

# AL-ITQĀN

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SCIENCES AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES

---

**Volume: 5**

**Issue No. 2**

**August 2021**

---

**EDITOR IN-CHIEF**

Dr. Wan Mohd Azam Mohd Amin

**MANAGING EDITOR**

Dr. Masitoh Ahmad

**EDITORIAL BOARD**

Dr. Syed Arabi Aidid, IIUM.

Dr. Hassan Basri Mat Dahan, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia,  
Nilai, Negeri Sembilan

Dr. Kamaruzaman Yusuff, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak,  
Kota Semarahan, Kucing.

Dr. Kamar Oniah, IIUM.

Dr. Mumtaz Ali, IIUM.

Dr. Noor Amali Mohd Daud, IIUM.

Dr. Adibah Abdul Rahim, IIUM.

Dr. Haslina Ibrahim, IIUM.

Dr. Siti Akmar, Universiti Institut Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam

Dr. Thameem Ushama, IIUM.

## INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. Muhammad Afifi al-Akiti, Oxford University, UK  
Dr. Abdullah M. al-Syarqawi, Cairo University, Egypt.  
Dr. Abdul Kabir Hussain Solihu, Kwara State University, Nigeria.  
Dr. Anis Ahmad, Riphah International University, Islamabad.  
Dr. ASM Shihabuddin, Uttara University, Dhakka, Bangladesh.  
Dr. Fatimah Abdullah, Sabahattin Zaim University, Turkey.  
Dr. Ibrahim M. Zein, Qatar Foundation, Qatar.  
Dr. Khalid Yahya, Temple University, USA.

© 2017 IIUM Press, International Islamic University Malaysia. All rights reserved.  
eISSN:26008432

### Correspondence

Managing Editor, *Al-Itqān*  
Research Management Centre, RMC  
International Islamic University Malaysia  
P.O Box 10, 50728 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  
Tel: +603 6196 5558  
Website: <http://journals.iium.edu.my/al-itqan/index.php/alitqan/index>  
Email: [al-itqan@iium.edu.my](mailto:al-itqan@iium.edu.my)

Published by:  
IIUM Press, International Islamic University Malaysia  
P.O. Box 10, 50728 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia  
Phone (+603) 6196-5014, Fax: (+603) 6196-6298  
Website: <http://iiumpress.iium.edu.my/bookshop>

# Table of Contents

A Muslim Brief View on the Trinity: The Doctrine of Oneness of God in Christianity	<i>Ungaran Rashid</i>	5-19
Examining the Concept of Pan-Islamism	<i>Spahic Omer</i>	21-51
Atheism and Atheists: Western and Islamic Perspective	<i>Nur Afifah Abdul Razak Wan Mohd Azam Mohd Amin</i>	53-70
Islamic and Western Higher Education Systems: A Comparative Analysis	<i>Nur Irdina Hakimah Nor Razali Nur Suriya Mohd Nor</i>	71-97
Abū Zayd al-Balkhi's Sustenance of the Soul and the Development of Self-Control	<i>Afifah Shamsuddin Amilah Awang Abd Rahman @ Jusoh</i>	99-115
The Notion of Afterlife in Islam and Sikhism and Its Implication on Muslims and Sikhs Lives	<i>Muhammad Hanif Ismail Mohd Noh Abdul Jalil</i>	117-135
Social Cohession in the Views of Islam and Buddhism: A Textual Analysis	<i>Mohamed Ashath Nur Suriya Mohd Nor</i>	137-158
The Muslim Minority in Myanmar: The Struggle for Identity amidst A Continous Political Crisis	<i>Tin Aung Myint @ Asad Noor Amali Mohd Daud</i>	159-198
Rahmatullah <i>al-Kairanawi</i> and His Work Entitled " <i>Izhar al-Ḥaq</i> " External Criticism toward Gospel	<i>Aisyatur Rabiah Abdullah Maziah Mustapha</i>	199-218
The Rebuttal of the Literalist Interpretation of the Bible: The Example of Stepphen Sizer	<i>Bachar Bakour</i>	219-248
The Foundation of al-Qawā'id al-Fiqhiyyah According to Four <i>Madhhabs</i>	<i>Heri Firmansyah Irham Dongoran</i>	249-275

## Author Guidelines

Manuscript article can be either in English, Malay or Arabic using software Microsoft office (Word, and Excel), Font 12 Times New Roman. Only tables, figures and appendix can be written using Font 10, Times New Roman.

If there is a usage of Quranic verses or Hadith from Prophet P.B.U.H., it only needs to be done by translation only.

The manuscript should be in 1.5 single spacing and justified, with the margin of 2.5cm.

Article needs to have a title and author's name and second author's name along with the full address (institution's or university's address, e-mail, handphone's number, office's number, fax together with the second author's details).

Every article must include an abstract in Malay and English. The length of the abstract is no more than 150 words including 5 keywords.

The length of each article must not exceed 6000 words.

The Arabic words in manuscript should be in a transliterated form.

Reference for each article must be written according to **Chicago Manual**.

Notification Letter :

Letter of Acceptance – editorial board will send an e-mail to the author to notify that the manuscript is received.

Letter of Acceptance/Rejection for Publication – editorial board will send a letter by an e-mail to the author to notify if the manuscript judged by the panels is approved or declined to be published.

Letter of Publication – editorial board will send a letter by e-mail to the author if the article has been judged, repaired, and corrected to be published in the college's journal.

Certificate of Appreciation– editorial board will send a certificate of appreciation by mail to the authors who have sent their articles.

## Examining the Concept of Pan-Islamism

Spahic Omer\*

### Abstract

This article discusses the concept of pan-Islamism as one of the most important concepts of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries in Western scholarship. The article focuses on the genesis, socio-political context, and ideological purpose of the pan-Islamism thought. The conclusion made is that pan-Islamism was a Western socio-political construct intended to smear and pre-empt the prospect of a global Muslim union. It was also advocated that pan-Islamism was just another pan-ideology and pan-movement that stood in the way of the western-style modernization and democratization of the world. As such, pan-Islamism had to be impeded and neutralized by all means necessary and as much as possible. Since Sultan-Caliph Abdul Hamid II was the prime mover of pan-Islamism, his reign divided opinion like no other. Little wonder that in the West, generally, his political programs were continuously repudiated and his legacy vilified.

**Keywords:** Pan-Islamism; Abdul Hamid II; Islamic Unity; West; Ottoman Empire

### Introduction

Pan-Islamism was one of the most controversial concepts, both in Muslim and Western scholarships. Very few concepts managed to excite such passions and divide opinion as Pan-Islamism. Standpoints oscillated between seemingly endless affirmative and reproving outlooks. This chapter attempts to capture that intellectual mood as much as possible, demonstrating, ultimately, that pan-Islamism was a Western socio-political construct. The construct, which aimed to curb the rising political and intellectual calls for Muslim unity, brotherhood and cooperation, stemmed from the character of the multi-tiered interactions between the West and the Muslim world in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The Orient-Occident relations were dictated by the insatiable colonialist and imperialist thirst of the West and the

---

\* Assoc. Prof. Dr. Department of History and Civilization, Kulliyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia.  
Email: ospahic@iium.edu.my

Muslim increasingly desperate responses against it. The chapter is divided into the following sections: the failure of Ottoman reforms; the impact of nationalism and liberalism; Abdul Hamid II comes to power; Abdul Hamid II the man of the moment; Islam and Muslim unity the only way forward; the response of the antagonistic West; pan-Islamism and vilification campaigns against Abdul Hamid II; Islam between “pan” and “ism”; pan-Islamism as just another spasmodic pan-ideology and pan-movement; pan-Islamism a figment of Western imagination; pan-Islamism bereft of the true spirit of Islamic unity; conclusion.

### **The Failure of Ottoman Reforms**

The 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries witnessed unprecedented problems for Muslims. Most problems came from inside and were caused by Muslims themselves, while other problems were caused or aggravated from outside by certain adverse forces. In its capacity as the leader of the Muslim world with the caliphate institution in its custody, the Ottoman state tried to stop the rot, but in vain. Neither *Nizam-i Jedid* (New Order) - a program of westernizing reforms undertaken by Sultan Selim III (d. 1808), which lasted from 1789 to 1807 – nor the *Tanzimat* movement - a series of reforms inspired by Western thought and values embarked on between 1839 and 1876 by two Ottoman sultans, Abdulmejid I (d. 1861) and Abdulaziz (d. 1876) – brought about desired results.

Moreover, the failure of the reforms only exacerbated the situation and forced the Ottoman government – and with it all Muslims - into a frustrating *cul-de-sac*. All other subsequent lesser efforts and programs, institutionalized or otherwise, led essentially nowhere. The fallout was overwhelming. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt (d. 1922), an English scholar, wrote about the matter in his book “The Future of Islam”. As an eyewitness, he opined that the death of Sultan Abdulaziz in 1876 might have spelled the end of the Ottoman Caliphate were it not for the abilities and political acumen of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (d. 1918).

