Islamization of Knowledge: A Comparative Analysis of the Conceptions of Al-Attas and Al-Fārūqī

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Abstract: There has been a lot of discussion and debate on the issue of Islamization of Contemporary Knowledge among Muslim intellectuals. Two Muslim thinkers, namely al-Attas and al-Fārūqī were foremost in the attempt to conceptualise the problem of the Muslim Ummah and the issue of Islamization of knowledge as an epistemological and socio-political solution. This article aims to examine, compare and analyse the ideas of both scholars with respect to the various interpretations of the concept of Islamization of knowledge their definition of the concept, their philosophical framework, and their methodology for achieving the goals of Islamization. It aims at understanding the similarities and differences and the strengths and weaknesses of their conceptions, philosophical framework and methodology. This paper also explores the possibility of reconciliation between their ideas in the hope of further advancing the cause of Islamization of knowledge.

Many Muslim scholars concerned with the plight of the Muslim community (Ummah) have been deeply involved with the concept of Islamization of knowledge which gained momentum in the 80s, as a result of the global consciousness for the "resurgence of Islam" in the 70s and the momentous gathering of prominent scholars in the First World Conference on Muslim Education in Makkah in 1977. Nothing has engaged the Muslim scholars as deeply as this epistemological, social and political issue. Secularism and the great speed with which secularization has engulfed the Muslim world has stirred the Muslim intellectuals from their indifference and motivated them to act. Initially the discussion took
the form of an analytical inquiry in which the concepts involved such as Islamization and knowledge were defined and examined and the philosophical justification laid bare. The amount of discussion that was generated exceeded the expectations and soon a body of literature on the subject spanning the social, human and natural sciences were amassed.

Despite the massive discussion and literature, Muslim scholars have not struck a common chord among themselves. The traditional Muslim scholars contend that all knowledge is from Allah and is therefore already Islamized. Hence, there is no need to re-Islamize it. The secularist-modernists also agreed that there is no need to Islamize knowledge but for a different reason. They felt that the modern scientific knowledge is universal and culturally neutral and as such, it cannot be infused with the value system of any particular culture. For instance, Hoodbhoy and Abdus Salam totally reject the concept of Islamic sciences. In fact Hoodbhoy vehemently claims that the scientific views, say, of a Muslim scientist are not necessarily connected to his faith. Likewise, Abdus Salam strongly contends that "there is only one universal science, its problems and modalities are international and there is no such thing as Islamic science as just there is no Hindu science, no Jewish science, no Confucian science, nor Christian science." The position of these secularist-modernists is reinforced by another prominent scholar Fazlur Rahman, who argues that one cannot map knowledge; it is created by Allah (SWT) in the human mind. So Muslims should not get enamored over making maps and charts of how to go about creating Islamic knowledge.

The secularist-modernist’s views of the neutrality of science were debated and rebutted by contemporary Muslim scientists. Kirmani for instance, argues that in reality "there is nothing neutral or value free about modern science, its priorities, its emphases, its method and process and its worldview are dictated by the narrow concerns of Western society or culture." Sardar, a physicist, concurs with this view and argues that by divorcing ethics and morality from its epistemology, Western civilization has produced a body of knowledge that does not concern itself with the Islamic concerns of trusteeship of man, sacredness of nature, social justice, public interest and seeking the pleasure of Allah. He asserts further that this body of knowledge and its associated disciplines promote the interest and well being of Western civilization.

Their views are shared by Nasr, an eminent historian of science who contends that "Muslims must seek to create their own science by incorporating what is positive in modern science into a world view where
Several attempts have been made during the last decade to translate the concept of Islamization of knowledge into concrete forms such as the publication of monographs and textbooks, and in the establishment of institutions which offer related academic programmes to further the cause. Undoubtedly, two major scholars were in the forefront in this effort, namely S.M. Naquib al-Attas and the late Ismā'il R. al-Fārūqī. Both scholars have attempted to define the problem and the concept involved and translate their understanding of it through their works. They have even established institutions which are devoted to this mission—The International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) in Kuala Lumpur in 1987 and The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in Herndon, Virginia in 1981. Both scholars have a significant number of followers who have further expanded their efforts. Al-Fārūqī and his fellow scholars played a very significant role in mobilizing the Muslim intelligentsia, and in disseminating and popularizing the concept of Islamization of modern knowledge around the world.7

It is the aim of this article to examine, compare and analyse the ideas of both these scholars, hoping that it would lead to an understanding and tolerance among their adherents and interested scholars.8 The possibility of a reconciliation will also be explored. In this manner it is hoped that the effort in Islamization of contemporary knowledge would be further advanced.

The Concept of "Islamization of Knowledge"

The "Islamization of knowledge" movement has awakened the Muslim Ummah from their comfortable slumber. Had the term "Islamization" not been used, it would not have drawn the attention of many concerned Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and activists. Muslims desire to rediscover their own way of life after being held subservient for a long period under the dominant Western civilization. During this period, modern knowledge and Western culture that grew from the secular worldview have affected the very fabric and pillars of Muslims' faith. Muslims had to free themselves from this subjugation through an "epistemological revolution," which later came to be known as the Islamization of contemporary knowledge. Thus, this concept is not merely a slogan, a catchword, a symbol or an empty rhetoric without any significance. It bears a deep meaning especially to those who thought and conceptualized it.
There have been several phrases used to interpret this concept such as "Islamization of knowledge" and "Islamization of contemporary or present-day knowledge." The phrase "Islamization of knowledge" is to a certain extent misleading because it gives the connotation that all knowledge, including Islamic traditional knowledge based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah, which were developed by Muslim scholars over the millenium are not Islamic and therefore, needs to be Islamized. In the original phrase "Islamization of present-day or contemporary knowledge," the reference to modern Western knowledge. The process of Islamization excludes Islamic traditional knowledge because this knowledge has never detached God as the ultimate truth and reality and the origin of all knowledge. Secondly, it has gone through the process of Islamization by the early Muslim scholars. Islamic traditional knowledge has already integrated reason, intuition and revelation. It has also integrated belief, knowledge and good deed or value, to cater for both spiritual and material needs. Thus it has been fully integrated at the ontological, epistemological and axiological levels.

