

semblance of legitimacy to the rulers hoping, in vain, that by so doing the rulers would adhere to the *sharī'ah*.

It must be noted that contemporary Islamic movements do not treat *khilāfah* as a historical institution to be replaced in its entirety. Their leadership, though not composed of religious scholars, desires a system of *khilāfah* which aims at the welfare of humanity through the implementation of Islamic values and principles enshrined in the *sharī'ah*. They do believe, as does Feldman, that *sharī'ah* has the capacity to function as a tool for the fair administration of justice. Therefore, Feldman's suggestion to help develop a *sharī'ah*-based political system embedded in a constitutional order will be acceptable to Muslims and is well worth considering. A Gallup opinion poll suggests that Muslims desire a system based upon *sharī'ah* but they are not keen on having religious scholars exercising executive power.

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**The Next 100 Years: A FORECAST for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.** By George Friedman. New York: Doubleday, 2009, pp. 253. ISBN: 978-0-385-51705-8.

Reviewer: Abdul Wahid Jalal, Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM).  
E-mail: sulaimanya79@yahoo.com

Francis Fukuyama in *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992) pronounced the end of history and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy. Samuel Huntington in *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997) announced the return of history, the clash of civilisations and the remaking of a new World Order. George Friedman's *The Next 100 Years: A FORECAST for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* confirms that history indeed continues to unfold and predict, on the basis of history and traditional geopolitics, that the "history of the United States will be the history of the twenty-first century" (p. 13).

Friedman, the founder and CEO of STRATFOR, a private intelligence forecasting company, contends that North America is and will remain the centre of gravity in international relations and that the United States that dominates North America is automatically assured of being the dominant global power whose culture will permeate the world and define it.

Friedman admits the speculative nature of forecasting a hundred years ahead. He, however, has a method of seeing the order underneath the disorder of history and to anticipate the shape of things that order will bring forth. Anticipating the future is possible though reasonable people think otherwise. To reinforce this point, Friedman opens the book with a quick recounting of the preceding century in a cycle of 20 years. In 1900, Europe was enjoying peace and prosperity such that serious people came to believe that war was impossible. By 1920, Europe tore itself apart in a vicious continental war. The countryside was in ruins, empires had been overthrown, Germany was totally destroyed, and a ruthless dictatorship emerged in Russia.

Twenty years later, Germany not only reemerged but conquered France and became the master of the continent and was preparing to establish a Eurasian empire at the expense of Russia. Two decades later, the United States became the dominant Western power and was leading liberal European nations, including a newly democratic Germany against the Soviet Union.

In 1980, America was defeated in a seven-year war by communist North Vietnam, was humiliated in Iran, and experienced economic chaos on the home front, while the USSR seemed poised to consolidate its hold on nations around the world. By 2000, the USSR was history; the United States was a global superpower at the forefront of a new era of peaceful and bountiful globalisation. Of course, twenty-one months later, jihadists struck the American symbols of power and the promise of 2000 began to retreat into memory.

Friedman recounted the century to underscore the need to “be practical and expect the impossible” (p. 10). This idea is at the heart of Friedman’s method which is called geopolitics. Despite the turbulence of the past century, Friedman asserts, continuity can be predicted from a key geopolitical development dating back to 1871.

If one could identify the main forces that drive history, and identify the demographic and political process underway, one will get a sense of what the century is going to look like.

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it was all about Germany. The 21<sup>st</sup> century is about the United States of America. Europe had been the dominant continent for over 500 years, but with the preponderance of trade now passing to nations poised to capitalise on trade in both oceans (namely the North American ones), the days of the European age are fading. As the dominant North American power, the United States is now ready for new heights. The Middle-East will decline in importance as the United States campaigns in the region will neutralise Islamic extremists and native governments will do the rest in the aftermath of jihadists' defeat in Iraq. Russia will stage a brief comeback but in the end will not win, simply because of its deteriorating demography and failure to diversify its economy. China, everyone's favourite prospect to be the next Great Power, will be weakened because of the massive imbalance between the rising coast and the impoverished interior leading to instability in the country.

