The Theory of Context (Ikhtilāf al-Ḥālayn) and the Problem of Ikhtilāf in Islamic Legal Theory

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Abstract: As the various parts of the Qurʾān were revealed in many different situations, and the orders contained in the sunnah also belong to various periods, a closer examination of the relationship between these “contexts” and the problem of ikhtilāf is necessary. Since these two foremost sources of Islamic law have come to Muslims in the language, grammar and morphology of the Arab, the study of this neglected area in Arabic and its relation to legal studies is likely to be of use to those interested in legal conflicts as well as in linguistics. The concern of this paper is the theory of context as it was conceived of by Imām al-Shafīʿī (d.204 H) in the second/third century of Ḥijrah before it was developed by Western scholars/linguists in the early twentieth century.

The topic in question is somewhat unwieldy in scope. To make the discussion more specific, this paper shall concern itself with only two works of al-Shafīʿī (d. 204 H), namely, al-Risālah and Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth. This limitation is justified by the fact that al-Shafīʿī, the founder of a school of law, is not only knowledgeable in Arabic language but is even regarded as ḥujjah fi al-lughah.¹ This is not surprising since he is purported to have spent a substantial period of time in the desert outside Makkah, with the tribe of Hudhayl, to

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acquire pure Arabic, for which this tribe was renowned. He is said to have, consequently, excelled in the language, poetry, tales (akhbâr) and history of the Arabs (ayyâm al-‘Arab) and was able to compose poetry himself. The other reason for selecting al-Shâfi‘î’s works for this study is that both al-Risâlah and Ikhtilâf al-Hadîth are considered to be among the earliest available literature that subject both the issues, namely, al-ḥâl and ikhtilâf, to considerable discussion. In both, one can see how the knowledge of different situations and contexts was utilised by al-Shâfi‘î for solving legal conflicts. The application of this theory to actual cases in Islamic law can be easily observed in this kind of writing because the author of these valuable treatises was particularly concerned with the task of removing legal conflicts by any possible means; ikhtilâf al-ḥâlayn, as we shall see, was one of these means.

Mention should be made at the outset that Islamic legal theory or usûl al-fiqh encompassed a system of thought expanding over several fields. In other words, it does not concern itself solely with the law proper but also with questions of linguistics, logic, methodology, custom, epistemology and theology. The knowledge of tafsîr is part of its subject matter, particularly the knowledge of the occasions of the revelation (asbâb al-nuzûl). As far as asbâb al-nuzûl is concerned, early exegists were well-versed with this knowledge by which they were able to distinguish between verses revealed in Makkah and those revealed after the Prophet’s migration to Medina. Not only that, they were able to understand well the conditions in which a particular verse was revealed. Clearly, this knowledge is closely related to the theory of context, i.e., the contexts in which particular Qur’anic verses were revealed. The significance of this knowledge to the accurate understanding of legal texts or otherwise, i.e., ikhtilâf, has been summarised by al-Shâfibî in the following statement, “… ignorance about the occasions of the revelation would raise doubt and uncertainty and would lead the texts to general interpretations that are liable to discrepancy. This (ignorance) would lead to ikhtilâf.”

An example of this can be illustrated through the seeming conflict of two Qur’anic verses: al-Mursalât: 35 and al-Zumar: 31. The first reads as, “This is a day wherein they will speak not,” while the second verse reads, “Then lo! on the Day of Resurrection, before your Lord ye will dispute.” Citing these two verses, Ibn Qutaybah has explained that each verse has its own situation (i.e., mawqîf). On the Day of Judgement, humans will initially be permitted to argue before Allah; subsequently, the ability of man to speak shall be removed. Instead, the
hands and the legs will be given the ability to bear witness to the actual practices of their owners. Viewed from these different contexts, these two verses are no longer contradictory.