According to the author, it was almost certain that if Sultan Abdulmejid I and Sultan Abdulaziz – paragons of the *Tanzimat* as an idea and movement - had been succeeded by another of those weak and ineffective monarchs who had so often filled the Imperial throne, the Ottoman Caliphate would already have been a thing of the past, at least as regards the larger and more intelligent part of Islam and the Islamic world. However, Abdul Hamid II was neither a mere voluptuary nor an imbecile.

By an instinct which one could not but admire he held fast to the only rope of safety “which remained for him and his house” and thus put back for a while the hour of fate.<sup>1</sup>

The same author concluded that there was little doubt that the death of Abdul Hamid II, or his fall from Empire, would signify the end of the Ottoman Caliphate and the Ottoman House and would be the signal for the return of the caliphate institution to the Arab world – with Cairo or the Hijaz region (Makkah or Madīnah) being the leading contenders. The developments circumscribed either by a political hiatus or a communal chaos would also mark a formal renewal by the Arabian mind of its lost religious and intellectual leadership.<sup>2</sup>

That way, Islam and its civilization would come full circle and the caliphates finally come home. Perhaps the transitory and simultaneously ill-fated rule of Sultan Murad V (d. 1904) - whose rule lasted only three months: from 30 May 1876, which was the end of Sultan Abdulaziz’s rule, until 31 August 1876, which was the beginning of Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s rule – was a bad omen. It was a sign of things to come for which the writing was on the wall. The restoration of a more legitimate caliphate was deferred for the day when its fate will be set to overtake the Ottoman Empire.

The Young Ottomans were a secret society comprising prominent reformers and intellectuals. They were dissatisfied with the ways the *Tanzimat* reforms were generally implemented, nor with their scale as well as coverage. They insisted that a constitutional government similar to those in Europe – whereby the sultan-caliph will exercise his authority according to a constitution - be formed. The constitutional era commenced with the ousting of Sultan Abdulaziz and the enthronement of Sultan Murad V.

However, according to Mehmet Maksudoglu, the officials who initially installed Murad V as sultan-caliph could not agree among themselves about the terms of the constitution, while Europe, on the other hand, urged its speedy proclamation. “This incident and others were clear indications of the increasing intervention of European powers in the internal and administrative affairs of the Osmanli Devlet.”<sup>3</sup> As it was a sign that the Ottomans were ever less in charge of their own socio-political destiny. Without doubt, the situation was a determinant of Murad

---

<sup>1</sup> Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *The Future of Islam*, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & CO, 1882), p. 84.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. pp. viii-xix.

<sup>3</sup> Mehmet Maksudoglu, *Osmanli History (1289-1922) Based on Osmanli Sources*, (Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia, 1999), p. 220.

V's mental breakdown shortly after his investiture, due to which he was declared unfit to rule and so, was removed.

### **The Impact of Nationalism and Liberalism**

The problems and setbacks were multiplying by the day, internally through a total disintegration and the weakening of life systems, and externally through the interferences of the powerful and arrogant imperialist European powers. The problems were as much religious and intellectual as they were socio-political, administrative and military. The consequences were numerous and sundry. However, two deserve to be highlighted: nationalism and liberalism, the latter, especially, subsequently engendering and encompassing secularism. Both ideas were spreading like wildfire across Europe in the wake of the French Revolution (1789-1799), affecting the colonized parts of the rest of the world as well.

As political, social and moral philosophies, as well as movements, nationalism and liberalism paid little respect to the dynamics of geopolitics and religion. They hankered for imposing themselves as inclusive worldviews and lifestyles. They were also bent on creating and dictating the terms of a new world order. As expected, the Muslim world could not for long remain immune to the events. In addition, its burgeoning conundrums started to tilt particularly the Muslim youth towards the prospect of observing more keenly - and progressively more favourably - what was going on in the West.

While some within the orb of the Ottoman leadership tried to dismiss the dangerous new ideas, describing French liberty “as mere libertinism and anarchy”, others were more cautious and discerning. They perceived the novel ideas not only as harmful, but also as aggressively threatening. Some even predicted that the forces of nationalism and liberalism would “do so much to destroy the (Ottoman) Empire.”<sup>1</sup> Indeed, there was more to the hazard of the West than its political shrewdness and military might. Its thought and values were as dangerous. Together, both domains were supposed to serve as a wake-up call.

As stated by Bernard Lewis, during the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, growing numbers of Turks, especially among those who had had the opportunity to travel in the West, were becoming unpleasantly aware of

---

<sup>1</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 130.



the backwardness of their own country, as contrasted with a Europe which was increasingly rich and powerful, and which, in its limitless self-confidence and aggressiveness, seemed to be bringing the whole world within its grasp. "The old question: 'Why is the Empire declining?' had now to be restated: 'Why is the Empire declining while Europe advances and progresses, and what is the secret of European success?'"<sup>1</sup>

The West was an idea and experiential reality, and was at once repelling and attracting. Its case was the one of a double-edged sword which could slay, but also revive. As a result, Western inquisitive and creative spirit, educational philosophy, content and methods, plus its refined culturalism, were much admired. Moreover, the seeds of nationalism-ideology based on the notion that one's loyalty and devotion to the nation-state exceed all other individual or group interests - were planted in the soil of the Muslim world. They soon struck root, after which the growth was unrelenting. The most important centres of Islamic culture and civilization, such as Turkey, Iran, India and Egypt, were seriously affected.

Concerning the nationalistic sentiment in Egypt in the country's nationalist historiography-as for example- it is often held that Muhammad Ali (d. 1849), the founder of modern Egypt, had mysteriously appeared on the Egyptian historical landscape. "Answering Egypt's pleas, the Great Pasha descended from heaven to deliver her from oppression, and to lift her from the dark recesses of centuries of Ottoman neglect and misery into the bright sunlight of dignity and national independence." Egypt came to be seen as a nation so defined only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and mostly as a result of Muhammad Ali's policies. It was only then, furthermore, that Egypt became a nation with a purposeful and clear identity.<sup>2</sup>

Following the British occupation of Egypt, the country's nationalism was rejected. Lord Cromer (d. 1917), the British controller-general in Egypt, proclaimed unequivocally – as informed by Edward Said - that "the real future of Egypt lies not in the direction of a narrow nationalism, which will only embrace native Egyptians, but rather in that of an enlarged cosmopolitanism."<sup>3</sup> Whether this was an attempt to put out the flames of Egyptian nationalism, and an overture to the

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 130.

<sup>2</sup> Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men*, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 2002), pp. 16-18.

<sup>3</sup> Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1980), p. 36.

blossoming outlook of pan-Islamism – of course as part of incessant stratagems by the colonizers – is hard to say. However, it is obvious that the colonizing powers were ready to stop at nothing to protract their firm grip on their Muslim colonies. The new-fangled notions of nationalism and pan-Islamism were to be optimized for the purpose. They were reminiscent of playthings in the enemies' hands.

### **Abdul Hamid II Comes to Power**

When Sultan-Caliph Abdul Hamid II acceded to power in 1876 he decided to improve the situation. Since the root causes of all problems seemed to be growing nationalism and liberalism – including all minor concomitants – they were to be targeted with their antitheses as the most effective cures: absolutist caliphate-centric monarchy and Muslim unity. Once institutionalized and implemented properly, the cures were expected to check the surge of nationalism and liberalism. The two were not fated to coexist peacefully.

The Ottoman central government was desperate to save itself from the threats posed by the military superiority and expansionism of the European powers and the ideology of secular nationalism that was rapidly spreading among the empire's ethnic groups. The capital city of Istanbul was not spared either, with its political and intellectual elites being influenced the most.

In 1877-78, there was a disastrous war with Russia whose advances against the Ottoman territories in Europe and the East put the Ottoman government in an awkward and embarrassing position. The Ottoman army was pushed back all the way to the gates of Istanbul. One of the reasons for the war was the newly-arisen Balkan nationalism. There were also French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, British occupation of Egypt in 1882, and Ottoman-Greek war in 1897.

Consequently, the Ottoman state lost much of its territories in Europe. Many other especially peripheral territories were constantly under threat. In addition to the territories lost in the aftermath of the war with Russia, 5.5 million Christians - who hitherto had been Ottoman subjects - remained outside the borders of the empire. This led to a significant demographic change. Henceforth, over 20 million of the 25 million people living within the borders of the empire were Muslims. That is to say, in the 1880s, the Ottoman Empire was more of an Asian

and Muslim state with Arab territories gaining particular importance.<sup>1</sup> The first few years following Abdul Hamid II's enthronement were most turbulent. Only after three years of his rule, the empire lost about a third of its total territory and over 20 percent of its population.

