The Place of Mullā Ṣadrā’s *Kitāb al-Mashā`ir* in Izutsu’s Philosophy

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**Abstract:** This paper examines Izutsu’s study of Islamic philosophy, notably his work on Mullā Ṣadrā’s *Kitāb al-Mashā`ir*, a philosophical treaties on existence and quiddity, in a wider framework of his philosophical thinking. From his younger days Izutsu had been interested in philosophical systems that were based on thinkers’ own unitive experience of the Reality. Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophical thesis of the “principality of existence” (*aṣālat al-wujūd*) based on his own unitive experience was of special interest to Izutsu. He analysed Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy of mystical experience using the function of semantic articulation of language and showed how the non-articulated reality of the mystic’s ecstatic experience with no meaning becomes meaningful. Izutsu’s study of Islamic philosophy such as Mullā Ṣadrā’s may be seen as a case study of his “Oriental Philosophy.”

**Keywords:** existence, quiddity, unitive, Islamic philosophy, Oriental philosophy, semantic articulation of language, mysticism

Izutsu Toshihiko (1914-1993) is a multi-talented scholar and philosopher. In this paper, I would like to shed some light on his basic interest commonly found in his studies on Islamic thought as well as in his philosophical studies of different Asian traditions.

**Izutsu and Mysticism**

Izutsu had a keen interest in mysticism from his younger days. One of his earliest works published in 1949 was titled the *Mystical Philosophy (Part of Greece)*. He dealt with the Greek philosophers

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from the Pre-Socratic philosophers to Plotinus and investigated the kind of experience their philosophical thinking was based on and how they articulated their metaphysical insight. The following passages in this book about the Pre-Socratic philosophers show that Izutsu had already clear interest in mystical experience and rational thinking based on the experience. He states as follows:

From fragmental passages left by the Pre-Socratic philosophers seem to appear speechless spiritual atmosphere and gigantic sound. It is because the vivid life of a kind of peculiar experience is hidden at the bottom of their thought. At the roots of their thought there is a cosmic experience, from whose metaphysical source like an empty limitless sky all originates. Their philosophy is the first effort in the history of the Western spirituality to grasp the original experience through reason and to articulate in a logical form.¹

Many historians of philosophy have not noticed a kind of cosmic mystical experience hidden at the bottom of the development of thought in the Pre-Socratic philosophers. But if we missed this central issue, lots of fragments left by the Pre-Socratic philosophers would lose their integration, split apart and turn to be a heap of lifeless scraps.²

In this way, he noticed as an important factor the mystical experience which was hidden behind the thought of Greek philosophers and which backed their metaphysical systems. What is mysticism in his understanding? In the following excerpt, Izutsu conveys his understanding of mysticism in the chapter where he discussed Plato:

According to the popular understanding of mysticism which is considered one and the same as the ecstatic union, the contemplation of the One in the blissful ecstasy might be regarded as the ultimate goal of mysticism. However, the unveiling of the Reality in the ecstatic experience is merely the goal of the first half of the mystic way, and not the ultimate goal of mysticism. Whether it becomes mysticism or not, depends upon the result of its latter half. It is certain that contemplation is an essential element of the mystic way, but the ecstasis is not the whole of mysticism. Because once it reaches the peak of theoria, mysticism must come back to the eagerness of practical activities so as to break down the serenity of beatific vision. What we see in Plotinus is the magnificent panorama of his ontological thinking developed
on his *anabasis* experience finally leading to the contemplation of the One. It is certainly a mystical thought, but not mysticism in its full sense.³

Izutsu’s understanding of mysticism in his early years is not so much different from the usually formulated one.⁴ However, in his understanding of mysticism, he seems to stress very strongly a particular aspect of mysticism, that is to say, acquisition of a new horizon of meaning or value in the ordinary world or our everyday life. Once he acquired the beatific vision in his ecstatic experience, a mystic must return to his ordinary life and realise the ordinary life with the elevated spirituality, which seems to be the same as the earlier ordinary life in its outward appearance, but changed in its inward quality. Those who acquired the elevated spirituality in the awareness of the reality should find spiritual bliss in the midst of the ordinary life. This way of thinking reminds me of Zen. Mystical union, or enlightenment if we use the word more suitable to the context of Zen Buddhism, is surely an extraordinary experience. But Zen dislikes extraordinary experience to keep its extraordinariness as something different from, or opposite to, the ordinary life. Extraordinary experience should be one, or united with the ordinary, everyday life. Izutsu’s understanding of mysticism has something very close to the Zen way of thinking.

