that these un-Islamic extravagance, vulgarity, and luxury provided the West with its images of Islam. The problem with the West is “many of the prejudices of writers and intellectuals which are rooted in the secular tradition are transferred to Islam... They see Islam as licentious (which it is not); they see it as misogynist (which it is not) and as plagued with a priesthood (there is no priesthood among Sunnis who make up 90% of Muslims)” (pp. 230-31). The Western audio-visual media help perpetuate these images by programmes slanted to suggest negative images of Muslims and Islam.

What is to be done? Akbar suggests that the West should rid itself of the colonial and racial dimensions of its attitudes towards Islam. The Western media should take a more balanced and more understanding position on Islam and resist the temptation to slip into old-style Orientalist prejudices. They should make Muslims more visible in their programmes. Most importantly, the West should address justly the problems, for instance, of the Bosnians and Kosovans in Europe, the Palestinians in the Middle East and Kashmiris in South Asia. On their part, Muslim societies need to recreate the sense of ‘sadl, (justice) and ihsan, compassion, to play a major role in the world. Akbar has written with feeling as well as critical concern. It should help bridge the gap between the Muslims and the West.


Reviewer: Khairol Anuar Masuan, Department of Psychology, International Islamic University Malaysia.
This edited book will be of great interest to those counselors and clinical psychologists who recognize the importance of religiosity in therapeutic relations. In conformity with the ethical guidelines issued by APA, this book stresses that religiosity of a client must be given serious consideration in therapeutic and clinical practices.

This book is divided into four parts. Part one discusses the conceptual, cultural and historical context of religion and provides an empirical overview of the domain of religion and applied psychology in America. This part is meant as a foundation upon which the subsequent chapters, focusing on clinical practice, are based. Part two deals with religion, mental health and clinical practices. Part three suggests ways to deal with religiously committed individuals. Part four makes a case for the inclusion of religion in clinical practice for it to ensure quality in clinical practice.

Part one provides a setting for religion and counseling psychology in America. Dean R. Hoge provides ample empirical data to make his case for the potency of religion in America. While there is a significant decrease in the number of those who embrace Protestantism and Judaism, there is, however, a corresponding increase in the number of those adhering to Catholicism. Likewise, there is a decrease in people’s support for religious institutional authority but there is an increase in people’s religiosity as a whole. In other words, people’s adherence to religion is independent of religious institutions. Hoge also notes that the American society is steadily giving recognition to Islam as future major religion. Wulff argues that psychologists do include religion in their practice. He however, found two major trends in the psychology of religion: the descriptive and the explanatory. The descriptive method appreciates a patient’s religious experience and includes religion as a factor in their practice. The explanatory method is reductionist in nature and interprets religious experience on the basis of several other variables. Thus, they consider religion to be of marginal effect on clinical practice. Apparently not all psychologists are comfortable with religion. One explanation for this is the tilt of psychology towards positivism and pure science. Wulff appears to be ambivalent. He apparently belongs to the school of explanatory psychology, but he also has a soft corner for descriptive psychology as it is gaining more appreciation from many psychologists. Chapters by Hendrika V. Kemp, Stanton L. Jones and Edward P. Shafranske provide enough literature to suggest that psychologists generally do include religious experience in their investigations. It is ironic, as Shafranske points out, that
psychologists are ill equipped to handle religion in their practice as religion is of lesser personal importance to the psychologists and that they received almost no education in the psychology of religion.