An overview of the works of these leading scholars reveals that they employed more specific phrase related to the concept. Al-Attas for instance, consistently emphasizes and uses the phrase "Islamization of contemporary knowledge" or the "Islamization of present-day knowledge" rather than just "Islamization of knowledge." Even al-Faruqi also used the phrase of "Islamization of modern knowledge" for his project although later, he tended to use the phrase "Islamization of disciplines." Therefore, whenever both of them employ the phrase "Islamization of knowledge" it actually refers to the "Islamization of contemporary or present-day knowledge." In other words it refers to knowledge based on Western secular worldview; knowledge as conceived and disseminated throughout the world by Western civilization. However, one can be misled by the title of al-Faruqi’s work Islamization of Knowledge: General Principles and Workplan into applying the phrase too broadly to include all kinds of knowledge and not just modern knowledge.

Al-Attas disagrees with the commonly used Arabic phrase aslamah or Islamiyatul ma‘rifah because he argues ma‘rifah is a priori knowledge (already there or innate and independent of experience), and it does not need to be Islamized. He prefers to use the Arabic phrase aslamat ‘ulūm al-mu‘āṣirah or Islamiyatul ‘ulūm al-mu‘āṣirah. But one may wish to argue that in the Muslim tradition al-ma‘rifah refers to secular knowledge
whereas *al-ilm* refers to religious knowledge. In this sense the former translation is correct because the knowledge that needs to be Islamized is Western secular knowledge and not the religious knowledge. However such distinction is doubtful because in the Islamic tradition both *ilm* and *ma'rifah* are sometimes used interchangeably and the distinction between secular and religious knowledge does not exist. Considering the sensitivity of Muslim community, some scholars prefer to use other terms in place of Islamization such as desecularization, dewesternization, desacralization, resacralization, and integration of knowledge holistic. Although there is some resemblance between these terms, they do not exactly have the same meaning as the term "Islamization." However, they all share the same essence, which is to bring all contemporary knowledge to be consistent with the *tawhīdic* paradigm.

The emergence of the idea of Islamization of contemporary knowledge stems from the basic premise that contemporary knowledge is neither value-free nor universal. Contemporary knowledge has undergone the process of secularization and westernization which is not only not in harmony but also endangers the Muslim faith. Al-Attas argues that "knowledge is not neutral and can indeed be infused with a nature and content which masquerades as knowledge."¹⁴ Al- Fārūqī points out,

> That the West claims that its social sciences are scientific because they are neutral; that they deliberately avoid human judgment and preference; that they treat the facts as facts and leave them to speak for themselves. This, we have seen, is a vain claim. For there is no theoretical perception of any fact without perception of its axiological nature and relations.¹⁵

He further argues that modern knowledge is not universal but is ethnocentric, in particular Eurocentric, and consequently it is not universally applicable.¹⁶ Since knowledge is not neutral, modern knowledge cannot be applied *in toto* to the Muslim community which has certain values and beliefs that differ from Western civilization. Contemporary secular Western sources and method of knowledge depend solely on the empirical, and rational means. It undervalues and most often neglects a major means of knowing, the scriptures. Western knowledge is not anchored in transcendental values nor is it related to religious faith. Western sciences are completely secularized. This process of secularization according to al- Fārūqī is due to “their hatred for the Christian Church and the false *magisterium* it had imposed for itself on all knowledge including that of nature.”¹⁷ This incompatibility and
incompleteness of Western methods of knowledge led Muslims to seek other alternatives that correspond with the Islamic worldview.

Al-Attas and al-Fārūqī's Philosophical Framework

Al-Attas espouses an Islamic metaphysics that is a synthesis of ideas traditionally upheld by Muslim theologians, philosophers and Sufis or ahl al-tasawwuf. In his metaphysics, the reality and concept of God forms the major thrust of the Islamic worldview and this has deep implications for the concept of knowledge and the concept, contents and methods of Islamic education. He asserts that "the knowledge about God is not merely propositional or cognitive but also more importantly experiential, based on one's intuitive experience and awareness of one's self and of the external world of creation." Al-Attas enunciates that "all knowledge of reality and of truth, and the projection of a true vision of the ultimate nature of things is originally derived through the medium of intuition." He affirms that "each metaphysical system, and thus also the worldview it projects, is not the same for every other civilization; it differs from one another in accordance with differences in the interpretation of what is taken to be ultimately true and real." Since the metaphysics of Islam and the worldview it projects differs from any other metaphysics, naturally the concept of knowledge, methodology and other affiliated matters derived from it will be fundamentally different. The idea of Islamization of modern knowledge within a certain metaphysical context can be meaningful due to this basic theoretical difference in metaphysics and the concept of knowledge. He affirms that the Western vision of reality and truth is not founded on revealed Truth but is established upon philosophical speculations which are characterized by uncertainty and relativity. Consequently, knowledge and sciences that emerge from it are also relative, uncertain, always subject to change and entail alterations in the worldview and the metaphysical system that project it.

According to al-Attas, Islam derives its sources from revelation, confirmed by religion and affirmed by intellectual and intuitive principles. The Islamic worldview is not to be understood as a dualism, for Islam affirms "only One Reality and Truth, and all Islamic values pertain ultimately to It alone, so that to the Muslim, individually and collectively, all endeavour towards change and development and progress and perfection is invariably determined by the world view that projects the vision of the One Reality and confirms the affirmation of the same Truth." Al-Attas supports his contention by mentioning some of the fundamental elements of Islam like "the nature of God, of Revelation
(i.e. the Qurʾān), His creation, man and the psychology of the human soul, knowledge, religion, freedom, values and virtues, of happiness” that remain original and unchanged. All of these elements along with the key terms and concepts have never changed because it was already perfected and "matured" since the beginning, it does not require any more progress or development.27