Friedman's nominees for ascendancy include Japan, Turkey, Poland, and Mexico. Japan remains the second largest economy in the world with an enormous and adaptive population. Japan, while pacifist now, will not remain so and will have to compensate for an aging and stabilising population. Resistant to immigration, Japan will again seek expansion abroad to obtain the necessary labour force to maintain its standard of living, while also remaining a technological pioneer.

Turkey, which has historically been both a land and naval power with a large population, will be a major regional power by mid-2040. Poland is already the focus of American attention in reconfiguring European security arrangements. With Russia re-asserting itself, an economically and demographically robust nation like Poland is well-positioned to benefit from American support. The Americans

... will arm the Polish bloc and encourage its confrontation with the Turks. They will help increase the strength of the Indians in the Indian Ocean. They will strengthen the Chinese

and Koreans and build up American forces in the Pacific and the Mediterranean. They will do everything they can to strangle both Japan and Turkey without acting directly against them. And they will pursue the policy well – too well in fact. Both Turkey and Japan, well aware of the United States’ historic ability to arm and support its allies, will be led to the conclusion that they are facing disaster at the hands of American proxies. And this will lead to massive escalation (p. 164).

In the predicted scenario, Friedman argues that the militarisation of space is inevitable. In the 2030s, the US will go for a fairly low-key programme for the commercialisation of space. He paints a futuristic picture of aerospace forces, “Battle Stars,” and hypersonic strike capabilities which will alarm the Turks and the Japanese. The new space-based system will be fully operational by 2047. Friedman describes corps of technologically enhanced troopers both fast and lethal. And of course, as he claims, America will win. When America is roused, it lashes out fiercely. Ultimately, however, Friedman predicts this future mid-century war will be several orders of magnitude less bloody than World War II. In the end, triumph in a major world war will again set the stage for an American “golden era.”

By the later half of the twenty-first century, Friedman posits, Mexico will be one of the top ten economies. Unlike other petroleum producers, Mexico has diversified its economy. Moreover, as a North American state, Mexico is similarly positioned to capitalise on the advantages of oceanic trade in two directions, especially if its northern neighbour is preoccupied with contenders in Eurasia. Separately, Friedman notes, as many other commentators do, the populations of major advanced countries are stabilising. Accordingly, Friedman contends their governments will be exploring more, not less immigration in the future. In the case of the United States, current arguments over immigration will be overtaken by growing labour requirements which have to be met through Mexicans crossing over. However, Friedman also notes the potential risk in pursuing unrestrained Mexican immigration. Like Samuel Huntington before him, Friedman asserts that the nature of Mexican immigration is qualitatively different because of the home nation’s geographical proximity. Moreover, the sympathy for the mother country is

compounded by latent resentment over the hostility Mexicans feel over the cession of vast territories in the mid-1800s. Consequently Friedman foresees a growing Mexifornia as the basis for continued divided loyalties of Mexicans living in America and a potentially major clash between an ascending Mexico and the United States. The result of such a clash will unfold in the twenty-second century.

Friedman's book has been well received and it has become a best-seller for the reason, among others, is that the book is American centric and is written from an American perspective. It is opposed to everything Paul Kennedy's meticulously researched *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987) stands for. Friedman's view is simple and naive. He is a realist preoccupied with power politics and "high politics," disregarding other issues in global politics. With a Jewish background, Friedman may be accused of playing to the gallery so that Israel remains the 51<sup>st</sup> state of the United States. Alternately, Friedman may be suggesting to the US policy makers the strategy they should follow to remain on top for the rest of the century. The book is written in accessible prose and the argument at each turn is easy to follow. However, it is not at all academic in nature; it is devoid of footnotes and documentation of sources. Serious readers will take the arguments provided in the book with a pinch of salt.

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**Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada).** By Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (eds.). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, pp. 392. ISBN: 978-981230-840-5.

Reviewer: M. Moniruzzaman, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Email: mmzaman@iiu.edu.my

*Deepening Democracy in Indonesia?* is an analysis of Indonesia's new electoral system introduced in 2004 to directly elect the heads