Under those circumstances, according to Murat Ozyuksel,<sup>2</sup> the *Tanzimat* code- which had been instigated by the Ottoman transnationalism, plans to secure political integration with Europe and to consolidate the social, political and territorial integrity of the empire, and which had relied on the European and Christian millets (communities) of the empire - was no longer justifiable. The Ottomanism of the *Tanzimat* as a supranational and proto-nationalist political principle, which considered all subjects to be of equal status, left Muslims unsatisfied as they no longer felt superior. Hence, virtually in one fell swoop, the greater part of the conceptual framework of the earlier reforms, which called for a western-style constitutional regime desirous of upholding liberalism, became anachronistic, or at least questionable. The *Tanzimat* reforms were controversial at best. Some Turkish conservatives still consider them the start of the degradation of everything Ottoman and Islamic.<sup>3</sup>

This prompted the new caliph Abdul Hamid II to give preference to an absolutist/centralist regime which would hold the remaining parts of the empire together. He “espoused a caliph-centred autocratic system instead of one based on a western-style social contract with his subjects. He was already aware that the majority of Muslim subjects were indifferent towards the parliamentary regime.”<sup>4</sup> Amid the calamitous war with Russia, in December 1877, the newly created parliament in its function as an instrument of constitutionalism proved indiscreet and futile, as a result of which it was suspended. As Mehmet Maksudoglu puts it,<sup>5</sup> Abdul Hamid II argued that he had honoured his word to convene parliament, but the latter failed to rise to the challenge, yet was turning into a hindrance, and therefore deserved his decision to suspend it promptly.

---

<sup>1</sup> Murat Ozyuksel, *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014), p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 43.

<sup>3</sup> Carter Vaughn Findley, *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), p. 132.

<sup>4</sup> Murat Ozyuksel, *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire*, p. 43.

<sup>5</sup> Mehmet Maksudoglu, *Osmanli History (1289-1922) Based on Osmanli Sources*, p. 226.

**Abdul Hamid II the Man of the Moment**

The decisions of the new caliph were not ideal by any stretch of the imagination, but certainly were valuable and pragmatic given the circumstances. People could see in them whatever they wanted and whatever their ideological penchants were inclined to decree to them. The caliph believed that the empire had enough internal capacity and resources to tackle its problems head-on and on its own. Consequently, no other Ottoman ruler divided opinion like Abdul Hamid II, and nobody left a more controversial and misunderstood legacy like him. Love (admire) him or hate (denigrate) him, he was the man of the moment.

To some, Abdul Hamid II was a shrewd and master politician. He likewise was the most legitimate and prestigious Muslim sovereign of his era. He was a reformer and his tenure a period of Islamic restoration. He was a saviour, so to say. His time was preceded by periods of various crises and failed attempts of revival, and was followed by a period of devastation and the extinguishing of the institution of caliphate. He stemmed the tide of overall deterioration and potential collapse, and succeeded in holding together the remainder of the empire.

To others, however, Abdul Hamid II was a bloodthirsty tyrant, autocrat, cynic and opportunist. To the Western imperialist powers and the domestic proponents of liberalism and western-style democracy, he was a sworn enemy. He was an obstacle to the former's expansionist and colonialist plans, and was standing in the way of the latter's gullibility and the actualization of their dishonest and myopic designs.

Be that as it may, positively, Abdul Hamid II was a fairly religious man. Far from being perfect, he was sincere and steadfast in his religious beliefs and practices. Compared to many of his predecessors, such was a breath of fresh air. Even in his youth, he was displaying some signs of a different approach. He was, for a prince, a serious man, showing a taste for learning, especially for geography and history; and though not a religious scholar (*'alim*) he had some knowledge of his religion. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, the Caliph's contemporary, wrote that on the day soon after his accession, Abdul Hamid II astonished his courtiers with the manner of his demeanour. "All the afternoon of that day he talked to

them of his spiritual rank in language which for centuries had not been heard in the precincts of the Seraglio (the royal palace).”<sup>1</sup>

Abdul Hamid II’s language, too, to strangers from external Islam was that of a spiritual rather than a temporal prince, and with the European ambassadors he had used this position consistently and most effectually. Moreover, he is said to have been regular in his daily prayers. He was at the same time a liberal patron of dervishes, workers of miracles and holy men. These he was at pains to seek out and receive honourably. In his administration Abdul Hamid II conformed, wherever he himself was the actor, strictly to the provisions of the Shari’ah (Islamic law), and on doubtful points consulted always the mufti or *Shaykh al-Islam* (the chief governmental mufti). “He has shown no inconsiderable firmness in resisting European demands when they contravened the canon law.”<sup>2</sup>

For all these reasons was Abdul Hamid II gaining the support not only of the Turks, but as well of most other Muslim peoples. From a traitor to the cause of religion, the Ottoman Sultan has come to be looked upon, East and West, as once more its champion. With the old-fashioned reactionary school Abdul Hamid II was fast growing into a hero. He was becoming the caliph of the Muslim world akin to the classical sense of the word. Confidence was returning and expectations amplifying.

Since the matter was rather dramatic and unforeseen – in that it seemed impossible one born in Sultan Abdulmejid I’s Seraglio or palace should be a serious and pious man, as Wilfrid Scawen Blunt sarcastically remarked – the new Caliph’s reputation grew slowly but surely. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt stated in 1881: “A year ago, when I was at Jeddah, this was not yet the case (that is, the global rise of Abdul Hamid II’s positive reputation), but it would seem to be so now. Then even the people of his own party spoke of him doubtfully, and he certainly excited no enthusiasm among them. They did not understand him, and thought that he was playing a part.”<sup>3</sup>

Abdul Hamid II wanted to save the empire and with it the Muslim world. If one wanted to judge the character and achievements of the rule of Abdul Hamid II one must bear in mind that his was a time of recovery from a crisis that had come close to putting an end to the Ottoman Empire,

---

<sup>1</sup> Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *The Future of Islam*, pp. 84-85.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 85-86.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 86.

as emphasized by Erik Zurcher in his book “Turkey, a Modern History”.<sup>1</sup> It was a case of desperate times calling for desperate and unconventional measures, which could not make everybody happy nor sympathetic.

### **Islam and Muslim Unity the only Way Forward**

It was becoming obvious that Islam as a vision and mission, and Muslim unity as a *modus operandi* were the only way forward. Foreign alternatives, no matter how much attractive they might have seemed outwardly, were and remained just that: foreign and irrelative. They and the spirit of Islam and its civilization were unsuited to each other. Continuous cosmetic relationships and marriages of convenience between them were neither realistic nor productive. Something’s got to give and one side eventually had to yield to the other. However, all things considered, especially as regards the ways both Islamic and Western civilizations behaved at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, it was inevitably Islamic civilization that was going to be compromised and ceded.

The most – and perhaps best - that Muslims and Islamic civilization could do in the circumstances was to have recourse to all beneficial things that Western civilization could offer and use them for their own home-grown recovery and renewal. Neither the domestic shambles nor the imported scraps alone and in their existing moulds could fill the bill. Instead of trying to adopt and replicate the agnostic renaissance, enlightenment and scientific progress of the West, Muslims should have used them as a catalyst for generating their own Islam-driven cultural and civilizational regeneration. Similarly, instead of trying to adopt and imitate the secular social and political revolutions of the West, Muslims should have perceived those occurrences as a warning bell and should have utilized them for calibrating their own social, political and even religious thought. They should have known that if they did not become masters of the rapid proceedings, the proceedings would soon become their masters.

It is hard to accurately authenticate the assessment, but it seems that not many were able to understand these permutations, with most people generally oscillating between different conceptual or practical extremities. All his limitations and faults notwithstanding, Abdul Hamid II was one of the

---

<sup>1</sup> Erik Zurcher, *Turkey, a Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), p. 76.

enlightened few. He was one of a kind and might have just lived ahead of his time. He wanted to restore the role of Islam on the individual, institutional and social levels, and to revive the fortunes of Islamic civilization. But to do this he needed to unite all Muslims under one banner and restore people's faith in the institution of caliphate and, by extension, in the integrity of the Ottoman leadership. He aspired to "Islamise" and improve caliphate and to "Islamize", enhance and internationalize the Ottoman governance.

Abdul Hamid II wanted to bring Ottomanism and Islamism on a par with each other. While the latter was legitimizing the former, the former was enriching the latter. Neither could subsist without the other. It was a win-win situation for both the Turks and the rest of Muslims. Abdul Hamid II's Islamist policy, as Murat Ozyuksel explains, could be defined "as a policy of New Ottomanism emblazoned with the ideological concepts of Islam. In one sense, secular Ottomanism was replaced by Islamic Ottomanism. This new type of Ottomanism was a highly pragmatic policy which legitimized an autocratic regime, capitalized on Islamic symbols, and highlighted the Islamic identity of the state."<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, Abdul Hamid II seems to have held onto the Asian and Muslim identity of the state. The primary motivation was to retain control over regions inhabited by Muslims. The sultan compared the empire to a tall plane tree. Loss of the Balkan and other peripheral territories meant getting rid of the blighted leaves. However, the trunk constituted by Islamic countries had to be preserved at all cost. Under these circumstances, the trunk could only be preserved by pursuing an Islamist policy. In line with this policy, closer and more tolerant ties were established with diverse religious groups and Sufi orders, religious spiritual and intellectual figures were publicly recognized, new mosques and schools were built, more religious books were written and published, religious festivals were celebrated more fervently, and Islamic behavioural practices (Islamic ethics) were more assertively promoted.<sup>2</sup>

According to Sukran Vahide,<sup>3</sup> Abdul Hamid II founded literally hundreds of new schools throughout the empire, together with ten or so institutes of higher learning in the capital, aiming to instil the official

---

<sup>1</sup> Murat Ozyuksel, *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire*, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>3</sup> Sukran Vahide, *Islam in Modern Turkey*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 35.

