition parties into their government, making the political settlement stronger and more inclusive

2) A new alliance is formed between excluded groups and an elite faction: When an elite faction seeks an alliance with the leadership of a discontented minority and champions that minority’s causes, this can generate pressure for major adjustments in the political settlement. Such alliances may be used by factions in the dominant coalition to strengthen their position in the current political settlement, or they may be used by excluded elites to press for inclusion in the settlement.

3) An influential new group emerges: The emergence of a new elite faction or a well-organized, influential middle class, has been an important factor in the evolution of political settlements. In many cases, the emergence of an independent, organized entrepreneurial class, with



access to significant resources, has led to changes in key institutions and the emergence of new elite coalitions.

4) Non-elite groups mobilize around shared interests for reform: There are occasions when non-elite groups can mobilize enough people to put substantial pressure on elite coalitions to modify the political settlement. Occasionally, the leadership of these movements comes from the non-elite level, though they may be in alliance with elite groups. In cases such as these, the result is the emergence of a significantly revised national political settlement that may be characterized by greater inclusiveness, but also by deteriorating stability in the short term.

5) A state agency becomes powerful and independent of the settlement: In many cases, the leadership of militaries and powerful ministries are political actors themselves; becoming the dominant faction in a coalition that reshapes the political settlement. A military coup is the most common example of this type of change in the political settlement. Military leadership has the ability to threaten and coerce, and therefore it may have the ability to impose a political settlement on other elite factions.

6) Changes in legitimacy of the state or of its leadership: Public perceptions of the legitimacy of the state and its leadership have important implications for the resilience of a political settlement. As legitimacy erodes, potential opponents of the ruling coalition, especially excluded factions or factions within the ruling coalition, may see opportunities for changing the settlement.

7) Changes in coercive capacity under the control of the dominant elite coalition: When the ruling coalition increases its coercive capacity, and the threat to use that capacity becomes more credible, potential competitors may be forced to accede to changes in the settlement that favour the dominant elite faction. Similarly, the political settlement can become more unstable if the coercive capacity of the ruling coalition - its control of the police, military, or other armed forces, deteriorates.

8) An alliance of excluded elites challenges the current ruling coalition and the settlement it has established: When powerful excluded factions join forces to challenge the ruling coalition, this can lead to the collapse of the old settlement and the emergence of a new settlement. This has profound implications for stability, inclusiveness and development.

9) An outside force intervenes: When an outside power intervenes militarily against the ruling coalition, the current political settlement often collapses. The external force may then strengthen the hand of one or more elite factions, and broker a new settlement. However, the new political settlement that emerges from this type of event is often very unstable, especially when perceived to be a creation of the intervening power.

### **How Political Settlements Are Maintained**

There are several different ways that ruling coalition(s) typically establish, consolidate, or strengthen a political settlement and prevent crises leading to IDPs, refugees or state failure. The most basic example is coercion. The ultimate form of coercion is to amass the capacity to use, or threaten to use, physical force. This generally means securing control of the police and military forces. In extremely fragile conditions (e.g., a situation of state collapse), for an elite coalition to prevail, it must assemble enough military power to defend against, or defeat, competing coalitions (Parks and Cole 2010). More generally, coercion includes actions by the ruling coalition to impose their interests on other groups, including excluded elites that might challenge it.

The second method for sustaining a political settlement is through co-optation of potential threats from powerful excluded elites. This is often done by allowing these elite groups a role in the political settlement, which then may be formalized in, for example, a new coalition government. The third method to consolidate the position of a ruling coalition, and ultimately the most important for the long-term viability of a political settlement, is through building and maintaining the legitimacy of state institutions established and shaped through the political settlement. Alan Whaites (2008) notes that “even the most repressive states seek to stake a claim to some form of legitimacy, essentially a claim that state institutions have a moral right to continue to lead the state building process.” The more widely the claim to legitimacy is accepted, the greater the prospects for stability of the political settlement.

The fourth method through which political settlements are maintained is through the actions of the international community. International actors may exert a stabilizing influence through a wide range of mechanisms (Parks and Cole 2010). One obvious method

is through the presence of external security forces, which are able to extend or reinforce the capacity of the ruling coalition to keep potential competitors in check. Massive foreign assistance transfers may also strengthen a political settlement, especially insofar as the ruling coalition is able to capture most of the benefits.