Part II, composed of eight chapters, considers religion as a clinical variable and suggests various approaches for clinical understanding and intervention. James Fowler’s presentation is interesting. He tries to understand religion in a pragmatic framework. He differentiates between religion and faith and argues that religion is a cumulative tradition that is embedded in culture, which later forms the faith consciousness. Faith is an inclusive part of an individual that is composed of beliefs, values, and meaning formations. Fowler says that faith development exists in tandem with developmental stages of an individual. In infancy it is primal faith, in early childhood it is intuitive-projective faith. In childhood it is mythic-literal faith, in adolescence, it is synthetic-conventional faith. In young adulthood it is individuative-reflexive faith, in early midlife it is a conjunctive faith and in midlife and beyond it is universalizing faith. Fowler makes an interesting observation that the primal faith that an infant experiences activates prepotentiated capacities. The concept of prepotentiated capacities, to some degree, is akin to the Islamic concept of “fitrah” which Fowler apparently is not aware of. Contrary to Fowler, Meissner looks at religion a la Freud, as a delusion. Therefore, he suggests that the psychotherapist should evaluate a patient’s religious delusion by using pathological belief system criteria like closed belief system, narrowed perspective toward others, and very rigid norms and values. Amazingly Meisner leaves belief psychology to theologians not to psychologists. Pathology of belief involves the cult psychology. It is clear from other contributors that pathology of belief should be treated with care and various therapies can be prescribed. The therapist should behave professionally. Galanter, through his clinical experiences, identified ten religious pathologies, namely, self-oriented display, religion as reward, scrupulosity, relinquishing responsibilities, ecstatic frenzy, persistent church-shopping, indiscriminate enthusiasm, hurtful love, moment-to-moment, and possession. On the other hand, mature adjustments characterized by five indices, namely, awareness of complexity, choice of religious affiliation, value-behavior congruence, recognition of shortcoming and respect of boundaries. Finally, clients can be classified as wrong direction, wrong road, and against the stream. These categorizations need to be tested before their utility could be determined.
Part three proposes various techniques in psychotherapy to treat religiously committed clients. Propst considers religious beliefs and practices as exemplars of cognitions and behaviours and hence suggests using cognitive behavior therapy to help clients through “cognitive reframing.” This would necessitate the use of Scripture, theological reflection, and religious imagery and forms of prayer for therapeutic purposes. Given Shafranske’s findings that the psychologists are devoid of education in the psychology of religion or clinical training respective of religious issues, this approach certainly would be a Herculean challenge for Western psychologists. Ana-Maria Rizzuto, however, suggests a psychoanalytic approach which is an extension of Freud’s “object relations” and Winnicott’s theory of God representations. Evidently, this is the most conflicting framework towards religion. Despite all her “cautions” and “sympathy to religious clients” this framework seems to be of limited value in helping religiously committed clients. What Rizzuto’s chapter shows is that the psychoanalytic approach has lost much of its charm and, under the religiously sensitive environment, it needs to be modified. Another problematic approach is the existential-humanistic approach. Mahrer, asserts that experiential psychotherapy is the only way to appreciate religion. Mahrer, defines religion as beliefs and spirituality as a “relationship” to a higher being. The aim of this approach is to ensure that a client turns out to be qualitatively a new person in which religiosity plays an auxiliary role. Transpersonal psychotherapy, advocated by Frances Vaughan and others, is different from common Western psychotherapy, although it may utilize traditional psychotherapeutic techniques, like free association and transference. It regards spiritual experiences as part of human real experience and is well worth applying to solve problems of mental health.

In the final part, Shafranske and Malony return to the central question posed in the introductory chapter concerning the influence of religion in mental health and psychological treatment. They argued that religion must be regarded as cultural fact and this requires a psychotherapist to consider an intersubjectivity dyadic relationship. To the extent of appearing apologetic, both authors maintain that religion is part of mental health variation. Therefore, a value based intervention must be considered when dealing with religious experiences.

Shafranske’s anthology is laudable because it makes a very convincing case for the inclusion of religion in psychological treatment and development of the individual. Yet, the contributors
to the volume considered religion as a secondary variable to be treated within the existing secular, positivistic framework. Paradoxically, this anthology implicitly calls for a critical assessment of the discipline of psychology as a champion in positivistic agenda within the social sciences. Inclusion of religion would render it difficult to operationalize human experiences and hence to study the problem from a purely quantitative perspective. Perhaps out of innocence, the authors in this volume are calling for a qualitative approach when human experiences give meaning to nomothetic data.


Reviewer: Dahnil Adnani, Department of English Language and Literature, International Islamic University Malaysia.

In the book under review, the author proposes to present Islamic and Muslim views of language, its systems and actions in situations of communication. This is to be done through presentations and discussions of the contributions of some Muslim scholars to the study of language and related studies. Specifically, the author proposes to present introductory readings in views and theories of language presented by some Muslim scholars and an in-depth reading of some of their selected works on language, social sciences and textual analysis. Specifically the author intends to draw attention to theoretical bases that are drawn from the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, and the Islamic heritage in general.

This presentation is deemed necessary in view of the need to bring to the attention of students of linguistics the existence, within the Islamic heritage, of a wealth of treasures of theories and views related to language. Muslim contributions in this area are not confined to the study of the various aspects of the linguistic system of the Arabic Language, but they include the integration of linguistics with Shari‘ah as well as with other branches of knowledge. This integration resulted in the development of advanced linguistic theories. The wealth of treasures available for studies do not only reflect serious intellectual endeavors and outstanding achievements, it should also encourage and stimulate regeneration of such endeavors.

In the past, Muslims contributed to the development of the linguistic tradition of the Greeks, enriching it in many ways. In the area of