Islamic ideology and produce loyal servants of the caliph-sultan and his new vision. The Sultan also dispatched religious leaders to different parts of the Muslim world as his promoters and goodwill ambassadors. Due to the lost territories, mass migration was also an issue, whereby many people, sometimes entire tribes and communities, preferred to migrate to Muslim lands than to live under a foreign (Christian) occupation. The potential impact of these people on public opinion was noteworthy, and so, was banked on. In addition, the huge potentials of the printing press were also optimized for the purpose. Newspapers, when compared with the pioneering efforts of the 1860s, were “more professional and reached a much larger public. Between 1876 and 1888, nine to ten new periodicals appeared in Istanbul each year.”<sup>1</sup>

The Ottoman railway network was introduced for the same reason. It featured most prominently Istanbul-Madinah railway which was meant to facilitate, as well as improve, the annual hajj services and to bolster the Ottoman control over the Hijaz region. A wider religious, political and economic integration was thereby sought. Since the railway was a project of massive Muslim ummah’s (entire community) proportions, representing Muslim power, unity and solidarity *en bloc*, Abdul Hamid II wanted to portray it as such since the inception and to involve as many Muslims in its realization as possible.<sup>2</sup> He thus embarked on an expansive government-backed donation drive, stressing that all Muslims if possible should make contributions for the railway enterprise, with the sultan’s donation serving as a shining example. The government insisted that, come what may, this had to be an archetypal and standard-setting Ottoman-*cum*-ummatic project undertaken by the people and their donations and for the people. As highlighted by Jacob Landau, despite the substantial use of German engineers, technicians and managers, as well as some foreign foremen and several hundreds of Italian, Montenegrin and Greek workers, this was to be an Ottoman (and Muslim) railway par excellence.<sup>3</sup>

In Abdul Hamid II’s broad Islamization campaign Arabization played a prominent role. He was personally encouraging to Arabs who sought high

---

<sup>1</sup> Erik Zürcher, *Turkey, a Modern History*, p. 74.

<sup>2</sup> William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), p. 45.

<sup>3</sup> Jacob Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage*, (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 12.



posts, for he considered Arabs to be natural leaders in his envisioned programs. He knew all too well that there could be no revival of Islamic consciousness and thought without the Arabic language, Arabic culture and Arabic religious and intellectual centres, nor could there be an institution of Muslim unity and harmony without Arabs. By doing so - in truth - the sultan walked a tightrope. He needed to appease the growing nationalist sentiments at home and, at the same time, counterbalance and make peace overtures to the Arab nationalism that was as thriving and as menacing. It was progressively more difficult to convince opponents that nationalism should take a backseat to Islamism and that all considerations, essentially, should assume a subsidiary role vis-à-vis those of Islam which is not merely a religion, but a *modus vivendi* as well.

Thus, “the Sultan’s second secretary from 1880 to 1892 was Abd al-Qadir Qadri al-Qudsi, of Aleppo. A successor, Ahmad Izzat Pasha al-Abid (1855-1924), of Syria, became a confidant of the Sultan in the 1890s. It was he who persuaded the Sultan to build the Hijaz railroad. Ahmad Asad (d. 1906), who became an adviser to Abdul Hamid II, was born in Medina. He held the honorary position of a sweeper at the Prophet’s tomb and was also a leader in a Sufi order in Medina.”<sup>1</sup> William Ochsenwald concluded that “these Arabs, plus the Hashimites living in Istanbul, provided the Hijazis with access to the corridors of power.”<sup>2</sup>

In any case, Abdul Hamid II’s reign was extraordinary. His was the only reign in the late Ottoman period to be known by the name of its sultan, the “Hamidian” period (1876-1908), which stands out among the other eras of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Turkish history. However, as expected, Abdul Hamid II’s campaigns for Muslim unity and the Islamization of the state did not go down well with the colonization and war hawks in the West. The proponents of militant expansionism and empire-building in the West saw in the ailing Ottoman Empire – and in the entire Muslim world – an opportunity for intensifying and broadening their efforts. It was a chance, according to the popular Western conviction, to finish off once and for all a centuries-old enemy and bring to an end one of the most precarious chapters in the history of the West. It was furthermore a chance to start devising a new world order and bring on the future.

---

<sup>1</sup> William Ochsenwald, *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, p. 209.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 210.

All the crises, ineffective governments and unviable reformative initiatives, which proceeded the reign of Abdul Hamid II, played into the hands of Western adversaries, while causing the Muslim world to sink deeper into dysfunction and stare into the abyss of cultural and civilizational oblivion. However, a man determined upon derailing the whole process, and hence queering the pitch, all of a sudden appeared on the scene. No surprise that Abdul Hamid II was endlessly attacked, discredited and vilified. He was the greatest hindrance, nemesis and nightmare to the interests of Europe. Debates over his place in history continue even today, both in Turkey and beyond.

### **The Response of the Antagonistic West**

The first to write about Abdul Hamid II was Sir Edwin Pears (d. 1919). He wrote a book titled “Life of Abdul Hamid”. It was published in 1917 – eight years after the Sultan’s ousting and only one year before his death - in London by Constable & Company LTD. The book’s author was a British attorney and scholar. He lived in Istanbul for about forty years, as another book of his clearly states: “Forty Years in Constantinople; the Recollections of Sir Edwin Pears, 1873-1915, with 16 Illustrations”. He practiced in the consular courts in Istanbul – which were law courts established by foreign powers in the country - and became president of the European bar in Istanbul. While in Istanbul, traveling extensively throughout the Ottoman territories and acquiring an intimate knowledge of the conditions of the empire, the author was an informer for the British government. He was also a correspondent, greatly influencing the British popular opinion about the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. In part, he might have been a spy too.

To Sir Edwin Pears Abdul Hamid II was one of the makers of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, albeit for all the wrong reasons.<sup>1</sup> Prior to his rule and during the West-oriented reforms, the Ottoman Empire was intended to be “regenerated” and to be allowed to take rank among the great European powers. “The country was governed with a fair amount of success on what may be called reformed Asiatic lines.” A series of able ministers, rather than sultans, were in charge of the country. Sultans “rarely interfered with their ministers so long as their wants and those of their harems were

---

<sup>1</sup> Sir Edwin Pears, *Life of Abdul Hamid*, (London: Constable & Company LTD, 1917), p. 1.

complied with. Life and property were fairly safe. Turkey was indeed blundering her way out of barbarism. Certain well marked steps towards improvement in Turkish administration had been taken during the first seventy years of the nineteenth century. Reform was in every one's thoughts. Even in reference to foreign affairs progress had been made."<sup>1</sup>

However, no sooner had Abdul Hamid II taken the reins of power, than all reforms and improvements - as guises for westernization and secularization - came to an abrupt end. It was all evil and downhill from there. Sir Edwin Pears elaborated: "Then came Abdul Hamid, the greatest of the destroyers of the Turkish Empire. One of the earliest evils which he inflicted upon his country and race was the destruction of government by ministers. Under him the rule of the country became personal. He aimed at making himself the sole ruler of the Empire. From the first he was jealous of any minister who was either eager in making reforms, or, indeed, taking any steps which had not previously met with his approval. Yet in comparison with him many of his ministers were educated men according to the standard of European culture. According to such standard Abdul Hamid himself was an uneducated man. He endeavoured to govern the country on what he considered were the lines of the greatest of his predecessors and succeeded in copying only their barbarism."<sup>2</sup>

That this was an official narrative in Britain, and by extension in most of Europe, testify the words of Basil Williams (d. 1950), a British historian, who wrote in the "General Editor's Preface" of Sir Edwin Pears' mentioned book on Abdul Hamid II that the Sultan was a sorry creature without credibility whatsoever. He was evil incarnate. Basil Williams even offered a word of apology for including such a contemptable person as Abdul Hamid II among the "makers" of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Basil Williams added: "As an influence on the political thought and action of Europe in the last quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, as one who has handed down that evil influence to the Europe of this century, Abdul Hamid may justly lay claim to be included among those who have helped in large measure to make or mar the world into which we were born. During his reign Abdul Hamid was an evil nightmare brooding over Europe, the kind of nightmare which a sleeper could shake off at any moment, did he but choose to move, but he cannot choose and still

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4.

remains fixed and motionless, and so the nightmare abides. Abdul Hamid traded on his own weakness and on the weakness of his country, for he knew that though all abhorred him, no country would take the lead against him in retribution for his most outrageous crimes, lest instead of abasing him it should be set upon by the others and itself abased.”<sup>1</sup>

### **Pan-Islamism and Vilification Campaigns against Abdul Hamid II**

As part of evil campaigns in the West against Abdul Hamid II and his own Islamically-inspired reformatory drives, his ideas and policies pertaining to Muslim unity and solidarity were christened “pan-Islamism”. Such was a calculated move and was but part of the ongoing vilification campaigns. By no means was the concept of pan-Islamism equivalent to the concept of Islamic unity. A world of differences stood between them. While the latter signified a major Islamic tenet which all Muslims, come rain or shine, must strive to actualize to the best of their abilities, the former, on the other hand, was a distortion and was meant to function as a poisoned chalice.