Izutsu had deep knowledge of Zen, of which we are easily convinced if we read his lectures at the Eranos Conference and other essays. Izutsu did not relate much of his personal experience of Zen training though we notice his acquaintance with the Zen practice in the pages of his description of Zen. He did not talk much of his personal Zen experience, but there is an interesting and precious record, in which he talked about the atmosphere of his family as well as his spiritual practice in his younger days. It runs as follows:

> I was born in a family whose atmosphere is filled with a spirituality that may be called “Oriental Nothingness.” “Everyday is a good day”(rì rì shì hǎo rì/ nichi nichi kore koujitu). When I was young, entire time was quietly passing in my family for the purpose of realising in our everyday life something invisible absolute. At least it had such a serene outlook. My father was at the center of this life....
My father taught, or rather forcibly disciplined me his peculiar kind of meditation. His method is the following. He gave me a sheet of paper on which “Mind” (xin/shin, kokoro) in the Chinese letter was written with fresh ink. He ordered me to fix my eyes on the letter for a certain period of time everyday. When he found my gazing enough, he threw away the sheet and ordered me to gaze the letter written in my mind, not that on the sheet, and to concentrate on a point through gazing it without a break for a full day. Then, sometime after, he ordered to erase completely all the letters written in my mind and to find my own living Mind behind the letter Mind. Further again, he ordered me not to see even my Mind and to make myself disappear in Mindlessness with paying no attention to Nothingness even if I were in Nothingness. I was taught at the same time, that the progress of meditation should be actualized in the form of the inner freedom in the (practical) sphere of the everyday life and that any kind of intellectual inquiry is a terribly wicked thought whether in the middle of the training or after the completion of the spiritual quest. In fact, Bi yán lù (Hekiganroku), Wú mén guān (Mumonkan), Lín jì lù (Rinzairoku) and other analects of Zen masters, which were then common subjects of discussion between Father and me, seemed to teach me, ‘Do not think! Do not think!’ They warned me not to be entangled in intellectual play. In other words, I firmly believed that I was not able to think based on meditation because the contemplative life (vita contemplativa) was a purely practical way either in its ascending path or in its descending path. I had never dreamed that such typical activities of human thinking as philosophy and metaphysics could be built on the experience of contemplative life. Later Western mystics taught me the fact opposite to my conviction at that time. How much was my astonishment and enthusiasm when I found that at the bottom of their philosophy Greek philosophers expect the ecstatic experience of vita contemplativa as the root of their philosophical thinking! In this way I found my Greece.5

A type of mysticism that Izutsu was taught through his family tradition of Zen with the practice of meditation forms his basic understanding of philosophy. The massive influence of the traditional way of Zen teaching in his earlier years led him to the conviction that the religious quest should be practical and that any kind of
rational reasoning is intellectual acrobatics, which serve as the serious obstruction in the quest of enlightenment. However, his reading of Greek philosophical texts revealed that any meaningful philosophical systems have mystical insight in their roots. On the last line of the above quotation he states, “I found my Greece.” This sentence is meaningful. Izutsu had two different aptitudes in himself: a very keen logical mind and an intuitive mystical insight. The conventional Zen teaching had hampered the unification of his two aptitudes. It is the Greek philosophy that removed the obstacle and opened his eyes for a new horizon of study, namely, a study of philosophy founded on mystical experience. “His Greece” would be this new horizon, where he worked until his final days in this world.

**Mullā Ṣadrā’s Kitāb al-Mashāʾir**

Izutsu published a Japanese translation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s *Kitāb al-Mashāʾir* in 1978. He often referred to Mullā Ṣadrā in his research papers and published books like *The Concept and Reality of Existence* (1971), but the Japanese translation of *Kitāb al-Mashāʾir* is the only work in which Izutsu thematically concentrated on Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy.