This interesting study of the occasions of the revelation later influenced the study of the hadith of the Prophet. The scholars of hadith started to investigate the circumstances in which a particular tradition was situated. The concern given to this study is most evident from the huge amount of literature available on this aspect of the study of hadith known as asbāb wurūd al-hadīth. This knowledge is important because although the language of the sunnah is comprehensible, there is no guarantee that the jurist will necessarily understand the precise meaning and intent of the text’s language. A word or a sentence may have a meaning that seems intelligible to the interpreter, but, it may be asked, is it the meaning intended by the Prophet? To ensure that the real meaning and intent are understood, scholars have emphasised the necessity of exploring the reasons and circumstances of the occurrence of ahādīth (asbāb al-wurūd) as well as asbāb al-nuzūl vis-a-vis the Qur’ān. This is so because a statement may have several meanings, or one meaning, but pronounced, for a specific situation. Only when the circumstances in which a particular verse occurred are known, is it possible to come closer to the real purpose and intended meaning of revealed texts.

As far as hadith is concerned in establishing laws, there is no doubt that a large number of the ahādīth are seemingly contradictory. There are many ways used by jurists to reconcile the conflict. One such method involved inquiring closely into the meaning of each statement. If the jurists were clever enough in their exegetical techniques, they could remove the contradiction by showing that far from containing any conflict of meaning, these ahādīth complement each other. The same was true of the context by which these conflicts could be harmonised when argued from their proper contexts. In other words, in certain cases, the contradiction could be removed by pointing out the different circumstances in which the contradictory instructions were given. In short, one can say that ikhtilāf al-hālayn is a philological analysis of apparently contradictory words or phrases in order to reconcile them through closer examination of circumstances surrounding the revelation or the occurrence of the legal text in question.

Before we proceed to examine the contribution of Imām al-Shāfi‘ī to the theory of context, it would seem appropriate to sketch briefly the position of "context" in linguistic study. Generally speaking, Muslims
tend to credit al-Jāhiz (160-255 H) with having been the first scholar to discuss this theory. In the West, however, the credit is given to J. R. Firth, an English scholar in the early twentieth century who founded the London School of Linguistics.

The discussion of al-maqām in Arabic has occupied a significant place in both ʿilm al-maʿānī and ʿilm al-lughah. In the former, the issue of maqām is commonly discussed under the science of al-balāghah, i.e., rhetoric, while in the latter, the discussion of maqām can be easily found in ʿilm al-dīlālah. Muslim linguists have treated the theory of al-maqām as well as its relation to both rhetoric and language studies respectively. Modern scholars have done intensive study on the theory of maqām and have been able to demonstrate its value through the "theory of context" (nazarīyyat al-siyāq). In the middle of this century, the London School was widely recognised as the "context-oriented school." Firth, has succeeded in formulating a comprehensive theory of meaning (al-maṣna) from the theory of context (maqām). His formulations were one of the best achievements related to the study of the meaning because they were concerned with aspects of linguistics as well as of society, i.e., sociolinguistics.

As far as context is concerned, it has been classified into two parts, namely, internal and external contexts. These are also known as linguistic context and circumstantial context respectively. The former studies all the features pertinent to the structure of the wording, ranging from phonetic problems to the question of dilālah. The meaning given by this study is called by the usūlis the "apparent meaning of the text," free from any consideration of external elements which might alter its simple and literal meaning. The latter, on the other hand, is more concerned with circumstantial conditions and surrounding social characteristics. It lays down general guidance on how language can be presented to suit different circumstances, conditions and contexts. In other words, the information that people have about their language is their "linguistic competence." The information about the situation and about the people involved in a particular discourse is "contextual knowledge." Both linguistic competence and contextual knowledge are necessary for understanding a speech or a text. For example, it is highly likely that a speech directed to educated people would be different from one directed to illiterate people. The same applies to similarly differing contexts and circumstances. In short, understanding the context of a speech or text is necessary because it is the only means capable of determining the
correct meaning of a word or a phrase open to many possible interpretations, let alone contradictions. As such, theoretically, it can also play an important role in interpreting the text of both the Qurʾān and the sunnah with which we are particularly concerned in this article.