The first person to articulate the concept of pan-Islamism was Wilfrid Scawen Blunt in his book “The Future of Islam”. The book was composed in 1881 and published in 1882. That means that the concept might have been invented only a few years after Abdul Hamid II’s inauguration after his signature policies had commenced taking shape. The author mentioned the concept twice. In one context he described Abdul Hamid II’s schemes as “pan-Islamic”, and in the other he identified the Sultan’s ideas and programs relating to the unity and cooperation of all Muslims with the “dream of pan-Islamism”. However, that the concept was newly coined and was yet to gain currency is indicated by these words of the author in the latter context: “what is called pan-Islamism”, which means that at that particular juncture pan-Islamism was no more than “so called”, “came to be called”, “might be called”, “what has become known”, etc.

By the time Sir Edwin Pears wrote his book on Abdul Hamid II in 1917, the concept of pan-Islamism was well-established and seemed to have gained general acceptance. He mentioned the concept nine times. He even dedicated a “note” or a special comment on pan-Islamism, dwelling on it as a symptom of the failure of all attempts of the Sultan. Given that the new concept was officially recognized and used, Sir Edwin Pears wasted no

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. v-vi.

time explaining its significance. He said that Abdul Hamid II created and employed the concept as “a weapon against Great Britain, to oppose European, but especially British, influence in Egypt.”<sup>1</sup> Little wonder, then, that Chapter IX of Sir Edwin Pears’ book is titled “Abdul Hamid’s relations with Egypt”. The last “note” in the chapter is that on pan-Islamism. The author gave emphasis to his belief that “all Abdul Hamid’s pan-Islamic intrigues failed”. He also disclosed that in the name of pan-Islamism, the Sultan made some attempts to create disaffection amongst the Muslim population in India, which was under the British rule. However, the Sultan was made aware that any attempt made in such direction would be regarded as an unfriendly act by the British Government.

Next, Sir Edwin Pears went on haranguing about why pan-Islamism had failed. Firstly, it failed because of Abdul Hamid II’s insincerity and many other deficiencies, because of the concept’s unfeasibility and archaism, and because the disintegration of Islamic ummah (society) and the fall of Islamic civilization were both unavoidable and irrevocable. The second reason for the failure of pan-Islamism was relatable to the rise of Europe in general and Great Britain in particular, whose liberal and democratic tendencies were able to assimilate the fallen Muslim societies and offer them hope for the future.

As if Sir Edwin Pears suggested that, within the bounds of an inexorable march of history similar to sociocultural evolutionism and socio-biology, the West fell heir to the Muslim legacies. Inasmuch as the latest developments were signs of the potential end-point of humanity’s sociocultural evolution and the final form of human government – sometimes called “the end of history” – the new trends were set to be long-lasting. In consequence, owing to its progress, freedom and tolerance, the West was “entrusted” with charting the future courses of Islam and Muslims as well.

Strange as it may seem, such a prospect could be legitimized as much on moral as on practical-*cum*-political grounds. If for the sake of argument the Ottoman rulers were the usurpers of the institution and title of caliphate and were by no means legitimate caliphs, regularly practicing all sorts of wrongdoing and debauchery, the same responsibility (custody) could be transferred to a conscientious and accountable non-Muslim system of

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 124.

government. Such an administration could neutralize the rampant wickedness of the Muslim Ottoman sultan-caliphs, and its being honest and responsible could offset its being non-Muslim. The move would be based on geopolitical expediency and imperialistic realism, rather than religious or moral principles. In the absence of better alternatives – for Muslims and non-Muslims – the move was ever more projected as a plausible option. If nothing else, it could be seen as a latest phase, or twist, in the long and turbulent history of caliphate. It could be its evolution's new-fangled (objectionably new) stage.

This is why prior to the "Note on pan-Islamism" within the framework of Chapter IX titled "Abdul Hamid's relations with Egypt" in his book on Abdul Hamid II, Sir Edwin Pears talked at length about the caliphate institution in Islam. He dedicated an independent section to the subject, naming it "Note on the Caliphate". At the outset of the "Note on the Caliphate" Sir Edwin Pears set the tone for his discussion. He said: "Before speaking of Abdul Hamid's dealing with Egyptian questions, it is well to give an account of the various opinions held by Mahometans on the caliphate, so far at least as they bear on the claim of the Sultan of Turkey. The question is of importance to the British Empire, for within its ambit are included nearly one hundred million Moslems, out of whom some ninety million acknowledge the title of the Sultans of Turkey to what may be called the pontifical office of Islam."<sup>1</sup>

Thenceforth, Sir Edwin Pears went on explaining the subject matter, focusing on Muslim divergent views concerning it. He aimed to narrow the issue down to the point where he could claim that the Ottomans were not qualified for the caliphate and was pretenders. In the process he happily quoted the Rev. Dr. T. P. Hughes, an Anglican clergyman who had spent many years in India. The man is reported to have said, backing up his assertions by "a number of quotations on the subject from Mahometan writers": "I have not seen a single man of authority who has ever attempted to prove that the Sultans of Turkey are rightful Caliphs." The same person, the Rev. Dr. T. P. Hughes, likewise is related to have said, alluding to his long residence in India: "After a careful study of the whole subject for thirty years, twenty having been spent amongst the mosques of the Moslems, I

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 143.

will defy anyone to produce any reasonable proof that any Moslem school in India acknowledges Abdul Hamid as the rightful Caliph.”<sup>1</sup>

Finally, Sir Edwin Pears rationalized why Great Britain, specifically, was entitled to replace the Ottomans in taking care of Muslim affairs, thereby destroying the pan-Islamism dream and invalidating all the ostensible needs that might have been misinterpreted as calling for it. “Great Britain granted and would always grant the utmost freedom to the Mahometans of the Empire. Happily they recognised the justice of our conduct in regard thereto, but the British Government would not tolerate any outside interference with the religious faith of the Moslems in the Empire. Nevertheless Abdul Hamid sent messengers to Afghanistan and elsewhere to endeavour to stir up disaffection. All attempts in the direction of pan-Islamism made by Abdul Hamid completely failed. Many Indian Moslems during the last forty years visited Turkey. Some of them were barristers-at law, and the impression generally left was that, while they went to Constantinople as the pious Jew of old time might have gone to Jerusalem, they left it with far other feelings. They hoped to see Islam at its best; they went away greatly disappointed. They were often kindly treated and made much of by good Moslems, but the longer their stay in Islambol the more completely did they realise the maladministration of government, and especially the disgraceful condition of the courts of law. Even in Turkey itself pan-Islamism as a living force can hardly be said to have existed during Abdul Hamid’s reign.”<sup>2</sup>

The narrative of Sir Edwin Pears in connection with pan-Islamism became a Western dogma. It was adopted and expounded as such ever since by all subsequent scholars of Ottomanism and Mohammedanism. Many Muslim scholars, proponents of liberalism and nationalism, quickly started jumping on the bandwagon, too. They all agreed that pan-Islamism was a negative and threatening policy. At best, it was counterproductive. To Murat Ozyuksel, Selim Deringil, Alyson Chouinard, Alp Yenen and Benjamin Fortna, pan-Islamism was so much anti-West that ultimately it mutated into a phobia. In the meantime, it was so much in support of the Islamic and Muslim causes that, in the end, it often became associated with Islamic radicalism, fundamentalism and militancy, as implied by Bernard Lewis, Erik Zürcher, Jacob Landau and others. Cutting through

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., p. 149.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 150.

the variables entailed in the aforementioned viewpoints, Nikki Keddie observed that pan-Islamism was “a movement in many ways analogous to nationalism”, within whose open-ended parameters diverse interpretations could easily find a footing, partly or completely.<sup>1</sup>