In the *Kitāb al-Mashāʾir*, Mullā Ṣadrā presents his own understanding of the concepts and reality about existence (*wujūd*) and quiddity (*māhiyyah*) and of their relationship, which form the foundation of metaphysics in the Islamic philosophical tradition. In this book, Mullā Ṣadrā elucidated his philosophical standpoint of the “principality of existence” (*ašālat al-wujūd*). According to Mullā Ṣadrā, the world where we live and that we perceive through our senses and rational reasoning is, in its true sense, the self-manifested forms of the reality of existence with different degrees and grades of intensity and weakness. Individual things are rationally analysed to have, in addition to existence, quiddities through which they are distinguished from each other. But quiddity is simply a name pasted to a particular mode of existence, and has no reality in itself. Mullā Ṣadrā formulated this idea under massive influence from the earlier mystical thinkers like Ibn ‘Arabi (d.1240) and Suhrawardī (d.1191). They are the philosophers whom Izutsu had keen interest in and had investigated.
Izutsu refers to Mullâ Ṣadrâ and his philosophy in various sections of his *The Concept and Reality of Existence* as well as in his explanation in the Japanese translation of the *Kitâb al-Mashâ’ir*. I believe that the most important characteristic of the philosophy of Mullâ Ṣadrâ, at least for Izutsu, is its harmonious integration or ‘reciprocal relationship’ of mystical experience and rational reasoning. Izutsu states:

Like Suhrawardî, Mullâ Ṣadrâ was wholly convinced of the reciprocal relationship between mystical experience and logical thinking. All philosophising which does not lead to the highest spiritual realisation is but a vain and useless pastime, just as all mystical experience which is not backed by a rigorous conceptual training in philosophy is but a way to illusions and aberrations. Such was the conviction he had obtained through his own personal experience. The meeting point, in this experience, of mysticism and philosophy was furnished by a sudden illuminative realisation of the ultimate oneness of the subject (‘âqîl) and the object (ma’qûl) — the seer and the seen — and of the intellect (‘aqîl) itself. For in such a spiritual state alone can the metaphysical reality of things be intuited as it really is, as opposed to the way it ordinarily *looks.*

Here Izutsu stresses the importance of mystical elements of Mullâ Ṣadrâ and refers to the thesis of the “Unification of the knower and the known,” one of Mullâ Ṣadrâ’s novel ideas, which is understandable only in the context of the mystical unitive experience serving as the foundation of his philosophical thesis. To establish the cognition at the highest level between the subject and the object, the subject should get closer to its object in the utmost degree of closeness. The closest relationship between them is their being one, their oneness. There is nothing closer than their unification. The unification cannot take place in the field of logical thinking, but it can in the mystical awareness. The experience of oneness makes his thesis tenable.

In the *Kitâb al-Mashâ’ir*, Mullâ Ṣadrâ describes his “conversion” from the position of the principality of quiddity to that of the principality of existence as follows:

In the earlier days, I used to be a passionate defender of the thesis that the “quiddities” are *ašîl* and “existence” is *i’tibârî,*
until my Lord gave me guidance and let me see His demonstration. All of a sudden my spiritual eyes were opened and I saw with utmost clarity that the truth was just the contrary of what the philosophers in general had held. Praise be to God who, by the light of intuition, led me out of the darkness of the groundless idea and firmly established me upon the thesis which would never change in the present world and the Hereafter.

As a result (I now hold that) the ‘existences’ (wujūdāt) are primary ‘realities’, while the ‘quiddities’ are the ‘permanent archetypes’ (a’yān thābitah) that have never smelt the fragrance of ‘existence.’ The ‘existences’ are nothing but beams of light radiated by the true Light which is the absolutely self-subsistent Existence, except that each of them is characterised by a number of essential properties and intelligible qualities. These latter are the things that are known as ‘quiddities.’

Here Mullâ Šadrâ himself describes his experience of mystic nature, which convinced him that the reality of things is found in “existence,” not in “quiddities.” He, as the subject of cognition, is encompassed in the beams of the true Light and unified in the Light itself, which used to be the object of his cognition. All of the things in the world are different forms taken by the sole reality of existence. The record above certainly describes Mullâ Šadrâ’s unitive experience, which serves as the basis of his philosophical thesis of the “unification of the knower and the known.” In the excerpt that follows Izutsu comments on the relationship of Mullâ Šadrâ’s mysticism and philosophical thesis:

The principality of ‘existence’ was a philosophical conviction that originated in a personal experience on quite a different level of the intellect from that on which his former conviction stood. It was a philosophical position which had a deep root in a mystical experience of Existence.