Al-Attas maintains that knowledge is not totally and purely the product of the human mind and experience but is also based on revealed truth. Knowledge continuously requires direction, supervision and confirmation from the revealed truth. This is so because the metaphysics of Islam is not only based upon reason and experience but also firmly grounded upon Revelation.28 Thus, Islamization of contemporary knowledge makes sense only within the framework of Islamic metaphysics. Al-Attas maintains that “Islam affirms the possibility of knowledge; that knowledge of the realities of things and their ultimate nature can be established with certainty by means of our external and internal senses and faculties, reason and intuition, and true reports of scientific or religious nature, transmitted by their authentic authorities.”29 He asserts that

Islam has never accepted, nor has ever been affected by ethical and epistemological relativism that made man the measure of all things, nor has it ever created the situations for the rise of skepticism, agnosticism, and subjectivism all of which in one way or another describe aspects of the secularizing process which have contributed to the birth of modernism and post-modernism.”30

For him the most appropriate epistemological definition of knowledge, “with reference to God as being its origin, is the arrival in the soul of the meaning of a thing or an object of knowledge; and with reference to the soul as being its interpreter, knowledge is the arrival of the soul at the meaning of thing or an object of knowledge.”31

Similar to al-Attas, al-Fārūqī considers tawḥīd as the basic and unifying principle of Islam upon which he elaborates and develops his conception and methodology of Islamization of modern knowledge. He believes tawḥīd as the core of the Islamic worldview. “Al-tawḥīd is a general view of reality, of truth, of the world, of space and time, of human history and destiny.”32 The object of knowledge is the pattern of nature, which is the work of God. Certainly God knows them since He is their Author; and the source of revelation. He gives man of His knowledge which is absolute and universal. Al-Fārūqī further elaborates
that “al-tawḥīd is the recognition that the truth is indeed knowable, that man is capable of reaching it. Skepticism, which denies this truth, is the opposite of al-tawḥīd.”

Al-Fārūqī maintains that God is the ultimate Cause of every event, and the final End of all that is; that He is the First and the Last.” The Unity of God means that He is the First Cause of everything.” Al-Fārūqī, like the mutakallimūn in the past, repudiated the philosophers who upon the influence of the Aristotelian god believed that after creation God left the cosmos to operate on its own, like a mechanical clock which does not need the clock maker to operate. He strongly argues that God is alive, active and continuously creating and destroying.

Al-Fārūqī also affirms that in Islam, nature is neither bad nor evil, rather it is viewed as a creation and a gift. As God’s creation it is purposive, perfect and orderly; and as a gift it is created for the benefit of man. The main purpose of creation is to facilitate and assist man to act in good deeds and attain happiness. The orderliness, purposiveness and goodness of nature are the distinctive features of the Islamic view of nature. Although nature has been created for human beings, it should not be abused or exploited and must be used in line with divine purpose. Therefore, nature as a divine manor, has the following ethical principles

First, nature is not man’s property but God’s. Second, the order of nature is subject to man, who can bring to it such changes as he wills. Third, in his use and enjoyment of nature, man is enjoined to act morally, for theft and cheating, coercion and monopoly, hoarding and exploitation, egotism and insensitivity to the needs of others, are unworthy of him as God’s vicegerent and are therefore strictly forbidden. Fourth, Islam demands of man to search for and understand the pattern of God in nature, not merely those which constitute the natural sciences, but equally those which constitute nature’s general order and beauty.

Although in the West natural science could only flourish and prosper after the process of secularization, this was not the case in Islam. To develop the sciences, Muslim scientists do not need to remove God from nature. Instead of being its enemy, God is the necessary condition of natural science. The Muslim is convinced beyond doubt that Allah (SWT) is the ultimate cause, the only Agent, by whose benevolent action all that is, and all that happens, happens.

For al-Fārūqī the gist of tawḥīd is central and comprises of five principles. First, duality that is, the notion that reality is of two generic
kinds, God and non-god; Creator and creature. Second is ideationality, that is, the relation between two orders of reality is ideational in nature. Third is teleology, that is, the cosmos is created for a purpose that is, serving the purpose of its Creator, and doing so out of design. Fourth, the capacity of man and malleability of nature. This is consistent with the idea that since everything is created for a purpose—the totality of being no less so—the realization of that purpose must be possible in space and time. Fifth and finally, responsibility and judgment, that is, man is responsible for his action. Moral obligation is impossible without responsibility or reckoning. Judgment or the consummation of responsibility, is the necessary condition of moral obligation, or moral imperativeness.40

In the introduction of his monograph, al-Fārūqī states the necessity of remoulding every discipline so as to incorporate the relevance of Islam, along a triple axis which constitutes ātā'īd. These three axes for Islamization of modern disciplines are:

1. The unity of knowledge, which will abolish the dichotomy between ṣaqlī [acquired] and naqīlī [revealed] sciences;
2. The unity of life, which will eradicate the distinction that some sciences are value-involved and some are value-free, thus making all the sciences as value loaded; and
3. The unity of history, which will remove the separation of knowledge into individual and social sciences, forming all disciplines that are at the same time humanistic and Ummatic.41

Definition of Islamization of Contemporary Knowledge

Al-Attas’ definition of Islamization of contemporary knowledge is the logical consequence and extension of his more general idea on Islamization, which seems to be a response to secularization or Westernization. Islamization is defined by al-Attas as “the liberation of man first from magical, mythological, animistic, national-cultural tradition, and then from secular control over his reason and his language.”42 The liberation of his spirit or soul bears direct influence upon man’s physical being. It brings about peace and harmony within himself, and also between him and other men and nature. In this sense, man has set his course towards the attainment of his original state, which is in harmony with the state of all being and existence (i.e., fitrah). It is also liberation from subservience to his physical demands which are inclined toward the secular and prone to injustice to his true self or soul, since
man has a tendency towards forgetfulness of his true nature, becoming ignorant of his true purpose and unjust to it.\textsuperscript{43}