As far as al-Shāfiʿī is concerned, he was not only aware of this theory, but also repeatedly argued on the basis of difference of ḥāl (ikhtilāf al-ḥālayn), a term used by al-Shāfiʿī to illustrate two different circumstances surrounding the occurrence of two conflicting traditions. In his Risālah, al-Shāfiʿī treats the issue of context at a number of places. The first occurs in his discussion of the significance of Arabic language to legal studies. He starts by saying, “It is obligatory upon every Muslim to learn the Arab tongue to the utmost of his power in order (to be able) to profess through it that ‘there is no God at all but Allah and Muhammad is His servant and Apostle’ and to recite in it (i.e., the Arabic tongue) the Book of God…” He continues to say that "(the reason) I began by explaining why the Qurʾān was communicated in the Arab tongue rather than in another, is that no one who understands clearly the total meanings of the (legal) knowledge of the Book of God could be ignorant of the extensiveness of that tongue (ittṣāʿuḥā) and of the various meanings (of its words) (just as) there are various words for a meaning. Doubts which occur to one who is ignorant (of the Arab tongue) will disappear from him who knows it.” He further expresses his concern by saying:

Allah has addressed His Book to the Arabs in their tongue in accordance with the meanings known to them. Included (in the words) ‘in accordance with the meanings they know’ was the extensiveness of their tongue. It is (Allah’s) divine disposition to express something, part of which is literally general which is intended to be obviously general with the very first part (of the phrase) not needing the second. (Something) ‘literally general’ means that (the concept of) the particular is included in the general; that is, indicated by some (of the words) expressed. Also, ‘literally general’ includes what is particular, with the word literally recognised in its contexts to mean what is not literally so. Knowledge of all of this is to be found either in the beginning of what is said or in the middle or at the end.

In other words, ‘āmm is of three categories, namely, ‘āmm which is absolutely general, ‘āmm which is meant to imply khāṣ and ‘āmm which is not accompanied by any indication to show either the first or
the second meaning in which case the solution should be sought from the proper "context."

In another instance i.e., in a section on category of declaration of meaning which is clarified by the context (al-ṣinīf alladhī yubayyīn siyāqūhū maʿnāhū), al-Shāfīʿī quotes two Qur'anic verses to illustrate the significance of context in understanding these two verses. However, only one example will be highlighted, which is, “Ask them (O Muḥammad) of the township that was by the sea, how they did break the sabbath, how their big fish came unto them visibly upon their sabbath day and on a day when they did not keep sabbath they came not unto them. Thus did We try them for that they were evil.” (7:163) Al-Shafici points out that God, glorious be His praise, initially makes the town bordering the sea the subject of the verse, but when He states, "how did they break the Sabbath," He obviously refers to the people of the town, since the town (itself) can neither transgress nor deviate from the sabbath or other (matters). Thus, by "transgression," (God) means the people of the town whom He tried for their violation (of the sabbath).

Al-Shafici moves to discuss the issue of context under a section on defects (ʿīlal) in the traditions and this time, the issue of context is explained by him in relation to the problem of ikhtilāf. Not only that, he also analyses the factors which, in his opinion, cause the apparent contradiction between the two aḥādīth. Such contradiction, according to al-Shafici, arises principally from misquotation and imperfect transmission in the process of which the actual context surrounding the aḥādīth is altered. To illustrate the original idea of al-Shafici, we have little choice but to quote the exact expression of al-Shafici as recorded in al-Risālah. Al-Shafici replied to the questions put forward by his interlocutor by saying:

As to contradictory traditions, where no indications exist to specify which is the abrogating and the abrogated, they are all in accord with one another, and contradiction does not really exist among them. (For) the Apostle of God, being an Arab by tongue and by country, may have laid down a general rule intended to be general and another general rule intended to be particular, as I have already pointed out in my discussion on the Book of God and the sunnah of His apostle. Or a certain question may have been asked to which he gave a certain concise answer, leading some of the transmitters to relate the tradition in detail and others in brief, rendering the meaning of the tradition partly clear and partly vague. Or (it may happen) that the transmitter of a certain tradition related the answer
he heard (from the Prophet) without knowing what the question had been, for (had he known) the question, he would have understood the answer clearly from the reasoning on which the answer was based. The Prophet may have likewise laid down a sunnah covering a particular situation and another covering a different one, but some of those who (related what they) heard failed to distinguish between the two differing situations for which he had laid down the sunnah. And he may have laid down a sunnah-transmitted by one authority—on a certain matter in conformity with the text (of the Qur’ān) and another—transmitted by another authority—in one sense in agreement with the text but in another contradictory to it—owing to changes in the contexts. Hence the transmission by one authority appeared to some people as contradictory to the other while (in reality) no contradiction existed at all.23