Mullâ Šadrâ built his philosophical system based on his own mystical experience of Existence. I believe that Izutsu shared the same mentality and spirituality with him, which is the point that attracted Izutsu’s spiritual and philosophical interest.
Huwiyyah

Izutsu paid special attention to the term *huwiyyah*. In one of his Japanese works, *The Consciousness and Essence*, he uses the term as one of the important key concepts of Islamic philosophy. I would like to elucidate why he placed such great importance on the term *huwiyyah*, which seems not to be so commonly used in the texts of Islamic philosophy. A simple explanation of the meaning of *huwiyyah* is given in the following way: “*Huwiyyah* means individual (*shakhṣ*). It is known in the same meaning among philosophers and theologians. *Huwiyyah* is also applied to the extra-mental existence (*wujūd-i khāriji*).”

Izutsu also explains the meaning of *huwiyyah* in the following way:

It has two meanings: (1) the state in which a thing is completely actualised in the extra-mental world (*al-taḥaqquq al-khāriji*); and (2) that which brings a thing into such a state of actualisation. In this second meaning, *huwiyyah* is synonymous with *wujūd*.

Mullā Šadrā refers to *huwiyyah* in several passages in the *Kitāb al-Mashāʿir*. In the preface, he stresses on the importance of the understanding of *wujūd* (existence) and states the object of his investigation in the following way: “It is to establish that Existence is the unchangeable root of all existents (*mawjūd*) and that it is the only one Reality (*ḥaqīqah*) while all the others are nothing but its reflections, shadows and forms.” Here he mentions the gist of his idea of the principality of existence. In the same preface he succinctly states the relationship of existence and quiddity, in the explanation of which the word *huwiyyah* appears as follows:

Existence has quiddities different in species and individual, and also definitions and realities divergent in genus and differentia. However, as a whole, Existence is the only one actual existent (*jitsu, jawhar*) that has the only one Reality (*huwiyyah*) with many degrees and grades in ascent and descent.

Here *huwiyyah* is used in the sense of the reality as existing in the extra-mental world. Different degrees and grades of existence serve as the foundation of quiddities that have no foundation in the reality.
In the first section of his introduction, Mullā Ṣadrā presents the four points of view concerning existence (wujūd): (1) anniyyah; (2) māhiyyah; (3) mafhūm; and (4) huwiyyah.

Nothing is more intuitively evident and self-demonstratively clear than Existence as the concrete reality (anniyyah), while nothing is more hidden than ‘what is it?’ (māhiyyah). It is extremely difficult to represent and conceptually grasp it. However, what is meant by the expression: ‘[Something] is (exists)’ (mafhūm) is self-evident for everyone with no necessity of explanation.

The word ‘is (exists)’ [in the expression: ‘[Something] is (exists)’] has a field of indication much wider than any other words. On the other hand, however, the concrete actuality (huwiyyah) of Existence is more specific in its concrete determination and individuality than any others. Because all individualized acquire their individuality through their being existent; all generated are to be generated through their being existent; and all specified and all determined are to be determined and specified through their being existent. But Existence is individualized in itself from the beginning and is ultimately determined by itself.¹⁵

In this section, Mullā Ṣadrā succinctly presents four different aspects of Existence. Izutsu gives some footnotes to the three points of view except that of mafhūm (notion).¹⁶ He translates anniyyah as “concrete reality” and explains it to mean that it is not only represented in mind but also has a corresponding real existence in the extra-mental world. On māhiyyah (quiddity) he comments, that it has two meanings:¹⁷ (1) the answer to the question “mā huwa?” that is, the conceptual quiddity expressed in the form of definition; and (2) that to the question “mā bī-hī al-shayʿ huwa huwa?” that is, the reality which makes a thing as it is. The first meaning is not applicable to wujūd, and what Mullā Ṣadrā intended to convey is this latter meaning. Huwiyyah is a raw reality, to which no process of human consciousness like representation and conceptualisation is added. Thus, he gave some comments to the different terms.