Al-Attas further explains that Islamization involves firstly the Islamization of language since “language, thought and reason are closely interconnected and are indeed interdependent in projecting to man his world view or vision of reality. Thus the Islamization of language brings about the Islamization of thought and reason...”\textsuperscript{44} This fact is demonstrated by the Holy Qur'an itself when it was first revealed among the Arabs.\textsuperscript{45} He argues that the concept of Islamization in general will naturally lead to the Islamization of contemporary knowledge. This is so because thought, reason and language shape the form and kind of knowledge to be generated. Al-Attas explains the Islamization of contemporary knowledge as “the deliverance of knowledge from its interpretations based on secular ideology; and from meanings and expressions of the secular.”\textsuperscript{46} More specifically, he defines the Islamization of present-day knowledge as that,

\textit{...after} the isolation process referred to, the knowledge free of the [western] elements and key concepts isolated are then infused with the Islamic elements and key concepts which, in view of their fundamental nature as defining the fitrah, in fact imbue the knowledge with the quality of its natural function and purpose and thus makes it true knowledge.\textsuperscript{47}

Al-Attas clearly identifies and explains the foreign elements and key concepts that should be removed from the body of contemporary Western, secular knowledge as comprising:

1. The concept of dualism which encompasses their vision of reality and truth;
2. Their dualism of mind and body; their separation of intellectus and ratio, and their stress upon the validity of ratio; their methodological cleavage pertaining to rationalism and empiricism;
3. Their doctrine of humanism; the secular ideology;
4. Their concept of tragedy—mainly in literature.\textsuperscript{48}

On the other hand, al-Faruqi explains that Islamization of modern knowledge is recasting knowledge as Islam relates to it. He believes that to Islamize knowledge is “to redefine, and reorder the data, to rethink the reasoning and relating of the data, to reevaluate the conclusions, to reproject the goals and to do so in such a way as to make the disciplines enrich the vision and serve the cause of Islam.”\textsuperscript{49} Al-Faruqi asserts that
the task of Islamizing knowledge which in concrete term means to Islamize disciplines or, better, to produce university-level textbooks, is among the most difficult to realize because it involves recasting some twenty disciplines in accordance with Islamic visions. According to al-Fārūqī,

As disciplines, the humanities, the social sciences and natural sciences must be reconceived and rebuilt, given a new Islamic base and assigned new purposes consistent with Islam. Every discipline must be recast so as to embody the principles of Islam in its methodology, in its strategy, in what it regard as its data, its problems, its objectives, [and] its aspirations.

Al-Fārūqī defines Islamization of modern knowledge as integrating “the new knowledge into the corpus of the Islamic legacy by eliminating, amending, re-interpreting and adapting its components as the world view of Islam and its values dictate.”

Methodology of Islamization of Knowledge

With regard to the method of knowledge al-Attas upholds the tawḥīdic method in which there is a unity of all the empirical and the rational, the deductive and the inductive methods. He assures that Muslim scholars in the past had utilized several methods in their research. Al-Attas also considers “tafsīr and ta’wīl as valid methods of approach to knowledge and scientific methodology respecting our study and interpretation of the world of nature, and its significance in our conception of knowledge and education.” According to al-Attas “knowledge includes faith and belief (īmān)” and knowledge should be followed by action (ʿamāl) “for there is no useful knowledge without action, and there is no worthwhile action without knowledge.” Thus, the ultimate aim of pursuing knowledge in Islam is to be a good man and not a good citizen of a secular state.

For al-Attas the process of Islamization of contemporary knowledge consists of two major steps. First, isolation of Western elements and key concepts from existing body of knowledge and secondly, the infusion of Islamic elements and key concepts into it. He reiterates that “knowledge must be imbued with Islamic elements and key concepts after the foreign elements and key concepts have been isolated from its every branch.” The infiltration of four elements and key concepts namely secularism, dualism, humanism, and tragedy mostly occurred in the branch of knowledge referred to especially the human sciences. However, as al-Attas observes these alien concepts also penetrate into the natural, physical and applied sciences that are specifically concerned with the
interpretation of facts and formulation of theories. Therefore he suggests that a similar process of separation of the foreign elements and key concepts should be undertaken because interpretations of facts and formulations of theory are in the domain of the human science.63

Al-Attas explicitly indicates the components of the Islamic elements and key concepts that should be infused to the existing body of knowledge after the isolation of the Western elements and key concepts. These consist of the nature of man (insiin), of religion (din), of knowledge (iilm and marifah), of wisdom (hikmah), of justice (adl), of right action ('amal-adab)64 and the concept of university (kulliyyah-jami'ah).65 All of these ingredients should be linked to the concept of tawhid, shari'ah, sirah, Sunnah and tarikh. They should also be referred to knowledge of the religious sciences (ulam al-shari'ah) that should encompass positive elements of taṣawwuf, Islamic philosophy, cosmological doctrines, knowledge of Islamic ethics (akhlâq) and adab.

In addition to that they should be supplemented with knowledge of the Arabic language and of the Islamic world-view in general.66

Al-Attas cautions that Islamization of contemporary knowledge cannot be carried out simply by grafting or transplanting secular knowledge into Islamic sciences and principles. Such method will only yield perpetual conflicting results and meaningless efforts because the essence of foreign elements or disease remains in the body of knowledge that makes it impossible to recast it in the crucible of Islam. Furthermore transplanting between two distinct and contradictory elements and key concepts will produce neither secular knowledge nor Islamic one.67

The aim and objective of Islamization of contemporary knowledge is to protect Muslims from corrupted knowledge that misguides and leads to confusion and scepticism of Muslim minds. It is to produce true knowledge that can develop and mould Muslim minds and bring them to the proper acknowledgement and recognition of God. Knowledge, which is in conformity with its true purpose, fitrah and the Islamic worldview will bring salvation to man in this world and the hereafter. Islamization of contemporary knowledge will result in peace, goodness and justice and strengthening of the faith.