### **A Synopsis of Internally Displaced People (IDP) in Nigeria**

It is estimated that there are twenty six million (26 million) IDPs worldwide as a result of various conflicts. About fourteen million (13.5 million) are children, and about three million (3.3 millions) IDPs of the world are Nigerians. At the international level, no single agency or organization has been designated as the global leader in regards to the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons. Rather, agencies and international organizations cooperate with each other to help address the needs of the IDPs. As a crucial element of sovereignty, it is the Governments of the states where internally displaced persons are found that have the primary responsibility for their assistance and protection. The role of the international community is merely complementary (OHCHR 2016)

Generally internally displaced children are driven away from the schools of their original home communities through civil insurrection, ethnic conflict, tsunami, typhoon, flood, drought, earthquake, volcanic eruption or other factors. Children, along with their parents who are involved in the mass migrations, leave the place where they may have been able to access primary education, and usually settle temporarily in a place where there is no provision of education.

The armed violence affecting many African countries is generating massive humanitarian consequences for entire communities. Karl Anton Mattli (2015)—Head of Delegation in Nigeria for the International Committee of the Red Cross, perceived that People living in the Lake Chad region and in north-east Nigeria are extremely exposed to armed conflict, and an estimated 2.4 million people have been displaced, and about seven million (7 million) people are in need of assistance. The IDMC (2015) *preliminary* estimates indicated that there are nearly two million (2,152,000) internally displaced people (IDPs) in Nigeria.

Nigeria as the largest black nation in the world, and the biggest in Africa polity, is having a huge share of the socio-economic, geographical

and political problems caused by communal clashes and internal insurrections. Wide spread poverty, among other factors such as little or no trust for the government by the citizens within the polity, cumulates to sparks of crises which led to displacement of the people from their homes (Aluko, Mu'awiyya and Balogun 2015). The major sources of internally displaced persons in Nigeria are the Boko Haram Insurgency in the North-East, the Federal government counter insurgency in the North, Farmers-Fulani Herders feud in the North, Central and Eastern Nigeria, and the Niger-Delta illegal oil bunker crises. The figures based on the assessment conducted by the International Organization for Migration's (IOM) and Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) team in 2016, using selected Northern and Central states in Nigeria 207 Local Government Areas (LGA) covering 13 States of Nigeria, is represented in Table I and Figure I and II below.

The DTM teams were composed of IOM staff, members of NEMA, the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), Nigerian Red Cross Society and other humanitarian partners on the field. The displacement assessments were conducted with key informants from LGAs, wards, and IDP sites (both in official camps and camp-like settings), as well as people in host communities. The assessments resulted in individual and household displacement estimates, including the identification of wards within the LGA with displaced populations and the type of displacement locations, reason for displacement, displacement history, livelihood and return intention, and time of arrival of IDPs as well as their place of origin.


*Table I*

S/N	STATES	NO of IDPs	PERCENTAGE	GENERAL REASONS FOR DISPLACEMENT
1.	Abuja	13,481	0.63%	Boko Haram Insurgency
2.	Adamawa	136,010	6.32%	Boko Haram Insurgency
3.	Bauchi	70,078	3.26%	Boko Haram Insurgency
4.	Benue	85,393	3.97%	Fulani Herdsmen Insurgency
5.	Borno	1,434,149	66.64%	Boko Haram Insurgency
6.	Gombe	25,332	1.18%	Boko Haram Insurgency
7.	Kaduna	36,976	1.72%	Boko Haram Insurgency

8.	Kano	9,331	0.43%	Boko Haram Insurgency
9.	Nasarawa	37,553	1.75%	Boko Haram Insurgency
10.	Plateau	77,317	3.59%	Boko Haram Insurgency
11.	Taraba	50,227	2.33%	Boko Haram Insurgency
12.	Yobe	131,203	6.09%	Boko Haram Insurgency
13.	Zamfara	44,929	2.09%	Boko Haram Insurgency
	TOTAL	2,151,979	100.00%	

Source: (IOM/NEMA 2015)

Figure I Showing IDPs in Borno and other States in Nigeria



The Table I and figure I above shows the number and the corresponding percentage of the internally displaced people in thirteen selected states in Northern and Central States in Nigeria. Figure I specifically shows that Borno State has IDPs of above one million persons (1,434,149), about sixty seven percent (66.64%) of the total displaced in Nigeria. The general cause of this internal displacement is the Boko Haram insurgency from 2012 to 2018, and the federal government’s counter insurgency. This revealed that Borno state is the epicentre of the insurgency, and requires more attention from the Nigerian government and the international community. The primary root cause of the crises were acute poverty, strong individual non state

actors, gross neglect of the citizens’ welfare by the state government and weak and rather late reactive actions instead of strong proactive actions of the federal government. The political settlement applicable to this raging situation is to stop the reign of impunity, nepotism, favouritism and empowerment of a few non-state actors at the expense of the others with transparency and accountability in the public and private sectors.