In the Risālah, al-Shāfi‘ī produces one example of how contradiction between ahādīth can be removed by observing the context in which contradictory ahādīth were pronounced by the Prophet. The majority of the Companions reported that both ribā al-faḍl and ribā al-nasī‘ah were prohibited by the Prophet. In contrast, Ibn ‘Abbās, one of the leading Companions, reported that Usāmah b. Zayd told him that the Prophet said, “al-riba (usury) is to be found only in transactions with al-nasī‘ah (deferred payment).” Ibn ‘Abbās concluded from this report that the prohibition of ribā was limited and confined to ribā al-nasī‘ah alone. Al-Shāfi‘ī removes this conflict by saying that Usāmah—the transmitter who heard directly from the Prophet—may have heard someone ask the Prophet about the (exchange of) two different kinds of property such as gold for silver, dates for wheat, or any other different property the transfer of which was to take place immediately, to which the Prophet replied: “Ribā is in nasī‘ah.” Or he (Usāmah) may have been absent when the question was asked, but heard only the answer. He therefore related the answer without knowing the question. Or he may have guessed what the question was, for there is nothing in Usāmah’s tradition which is not in agreement with the other tradition.24

After elaborating on the issue of context at some length in his Risālah, al-Shāfi‘ī evinces a deep understanding of it in his later treatise, namely, Ikhtilāf al-Hadith.25 In this work, the theory was used extensively by him to remove contradiction between two ahādīth pertaining to legal issues. The use of theory in this manner and not in another is reasonable, since, as mentioned earlier, al-Shāfi‘ī was more concerned with legal studies—particularly legal conflicts—rather than
with pure linguistic application. At this stage, it is appropriate to examine closely the effort made by al-Shāfi‘ī to reconcile contradictory hadith through an appreciation of different contexts, with which this article is particularly concerned.

Ikhilāf al-Hadīth and indeed, all the writings of al-Shāfi‘ī, contain discussions with other jurists and scholars, particularly the representatives of both ‘Irāqi and Medinese schools. In other words, al-Shāfi‘ī’s work is concerned with a comparative study of legal opinions. It is only natural in this kind of study that al-Shāfi‘ī must clarify his opinion as well as the basis of his opinion. Not only that, in case of conflict, he must also identify the cause of conflict and, as a distinguished jurist, must be able to respond to it either by making two contradictory opinions jointly applied i.e., reconciled, or by making one of them prevail (tarjih). In this extensive juristic discussion, al-Shāfi‘ī has recourse to the theory of context, particularly in his effort to reconcile two contradictory traditions.

We need to see the actual application of the theory of al-ḥāl (i.e., context), as it was called by al-Shāfi‘ī himself, to certain cases disputed among jurists. The idea behind this is to see how this theory was used to solve legal conflicts. We shall begin with the problem of the prohibition of seeking marriage with a woman already engaged to another person. This is taken from the hadith, “Do not ask for a woman in marriage when another Muslim has already done so.” There is another hadith that records the conversation between the Prophet (SAS) and Fāṭimah bt. Qays; both Muḥāwiyyah and Abū Jahm had offered marriage to Fāṭimah. This report clearly reveals that Fāṭimah was asked concurrently by two persons to which the Prophet (SAS) showed no objection. Dealing with this apparent conflict, al-Shāfi‘ī argued that the two hadith should not be regarded as contradictory because each of them occurred in a special context. The Prophet’s tradition allows for a man to seek a woman’s hand in marriage, despite her having been asked by others, as long as she has not yet expressed her choice of suitor to her guardian. Al-Shāfi‘ī infers this from the fact that the Prophet had sought Usāmah b. Zayd as a suitor for Fātimah even though other men had already sought her hand in marriage. Therefore, the possibility of seeking marriage with a woman is not precluded by other men’s prior and, as yet, unaccepted proposals.