From Izutsu’s translation with his related comments, we understand that huwiyyah of Existence refers to the Reality of existence. He also translates anniyyah as concrete reality (gutaiteki jitsuzaisei), which is explained as “realisation” (al-taḥaqquq) in the
Persian paraphrase. Its translation is, in a sense, very close to that of *huwiyyah* (concrete actuality), but according to Izutsu’s understanding, *anniyyah* is represented in mind with existence of its corresponding entity in the extra-mental world, while *huwiyyah* is the most specified, or individualised Reality without adding any process of human consciousness. Both terms share the meaning of existential reality. They are explained either as realization (*taḥaqquq*) or as individualisation (*tashakhkhuṣ*), both of which are actually not realised but through their being existent. Therefore, any things that are realised (*mutahaqqiq*), or individualised (*mutashakhkhīṣ*) have reality in the extra-mental world. From his distinction between *anniyyah* and *huwiyyah*, namely, the former being added a process of human consciousness and the latter without it, we understand that *huwiyyah* refers to the level of reality much deeper, more primordial, and more intense in purity than *anniyyah*.

Some examples of *huwiyyah* in the Kitāb al-Mashā’ir make somewhat clear that the word refers to that which is a concrete, individual, existential reality with different grades and not in universals. When we consult Mullā Ṣadrā’s *magnus opus*, the *Asfār*, the meaning and its connotation may become clearer. It runs as follows:

> It is certain and clear for the true Gnostic philosophers that existence of everything is nothing but the reality of its *huwiyyah* connected to the Everlasting real Existence (*al-wujūd al-ḥaqq al-qayyūm*), namely, the [extra-mental] referent (*miṣdāq*) of the judgment of the things’ being existent. Corresponding statement to it is that their concrete *huwiyyah* (*huwiyyātuḥā al-‘ayniyyah*) depend on and are connected to, the divine Existence (*al-wujūd al-ilāhī*). We will demonstrate that the existential *huwiyyah* (*al-huwiyyāt al-wujūdiyyah*) are of the various degrees of the self-manifestations (*tajalliyyāt*) of His essence (*dhāt*) or of the radiances of His sublimity (*jalāl*) and grace (*jamāl*). Therefore, cognition of anything is nothing but observing that its existence and existentness is its being connected to the Necessary [existence].

Thus *huwiyyah* is connected to the Existence as a whole. In other words, Existence with its utmost purity, expressed by “Everlasting real Existence” and “divine Existence.” All of the things in the
phenomenal world are manifestation of the Reality of existence with the various degrees of intensity. And therefore, an individual thing is a particular mode or form of divine self-manifestation. An individual thing is realised due to the aspect of huwiyyah/\textit{wuji\text{\textdaggerright}d} in it, which is directly connected to the Existence in its full reality, “Everlasting real Existence.”

\textit{Huwiyyah} of a thing is the core of its reality, which is a partial manifestation, or a particular mode of self-manifestation, of the Reality in its full sense, namely, Existence in the utmost purity. In Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought, the ultimate reality is Existence. Therefore, \textit{huwiyyah}, an individual reality of a thing takes its reality from Existence. Insofar as he is concerned, \textit{huwiyyah} as individual reality may be interchangeable with the reality of existence (\textit{\textdaggerright}aqīqat al-\textit{wuji\text{\textdaggerright}d}). But \textit{wuji\text{\textdaggerright}d} may have different connotations from different points of view. Izutsu chose the word \textit{huwiyyah}, instead of \textit{wuji\text{\textdaggerright}d}, when he analysed an existent with a pair of terms: \textit{huwiyyah} and \textit{māhiyyah} in his \textit{Consciousness and Essence}. It is probably because the word \textit{huwiyyah} can unequivocally point to the aspect of individual reality.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{The Consciousness and Essence: Concluding Remarks}

Izutsu’s academic work after his return to Japan in 1979 seems to have been carried out around the pole of the “Oriental Philosophy.” Among his works in this period \textit{The Consciousness and Essence – A Quest for the Spiritual Orient} (1983) is probably the most important work that epitomises his philosophical thinking. It has the widest range of treatment of Asian philosophical traditions. In this book, in addition to Islam, he deals with such different traditions as Japanese, Chinese, Indian, and Jewish philosophy with their various schools of thought.