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria other than Borno State**

*Figure II Showing IDPs in Nigeria without Borno State*




Table I and Figure II above shows the number and the corresponding percentage of the internally displaced people in thirteen selected Northern and Central States in Nigeria. Figure II shows the other twelve states, other than Borno State. As revealed in Figure I, Borno state has about sixty seven percent (66.64%) of the total internally displaced in Nigeria, the other states that closely follow it are Adamawa and Yobe States with about 136,010 and 130,000 internally displaced respectively. The percentages are about 6.32% and 6.09% respectively. The general cause of this internal displacement in many of the Northern states in Nigeria is the Boko Haram insurgency from 2012 to 2018. This revealed that the Boko Haram insurgency has had a protracted effect on the country, and this requires more attention from the government of Nigeria and the international community.

It can be inferred that the general root cause of the internal displacement of people in Benue, a Central state in Nigeria, is the Fulani Herdsmen Insurgency. This displaced about eighty five thousand (85,393) persons, about four percent (3.97%) of the displaced persons in Nigeria. The primary and the root cause of the ripple effects of the insurgency were acute poverty, climate change and greed on the part of the Fulani herders, strong individual non-state actors, gross neglect of the citizens' welfare by the state government, and weak reactive actions instead of strong proactive actions of the federal government (Aluko, 2017). The political settlement applicable to this raging and still growing incidence is the government at the state and federal levels putting an end to the reign of impunity, nepotism, favouritism and empowerment of a few non-state actors at the expense of the others within the country and beyond. Therefore, transparency and accountability in the public and private sectors should be upheld, taking note of adequate welfare packages for citizens.

The assessment based on the total figure of IDPs indicates that about thirteen percent (12.6%) were displaced due to communal clashes, 2.4 percent by natural disasters, and 85 percent as a result of insurgency attacks by the Boko Haram Islamists Sect. The decrease in the percentage of IDPs who were displaced by insurgency from 95.3 percent in August to 85 percent in December 2015, and the increase in the numbers of those displaced by communal clashes from 4.6 percent to 10.1 percent in October, were due to the inclusion of five additional States witnessing more communal violence than insurgencies by Islamist groups. However, there was a rise in IDPs caused by the Fulani herdsmen militia in 2017 and 2018 respectively, especially in the states that constitute Central Nigeria (Middle Belt).

In April 2016, the European Commission, in association with the European External Action Service (EEAS), adopted a new development-led approach to forced displacement aimed at harnessing and strengthening the resilience and self-reliance of both the forcibly displaced, and their host communities. Political, economic, development and humanitarian actors should be engaged from the outset, and throughout displacement crises to work with third partner countries towards gradual socio-economic inclusion of the forcibly displaced. If this is adopted in Nigeria, the IDPs will have more economic and political values, and rate of crises will drastically reduce.

## Conclusion

There is no doubt that the incidences of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the world constitute a global crisis. In terms of total headcount worldwide, about forty one million (40.8 million) Internally Displaced People (IDPs) were displaced as a result of conflict and violence at the end of 2015. This is an increase of about three million (2.8 million) in 2014, the highest figure ever recorded and twice the number of refugees in the world. Just ten countries accounted for over two-thirds of the total, or around 30 million people. Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Sudan and South Sudan have featured in the list of the ten largest internally displaced populations every year since 2003 while others like Yemen, Nigeria, Ukraine and Pakistan complete the list of the first ten countries, which together account for seventy five percent (75%) of the world's IDPs.

The rights of the IDPs had been catered for in the international community. The international laws on refugee and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement established in 1998 restate, and compile existing international human rights and humanitarian law germane to the internally displaced and also attempt to empower the various instruments with regard to situations of particular interest to the internally displaced. This had been domesticated in most countries including Nigeria.

The conflicts in Nigeria can be laid to rest on the platter of mutual understanding of both state and non-state actors. There is growing recognition within the international development community that political settlements can be a significant factor in determining the success or failure of a state. Instead of accepting the political status quo, the political settlements analytical framework explains that international actors recognize they have a degree of influence in shaping the direction and balance of power in elite politics that in turn shapes development, security, and institutions of governance.