In passing, Jamaluddin al-Afghani (d. 1897) is said – or alleged - to have been an ideologist and intellectual mastermind of pan-Islamism (philosophy of Islamic unity). He was the father of what could be described as Islamic modern reform. It was perhaps in 1885 that Jamaluddin al-Afghani contacted the Ottoman political leadership in Istanbul and offered his services “as a kind of wandering pan-Islamic messianic emissary.” However, Sultan Abdul Hamid II asked him to stay where he was *ad interim*. Only in 1892 was Jamaluddin al-Afghani invited by the Sultan to Istanbul to join forces with the government and boost the agenda intellectually. Some sources indicate that it was the Sultan who initiated the first overtures, but others claim the opposite.<sup>2</sup>

### **Islam between “pan” and “ism”**

The term “pan-Islamism” consists of two words: “pan” as a prefix or combining form and “Islamism” as a noun. As a word-forming element originating from Greek “pan” means “all, every, whole and all-inclusive”. The first examples of the prefix “pan” in connection with nationalities were used in the mid and late 19<sup>th</sup> century, such as pan-Hellenism (1844), pan-Slavism (1846), pan-Americanism (1889), pan-Germanism (1892), pan-Africanism (1900) and pan-Europeanism (1901).<sup>3</sup>

“Pan” in relation to a nationality connotes the union of all people belonging to that particular nationality (race). It also advocates adopting and holding on to all that is common to those people and that distinguishes them from others. That would be a platform for the intended union. Against the backdrop of a nationality - above all within the socio-political contexts of the world towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries - the notion of “pan” was a sensitive thing. By and large, it is always a mixed blessing. If mishandled and misused, it can turn into a source of chauvinism and xenophobia. It could spell a

---

<sup>1</sup> Nikki Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Pan-*, <https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=pan->, accessed on July 24, 2021.



threshold of ethnocentrism and conflict, and become an impediment to peace, dialogue and collaboration.

Due to this, pan-movements and pan-ideologies are often viewed with scepticism. Their many disadvantages are exaggerated and persistently drawn attention to, whereas their fewer advantages are downplayed and kept in perspective. As for instance, in his article “Pan-Slavism and European Politics”, Louis Levine stated in 1914 that more than once in the course of the past hundred years has an international crisis been laid at the door of pan-Slavism. It was either at the root of, or was dragged into the arena of most disturbances and conflicts.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Joseph Lockey, in his article “Pan-Americanism and Imperialism”, wrote that pan-Americanism was an exclusive concept, albeit without a precise and agreed-upon meaning. The attempts at formal definition have proved unsatisfactory. “Not even the genus to which pan-Americanism belongs has been agreed upon. One author calls it an advocacy, another an idea, another a sentiment, and still others an aspiration, a tendency or a doctrine.”<sup>2</sup> Finally, as a pan-nationalist political idea, pan-Germanism was firstly attempted to be fully implemented in World War I, and as a pan-movement argued for expansionist imperialism. Following World War I, in due course, pan-Germanism went so far as to give rise to Adolf Hitler and his hitherto most controversial and most devastating political ideology.

Furthermore, “Islamism” itself is composed of two words: “Islam” and “ism”, the latter being a suffix or a word-forming element that makes nouns. “Ism” placed after the stem of a word signifies the practice, system, teaching, doctrine, philosophy, ideology, behaviour and movement associated with an idea or a phenomenon. Generally, there are political, cultural, social justices, systemic and philosophical isms. All meanings of “ism” can be catalogued as follows: a distinctive doctrine, cause, theory or religion; manner of action or behaviour characteristic of a (specified) person or thing; prejudice or discrimination on the basis of a (specified) attribute; adherence to a system or a class of principles;<sup>3</sup> belief in the superiority of one over another.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Louis Levine, Pan-Slavism and European Politics, inside “*Political Science Quarterly*”, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Dec. 1914), pp. 664-686.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph Lockey, Pan-Americanism and Imperialism, inside “*American Journal of International Law*”, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 1938), pp. 233-243.

<sup>3</sup> *Index of ISMS – Philosophy; Words that End in ISM, with Meanings*, <https://ismbook.com/ism-list>, accessed on July 24, 2021.

The first recorded usage of the suffix “ism” as an independent word was in 1670. It was chiefly negatively and as a form of criticism. By the 19<sup>th</sup> century, still disparagingly, it was being used to denote a pre-packaged ideology. In the United States of the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, “the phrase ‘the isms’ was used as a collective derogatory term to lump together the radical social reform movements of the day and various spiritual or religious movements considered non-mainstream by the standards of the time. Southerners often prided themselves on the American South being free from all of these pernicious ‘isms’.”<sup>2</sup>

This disagreeable vibe commonly associated with “isms” - no less than in the realm of thought - can be sensed from the book “Today’s Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism and Socialism” by William Ebenstein. Suggesting the extraordinary potency and, at the same time, questionability of the world’s leading isms, the author said in the preface of the book: “This book analyses the four main isms of the contemporary world - communism, fascism, capitalism and socialism. In a short book, it has seemed advisable to concentrate on the isms that shape the fate of the world rather than to discuss in detail the numerous other movements and ideologies that are important, but have not been decisive in the struggle for men’s minds. These lesser isms, whether philosophical, political, social or economic, are therefore discussed within this book only to the extent that they are related to the four major isms.”<sup>3</sup>

### **Pan-Islamism as Just another Spasmodic Pan-Ideology and Pan-Movement**

So, therefore, by christening Sultan-Caliph Abdul Hamid II’s calls and master plan for Muslim global unity and solidarity as “pan-Islamism”, the allusions were malicious. Pan-Islamism was meant to be depicted as a novel and unconventional concept, and to be presented as a reactionary and radical ideology, as well as movement, opposed to the prevalent socio-political undercurrents. It was a form of political extremism which in the

---

<sup>1</sup> Nancy Krieger, Measures of Racism, Sexism, Heterosexism, and Gender Binarism for Health Equity Research: From Structural Injustice to Embodied Harm - An Ecosocial Analysis, inside “*Annual Review of Public Health*”, Vol. 41 (April 2020), pp. 37-62.

<sup>2</sup> “Ism Definition & Meaning,” Dictionary.com (Dictionary.com), accessed July 24, 2021, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/-ism>.

<sup>3</sup> William Ebenstein, *Today’s Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism and Socialism*, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973), p. xi.

context of the left-right political spectrum slanted towards right-wing politics. Moreover, by means of its etymological and morphological properties, pan-Islamism was intended to be desacralized and, as such, rendered, particularly in the spheres of intellectualism and political dynamics of the day, as yet another temporal philosophy and retrograde movement. It was a secular and humanized undertaking, devoid of any spiritual significance and purpose. Material and humanized merits were written all over it.

As an ideological construct, pan-Islamism vied with a myriad of other newly-fashioned constructs of the world for global ascendancy. The end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the commencement of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries was a period of “isms” whereby numerous ideologies, movements and life-systems were sparked off by wholesale cultural and civilizational transformations not only in the West, but also elsewhere. Pan-Islamism was just one of them. It was unoriginal and barren. It was ill-conceived and unrealistic, and so, was destined to fail sooner rather than later. Its fate would be the fate of many other similarly unreasonable and unworkable “isms”. The necropolis of history was rapidly filling with them.

Certainly, it was easier for the West to fight pan-Islamism as a potential ideological bankruptcy, than Muslim unity and brotherhood as divine precepts of Islam. By the same token, it was easier to wage war against some purported Muslim religious and socio-political constructs, than against Islam as an impenetrable fortress of virtue and thought. In the arena of sheer human endeavours, the West stood a chance of being victorious. The situation was analogous to the West moving the battles to their home turf.

Such was also a period of “pan-s” whereby numerous ideologies and socio-cultural schemes were lusting after the infinite opportunities generated by the “miracle” of modernity and the nascent signs of globalization. Pan-Islamism – again – appeared as though merely one of those “pan-s”. In this manner, all reformatory drives of Muslims – current and in the future - were instantaneously placed in a disadvantageous position. They were doomed from the start. They were consigned to a framework demarcated by the principles of dogmatism, nationalistic internationalism and fanaticism. Thus, instead of being free and liberating, Muslim reforms – and reformers – were entrapped and, in turn, were restraining and off-putting. Instead of being progressive and forward-

looking, they were regressive and conservative. Instead of working with the constructive forces of the world, they were swimming against the current.

In short, pan-Islamism could never be democratic, or assuring. It deserved no role in the future of a new-world-order making. As a bane of the modern world, it had to be stopped and neutralized by all means necessary and as much as possible. Even if it survived in certain restricted forms, it would remain second best and would always play second fiddle to the vast potencies of modernization, innovation and liberalism. Confronting pan-Islamism was the latest crusade.