However, al-Shāfi‘ī points out, “someone may argue the basis of this conclusion.” Here, al-Shāfi‘ī presents his theory of context vis-a-vis the above-mentioned conflict. He says that the transmitter of the first
hadīth might have been present on a particular occasion in which the Prophet (SAS) was questioned about a man who had asked for a woman in marriage. The woman agreed to the proposal and to this effect, the Prophet declared that “Do not ask for a woman in marriage when another Muslim has already done so.” The problem arose when the transmitter (who was present at the time) narrated the saying of the Prophet without mentioning its context.32 Or, al-Shāfi‘ī argues, the transmitter missed the question and heard only the answer of the Prophet (SAS).33 Whatever the reason, the implication of this hadīth would be contradictory to the hadīth of Faṭīmah, in which the Prophet (SAS) said nothing about the attitude of either Mu‘āwiyyah or ‘Abū Jahm because Faṭīmah had not yet given her consent to either. Instead she consulted the Prophet on her marriage, and he suggested that she marry Usāmah b. Zayd.34 If this was not allowed, the Prophet (SAS) would certainly not have proposed that Faṭīmah should marry Usāmah b. Zayd. In other words, the prohibition was directed to a certain condition and not to another. Thus, it is the context of both ahādīth that guarantees a sound understanding of the two, and, accordingly, resolves whatever conflict seemed inherent.

Throughout his Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth, al-Shāfi‘ī uses the same line of "linguistic" argument to remove many other apparent conflicts. Among other cases is the disagreement over the problem of fasting while travelling.35 Al-Shāfi‘ī is of the view that that to break the fast while travelling is merely a rukḥsah i.e., concession. Other jurists view the problem differently.36 They contend that fasting on a journey is disapproved of, since the Prophet (SAS) clearly stated that no good is accredited to those who fast while travelling,37 and in another report, the Prophet (SAS) is reported to have named travellers who fasted on one of his expeditions as wrong-doers (‘uṣāṭ).38 Al-Shāfi‘ī once again resorts to the theory of context in order to resolve this apparent contradiction. He produces many ahādīth which support his thesis that fasting while travelling is optional and not blameworthy. He cites Ibn ‘Abbās’s report that the Prophet (SAS) left for Makkah in Ramaḍān during the Year of Conquest, and fasted until he reached al-Kadīd. He then broke the fast as did everyone else. Al-Shāfi‘ī argues that if fasting was condemned, the Prophet (SAS) would have abstained from fasting from the very beginning.39 He also cites a report from Anas b. Mālik who said, “We once travelled with the Prophet in Ramaḍān, and those who were fasting did not find fault with those who were not, and those who were not fasting did not find fault with those who were.”40
With reference to *ahādīth* produced by his disputants, al-Shāfi‘ī was successful in his reconciliation of their *ahādīth* with those reported by himself. He says that every *hadīth* should be viewed within its context. It is true that the Prophet (SAS) blamed those who fasted while travelling, but this, al-Shāfi‘ī argues, was due to their unwillingness to break the fast even though they were in extreme hardship; as reported in another *hadīth*, “a group of people kept on fasting even though the Prophet had broken his fast.” The blame, therefore, was directed only to those who put themselves in great difficulty by not breaking fast while travelling.

From these two cases, we can conclude that al-Shāfi‘ī was well-versed in the "contexts" of legal traditions. This finding can perhaps stimulate further study of the contribution of al-Shāfi‘ī to the theory of context as known both to the contemporary Muslim and to Western linguists. Although the theory was still in rudimentary form in al-Shāfi‘ī’s time, this should not prevent us from appreciating the latter’s contribution and paying tribute to him for his systematic endeavour to resolve contradictions between traditions by means of employing the theory of context. *Al-ḥāl* in al-Shāfi‘ī’s thought might correspond to what is widely known among the Arabs as *likulli maqām maqāl* and *likulli insān khitāb*. The idea of *al-ḥāl* was further elaborated by later Muslim scholars of various disciplines, such as al-Jāhiz and Ibn Qutaybah (d. 276H), according to their own particular interests. It should also be made clear that al-Shāfi‘ī, being a jurist, was less concerned with the linguistic application of the theory of context than with the problem of solving legal conflicts. Thus, whatever difference exists on this point between al-Shāfi‘ī and linguists is merely a difference of emphasis and of how the theory of context was used; in al-Shāfi‘ī’s case, it was used in relation to legal matters, not for the purpose of linguistic analysis.