Al-Fârûqî’s methodology of Islamization of modern knowledge too has been developed and elaborated on the basis of tawhid. For the sake of Islamizing modern knowledge al-Fârûqî has laid down fundamental principles of the Islamic worldview that serve as the framework of
Islamic thought, methodology and way of life.\textsuperscript{68} Al-Fārūqī clearly stated the five elements that form the “First Principles of the Islamic Methodology.” They are: the Unity of Allah; the Unity of Creation; the Unity of Truth and the Unity of Knowledge; the Unity of Life; and the Unity of Humanity.\textsuperscript{69} Al-Fārūqī reasons that the Islamic traditional methodology is inadequate to Islamize modern knowledge due to the following shortcomings. First, it confined and restricted the meaning of important terms such as fiqh, faqih, ijtihad and mujtahid. For example, the term fiqh and its derivatives are confined only to the ʿulūm al-sharīʿah rather than knowledge of Islam as a whole as originally used by the Qurʾān. Second, the traditional method separates wahy (revelation) and ʿaql (reason). Third, it separates thought and action. Finally, the traditional method creates cultural and religious dualism, that is the bifurcation of the method into two paths, secular and religious. This dichotomy occurred particularly “in the period of decay—because of the estrangement between thought and action—the split into two: the way of the world and the way of God or virtue.”\textsuperscript{70} These shortcomings could have been avoided if the First Principles were adhered to.

Unlike al-Attas, Al-Fārūqī goes a step further in concretizing his ideas. He set up a workplan for the Islamization of modern knowledge which consists of five objectives, as follows:

1. To master the modern disciplines;
2. To master the Islamic legacy;
3. To establish the specific relevance of Islam to each area of modern knowledge;
4. To seek ways for creative synthesis between the legacy and modern knowledge;
5. To launch Islamic thought on the trajectory which leads it to fulfilment of the divine pattern of Allah.\textsuperscript{71}

In order to achieve the objectives of the workplan and the aims of Islamization of modern knowledge, al-Fārūqī further outlines twelve steps through which one must go through.\textsuperscript{72} They are:

1. Mastery of the modern disciplines;
2. Discipline survey;
3. Mastery of the Islamic legacy: Anthology;
4. Mastery of the Islamic legacy: The analysis;
5. Establishment of the specific relevance of Islam to the disciplines;
6. Critical assessment of the modern discipline: The state-of-the art;
7. Critical assessment of the Islamic legacy: The state-of-the art;
8. Survey of the Ummah’s major problems;
9. Survey of the problems of humankind;
10. Creative analyses and syntheses;
11. Recasting the disciplines under the framework of Islam: The university textbook;
12. Dissemination of Islamized knowledge.

The first two steps are to ensure Muslims’ understanding and mastery of the disciplines as they have developed in the West. The next two steps are to ensure that modern Muslim scholars who are not too familiar with the Islamic legacy due to the problem of access, will be provided an opportunity to access it from anthologies prepared by traditionally trained Muslim scholars who have access to it. The analysis of Islamic legacy is to better understand the Islamic vision with respect to the historical backgrounds, problems and issues involved. These first four steps should inform the scholars of the contributions of the Islamic legacy and its relevance to the areas studied by the disciplines and their general goals. The sixth step is the major step in the Islamization process where consistency with the First Principles and the five-fold unity are checked before the creative synthesis is reached in step ten.

Analysis of the Two Conceptions of Islamization of Knowledge

An analysis of al-Attas and al-Fārūqī’s philosophical frameworks shows that they both share the same assumptions about knowledge. Epistemologically, they believe that knowledge is not value-neutral and its attainment is possible. Their aims of knowledge (or true knowledge) are one and the same and their conceptions of knowledge are founded on Islamic metaphysical, ontological, epistemological and axiological principles, which have the concept of tawḥīd as their pivot. They both share the belief that God is the origin of all knowledge; that knowledge is the basis of faith and good deeds. In fact both of them agree that the root of the Ummah’s problems lies in the educational system and in particular, with the problem of existing knowledge and the solution to the problem lies in Islamization of existing knowledge, i.e. Islamization of contemporary or modern secular knowledge. They both share the same fundamental notion of Islamization of modern knowledge which is, that one needs to perform surgery to modern knowledge whereby the bad
elements and impurities are eliminated, amended, reinterpreted or adapted to be in accordance with the dictate of the Islamic worldview or values (al-Fārūqī’s terms) or isolated or removed and then infused with Islamic elements and key concepts (al-Attas’ terms).

However, there are a few fundamental differences between the two scholars in spite of apparent similarities. First, it is quite conspicuous that al-Attas as compared to al-Fārūqī has a more elaborate and convincing philosophical framework in which his metaphysical, epistemological and axiological principles are carefully drawn out in many of his works. He has delved deeply on the relationship between the nature of man, knowledge, faith and education. Another area of difference lies in their definition of Islamization of contemporary knowledge. Although the two definitions of al-Attas and al-Fārūqī bear a close resemblance with one another as articulated above, there is still a slight difference. Al-Attas’ definition is more coherent and more rooted in the theory of Islamization in general. He has been able to capture the essence of Islamization of individual personality as prior to Islamization of knowledge. In addition he has been able to establish more concretely the crucial need for Islamization of knowledge as a response to secularization. However, the driving force behind the needs for Islamization in al-Fārūqī seems to be the malaise of the Ummah, the dualistic educational systems and the failure of the traditional Islamic methodology to confront the modern reality.

Another major difference between them is that al-Attas confines the concept of Islamization of knowledge to only present day knowledge while al-Fārūqī believes that the process of Islamization should also include knowledge inherited from the Islamic legacy, as clearly stated in his work plan.

The greatest distinction between them is in their methodology for the process of Islamization of contemporary knowledge. For al-Attas his definition of Islamization of knowledge constitutes its methodology. The process consists of two steps, namely, the process of verification and the process of infusion. He does not outline the specific procedures probably because he feels that once an individual understands the Islamic worldview and its metaphysics, and internalizes its corresponding values, Islamization of contemporary knowledge would logically follow. The individual scholar would recognize and know the “alien” elements and concepts and thus would perform the necessary surgery required. Al-Fārūqī on the other hand, develops a methodology of Islamization of
modern knowledge based on the First Principles, which involves twelve steps. Al-Fārūqī's method involves a creative synthesis and the integration of the Western and Islamic concepts of knowledge that is expected to bring Islamic knowledge to the secular and modern knowledge to the Islamic system. But this according to Al-Attas would only be possible after isolating Western secular elements and key concepts. As he firmly espouses:

It will not do to accept present-day knowledge as it is, then hope to 'Islamize' it merely by 'grafting' or 'transplanting' into it Islamic sciences and principles; this method will but produce conflicting results not altogether beneficial nor desirable. Neither 'grafting 'nor 'transplant' can produce the desired result when the 'body' is already possessed by foreign elements and consumed in disease. The foreign elements and disease will have first to be drawn out and neutralized before the body of knowledge can be remolded in the crucible of Islam.