Pan-Islamism, therefore, was never treated in a complimentary sense. As outrageous as it is, the Free Dictionary goes so far as to define pan-Islamism as “a desire or plan for the union of all Muslim nations for the conquest of the world.”<sup>1</sup> A similar tone has somewhat been adopted by Merriam-Webster dictionary as well, by which pan-Islamism is understood as “a political movement launched in Turkey at the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century by Sultan Abdul-Hamid II for the purpose of combating the process of westernization and fostering the unification of Islam.”<sup>2</sup> Although not in an equally unambiguous manner, this definition nevertheless clearly insinuates the perceived militant proclivity of Islam and Muslims, and tries to draw a line between “us” and “them”. The battle lines seem to be drawn too.

The idea of pan-Islamism might likewise have been part of a Western conspiracy theory of global proportions. According to Alp Yenen, whereas “Islamic belief advocates that all Muslims should constitute a united community, namely the *ummah*, which cuts across differences in status, tribe and ancestry”, “both academic and colonial Orientalists developed a conspiracy theory, in which all Muslims were behaving and thinking in similar ways due to their zealous commitment to Islam. While considered to be racially subordinate to Europeans, once geopolitically united across the world, forming a global sect as their divine scripts dictate, Muslims could constitute a serious menace against Western civilization.” Pan-Islamism, it stands to reason, connoted invitation to the exploitation and justification of the ill-treatment of the Muslim world. Accordingly, “the modern idea of a Muslim world is a social construct that emerged in multiple interrelated

---

<sup>1</sup> *Panislamism*, <https://www.thefreedictionary.com/Panislamism>, accessed on July 26, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> *Pan-Islam*, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Pan-Islam>, accessed on July 26, 2021.

processes of colonial and cultural subjugation of Muslims by European powers and the resistance there-against.”<sup>1</sup>

In the same vein, Jacob Landau stated in his authoritative book “Pan-Islam, History and Politics” that, for many years, very few concepts managed to excite such passions and divide opinion as Pan-Islam(ism). Different and even clashing opinions were common. For example, “as early as 1902, two of the best-known Orientalists of that time, E.G. Browne and C.A. Nallino, gave their expert estimates of Pan-Islam. The former considered it non-existent, while the latter saw it as a major trend in modern Islam.” The debate never died away. As recently as in 1985 and 1987, there were two studies on the rule of Abdul Hamid II. Inevitably, the studies touched on the notion of pan-Islamism. Whereas one study (the one published in 1985) insisted that pan-Islamism constituted the foundation of the Sultan’s rule and policies, the other study (the one published in 1987) contended that such was never the case. Pan-Islamism did not feature at all in state codes and policies.<sup>2</sup>

Pan-Islamism, when all is said and done, was a fluid and open-ended concept. Both Bernard Lewis and Nikki Keddie were of the opinion that many pre-1881 political and intellectual events, especially in Turkey, acted as precursors to the official emergence of the doctrines of pan-Islamism. In like manner – by extension - many other ideas and projects, considerably deeper in the history of Islam, could be comprehended along the same lines. This attitude was a reason why Nikki Keddie, while maintaining that the pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and Jamaluddin al-Afghani was the real deal, the same, nonetheless, was nothing but the culmination of a process to which many near and distant protagonists had contributed. Hence, Nikki Keddie stated that Young Ottomans in the early 1870’s had already begun to write in favour of pan-Islamic cooperation and solidarity, and that Ottoman pan-Islamism had already been promoted under Sultan Abdulaziz, who preceded Sultan Murad V and Sultan Abdul Hamid II.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Alp Yenen, *Pan-Islamism (Ottoman Empire)*, [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism\\_ottoman\\_empire](https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism_ottoman_empire), accessed on July 26, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Jacob Landau, *Pan-Islam, History and Politics*, (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Nikki Keddie, *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, p. 22.

### **Pan-Islamism A Figment of Western Imagination**

Muhammad Iqbal was also categorical about the matter. He said that the concept of pan-Islamism, as understood and employed in the West, was nothing but a figment of Western imagination. It was later taken to mean a kind of intrigue, whose epicentre was in Istanbul. However, E.G. Browne of the Cambridge University – to whom Jacob Landau correspondingly referred as a pan-Islamism denier – “conclusively proved that pan-Islamism in that sense never existed in Constantinople or anywhere else.” To Iqbal, on the other hand, calling for Muslim unity and cooperation against Western aggression was an entirely different thing, in that such was a pure defensive measure. It was a religious and social contract. This type of pan-Islamism, in fact, was a form of pan-humanism, which was taught by Prophet Muhammad from the first day of his prophetic mission. In that sense, every Muslim is a pan-Islamist and ought to be so. In addition, Iqbal called for the prefix “pan” to be dropped from the “pan-Islamism” expression, as it was contributing to the distortion of the idea.<sup>1</sup>

Therefore, it would be grossly inappropriate and even naïve to say that the Ottomans engaged in creating their own “pan” ideology, which is pan-Islamism, because they were inspired by the “pan” movements in Europe in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century – as asserted by Selim Deringil. Indeed, the matter was much more than going after the trends of pan-Slavism, pan-Hellenism, pan-Germanism, etc.<sup>2</sup> The most that could be said about the emerging “pan” ideologies in Europe and the rest of the world is that they reminded certain Ottoman sovereigns of their actual responsibilities towards the whole Muslim ummah (community). It was a practical lesson in accountable and upright leadership.

While continuously dealing with the inauspicious consequences of such “pan” ideologies, and while being at the receiving end of their incredible effectiveness and power, the Ottomans were given thereby a cue to consider a similar weapon and deterrent power in their own arsenal. They came to realize that other nations’ extended nationalistic programs could be matched and outclassed only by the unparalleled

---

<sup>1</sup> Shereen Aslam, *Pan-Islamism and Iqbal*, [http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct94/2.htm#\\_edn58](http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct94/2.htm#_edn58), accessed on July 26, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Selim Deringil, Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), inside “*International Journal of Middle East Studies*”, Vol. 23, No. 3 (August 1991), pp. 345-359.

Islamic concepts of unity, brotherhood and cooperation. Bernard Lewis went one step further and said that Russian pan-Slavism not only contributed to the hybrid concept of pan-Islamism, but as well influenced the escalation of a Turkish national consciousness, which later developed into the Turkish national idea, in the modern sense.<sup>1</sup>

Some interpreted this Ottoman undertaking as pan-Islamism, in the moulds of other “pan-s”, whereas others saw in it an attempt towards an authentic Islamic renaissance through the medium of an Islamic (Muhammadan) union or federation (*ittihad*). They saw in it, furthermore, an act of following in the footsteps of many preceding Muslim reformers whose ideas and activities functioned as a template for the Ottoman agendas. Some yet saw in pan-Islamism (drives for Islamic union) a mode of universalism, pan-humanism and, in the broader sense, a mode of globalization, that is a form of trans-nationalization and worldwide integration. It all depended on the ideological prisms through which things and events were observed.

### **Pan-Islamism Bereft of the True Spirit of Islamic Unity**

Nevertheless, such is the character of Islam that every genuine Islamic enterprise is simultaneously “pan-Islamic” and “pan-humanistic”, and every genuine Muslim a “pan-Islamist” and “pan-humanist”. On the contrary, artificially concocted forms of “pan-Islamism” – or anything else similar, devised for socio-political expediencies – are not necessarily “Islamic” and do not necessarily serve the interests of Islam and Muslims. Moreover, their authors are not necessarily true Muslims; they may not yet be Muslims at all. Often, the misunderstandings centre on mere semantics.

As a result – for example – Mawloud Mohadi theorized about pan-Islamism in Algeria that existed in actual reality way before its official birth in Western learning. In his PhD dissertation, Mawloud Mohadi spoke about the concept of Muslim unity in the works of Hamdan Khuja (d. 1845) and Amir Abdul Qadir (d. 1883), equating it in practical terms with a style of pan-Islamism in order to tailor the discussions to the provisos of modern scholarship. The two Algerian scholars’ works represented a part of their anticolonial struggles for which they often solicited Ottoman cooperation and help.

By no means were those efforts pan-Islamic, in the Western (colonial) understanding of the term. Rather, they were purely Islamic and Islamically

---

<sup>1</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 2.

energizing, yet reformative, exertions. They entailed numerous theoretical and practical implications, which should be read consistently irrespective of ideological, socio-cultural and historical frameworks within which they may be cast. Positively, they were “Islamically pan-Islamic”.

Echoing the same sentiment, neither did Syed Ameer Ali (d. 1928) nor Salahuddin Khuda Bukhsh (d. 1931) - who were among the first Muslim intellectuals to write extensively in English – resort to using the term pan-Islamism, although at that time the term was gaining currency rapidly in the West. Instead, both scholars opted for the constant and familiar Islamic terminology, such as “the unity and brotherhood of all Muslims”, “corporate unity of the Muslims”, “unity and fraternity”, “the unity of God enforced the unity of man”, “religious and political unity”, “brotherly love and fraternal unity”, “Islamic unity”, “divine unity and human equality” and “religious unity and universal citizenship”. Salahuddin Khuda Bukhsh did so primarily in his books “Essays: Indian and Islamic” (1912) and “Contributions to the History of Islamic Civilization” (1905), and Syed Ameer Ali in his book “Spirit of Islam, Life and Teachings of Mohammed” (1902).

