could have been better appreciated if the author had used, for instance, analogical and allegorical styles of presentation to understand Hinduism. Additionally, the book is marred by several technical mistakes (e.g., p. 26, 33, 56 and 59), few repetitions (e.g., p. 5-6 and 27-28) and references to materials that do not appear in the text (e.g., p. 19, 72 and 82). These shortcomings do not undermine the utility of the work. This book should inspire others to study diverse civilizations and religions by using the scientific methodology without becoming secular.


Reviewer: Abdul Rashid Moten, Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia.

_Understanding Terror Networks_, according to its author, is “a general empirical study” of the terrorists “to add to what is known and to correct some widely disseminated misconceptions” (p. 61). It is an attempt to identify the origins, the objectives, and the social network of the members of what Marc Sageman calls the Global Salafī jihād Islamic jihād—the interlocking series of radical Islamist terrorist networks guided by Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants manning the al-Qaida organisation. According to Sageman, the Islamist fanatics in this violent, revivalist social movement target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people of all races and religions throughout the world. “The Global Salafī jihad is a threat to the world…. Elimination of this movement is imperative” (p. 175).

The Salafists are those who preach the restoration of authentic Islam and, to Sageman, they include every one beginning from Ibn Taymiyyah and Mohammed ibn Abd el-Wahhab to Syed Qutb, Mawdudi and their followers and the Tablighi Jamāʿat. Sageman traces the origin of the Salafī jihād (the violent, revivalist social movement with al-Qaida on the lead) to Egypt. Most of the leadership
and the whole ideology of al-Qaida derive from Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb (1906–66) and his progeny, who killed Anwar Sadat. From there, they migrated to Afghanistan. With the end of the Soviet-Afghan War, they continued on to jihad. In 1991, Hassan al-Turabi of the National Islamic Front invited the most militant of these terrorists to Khartoum. It was in Khartoum that the Salafists decided to attack the “far enemy,” the United States, for supporting the unIslamic regime in Sudan and elsewhere.

In 1996, for many reasons, the al-Qaida was expelled from the Sudan and, within two months of returning to Afghanistan, bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war on the United States. The leadership of the Salafi jihād consists of a group that includes Saudi exile Osama bin Laden and his right-hand commander, Ayman Mohammad al-Zawahiri, whose Egyptian Islamic Jihad group formerly merged with al-Qaida.

Based on the study of biographical data on 172 terrorists, Sageman refutes the stereotypes of terrorists as “poor, desperate, naïve single young men from third world countries, vulnerable to brainwashing and recruitment into terror” (p. 69). He rejects psychological explanations often used to explain why terrorists kill—specifically, mental illness or pathological personality disorders such as narcissism, paranoia, and pathological hatred. Instead, he argues that they make considered, sane, and determined decisions. For the vast majority of the mujāhidīn, social bonds predated ideological commitment, and it was these social networks that inspired alienated young Muslims to join the jihād. These men, isolated from the rest of society, were transformed into fanatics yearning for martyrdom and eager to kill.

The Salafi jihād resembles a network of self-selected individuals who, with their fellow conspirators, are carrying out terror attacks against their targets. They are held together more by friendship, kinship, and discipleship than any traditional recruitment methods. Sageman is informed about these networks as he was a CIA case officer who worked undercover on the Afghan frontier during the 1980s. Sageman, however, argues against the widespread belief that in the 1980s, the United States helped to arm and train Afghanistan mujāhidīn who, following the Soviet defeat in that war, drifted back to their home countries to become part of the global jihād. To him,
“The notion that U.S. personnel trained future al-Qaida terrorists is pure fantasy.” According to Sageman, the CIA channeled its aid through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, or ISI, which was watchfully jealous to ensure that the United States was shut out of the management of the mujāhidīn. “No U.S. official came in contact with the foreign volunteers” (p. 57). In fact, Sageman says that foreign Muslim fighters were aided by the Arab nationals who joined up to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, further removing them from any taint of U.S. contact. Sageman goes so far as to claim that with the exception of Wali Khan Amin Shah, a personal friend of bin Laden, “no Afghan, no matter how fundamentalist, who was trained and supported by the ISI, later joined al-Qaida” (p. 57). Indeed, there is a great deal of misinformation or a great deal of malignance in this statement.