Nevertheless, we have to note that to appreciate the contribution of al-Shāfi‘ī to this theory is one thing, to agree with the legal rulings he derived thereby is another. Our position in this article is concerned exclusively with the former i.e., to examine the meaning of "*al-ḥāl*" and its relation to the problem of *ikhtilāf*, and how it was deployed by al-Shāfi‘ī to solve legal conflicts. As far as al-Shāfi‘ī is concerned, we can see that he was aware of the fact that ḥāl or rather context, affects meaning and that a speech, a conversation, and especially the language of legal documents, should not be studied without reference to the context in which it is situated.
In other words, al-Shāfi‘ī argues for the need to examine all the relevant traditions in the light of their proper contexts, if possible, when extracting a legal ruling from them. It is often the case, as he observes, that one or more traditions explicate on that is vague. If an adequate understanding of one part depends on another part, and given the fact that the traditions were pronounced in many different contexts, a part may therefore introduce, confirm, clarify or complement another. In this context, it seems to the writer that context as perceived by al-Shāfi‘ī, is nothing other than a qarīnah; that is, any part of speech must, in order to be properly construed, be viewed within its own context. A context would be further determined by qarīnah (verbal or circumstantial evidence). The knowledge of this aspect of the Arabic language (as well as other languages) is important to study and, accordingly, to appreciate the meaning and intent of legal texts satisfactorily.

Also, we must conclude that to conduct a thorough inquiry in this field of study would be an onerous task. To deal adequately with the topic, even when restricting inquiry to Islamic legal theory literature, would require a comprehensive survey. It is equally important to note that the contribution of al-Shāfi‘ī in relating Arabic language to law studies proper influenced al-Shāhibī, an eighth century scholar, to follow the same methodology, giving more emphasis to Arabic the language and its characteristics in order to adequately understand the sharī‘ah, and particularly to tackle the problem of legal conflict.

Notes

3. Ibid.
4. See Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, al-Mankhūl min Ta‘līqāt al-Uṣūl,

5. ʿAbdāb al-nuzūl which constitutes an important part of the field of Qur’ānic exegesis, hold significant relationship with Islamic legal theory. It helps to discover and identify the rationale (al-ḥikmah al-baʾithah) behind divine legislation of legal rulings. See Badr al-Dīn Muhammad al-Zarkashi, al-Burhān fi ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān, ed. M. Abu al-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Beirut: Māshūrāt al-Maktabah al-ʿAṣrīyyah, n.d.) 1:22ff.


12. Ḥamūdah, Dirāsah al-Maʿnā, 213

13. Langendoen, The London School of Linguistics, 37. Firth speaks about phonological, lexical, morphological, syntactic and situational context. The expression of "Good day!" when uttered as a greeting, according to him, would be completely unrelated to the same "Good day!" when uttered as a farewell, and so on, for countless such instances.


16. Al-Šāfiʿī, al-Risālah, ed. ʿAḥmad Muhammad Shākir (Cairo: Sharikah Maktahāh wa Matbaʿāh al-Bābī al-Halbī wa Awlādūhū, 1940), 214, 239 (paras. 570, 670); Al-Šāfiʿī, Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth, printed in volume eight of
al-Umm, ed. by Muhammad Zuhrī al-Najjār (Cairo: Maktabah al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyyah. 1961) 8: 545.


18. Ibid., 50 (para, 169).
19. Ibid., 51-52 (para, 173).
20. Ibid., 62-64 (paras, 208-213).
21. Ibid., 62-63 (paras, 208-209).
22. Ibid., 210 ff. (para, 596ff).
23. Ibid., 213-214 (paras, 574-579).
24. Ibid., 278-281 (paras, 763-773).


27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., al-Shāfi‘ī wrote, “...nahyu ‘anhā fi ḥāl dānā ḫāl.”
29. Ibid. In this regard, al-Shāfi‘ī quoted the incident of Khansa’ bint. Khidhām to give further support to his argument.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 546.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. 545.
35. Ibid., 492-494.
36. Ibid., 492.
37. Ibid., 492-493.
38. Ibid., 493.
39. Ibid.,492.
40. Ibid., 493.
41. Ibid., 494.
42. Ibid., 493
43. See e.g. Langendoen, The London School of Linguistics; Ḥamūdah, Dirāsat al-Ma’nā ‘ind al-Uṣūliyyin.


47. Muḥammad Khalid Mas‘ūd, *Islamic Legal Philosophy* (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1977), 238.