However, when Syed Ameer Ali wrote a foreword to the book “Islam: Her Moral and Spiritual Value”, which was composed by Major Arthur Glyn Leonard, an Irish soldier and ethnographer, and was published in London in 1909, he had no choice but to articulate his view on pan-Islamism. Syed Ameer Ali did so because the book itself touched on the subject matter. In the book, the author Major Arthur Glyn Leonard exposed some of the Western conspiracies against the Muslim world, some of which unfolded under the banner of pan-Islamism. The main culprit for “the so-called Muslim menace” - as the title of the book’s Chapter I goes – was the European press.

Major Arthur Glyn Leonard summarized “the Muslim menace”, which was aggressively propagated in the West at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, as follows: “In one word, Europe - Christian, civilized and unoffending Europe - is confronted with a pan-Islamic confederation, that is co-operating to achieve the unity and the nationalization of all Islam, with the express object of ultimately turning upon Christendom, and rending her into a thousand tattered fragments.”<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Major Arthur Glyn Leonard, *Islam: Her Moral and Spiritual Value*, (London: Luzac & Co, 1909), p. 13.



Syed Ameer Ali was both glad and grateful for the contributions of the book towards debunking several dominant misconceptions about Islam and Muslims, in particular such as pertained to the pan-Islamism construct. He used the writing of the book's foreword as an opportunity to lay emphasis on the fact that, fundamentally, Islam was a pan-Islamic religion, championing universal moral and spiritual excellence. Accordingly, it would be an offence to politicize the idea of pan-Islamism as Islam's innate identity - especially in the existing milieu of Islam-West tensions – and to thus demean and render it a “bogey”.

Syed Ameer Ali elaborated: “In the first chapter the author has applied himself to expose the absurdity and hollowness of the pan-Islamic ‘bogey’. That the growing rapprochement between Moslem communities, hitherto divided by sectarian feuds, should be viewed with disfavour by Europe as indicating a danger to its predominance and selfish ambitions is intelligible. Hoawever that it should be regarded as a deliberate challenge to, or intended as a hostile demonstration against Christendom, is a mere chimera. Major Leonard proves conclusively that the pan-Islamic movement is no modern political movement, but that morally and spiritually Islam, in its very essence, is pan-Islamic; in other words, a creed that recognizes in practices the brotherhood of man to a degree unknown in any other religion, and admits in its commonwealth no difference of race, colour or rank.”<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the case of Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayed (d. 1963), one of Muhammad Abduh's prominent disciples in Egypt, is also noteworthy - as cited by Albert Hourani. Despite the standpoints of his teachers, Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayed did not believe in the concept of pan-Islamism as a political force. He rather held that such was a “bogey” – the term first used by Syed Ameer Ali in connection with pan-Islamism – formed by the British so as to provoke European sentiments against the national movement in Egypt. Even if political pan-Islamism existed, Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayed believed it would inevitably fail, because “states are based on common interest and not on common sentiment.”<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-7.

<sup>2</sup> Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 178.

## Conclusion

Pan-Islamism was an artificial concept. It was a Western socio-political construct aimed to stifle the growing calls for the implementation of such fundamental tenets of Islam as Muslim unity, brotherhood and cooperation. A potential Muslim renaissance was thus meant to be undermined by means of desacralizing and trivializing its harbingers. Moreover, the same was to be politicized as much as possible and cast as a mere political expediency. On the global stage, pan-Islamism needed to be projected as just another opportunistic pan-ideology and pan-movement – i.e., just another spasmodic “ism” - that stood in the way of the western-style modernization and democratization of the world.

Pan-Islamism, furthermore, was promoted as the antithesis of civilizational progress, cultural refinement and liberalism, based on which the colonization and Western expansionism crusades were additionally rationalized. Hence, no matter what, the pan-Islamism phenomenon – conceived in such a way as to malign and pre-empt the prospect of a global Muslim union - had to be resisted at all levels, and all its protagonists as well as functional systems, neutralized. Otherwise, the successful creation of a new world order might have never been possible.

Definitely, it was easier for the West to oppose pan-Islamism as a potential ideological bankruptcy, than Muslim unity, solidarity and brotherhood as Islamic essential precepts. In the same way, it was easier to wage war against some purported Muslim religious and socio-political constructs, than against Islam as an impenetrable fortress of virtue and thought. In pan-Islamism the West was facing people and a political system only, while in Islamic unity and brotherhood it was facing, in addition to people and a political system, a celestial paradigm as well.

It is against this truth that one ought to view the Western narratives of Jamaluddin al-Afghani as a professed ideologist of pan-Islamism (Islamic unity), Sultan-Caliph Abdul Hamid II as the mission's prime mover, and of the Ottoman Empire – and the rest of the Muslim world at the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> centuries – as the background of the pan-Islamic activities. Anything short of this approach would be grossly unfair, not just to the persons involved, but also to knowledge and history.

## References

- Aslam, Shereen, *Pan-Islamism and Iqbal*,  
[http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct94/2.htm#\\_edn58](http://www.allamaiqbal.com/publications/journals/review/oct94/2.htm#_edn58),  
 Accessed on July 26, 2021.
- Blunt, Wilfrid S. *The Future of Islam*, London: Kegan Paul, Trench & CO, 1882.
- Deringil, Selim. Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: the Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), inside “*International Journal of Middle East Studies*”, Vol. 23, No. 3, August 1991.
- Ebenstein, William. *Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism and Socialism*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973.
- Fahmy, Khaled. *All the Pasha's Men*, Cairo: The American University in Cairo, 2002.
- Findley, Carter V. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism and Modernity*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.
- Hourani, Albert, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
- Index of ISMS – Philosophy; Words that End in ISM, with Meanings,  
<https://ismbook.com/ism-list>, accessed on July 24, 2021.
- “Ism Definition & Meaning.” Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com. Accessed July 24, 2021.  
<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/-ism>.
- Joseph Lockey, Pan-Americanism and Imperialism, inside “*American Journal of International Law*”, Vol. 32, No. 2, April 1938.
- Keddie, Nikki. *An Islamic Response to Imperialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.
- Krieger, Nancy, Measures of Racism, Sexism, Heterosexism, and Gender Binarism for Health Equity Research: From Structural Injustice to Embodied Harm - An Ecosocial Analysis, inside “*Annual Review of Public Health*”, Vol. 41, April 2020.
- Landau, Jacob. *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage*, London: Routledge, 2016.
- Landau, Jacob. *Pan-Islam, History and Politics*, London: Routledge, 2016.
- Leonard, Major Arthur G. *Islam: Her Moral and Spiritual Value*, London: Luzac & Co, 1909.
- Levine, Louis. Pan-Slavism and European Politics, inside “*Political Science Quarterly*”, Vol. 29, No. 4, Dec. 1914.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Maksudoglu, Mehmet. *Osmanli History (1289-1922) Based on Osmanli Sources*, Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Malaysia, 1999.
- Ochsenwald, William. *Religion, Society and the State in Arabia*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984.
- Ozyuksel, Murat. *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2014.
- Pan-, <https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=pan->, accessed on July 24, 2021.
- Panislamism, <https://www.thefreedictionary.com/Panislamism>, accessed on July 26, 2021.
- Pan-Islam, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Pan-Islam>, accessed on July 26, 2021.
- Pears, Edwin Sir. *Life of Abdul Hamid*, London: Constable & Company LTD, 1917.
- Said, Edward. *Orientalism*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1980.
- Vahide, Sukran. *Islam in Modern Turkey*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.
- Yenen, Alp. *Pan-Islamism (Ottoman Empire)*, [https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism\\_ottoman\\_empire](https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/pan-islamism_ottoman_empire), accessed on July 26, 2021.
- Zurcher, Erik. *Turkey, a Modern History*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2017.

# AL-ITQĀN

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC SCIENCES AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES

---

**Volume: 5**

**Issue No. 2**

**August 2021**

---

**EDITOR IN-CHIEF**

Dr. Wan Mohd Azam Mohd Amin

**MANAGING EDITOR**

Dr. Masitoh Ahmad

**EDITORIAL BOARD**

Dr. Muhammad Afifi al-Akiti, Oxford

Dr. Muhammad Kamal Hassan, IIUM

Dr. Syed Arabi Aidid, IIUM.

Dr. Hassan Basri Mat Dahan, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia,  
Nilai, Negeri Sembilan.

Dr. Kamaruzaman Yusuff, Universiti Malaysia Sarawak,  
Kota Semarahan, Kucing.

Dr. Kamar Oniah, IIUM.

Dr. Mumtaz Ali, IIUM.

Dr. Siti Akmar, Universiti Institut Teknologi MARA, Shah Alam

Dr. Thameem Ushama, IIUM.