It must be noted that Sageman’s work is not concerned with terrorists of all kinds. The Kashmiri terrorists targeting India and Chechnyans targeting Russia are not included in his study. Similarly, Algerian terrorists who confine their activities to Algeria are excluded but those who attack French targets are included. Interestingly, Palestinian terrorists are also excluded from the study because they are secular and they do not target the US or other Western countries (p. 62). For understandable reasons, Sageman does not include non-Muslim terrorists. Evidently, Sageman has singled out for extinction only those terrorists who are “Anti-American or anti-West.” This is due to the fact that they advocate the “defeat of the Western powers that prevent the establishment of a true Islamist state” (p. 1). Their goal consists of “reestablishing past Muslim glory and predominance in a great Islamic state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries” (p. 1). Reading between the lines, Sageman blames Islam and its shared rituals for producing fanatics. He argues that the ferocious tenacity of purpose of the Muslim terrorists emanate from a fixed, immoveable will derived from Islam, the most communal of all religions, with many orchestrated shared rituals, which he says “reinforce religious explanations and faith in God and the community of believers” (p. 117). The mosques are the places where young Muslims are transformed into dedicated fanatics, ready to sacrifice their lives for the glory of God. Clearly, Sageman is suffering from what is known as Islamophobia, a strong, irrational hatred and/or fear of Islam.
Sageman tried his best not to implicate America as the ultimate cause of Muslim terrorism. He did concede, however, that the presence of U.S. troops in the Arabian Peninsula has breathed a new life into the Salafi jihād movement. The objective of al-Qaida was to attack Western targets “to force Western forces to withdraw from the Muslim lands” (p. 41). Sageman recommends several strategies to counter the Salafi jihād. First, the West should attack and eliminate hubs to break the network down into “isolated, non-communicating islands of nodes.” This to him is the best way of countering terror networks. Second, the law-enforcing agencies must delegitimize the Salafist movement within the worldwide Muslim community, discouraging recruitment of new terrorists, and deny places of sanctuary and training. Third, “the greatest priority now should be extensive penetration of the jihad.” For this, he suggests that researchers and analysts should focus on friends and relatives of identified terrorists, and especially those Muslims who underwent training, but decided not to join the jihād. Finally, he proposes a determined approach to decrease the pool of potential terrorists and win over Muslims by using an international anti-defamation league and a special cadre of officers steeped in Muslim cultures and languages (pp. 181–82).

Understanding Terror Networks has been widely lauded for debunking the stereotypes of terrorists and for insightful observations derived solely from research in open sources. However, the book is flawed on several counts. Sageman himself admits that his analysis is based upon poor quality and insufficient quantity of data. His sources include the documents and transcripts of legal proceedings involving terrorist organizations, government documents, press and scholarly articles, and Internet articles. Much of his analysis is based upon journalistic accounts and hence suffers from misinformation. On several occasions, Sageman contradicts himself. For example, on p. 57, he contends that foreign fighters were barely involved in fighting in the Soviet-Afghan war but on p. 70, he stipulates that the leadership and founding members of al-Qaida were indeed in the fight. Likewise, on p. 87, the author explains that “Salafi groups are careful to avoid a cult of personality” yet, several pages later, he reminds readers that all true members of al-Qaida must swear an oath of allegiance, or act of Baya, to Osama bin Laden (p. 91). Also, Sageman reports that he has read “no accounts of sinister al-
Qaida recruiters lurking in mosques” but later he points out that “potential mujahedin have a hard time joining the Jihad if they do not know how to link up with the movement.”

The real value of this book, and the reason why Muslims and responsible scholarship should pay attention to, is that it portrays the attitude of the West towards Islam and is symptomatic of current problems associated with Western analysis of terrorism, both in government and in the popular and academic sectors. Most of Sageman’s recommendations have been implemented by the Bush administration.


Reviewers: Dr. Syed Sohail Imam and Khairol Anuar Masuan, Department of Psychology, International Islamic University Malaysia.

Though the history of formal psychology in Malaysia is quite recent, informal psychology has been part and parcel of the lives of Malays. The book under review raises psychological issues within the context of the Malaysian society. It presents the historical development of psychology in Malaysia and documents some current useful local studies in different areas of psychology. The eleven chapters in the volume cover both basic and applied areas. In the final chapter the editors explore the future directions of Malaysian psychology. Noticeably, all the chapters, with the exception of one on counseling in Malaysia, were contributed by members of the Department of Psychology at the International Islamic University Malaysia. The issues covered are not exhaustive; they reflect mainly the interest of the contributors.

Wan Rafaei’s chapter on the historical developments of psychology in Malaysia includes both formal and informal psychology. While the former started with the establishment of psychology departments at the local universities, with the earliest being Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia in 1979, the latter provides a wealth of information