Izutsu has a basic philosophical assumption, on which he carries out his study on different traditions. Each philosophical tradition differently articulates or discriminates the reality. To articulate the non-articulated amorphous reality is to give it names or essences (quiddities). Here is the importance of the semantic function of language through which primordial amorphous reality turns to be a world with articulated sets of meanings. The function of the semantic articulation of language makes the meaningful world appear. In this
sense the point where the Reality is articulated or discriminated forms the boundary between the non-articulated and the articulated reality. The reality of existence can be seen as having non-articulated and articulated dimension, though it has possibly more dimensions in concrete examples of philosophical traditions. This multi-layered structure of the reality is closely related to that of human consciousness. It also has a multi-layered structure, which typically comprehends the deep layer in which mystics become aware of the unitive reality in the ecstatic state without separation of the subject and the object, and then the surface layer in which ordinary rational thinking functions.

On the basic understanding of the correspondence of the structure of the reality with that of consciousness, Izutsu paid attention to the modes of discrimination or articulation of the Reality, which might be called the process of the origination of essence from the side of the reality articulated through essences. The origination of essence takes place at the point where existents emerge in the surface layer of both reality and consciousness from their deep one. *The Consciousness and Essence* may be characterised as the work in which Izutsu intends a typology of articulation of the Reality, i.e., the origination of essence, in the Asian major philosophical traditions as a preparation for his further philosophical thinking. Mullā Ṣadrā’s inquiry of existence and essence seems to me to be in perfect harmony with Izutsu’s research interest that is summarised above.

The final words I would like to say are the following. Throughout his life Izutsu consistently kept his philosophical interest on the question of how human beings become aware of the amorphous Reality and articulate it into systems of meanings. The process of the articulation of the Reality that is tightly related to that of consciousness gives rise to its rich varieties in different traditions. Izutsu freely flew over the barriers of language in the sky of philosophical texts and undertook to clarify the root of existence covered with impenetrable appearance of quiddities. The backbone of his philosophical interest is certainly his personal finding and conviction of the importance of the unitive experience combined with rational thinking, which goes back to his experience in his younger days. From this viewpoint Izutsu’s magnificent works on Islam may be seen as case studies of his “Oriental Philosophy.”
Notes


2. Ibid., 24.

3. Ibid., 238.

4. Mysticism may have the following four features. (1) Seeking awareness of the ultimate reality (the absolute, God and others) on the dimension different from that of the ordinary world or the scientific world view; (2) Manifestation of the absolute in his awareness (religious experience of union); (3) Acquisition of a new horizon of meaning or value in the ordinary world or our everyday life; and (4) Various kinds of asceticism and meditation accompanied. See Hisao Miyamoto, “Shinpishugi [Mysticism],” *Iwanami Tetsugaku Shiso Jiten [Iwanami Dictionary of Philosophy and Thought]* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1998), 837-838.


7. Ibid., 65.


17. See ‘*Imad al-Hikma* (Persian paraphrase of the *Mashā‘ir*), 78-79.

18. Izutsu Toshihiko trans., *Sonzai Ninshiki no Michi*, 11. ‘*Imad al-Hikma*, 78. Izutsu also explains *huwiyyah* as *al-taḥaqquq al-khāriji* [See note (12)]. ‘*Ayniyyah* may be taken synonymous as *huwiyyah*.

19. In addition to those mentioned, we find the word in the *Mashā‘ir*, Sec. 60, 25; Izutsu Toshihiko trans., *Sonzai Ninshiki no Michi*, 84 and Sec. 21, 12: 32.


21. Izutsu finds the importance of *huwiyyah* in its logical exactness. The essence (in a wide sense, not quiddity) can be observed from two different perspectives: (1) the concrete individual reality and (2) the universal determinedness. Islamic philosophy has accorded the different terms to them respectively, i.e., *huwiyyah* to (1) and *māhiyyah* to (2). Izutsu extends the idea of the differentiation of the two terms in Islamic philosophy further to other philosophical traditions in order to clarify the issue of the origination of essence. See Izutsu, *Consciousness and Essence*, 39-42.