Integration “by Islamizing the secular system and modernizing the religious concept” will be problematic because the Islamic system is not required to be modernized in order to appear modern or be relevant with the modern world. Thus the two systems could be properly integrated only after isolating Western secular elements from the body of the modern knowledge.

Ashraf, a well-known scholar and the former editor of the Muslim Education Quarterly also criticizes al-FarOqI who “wants research to be done in Western and Eastern concepts, compare them according to the subjects concerned and strike a compromise wherever possible.” He argues that such a compromise is impossible because these concepts, are based on two distinct worldviews, and therefore both are completely different and even antagonistic. He insists on Muslim scholars not to begin with Western concept but with the Islamic one. Therefore the first task for them is to formulate the concept based on principles derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. He further argues that instead of Islamizing Western secular concepts Muslim scholars must first re-discover the Islamic concepts for each branch of knowledge “and then compare them with Western concepts, and then produce Islamic schools of thought in all branches of Human and Natural Sciences.” However contrary to Ashraf, Nasr posits that even in the present time such integration as proposed by al-FarOqI is not only possible but also necessary. He strongly argues that,
Muslim thinkers must integrate various forms of knowledge within themselves by not only accepting but also often criticizing and rejecting prevalent structures and premises of many of the sciences, and then write textbooks in which a particular subject whether it be anthropology or astronomy is treated from the Islamic point of view as was done by Ibn Sina or Ibn Khaldun centuries ago.  

Al-Faruqi’s effort to develop the concept of Islamization of modern knowledge based on the First Principles must be acknowledged. However when he attempted to translate it into a workplan, it became problematic and led to devastating criticism. Especially when he puts the mastery of modern knowledge as the first step prior to the mastery of the Islamic legacy and the establishment of the relevance of Islam to Western discipline. This was seen by Sardar like putting the cart before the horse. He felt that it is modern knowledge that needs to be made relevant to Islam. Islam is a priori relevant for all time.  

Al-Faruqi reveals the shortcomings of both the traditional and modern method and synthesizes the positive aspect of both in order to produce Islamized knowledge. Al-Attas however, would not agree with al-Faruqi’s step in the workplan which indicates that the latter already regarded the problem to also lie within the Islamic tradition. For al-Attas the problem lies in the Western modern secular knowledge. Therefore there is a dire need to Islamize modern knowledge but not Islamic traditional knowledge because the latter does not suffer from secularization. It has been Islamized, to a certain degree. In other words, al-Faruqi’s concept of Islamization of modern knowledge constitutes double movement theory in the sense that it requires reconstruction of both modern and Islamic traditional knowledge. He calls to identify the past Muslim legacy in order to establish its relevance to modern knowledge. Whereas al-Attas’s concept does not include the task of deconstruction of Islamic traditional knowledge. It requires only reconstruction of contemporary knowledge. Al-Attas does call for an examination of the Islamic legacy but not for establishing its relevance to modern knowledge, but rather to scrutinize and verify how far the modern knowledge has diverged or deviated from the tradition.  

The difference is also conspicuous between al-Faruqi and al-Attas, regarding the significance of ṭaṣawwuf (ṣūfism) in formulating basic concepts in all branches of knowledge. Al-Faruqi like other salafiyah (revivalist) reformists such as Muhammad Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, and Abul A‘lā Mawdūdi, berates ṭaṣawwuf and considers that “the spirituality
as manifested through taṣawwuf only leads to decay and hence should be regarded as not only as not essential but also harmful.” Al-Attas, on the other hand, considered taṣawwuf not only significant but necessary for formulation of the theory of knowledge and education. In fact al-Attas argues that “...no formulation of a philosophy of education and a philosophy of science along Islamic lines can be developed by ignoring the great contributions of the şüfi masters on the ultimate nature of reality.” Moreover the traditionalist considers taṣawwuf as a means of acquiring spiritual knowledge, and see spiritual knowledge as the chief means of saving people from the “clutches” of empiricism, pragmatism, materialism and narrow rationalism (which are the main sources of the modern scientific outlook), and thus the means of organising education from a comprehensive integrated point of view.

Like the other early revivalists, al-Faruqi also emphasized on the social transformation, against the şüfi ideal that stressed on individual change. He stressed on society and state rather than the individual. Al-Attas argues,

.... it's true that the Ummah and the Islamic state are paramount in Islam, but so is the individual Muslim, for how can the Ummah and the Islamic state be developed and established if individually Muslims have become confused and ignorant about Islam and its worldview and are no longer good Muslims? .... So, as a matter of correct strategy in our times and under the present circumstances, it is important to stress the individual in seeking a just solution to our problem rather than the society and the state.... The stressing of society and the state opens the door to secularism, secular ideology and secular education.