The research methodology and design adopts thirteen states in Nigeria that has had recent surge in IDP numbers. The result revealed that Borno state has about sixty seven percent (66.64%) of the total internally displaced in Nigeria, followed closely by Adamawa and Yobe States with both at six percent (6.32% and 6.09% respectively). The primary root causes of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are the ripple effects from the Boko Haram insurgency, acute poverty, climate



change and greed on the part of the Fulani herders, strong individual non-state actors, and gross neglect of citizens welfare by the state government, as well as weak reactive actions instead of strong proactive actions by the federal government. The secondary causes of the internal displacement is the use of military force to combat the Boko Haram syndicates which forces citizens out of their homes to another location.

### **Recommendation**

The following recommendations can be meted out to the individual persons, the civil society and government at all levels. The individuals at the pre-displacement period should adopt simple means of communicating intelligence information to the security personnel assigned to their area so as to be prompt about the process. This is because the initiation and recruitment activities of anti-state groups start from the people at the grass roots level. Such actions can be foiled if people relay intelligent information to the necessary quarters when anti-state groups are still at the embryo stage of formation. Patriotism to the state should also be built more towards the state than to the ethno-religious, socio-political, geographical or economical alignments. This can be archived when the people derive proper and adequate social contract welfare benefits from the state.

The civil societies, which include the local religious groups, ethnic groups, professional groups, economic groups, political groups and their international counterparts should invest in the education of people on the need to be patriotic, instead of carrying group sentiments against the state. This will reduce the rate of internal fractioning, which has a tendency of degenerating to militia in the polity. They should also join the people in reporting marginalization of their interests, nepotism and favouritism of the government agencies to the relevant public domain. This will attract public sympathy, and the menace will be corrected before the affected group degenerates into militia or insurgent factions.

The state at all levels should provide adequate security for the layman in the street, as well as high intelligent gathering with efficient and effective feedback mechanisms. This will boost trust of the government, and the readiness of people to divulge important secrets of in-house groups to intelligent security stations. The government should be accountable to the people at all times, and the principle of adequate and equitable representation of each group should be upheld. This will in

turn enhance a high level of loyalty, trust and support to the government by the citizenry.

The rate of poverty in the community should also be reduced by equitable distribution of proceeds of national investments from the federal arrangement in Nigeria. The resultant implication will lead to a reduction in social vices such as prostitution, ‘baby factor’, child labour, human trafficking, illegal drugs dealings, state property vandalism and crime syndicate build up in the state. Finally, in situation of crises which leads to internal displacements, the government, should first of all, employ the political settlement approach while a military approach may be used as a last resort.

## REFERENCES

- Aluko O.I., (2017) Urban Violence Dimension in Nigeria: Farmer and Herders Onslaught University of Iasi Journal *AGATHOS*, Volume 8, Issue 1
- Aluko O. I., Mu’awiyya A. and Balogun O. S. (2015). Urban Violence in Nigeria: Of Frog, Pig and Goat *International journal of Humanities and Social Science (IJHSS)* Cambridge Publications and Research International Vol 3 No 10
- Brookings-Bern (2004). *Project on Internal Displacement International Committee of the Red Cross* <http://www.icrc.org/> <http://www.brook.edu/idp>
- Brown S. and Gravingholt J. (2009). Framing Paper on Political Settlements in Peacebuilding and State Building. *OECD DAC Room Document 3*.
- Deng, F.M. (1994). Internally Displaced Persons: An interim report of the UN Secretary General on protection and Assistance, New York: UN Dept. for Humanitarian Affairs, Washington, D.C., U.S.A
- DFID (2010). Building Peaceful States and Societies: *A DFID Practice Paper*, London, March.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica (2012) Refugee *Encyclopaedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite* Chicago
- Federal Republic of Nigeria (2012). *National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria* Abuja Nigeria
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDMC (2015). *2015 Global Overview People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence* <http://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/2015/global-overview-2015-people-internally-displaced-by-conflict-and-violence>