Al-Faruqi considered the salafiyyah movements as more successful than most current efforts because salafiyyah assaulted taṣawwuf, but failed because salafiyyah were not really well prepared to encounter the outside world. However, towards the end of his life al-Faruqi acknowledged that he is not opposed to the true form of taṣawwuf as affirmed by sharī'ah. Saleh Yaapar, one of his students recalls that once he asked al-Faruqi the reason for his hard stance toward taṣawwuf. Al-Faruqi said:

I am not against the genuine taṣawwuf sanctioned by the sharī'ah, which is to purify one’s self but the kind of taṣawwuf we see today in some circles is disastrous for our regeneration as an Ummah. Instead of disciplining man to obey Allah and observe the Sharī'ah, it has reopened doors to innovations in faith (bid'ah). The substitution of knowledge by
kashf (gnostic illumination) is a sure way to retrogression. This has happened in the past. Once the attitude of the mind toward reality changed and the subjective, esoteric inclination took over, all the sciences suffered.88

As far as the scientific methodology is concerned, Al-Attas also affirms intuition as a valid source and method. This concurs with Nasr who believes that “intuition and symbolic interpretation of sacred texts play important roles in acquiring scientific knowledge. This is in contrast to the methodology in modern sciences in which intuition is not recognised as a scientific method...”89 Al-Fāruqī on the other hand, strongly opposes traditional methodology particularly under the influence of taṣāwuf that subscribed to intuitive and esoteric methodology. For him this method leads to the alienation of waḥy (revelation) and ‘aql (reason) from each other. Despite these discrepancies the two scholars are in agreement that revelation is the basic source of knowledge.

These different views on taṣāwuf as a method and source of knowledge hold several implications for the concept of knowledge, education and Islamization of contemporary knowledge and Islamization in general. Al-Fāruqī’s concept on Islamization of modern knowledge for instance emphasises more on society or socio-economic and political changes. This is evident from his frequent use of the word Ummah in his works. In fact, the IIIT has been more dynamic in disseminating the idea of Islamization of Knowledge to the Muslim masses through its regular activities in the form of seminars, conferences and has set up several branches in different parts of the world. Al-Attas’ conception of Islamization of contemporary knowledge on the other hand, emphasises more on the individual rather than society because when he is talking of Islamization of contemporary knowledge he is dealing with individual development. For him changes in the individual will be followed by change in society. ISTAC is serious in its role of Islamizing knowledge and personalities and producing the Islamized scholars as evident from its publications. However there have been critics of some of its academic staff who do not portray the character of an Islamic personality.

In certain aspects, it is evident that both scholars have overly generalized the West as though composing of a particular school of thought, in particular the logical positivist. In fact Western scholars were reexamining their approaches and were gradually undergoing a philosophical transformation in its research methodology after being held captive by the obsession over behaviourism and other offsprings of
empiricism in their attempts to understand, explain and predict human behaviours. There was a positive trend towards qualitative methods which seek to understand and interpret human behaviours from the perspective of the doers and which attempts to move away from empirical methods. However philosophically, this approach is still based on a metaphysics which rejects transcendental values. Similarly in another development, Western scientific endeavor has begun to accept the notion of intuition since the 1960s when Kuhn demolished the logical empiricist view of sciences as an objective progression toward the truth. In fact, Kuhn established the structure of scientific revolutions in which science is seen to be heavily influenced by irrational ideas in breaking the deadlock when normal science can no longer explains and therefore leading to the discovery of novel ideas and the shift of scientific paradigms, say from the Newtonian to the Einsteinian.90

The Possibility of Reconciliation

This analysis has attempted to show that al-Attas and al-Fārūqī, two eminent Muslim scholars, share similar metaphysical principles with tawḥīd as the foundation of their ideas. They subscribe to similar epistemological and axiological principles which are grounded to their metaphysics. Apart from minor differences, their concepts and definitions of Islamization of contemporary knowledge bear very close resemblance. The only major fundamental difference between them lies in the process and methodology of Islamization of knowledge itself. Methodological difference is minor compared to differences in philosophical framework that forms the basis of their paradigm. Therefore, we are optimistic on the possibility of reconciliation and cooperation, assuming that the followers of both parties are able to take into account each other’s strengths and weaknesses, and are able to reach out to each other in honest, intellectual discourses. Al-Fārūqī’s methodology seems to contain a few logical inconsistencies. For example, his workplan is devoted to Islamizing “discipline” rather than knowledge as he had defined. Further, his attempt to make Islam relevant to modern knowledge does not follow the normal logical order of knowledge as classified by early Muslim scholars such as al-Ghazālī, who would place the naqliyyah knowledge higher in the hierarchy than the ‘aqliyyah knowledge. Al- Fārūqī has incidentally put the cart before the horse. Thus it has received much criticism from other Muslim scholars.

Already AbuSulayman, one of al-Fārūqī’s team members has provided an indispensable clarifications of the concept and significant
modifications were made in the second edition of the monograph which was published in 1988. Similarly, Safi, another scholar affiliated to the team has suggested the need to modify al-Faruqi’s workplan into something more realistic by reducing the twelve steps to three. Even Zein, a pupil of al-Faruqi thinks that Al-Attas is better qualified to speak on integrating theory, practice and spirituality, that is the synthesis of al-‘aql, al-jasad and al-rūḥ and believes that people in IIIT have not given ample attention to this.

With respect to the different emphasis on society and on the individual given by both scholars, one may attempt to bridge it by taking the middle path, that is a balanced or unified approach. Such an approach gives equal emphasis to both individual and societal change. In other words, the emphasis on societal change should not be at the expense of individual change and vice-versa. Similarly with respect to the scientific methodology, both intuition and reason should be accepted as sources and methods of knowledge as the case for experiment and revelation. Thus it implies that reason should not be employed at the expense of revelation and vice-versa, rather they should both be employed in a proper and balanced manner that complement each other. In this way al-Faruqi’s fears of an overemphasis of one at the cost of the other can be avoided. As he puts it “the Muslims’ exaggerated emphasis on the intuitive at the cost of reason opened the gates to corruption of the faith. ... Just as surely, the overemphasis of “reason” at the cost of intuitive faith corrupted the “life of reason” by reducing it to materialism, utilitarianism, mechanism and meaninglessness.”

Finally, it might be possible that al-Faruqi borrowed al-Attas’ idea and developed it further based upon his own understanding. Hence, the differences with al-Attas who regrets that al-Faruqi has done injustice to his original idea, making it more confusing and “depriving the Ummah of knowledge of the right direction.” Despite this, one has to acknowledge and appreciate the effort of al-Faruqi and IIIT in raising the awareness of Muslim intellectuals of their epistemological, social and political problems, disseminating this idea and advancing it. Therefore it is essential for Muslim intellectuals to understand fully the concept of Islamization of contemporary knowledge and work together towards its fulfilment. The differences in opinions and approaches within the boundary of Islam is a blessing from Allah and should be tolerated and appreciated, as long as the aims are noble and there is complete sincerity among those who attempt to realize those aims.
Notes

8. There have been a lot of debates between adherents of the two points of view, for the latest see M. Zainiy Uthman, "Islamization of Knowledge (IK) in IIIT and ISTAC is Not Only a Question of Perspective," al-Hikmah 3 (1999): 56-58.
9. S.M.N. Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism 2d ed. (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993), preface. He also reiterates this term several times in his weekly Saturday Night Lectures at ISTAC, for example the lecture held in March, 22, 1997, entitled "The Critique of Modernist Thought: The Case of Fazlur Rahman."
10. Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 155-156.
11. The closest meaning of the phrase used by both of them is “Islamization of modern Western secular knowledge”.
17. Ibid.
18. Wan Muhammad Nor further elaborates that “The metaphysics of Prof. Al-Attas, in fact all of his articulation about Islam are based on his interpretation of the Qur’ān, the Sunnah of the Prophet (SAW) and the teachings of the higher
şûfîs.” “An Outline of the Educational Philosophy and Methodology of Al-
20. Ibid.
21. S.M N. Al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam (Kuala Lumpur:
ISTAC, 1995), 177.
22. Ibid., ix.
23. Al-Attas states that “It is incorrect to refer to the worldview of Islam as
naţrat al Islâm li al-kawn. This is because, unlike what is conveyed by nazrah,
the world view of Islam is not based upon philosophical speculation formulated
mainly from observation of the data of sensible experience, of what is visible to
the eye; nor is it restricted to kawn, which is the world of sensible experience,
the world of created things.” For him the most appropriate term for Islamic
worldview is ru‘yat al-Islâm li al-wujûd. This so because it conveys “the vision
of reality and truth that appears before our minds revealing what existence is all
about; for it is the world of existence in its totality that Islam is projecting.”
(Prolegomen, 2).
25. Ibid., 4.
27. Ibid., 5.
28. According to Wan Muhammad Nor al-Attas affirms “the existence of God
and of his Unity can be arrived at through human reason and intellectual effort
but... the proper understanding concerning the attributes of God and His
relationship to His creatures and vice versa can only be known through religion.”
29. Ibid., 14; 217.
30. Ibid., 14.
31. Ibid., 17. Italics mine.
32. Isma‘î Rajî al-Fârûqi, Al-Tawhîd: Its Implications for Thought and Life (Kuala
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., 50.
35. Ibid., 51-52.
36. Ibid., 52.
37. Ibid., 50.
38. Ibid., 57-59.
39. Ibid.
40. Al-Fârûqi, Al-Tawhîd, 10-14.
41. Al-Fârûqi, Islamization of Knowledge, introduction.
42. Ibid., 41; 174.
43. Ibid, 42.
44. Ibid., 42-43.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., 43.
47. Ibid., 156.
48. Ibid., 45.
50. Ibid.
53. Al-Attas, Prolegomena, 3.
55. Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 141.
56. Ibid., 140.
57. Ibid., 141.
58. Al-Attas, The Concept of Education in Islam, 43.
59. The secular ideology that subscribes to the idea that everything is continuously changing, including values and also the rejection of spiritual truth, meaning, and nature. For a detailed and excellent exposition on secularism see al-Attas, Islam and Secularism.
60. This idea prescribes the dichotomy of looking at things, the way of looking at things and the method. For instance the dichotomy between objective and subjective, rational and empirical, deductive and inductive. Whereas Muslim believe that these things are not dual, not separate methods but they are a unity and they should be treated as one. Therefore, they did not see any conflict between the methods.
61. That is, the idea of the glorification of man. This idea regards man as determiner of everything and ultimately became 'like' the Master.
62. Al-Attas has elucidated that the concept of tragedy mostly occurred in Western art and literature: He further elaborates in his Prolegomena to the Metaphysics: “Tragedy not merely in its dramatic sense as a form of art, but more so in its philosophic sense as the drama of life enacted in the experience and consciousness of man when he rejects religion and turns away from God” (p. 99). According to al-Attas tragedy is a very peculiar characteristic of Christianity, in fact, they founded their religion on the structure of tragedy. It is the spirit of Western culture that is characterized by frustration and desperation of hope that all is well. “The pursuit of knowledge, [which is] like the struggle to push the stone from the plains up to the mountain where at the top it is destined to roll down again, becomes a kind of serious game, never ceasing, as if to distract the soul from the tragedy of un-attainment.” Therefore it is not surprising if in Western culture tragedy is exalted and considered as one of the most excellent and highest value in the drama of human existence (Islam and Secularism, 130–131). These four elements are found in every branch of learning.
63. Ibid., 43.
64. Ibid., 156.
65. Ibid., 153.
66. For a detailed elaboration see, Islam and Secularism, 156-157.
67. Ibid., 56.
68. Ibid., 33.
69. Al- Fāruqī, Islamization of Knowledge, 22-23.
70. Ibid., 32-38.
71. Ibid., 28.
72. Ismā'īl Rajī al-Fāruqī asserts that “to realize these objectives, a number of steps must be taken. Their logical order defines the order of priority belonging to each step.” See, “Islamization of Knowledge,” 54.
73. For details of each step, see Islamization of Knowledge, 39-46.
75. S. A. Ashraf, New Horizons in Muslim Education (Cambridge: The Islamic Academy, 1985), 34-35.
76. Al-Farūqī, Islamization of Knowledge, 10.
77. Al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, 156.
79. Ibid., 35-36.
80. Ashraf, "Introduction," New Horizons in Muslim Education.
87. Al-Fāruqī, Al-Tawḥīd, viii.
91. The three steps encompasses: (1) Mastery of substantive knowledge, (2) Mastery of methodological knowledge, and (3) Production of textbooks. See


95. Ibid., 389 and through personal communication.