- Internally Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2016): Global report on Internal Displacement 2016 *IDMC Quarterly updates* Geneva, Switzerland
- Jonathan D. and Putzel J. (2009). Political Settlements: Issues Paper, *Governance and Social Development Resource Centre*, University of Birmingham.
- Mushtaq K. (2009). *Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions*
- National Emergency Management Agency (IOM/NEMA) (2015). *Nigeria Report* [http://nigeria.iom.int/sites/default/files/dtm/01\\_IOM%20DTM%20Nigeria\\_Round%20VII%20Report\\_20151223.pdf](http://nigeria.iom.int/sites/default/files/dtm/01_IOM%20DTM%20Nigeria_Round%20VII%20Report_20151223.pdf)
- Norwegian Refugee Council (2014) *Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) General Remarks* <http://www.internal-displacement.org/>
- OCHA (1999) ***Internally Displaced Persons and Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*** <http://ochaonline.un.org/> and [http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha\\_ol/pub/idp\\_gp/idp.html](http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html)
- OHCHR (2016) *Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Geneva, Switzerland on Internally Displacement Reports* Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Palais Wilson 52 rue des Pâquis CH-1201 Geneva, Switzerland) [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what-we-do/humanitarian-aid/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons\\_en](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what-we-do/humanitarian-aid/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons_en)
- Parks T. and Cole W. (2010) Political Settlements: Implications for International Development Policy and Practice *Occasional Paper No. 2* The Asia Foundation
- Redmond, W.A. (2009). *Refugee* Microsoft Encarta DVD Microsoft Corporation.
- UNHCR (2016). Nigeria Regional Refugee Response Plan January- December 2016 Nigeria
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA 2003). *United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Report on Internally Displacement*
- Whaites, A. (2008). States in Development: Understanding State-Building *Governance and Social Development Group, Policy and Research Division DFID Working Paper.*

# In This Issue

## *Editorial*

### *Special Articles*

**Md. Moniruzzaman**

Politics of Forced Migration and Refugees: Dynamics of International Conspiracy?

**AKM Ahsan Ullah and Diotima Chatteraj**

Roots of Discrimination Against Rohingya Minorities: Society, Ethnicity and International Relations

**Kamal J. I. Badrasawi, Iman Osman Ahmed and Iyad M. Eid**

Exploring Ways to Provide Education in Conflict Zones: Implementation and Challenges

**Ibrahim O. Salawu and Aluko Opeyemi Idowu**

Political Settlement Analysis of the Blight of Internally Displaced Persons in the Muslim World: Lessons from Nigeria

### *Research Articles*

**Rohaiza Rokis**

Women's Work Empowerment through "Re-upcycle" Initiatives for Women-at-home

**Shafizan Mohamed and Tengku Siti Aisha Tengku Mohd Azzman**

The Islamization of the Malaysian Media: A Complex Interaction of Religion, Class and Commercialization

**Suleyman Temiz**

Rise of Central Conservatism in Political Leadership: Erdogan's National Outlook Movement and the 1997 Military Coup in Turkey

**Maskanah Mohammad Lotfie and Hartono**

Language Policy and Practices in Indonesian Higher Education Institutions

**Rahmah Bt Ahmad H. Osman and Naseeb Ahmed Siddiqui**

A Novel Critique on 'The Scientific Miracle of Qur'an Philosophy': An Inter-Civilization Debate

**Muhammad Nabil Fikri Bin Mhd Zain and Muhammad Amanullah**

Duties and Decision-Making Guidelines for Shari'ah Committee: An Overview of AAOIFI

**Nor Razinah Binti Mohd. Zain, Rusni Hassan and Nazifah Mustaffha**

Waqf Institutions in Malaysia: Appreciation of Wasafiyah Approach in Internal Control as a Part of Good Governance

**Ali Ahmed Zahir**

Muslim Jurists' Debate on Non-Muslim Religious Festivals and Its Effect on Muslims in the United States

**Azman Ariffin, Kasyfullah Abd Kadir and Idris Mansor**

Archaeological Analysis of Arabic-Malay Translation Works of Abdullah Basmeih

**Mohamed El Tahir El Mesawi and Mohammad Rizhan bin Leman**

*Takyif Fiqhī* and its Application to Modern Contracts: A Case Study of the Central Provident Fund Nomination in Singapore

**Wafa Zoghbor**

Revisiting English as a Foreign Language (EFL) Vs. English Lingua Franca (ELF): The Case for Pronunciation

**Ummu Atiyah Ahmad Zakuan, Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani, Norehan Abdullah, and Zaireeni Azmi**

"How did we Choose?" Understanding the Northern Female Voting Behaviour in Malaysia in the 14th General Election

**Anke Iman Bouzenita, and Bronwyn Wood**

Unintended Consequences? The Commodification of Ideas in Tertiary Education and their Effects on Muslim Students

**Muhammad Siddiq Armia**

Ultra Petita and the Threat to Constitutional Justice: The Indonesian Experience

**Mariam Adawiah Dzulkifli, and Abdul Kabir Hussain Solihu**

Methods of Qur'anic Memorisation (Ḥifẓ): Implications for Learning Performance

### *Book Reviews*

### *Research Note*

### *Conference Report*

ISSN 0128-4878 (Print)

ISSN 2289-5639 (Online)

